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#AirWarVietnam – Making a MiG-Killer Technology a…

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#AirWarVietnam – Making a
MiG-Killer: Technology and
Signals Intelligence for Air-to-
Air Combat in Vietnam
Ross 22 hours ago

EC-121K Rivet Top

By Dr Mike Hankins

Editorial Note: During 2019, From Balloons to


Drones is running a series of articles looking at
various aspects of the air war over Vietnam from
the French-Indochina War through to the end of
the Vietnam War. In this article, Dr Mike Hankins
discusses the use of signals intelligence via Project
Teaball that helped to improve the air-to-air
combat ratios of the United States Air Force during
the Vietnam War. If you would like to contribute to
the series, then please email our editor, Dr Ross
Mahoney, at airpowerstudies@gmail.com or via
our contact page here. The official call for papers is
here.

Air-to-air combat in the Vietnam War has long


been a sore subject for some observers.[1]
Sources vary, but U.S. forces overall killed
approximately 200 MiGs while losing about 90
planes to them, for a ratio of about 2.2:1.[2]
Robert Wilcox, in his history of the Top Gun
program, calls this ‘embarrassingly low.’[3]
Looking just at 1968, the picture is even bleaker.
The US Navy was disappointed with its 3:1 ratio
and the US Air Force (USAF) traded McDonnell
Douglas F-4 Phantoms for MiGs at nearly a 1:1
rate. During the bombing halt between 1968 and
1972, both services sought to upgrade their
technology and training, including the creation
of the US Navy Fighter Weapons School, also
known as ‘Top Gun.’ In 1972 when the
LINEBACKER bombing campaign began, the US
Navy’s air-to-air record jumped to 6:1. The
USAF struggled in the early months of
LINEBACKER, earning a negative kill ratio for
the first time in the war and perhaps in its
existence.[4]

The US Navy is often praised for their changes


to training procedures (even though Top Gun
initially had little support from US Navy
leaders) while the USAF is often criticised for
over-reliance on technological solutions.[5]
However, the most significant improvement in
air-to-air combat for the USAF was the result of
a technological system: Project Teaball – a
Ground Controlled Intercept (GCI) system that
allowed analysts on the ground to track enemy
planes in real-time and communicate that
information to pilots in the air.

‘Teaball’ was just as critical to the USAF’s air


combat success during the LINEBACKER
campaigns as Top Gun was for the US Navy. It
demonstrated that the USAF was open to change
and adapted its technological culture to meet
new challenges. This is not to take away from
the undeniable success of the Top Gun program,
nor to diminish the importance the USAF’s
effective RED FLAG program that began shortly
afterwards. In the last throes of the Vietnam
War, both technology and training worked in
tandem.

Web of Confusion

North Vietnamese pilots had long relied on GCI


to direct their movements – ground controllers
used their extensive radar coverage of the area
to track aircraft and give detailed second-by-
second instructions to MiG pilots.[6] American
forces were different. They tended to rely more
on the initiative and skill of individual pilots,
but they also had far less radar coverage of the
areas they flew over in North Vietnam.
Complicating, this was the fact that US radar
stations were not well integrated, creating a
confusing web of systems competing for pilots’
attention.
North Vietnamese MiG-19 pilots discuss air-to-air
combat tactics (Source: US Air Force)

The USAF operated a ground radar covering the


southeast at Da Nang. Another radar further
north at Dong Ha known as ‘Waterboy’ covered
the lowest reaches of North Vietnam, although
few air-to-air engagements occurred there. For
further coverage, USAF flew a Lockheed EC-121
known as ‘College Eye,’ which was excellent
over water but was less accurate over land.
Other radar stations existed in Thailand,
including ‘Brigham,’ at Udorn, and ‘Invert,’ at
Nakon Phanom. These stations contributed
ground control and navigational assistance,
although their short-range provided almost no
coverage of North Vietnam itself.
This map shows the radar coverage of systems prior to
Project Teaball. Note that coverage above the 20th
parallel, where air combat was much more likely, was
almost nonexistent.

