Case #1
Kuroda v. Jalandoni W/N EO 68 is illegal based on the argument of Petitioner Kuroda – NO
March 26, 1949 | G.R. No. L-2662 | March 26, 1949
Petitioners: Shigenori Kuroda
Respondent: Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General
CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO
BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA, Major FEDERICO ARANAS,
MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT
DOCTRINE:
The rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions form part of and
are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. Such
rules and principles, therefore, form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our
Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not
confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained
in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
FACTS:
1. ​In 1947, The President of the Philippines issued Executive Order No. 68,
establishing a National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations
governing the trial of accused war criminals.
2. ​Petitioner Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army
and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines, is
charged before a Military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, with having unlawfully disregarded and failed
"to discharge his duties as such commander to control the operations of
members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other
high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial
Japanese Forces, in violation of the laws and customs of war.
3. ​Petitioner seeks to establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 on the
ground that it violates not only the provisions of our constitutional law but also
our local laws, and that the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the
Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and,
therefore, petitioner is charged with 'crimes' not based on law, national and
international.
ISSUE:
RULING:
1. ​The Court held that it is valid and constitutional based on Article 2 of the
Constitution:
● The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the nation.
2. ​In accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law of the
present day, including the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and
significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United
Nations, all those persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of
planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of
crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto, in violation of the laws
and customs of war, of humanity and civilization, are held accountable therefor.
Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement of Executive Order
No. 68, the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the
generally accepted principles and policies of international law which are
part of our Constitution.
3. ​It cannot be denied that the rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva
conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted
principles of international law. In fact, these rules and principles were accepted
by the two belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who were
signatories to the two Conventions.
4. ​Such rules and principles, therefore, form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, ​for our
Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is
not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law
as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be
a signatory.
5. ​Furthermore, when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly
committed, the Philippines was under the sovereignty of the United States, and
thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan, to
the rights and obligations contained in the treaties between the belligerent
countries. ​These rights and obligations were not erased by our assumption of full
sovereignty. If at all, our emergence as a free state entitles us to enforce the
right, on our own, of trying and punishing those who committed crimes against
our people.

Case No # 2
Philip Morris Inc., Benson & Hedges (Canada), Inc., and Fabriques of Tabac
Reunies, S.A. v. Court Of Appeals and Fortune Tobacco Corporation,
July 16, 1993| G.R No. 91332| Domestic v Int’l Law
Petitioners: Philip Morris Inc., Benson & Hedges (Canada), Inc., and Fabriques of
Tabac Reunies, S.A
Respondent: ​Court Of Appeals and Fortune Tobacco Corporation
Super Summarized Version:
Petitioners are foreign corporations organized under US laws not doing business in
the Philippines and registered owners of symbols ‘MARK VII,’ ‘MARK TEN,’ and
‘LARK’ used in their cigarette products. Petitioners moved to enjoin respondent
Fortune Tobacco from manufacturing and selling cigarettes bearing the symbol
‘MARK’ asserting that it is identical or confusingly similar with their trademarks.
Petitioners relied on Section 21-A of the Trademark Law to bring their suit and the
Paris Convention to protect their trademarks. The court denied the prayer for
injunction stating that since petitioners are not doing business in the Philippines,
respondent’s cigarettes would not cause irreparable damage to petitioner. CA
granted the injunction but on a subsequent motion, dissolved the writ.
DOCTRINE:
Equal Standing of International Law and Municipal Law
RELEVANT LAWS USED:
TRADEMARK LAW SECTION 21-A. ​Any foreign corporation or juristic person
to which a mark or trade-name has been registered or assigned under this act may
bring an action hereunder for infringement, for unfair competition, or false
designation of origin and false description, whether or not it has been licensed to do
business in the Philippines under Act Numbered Fourteen hundred and fifty-nine,
as amended, otherwise known as the Corporation Law, at the time it brings
complaint: Provided, That the country of which the said foreign corporation or
juristic person is a citizen or in which it is domiciled, by treaty, convention or law,
grants a similar privilege to corporate or juristic persons of the Philippines
FACTS:
● Petitioners are questioning the decision made by the CA in which the said
court lifted the Writ of Preliminary Injunction it had earlier issued against
Fortune Tobacco Corp herein private respondents ​from manufacturing
and selling “MARK” cigarettes in the local market.
● The petitioners bank on the thesis that they’re respective symbols “MARK
VII”, “MARK TEN”, and “LARK” which are also cigarettes, must be
protected from ​unauthorized appropriation​.
● Petitioner Philip Morris, INC a corporation (State of Virginia, U.S.A), is
the registered owner of the trademark ​“MARK VII” for cigarettes.
Similarly, petitioner Benson & Hedges (Canada), Inc., a subsidiary of
Philip Morris, Inc., is the registered owner of the trademark “​MARK TEN”
for cigarettes ​Fabriques de Tabac Reunies, S.A​. (Swiss company), another
subsidiary of Philip Morris, Inc., is the assignee of the trademark ​“LARK,”
● [IMPORTANT] It should be noted here that these foreign companies are
not engaged in the sale, manufacture, importation, exportation and
advertisement of their cigarette products in the Philippines.
● Petitioners argue that Private respondent has no right to manufacture and
sell cigarettes bearing an allegedly identical trademark ​“MARK”. ​This is in
contravention to Sec 22 of the Trademark Law and should be granted
Preliminary Injunction.
● Petitioner’s prayer for preliminary injunction was first denied by the RTC
Pasig. As stated in the pleadings of the parties, the defendant asks “how
could MARK cigarettes cause the petitioners irreparable damage within the
territorial limits of the Philippines? Petitioners argue that since their
trademarks are entitled to protection ​by treaty obligation under Art.2 of
the PARIS convention of which the Philippines is a member of, and as
such, have the force and effect of law under the Constitution.
● Defendant argues that since petitioners are not engaged in sale here in the
PH, coupled by the fact that the Director of Patents has not denied their
pending application for registration of its trademark “MARK”, ​the grant
for preliminary injunction if premature.
● It has been held that in order for a ​preliminary injunction be granted, it
should be clear and free from doubt.
● There is no question that defendant has been authorized by BIR to
manufacture cigarettes with MARK as its trademark. The authority is
however, ​qualified​. It does not ​give the defendant protection against any
person or entity whose rights may be prejudiced by infringement or
unfair competition in relation to your indicated trademarks/brands​.
● The registration of the trademark “MARK” seems to still be pending for
approval from the Philippine Patent Office. It being so, the defendant is still
allowed to use “MARK” until the ownership is finally resolved.
