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(I) TOPIC: QUASI-LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION (Necessity for Notice and Hearing)
The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) General Manager issued an administrative
order to the fact that all existing regular appointments to harbor pilot positions shall
remain valid only up to December 31 of the current year and that henceforth all
appointments to harbor pilot positions shall be only for a term of one year from date
of effectively, subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the PPA after conduct of a
rigid evaluation of performance. Pilotage as a profession may be practiced only by
duly licensed individuals, who have to pass five government professional
examinations. The Harbor Pilot Association challenged the validity of said
administrative order arguing that it violated the harbor pilots' right to exercise their
profession and their right to due process of law and that the said administrative
order was issued without prior notice and hearing. The PPA countered that the
administrative order was valid as it was issued in the exercise of its administrative
control and supervision over harbor pilots under PPA's legislative charter; and that in
issuing the order as a rule or regulation, it was performing its executive or
legislative, and not a quasi-judicial function. Due process of law is classified into two
kinds, namely, procedural due process and substantive due process of law. Was
there, or, was there no violation of the harbor pilots' right to exercise their
profession and their right to due process of law?
Suggested Answer:
The right of the pilots to due process was violated. As held, in Corona vs. United
Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines, 283 SCRA 31 (1997), pilotage as a
profession is a property right protected by the guarantee of due process. The pre-
evaluation cancellation of the licenses of the harbor pilots every year is
unreasonable and violated their right to substantive due process. The renewal is
dependent on the evaluation after the licenses have been cancelled. The issuance
of the administrative order also violated procedural due process, since no prior
public hearing was conducted. As held in Commissioner r of Internal Revenue vs.
Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 237 (199), when a regulation is being issued under the
quasi-legislative authority of an administrative agency, the requirements of notice,
hearing and publication must be observed.


Give the two (2) requisites for the judicial review of administrative
decision/actions, that is, when is an administrative action ripe for judicial
Suggested Answer:
1. The administrative action has already been fully completed and, therefore, is a
final agency action; and
2. All administrative remedies have been exhausted. (Gonzales, Administrative
Law, Rex Bookstore: Manila, p. 136 (1979).

(I)TOPIC: QUASI-LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION (Necessity for Notice and Hearing)

The Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued new rules and regulations
governing pilotage services and fees and the conduct of pilots in Philippine ports.
This it did without notice, hearing nor consultation with harbor pilots or their
associations whose rights and activities are to be substantially affected. The harbor
pilots then filed suit to have the new MARINA rules and regulations declared
unconstitutional for having been issued without due process.
Suggested Answer:
The issuance of the new rules and regulations violated due process. Under Section
9, Chapter II, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987, as far as practicable,
before adopting proposed rules, an administrative agency should publish or
circulate notices of the proposed rules and afford interested parties the
opportunity to submit their views; and in the fixing of rates, no rule shall be valid
unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general
circulation at least two weeks before the first hearing on them. In accordance with
this provision, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA
236 (1996), it was held that when an administrative rule substantially increases the
burden of those directly affected, they should be accorded the chance to be heard
before its issuance.
Alternative Answer:
Submission of the rule to the University of the Philippines Law Center for
publication is mandatory. Unless this requirement is complied with, the rule
cannot be enforced.

(II) TOPIC: JUDICIAL REVIEW (Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies)

A) Explain the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
B) Give at least three exceptions to its application.
Suggested Answer:
A) The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies means that when an
adequate remedy is available within the Executive Department, a litigant must first
exhaust this remedy before he can resort to the courts. The purpose of the
doctrine is to enable the administrative agencies to correct themselves if they have
committed an error. (Rosales vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 344 (198 .
B) The following are the exceptions to the application of the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
1. The question involved is purely legal;
2. The administrative body is in estoppel;
3. The act complained of is patently illegal;
4. There is an urgent need for judicial intervention;
5. The claim involved is small;
6. Grave and irreparable injury will be suffered;
7. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
8. Strong public interest is involved;
9. The subject of the controversy is private law;
10. The case involves a quo warranto proceeding (Sunville Timber Products, Inc. vs.
Abad, 206 SCRA 482 (1992);
11. The party was denied due process (SamahangMagbubukid ng Kapdula, Inc. vs.
Court Appeals, 305 SCRA 147 (1999);
12. The decision is that of a Department Secretary (Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals,
G. R. No. 131641, February 23, 2000);
13. Resort to administrative remedies would be futile (university of the Philippines
Board of Regents vs. Rasul, 200 SCRA 685 (1991)
14. There is unreasonable delay (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 301 SCRA 237 (1999)
15. The action involves recovery of physical possession of public land (Gabrito vs.
Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 771 (198 ;
16. The party is poor (Sabello vs. Department of Education,