The US Navy used a system called ‘Red Crown,’


a ship-based radar located in the Gulf of
Tonkin, to provide early warning of
approaching MiGs. There was some limited
cooperation between ‘Red Crown’ and ‘College
Eye’ during Operation ROLLING THUNDER. The
bottom line for all these radar systems was that
none of them was effective for strikes further

North than the 19th parallel, where air combat


was more likely, and some of these systems,
such as ‘Red Crown,’ could not effectively track
planes below 10,000 feet, where MiGs often
flew.[7]

However, radar was only one way to gain


situational awareness of enemy MiGs.
Communications surveillance, or signals
intelligence (SIGINT), could track enemy
movements and plans. In 1967, the USAF
brought in new EC-121s known as ‘Rivet Top; to
do just that: Intercept North Vietnamese
communications and pass on vital information
to American pilots. ‘Rivet Top’ was a success. In
its limited time of employment, American
forces claimed 20 MiG kills, 13 of which received
direct contributions from ‘Rivet Top.’[8]
However, the ROLLING THUNDER campaign
ended before they could make a more
significant contribution. At the beginning of the
LINEBACKER Campaign, the US Navy’s ‘Red
Crown’ ship returned, and the USAF instituted a
system known as ‘Disco,’ essentially a slightly
upgraded version of ‘College Eye.’ Under
‘Disco,’ multiple EC-121s provided a larger area
of radar coverage and continued the SIGINT role
provided by the ‘Rivet Top’ equipment,
although the system suffered many of the same
problems that plagued the ‘College Eye’ system,
such as a limited range, limited crew and
equipment capacity, and the need to stay in
slow, controlled orbits.[9]

Both sides found that GCI was key to air-to-air


victory. General John Vogt, Director of the Joint
Staff and later commander of the Seventh Air
Force, argued that MiG successes were
attributable entirely to how their radar systems
connected to their command and control
practices.[10] USAF Ace fighter pilot Richard
‘Steve’ Ritchie went so far as to state that flying
a protective escort without GCI warning of
incoming MiGs was ‘useless,’ and that
employment of US GCI ‘was one of the primary
reasons that we were able to engage MiGs and
effect kills.’[11] Yet the limited range,
communications problems, and frequent
technical failures limited US GCI efforts.

The F-4D flown by Captains Richard S. Ritchie and


Charles B. DeBellevue at Udorn AFB in 1972. This
aircraft is currently on display at the Air Force Academy.
(Source: US Air Force)

Green Door Syndrome

An equally serious bureaucratic problem


aggravated these technological difficulties.
Unknown to most fighter pilots, the National
Security Agency (NSA) frequently intercepted
North Vietnamese communications – including
information about MiG flights. Some NSA
analysts, such as Delmar Lang, had previously
advocated combining these intercepts with GCI
to provide a more accurate picture of enemy
locations and movements. Lang had developed
such a system in the Korean War, contributing
to the success of North American F-86 Sabre
pilots. Lang had offered to create a similar
program in Vietnam, but both NSA and USAF
leaders, particularly Major General George
Keegan, Director of Air Force Intelligence,
repeatedly turned him down.[12] Interception of
North Vietnamese transmissions was classified,
and American pilots did not have proper
security clearance. This policy was not
unfounded. Using these intercepts could
undoubtedly aid American pilots but using them
too frequently risked alerting the North
Vietnamese that the US was intercepting their
signals.[13]

This was a dilemma for American planners who


needed to balance using the data with keeping
its existence secret. However, USAF leaders such
as Keegan simply refused to pass on any
information to American pilots in combat. This
created a sense of ill will between pilots and
intelligence agents. As former USAF intelligence
officer, Gilles Van Nederveen noted, ‘US pilots,
already frustrated by the small amount of data
provided to them, felt betrayed when they
learned that some losses over Vietnam could
have been prevented if intelligence data had
been shared with them.’ This animosity grew so
prevalent that it received a name: ‘green door
syndrome,’ so labelled because, in many combat
wing bases in the theatre, classified information
was kept in vaults usually behind a green door.
[14]

