I.

Introduction/Preliminary Considerations/ Jurisdiction

A. Due Process in Criminal Cases
1. Alonte v. Savellano, GR No. 131652, 9 March 1998

B. Jurisdiction, in general
2. Antiporda Jr., et.al. v. Gachitorena, GR. No. 133289, 23 December 1999

3. Foronda-Crystal v. Son, GR No. 221815, 29 November 2017

FACTS:
Aniana Lawas Son (respondent) instituted an action for reconveyance and damages
against Glynna Foronda-Crystal (petitioner) alleging that, for twelve and a half years,
she has been the lawful owner and possessor of the subject lot. She alleged that she
purchased the same from a certain Eleno T. Arias and that the issuance of the Free
Patent in favor of the petitioner’s father was “due to gross error or any other cause.” In
support thereof, the respondent alleged that “there is no tax declaration in the name of
patentee Eddie Foronda” and that this “goes to show that Eddie Foronda is not the
owner of lot 1280 and neither has payment of real estate taxes been made by him
when he was still alive or by his heirs.” According to her, since her acquisition, she has
been religiously paying real property taxes thereon as evidenced by Tax Declaration
No. 16408A, which was issued under her name.5 On April 13, 1999, herein petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction A week thereafter, the
RTC issued an Order dated April 20, 1999,8 which dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. RTC reconsidered and set aside its earlier ruling based on the property
located at Magay, Compostela, Cebu carries the value more than P20,000.00. CA
affirmed in toto.
ISSUE:
(1) whether or not the RTC should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction
(2) whether or not the RTC’s decision should be rendered void for being issued without
jurisdiction.
HELD: On the Issue of Jurisdiction Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of
a court to hear, try, and decide a case. In order for the court or an adjudicative body to
have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire, among others,
jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject
matter is the power to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings
in question belong; it is conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of
any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists.
The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, requires the allegation of the
real property’s assessed value in the complaint. That the complaint in the present case
did not aver the assessed value of the property is a violation of the law, and generally
would be dismissed because the court which would exercise jurisdiction over the case
could not be identified.
However, a liberal interpretation of this law, as opined by the Court in Tumpag, would
necessitate an examination of the documents annexed to the complaint perusal of the
Tax Declaration would reveal that the property was valued at P2,826.00.
On this basis, it is clear that it is the MTC, and not the RTC (RTC takes cognizance of
property that exceeds 20k) that has jurisdiction over the case. The RTC should have
upheld its Order dated November 8, 2006 which dismissed the same. Consequently,
the decision that it rendered is null and void.
Cañero v. University of the Philippines: A void judgment is not entitled to the respect
accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative
by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It has no legal or binding
effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It can not affect, impair or create
rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who
seek to enforce. In other words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the
situation is the same as it would be if there was no judgment.
C. Jurisdiction is conferred by law
4. United States v. De La Santa, GR No. L-3181, 10 October 1907
FACTS:
The complaint charges the defendant with the crime of seduction (estupro) of a woman
over 12 and under 23 years of age, as defined and penalized in article 443 of the Penal
Code. It is alleged that the defendant seduced Teofila Sevilla under promise of
marriage early in the year 1902, at which time' she was less than 21 years of age. The
complaint was not filed until February, 1906, when she was more than 24 though less
than 25 years of age, and was signed, sworn, and submitted by one Esteban Sevilla, at
whose "instance" these proceedings were had, he appearing as the private prosecutor
and alleging that he is the father of the said Teofila Sevilla. Prosecution avers that the
woman have already instituted the complaint herself on the ground that she testified
during the trial.
Counsel for the prosecution insists that since no objection was made to the complaint
in the court below, the appellant is not entitled to raise an objection thereto for the first
time in this court, and should be held to have waived such objection by his failure to
urge it in the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not defendant may question the jurisdiction of the lower court on
appeal
Whether or not the act of testifying by the woman is tantamount to filing the complaint
herself.
HELD:
If the father does not institute such proceedings until after his daughter has attained full
age, we are of opinion that he loses the right to do so.
The objection in this case is not, strictly speaking, to the sufficiency of the complaint,
but goes directly to the jurisdiction of the court over the crime with which the accused
was charged. It has been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the
subjectmatter is fatal, and subject to objection at any stage of the proceedings, either
in the court below or on appeal and, indeed, where the subject- matter is not within the
jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the proceeding ex mero motu.
The fact that she appeared and gave testimony not justifying such conclusion because,
being duly subpoenaed, she would have been compelled so to do whether she
appeared voluntarily or otherwise; but, as has been shown before, the provisions of
article 448 are so explicit and so positive that even though it appears that she had, in
fact, taken an active part in all the proceedings, this would not be sufficient unless the
complaint was submitted and the action formally maintained by her.
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organizes the court; it is given only by law and in the manner
prescribed by law and an objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction can not be
waived by the parties. Hence, the accused in a criminal case can not, by express
waiver or otherwise, confer jurisdiction on a court over an offense as to which such
jurisdiction has not been conferred upon such court by law.
Complaint dismissed.
5. Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 136806, 22 August 2000
FACTS:
The information filed by the Special Prosecutor against herein petitioner states that: the
petitioner aim a .45 caliber pistol at and threaten to kill one Simeon G. Legaspi, during
a public hearing about the pollution from the operations of the Giant Achievers
Enterprises Plastic Factory and after the said complainant rendered a privilege speech
critical of the abuses and excesses of the administration of said accused.
Petitioner assails the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over the case on the ground that the
crime was not committed in relation to his office. He contends that it has not been
established that the crime charged was committed by him while in the discharge of or
as a consequence of his official functions as municipal mayor. Additionally, he claims
that public office is not an essential ingredient of the crime of grave threats, which may
be committed by a public officer and a private individual alike, with the same facility.
Therefore, the Sandiganbayan erroneously assumed jurisdiction over the present case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of petitioner is “office-related” hence falls under the
jurisdiction of sandiganbayan
HELD:
With regards to the issue of jurisdiction, the Sandiganbayan held that—In criminal
cases, the court’s jurisdiction in the first instance is determined by the facts alleged in
the complaint or information. The complaint or information must be examined for the
purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the punishment
provided for by law for such acts fall within the jurisdiction of the court in which the
complaint or information is presented. If the facts set out in the complaint or information
are sufficient to show the court in which the complaint or information is presented has
jurisdiction, then the court has jurisdiction.
It is alleged therein that accused mayor committed the crime of grave threats when he
threatened to kill private complainant Simeon Legazpi during a public hearing. Thus,
accused was performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said
public hearing. It is apparent from the allegations, that, although public office is not an
element of the crime of grave threat[s] in abstract, as committed by the accused, there
is an intimate connection/relation between the commission of the offense and
accused’s performance of his public office.
It is well established that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined
by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. Once the court acquires
jurisdiction over a controversy, it shall continue to exercise such jurisdiction until the
final determination of the case and it is not affected by subsequent legislation vesting
jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. A recognized exception to this
rule is when the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is
intended to operate upon actions pending before enactment. However, where such
retroactive effect is not provided for, statutes altering the jurisdiction of a court cannot
be applied to cases already pending prior to their enactment.
The applicable law when the information was filed at the time would be Presidential
Decree No. 1606 (PD 1606), as amended by Republic Act No. 7975 (RA 7975),35
which took effect on May 16, 1995. Section 4 of PD 1606, as amended by RA 7975,
provides that— The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases
involving: (a.) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and (b.) Other offenses or felonies committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in
relation to their office.
Thus, to fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
crime charged must be either one of those mentioned in paragraph (a)
abovementioned or one committed by a public officer in relation to his office. The Court
has held that an offense is deemed to be committed in relation to the accused’s office
when such office is an element of the crime charged or when the offense charged is
intimately connected with the discharge of the official functions of accused.
The principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as
committed in relation to the accused’s office if “the offense cannot exist without the
office” such that “the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x.” In People v.
Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion said that “although public office
is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract,” the facts in a particular case
may show that “x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the
accused’s] respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance,
though improper or irregular, of their official functions.
In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused,
petitioner herein, took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave threats as defined in
Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a
municipal councilor.Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately
connected with the discharge of petitioner’s official functions. Thus, based on the
allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction over
the case
6. Garcia v. De Jesus, GR No. 88158, 4 March 1992, GR No. 97108-09, 4 March
1992
7. Garcia v. Ferro Chemicals, Inc. GR No. 172505, 1 October 2014
FACTS: Antonio Garcia (Garcia), as seller, and Ferro Chemicals, Inc. (FCI) as buyer,
entered into a deed of absolute sale and purchase of shares of stock. The deed was
for the sale and purchase of shares of stock from various corporations, including one
class "A" share in Alabang Country Club, Inc. and one proprietary membership in the
Manila Polo Club, Inc.4 These shares of stock were in the name of Garcia.5 The
contract was allegedly entered into to prevent these shares of stock from being sold at
public auction to pay the outstanding obligations of Garcia.
A deed of right of repurchase over the same shares of stock subject of the deed of
absolute sale and purchase of shares of stock was entered into between Garcia and
FCI under which Garcia can redeem the properties sold within 180 days from the
signing of the agreement.
Before the end of the 180-day period, Garcia exercised his right to repurchase the
properties.8 However, FCI did not agree to the repurchase of the shares of stock.
Thus, Garcia filed an action for specific performance and annulment of transfer of
shares.
The class "A" share and proprietary membership which were included in the contracts
entered into between Garcia and Ferro were sold at public auction.
Sometime in September the information based on the complaint of FCI was filed
against Garcia before the RTC. He was charged with estafa for allegedly
misrepresenting to Ferro that the shares subject of the contracts entered into were free
from all liens and encumbrances when in truth and in fact, accused well' knew that
aforesaid share of stock/proprietary share had already been garnished and
subsequently sold at public auction.
RTC: Garcia was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. FCI filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC. FCI appealed to the CA as to the civil
aspect of the case. The notice of appeal filed was entitled "Notice of Appeal Ex Gratia
Abudantia Ad Cautelam (Of The Civil Aspect of the Case)." The Makati City
Prosecutor's Office and FCI also filed a petition for certiorari with this court, assailing
the RTC’s decision and order acquitting Garcia. The petition for certiorari filed before
this court sought to annul the decision of the trial court acquitting Garcia.
People of the Philippines and FCI argued that the trial court "acted in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction”. The verification/certification
against forum shopping, signed by Ramon Garcia as president of FCI disclosed that
the notice of appeal was filed "with respect to the civil aspect of the case. The court
dismissed the petition for certiorari filed, and entry of judgment was made. On the other
hand, the CA its decision granted the appeal of FCI. The appellate court found that
Garcia failed to disclose the lien over the club shares. Garcia filed a motion for
reconsideration and FCI filed a partial motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
CA. These motions were denied. Thus, Garcia filed this petition for review on certiorari,
assailing the decision and resolution of the CA. In its comment, FCI points out that
Garcia raised factual issues not proper in a Rule 45 petition and reiterates the findings
of CA. There are pertinent and important issues that the parties failed to raise before
the trial court, CA, and this court. Nonetheless, we resolve to rule on these issues.
As a general rule, this court through its appellate jurisdiction can only decide on
matters or issues raised by the parties. However, the rule admits of exceptions. 1)
When the unassigned error affects jurisdiction over the subject matter or 2) when the
consideration of the error is necessary for a complete resolution of the case
ISSUE: Whether RTC had jurisdiction over the case?
HELD: No. The Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction
Jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is vested by law. In criminal cases, the
imposable penalty of the crime charged in the information determines the court that
has jurisdiction over the case.
The information charged Garcia with violation of Article 318 of the RPC, which is
punishable by arresto mayor, or imprisonment for a period of one (1) month and one
(1) day to six (6) months. When the information was filed the law in force was Batas
Pambansa Big. 129 before it was amended by RA No. 7691. Under Section 32 of
Batas Pambansa Big. 129, the MTC had jurisdiction over the case.