RTC: The ​RTC ​then again denied the second motion for reconsideration for the
issuance of the injunctive writ. The petitioners failed to establish by competent
evidence that the products of defendant adversely affected them.
CA: Reversed the decision of the RTC and granted the writ of preliminary
injunction. But on a subsequent motion, the CA then affirmed the decision of the
RTC.
ISSUES:
1. W/N there has been an invasion of Plaintiffs’ right of property to such
trademark or trade name - NO
2. W/N petitioner may be granted injunctive relief
HELD:
1. Petitioners as foreign corporations not engaged in the local commerce, rely
on Sec 21-A of the Trademark law to drive home a point that they ​are not
precluded from initiating a cause of action in the Philippines on
account of the principal perception that another entity is pirating their
symbol without authority to do so.
[SUPER IMPORTANT] ​Additionally, the petitioners desire to impress upon the
court is the ​protection they enjoy under the PARIS CONVENTION of 1965 to
which the Philippines is a signatory. ​However, the SC held that there is NO
NECESSITY to treat the matter with an extensive response because adherence of the
Philippines to the ​1965 international covenant ​due to ​PACT SUN SERVANDA - (a​
latin term which means agreements must be kept. It is the principle in international
law which says that international treaties should be upheld by all the signatories) -
GOOGLE
Given these existing laws, the SC held that the guiding principle involving
commercial law is that ​foreign corporations NOT ENGAGED in business in the
PH may maintain a cause of action for infringement due to Section 21-A of the
Trademark Law. In line with this, the petitioners believe that ​actual use of their
trademarks in PH Commercial dealings IS NOT AN INDISPENSABLE
ELEMENT under ART.2 of the Paris Convention
Yet, ​this was however countered by Sections 2 and 2-A of the Trademark law which
spoke loudly about the necessity of actual commercial use of the trademark.
[SUPER IMPORTANT] ​The fact that international law has been made part of the
law of the land DOES NOT by any means imply the primacy of international law
over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the ​DOCTRINE OF
INCORPORATION ​as applied in most countries, ​RULES OF international law
are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislative enactments.
A fundamental principle of Philippine Trademark law is that actual use in commerce
in the PH is a pre-requisite to the acquisition of ownership over a trademark or
tradename. Records show that petitioner has never conducted business in the PH. It
is unknown to all Filipinos and it has never paid a single centavo of tax to the PH
Gov’t. ​Under the law, IT HAS NO RIGHT TO THE REMEDY IT SEEKS.
[You guys can read this part na. It’s the summary of the whole issue] In other
words, ​Petitioners may have the capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of lack
of business activity in the Philippines on account of Section 21-A of the Trademark
Law but the question whether they have an exclusive right over their symbol as to
justify issuance of the controversial writ will depend on actual use of their
trademarks in the Philippines in line with Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law. It is
thus incongruous for petitioners to claim that when a foreign corporation not licensed
to do business in Philippines files a complaint for infringement, the entity need not
be actually using its trademark in commerce in the Philippines. Such a foreign
corporation may have the personality to file a suit for infringement but it may not
necessarily be entitled to protection due to absence of actual use of the emblem in the
local market.
2. NO. More telling are the allegations of petitioners in their complaint as
well as in the very petition filed with this Court indicating that they are not
doing business in the Philippines, for these frank representations are
inconsistent and incongruent with any pretense of a right which can
breached. Indeed, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioner must
show that there exists a right to be protected and that the facts against
which injunction is directed are violative of said right. On the economic
repercussion of this case, we are extremely bothered by the thought of
having to participate in throwing into the streets Filipino workers engaged
in the manufacture and sale of private respondent’s “MARK” cigarettes
who might be retrenched and forced to join the ranks of the many
unemployed and unproductive as a result of the issuance of a simple writ of
preliminary injunction and this, during the pendency of the case before the
trial court, not to mention the diminution of tax revenues represented to be
close to a quarter million pesos annually. On the other hand, if the status
quo is maintained, there will be no damage that would be suffered by
petitioners inasmuch as they are not doing business in the Philippines. In
view of the explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint that they
are not engaged in business in the Philippines, it inevitably follows that no
conceivable damage can be suffered by them not to mention the foremost
consideration heretofore discussed on the absence of their “right” to be
protected.
Case No. 3
Tanada vs Angara
May 2, 1997| G.R No. 118295| International Law
Petitioners: ​DR. VICTORIA L. BATIQUIN and ALLAN BATIQUIN
Respondent: ​COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES QUEDO D. ACOGIDO and
FLOTILDE G. VILLEGAS
Summary:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Philippines acceding to the World
Trade Organization for being violative of provisions which are supposed to give
preference to Filipino workers and economy and on the ground that it infringes
legislative and judicial power. The WTO, through it provisions on “most favored
nation” and national treatment, require that nationals and other member countries
are placed in the same footing in terms of products and services. However, the
Court brushed off these contentions and ruled that the WTO is constitutional.
Sections 10 and 12 of Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) should be
read in relation to Sections 1 and 13 (promoting the general welfare). Also, Section
10 is self-executing only to “rights, privileges, and concessions covering national
economy and patrimony” but ​not every aspect of trade and commerce. There are
balancing provisions in the Constitution allowing the Senate to ratify the WTO
agreement. Also, the Constitution doesn’t rule out foreign competition. States
waive certain amount of sovereignty when entering into treaties.
DOCTRINE:
BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:
● The present case first provided a brief historical background on various
international institutions such as the UN, WB and the IMF and the W​orld
Trade Organization (WTO).
● Philippines is a member of the WTO as articulated by President Ramos in 2
letters to the senate. This benefits not only the economy, but also the legal
profession - by judicial Adjudication through the indepent WTO settlement
bodies called (1) Dispute settlement Panels and (2) Appellate Tribunals.
PETITION IN BRIEF:
● This case questions the constitutionality of the Philippines being part of the
World Trade Organization, particularly when President Fidel Ramos signed
the Instrument of Ratification and the Senate concurring in the said treaty​.
Specifically, The WTO requires the Philippines to “place nationals and
products of member-countries as EQUAL FOOTING, The WTO intrudes
the constitutional powers of both Congress and the SC. Basically, the
instant petition assails the WTO Agreement for violating the 1987
constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos
THE FACTS:
● Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Sec. of Dept of Trade and Industry,
signed the Final Act embodying the results of the uruguay Round of
Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act).
● Members of the Senate received a letter from the President that the Final
Act, The Agreement establishing the WTO, the Ministerial Declarations and
Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services
are hereby submitted to the Senate for concurrence.
● The Senate then concurs and is then Ratified by the President.
