Peter Andes

Book Approved by: Jacob Levin

David Glantz and Jonathan House. When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler.
Lawrence, Ka.: University Press of Kansas, 1995. Pp. 414.

The titanic struggle between the two most infamous authoritarian powers of the 20th

century, fought from the Russian Steppes to the outskirts of Moscow and ultimately ending in the

heart of Berlin, involved some of the largest battles and highest casualties of World War II. The

German military employed a highly organized, well-coordinated, modern blitzkrieg spearhead

during Operation Barbarossa that broke through Russian lines and gained territory rapidly by

outgunning and outmaneuvering a surprised, unprepared, ill-led, and poorly equipped Russian

force (p. 33, 49, 51, 123). Glantz and House examine what eventually turned the tide on the

Eastern Front, reevaluating traditional perceptions of the conflict and asserting that the Red

Army caused the German defeat to a much greater extent than is commonly acknowledged.

On the morning of 22 June 1941 Operation Barbarossa began as German troops poured

across the border supported by the devastating air attacks of the Luftwaffe on the Red Air Force.

For the most part they met little resistance due to the surprise and strength of the attack, the Red

Army suffering greatly from a lack of communication and intelligence, on some occasions

incapable to respond to the German offensive due to lack of supplies and ammunition (p. 49).

Virtually all Soviet armor lost 90 percent of its strength in the war's first week (p. 51). Russian

counter-attacks in areas such as south of the Pripiat Marshes briefly slowed the German advance

(p. 54). The first time the Red Army actually halted the Germans was in heavy fighting around

Smolensk in July and August 1941, but for the most part the Red Army backpedaled (p. 58).

One of the first steps taken by the Russians in an attempt to reverse their fortunes was a

reorganization of the Red Army command structure or Stavka that gave more direct control of
units to experienced commanders (p. 65). The Soviet military also became quite good at

reorganizing units shattered by the German advance into new forces of fighting strength, while

their “scorched earth” policy made enemy foraging efforts fruitless (p. 67, 72). As winter

continued to set in, Soviet forces showed their initiative and resourcefulness despite their

battered state. They seized the opportunity to make a successful counter-attack in the Battle of

Moscow on the “overextended and poorly equipped” Germans, pushing the line back until

Hitler's order to hold firm in January (p. 87). The Stavka also implemented the use of shock

troops meant to attack at narrow points in the line and overwhelm a single enemy unit (p. 100).

Glantz and House note how the terrible suffering of Russian soldiers and peasants secured the

time needed to increase production and the developments of tactics from battlefield experience

that made the Red Army more formidable than the German war machine (p. 124-125).

The Battle of Stalingrad from 17 July 1942 to 2 February 1943 was one of the bloodiest

in history, a decisive Red Army victory, and the turning point of the conflict on the Eastern Front

(p.129). The masterful strategic planning of Soviet Generals Zhukov, Vasilevsky, and Vatutin

coupled with the great sacrifice of the Red Army won the day by surrounding the German 6th

Army in Stalingrad and after much struggle defeating them (p. 130). Another stunning Soviet

victory followed at the Battle of Kursk from 4 July to 23 August 1943 where an enormous Soviet

defensive line destroyed the German blitzkrieg (p. 166). A Soviet counter-attack followed that

led to the German retreat towards the Dnepr (p. 172). These Red Army efforts and other victories

on the Eastern front such as Operation Bagration in 1944 and the Battle of Berlin in 1945

indicate that the Russian General and the Russian soldier learned from their disasters in 1941.

They implemented improved tactics and equipment that, along with the ability to sustain high

casualties, defeated the once seemingly unstoppable German army (p. 214, 275)
 Glantz and House present as their thesis the position that the Red Army learned from its

initial defeats, utilizing its ability to sustain casualties to buy time so that when Soviet wartime

industry was finally in efficient production Soviet forces militarily defeated the German Army

(p.274-275). They emphasize how the Russian people bore the brunt of the German onslaught

during World War II, being “constantly engaged and [absorbing] more than half of all German

forces,” and that the Soviet Union was largely responsible for the defeat of Hitler rather than the

Western Allies (p. 283). The authors use extensive scholarly research to support their

conclusions, with 89 pages of endnotes and appendices. The primary sources are of high quality

including official Russian and German casualty and strength data, as well as documents from the

Russian and German national archives such as war diaries, intelligence materials, and strategic

maps. Many of the Russian materials were released in the early 1990s after the fall of the Soviet

Union and had previously been unavailable in the West, some still remaining classified. Glantz

and House also refer to secondary sources, noting those of John Erickson to be the most accurate

and authoritative previous accounts of conflict on the Eastern Front.

The text is a good overview of the struggle between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia

during World War II as its scope includes the entire conflict, reaching the right balance so it is

rich in detail but not bogged down by it. The facts and the conclusions of the authors are

presented in clear, understandable language well supported by scholarly research. It is worthy of

recommendation as its conclusions provide new insights and challenge some of the conventional

views on the role of the Soviet Union and the significance of the Eastern Front. However, the

work would most usefully be read coupled with either a text focusing on the German side of the

Eastern Front or a work that encompasses examinations of both Soviet and Nazi perspectives to

prevent exposure to only one side of the history. The text does what Glantz and House are aiming
for, and is an edifying overview of the failures and successes of the Soviet Union during World

War II.

The text both agrees and contrasts at various points with class lectures and with the

interpretation given in World War II: A Short History by Michael J. Lions. In class lectures the

Russian winter is seen as playing a major role in the crippling and defeat of the German Army,

which is echoed by Glantz and House but not to the same degree. They focus more on Russian

success due to the efforts of the Red Army than to the Russian winter, though it was certainly a

contributing factor. They note that before the winter set in, Operation Barbarossa was almost as

destructive to the German Army as it was to the Red Army (p. 103). They also emphasize the

role the Soviet Union played in the Allied war effort against Germany more than has been

addressed in class lectures, or in World War II: A Short History, stating that Soviet Generals

Zhukov and Vasilevsky, or even Stalin, ought to be thanked for the defeat of Hitler more than

Allied Generals such as Dwight D. Eisenhower (p. 282). The authors do agree with the lectures

and the textbook in that the Red Army exchanged lives and land in order to stall the German

Army until winter when they could mount a counter-attack. The sacrifice provided more time for

Soviet industry to catch up to the production of German industry and for Russian military

leadership to implement better tactics (p. 124).

Glantz and House examine the failures and successes of the Red Army on the Eastern

Front and conclude that while aided by a number of factors such as American Lend-Lease aid

and the Russian winter Soviet forces defeated the German Army militarily using land and lives to

buy time and then employing better tactics and their superior industrial capacity to defeat the

enemy. The previously unstoppable German Blitzkrieg could neither defeat Russia nor her

people, resulting in a terrible conflict of attrition virtually unparalleled in the history of warfare.