LINEBACKER and Project Teaball

When bombing (and air-to-air combat)


resumed in earnest with the LINEBACKER
campaign in May 1972, the US, particularly the
USAF, received what Colonel Russ Everts, an F-
4 Pilot, generously called ‘an old fashioned butt
kicking, pure and simple.’[15] After some initial
successes that May, in June and July, USAF F-4
Phantoms claimed 8 MiGs, with the US Navy
shooting down only 3. While the US Navy only
lost one F-4, USAF lost 13.[16] The US Navy
could still claim their previous 3:1 ratio; the
USAF had sunk to its lowest ratio during the
war, 0.6:1. For the first time in the war, the kill
ratios favoured the North Vietnamese.

These reversals rippled through USAF quickly,


prompting investigations into the quality of
fighter pilots. General William Momyer, then
commander of Tactical Air Command (TAC),
who had previously resisted any alterations to
training procedures, changed his mind and
recommended the creation of an ‘Aggressor’
squadron to simulate MiGs in air combat
training (building on a program at Nellis run by
Major Roger Wells). Although Chief of Staff of
the Air Force General John Ryan approved the
Aggressor concept at that time, the program did
not begin until after the war was over and thus
it had no effect on air combat in Vietnam.[17]

However, one element the USAF could fix in


time to make a difference was their GCI system.
The summer’s heavy losses, increasing concern
from Vogt about the shortcomings of American
GCI, and pressure from eager NSA analysts and
USAF pilots all overrode earlier concerns with
sharing classified intelligence and pushed the
issue higher up the chain of command. Ryan
directly contacted the head of the NSA, Admiral
Noel Gayler – himself a former US Navy aviator
– and requested the creation of an improved
early warning system to alert pilots to
approaching MiGs. With Ryan and Gayler’s
approval, General Vogt worked with Delmar
Lang and Lieutenant Colonel William Kirk to
establish Project Teaball at Nakhom Phanom Air
Force Base in Thailand in August 1972.[18]
The flow of information from various radar and SIGINT
sources, to the Teaball center that was eventually
disseminated to pilots. (Source: Nederveen, ‘Wizardryʼ)

‘Teaball’ took the classified NSA intercepts and


combined them with other US radar sources.
These included the radio calls sent from North
Vietnamese pilots to their ground controllers
and vice versa, revealing precise locations and
vectors for their MiGs. This information was fed
into a computer known as ‘Iron Horse’ that took
data from these sources and quickly synthesised
it into a composite display showing a near real-
time picture of the location of all friendly and
enemy aircraft over North Vietnam.[19]
‘Teaball’ operators then sent this information
directly to pilots via Ultra-High Frequency
(UHF) radio signals relayed through a Boeing
KC-135 aircraft code-named ‘Luzon.’

There was still tension between some pilots and


the intelligence community. Kirk worked to
build trust between the two groups and
overcome ‘green door syndrome’ by personally
visiting every single wing in the theatre to brief
them on ‘Teaball’s’ capabilities, the accuracy of
its data, and the methods he used to contact
pilots directly.[20] Finally, US pilots could have
situational awareness of the aerial battlefield
and early warning of MiG threats. However,
‘Teaball’s’ implementation differed from the
authoritarian North Vietnamese GCI system and
simply provided information to pilots. The
American ground controllers often suggested
courses of action, but individual pilots handled
threats at their discretion.

