Article 412.
No entry in a civil register shall be changed or and excavations which he may deem proper, without
corrected, without a judicial order. (n)
 detriment to servitudes and subject to special
TITLE II OWNERSHIP
CHAPTER 1 Ownership in General
Article 427. Ownership may be exercised over things or rights.
(n)
 Nevertheless, when the discovery is made on the property of
Article 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a
thing, without other limitations than those established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the holder and
possessor of the thing in order to recover it. (348a)
Article 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the
right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal
thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his
property. (n)
Article 430. Every owner may enclose or fence his land or
tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or
by any other means without detriment to servitudes
constituted thereon. (388)
Article 431. The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in
such manner as to injure the rights of a third person. (n)
Article 432. The owner of a thing has no right to prohibit the
interference of another with the same, if the interference is
necessary to avert an imminent danger and the threatened
damage, compared to the damage arising to the owner from
the interference, is much greater. The owner may demand
from the person benefited indemnity for the damage to him.
Article 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises
disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must
resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property. (n)
Article 434. In an action to recover, the property must be
identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title
and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim. (n)
Article 435. No person shall be deprived of his property except
by competent authority and for public use and always upon
payment of just compensation.
Should this requirement be not first complied with, the courts
shall protect and, in a proper case, restore the owner in his
possession. (349a)
Article 436. When any property is condemned or seized by
competent authority in the interest of health, safety or
security, the owner thereof shall not be entitled to
compensation, unless he can show that such condemnation or
seizure is unjustified. (n) ARTICLE 437. The owner of a parcel of
land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and
he can construct thereon any works or make any plantations
laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable
requirements of aerial navigation. (350a)

Article 438. Hidden treasure belongs to the owner of the land,
building, or other property on which it is found.
another, or of the State or any of its subdivisions, and by
chance, one- half thereof shall be allowed to the finder. If the
finder is a trespasser, he shall not be entitled to any share of
the treasure.
If the things found be of interest to science or the arts, the
State may acquire them at their just price, which shall be
divided in conformity with the rule stated. (351a)
Article 439. By treasure is understood, for legal purposes, any
hidden and unknown deposit of money, jewelry, or other
precious objects, the lawful ownership of which does not
appear. (352)
CHAPTER 2 Right of Accession
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 440. The ownership of property gives the right by
accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is
incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.
(353)
SECTION 1
Right of Accession with Respect to What is
Produced by Property
Article 441. To the owner belongs:
(1) The natural fruits;
(2) The industrial fruits;
(3) The civil fruits. (354)
Article 442. Natural fruits are the spontaneous products of the
soil, and the young and other products of animals.
Industrial fruits are those produced by lands of any kind
through cultivation or labor.
Civil fruits are the rents of buildings, the price of leases of lands
and other property and the amount of perpetual or life
annuities or other similar income. (355a)
Article 443. He who receives the fruits has the obligation to
pay the expenses made by a third person in their production,
gathering, and preservation. (356)
Article 444. Only such as are manifest or born are considered
as natural or industrial fruits.
With respect to animals, it is
sufficient that they are in the womb of the mother, although
unborn. (357)
SECTION 2
Right of Accession with Respect to Immovable
Property
Article 445. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of
another and the improvements or repairs made thereon,
belong to the owner of the land, subject to the provisions of
the following articles. (358)
Article 446. All works, sowing, and planting are presumed
made by the owner and at his expense, unless the contrary is
proved. (359)
Article 447. The owner of the land who makes thereon,
personally or through another, plantings, constructions or
works with the materials of another, shall pay their value; and,
if he acted in bad faith, he shall also be obliged to the
reparation of damages. The owner of the materials shall have
the right to remove them only in case he can do so without
injury to the work constructed, or without the plantings,
constructions or works being destroyed. However, if the
landowner acted in bad faith, the owner of the materials may
remove them in any event, with a right to be indemnified for
damages. (360a)
Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been
built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548,
or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of
the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However,
the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its
value is considerably more than that of the building or trees.
In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the
land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of
the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the
terms thereof. (361a)
Article 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the
land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without
right to indemnity. (362)
Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been
built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition
of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in
order to replace things in their former condition at the expense
of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel
the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the
sower the proper rent. (363a)
Article 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the
landowner is entitled to damages from the builder, planter or
sower. (n)
Article 452. The builder, planter or sower in bad faith is
entitled to reimbursement for the necessary expenses of
preservation of the land. (n)
Article 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the
person who built, planted or sowed on the land of another, but
also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one
and the other shall be the same as though both had acted in
good faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the
landowner whenever the act was done with his knowledge and
without opposition on his part. (364a)
Article 454. When the landowner acted in bad faith and the
builder, planter or sower proceeded in good faith, the
provisions of article 447 shall apply. (n)
Article 455. If the materials, plants or seeds belong to a third
person who has not acted in bad faith, the owner of the land
shall answer subsidiarily for their value and only in the event
that the one who made use of them has no property with
which to pay.
This provision shall not apply if the owner makes use of the
right granted by article 450. If the owner of the materials,
plants or seeds has been paid by the builder, planter or sower,
the latter may demand from the landowner the value of the
materials and labor. (365a)
Article 456. In the cases regulated in the preceding articles,
good faith does not necessarily exclude negligence, which
gives right to damages under article 2176. (n)
Article 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from
the effects of the current of the waters. (336)
Article 458. The owners of estates adjoining ponds or lagoons
do not acquire the land left dry by the natural decrease of the
waters, or lose that inundated by them in extraordinary floods.
(367)
Article 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent
segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land
and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land to
which the segregated portion belonged retains the ownership
of it, provided that he removes the same within two years.
(368a)
Article 460. Trees uprooted and carried away by the current of
the waters belong to the owner of the land upon which they
may be cast, if the owners do not claim them within six months.
If such owners claim them, they shall pay the expenses
incurred in gathering them or putting them in a safe place.
(369a)
Article 461. River beds which are abandoned through the
natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to
the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in
proportion to the area lost. However, the owners of the lands
adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same
by paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the
value of the area occupied by the new bed. (370a)
Article 462. Whenever a river, changing its course by natural
causes, opens a new bed through a private estate, this bed
shall become of public dominion. (372a)
Article 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into
branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the
owner of the land retains his ownership. He also retains it if a
portion of land is separated from the estate by the current.
Article 464. Islands which may be formed on the seas within
the jurisdiction of the Philippines, on lakes, and on navigable
or floatable rivers belong to the State. (371a)
Article 465. Islands which through successive accumulation of
alluvial deposits are formed in non-navigable and non-
floatable rivers, belong to the owners of the margins or banks
nearest to each of them, or to the owners of both margins if
the island is in the middle of the river, in which case it shall be
divided longitudinally in halves. If a single island thus formed
be more distant from one margin than from the other, the
owner of the nearer margin shall be the sole owner thereof.
87.III.1 - Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.
87.III.9. Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
RULE 60 - Replevin
SECTION 1. Application. — A party praying for the recovery of
possession of personal property may, at the commencement
of the action or at any time before answer, apply for an order
for the delivery of such property to him, in the manner
hereinafter provided. (1a)
SECTION 2. Affidavit and bond. — The applicant must show by
his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally
knows the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed,
particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession
thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse
party, alleging the cause of detention thereof according to the
best of his knowledge, information, and belief;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax
assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of
execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed
under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such
seizure or custody; and
(d) The actual market value of the property.