● On Dec 29, 1994 the present petition was filed. It is petitioners’ position
that the “national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO
Agreement “place nationals and products of member countries on the same
footing as Filipinos and local products,” in contravention of the “Filipino
First” policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the
phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.”
ISSUE:
1. W/N The petition presents a justiciable controversy -​ YES
2. W/N The Provisions of the WTO agreements and its 3 annexes contravene
the Constitution - ​NO
3. W/N The provisions of the Agreement and Annexes limit, restrict or impair
the exercise of Legislative Power by Congress - ​YES
4. W/N The provisions unduly impair the exercise of judicial power by this
Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence. - ​NO
5. W/N the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the ratification by the President of
the Philippines of the Agreement establishing the World Trade
Organization’ implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.
HELD:
1. YES​. In seeking to nullify an act of the PH Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition does raise a justiciable
controversy. The Judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or
not a branch of government or any of its officials acted without jurisdiction
or in excess of its jurisdiction.
 2. [MAIN ISSUE] [PRESENTATION OF ARGUMENTS OF BOTH
SIDES] ​Petitioners argue that the “letter, spirit and intent” of the
Constitution mandating “economic nationalism” are violated by the
provisions in the WTO Agreement, its annexes and in the Ministerial
Decisions and Declarations and in the Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services. Basically, the petitioners argue that the WTO
Agreements is in contravention of the Filipino First Policy of the
Constitution. ​Respondents​, on the other hand, argue that the provisions
under the constitution are not self-executing and merely set out general
policies. That they should not be read in isolation. That when properly read,
it does not contravene the Constitution and that the WTO Agreement
contains provisions that protects developing countries like the PH from the
harshness of sudden trade liberalization.
[RATIO OF SC] ​The SC held that the provisions are not self executory. They do
not embody Judicially enforceable constitutional rights but are guidelines for
legislation.
On the other hand, Sec.10 and 12 of Art. XII (National Economy and Patrimony),
should be read and understood in relation to the other sections. To answer the issue,
NO. The WTO does not contravene the constitution. While the constitution mandates
a bias in Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it
recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world and limits
protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices
that are unfair. IN OTHER WORDS, t​he Constitution did not intend to pursue an
isolationalist policy. ​It allows an exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
Poor countries can likewise protect their common interests more effectively through
the WTO than through 1-on-1 negotiations with developed countries. These basic
principles are found in the preamble.
There is hardly any basis for the statement that under the WTO, local industries and
enterprises will be wiped out and that Filipinos will be deprived of control of the
economy. Thus, ​there is no basis to say that in joining the WTO, the respondents
have gravely abused their discretion.
3. The WTO Agreement provides that “each member shall ensure the
conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its
obligations. The ​Petitioners, maintain that such undertaking unduly limits,
restricts and impairs PH Sovereignty. Simply, this means that Congress
could not pass legislation that will be good for our national interest and
general welfare ​if such legislation WILL NOT CONFORM with the
WTO Agreement.
[IMPORTANT] The Court HELD that while sovereignty has traditionally been
deemed absolute and encompassing on the domestic level, ​IT IS HOWEVER
SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS voluntarily agreed by
the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations.
As stated in the Constitution, it adopts the generally accepted ​principles of
international law as PART OF LAW OF THE LAND. by the ​DOCTRINE OF
INCORPORATION​, the ​ country is bound by generally accepted principles of
International Law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws.
One of the fundamental rules in International Law, ​Pacta Sunt Servanda -​
International agreements must be performed in good faith. “​A treaty engagement is
not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the
parties. A state which has contracted a valid international obligations is bound
to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the
fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of
sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state
power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or
pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually
covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise
of their otherwise absolute rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties Philippines has
entered, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution,
based on the rationale that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
cooperation and amity with all nations.” ​The sovereignty of a state therefore
cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute.
4. The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an
unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of
adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
5. Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and
its annexes ​BUT NOT ​in other documents referred to in the Final Act ​is
DEFECTIVE and INSUFFICIENT and thus constitutes abuse of
 discretion. However, the SC held that the Ministerial declarations and
decisions were deemed adopted without need for ratification.

The Senate was well aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members
deliberation. After reading the letter of Pres. Ramos, the Senators minutely dissected
what the Senate was concurring in.

EPILOGUE​ (wow nobela)

The court did not find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of discretion
to the Senate’s exercise of its power of concurrence in the WTO agreement granted it
by Sec.21 Art. VII of the Constitution. That the senate, after deliberation and voting,
gave its consent to the WTO agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of
the land”​ is a ​legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power.

As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of
judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and
its people.

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE,
Case No # extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE vs HON. RALPH C. LANTION charged in the United States with violation of the following provisions of
Date | G.R number & PHIL no.| Topic in syllabus the United States Code
a. 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the
Petitioners: SECRETARY OF JUSTICE United States)
Respondent: HON. RALPH C. LANTION and MARK B. JIMENEZ b. 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax)
c. 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television)
DOCTRINE: d. 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries)
Where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of e. USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another)
international law and municipal law, ​jurisprudence dictates that municipal law 6. On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating
should be upheld by the municipal courts. and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case
pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069.
7. The panel found that the "official English translation of some documents in
FACTS:
Spanish were not attached to the request and that there are some other
1. On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
matters that needed to be addressed"
Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition
8. Petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S.
of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country."
Government, pending the evaluation of the aforestated extradition case.
a. *Important* The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of
9. Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held
incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the
in abeyance in the meantime.
suppression of crime both in the state where it was committed and
10. In response to private respondent's July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a
the state where the criminal may have escaped;
reply-letter:
i. the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and
a. Premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and
the intention of the Philippines to enter into similar
supporting documents from the United States Government,
treaties with other interested countries; and the need for
pending evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of the
rules to guide the executive department and the courts in
extradition documents submitted in accordance with the provisions
the proper implementation of said treaties
of the extradition treaty and our extradition law.
2. On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon,
b. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the
representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in
United States enumerates the documentary requirements and
Manila the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The Senate, by way of Resolution
establishes the procedures under which the documents submitted
No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty.
shall be received and admitted as evidence.
3. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting
c. *important* Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned
Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents
documents is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to
accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal
preliminary investigation of criminal cases. It only merely
diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the
determine whether the procedures and requirements under the
Requesting State)
relevant law and treaty have been complied with by the Requesting
4. On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department
Government.
of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the
d. *Important* The constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused
extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States.
in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not available.
5. Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District
Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said
 e. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains
grand jury information and documents obtained through grand jury
process covered by strict secrecy rules under United States law.
f. *important* The Department's denial of your request is consistent
with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides that
the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the
United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for
extradition. The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the
counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition requests.
g. *important* That Department is not in a position to hold in
abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request.
The department invoked Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, to which we are a party provides that "[E]very
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith."
i. Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to
be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of
accused or convicted persons must be processed
expeditiously.
11. On August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court
of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of
Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation:
a. For Mandamus: To compel herein petitioner to furnish private
respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto,
and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the
extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request
impartially, fairly and objectively
b. For Certiorari: to set aside herein petitioner's letter dated July 13,
1999
c. For Prohibition: to restrain petitioner from considering the
extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court;
and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of
the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of
private respondent to the United States
d. w/ issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction.
12. RTC: Order to maintain the ​status quo by refraining from committing the
acts complained of; from conducting further proceedings in connection with
the request of the United States Government for the extradition of the
petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial
court; and from performing any act directed to the extradition of the
petitioner to the United States, for a period of twenty (20) days from service
on respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997
Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WoN the municipal law will prevail over int law. YES.
HELD: ​(kahit yung 11 to 21 nalang read niyo ayun yung PIL related, baka lang
magtanong si ma’am sa main contention which is yung 1-9)
1. The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs
to a class by itself. It is ​sui generis​. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is
also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions.
a. At such stage, the executive authority has the power: (a) to make a
technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the
extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its face
and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated
are not extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or
not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a
military one which is not punishable under non-military penal
legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and
Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).
b. Hence, said process may be characterized as an investigative or
inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the
exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial power.
2. It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the
evaluation procedure is characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it
sets into motion the wheels of the extradition process. Ultimately, it may
result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee.
3. This deprivation can be effected at two stages:
a. First, the provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending
the submission of the request.
i. This is so because the Treaty provides that in case of
urgency, a contracting party may request the provisional
arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the
request ​(Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition
Treaty)​;
ii. But he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days if
no request is submitted ​(Paragraph 4)​. Presidential
Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter period of 20 days
 after which the arrested person could be discharged
(Section 20[d])​.
iii. Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on this
respect, the provisions only mean that once a request is
forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective
extraditee may be continuously detained, or if not,
subsequently rearrested ​(Paragraph [5], Article 9,
RP-US Extradition Treaty​), for he will only be
discharged if no request is submitted. Practically, the
purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight
from the Requested State.
b. Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during
the pendency of the extradition petition in court ​(Section 6,
Presidential Decree No. 1069)
4. In this sense, the ​e​valuation procedure is akin to a preliminary investigation,
Administrative and criminal nature ​since procedures may have the same
result — the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent or the person
charged. Similar to the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a
preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing of an information
against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation
of his liberty.
5. The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are
not only worded in exactly identical language and terminology, but more
importantly, they are alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have
expounded as the spirit with which the provisions are informed and
impressed, the elasticity in their interpretation. It capsulized and refer as to
"the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play"
6. PH laws/jurisprudence:
a. Due process is comprised of two components — substantive due
process which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in
interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or
property, and procedural due process which consists of the two
basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being
heard by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional
Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).
b. True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of
notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil
proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well.
Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings.
Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting
their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear
therein and present their side and to refute the position of the
opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).
c. In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative
investigatory proceeding, ​Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
guarantees the respondent's basic due process rights, granting him
the right to be furnished a copy of the complain​t, the affidavits, and
other supporting documents, and the right to submit
counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within ten days
from receipt thereof. Moreover, the ​respondent shall have the right
to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.
d. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is
no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the
most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions,
will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. ​It is no
exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under
Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against
the rest of the nation who would deny him that right ​(Association
of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform) ​Compare with 8 (b)
7. US law and Jurisprudence:
a. A statutory provision requiring duplicate copies of the indictment,
information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence and
other instruments accompanying the demand or requisitions be
furnished and delivered to the fugitive or his attorney is directory.
However, the right being such a basic one has been held to be a
right mandatory on demand.
b. The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve
legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance
in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes
higher values than speed and efficiency. ​Indeed, one might fairly
say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause, in
particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a
vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency
and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government
officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones. (Stanley
vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656) ​compare w/ 7(d)
8. In this case:
a. it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins and
ends with one entity — the Department of State — which has the
 power to evaluate the request and the extradition documents in the
beginning, and, in the person of the Secretary of State, the power
to act or not to act on the court's determination of extraditability.
b. In the Philippine setting, it is the Department of Foreign Affairs
which should make the initial evaluation of the request, and having
satisfied itself on the points, then forwards the request to the
Department of Justice for the preparation and filing of the petition
for extradition. However, the Department of Foreign Affairs, in the
instant case, ​perfunctorily turned over the request to the
Department of Justice which has taken over the task of evaluating
the request as well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing,
and prosecuting the petition for extradition.
9. The individual himself is involved in official government action because
said action has a direct bearing on his life, and may either cause him some
kind of deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the basic right to be
notified under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to
information on matters of public concern. As to an accused in a criminal
proceeding, he invokes Section 14, particularly the right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
a. The right to information is implemented by the right of access to
information within the control of the government (Bernas, The
1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p.
337). Such information may be contained in official records, and in
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions.
10. *IMPORTANT PERTINENT TO TOPIC*:
11. The rule of ​pacta sunt servanda​, one of the oldest and most fundamental
maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their
agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal
duties under a treaty is also compelled by ​Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution which provides that "​[t]he Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.​ "
12. Under the ​doctrine of incorporation​, rules of international law form part of
the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such
rules applicable in the domestic sphere.
13. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or
local courts) are confronted with situations in which there a​ppears to be a
conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the
constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to
harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that
municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted
principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause.
14. *READ* In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a
choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal
law, ​jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts
a. The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the
land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law
over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere.
b. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees
that ​rules of international law are given equal standing with, but
are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
15. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect — a
treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where
the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the
Philippines, ​both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in
conflict with the constitutio​n.
16. From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition
petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition,
the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective
extraditee. However, prior thereto, ​the law is silent as to these rights.
Reference to the ​U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence.
17. In the absence of a law or principle of law, ​we must apply the rules of fair
play​. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and
hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the
Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective
extraditee.
18. In the case at bar, private respondent ​does not only face a clear and present
danger of loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself​, which may
eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The
convergence of petitioner's favorable action on the extradition request and
the deprivation of​ private respondent's liberty is easily comprehensible​.