The Best Show We’ve Had

‘Teaball’ was only active from August 1972 until


the end of LINEBACKER operations in October.
In that time, USAF F-4’s shot down 21 MiGs
with only six losses. Of those kills, 13 were a
direct result of vectoring from ‘Teaball.’[21] Of
those losses, five of the six occurred when
‘Teaball’ was down due to technical failure,
demonstrating just how critical the system was
to the USAF effort. When examining only
MiGCAP flights, USAF F-4s claimed 18 kills with
five losses, a nearly 6:1 ratio.[22] During that
same timespan, the US Navy got two kills but
lost two Phantoms.[23] General Vogt extolled
the program’s success:

This is the most effective show we’ve had


during the entire war with the battle against
the MiGs […] This proved one thing – if you
can show the American fighter pilot where
[the enemy] is in sufficient time, he’ll shoot
him down.[24]

Vogt went on to say:

Same airplane, same environment, same


situation, same tactics; largely [the] difference
[was] Teaball. It was one of the most
impressive developments we’ve had out here.
[25]

Pilots praised ‘Teaball’ as well. One mission


report stated: ‘A good GCI capability made the
difference, and will in the future.’ Another
echoed: ‘Computerized real-time intelligence
will get more kills than all the fighter sweeps we
can put together.’[26]
No matter how well-trained a pilot is, if they do
not realise they’re under attack, they cannot use
their training. ‘Teaball’ gave them that
warning, preventing further losses. ‘Teaball’
also provided more accurate visual recording of
encounters than the memory of pilots could
provide, enabling both a better study of enemy
tactics and a useful training tool. It was also
invaluable for search and rescue efforts, as
‘Teaball’ data could pinpoint the location of
downed aircrews, enabling rescue craft to arrive
quickly.[27]

However, the program, literally operating out of


the back of a van, was not without problems.
[28] The ‘Iron Horse’ computer was powerful
for its time, but processing the data of all the
SIGINT and radar inputs took an average of two
minutes – an eternity in a dogfight. For this
reason, ‘Teaball’s’ role was limited to providing
early warning only. Once combat began, most
pilots relied on more timely information from
‘Disco’ or ‘Red Crown’ if in range.[29] Also, the
UHF radio relays in F-4 cockpits were old and
broke down frequently.[30]

Increased American success forced the North


Vietnamese Air Force to scale back its
operations, flying fewer missions and
attempting to counter ‘Teaball’s’ tracking
ability by turning off their IFF (Identify-Friend-
or-Foe) signals. However, that separated North
Vietnamese pilots from their GCI, their chief
advantage to this point. They could run with
radio silence, but that risked making them
vulnerable to their surface-to-air missiles
(SAMs). ‘Teaball’ operators could spot them as
soon as they tried to alert their missile sites. The
more common technique the North Vietnamese
used to get around ‘Teaball’ was deception.
Ground controllers sent messages pretending to
be pilots, essentially creating ‘ghost MiGs.’
However, ‘Teaball’s’ operators could easily
distinguish between these fake calls and
authentic ones due to differences in the signal
itself.[31]

When LINEBACKER ended, so did most air-to-


air combat, but ‘Teaball’ stood ready when
LINEBACKER II commenced on 18 December
1972. Lieutenant General Horace Wade, Vice
Chief of Staff of the Air Force, was impressed
enough with ‘Teaball’ to move it into a
permanent facility at Nakom Phenom.[32]
However, MiGs barely flew during the operation
– only 26 were even sighted. USAF Phantoms
took down four, the US Navy got one more, and
B-52 gunners shot down two. USAF lost two
Phantoms to MiGs. North Vietnamese sources
claim that MiGs shot down two B-52s as well,
but this is unconfirmed by the U.S.[33] This 3.5:1
is above average for the war, if not as impressive
as when ‘Teaball’ was most active in
LINEBACKER. However, the sample size for
LINEBACKER II is incredibly small, and the
operation was unique. In any case, although
SAMs wreaked havoc on the B-52 fleet, MiGs did
not pose a significant threat. By 28 December
1972, North Vietnam had exhausted its SAM
supply and was incapable of defending itself
from the B-52 raids. When Hanoi expressed its
desire to renew serious negotiations, President

Nixon halted all bombing north of the 20th


parallel. With the signing of final settlements on
23 January 1973, air-to-air combat in the
Vietnam War ended.[34]

Conclusion

The typical, perhaps romanticised narrative of


air combat in Vietnam is that the US Navy used
the ‘correct’ approach when creating the Top
Gun program and that the USAF deserves
criticism for its failure to produce a similar
program and its adherence to technological
chimeras. However, this story ignores that the
US Navy also used technological improvements,
including upgrades to their missiles and the
jamming of enemy communications. It fails to
note that the US Navy engaged fewer MiGs
during the LINEBACKER period, with little
contact with the more advanced MiG-21
Fishbed, so perhaps a direct comparison of each
service’s kill counts is misleading.

Furthermore, this narrative fails to recognise


that the USAF saw a more significant
improvement in its effectiveness than did the
US Navy in the same period owing to the
systems-based, technological approach of
Project Teaball. Top Gun worked, but ‘Teaball’
worked better. The role performed by ‘Teaball’
laid the foundation for the later role of Airborne
Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) that has
become an essential element of American air
power strategy. In the final phase of the
Vietnam War, the USAF demonstrated that
technological solutions could be effective.

Dr Michael Hankins is the Curator of US Air


Force History at the Smithsonian National Air
and Space Museum. He is a former Professor of
Strategy at the USAF Air Command and Staff
College eSchool, and former Instructor of
Military History at the U.S. Air Force Academy.
He earned his PhD from Kansas State University
in 2018 with his dissertation, ‘The Cult of the
Lightweight Fighter: Culture and Technology in
the U.S. Air Force, 1964-1991.’ He completed his
master’s thesis at the University of North Texas
in 2013, titled ‘The Phantom Menace: The F-4
in Air-to-Air Combat in the Vietnam War.’ He
has a web page here and can be found on Twitter
at @hankinstien.

Header Image: A U.S. Air Force Lockheed EC-121K


‘Rivet Top’ of the 552nd Airborne Early Warning &
Control Wing, based at Korat Royal Thai Air Force
Base, Thailand, in 1967-68. (Source: Wikimedia)

[1] This article is adapted from Michael


Hankins, ‘The Teaball Solution: The Evolution
of Air Combat Technology in Vietnam, 1968-
1972,’ Air Power History, 63:3 (2016), pp. 7-24.

[2] John Correll, The Air Force in the Vietnam War,


The Air Force Association (Arlington, VA:
Aerospace Education Foundation, 2004), p. 17.
See also Robert Futrell, et al., Aces and Aerial
Victories: The United States Air Force in
Southeast Asia, 1965-1973 (Maxwell Air Force
Base, AL: Albert F. Simpson Historical Research
Center, Air University, 1976); Chris Hobson,
Vietnam Air Losses: United States Air Force Navy
and Marine Corps Fixed-Wing Aircraft Losses in
Southeast Asia 1961-1973 (England: Midland,
2001); and the Red Baron Reports, Volumes I, II,
and III, Institute for Defense Analyses Systems
Evaluation Division.

[3] Roger K. Wilcox, Scream of Eagles: The


Dramatic Account of the US Navy’s Top Gun Fighter
Pilots: How they Took Back the Skies over Vietnam
(New York, NY: Pocket Books, 1992), p. xii.

[4] Red Baron II Vol. I, C-1–E-2, USAF Fighter


Weapons Center, 1973; and Red Baron III, Vol. I,
C-1–D-6, USAF Fighter Weapons Center, 1974.

[5] Wilcox, Scream of Eagles, 214-215; See for


example Steven A. Fino, ‘Breaking the Trance:
The Perils of Technological Exuberance in the
US Air Force Entering Vietnam,’ Journal of
Military History, 77:2 (2013), pp. 625-55.

[6] United States Air Force Oral History


Program, Interview #K239.0512-630, Captain
Richard S. Ritchie, 11 Oct 72 and 30 Oct 72, 1, pp.
74-5.
[7] William Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars
(Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History,
1978), pp. 150-5.

[8] Marshall Michel, Clashes: Air Combat Over


North Vietnam, 1965-1972 (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1997), p. 114.

[9] Futrell, Aces, p. 14; Momyer, Air Power, p.


155; Michel, Clashes, p. 226.

[10] M. F. Porter, ‘Linebacker: Overview of the


First 120 Days,’ Project CHECO Report, 27 Sept
1973, p. 48.

[11] Ritchie Interview, 37, 8.

[12] Thomas R. Johnson, American Cryptology


During the Cold War, 1945-1989, Book II:
Centralization Wins, 1960-1972 (Fort Meade, MD:
Center for Cryptologic History, National
Security Agency, 1995), p. 580.

[13] Michel, Clashes, p. 115; See also Walter J.


Boyne, ‘The Teaball Tactic,’ Air Force Magazine
(July 2008), p. 68; and Gilles Van Nederveen,
‘Wizardry for Air Campaigns: Signals
Intelligence Support to the Cockpit’ (Research
paper for the College of Aerospace Doctrine,
Research, and Education, Airpower Research
Institute, Maxwell: 2001), pp. 2-3.
[14] Nederveen, ‘Wizardry,’ 24.

[15] Quoted in Marshall Michel III, “The Revolt


of the Majors: How the Air Force Changed After
Vietnam” (PhD Thesis, Auburn University,
2006), p. 145.

[16] Red Baron III, C-1–D-6.

[17] Michel, ‘The Revolt,’ 146-52. See also,


Brian D. Laslie, The Air Force Way of War: US
Tactics and Training after Vietnam (Lexington,
KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2015).

[18] Johnson, American Cryptology; Boyne, ‘The


Teaball Tactic,’ p. 69; Nederveen, ‘Wizardry,’ p.
25. See also Calvin R. Johnson, ‘Linebacker
Operations: September – December 1972,’
Project CHECO Report, 31 December 1978, p. 50.

[19] Author redacted, ‘TEABALL: Some Personal


Observations of SIGINT at War,’ Cryptologic
Quarterly, 9 (Winter 1991), p. 92.

[20] Quoted in Boyne, ‘The Teaball Tactic,’ pp.


69-70. See also Nederveen, ‘Wizardry,’ p. 25-6.

[21] Johnson, American Cryptology, p. 580. See


also Johnson, ‘Linebacker Operations,’ p. 52.

[22] William Sayers, ‘The Red Baron Reports:


What They Really Said,’ Air Power History, 52:3
(2005), p. 12, 39. See also Johnson, ‘Linebacker
Operations,’ p. 52.

[23] Red Baron III, Vol. 1, C-1–D-6.

[24] Quoted in Porter, ‘Linebacker: Overview of


the First 120 Days,’ pp. 46-7.

[25] Quoted in Johnson, ‘Linebacker


Operations,’ pp. 52-4.

[26] Red Baron III, vol. III, C-29.

[27] Nederveen, ‘Wizardry,’ pp. 28-9.

[28] Johnson, American Cryptology, p. 579.

[29] Ibid., p. 31.

[30] Ibid., pp. 28-9; Ritchie Interview, p. 8.

[31] Author redacted, ‘TEABALL: Some Personal


Observations,’ 94-5.

[32] Ibid., p. 95.

[33] Red Baron III, C-1–D-6. Roger Boniface,


MiGs Over North Vietnam: The Vietnam People’s
Air Force in Combat (Mechanicsburg, VA:
Stackpole Books, 2010), p. 141, 145. See also,
István Toperczer, Mig-21 Units of the Vietnam
War and MiG-17 and MiG-19 Units of the Vietnam
War, both from Osprey Press. Toperczer and
Boniface each claimed to have examined North
Vietnamese records, but make no mention or
citation of specific documents, and their work
has not been peer reviewed. Naturally their
claims for NVAF victories are significantly
higher that official US records. While their
claims may have merit, this article has chosen
to rely on official US records where possible,
admitting that these are also not perfect.

[34] Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The


American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York:
The Free Press, 1989), pp. 188-9, 198-200.

Categories: Air Power History, Article, Cold War

Tags: Cold War, Dr Micheal Hankins, Ground Control


Intercept, Lockheed EC-121, McDonnell Douglas F-4
Phantom, North Vietnamese Air Force, Project Teaball,
Signals Intelligence, Top Gun, United States Air Force,
United States Navy, Vietnam War

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