The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse
party in double the value of the property as stated in the
affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to the
adverse party if such return be adjudged, and for the payment
to the adverse party of such sum as he may recover from the
applicant in the action. (2a)
SECTION3. Order. — Upon the filing of such affidavit and
approval of the bond, the court shall issue an order and the
corresponding writ of replevin describing the personal
property alleged to be wrongfully detained and requiring the
sheriff forthwith to take such property into his custody. (3a)
SECTION 4. Duty of the sheriff . — Upon receiving such order,
the sheriff must serve a copy thereof on the adverse party,
together with a copy of the application, affidavit and bond, and
must forthwith take the property, if it be in the possession of
the adverse party, or his agent, and retain it in his custody. If
the property or any part thereof be concealed in a building or
enclosure, the sheriff must demand its delivery, and if it be not
delivered, he must cause the building or enclosure to be
broken open and take the property into his possession. After
the sheriff has taken possession of the property as herein
provided, he must keep it in a secure place and shall be
responsible for its delivery to the party entitled thereto upon
receiving his fees and necessary expenses for taking and
keeping the same. (4a)
SECTION 5. Return of property. — If the adverse party objects
to the sufficiency of the applicant’s bond, or of the surety or
sureties thereon, he cannot immediately require the return of
the property; but if he does not so object, he may, at any time
before the delivery of the property to the applicant, require
the return thereof, by filing with the court where the action is
pending a bond executed to the applicant, in double the value
of the property as stated in the applicant’s affidavit, for the
delivery thereof to the applicant, if such delivery be adjudged,
and for the payment of such sum to him as may be recovered
against the adverse party, and by serving a copy of such bond
on the applicant. (5a)
SECTION 6. Disposition of property by sheriff. — If within five
(5) days after the taking of the property by the sheriff, the
adverse party does not object to the sufficiency of the bond,
or of the surety or sureties thereon; or if the adverse party so
objects and the court affirms its approval of the applicant’s
bond or approves a new bond, or if the adverse party requires
the return of the property but his bond is objected to and
found insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved
bond, the property shall be delivered to the applicant. If for
any reason the property is not delivered to the applicant, the
sheriff must return it to the adverse party.
SECTION 7. Proceedings where property claimed by third
person. — If the property taken is claimed by any other than
the party against whom the writ of replevin had been issued
or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title
thereto, or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds
therefor, and serves such affidavit upon the sheriff while the
latter has possession of the property and a copy thereof upon
the applicant, the sheriff shall not be bound to keep the
property under replevin or deliver it to the applicant unless the
applicant or his agent, on demand of said sheriff, shall file a
bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party
claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property under
replevin as provided in section 2 hereof. In case of
disagreement as to such value, the court shall determine the
same. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the
property may be enforced against the bond unless the action
therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from
the date of the filing of said bond.
The sheriff shall not be liable for damages, for the taking or
keeping of such property, to any such third-party claimant if
such bond shall be filed. Nothing herein contained shall
prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his
claim to the property, or prevent the applicant from claiming
damages against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or
plainly spurious claim, in the same or a separate action.
When the writ of replevin is issued in favor of the Republic of
the Philippines, or any officer duly representing it, the filing of
such bond shall not be required, and in case the sheriff is sued
for damages as a result of the replevin, he shall be represented
by the Solicitor General, and if held liable therefor, the actual
damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the National
Treasurer out of the funds to be appropriated for the purpose.
(7a)
SECTION 8. Return of papers. — The sheriff must file the order,
with his proceedings indorsed thereon, with the court within
ten (10) days after taking the property mentioned therein. (8a)
SECTION 9. Judgment. — After a trial of the issues, the court
shall determine who has the right of possession to and the
value of the property and shall render judgment in the
alternative for the delivery thereof to the party entitled to the
same, or for its value in case delivery cannot be made, and also
for such damages as either party may prove, with costs. (9a)
SECTION 10. Judgment to include recovery against sureties. —
The amount, if any, to be awarded to any party upon any bond
filed in accordance with the provisions of this rule, shall be
claimed, ascertained, and granted under the same procedure
as prescribed in section 20 of Rule 57. (10a)
RULE 70
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
SECTION1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. —
Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a
person deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession
of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by
virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee,
or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person
or person unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or
any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution
of such possession, together with damages and costs. (1a)
SECTION 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand.
— Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall
be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the
conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee,
or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person
found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the
premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to
comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or
five (5) days in the case of buildings.
SECTION 3. Summary procedure. — Except in cases covered by
the agricultural tenancy laws or when the law otherwise
expressly provides, all actions for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer, irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid
rentals sought to be recovered, shall be governed by the
summary procedure hereunder provided. (n)
SECTION 4. Pleadings allowed. — The only pleadings allowed
to be filed are the complaint, compulsory counterclaim and
cross-claim pleaded in the answer, and the answers thereto.
All pleadings shall be verified. (3a, RSP)
SECTION 5. Action on complaint. — The court may, from an
examination of the allegations in the complaint and such
evidence as may be attached thereto, dismiss the case outright
on any of the grounds for the dismissal of a civil action which
are apparent therein. If no ground for dismissal is found, it shall
forthwith issue summons. (n)
SECTION 6. Answer. — Within ten (10) days from service of
summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint
and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and
negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed
waived, except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims not asserted in
the answer shall be considered barred. The answer to
counterclaims or cross-claims shall be served and filed within
ten (10) days from service of the answer in which they are
pleaded. (5, RSP)
SECTION 7. Effect of failure on answer. — Should the
defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period
above provided, the court motu proprio or on motion of the
plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the
facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for
therein. The court may in its discretion reduce the amount of
damages and attorney’s fees claimed for being excessive or
otherwise unconscionable, without prejudice to the
applicability of section 3 (c), Rule 9 if there are two or more
defendants. (6, RSP)
SECTION 8. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. —
Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a
preliminary conference shall be held. The provisions of Rule 18
on pre-trial shall be applicable to the preliminary conference
unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary
conference shall be cause for the dismissal of his complaint.
The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall
be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance
with the next preceding section. All cross-claims shall be
dismissed. (7, RSP)
If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall
likewise be entitled to judgment in accordance with the next
preceding section. This procedure shall not apply where one of
two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action
who had pleaded a common defense shall appear at the
preliminary conference.
No postponement of the preliminary conference shall be
granted except for highly meritorious grounds and without
prejudice to such sanctions as the court in the exercise of
sound discretion may impose on the movant. (n)
SECTION 9. Record of preliminary conference. — Within five (5)
days after the termination of the preliminary conference, the
court shall issue an order stating the matters taken up therein,
including but not limited to:
1. Whether the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement,
and if so, the terms thereof;
2. The stipulations or admissions entered into by the parties;
3. Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations
and admissions made by the parties, judgment may be
rendered without the need of further proceedings, in which
event the judgment shall be rendered within thirty (30) days
from issuance of the order;
4. A clear specification of material facts which remain
controverted; and
5. Such other matters intended to expedite the disposition of
the case. (8, RSP)
SECTION10. Submission of affidavits and position papers. —
Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in
the next preceding section, the parties shall submit the
affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual
issues defined in the order, together with their position papers
setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them. (9, RSP)
chanroblespublishingcompany
SECTION 11. Period for rendition of judgment. — Within thirty
(30) days after receipt of the affidavits and position papers, or
the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall
render judgment.
However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain
material facts, it may, during the said period, issue an order
specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties
to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters
within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall
be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the
last affidavit or the expiration of the period for filing the same.
