25.

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature

Co Keng Kian v. IAC and Plaza Arcade, Inc.

GR. 75676, Aug. 29, 1990

Facts:

On February 23, 1982, a complaint for ejectment against petitioner Manuel Co Keng Kian was filed by
private respondent Plaza Arcade, Inc., alleging that despite the expiration of the written contract of
lease over a portion of the ground floor of the former Manila Times Building, petitioner refused to
vacate the premises and to pay the monthly rentals notwithstanding receipt of several letters of
demand, the last of which was sent to petitioner by registered mail.

During the pendency of the trial before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila petitioner voluntarily
vacated the disputed premises, turning over the key to the clerk of court but without paying the accrued
rent.

The inferior court rendered its judgment dismissing the ejectment case for lack of jurisdiction. It refused
to give probative value to the three letters of demand to vacate which were all sent to petitioner and
which he refused to receive. The court held that since none of the demand letters was served (1)
personally, or (2) by written notice of such demand upon a person found on the premises, or (3) by
posting such notice on the premises if no person can be found thereon. If none was made, the case
came within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Metropolitan Trial Court.

Plaza Arcade, Inc. appealed to the Regional Trial Court which initially reversed the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, but on motion for reconsideration by petitioner, affirmed the dismissal of the
ejectment case in its order.

A petition for review was filed with the then Intermediate Appellate Court. In its decision, the Appellate
Court overturned the appealed order of the trial court which had earlier sustained the dismissal of the
ejectment case. Motion for reconsideration having been denied, the aforesaid decision of the Appellate
Court was elevated to this Court on a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: WON the demand can be served thru registered mail.

Ruling: YES, the notice to leave the premises is transmitted by registered mail with a return card and
thereafter the receipt bearing the signature of the defendant was returned, a prima facie case is
established of the fact of delivery of said notice to the defendant personally by the Postal Office
Department although he refused to accept the same. 4 Indeed, notice by registered mail is considered
an effective service on the person concerned. It cannot be avoided by the mere expediency of declining
to accept delivery after notification thereof. The service is deemed complete regardless of such refusal
to accept if the addressee fails to claim his mail from the postal office after the lapse of five (5) days
from the date of the first notice of the postmaster.

In conclusion, we stress that the notice to vacate the leased premises, required by the Rules to be
served on the tenant before a forcible entry or unlawful detainer action can be commenced against him,
may be served by registered mail.
Actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature because they involve a
disturbance of social order which must be abated as promptly as possible without any undue reliance on
technical and procedural rules which only cause delays. In the ultimate analysis, it matters not how the
notice to vacate was conveyed, so long as the lessee or his agent has personally received the written
demand, whether handed to him by the lessor, his attorney, a messenger or even a postman. The
undisputed facts in the instant case show that the Manila Times Publishing Company, through its
manager, had informed petitioner that Plaza Arcade Inc. was the new owner of the subject building; that
on October 18, 1979, a demand letter was sent to petitioner advising him to leave the premises but
petitioner refused to receive the letter; that a second demand on January 12, 1981 elicited the same
reaction; that a final demand dated November 16, 1981 was sent to petitioner by registered mail which
he again refused.

26. Distinction between unlawful detainer and forcible entry

Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals

GR. 116192, Nov. 16, 1995

Facts:

Generosa Cruz owned a parcel of land in Bataan. The adjacent land belongs to the Nuguids but is being
used and occupied by Eufemia Sarmiento for several years now. It was found out by the Geodetic
Engineer that Sarmiento’s fence is encroaching Cruz’s land for about 71 meters. Cruz requested
Sarmiento to remove the fence, but the latter refused so Cruz filed a complaint for ejectment in the
Municipal Trial Court.

MTC decided for Cruz. Sarmiento appealed in the RTC, assailing the jurisdiction of the MTC. RTC decided
for Sarmiento and held that the MTC had no jurisdiction to hear the case. CA reversed RTC and
reinstated the MTC decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the court of origin (MTC) had jurisdiction over the ejectment case? (Apparently, Cruz
failed to state details on how the encroachment was done.)

Ruling:

No. To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is
necessary that the complaint should embody such statement of facts as brings the party clearly within
the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as the proceedings are summary in nature.
The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol
evidence.

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as when it does not state how entry was effected or
how and when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.
27. Right to recover ownership-action for reconveyance
28. Injunction as remedy for possession

Santos v. De Leon

GR. 36799, Sept. 13, 1934

Facts:

Both Nicolas Santos and Elias Cruz claimed ownership and possession of the land in question. Before
trial, a preliminary injunction was issued at the instance of the plaintiff. After trial, the lower court found
that said land belonged originally to Lazaro de Leon, who sold it to Elias Cruz on July 12, 1928 and the
deed of sale was registered on July 16, 1928. Before this sale, however, Nicolas Santos had obtained
judgment against Lazaro de Leon, on account of which the lands in question was levied on execution and
sold at public auction on May 23, 1929, to the judgment creditor. The sale in favor of the defendant Elias
Cruz was presumed to be fraudulent, the action instituted was improper, in view of the fact that Cruz
took possession of the land on July 12, 1928. The court, therefore, rendered judgment dismissing the
action and allowed the defendant the sum of P175 as damages by reason of the issuance of the
preliminary injunction. Santos took possession of the property by court order in 1930. From this
judgment the plaintiff appealed.

Issue: WON preliminary injunction is the proper relief.

Ruling: YES, The doctrine proceeds on the familiar rule that the writ of injunction is an equitable relief,
and that the determination of title is a legal remedy. Under the law and practice in this jurisdiction, the
plaintiff is allowed to pray for all legal as well special defenses, including counterclaims and cross-
complaints, irrespective of whether they are of legal or equitable nature. There is strong equity in
protecting plaintiff from paying damages suffered by a party who, in the eyes of the law, is fraudulent
grantee of the property in question. It is evident, therefore, that, as the parties now stand, to shift anew
the possession from the plaintiff to the defendants, would entail grave consequences for which the
tardy and inadequate process of the law would fail to afford full and complete relief.