PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

VS
BENJAMIN C. MAGPAYO

March 26, 2015

G.R. Nos. 92961-64 September 1, 1993

FACTS:

Appellant Benjamin C. Magpayo was charged with Rape, Robbery, Robbery with Hold-up and
Forcible Abduction with Rape before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon in four (4) separate complaints
and informations allegedly committed. He was charged for the (1) rape of a minor, Lilibeth Bobis, on
April 10, 1988; (2) robbery of the Lilibeth’s cash money on the same date; (3) robbery with hold-up on
an 8-year-old Jacquiline Yutuc-Jaime of her earrings and gold ring on February 1988; and (4) forcible
abduction with rape of Mara N. Chico on November 1987.

Magpayo entered a plea of not guilty to all charges. However, after trial, he was found guilty of
all offenses charged in a joint decision rendered by the trial court.

In the first case of rape, victim Lilibeth was able to provide a description of her rapist to the NBI
artist, who, on the basis thereof, made a sketch of the rapist’s face. She also clearly identified the accused
as her rapist, after referring to the shape of his nose as “matangos” and the eyes as “singkit”, in the
police station. Simarly on the case for forcible abduction with rape, the victim Mara also gave a
description to an NBI artist who drew the suspect’s face. On May 22, 1998, the victims Lilibeth, Mara
and Jacquiline (case for robbery hold-up) were able to positively identify the appellant as the perpetrator
of the crimes when the latter was arrested by the police and brought to the police station.

Appellant vehemently questions the trial court’s decision finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt because the prosecution witnesses allegedly failed to positively identify him. He avers that when
he was arrested to answer for an alleged wrongdoing on May 22, 1988, complainants were hesitant to
point at him and kept on looking at their parents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the
four charges, despite absence of proof that he is the perpetrator of the crimes charged.

RULING:

NO.

Under the circumstances, the Court is of the opinion that the lingering shock caused by such
harrowing experience at the hands of appellant could have caused the minor complainants to hesitate in
directly identifying him. Hence, the fact that complainants kept on looking at their parents is of no
moment. They were simply scared, looked at their parents for assurance, and such initial hesitation could
by no means indicate that complainants were guilty of fabrication.

Although Lilibeth Bobis admitted that she was not able to immediately identify the appellant at
the police station after his arrest, she declared that she thought it over very carefully if the appellant
was indeed the offender. The crime was committed on April 10, 1988 or one (1) month before Lilibeth
Bobis was again confronted with the man who had sexually abused her.

Appellant points out, however, that his actual physical features vary with the sketches prepared
by the NBI artists based on the description of the offender given by complainants Bobis and Chico. But
this is beside the point. Given the immaturity of complainants, it is of course natural that the sketches
of appellant based on the descriptions given by them would somehow differ with appellant’s actual
physical features.

What is important is that Bobis remembered the square shape of appellant’s face, his eyes to be
“singkit” and his nose as “matangos”. Indeed, familiarity with the physical features, particularly those of
the face, is actually the best way to identify the person (People v. Reception, 198 SCRA 670 [1991]).

JUDGMENT OF TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED.

NELLY LIM, Petitioner,
Vs
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL D. VICTORIO, as Presiding Judge of RTC-Rosales,
Pangasinan, Branch 53, and JUAN SIM, Respondents.

G.R. No. 91114. September 25, 1992

In order that the disqualification by reason of physician-patient privilege be successfully claimed,

the following requisites should concur: (1) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (2) the person against
whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (3) such
person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (4)
the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; (5) the information was confidential
and if disclosed, would blacken the reputation of the patient.

FACTS:
Juan filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Nelly on the ground that the latter has
been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage
and until the present." During trial, Juan's counsel announced that he would present as his next witness
Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. Said counsel forthwith orally
applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum. Nelly's counsel opposed the motion on the
ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is privileged since the latter had
examined the Nelly in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia.
Juan's counsel contended, however, that Dr. Acampado would be presented as an expert witness and
would not testify on any information acquired while attending to Nelly in a professional capacity. The trial
court denied the motion and allowed the witness to testify. Dr. Acampado thus took the witness stand,
was qualified as an expert witness and was asked hypothetical questions related to her field of expertise.
She neither revealed the illness she examined and treated Nelly for nor disclosed the results of her
examination and the medicines she had prescribed.

ISSUES:
1. Was the information given by the physician in her testimony in open court a privileged
communication?

2. Was there a waiver of the privilege?

HELD:
1. No. The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends
to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have
been made to the physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by
the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged.
The mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of
consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not
stated." One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these aforementioned requisites.
 Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness. She did not disclose anything
obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner; moreover, the facts
and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no bearing on whatever
information or findings the doctor obtained while attending to the patient. There is, as well, no showing
that Dr. Acampado’s answers to the questions propounded to her relating to the hypothetical problem
were influenced by the information obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise stated, her expert opinion
excluded whatever information or knowledge she had about the petitioner which was acquired by reason
of the physician-patient relationship existing between them. As an expert witness, her testimony before
the trial court cannot then be excluded.