19. The court have ruled time and again that this Court's equity jurisdiction,
which is aptly described as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only
in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial
pronouncements.
20. The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice
outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not
 guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional
guarantees.
21. The court stated that: “We would not be true to the organic law of the land
if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of
liberty. ​That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on
which our Constitution is premised.​”

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent
copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The
incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and academic by
this decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.
Case No. 5
Bayan vs Executive Secretary Zamora (SAM)
October 10, 2000 | G.R. No. 1358570 | Ratification
Petitioners: ​Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), et. al. (MARAMING
PETITIONERS)
Respondents: ​Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora (MARAMING
RESPONDENTS)
DOCTRINE: ​All treaties or international agreements entered into by the
Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or
appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective
FACTS:
1. The case is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the
constitutionality of ​THE ​VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT (VFA)
forged between the PH and the US and imputed grave abuse of discretion to
the respondents.
2. March 14, 1947: The PH and US forged a Military Bases Agreement
(MBA) which ​formalized the use of installations in the PH territory by
US military personnel. ​The two states also entered into a Mutual Defense
Treaty (MDT) in 1951
3. In view of the expiration of the MBA, the US negotiated for a possible
extension of the said agreement, but the PH rejected the same. Hence, the
military exercises between the two countries were held in abeyance, but the
MDT continued.
4. [IMPORTANT] July 18, 1997: The panels of both US and PH discussed
the possible elements of the ​VFA, ​which eventually led to a consolidated
draft text and, in turn, a final series which culminated in Manila on January
12 & 13 of 1998.
5. President Ramos approved the VFA, signed by Foreign Affairs Secretary
Domingo Siazon and US Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on February 10,
1998.
6. [IMPORTANT] ​October 5, 1998, President Estrada, through Sec. Siazon
RATIFIED the VFA. The President then transmitted the VFA to the
Senate.
7. [IMPORTANT] The Senate, after due deliberation among its committees
issued a resolution concurring with the VFA, approved by two-thirds (2/3)
vote. On June 1, 1999, the VFA entered into force.
ISSUES:
1. [NOT RELEVANT] ​W/N the petitioners have locus standi.
2. [RELEVANT] W/N the VFA is governed by the provisions of Sec. 21
Article VII or of Sec. 25. Article XVIII of the Constitution.
a. W/N the requirements were complied with.
3. [SEMI-RELEVANT] W/N the respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion.
HELD:
Issue No. 1: ​The petitioners DO NOT HAVE locus standi, HOWEVER, because the
issue is of TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE, the court brushed aside locus
standi.
1. [CONTENTION OF RESPONDENTS] The petitioners failed to prove
that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
operation of the VFA.
2. [CONTENTION OF PETITIONERS] ​The validity/ invalidity of the VFA
is a matter of transcendental importance.
The Court held that, as taxpayers, the petitioners failed to prove that they have
sustained injury or will sustain injury as a result of the operation of the VFA. No
public funds raised by taxation were involved in this case. However, since the issue
is of transcendental importance, it brushed aside the procedural requirement of legal
standing
Issue No. 2: ​The more applicable constitutional provision is Sec. 25 of Article XVIII
of the Constitution; HOWEVER, this must be read in conjunction with Sec. 21 of
Article VII in connection with the required number of votes for a valid concurrence
from the Senate.
1. [CONTENTION OF PETITIONERS] ​Sec. 25, Article XVIII is
applicable since that the VFA has for its subject the presence of foreign
military TROOPS in the Philippines.
2. [CONTENTION OF RESPONDENTS] ​Section 21, Article VII should
apply since the VFA is NOT A BASING arrangement but an agreement
which involves merely the TEMPORARY visits of United States personnel
engaged in joint military exercises.
Section 21, Article VII ​reads: required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate, as will be further
discussed hereunder. (SPECIAL LAW OVER GENERAL LAW)
"​No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless 8. The contention of the respondents is untenable since the provision does not
concurred in by ​at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate." distinguish between “temporary” or “permanent” placing of military bases.
(Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos.)
Section 25, Article XVIII ​reads: 9. The contention of the petitioners is also untenable since the provision
specifically states, “foreign military bases, troops, ​OR facilities”. This
"After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of means that the provision encompasses all any of the three standing together.
the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, In this note, the Court looked into the deliberations of the Constitutional
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities ​shall not be allowed in the Philippines Commission.
except under ​a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, ​when the Congress 10. [SALT] The Court also noted that military bases established in foreign
so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national states are no longer viable due to advancements/ alternatives in means and
referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other weapons of warfare like nukes, warships, guided missiles etc.
contracting State."
SUB-ISSUE: ​The Court ruled that the requirements under Sec. 25, Art. XVIII are
complied with.
3. Sec. 21, Art. VII deals with treaties or international agreements IN
1. Under the said provision, the requisites for compliance are as follows:
GENERAL​, and that ​concurrence of at least 2/3 of all Members of
a. It must be under a treaty;
Congress is required to make the subject treaty/ ITL agreement VALID.
b. The treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so
This applies to any form of treaty.
required by Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
4. Sec. 25, Art. XVIII is a ​SPECIAL provision that applies to treaties which
people in a national referendum; and
involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the
c. Recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
Philippines.
2. There ​was no dispute in regard to the ​FIRST ​requisite, the Court no longer
5. [SEMI - RELEVANT] ​Similarities between the two provisions:
discussed this.
a. Both embody phrases in the negative, thus deemed prohibitory “No
3. [IMPORTANT] As to the ​SECOND ​requisite, the Court held that it was
treaty...” and “shall not be allowed”
sufficiently complied with since the resolution issued by the Senate showing
b. Concurrence of the Senate is indispensable in both.
its concurrence is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution,
6. The Court noted that the VFA is an agreement which:
whether under Sec. 21, Art. VII or Sec. 25, Art. XVIII. The provision
a. Defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel
requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national
visiting the Philippines
referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
b. Provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military
a. In Sec. 21, Art. VII, it specifically states that 2/3 of all Members of
personnel
the Senate is required for concurrence, while in Sec. 25, Art. XVIII
c. Further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine
merely states “duly concurred in by the Senate."
government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of
b. [IMPORTANT] ​The Court held that the two provisions should
vessels and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment,
not be read in isolation of each other, this means that under Sec.
materials and supplies.