The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just to
gain time for the rendition of the judgment. (n)
SECTION 12. Referral for conciliation. — Cases requiring
referral for conciliation, where there is no showing of
compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without
prejudice, and may be revived only after that requirement
shall have been complied with. (18a, RSP)
chanroblespublishingcompany
SECTION 13. Prohibited pleadings and motions. — The
following petitions, motions, or pleadings shall not be allowed:
1. Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply
with section 12;
2. Motion for a bill particulars; 

3. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a
judgment, or for reopening of trial;
4. Petition for relief from judgment; 

5. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings,
affidavits or any other paper;
6. Memoranda;
7. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any
interlocutory order issued by the court;
8. Motion to declare the defendant in default; 

9. Dilatory motions for postponement; 

10. Reply; 

11. Third-party complaints; 

12. Interventions. (19a, RSP) 

SECTION 14. Affidavits. — The affidavits required to be
submitted under this Rule shall state only facts of direct
personal knowledge of the affiants which are admissible in
evidence, and shall show their competence to testify to the
matters stated therein. chanroblespublishingcompany
A violation of this requirement may subject the party or the
counsel who submits the same to disciplinary action, and shall
be cause to expunge the inadmissible affidavit or portion
thereof from the record. (20, RSP)
SECTION 15. Preliminary injunction. — The court may grant
preliminary injunction, in accordance with the provisions of
Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from committing
further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff.
A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry
or unlawful detainer may, within five (5) days from the filing of
the complaint, present a motion in the action for forcible entry
or unlawful detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The
court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the
filing thereof.
SECTION 16. Resolving defense of ownership. — When the
defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and
the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall
be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. (4a)
SECTION 17. Judgment. — If after trial the court finds that the
allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment
in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the
sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises,
attorney’s fees and costs. If it finds that said allegations are not
true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his
costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render
judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and
award costs as justice requires. (6a)
SECTION 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not
conclusive in actions involving title or ownership. — The
judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer
shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and in
no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or
building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the
same parties respecting title to the land or building.
The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the
appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same
on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the
court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs may be
submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial
Court. (7a)
SECTION 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay
same. — If judgment is rendered against the defendant,
execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an
appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay
execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the
Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to
pay the rents, damages, and accruing down to the time of the
judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of
the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of
rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as
determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In
the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional
Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of
the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate
determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before
the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The
supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial
Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial
Court to which the action is appealed.
All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited
with said court or authorized government depositary bank,
and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal,
unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in
the absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion
to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise.
Should the defendant fail to make the payments above
prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the
appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and
upon proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the
judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of
possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal
taking its course until the final disposition thereof on the
merits.
After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any
money paid to the court by the defendant for purposes of the
stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance with the
provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. In any
case wherein it appears that the defendant has been deprived
of the lawful possession of land or building pending the appeal
by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the Municipal
Trial Court damages for such deprivation of possession and
restoration of possession may be allowed the defendant in the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court disposing of the appeal.
(8a)
SECTION 20. Preliminary mandatory injunction in case of
appeal. — Upon motion of the plaintiff, within ten (10) days
from the perfection of the appeal to the Regional Trial Court,
the latter may issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
to restore the plaintiff in possession if the court is satisfied that
the defendant’s appeal is frivolous or dilatory, or that the
appeal of the plaintiff is prima facie meritorious.
SECTION 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of
Appeals or Supreme Court. — The judgment of the Regional
Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately
executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be
taken therefrom. (10a)
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. IBRAHIM
G.R. No. 168732. June 29, 2007 | Azcuna, J | Montano, J
FACTS
- In Nov 1994, respondent Lucman Ibrahim in his
peronal capacity and in behalf of his co-heirs filed an
action against NAPOCOR for recovery of possession of
land and damages before the RTC of Lanao del Sur
- Ibrahim and his co-heirs claimed that they were
owners of several parcels of land in Survey Plan FP
2278 consisting of 70,000 sqm divided into three lots
consisting of 31,894, 14,915, and 23,191 square
meters each respectively.
- In 1978, NAPOCOR, through alleged staleth and
without respondent’s knowledge and prior consent
took possession of the sub-terrain area of their lands
and constructed underground tunnels. They only
discovered these tunnels in 1992 when NAPOCOR
issued a memorandum through the Acting Assistant
Project Manager
o The tunnels were used for siphoning water
of Lake Lanao
- In Sept 1992, respondent Omar Maruhom requested
Marawi City Water District for a permit to construct a
motorized deep well in Lot 3 but this was denied
because the construction would cause danger to lives
and property
- In Oct 1992, the respondents demanded that
NAPOCOR pay damages and vacate the sub-terrain
portion but they refused to do so. The respondents
also claimed that the construction of the tunnels
endangered lives and properties because Marami City
 lies in area of local volcanic and tectonic activity. This
caused the respondents sleepless nights, serious
anxiety and shock
- NAPOCOR countered stating that: (1) there was no
cause of action because they seek possession of sub-
terrain area when they were never in possession of
the area, (2) no cause of action because there was no
proof that they were owners of the property, and (3)
the tunnels are a government project for the benefit
of all and private lands are subjet to easement as may
be necessary for the same
- The RTC ordered NAPOCOR to pay fair market value
of the said lands at P1000.00 or total of
P48,005,000.00 but not to dismantle the tunnels.
Respondents were entitled to moral damages and
atty’s fees
- The CA removed the award for moral damages and
reduced the amount of rentals and atty’s fees.
ISSUE
1. W/N respondents are entitled to just compensation
- YES.
- Just compensation is based upon who owns the sub-
terrain area occupied by the petitioner
- NAPOCOR maintains that respondents do not own
the sub-terrain area where the underground tunnels
were constructed because even if the respondents
owned the property, their right to the subsoil does
not extend to what is beyond necessary to enable
them to obtain all utility and convenience that such
property can normally give.
o Maruhom could still build his residence on
the property.
o The tunnel was 115 meters below the
property
- The SC disagrees.
- The sub-terrain area belongs to the respondents.
o Based on Art. 437: The owner of a parcel of
land is the owner of its surface and of
everything under it, and he can construct
thereon any works or make any plantations
and excavations which he may deem proper,
without detriment to servitudes and subject
to special laws and ordinances. He cannot
complain of the reasonable requirements of
aerial navigation.
- Ownership of the land extends from the surface as
well as to the subsoilunder it
- Republic v. CA: rights over lands are indivisible and
require a definitive and categorical classification
o There is no conflict of interest between
owners of the surface rights and the owners
of sub-surface rights
o The owner of a land has rights not only to the
surface but also everything underneath and
the airspace above it up to a reasonable
height.
- If lands are reclassified as mineral lands, registered
landowners may be ousted of ownership and
possession but they are entitled to just compensation
based on Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation
proceedings
- The respondents could have actually built their deep
well. They still had a legal interest in the sub-terrain
portion. The fact that they could not use their land to
build a deep well because of the tunnels shows that
they were deprived of its full use and enjoyment.
- In accordance with the principle that no person shall
be deprived of their property except by competent
authority and for public use and always upon
payment of just compensation, the Court has
previously held that if the government takes property
without expropriation and devotes the property to
public use, after many years, the property owner may
demand payment of just compensation in the event
restoration of possession is neither convenient nor
feasible
- NAPOCOR also argues that this constitutes an
easement upon property but the manner in which
this was done violated the respondent’s due process
rights – no notice and indemnity nor did it go through
proper expropriation proceeedings.