The Municipality of Binangonan, Rizal passed a resolution authorizing the operation
of an open garbage dumpsite in a 9-hectare land in the Reyes Estate within the
Municipality's territorial limits. Some concerned residents of Binangonan filed a
complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) to stop the operation
of the dumpsite due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents. The LLDA
conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring, testing and water sampling and
found that the dumpsite would contaminate Laguna de Bay and the surrounding
areas of the Municipality. The LLDA also discovered that no environmental clearance
was secured by the Municipality from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and the LLDA as required by law. The LLDA therefore issued to the
Binangonan Municipal Government a cease and desist order to stop the operation of
the dumpsite. The Municipality of Binangonan filed a case to annul the order issued
by the LLDA.
1. Can the Municipality of Binangonan invoke police power to prevent its residents
and the LLDA from interfering with the operation of the dumpsite by the
Municipality? Explain.
2. Can the LLDA justify its order by asserting that the health of the residents will be
adversely affected? Explain.
Suggested Answer:
1. No, the Municipality of Binangonan cannot invoke its police power. According to
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 292, under
Republic Act No. 4850, the LLDA is mandated to promote the development of the
Laguna Lake area, including the surrounding Province of Rizal, with due regard to
the prevention of pollution. The LLDA is mandated to pass upon and approve or
disapprove all projects proposed by local government offices within the region.
2. Yes, the LLDA can justify its order. Since it has been authorized by Executive
Order No. 927 to make orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution, its power
to issue the order can be inferred from this. Otherwise, it will be a toothless
agency. Moreover, the LLDA is specifically authorized under its Charter to issue
cease and desist orders.


On July 1991, the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), in response to public clamor,
issued a resolution approving and adopting a schedule for bringing down the prices
of petroleum products over a period of one (1) year starting 15 August 1991, over
the objection of the oil companies which claim that the period covered is too long to
prejudge and foresee. Is the resolution valid?
Suggested Answer:
No, the resolution is not valid, since the Energy Regulatory Board issued the
resolution without a hearing. The resolution here is not a provisional order and
therefore it can only be issued after appropriate notice and hearing to affected
parties. The ruling in Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. Alcuaz,
180 SCRA 218, to the effect that an order provisionally reducing the rates which a
public utility could charge, could be issued without previous notice and hearing,
cannot apply.


Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2, issued by President Corazon C. Aquino created the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and empowered it to
sequester any property shown prima facie to be ill-gotten wealth of the late
President Marcos, his relatives and cronies. Executive Order No. 14 vests on the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction to try hidden wealth cases. On April 14, 1986, after an
investigation, the PCGG sequestered the assets of X Corporation, Inc. (1) X
Corporation, Inc, claimed that President Aquino as President, could not lawfully
issue Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14, which have the force of law, on the ground that
legislation is a function of Congress. Decide. (2) Said corporation also questioned the
validity of the threeexecutive orders on the ground that they are bills of attainder
and, therefore, unconstitutional. Decide
Suggested Answer:
(1) The contention of X Corporation should be rejected. Executive orders Nos. 1, 2
and 14 were issued in 1986. At that time President Corazon Aquino exercised
legislative power Section 1, Article II of the Provisional Constitution established by
Proclamation No. 3, provided: "Until a legislature is elected and convened under a
new constitution, the President shall continue to exercise legislative power." In
case of Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalan ng Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Tan, 163
SCRA 371, the Supreme Court ruled that the Provisional Constitution and the 1987
Constitution, both recognized the power of the President to exercise legislative
powers until the first Congress created under the 1987 Constitution was convened
on June 27, 1987.
(2) Executive Orders Nos. 1,2 and 14 are not bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a
legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. On the contrary, the
expressly provide that any judgment that the property sequestered is ill-gotten
wealth is to be made by a court (the Sandiganbayan) only after trial.