25, Art. XVIII, the phrase “duly concurred in by the Senate" also
7. [IMPORTANT] To this note, the Court held that Sec. 25, Art. XVIII
means a vote of at least 2/3 of all Members of the Senate.
should apply in this case. While in a limited sense, Sec. 21, Art. VII is
c. The Senate shall be composed of 24 Senators, 2/3 of that number is
applicable only for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes
16, which means that at least 16 votes are necessary for
concurrence. In this case, there were only 23 incumbent Senators,
 however, the Court held that this fact will not alter the 2/3
requirement. (The Court did not say how many concurring votes
were cast, but it held that the 2/3 requirement was met.)
4. As for the ​THIRD ​requisite:
a. [CONTENTION OF PETITIONERS] ​The phrase "recognized
as a treaty," embodied in Sec. 25, Art XVIII, means that the VFA
should have the advice and consent of the United States Senate
pursuant to its own constitutional process, and that it should not be
considered merely an executive agreement by the United States
b. [CONTENTION OF RESPONDENTS] ​The letter of US
Ambassador Hubbard stating that the VFA is binding on the US
Government is conclusive that the VFA is recognized by the US.
c. [IMPORTANT] The Court held that the phrase "recognized as a
treaty" means that the other contracting party accepts or
acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. It should be read in its
ordinary meaning and not in the strict sense.
d. [IMPORTANT] Hence, it is immaterial whether the US treats the
VFA only as an executive agreement because under international
law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.
e. The Court made mention of the definition of a treaty in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT): "an international
instrument concluded between States in written form and governed
by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in
two or more related instruments, and whatever its particular
designation
f. Article 2(2) of the VCLT provides that "the provisions of
paragraph 1 regarding the use of terms in the present Convention
are without prejudice to the use of those terms, or to the meanings
which may be given to them in the internal law of the State."
g. [IMPORTANT] Thus, in international law, there is ​no difference
between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect
upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries
have remained within their powers
h. [SALT] Jurisprudence states that right of the Executive to enter
into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. US
Jurisprudence also held to the same effect.
i. As long as the US accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty,
and binds itself to comply with its obligations, the requirement
under the Constitution is complied with
5. The Court also discussed ​RATIFICATION:
a. It stated ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the
concurrence of the Senate should be taken as a clear and
unequivocal expression of our nation's consent to be bound by said
treaty.
b. It held that ratification is generally held to be an executive act,
undertaken by the head of the state or of the government, as the
case may be, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is
proclaimed.
c. Consent is expressed through ratification when:
i. the treaty provides for such ratification
ii. it is otherwise established that the negotiating States
agreed that ratification should be required
iii. the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject
to ratification, or
iv. the intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to
ratification appears from the full powers of its
representative, or was expressed during the negotiation
d. [IMPORTANT] ​The Court held that the, in our jurisdiction, the
power to ratify is vested in the President and not in the Senate. The
role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its
consent/ concurrence, to the ratification
6. Therefore​, since ratification to the VFA signifies the final acceptance, the
PH is now bound by its terms.
7. [SALT]:
a. Sec. 2, Article II of the Constitution declares that declares that the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity
with all nations
b. Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States
adopted by the International Law Commission in 1949 provides:
"​Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international
law, and it may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws
as an excuse for failure to perform this duty.
c. Lastly, the Court mentioned that principle of ​pacta sunt servanda,
which states that “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties
to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” This preserves
the sanctity of treaties.
Issue No. 3: The Court held that there was no grave abuse of discretion since the
power to enter into treaties/ ITL agreements is vested by the Constitution to the
President, subject only to the concurrence of the Senate. The Senate cannot intrude
or invade the negotiations between states.

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petitions are
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Case No #6
Bayan Muna vs Romulo (SAM)
February 01, 2011 | G.R. No. 159618 |
Petitioner: ​Bayan Muna
Respondents: ​ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and
BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs
DOCTRINE: ​MARAMI
FACTS:
1. The petitioner a duly registered party-list group established to represent the
marginalized sectors of society. They are assailing the constitutionality of
the ​Non-Surrender Agreement (NSA)​ between the PH and the US.
2. [IMPORTANT] On May 13, 2003, via Exchange of Notes No.
BFO-028-03 ​(E/N BFO-028-03), ​respondent Ople agreed with and
accepted the US proposals for the terms of the non-surrender agreement.
3. The ​NSA aims to protect what it refers to and defines as "persons" of the
RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought
against them in international tribunals.
4. “​Persons​” are current, or former Government officials, employees
(including contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party.
5. The NSA states that Persons of one Party that is present in the other Party’s
territory shall not be surrendered, absent any consent of the former party, to
any ITL tribunal or entity or third country (except tribunals established by
the UN Security Council)
6. [IMPORTANT] On another note, the ​ROME STATUTE established the
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC) with the power to
exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern . . . and shall be ​complementary ​to the national
criminal jurisdictions."
7. The serious crimes covered those considered grave under international law,
such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of
aggression.
8. [VERY IMPORTANT] On Dec. 28, 2000, The PH, through Charge
d'Affaires Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is subject
to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states. At the time of
the case, 92 out of 139 signatories have ratified the statute, the PH is not
one of the said 92.
9. [IMPORTANT] ​Upon the query of then SolGen Benipayo on the status of
the NSA, US Ambassador Ricciardone stated that the ​exchange of
diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding agreement under
international law.
10. [CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER] ​The petitioner imputed grave
abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the NSA.
11. [CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENTS] The petitioners do not have
locus standi.
ISSUES:
1. [NOT RELEVANT] ​W/N the petitioners have legal standing.
2. W/N the Agreement was contracted validly, which resolves itself into the
question of whether or not respondents gravely abused their discretion in
concluding it
3. W/N the Agreement, which has not been submitted to the Senate for
concurrence, contravenes and undermines the Rome Statute and other
treaties.
HELD:
Issue No. 1: ​The Court held that as citizens and since the issue at hand is of
transcendental importance, the petitioners satisfied the rule on locus standi. The
Court relaxed procedural requirements of direct injury.
Issue No. 2: ​The Court looked into various aspects of the validity of the NSA.
I. Validity of the NSA. ​The NSA is a valid and binding agreement between
the PH and US.
1. [CONTENTION OF PETITIONER] The petitioner challenged the NSA
regarding its form, alleging that ​E/N BFO-028-03 (Exchange Notes)
cannot be a valid medium for concluding the NSA.
2. The Court held that this contention is untenable. A well-recognized
international doctrine is the ​DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION,
expressed in Sec. 2, Art. II of the Constitution:
“the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the
 land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all
nations.”
3. Exchange Notes fall under the category of inter-governmental agreements
which is an accepted form of international agreement.