2. Yes. While it may be true that counsel for the petitioner opposed the oral request for the
issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to Dr. Acampado and filed a formal motion for the quashal of
the said subpoena a day before the witness was to testify, the petitioner makes no claim in any of her
pleadings that her counsel had objected to any question asked of the witness on the ground that it
elicited an answer that would violate the privilege, despite the trial court’s advise that said counsel may
interpose his objection to the testimony "once it becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to be
elicited is covered by the privileged communication rule." The particular portions of the stenographic
notes of the testimony of Dr. Acampado quoted in the petitioner’s Petition and Memorandum, and in the
private respondent’s Memorandum, do not at all show that any objections were interposed. Even granting
ex gratia that the testimony of Dr. Acampado could be covered by the privilege, the failure to seasonably
object thereto amounted to a waiver thereof.
CEBU SHIPYARD AND ENGINEERING WORKS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
WILLIAM LINES, INC. and PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE and ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
respondents.

G.R. No. 132607 May 5, 1999

FACTS:
Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. repaired marine vessels while the Prudential is in the
non-life insurance business. William Lines, Inc., the owner of M/V Manila City, a luxury passenger-cargo
vessel, which caught fire and sank. At the time of the incident, subject vessel was insured with Prudential
for P45M for hull and machinery. CSEW was insured for only Php 10 million for the shiprepairer’s liability
policy. They entered into a contract where negligence was the only factor that could make CSEW liable
for damages. Moreover, liability of CSEW was limited to only Php 1million for damages. The Hull Policy
included an “Additional Perils (INCHMAREE)” Clause covering loss of or damage to the vessel through
the negligence of, among others, ship repairmen.

William brought Manila City to the dry dock of CSEW for repairs. The officers and cabin crew
stayed at the ship while it was being repaired. After the vessel was transferred to the docking quay, it
caught fire and sank, resulting to its total loss.

William brought suit against CSEW alleging that it was through the latter’s negligence that the
ship caught fire and sank. Prudential was impleaded as co-plaintiff after it had paid the value of insured
items. It was subrogated to 45 million, or the value it claimed to indemnify.

The trial court brought judgment against CSEW 45 million for the ship indemnity, 65 million for
loss of income, and more than 13 million in other damages. The CA affirmed the TC decision.

CSEW contended that the cause of the fire was due to William’s hotworks on the said portion of
the ship which they didn’t ask CSEW permission for.

Prudential, on the other hand, blamed the negligence of the CSEW workers in the instance when
they didn’t mind rubber insulation wire coming out of the air-conditioning unit that was already burning.

Hence this MFR.

ISSUE:
WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies against the crew

RULING:
For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply to a given situation, the following conditions must
concur: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; and
(2) that the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person charged with negligence.

The facts and evidence reveal the presence of these conditions. First, the fire would not have
happened in the ordinary course of things if reasonable care and diligence had been exercised.

Second, the agency charged with negligence, as found by the trial court and the CA and as shown
by the records, is CSEW, which had control over subject vessel when it was docked for annual repairs.

What is more, in the present case the trial court found direct evidence to prove that the workers
didn’t exercise due diligence in the care of subject vessel. The direct evidence substantiates the
conclusion that CSEW was really negligent even without applying such doctrine.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle
Vs
RODOLFO MANALO Y CABISUELAS, accused-appellant

GR No. 9613-24, March 8, 1993

FACTS:
Accused was charged for the killing of Warlito Bonilla and Carlito Diomampo with the use of an
unlicensed pistol. Accused entered a plea of not guilty but was nevertheless convicted of two counts of
murder by the RTC on the positive identification by Lacbay (witness) that accused is the perpetrator of
the crime. Hence this appeal urging the court to reverse the conviction.

Accused avers that the trial court erred in convicting him considering that there is no physical
evidence that he fired a gun.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in giving undue weight and credence to the uncorroborated,
unreliable and unbelievable testimony of prosecution witness Carlos Lacbay which was belied by no less
than another prosecution witness Dr. Francisco Perez, an unbiased and very credible witness.

Whether or not the trial court erred in overlooking a vital fact that there is no physical evidence
that appellant fired a gun because he was not subjected to paraffin test.

RULING:
Under his first assigned error, accused-appellant tries to make capital out of the discrepancy
between Lacbay's testimony and the necropsy report and testimony of the City Health Officer concerning
the distance and the manner in which the victims were shot. Lacbay stated that accused-appellant was
more or less three meters away from the victims when he fired at them from behind. Dr. Francisco Perez,
on the other hand, testified that the assailant could not have been farther than eighteen inches owing to
the gunpowder smudge found on the wound of Carlito Diomampo. Dr. Perez also claimed that the victims
sustained frontal gunshot wounds indicating that they were shot while facing their assailant.