2. W/N the computation for just compensation is
correct
- YES
- The basis should be the value of the property at the
time of the taking in 1978
- There is taking when owners are deprived or disposed
of their property, not momentary and for public use
as to oust the owner of beneficial enjoyment thereof
- The taking was not under the color of legal authority
- NAPOCOR argued that they believed the property
formed part of public dominion
- In the Mangondato case:
o General rule: determine just compensation
value of the property as of the date of the
filing of the complaint
o Exception: time of taking
- To allow petitioner to use the date it constructed the
tunnels would be grossly unfair: (1) did it with no legal
authority, no notification (2) improvements did not
increase the value of the land
- The RTC and the CA rightly computed the valuation as
of 1992 when the respondents discovered the
construction of the tunnels
- The RTC and CA used values of adjacent properties,
which were valued at P1000.00.sqm as of 1990.
RULING
The respondents are entitled to just compensation and the
RTC and CA correctly computed the just compensation.
Sio Tiat King v Lim
| G.R. No. 185407 (June 22, 2015) | Reyes, J.
Facts of the Case:
• Spouses Calidguid executed a Compromise
Agreement binding themselves to pay the amount of
P2,520,000 to Spouses Lee which was approved by
the RTC
• As spouses Calidguid failed to comply with the terms
of the decision, spouses Lee availed the remedy of
execution which the RTC granted by issuing a Writ of
Execution
• A property belonging to the Spouses Calidguid was
levied on execution and sold at a public auction with
Jaime Lee emerging as the highest bidder
• Sio Tat King, an assignee of the Spouses Caliguid,
redeemed the subject property before the expiration
of the one-year period of right of redemption
• More than 11 years after the redemption, King filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of possession which
was granted by the RTC
• A Notice to Vacate addressed to the Spouses
Calidguid were served by the sheriff
• The Lims filed a Joint Affidavit of Third Party claim
alleging that they are the registered owners of the
property
• The Lims filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion to
Quash Writ of Execution before the RTC
• Actual and physical possession of the subject
property was turned over to King
• The Lims filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA
alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion when they were ousted from the property
by virtue of the writ of possession, without a separate
and independent action to resolve the issue of
ownership
• The RTC denied the motion to quash the Writ of
Execution filed by the Lims as they resolved that the
TCT of the Spouses Calidguid was issued at an earlier
date, therefore it shall prevail over the TCT of the Lims
• The CA rendered a decision annulling the order of RTC
which denied the motion to quash. The CA granted
the motion of the Lims which quashed the Writ of
Possession
Issue:
• WON the Lims may be evicted rom the property by virtue
of a writ of possession issued in favor of King? NO
o Sec. 33, Rule 39 of the ROC contemplates only
two situations wherein a writ of possession may
issue: 1) only upon the expiration of the period of
redemption and no such redemption having
been made; and 2) only to a purchaser or
SC Ruling:
redemptioner in the execution sale
o WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
o In relation to Sec. 27 of the Same Rule, the only
persons who are entitled to exercise the right of
redemption are: 1) the judgment obligor or his
successor-in-interest in the whole or any part of
the property; and 2) a creditor having a lien by
Villasi v Garcia
virtue of an attachment, judgment or mortgage
on the property sold, or on some part thereof,
subsequent to the lien under which property was
sold. Such redeeming creditor is termed as
redemptioner.
o King assails the ruling of the CA that he is a
successor-in-interest of the judgment debtor and
not a redemptioner. He averred that the word
redemptioner found in Sec. 33 should be loosely
applied to include the judgment debtor’s
successor is interest
o However, the line of reasoning of King is flawed
because notwithstanding his understanding of
the word “redemptioner”, the fact is that the writ
of possession can only be rightfully enforced
against the Spouses Calidguid and their
successors-in-interest which includes King
himself
o Also Sec. 33 provides an exception that the writ
of execution cannot be used when a third party
is actually holding the property adversely to the
judgment obligor
o King acquired the right over the property when
the right to redeem of Spouses Calidguid was
assigned to him and redemption was
subsequently made; on the other hand, the Lim’s
claim of ownership is based on a TCT registered
in their names showing the Lims hold the
property adversely to the judgment obligor,
Spouses Calidguid
o Moreover, the Lims are considered as a third
party whose possession over the subject
property may not be defeated summarily
o The third party’s possession of the property is
legally presumed to be based on a just title, a
presumption which may be overcome only
through a judicial proceeding for recovery of the
property after such third party is accorded due
process and the opportunity to be heard
o Art 433 of the Civil Code states that: “Actual
possession under claim of ownership raises a
disputable presumption of ownership. The true
owner must resort to judicial process for the
recovery of the property”
o King could have filed a suit to recover possession
of the property but he took a procedural shortcut
when he applied for the issuance of a writ of
possession
o King also cannot enforce his claim of possession
and ownership based on a case terminated long
ago (the compromise agreement) more so when
the Lims are considered strangers to such case.
Decision dated July 22, 2008 and the Resolution dated
November 13, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 103391 are AFFIRMED.
Bachrach v. Seifert a. ART. 474. Civil fruits are deemed to accrue
G.R. No. L-2659 | Oct. 12, 1950| Ozaeta, J. | Madcasim, A. day by day, and belong to the usufructuary
in proportion to the time the usufruct may
FACTS last.
1. In his last will and testament, the deceased E.M. b. ART. 475. When a usufruct is created on the
Bachrach willed all the fruits and usufruct of the right to receive an income or periodical
remainder of his estate to his wife, Mary McDonald revenue, either in money or fruits, or the
Bachrach: interest on bonds or securities payable to
a. “Sixth: It is my will and do herewith bequeath bearer, each matured payment shall be
and devise to my beloved wife Mary considered as the proceeds or fruits such
McDonald Bachrach for life all the fruits and right. When it consists of the enjoyment of
usufruct of the remainder of all my estate the benefits arising from an interest in an
after payment of the legacies, bequests, and industrial or commercial enterprise, the
gifts provided for above; and she may enjoy profits of which are not distributed at fixed
said usufruct and use or spend such fruits as periods, such profits shall have the same
she may in any manner wish.” consideration. In either case they shall be
2. As the owner of 108,000 shares of Atok Big Wedge distributed as civil fruits, and shall be applied
Mining, the estate of the deceased received 54,000 in accordance with the rules prescribed by
shares, which represented a 50 percent stock the next preceding article.
dividend on the 108,000 shares. 5. Applied in this case, the Court declared the 108,000
3. Claiming that the stock dividend constitutes “fruit” shares of stock as part of the property in usufruct.
or “income” of property belonging to her The 54,000 shares of stock dividend are civil fruits of
usufructuary, Mary Bachrach petitioned the lower the original investment. They represent profits, and
court to compel the Peoples Bank and Trust Company the delivery of the certificate of stock covering said
(“Peoples Bank”) to endorse and deliver to her the dividend is equivalent to the payment of said profits.
corresponding certificates of the said stock dividends. 6. “Said shares may be sold independently of the
4. The legal heirs of the deceased, Sophie Siefert and original shares, just as the offspring of a domestic
Elisa Elianoff, opposed the petition — arguing that the animal may be sold independently of its mother.”
stock dividends were not “income” and thus do not
belong to Mary’s usufructuary. Instead, they argue RULING
that it belongs to the remainderman. The order appealed from, being in accordance with the
above-quoted provisions of the Civil Code, his hereby
ISSUES/RATIO affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
WON the stock dividends belong to Mary’s usufructuary: YES
1. Siefert and Elianoff’s argument rests upon the
Massachusetts rule, which regards only cash
dividends as income and considers stock dividends as
capital. It likewise holds that stock dividends are not,
in any true sense, a dividend at all, since it does not
involve division or severance of the assets. It merely
“dilutes” the shares that existed before and takes
nothing from the property of the corporation.