4. [SALT] Exchange of Notes is a record of a routine agreement, that has
many similarities with the private law contract. The agreement consists of
the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession
of the one signed by the representative of the other. Under the usual
procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record
its assent. The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers,
diplomats or departmental heads. The ​technique of exchange of notes is
frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or,
sometimes, to ​avoid the process of legislative approval.
5. [IMPORTANT] The Court also stated that the terms "exchange of notes"
and "executive agreements" have been used ​interchangeably​, exchange of
notes being considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding
through executive action
II. Senate Concurrence Not Required
1. The Court reiterated the VCLT definition of a treaty and stated that
international agreements may be in two forms:
a. Treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive
ratification
b. Executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they
do not require legislative concurrence and are usually less formal
and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties
2. Treaties and Executive agreements are ​SIMILAR in terms of their binding
effects on the contracting states. Furthermore, they’re similar in a sense that
neither of them is valid if they contravene the Constitution.
3. They are ​DISTINCT in a sense that treaties have greater “dignity” than
executive agreements because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a
treaty having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the
people. A ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence
over any prior statutory enactment.
4. [CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER] ​The NSA is a ​TREATY
hence, ​concurrence of the Senate is required​. They also contend that
citing previous jurisprudence, the NSA does not fall under the categories
covered by executive agreements, such as commercial/consular relations,
most favored nation rights, etc.
5. The Court held that there are ​no hard and fast rules on the entering into a
treaty of executive agreement as an instrument of ITL relations. The
primary consideration in the choice of the form of agreement is the ​parties'
intent and desire to craft an international agreement in the form they
so wish to further their respective interests​. Under the principle of ​pacta
sunt servanda​, the matter of form is inferior compared to the effectiveness
and binding effect of the ENFORCEMENT of a treaty or executive
agreement.
6. Furthermore, the Constitution, except for Sec. 25, Art. XVIII, does not
classify the subject of treaties. The same merely prescribes the need of
Senate concurrence to complete the ratification process.
7. The Court reiterated the ​BAYAN DOCTRINE that “The right of the
Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of
subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage.”
Issue No. 3: ​The NSA Not in Contravention of the Rome Statute
1. [CONTENTION OF PETITIONER] ​The NSA is void since it restricts
the jurisdiction of the ICC and infringes the effectivity of the Roman
Statute. They believe that the NSA grants the covered persons immunity
from the jurisdiction of the ICC, and that such grant is considered a breach
of the PH’s obligation under the Rome Statute.
2. [IMPORTANT] The Court held that the NSA does not contravene, but in
fact, complements the Roman Statute. The principle of complementarity
supported the creation of the ICC. The jurisdiction of the ICC is to be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions of the signatory states.
3. [IMPORTANT] Furthermore, the provisions of the Roman statute states
that primary jurisdiction over ITL crimes rests, at the first instance, with the
state where the crime was committed.
4. [IMPORTANT] ​The Court stated the principle of ​ne bis in idem under
Art. 20 of the Rome Statute which states that "NO PERSON who has been
tried by another court for conduct . . . [constituting crimes WITHIN its
jurisdiction] shall be tried by the ICC with respect to the same conduct . . .”
(Parang Double Jeopardy?).
5. Taking No. 3 + No. 4, resolves the jurisdictional conflict between the
PH, ​as a party to the NSA, ​and the ICC. ​It also agues against the
contention that the PH has committed breach upon the Rome Statute.
6. Summary: ​The PH has ​PRIMARY jurisdiction over serious crimes
committed within their borders, the ​COMPLEMENTARY jurisdiction of
the ICC only comes to play when the signatory states are UNWILLING or
UNABLE to prosecute.
 7. [EXTRA RATIO] ​The Court added that there is a proviso (Art. 98) under
the Rome Statute which that enjoins the ICC from seeking the surrender of
an erring person, should the process require the requested state to perform
an act that would violate some international agreement it has entered into.
8. ​On this note, the Court differentiated a “​State-Party” from a “signatory”
of a treaty. According to the VCLT, a signatory state is only obliged to
REFRAIN from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty;
whereas a State-Party, on the other hand, is legally obliged to ​FOLLOW all
the provisions of a treaty in good faith.
a. [IMPORTANT] The Court noted that the PH is merely a
SIGNATORY to the Rome Statute since ratification by the Senate
is lacking. Therefore, the PH is only obliged to refrain from acts
which would defeat the object of the Statute, and any argument
obliging the PH to follow any provision of the same is premature.
b. On the same note, the Rome Statute states that if the requesting
State is ​NOT a Party [US] to the said statute, the requested State
[PH], ​IF IT IS NOT UNDER AN ITL OBLIGATION TO
EXTRADITE THE PERSON TO THE REQUESTING
STATE​, shall give priority to the request of the ICC. Since the US
is neither a state-party nor a signatory to the statute, and that there
is and ITL agreement (NSA) between the PH and the US regarding
extradition, even assuming that the PH is a State-Party, the Rome
Statute still recognizes the primacy of ITL agreements between
states.
I. ​Sovereignty Limited by ITL Agreements
1. [CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER] ​By entering into the NSA, the
PH abdicated its sovereignty by waiving its right to seek recourse through
the ICC for erring Americans committing ITL crimes in the PH.
2. The Court was not persuaded. It reiterated that that National criminal
jurisdiction is PRIMARY. The PH may decide to try “Persons” of the US
under our national criminal justice system or it may opt not to exercise such
jurisdiction and defer to the secondary jurisdiction of the ICC, subject to the
discretion and consent of the US. In return, the US must extend the same
privilege to the PH.
3. [SALT] ​Almost every time a state enters into an ITL agreement, it sheds off
part of its sovereignty, The Constitution did not envision a reclusive PH
isolated from the rest of the world. It adheres to the policy of cooperation
and amity with all nations.
4. [IMPORTANT] ​By their nature, treaties and international agreements
actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing and absolute
nature of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may decide to
surrender or waive some aspects of their state power or agree to limit the
exercise of their otherwise exclusive and absolute jurisdiction. The
consideration in such partial surrender is benefits from ​RECIPROCITY.
II. The NSA is NOT Immoral/ Not a variance with Principles of ITL Law
1. [CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER] ​The NSA imposes immoral
obligations and/or being a variance with the principles of ITL Law since the
NSA leaves criminals immune from responsibility for serious crimes and
precludes the PH from delivering an American criminal to the ICC.
2. The Court reiterated the PRIMACY of National Jurisdiction. Criminals
present in both states may be prosecuted under the national criminal
jurisdiction of each of the states or may be surrendered to the ICC, subject
to the other state’s consent.