Accused-appellant is clutching at reeds. The variance in the distance from which the victims were
shot is insignificant and does not take into account that even as Lacbay said that accused-appellant was
3 meters away from his victims when he fired, the distance would be considerably lessened because of
the arm extension when he fired. Then too, the relative positions of accused-appellant and the victims
need not necessarily be directly contradictory, one following the others according to Lacbay, and the
victims facing accused-appellant according to accused-appellant using the statement of Dr. Perez that
the victims sustained frontal gunshot wounds. It could very well have been that the dramatis personae
were following each other, but that as accused-appellant shot Diomampo and Bonilla, they turned
towards or had their faces turned towards accused-appellant. This could very well have been the case
especially in regard to Bonilla the second victim, for his natural reaction after accused-appellant fired the
first time at Bonilla was to look at the direction from which the shot was fired.

In any event, Lacbay's emphatic and positive identification of accused-appellant as the gunman
deserves full merit and weight despite any supposed inconsistency. Verily, establishing the identity of the
malefactor through the testimony of witnesses, is the heart and cause of the prosecution. All other
matters, albeit of considerable weight and importance, generally assume lesser consequence, and in this
regard, the identification by Lacbay of accused-appellant as the gunman is positive and unshakeable.
 The second assigned error would stress the alleged absence of physical evidence showing that
accused-appellant fired a gun. To this, we need only remark that such circumstance neither proves his
innocence as well. In fact, even if he were subjected to a paraffin test and the same yields a negative
finding, it cannot be definitely concluded that he had not fired a gun as it is possible for one to fire a gun
and yet be negative for the presence of nitrates as when the hands are washed before the test.

The Court has even recognized the great possibility that there will be no paraffin traces on the
hand if, as in the instant case, the bullet was fired from a .45 Caliber pistol.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOERAL GALLENO, accused-appellant.

G.R. No. 123546 July 2, 1998

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Joeral Galleno seeks reversal of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of the 6th
Judicial Region stationed in Roxas City, relying on the defense of denial. Since the case involves the death
penalty, the matter has been elevated to this Court for automatic review.

Accused-appellant was charged in an Information for the crime of Statutory Rape. Accused entered the
house of EVELYN OBLIGAR, a five-year old child, and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her
thereby inflicting upon the latter a vaginal laceration which caused continuous bleeding and her admission
of five (5) days at the Roxas Memorial Hospital.

The prosecution and the defense presented conflicting versions on what occurred at said residence.
However, the trial court did not accord credence to the version of the defense, pointing out in its decision
that accused-appellant's defense of denial hinged on the argument that the statement of Evelyn as to
how she sustained her vaginal laceration was a mere concoction and a plain distortion of facts by her
guardian. The trial court called this a "desperate attempt of the defense to becloud the charge of rape."

The instant appeal and review raised this issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in giving full weight and credence to the testimonies of the medical
doctors when the same failed to conclusively and sufficiently establish the cause of the laceration in the
offended party's vagina

RULING:
One cannot escape the feeling of utmost compassion for any rape victim, and more especially so
for a 5-year old statutory rape victim. However, in our consideration of the matter before us, we set
aside emotion and observe impartiality and coldness in drawing conclusions.

Under the assigned error, accused-appellant contends that the testimony of the three expert
witnesses presented by the prosecution, namely, Dr. Alfonso Orosco, Dr. Ma. Lourdes Lañada, and Dr.
Machael Toledo, which convinced the trial court that rape was committed against the offended party, is
not impeccable considering that they found that there was no presence of spermatozoa, and that they
were not sure as to what caused the laceration in the victim's vagina; that Dr. Lañada herself testified
that Evelyn told her that it was the finger of accused-appellant which caused the laceration. In addition,
accused-appellant banks on the victim's testimony on cross-examination, that it was the finger of
accused-appellant which caused the laceration; and that she even disclosed this to accused-appellant's
father, Raul Galleno.

We are not persuaded.

As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give opinions. It is the
court's duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the facts proved. However,
conclusions and opinions of witnesses are received in many cases, and are not confined to expert
testimony, based on the principle that either because of the special skill or expert knowledge of the
witness, or because of the nature of the subject matter under observation, or for other reasons, the
testimony will aid the court in reaching a judgment.

In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the expert
testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the victim's laceration, but also
the testimony of the other prosecution witnesses, especially the victim herself. In other words, the trial
court did not rely solely on the testimony of the expert witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided
the trial court in the exercise of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts enumerated
various possible causes of the victim's laceration does not mean that the trial court's inference is wrong.

The absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina does not negate the conclusion that it was his
penis which was inserted in the victim's vagina. In rape, the important consideration is not the emission
of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ. Verily, it is entirely probable that
climax on the part of accused-appellant was not reached due to the cries of pain of the victim and the
profuse bleeding of her vagina.