2. On the other hand, Mary’s argument rests upon the
Pensylvannia rule, which declares that all earnings of
a corporation made prior to the death the testator-
stockholder belong to the corpus of the estate.
3. The Court agreed with Mary, noting that the
Pensylvannia rule is more in accord with our statutory
laws.
4. Under section 16 of our Corporation Law, no
corporation may make or declare any dividend except
from the surplus profits arising from its business. Any
dividend, therefore, whether cash or stock,
represents surplus profits. Article 471 of the Civil
Code provides that the usufructuary shall be entitled
to receive all the natural, industrial, and civil fruits of
the property in usufruct.
Bachrach Motors v Talisay-Silay | G.R. No. 35223 |
September 17, 1931 | Romualdez, J.
Facts:
- a complaint filed by the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., against
the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., for the delivery of the
amount P13,850 or promissory notes or other instruments
or credit for that sum payable on June 30, 1930
- prays that the sugar central be ordered to render an
accounting of the amounts it owes Mariano Lacson
Ledesma by way of bonus, dividends, or otherwise
- to pay the plaintiff a sum sufficient to satisfy the
judgment mentioned in the complaint, and that the sale
made by said Mariano Lacson Ledesma be declared null
and void.
- The Philippine National Bank filed a third party claim
alleging a preferential right to receive any amount which
Mariano Lacson Ledesma might be entitled to from the
Talisay-Silay Milling Co. as bonus
- The basis is that since the land is mortgaged to PNB, the
civil fruits of such should be given to the mortgagee
- The bank is asserting that the sum payable to Mariano
Ledesma be paid to them
- The corporation Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., answered the
complaint stating that of Mariano Lacson Ledesma's credit,
P7,500 belonged to Cesar Ledesma because he had
purchased it, and praying that it be absolved from the
complaint and that the proper party be named so that the
remainder might be delivered.
- Cesar Ledesma, in turn, claiming to be the owner by
purchase in good faith an for a reconsideration of the
P7,500 which is a part of the credit referred to above,
answered praying that he be absolved from the
complaint.
- plaintiff Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., answered the third party
claim alleging that its credit against Mariano Lacson
Ledesma was prior and preferential to that of the
intervening bank, and praying that the latter's complaint be
dismissed.
- RTC: dismissed the complaint against Cesar Ledesma in
acknowledgement of him being a purchaser in good faith
- authorizing the defendant central to deliver to him the
aforementioned sum of P7,500
- the court held that the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., had a
preferred right to receive the amount of P11,076.02
which was Mariano Lacson Ledesma's bonus, and it
ordered the defendant central to deliver said sum to the
plaintiff.
- PNB appealed: bank bases its preferential right upon the
contention that the bonus in question is civil fruits of the
lands which the owners had mortgaged for the benefit of
the central giving the bonus
- "if the bonus in question is not civil fruits or rent which
became subject to the mortgage in favor of the
Philippine National Bank when Mariano Lacson
Ledesma's personal obligation fell due, the assignment
of March 7, 1930 (Exhibit 9, P.N.B.), is null and void, not
because it is fraudulent, for there was no intent of fraud
in executing the deed, but that the cause or
consideration of the assignment was erroneous, for it
was based upon the proposition that the bonus was civil
fruits of the land mortgaged to the Philippine National
Bank.”
Issue:
1. Whether or not the bonus in question is civil fruits.
- Talisay-Silay gave the bonus to Mariano Ledesma, the latter
being one of their planters and land owners, as
compensation for having his land part of that which they
mortgaged to PNB.
- Such bonus was to be paid to the landowners until the
mortgage ceased.
- Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil
fruits: First, the rents of buildings; second, the proceeds
from leases of lands; and, third, the income from perpetual
or life annuities, or other similar sources of revenue.
- As the bonus in question is not rent of a building or of
land, the only meaning of "civil fruits" left to be
examined is that of “income."
- As a mere compensation and not originating from the
land Ledesma himself owned, the bonus may not be
considered as “Income” either.
- It is not civil fruits or income from the mortgaged
property, which, as far as this case is concerned, has
nothing to do with it.
- The value of the bonus is based on a matter distinct to
that of the land itself but upon the debt secured by
Talisay-Silay.
Ruling: Finding no merit in this appeal, the judgment
appealed from is affirmed, without express finding as to
costs. So ordered.
PH Sugar v Poizat, 1925 Dec 31
Accession / GR L-23352 / Johns / Jules
Plaintiff: The Philippine Sugar Estates Development Co. Ltd. Inc.
Defendant: Juan M. Poizat, Et. Al.
Appelant: Gabriela Andrea de Coster
1. 1902 Nov 10: Department of Engineering and Public
Works of this City a permit for a new building to be erected
on Dona Gabriela’s lot with improvements.
2. 1905 Aug 25: Dona Gabriela executed a general power of
attorney to her husband Poizat with his consent which
authorized him to make a loan with or without mortgage.
3. 1912 Nov 2: Poizat got a loan of 10,000 Pounds Sterling
from the PSED through the Banco Espanol del Rio de la
Plata by mortgaging her property:
a. Nos. 5, 3, and 1 of Calle Urbiztondo, and No. 13
of Calle Barraca in Binondo.
b. Consisting of a house and six adjacent
warehouses, all of strong material and
constructed upon her own land
c. With the object of constructing a new building
over the land, the said structures were
demolished and in their stead a building of strong
material was erected (referred to in Facts #1)
which, together with the land, now forms only
one piece of real estate – this property must be
the subject of a new description in which it must
appear that:
i. The land belongs in fee simple and full
owned (even before marriage) by the
paraphernal property of Dona Gabriela
and
ii. The new building to the conjugal
partnership of her and Poizat.
d. Poizat binds himself and his principal Dona
Gabriela:
i. To pay with 9% yearly interest paid at
the end of each quarter.
ii. To pay within 4 years.
iii. To voluntary mortgage the said urban
property as security.
e. Poizat binds himself to insure against fire the
property with not less than P100K.
f. Don Buenaventura Campa, President of PSED
accepts this indenture (notarized by Don Enrique
Barrera y Caldes, a learned Spanish lawyer).
4. 1923 Nov 12: For failure to pay, PSED brought an action to
foreclose.
a. The summons was served upon Poizat only, who
employed the services of Antonio A. Sanz to
represent them.
b. The attorneys filed a general appearance and
gave a general denial.
5. 1924 Feb 18: During trial, Atty. Jose Galan y Blanco
admitted all of the allegations, and consented for
unfavorable judgment. Poizat, for himself and his
codefendants, filed an exception to the judgment and
moved for a new trial.
6. 1924 Mar 31: Poizat’s motion was denied.
7. 1924 Aug 22: Foreclosure sale was directed.
8. 1924 Sep 11: Dona Gabriela learned about the mortgage
contract.
9. 1924 Sep 18: The property whose assessed value is
P342,685, was sold to PSED for P100K.
10. 1924 Sep 23: Dona Gabriela appeared with her present
attorney Antonio Opisso to claim an illegal hence void sale,
she alleges that:
a. her agent was not authorized to execute it and
b. the sale was a constructive fraud by both PSED
and Poizat during a time that Dona Gabriela was
abroad
c. Dona Gabriela also had no knowledge of the
mortgage.
d. Poizat was not authorized to bind her property
for his personal debts.
e. PSED knew about Poizat’s lack of authority
11. All the objections were overruled, she appealed and
assigns as errors these lower court findings:
a. Poizat was authorized to mortgage her
paraphernal property for his personal loan.
b. Poizat had authority to make her jointly liable.
c. The PSED had no knowledge of Poizat’s lack of
authority.
d. Summons have been send to Dona Gabriela and
that Atty. Galan had authority to confess.
e. Judgment in this case has become final and res
judicata;
f. The judicial sale made by the sheriff at an
inadequate price;
g. The judgment is valid.