D. Jurisdiction over the subject matter, applicable law

8. People of the Philippines v. Lagon, GR. No. 45815, 18 May 1990
FACTS: On July 7, 1976, a criminal information was filed with the City Court of Roxas
City charging one Libertad Lagon with the crime of estafa. The accused had allegedly
issued a check in the amount of P4,232.80 as payment for goods or merchandise
purchased known that she did not have sufficient funds to cover the check.
Commission of the crime on April 1975 – jurisdiction over the offense was vested by
law in the City Court
The case proceeded to trial and the prosecution commenced the presentation of its
evidence. By the time of filing of the criminal action – paragraph 2(d) of Art. 315 of
RPC had been amended and the penalty imposable upon a person accused
thereunder increased, which penalty was beyond the City Court‘s authority to impose.
In an order dated December 2, 1976, the City Court dismissed the information upon
the ground that the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged was beyond the
court‘s authority to impose. The trial court ruled that the jurisdiction of a court to try a
criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the
action, and not by the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime.
ISSUE: Whether the City Court of Roxas City erred in issuing its order dismissing the
case due to lack of jurisdiction?
RULING: No, petitioner has failed to show that the City Court had committed reversible
error in dismissing the criminal information.
It is firmly settled doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal law
matters is properly measured by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of
a criminal action, rather than by the law in effect at the time of the commission of the
offense charged.
Thus, in accordance with the above rule, jurisdiction over the instant case pertained to
the then Court of First Instance of Roxas City considering that PD 818 had increased
the imposable penalty for the offense charged herein criminal case to a level in excess
of the minimum penalty which a city court could impose.
Should the criminal information be re-filed in the proper court (RTC), that court may not
impose that more onerous penalty upon private respondent Lagon. But the RTC would
remain vested with subject-matter jurisdiction to try and decide the re-filed case even
though the penalty properly imposable, given the date of the commission of the offense
charged, should be the lower penalty in RPC, art. 315(2d).
It should also be noted that:
1. The subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined by the authority of the
court to impose the penalty imposable under the applicable statute given the
allegations of a criminal information; and
2. After trial, a penalty lesser than the maximum imposable under the statute is proper
under the specific facts and circumstances proven at the trial. In such a case, that
lesser penalty may be imposed by the trial court even if the reduced penalty otherwise
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior court.