A. After 2 February 1987, the Philippine National bank (PNB) grants a loan to
congressman X. Is the loan violative of the Constitution? Suppose the loan had
instead been granted before 2 February 1987, but was outstanding on that date
with a remaining balance on the principal in the amount of P50,000, can the PNB
validly give Congressman X an extension of time after said date to stele the
B. For being notoriously undesirable and recidivist, Jose Tapulan, an employee in the
first level of the career service in the Office of the Provincial Governor of Masbate,
was dismissed by the Governor without formal investigation pursuant to Section 40
of the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. 807) which authorizes summary proceedings in
such cases. As a lawyer of Jose what steps, if any, would you take to protect his
Suggested Answer:
A. whether or not the loan is violative of the 1987 Constitution depends upon its
purpose, if it was obtained for a business purpose; it is violative of the
Constitution. If it was obtained for some other purpose, e.g. for housing, it is not
violative of the Constitution because under Section 16, Article XI, Members of
Congress are prohibited from obtaining loans from government-owned banks only
if it is for a business purpose. If the loan was granted before the effectivity of the
Constitution on February 2, 1987, the Philippine National Bank cannot extend its
maturity after February 2, 1987, if the loan was obtained for a business purpose. In
such case the extension is a financial accommodation which is also prohibited by
the Constitution.
B. Section 40 of the Civil Service Decree has been repealed by republic Act No.
6654. As a lawyer of Jose Tapulan, I will file a petition for mandamus to compel his
reinstatement. In accordance with the ruling in Mangubat vs. Osmeña, G.R. No. L-
12837, April 30, 1959, there is no need to exhaust all administrative remedies by
appealing to Civil Service Commission, since the act of the governor is patently


An existing law grants government employees the option to retire upon reaching the
age of 57 years and completion of at least 30 years of total, government service. As
a fiscal retrenchment measure, the Office of the President later issued a
Memorandum Circular requiring physical incapacity as an additional condition for
optional retirement age of 65 years. A government employee, whose application for
optional retirement was denied because he was below 65 years of age and was not
physically incapacitated, filed an action in court questioning the disapproval of his
application claiming that the Memorandum Circular is void. Is the contention of the
employee correct? Explain.
Suggested Answer:
Yes, the contention of the employee is correct. In Marasigan vs. Cruz, SCRA , it was
held that such memorandum circular is void. By introducing physical capacity as
additional condition for optional retirement, the memorandum circular tried to
amend the law. Such power is lodged with the legislative branch and not with the
executive branch.


In 1986, F, then the officer-in-charge of Botolan, Zambales, was accused of having
violated the ANTI-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandigan Bayan. Before
he could be arraigned, he was elected Governor of Zambales. After his arraignment,
he put under preventive suspension by the Sandiganbayan " for the duration of the
(1) Can F successfully challenge the legality of his preventive suspension on the
ground that the criminal case against him involved acts committed during his term
as officer-in-charge and not during his term as Governor?
(2) Can F validly object to the aforestated duration of his suspension?
Suggested Answer:
(1) No, F cannot successfully challenge the legality of his preventive suspension on
the ground that the criminal case against him involve acts committed during his
term as OIC and not during his term as governor because suspension from office
under Republic Act 3019 refers to any office that the respondent is presently
holding and not necessarily to the one which he hold when he committed the
crime with which he is charged. This was the ruling in Deloso vs. Sandiganbayan,
173 SCRA 409
(2) Yes, F Can validly object to the duration of the suspension. In Deloso vs.
Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 409, it was held that the imposition of preventive
suspension for an indefinite period of time is unreasonable and violates the right of
the accused to due process. The people who elected the governor to office would
be deprived of his services for an indefinite period, and his right to hold office
would be nullified. Moreover, since under Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree
the duration of preventive suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days, equal
protection demands that the duration of preventive suspension under the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act be also limited to ninety (90) days only.