Issue 1: W/N summons were served to Dona Gabriela? NO.
1. Reasons for it being null and void are stated in BPI v de
Coster.
2. The attorneys entered their appearance for all of the
defendants in the action, including Dona Gabriela upon
whom no service was ever made.
3. There may be truth in Dona Gabriela’s contention that the
attorneys acted collusively and fraudulently.
a. They made no effort to protect or defend her
legal rights.
b. However, this question is not material to this
decision.
Issue 2: W/N the mortgage is valid and binding to Dona
Gabriela? Valid to Poizat only.
1. Admitted: there is a valid general power of attorney.
2. Crucial point:
a. If the mortgage was legally executed by her
attorney in fact for her, it is binding.
b. If not, it is void.
3. These can be seen upon the face of the instrument:
a. Poizat was personally a party to the mortgage,
b. He was the only signatory.
 c. There is nothing in his signature indicating that
he signs it as an Attorney-in-Fact.
d. It was entered into by & between Juan M. Poizat
in his own behalf & as attorney in fact of his wife.
e. The record title of the mortgaged property is in
the name of Dona Gabriela.
f. Poizat in the dual capacity mentioned above
mentioned binds himself
g. Poizat may use…
i. appears that the loan was made to the
husband for his sole use
ii. if Dona Gabriela signed the document,
there would still be no valid mortgage
without Poizat’s signature
4. To bind the principal, the mortgage should be executed
for her "and in her name, place or stead," and as her act.
a. The mortgage in question was not so executed.
b. it was signed by Don Juan M. Poizat in his own
name, his own proper person, and by him only,
and it was acknowledge by him in his personal
capacity, and nothing shows that it was executed
for Dona Gabriela.
5. Poizat contends that his personal signature should be
construed as the couple’s dual signature.
a. SC: No authority has been cited, and no one will
sustain such a construction.
b. No principle of law makes a person liable on a
real mortgage which she never executed either in
person or by attorney in fact.
c. The title to real property cannot be divested
except by sale on execution or the formalities of
a will or deed.
d. This particular mortgage fails the form and
manner to bind the wife.
6. Mechem on Agency, volume 1, page 784: It is assumed
that the agent was authorized to bind his principal, but the
question is, has he done so. How is an authority executed?
a. SEC. 1093. Deed by agent must purport to be
made and sealed in the name of the principal. If,
on the contrary, though the agent describes
name, the words of grant, covenant and the like,
but the seal purports to be his seal, then the deed
will bind only the agent.
b. SEC. 1101. In determining whether a given deed
is of the principal,
i. First, to the grantor: Is the deed stated
to be made by the principal?
ii. Secondly, to the granting clause: Who,
principal or agent, purports to make the
grant?
iii. Thirdly, to the covenants, if any. Are
these the covenants of the principal?
iv. Fourthly, to the testimonium clause.
Who, principal or agent, is to set his
name and seal in testimony of the grant?
v. Fifthly, to the signature and seal. Whose
signature and seal are these?
c. SEC. 1102. Not enough to make deed the
principal's that the agent is described as such. —
even if he describes himself in the deed as acting
with a power of attorney or trustee; for these
expressions are usually but mere descriptio
personae.
d. SEC. 1103. Not principal's deed where agent
appears as both the grantor (maker) and signer
(who seals).
e. SEC. 1108. . . . The most usual and approved form
of executing a deed by attorney is by his writing
the name of the principal and adding “by his
attorney A B.”
7. Poizat may have had authority to borrow with mortgage,
but the for did not match the law specifies how it must be
done, thus that power was never exercised.
8. The mortgage is void as to the wife.
9. Since the old buildings (paraphernal) on the property were
torn down, the new building is presumed conjugal, hence
subject of the debts of the conjugal partnership for the
payment or security of which the husband has the power
to mortgage or otherwise encumber the property.
Ruling:
The mortgage as to the paraphernal property of the wife is
declared null and void ab initio.
Dissent by: Street, CJ Avancena, Villamor, Villa-real
1. The document’s preamble says it is executed by Poizat,
acting both in representation of himself and in the
character of attorney in fact of his wife.
2. Repeatedly expressed throughout the body is that Poizat
obligates both himself and his wife.
3. Under the doctrine informing the Civil Code, the mortgage
was in a form sufficient to bind the principal as well as the
agent.
4. It would never occur to a civilian lawyer that the
documents in question is informally executed.
5. The learned Spanish notary’s signature shows that it is
done in approved Spanish models.
6. Even in the US and UK, ample authority is found to the
effect that the principal will be bound by a contract signed
by the agent only, when it appears from the face of the
instrument that he is acting in the character of agent.
7. In fact both parties appear to have assumed that the
mortgage was in proper formality.
a. The question was not raised in the lower court,
b. No assignment of error mentions this question,
c. The court should have confined itself to the
matters put in issue by the litigants;
d. It should not have gone out of its way to take up
a point not discussed by the parties,
e. The rule is that an appellate court will not permit
an appellant to raise a point upon appeal which
was not put in issue in the court below.
Decision upon Petition for Rehearing, 1926 Feb 15 - Johns
1. The first proposition advanced is that the mortgage in
question is valid not only as to the buildings, but also as to
the land on which they are constructed.
2. The previous decision of this court is to the effect that, the
buildings being conjugal property, the mortgage is valid,
which is the paraphernal property of the wife.
3. PSED contends that the land is conjugal property under CC
1404 which makes the soil an accessory to the building.
a. That article does not apply.
b. Warehouses could not be construed as the class
of buildings mentioned in article 1404.
4. PSED accepted the mortgage which recited that the land
is still paraphernal hence is bound by those recitals. The
Torrens Title also shows that the land is vested in the wife.
5. PSED, in a supplemental plea filed January 21, 1926,
contends that the ruling in National Bank vs. Quintos and
Ansaldo be applied, in which CC 1408 was applied.
a. That article does not apply.
b. CC 1408 only applies when there is a
presumption that the debt contracted by the
husband is for the common benefit of both
spouses.
c. Poizat’s loan appears to be obtained to the
damage of the wife.
6. PSED contends that an agent need not write first his own
signature and then the name of his principal, and say "by
AB, attorney in fact”.
a. This contention is not valid.
b. The old Spanish notarial law and system of
conveyances was repealed by Act 496.
c. A fundamental differences:
i. Spanish system: the documents were
executed in the form of minutes,
wherein the notary was the one who
spoke, it was sufficient to look at the
text of the document.
ii. Act 496: the notary is not the one who
speaks, and there is no record kept of
the minutes, and the intervention of a
notary is limited to the
acknowledgment only of the document.
It is necessary to resort to the form in
which the parties sign an instrument,
because it is the signature rather than
the text which bears the stamp of
authenticity.
Same dissenters:
1. The doctrine laid down by the majority is openly
repugnant to the spiritualistic conception which informs
article 1278 of the Civil Code, according to which contracts
shall be binding whatever may be the form in which they
may have been entered into, provided that the essential
requisites for their validity are present.
2. The mortgage was executed in the form required by the
law, that is, in a public document registered in the registry
of property.
3. Once it is stated in the document that the agent acts by
virtue of the agency, he absorbs the personality of the
principal.
Kilario v CA, 2000 Jan 19
Accession / GR 134329 / De Leon / Jules
Petitioners: Verona Pada-Kilario & Ricardo Kilario
Respondents: CA & Silverio Pada
Facts:
1. Jacinto Pada, who died intestate, had an estate which
included a residential and coconut land in Poblacion,
Matalom, Leyte (Cadastral Lot 5581, 1,301.92 sqm) whose
northern portion is the subject lot.
2. While still alive, Jacinto allowed his half-brother Feliciano
Pada to build a house on the subject lot and after Feliciano
died, his son Pastor continued living there with his own 8
children, one of whom is Verona who lived in that house
since 1960.
3. May 1951: Jacinto’s heirs (6 children enumerated below)
partitioned his estate extrajudicially but they never
registered their partition document in RD-Leyte. At the
execution of the partition:
a. Marciano, represented by daughter Maria, 5581
co-recipient
b. Ananias, present, 5581 co-recipient
c. Amador, represented by daughter Concordia,
recipient of:
i. ½ of coconut land in the interior of Sto.
Nino St., Sabang, Matalom, and
ii. ½ of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom
d. Higino, represented by son Silverio
e. Valentina, dead w/o issue
f. Ruperta, dead w/o issue
4. When Ananias died, his daughter, Juanita, succeeded as
5581 co-owner.
a. 1978 June 14: Juanita sold her father’s share of
5581 to Engr. Ernesto Paderes.
b. 1993 Nov 17: Maria sold her father’s share of
5581 to Silverio.
5. Silverio demanded Sps. Verona & Ricardo to vacate the
subject lot.
a. All earnest efforts / meetings to an amicable
settlement mediated by the barangay failed.
b. 1995 Jun 26: Silverio filed for ejectment +
damages in MCTC Matalom, Leyte.
6. 1995 Jul 24: Heirs of Amador transferred by Deed of
Donation their respective shares in 5581 to Verona.
a. Esperanza Pada-Pavo,
b. Concordia Pada-Bartolome, and
c. Angelito Pada
7. 1996 Feb 12: Sps. Verona filed their Answer:
a. The subject lot has already been donated to them
by the heirs of Amador.
b. The 1951 extra-judicial partition was invalid and
ineffectual:
 i. Maria, Concordia, Silverio had no SPAs
from their fathers.
ii. The partition document was never
registered.
Procedural History:
MCTC ruled for Sps. Verona.
1. A preponderance of evidence shows that 5581 is still
under a community of ownership among the heirs of
Jacinto.
2. If it were true that Marciano and Ananias are the only /
real recipients of 5581,
a. then why did their shares not transfer to their
children?
b. The children sold their fathers’ shares, it’s as if
they did not gain ownership of the land via
succession.
3. The partition document was made in private Bisayan
writing and its genuineness and due execution was
doubtful.
a. Most of the heirs were not participants and
signatories.
b. No SPAs were given to representatives.
4. The donation made the Spouses the undivided owners of
the whole estate, hence their possession in the northern
portion is lawful.
1997 Nov 6: RTC ruled for Silverio.
5. It has been 42 years (1951-1993) that no co-heir
questioned the ownership of Juanita and Maria and their
conveyances.
a. This lends credence to the fact that they are legal
owners.
b. The rights of other co-heirs has been lost by
prescription / laches / estoppel.
6. General Rule: An action for partition does not prescribe.
a. Exception: When one heir possesses the property
as an owner for a period sufficient for acquisitive
prescription.
b. From the moment one heir claims that he is the
sole owner, the issue changes from partition to
ownership.
c. Since Maria and Juanita were the only co-owners
of 5581, the Heirs of Amador made an invalid
donation as they had nothing to donate.
7. Sps. Verona are instructed to:
a. vacate,
b. remove their house at their own expense,
c. pay a retroactive monthly rent of P100 from the
filing
d. pay P5K for moral damages and another 5k for
attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
1998 May 20: CA ruled for Silverio.
8. In an ejectment suit, the only issue is possession de
facto or physical or material possession and not de jure.
Hence, even if the question of ownership is raised in the
pleadings, the court may pass upon such issue but only to
determine the question of possession.
9. No action was ever previously filed in court to question
the validity of the partition.
10. In the spouses’ petition, they even wrote "Maria Pavo is
one of the co-owners… and that the lot was adjudicated
to Marciano and Ananias, and upon the death of Marciano
and Ananias, their heirs took possession…
11. The spouses also did not contest the cadastral survey of
Matalom where the share of Maria named Lot 5581, and
that of Juanita was Lot 6047.
12. The spouses, in their Answer, also admitted that they have
been occupying the subject lot without paying rent owing
to the liberality of Silverio.
13. The spouses cannot now impugn the partition.
a. As owner and possessor, Maria lawfully entitled
her vendee to possession.
b. A voluntary division of estate by the heirs among
themselves is conclusive.
14. The donation appears to be a mere afterthought to help
the spouses prolong their stay.
15. 1998 Jun 16: CA denied the MR of Sps. Verona.
Issue 1: W/N Maria was the owner of the portion of 5581
which she sold? YES.
1. The partition is valid even though it was unregistered,
unless and until it is shown that there were debts existing
against the estate which had not been paid.
2. No law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and
be registered.
3. Sec. 1, Rule 74, RROC: The notarization and registration of
a partition is for the protection of creditors and the heirs
themselves against tardy claims. (constructive notice)
4. CC 1358: acts done for the creation, transmission,
modification or extinguishment of real rights over
immovable property, must appear in a public instrument,
is only for convenience, non-compliance with which does
not affect the validity or enforceability of the acts of the
parties as among themselves.
5. The Statute of Frauds (CC 1403) apply because partition
among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real
property, but rather just a confirmation or ratification of
title or right which an heir renounces in favor of another
heir who accepts.
Issue 2: W/N the donation protects Sps. Verona from ejection?
NO.
1. The heirs of Amador could not donate the land which was
not even partitioned to Amador.
2. Prescription / Laches bar the heirs of Amador to repudiate
the partition.
Issue 3: W/N Sps. Verona are builders in good faith? NO.
1. The admission by Sps. Verona that their occupation of the
property without rent was only due to the liberality and
tolerance of the Pada family binds them.
2. They knew that their occupation may be terminated any
time.
3. Without any contract between them, they are bound by
an implied promise that they will vacate upon demand.
4. CC 448 and CC 546 apply only to possessors of good faith.
a. These provisions allow full reimbursement of
useful improvements and retention of the
premises until reimbursement is made.
b. A PGF is one who builds on land with the belief
that he is the owner.
5. The donation did not convert them into builders in good
faith since the improvements were already built by then.
6. A promise of donation also can’t be relied on.
a. Building improvements at a time such promise
was not yet fulfilled is a mere expectancy of
ownership that may or may not be realized.
7. More importantly, the donation was void.
Ruling:
1. Petition denied.
2. Sps. Verona are to vacate the subject lot bought by Silverio.
Erminda Florentino v Supervalue Inc., 2007 Sep 12
Accession / GR 172384 / Chico-Nazario / Jules
Nature of Case: Petition for Review on Certiorari, Rule 45
Facts:
1. Florentino uses the business name "Empanada Royale," a
sole proprietorship that retails empanada to outlets in
different malls and business establishments within Metro
Manila.
2. SuperV is a domestic corporation engaged in the business
of leasing commercial spaces in SM Malls around the
country.
3. 1999 Mar 8: Florentino & SuperV executed 3 Contracts of
Lease with similar terms
a. for cart-type stalls in SM North Edsa & SM
Southmall and a store space at SM Megamall.
b. Each contract is four months rent, renewable.
4. After they expired, the Contracts of Lease were renewed
until 31 March 2000.
5. 2000 Jan 14: SuperV dated 2 letters
a. Letter 1: Florentino was given stern warning &
charged for
i. violating Section 8 of the Contracts of
Lease by not opening on Dec. 16 & 26,
1999.
ii. selling a new variety of empanada called
"mini-embutido" w/o prior approval
iii. increasing prices (P20-P22) w/o prior
approval
iv. violating terms of contract by frequently
closing earlier than the mall hours,
either because of non-delivery or delay
in the delivery of stocks to her outlets.
b. Letter 2: SuperV will no longer renew the
contracts of the 3 outlets.
6. 2000 Feb 4: They were received by Florentino through
facsimile transmissions
7. 2000 Feb 11: Florentino sent a letter-reply saying that the
"mini-embutido" is not a new variety of empanada, just a
smaller, more affordable version.
a. SuperV still refused to renew.
b. SuperV took possession of the Megamall store
and confiscated the equipment and personal
belongings inside when the contract expired.
8. 2000 May 8: Florentino demanded through letter the
release of items seized and return the security deposits
(P192K).
9. 2000 June 15: Florentino sent another letter reiterating
her demands, but the SuperV did not comply.
Procedural History:
2001 Apr 30: RTC rules for Florentino.
1. 2000 Aug 17: Florentino filed an action for Specific
Performance, Sum of Money and Damages before RTC-57
of Makati. (CivC 00-1015)
a. SuperV made verbal representations that the
Contracts of Lease will be renewed from time to
time and Florentino relied on these to introduce
P200K worth of improvements to the Megamall
store.
b. SuperV unjustly refuses to return the deposit and
the items.
c. Florentino should be rewarded:
i. P472K actual damages (deposit,
improvements, items)
 ii. P300K moral damages
iii. P50K exemplary damages
iv. P80K attorney’s fees + litigation
expenses
2. SuperV countered by:
a. Listing Florentino’s violations
b. Demanding a Counterclaim of P106,474.09 as:
i. penalty for selling a new variety of
empanada,
ii. electricity and water bills, and
iii. rental adjustment,
iv. among other charges incidental to the
lease agreements.
c. The confiscation was in the exercise of its
retaining lien, since Florentino failed to settle her
obligations on time.
d. The security deposits were to ensure faithful
compliance and are forfeited due to infractions.
3. RTC: The physical takeover and the seizure of items w/o
prior notice were illegal. SuperV should:
a. Pay P192K security deposits + P50K attorney's
fees.
b. Return the items.
c. Choose between:
i. Reimburse half the value of
improvements.
ii. Allow Florentino to remove the
improvements, even if the space is
damaged.
2003 Oct 10: CA rules for SuperV.
4. Forfeiture of deposits is justified for breaches of contract.
5. No reimbursement for improvements since no prior
approval was obtained for these.
6. Aggrieved, the respondent appealed the adverse RTC
Judgment to the Court of Appeals.
7. Items are to be returned.
8. 2006 Apr 19: Florentino’s MR was denied.
Issue 1: W/N deposits are to be returned. Yes, half.
1. COL Sec. 5: DEPOSIT. The LESSEE shall make a cash deposit
in the sum of P60K equivalent to 3 months rent as security
for the full and faithful performance to each and every
term, provision, covenant and condition of this lease and
not as a pre-payment of rent.
2. COL Sec. 18. TERMINATION. Any breach, non-
performance or non-observance of the terms and
conditions herein provided shall constitute default which
shall be sufficient ground to terminate this lease, its
extension or renewal. LESSOR shall forfeit in its favor the
deposit tendered without prejudice to any such other
appropriate action as may be legally authorized.
3. A penal clause is an accessory undertaking to assume
greater liability in case of breach:
a. to provide for liquidated damages, and
b. to strengthen the coercive force of the obligation
c. whereby the obligor should pay without the
necessity of proof of the existence and the
measure of damages caused by the breach.
4. CC 1226. In obligations with a penal clause, the penalty
shall substitute the indemnity for damages and the
payment of interests in case of noncompliance, if there is
no stipulation to the contrary. Nevertheless, damages
shall be paid if the obligor refuses to pay the penalty or is
guilty of fraud in the fulfillment of the obligation. The
penalty may be enforced only when it is demandable
according to this Code.
5. General rule: Courts respect the Freedom to Contract.
a. Exception: contrary to L/M/GC/PO/PP.
b. CC 1229: Courts may equitably reduce a
stipulated penalty:
i. if the principal obligation has been
partly or irregularly complied with; and
ii. even if there has been no compliance if
the penalty is iniquitous or
unconscionable.
6. Ligutan v CA:
a. Determining iniquity is partly subjective, partly
objective.
b. Some factors are:
i. the type, extent and purpose of the
penalty,
ii. the nature of the obligation,
iii. the mode of breach
iv. the consequences of breach,
v. the supervening realities,
vi. the standing and relationship of the
parties,
vii. and the like,
7. Forfeiting the entire P192K of deposit was excessive as
compared to the gravity of the breaches and the damage
caused to SuperV.
8. The forfeiture is reduced to 50%.
Issue 2: W/N improvements are to be reimbursed. NO.
1. COL Sec. 11. ALTERATIONS, ADDITIONS, IMPROVEMENTS,
ETC. The LESSEE shall not make any alterations, additions,
or improvements without the prior written consent of
LESSOR; and all alterations, additions or improvements
made on the leased premises, except movable or fixtures
put in at LESSEE's expense and which are removable,
without defacing the buildings or damaging its floorings,
shall become LESSOR's property without
compensation/reimbursement but the LESSOR reserves
the right to require the removal of the said alterations,
additions or improvements upon expiration of the lease.
2. No consent was obtained prior.
3. Renewal is subject to mutual agreement. (Fernandez v CA)
4. Florentino claims that there was a verbal promise to
extend indefinitely.
a. This is inadmissible under the parole evidence
rule.
b. This is unenforceable under the statute of frauds.
5. SuperV made no inducement or misrepresentation.
a. To renovate a store according to the needs and
nature of their business and in harmony with
their trademark designs as part of their
 marketing ploy to attract customers = standard
practice.
b. Renovation is a necessity and a business strategy.
6. CC 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful
improvements which are suitable to the use for which the
lease is intended, without altering the form or substance
of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of
the lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the
improvements at that time. Should the lessor refuse to
reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the
improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer
damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more
impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.
7. CC 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been
built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,
after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles
546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to
pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the
proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be
obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more
than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose
to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the
lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the
terms thereof.
8. CC 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every
possessor; but only possessor in good faith may retain the
thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
9. Possessor in good faith is one who builds on land with the
belief that he is the owner.
10. Builder in good faith is one who is unaware of any flaw in
his title to the land at the time he builds on it.
11. Lessees can’t be builders in good faith. (Germiniano v CA)
12. CC 448 does not apply where one's only interest is that of
a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would
always be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his
landlord out of his property.

Issue 3: W/N SuperV is liable for attorney's fees. NO.

1. Attorney's fees may be awarded when a party is
compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to protect its
interest by reason of unjustified act of the other.
2. SuperV did not unjustifiably refuse Florentino’s demands.

Ruling:
1. Petition partly granted.
2. SuperV should return 50% of the Deposit and the items.
3. SuperV need not reimburse improvements or pay
attorneys fees.