9. Asistio v. People of the Philippines, GR. No. 200465, 20 April 2015

10. Republic of the Philippines v. Sunga, GR No. L-38634, 20 June 1988

E. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused

11. Cojuangco, Jr., v. Sandiganbayan, GR. No. 134307, 21 December 1998
FACTS: January 12, 1990, a complaint was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
before the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), petitioner, former
Administrator of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), and the former members of
the PCA Governing Board, petitioner among them, for violation of Republic Act No.
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for having conspired and confederated
together and taking undue advantage of their public positions and/or using their
powers; authority, influence, connections or relationship with the former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and former First Lady, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos without
authority, granted a donation in the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to
the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation (COCOFED), a private entity, using PCA
special fund, thereby giving COCOFED unwarranted benefits, advantage and
preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable
negligence to the grave (sic) and prejudice of the Filipino people and to the Republic of
the Philippines.
Subsequently, however, the Court ruled that all proceedings in the preliminary
investigation conducted by the PCGG were null and void and the PCGG was directed
to transmit the complaints and records of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for
appropriate action.
In a Resolution dated June 2, 1992, the panel of investigators recommended the filling
of an Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and was referred by
Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. to the Office of the Special
Prosecutor for review and if warranted, for the preparation of the criminal information
and the Office of the Special Prosecutor affirmed the recommendation as contained in
the Resolution dated June 2, 1992.
Consequently, then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez ordered the panel of
investigators to discuss the merits of the prejudicial question posed by respondent
Lobregat.
In a Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 the panel of investigators recommended
that the motion to suspend proceedings be granted. Ombudsman Vasquez referred for
comment to the Office of the Special Prosecutors the Memorandum dated December
1, 1993 of the panel of investigators on the issue of the existence of prejudicial
question.
On February 17, 1995, an order for the arrest of petitioner was issued by the
respondent Sandiganbayan. Petitioner posted bail. On the same day he likewise filed,
through counsel, a Manifestation stating that he was posting bail without prejudice to
the Opposition To Issuance of Warrant of Arrest with Motion For Leave To File a
Motion For Reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Resolution which he filed.
In a Resolution dated February 20, 1995, the respondent Sandiganbayan barred
petitioner from leaving the country except upon approval of the court. Petitioner was
conditionally arraigned pleading not guilty to the Information.
In the meantime, in a Memorandum dated October 22, 1995, Special Prosecution
Officer Victorio U. Tabanguil found no probable cause to warrant the filing against
petitioner and recommended the dismissal of the case. The recommendation for
dismissal was approved by the Honorable Ombudsman on November 15, 1996.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion To Dismiss alleging that with the reversal of the
earlier findings of the Ombudsman of probable cause, there was therefore nothing on
record before the respondent Sandiganbayan which would warrant the issuance of a
warrant of arrest and the assumption of jurisdiction over the instant case.
ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan still acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner? YES
HELD: Sandiganbayan had two pieces of documents to consider when it resolved to
issue the warrant of arrest against the accused:
a. the Resolution dated June 2, 1992 of the Panel of Investigators of the Office of the
Ombudsman recommending the filing of the Information and
b. the Memorandum dated June 16, 1995 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor
denying the existence of a prejudicial question which will warrant the suspension of the
criminal case. The Sandiganbayan had nothing more to support its resolution.
The Sandiganbayan failed to abide by the constitutional mandate of personally
determining the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. The 2
cited document above were the product of somebody else’s determination, insufficient
to support a finding of probable cause by the Sandiganbayan.
In Roberts vs. Court of Appeals, the Court struck down as invalid an order for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest which were based only on "the information, amended
information and Joint Resolution", without the benefit of the records or evidence
supporting the prosecutor's finding of probable cause.
In Ho vs. People, the Court the respondent "palpably committed grave abuse of
discretion in ipso facto issuing the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the
prosecutor's findings and recommendation, and without determining on its own the
issue of probable cause based on evidence other than such bare findings and
recommendation.
With regards to jurisdiction, the rule is well-settled that the giving or posting of bail by
the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
By posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim exemption effect of being subject to the
jurisdiction of respondent court. While petitioner has exerted efforts to continue
disputing the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest despite his posting bail,
his claim has been negated when he himself invoked the jurisdiction of respondent
court through the filing of various motions that sought other affirmative reliefs.
In La Naval Drug vs. CA , Lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be
waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to
waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to
the jurisdiction of the court, otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to
that jurisdiction. Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and
separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other
purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person.
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting opinion;
With the nullity of the arrest order, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
accused, and that all proceedings and orders issued thereafter are likewise void for
want of jurisdiction. As a consequence of the nullity of the warrant of arrest, the
Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner.
The posting of a bail bond by the petitioner despite the nullity or irregularity of the
issuance of the warrant for his arrest should not be equated with "voluntary
appearance" as to cloak the respondent court with jurisdiction over his person. Truly,
his "appearance" in court was not "voluntary." It should be noted that immediately upon
learning of the filling of the Information and the issuance of the warrant, petitioner filed
an "Opposition to [the] Issuance of [a] Warrant of Arrest with Motion for Leave to File
Motion for Reconsideration of [the] Ombudsman['s] Resolutions." Said Opposition was
based on the inadequacy of the respondent court's basis for determining probable
cause. It was essentially an express and continuing objection to the court's jurisdiction
over his person.
When petitioner posted his bail bond, he expressly manifested at the same time that
such was "without prejudice” to his Opposition.

12. Miranda v. Tuliao, GR. No. 158763, 31 March 2006

FACTS: On 8 March 1996, burnt dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao
were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela. Two informations for murder were
filed. The RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused therein and sentenced them to
two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at
that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic review
where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of
reasonable doubt. Later on, SPO2 Maderal was arrested and he executed a sworn
confession and identified petitioners herein as the persons responsible.
Respondent filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz,
and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June
2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against
petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary
investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying
said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In the meantime,
petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the
Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case
and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently,
he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda.
He likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21
September 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to
enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the
Orders and Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001,
16 October 2001, and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for
a temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the
criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint
Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against
petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of respondent’s cash bond
evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary
restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on
the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in
Contempt. On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in
view of the previous referral to it of respondent’s petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting
the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of
Santiago City, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and
SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this Decision, but the same
was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the accused.
RULING: Yes, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed
waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except
in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such
jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances,
an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither
jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the
special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the
custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e.,
the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon
seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in
the custody of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted
various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to
have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these
cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack
of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
F. Jurisdiction over the territory
13. Macasaet v. People of the Philippines, GR. No. 156747, 23 February 2005
14. Trenas v People, GR. No. 195002, 25 January 2012

G. Estoppel
15. Binay v. Sandiganbayan, GR. No 120681-83, 1 October 1999
16. Figueroa y Cervantes v. People of the Philippines, GR. No. 147406, 14 July
2008

H. Adherence of Jurisdiction or Continuing Jurisdiction, Exception

17. Cruz v. Court of Appeals, GR. No. 123340, 29 August 2002
18. Al-awadhi v. Astih, GR. No. 81969, 26 September 1988
19. People of the Philippines v. Cawaling, GR. No. 117970, 28 July 1998
20. Lacson v. Executive Secretary, GR. No. 128096, 20 January 1999

I. Lack of Jurisdiction
21. RCBC v. Isnani, GR. No. 117383, 6 March 1995
22. Cunanan v. Arceo, GR. No. 116615, 1 March 1995

J. Injunction of Criminal Cases

23. Brocka v. Enrile, GR. No. 69863-65, 10 December 1990
24. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Hontanosas, GR. No. 157163, 25 June 2014
25. De Jesus v. Sandiganbayan, GR. No. 164166 and 164173-80, 17 October 2007

II. Jurisdiction of Courts/ Tribunals in Criminal Cases

A. Municipal/ Metropolitan Trial Courts
1. Sections 32, 35, BP 129, as amended
2. AM No. 00-11-SC, 25 March 2003
3. Section 1(b), Rules on Summary Procedure

B. Regional Trial Courts

1. Sections 20, 22, 23, BP 129, as amended
2. Section 90, RA 9165
3. Section 5, RA 8369
4. AM No. 03-03-03-SC, 1 July 2003

Jurisdiction over Indigenous Peoples

26. Ha Datu Tawahig v. The Honorable Cebu City Prosecutor I Lineth Lapinid, et.
al., GR No. 221139, 20 March 2019

C. Sandiganbayan
a. Section 4, Sandiganbayan Law, as amended by RA 10660

D. Court of Tax Appeals

a. Section 7, RA 1125 as amended by RA 9282

E. Court of Appeals
F. Supreme Court