III. No Grave abuse of discretion
1. The Constitution vests in the President the power to enter into international
agreements, subject, in appropriate cases, to the required concurrence votes
of the Senate. As discussed however, executive agreements may be validly
entered into without such concurrence.
2. In this case, President Gloria, though the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, in
concluding and agreeing to the NSA thru exchange notes acted within the
scope of authority and discretion vested in her by the Constitution.
IV. Agreements Need not be in the form of a Treaty
1. On December 11, 2009, RA 9851 or the Philippine Act on Crimes Against
International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against
Humanity was enacted wherein it stated:
“the PH ​may dispense with the investigation or prosecution of a
crime punishable under this Act if another court or international tribunal is
already conducting the investigation or undertaking the prosecution of such
crime. Instead, the authorities ​may surrender or extradite suspected or
accused persons in the Philippines to the appropriate international court, if
 any, or to another State pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and
treaties.”
2. [CONTENTION #1] The NSA amends existing municipal laws on the
State’s obligation in relation to grave crimes against the law of nations. The
PH is ​REQUIRED to surrender to the proper ITL tribunal those persons
accused of violating RA 9851, if it does not prosecute them.
a. A situation was posed where a US national under prosecution by
an international tribunal for any crime under RA 9851, the
Philippines has the option to surrender such US national to the
international tribunal if it decides not to prosecute such US
national here. This option DOES NOT require the consent of the
US. Requiring such consent would need an amendatory law.
Therefore, it is argued that the NSA, in effect, amends RA 9851.
3. [CONTENTION #2] It was argued that the Rome Statute is declaratory of
customary international law hence it assumes the status of enforceable
domestic law in the context of Sec. 2 Art. II of the Constitution.
a. Therefore, any derogation from the said Statute cannot be
undertaken via mere executive agreement since the same cannot
amend or repeal an existing law.
4. In summary, the premises consider the NSA as inefficacious unless it be
embodied in a treaty duly ratified with the concurrence of the Senate.
Which in effect partakes the nature of a municipal law that can amend
another law, in this case RA 9851.
5. [IMPORTANT] ​The Court did not subscribe to the arguments above,
reiterating the PRIMACY of national criminal jurisdiction again. The Court
stated that RA 9851 merely establishes special courts for the prosecution of
these crimes and for the State to exercise primary criminal jurisdiction.
a. Regarding the view that the RA 9851 REQUIRES the PH to
surrender to the ITL tribunal those accused of the covered crimes,
the Court held that the said law does not require but gives
DISCRETION to the PH on W/N to surrender such accused
person because the law clearly uses the word ​“may”.
b. Granting arguendo, the Court also stated a relevant portion of RA
9851 that states that surrender may be made ​“to another State
pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties.”.
Since the NSA, although an executive agreement, is already
considered a treaty (Discussed earlier).
c. Furthermore, the Court stated that the PH and US already has an
existing extradition treaty – The RP-US Extradition Treaty of
1994.
d.
The view that the said treaties amend RA 9851 is improper since
RA 9851 is a SUBSEQUENT LAW and not a PRIOR law.
[NOT SURE IF RELEVANT PA TONG MGA NASA BABA] ​Just in case
tanungin.
6. [CONTENTION #3] ​It was argued that, citing U.S. vs Coolidge in the US,
a person cannot be tried in the federal courts for an international crime
unless Congress adopts a law defining and punishing the offense.
7. The Court found the contention untenable since the US has already adopted
law punishing war crimes similar to that of RA 9851 and the Rome Statute.
8. [CONTENTION #4] ​Another view advanced was that the current US laws
do not cover every crime listed within the jurisdiction of the ICC and that
there is a gap between the definitions of the different crimes under the US
laws versus the Rome Statute. The view used a report written by Victoria K.
Holt and Elisabeth W. Dallas, entitled ​"On Trial: The US Military and
the International Criminal Court,"​ as its basis.
9. The Court held that the said report does not have any weight or value under
ITL law. It listed the sources of ITL law under Art. 38 of the ICJ. The report
does not fall within the said sources and cannot be considered "teachings of
highly qualified publicists.
10. A ​highly qualified publicist is a scholar of public international law and the
term usually refers to legal scholars or "academic writers." The authors of
the said report were not proved to be as highly qualified publicists.
11. Assuming arguendo, the Court held that the “gaps” stated under the said
report are non-existent, in fact the very same report stated that US lawyers
are instrumental in drafting the elements of crimes under the Roman Statute.
(NOTE: The definitions of crimes are well-defined, and the elements were
well established.)
12. The Court stated that the US recognizes ITL law as part of the law of the
land even without any local statute. In fact, its Congress has not undertaken
to codify the specific offenses in the LAW OF WAR or mark its precise
boundaries. It adopted the principle of incorporation. (discussed earlier).
13. The Court then discussed the meaning of customary ITL law as a source of
ITL law, in the ICJ it is defined as: "general and consistent practice of
states recognized and followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation."
14. [IMPORTANT] ​In order to establish the customary status of a particular
norm, two elements must concur: ​State practice​, the objective element; and
opinio juris sive necessitates​, the subjective element
 15. State practice - ​the continuous repetition of the same or similar kind of acts
or norms by States. Elements of State practice:
a. Generality;
b. uniformity and consistency; and
c. Duration.
16. Opinio Juris – the psychological element, requires that the state practice or
norm "be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this
practice is rendered ​obligatory by the existence ​of a rule of law requiring
it."
17. Jus Cogens – “Compelling Law” – holds the highest hierarchical position
among all customary norms and principles. Thus, it is peremptory and
non-derogable even by agreement because it is so fundamental to the
existence of a just international legal order.
a. Thus, ​jus cogens crimes are of universal jurisdiction, any state
may exercise jurisdiction over the individual who commit such
crime.
18. THEREFORE, even without domestic legislation on the part of the US to
try these crimes, there is still the ​DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION
and ​UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION​ to try the said crimes.

V. ​The ICC is not declaratory of customary international law

1. The first element of customary ITL law is lacking. (State practice). The
Court pointed out that only 58.76% of the total countries in the world
ratified the Rome Statute, this casts doubt as to the customary nature of the
said Statute.
2. The Court also pointed out that it has been 8 years since the PH signed the
Statute, but the treaty has not been transmitted to the Senate for ratification.
(Res Ipsa Loquitur).
3. Citing Fr. Bernas, the ​initial factor for determining the existence of custom
is the actual behavior of states. ​(State Practice​). Once state practice has
been determined, it becomes necessary to determine Opinio juris or ​“why
states behave the way they do”

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED