DOROTHEO V.

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 108581. December 8, 1999

FACTS: Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo

and Aniceta Reyes. Petitioner filed for the probate of the latter’s last will and
testament. The court issued an order admitting Alejandro’s will to probate. Later,
the private respondents filed a Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void. The
trial court granted the motion and issued an order declaring Lourdes Legaspi not
the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and
testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring the
oppositors as the only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta
Reyes. Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some
compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although she
admitted that they were not married to each other. Petitioner appealed to the
Court of Appeals, but it was dismissed and such became final and executory.
Petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case filed before the
Court of Appeals was a petition under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion or lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner likewise assails the Order of the Court
of Appeals upholding the validity of the order declaring the intrinsic invalidity of
Alejandros will that was earlier admitted to probate.

ISSUE: Whether or not a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared
intrinsically void in an order that has become final and executory still be given
effect.

RULING: No. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed
or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. It is well settled that a lower
court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do
so would be to negate the hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. It
has been ruled that a final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding
on the whole world.
PASTOR, JR. V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-56340, JUNE 24, 1983

FACTS: Alvaro Pastor, Sr., a Spanish subject, died in 1966, survived by his
Spanish wife Sofia Bossio, their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. and
Sofia Pastor, and an illegitimate child, not natural, Lewellyn Barlito Quemada.
Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic
will of Pastor, Sr. The will contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy
in favor of Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor, Sr.'s 42% share in the
operation by ATLAS Corporation of some mining claims. The probate court,
appointed Quemada special administrator of the entire estate of Pastor, Sr.,
whether or not covered or affected by the holographic will. Quemada instituted
against Pastor, Jr. and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties
of the estate which were in the names of the spouses Pastor, Jr. and his wife
who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance.
Pastor, Jr. and his sister Sofia filed their opposition to the petition for probate and
the order appointing Quemada as special administrator.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Probate Order resolved with finality the questions of
ownership and intrinsic validity.

RULING: The Probate Court did not resolve the question of ownership of the
properties listed in the estate inventory, considering that the issue of ownership
in the reconveyance suit that was still pending. It was an error for the Orders to
conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with finality the question of ownership
of the mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the
dispositive portion of the said Probate Order directed special administrator to pay
the legacy in dispute.
REYES V. BARRETTO-DATU
G.R. No. L-17818, JANUARY 25, 1967

FACTS: Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. When Bibiano Barretto
died, he left his share of the properties in a will to Salud Barretto, mother of
plaintiff's wards, and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to
his two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew and nieces.
The usufruct of the fishpond, however, was reserved for his widow, Maria
Gerardo. Maria Gerardo was appointed administratrix. She prepared a project of
partition. Maria Gerardo died and it was discovered that she had executed two
wills where she instituted Salud and Milagros as her heirs; and, in the second,
she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto
alone. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the
children of Salud Barretto, the lower court held that Salud was not the daughter
of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was
appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the same. Plaintiff now falls back
upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was
given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for the recovery
of one-half portion, thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Project of Partition from which Salud acquired the
fishpond in question is void ab initio and Salud Barretto did not acquire any valid
title thereto.
RULING: Independently of a project of partition which is merely a proposal for
distribution of the estate, that the court may accept or reject, it is the court alone
that makes the distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled
thereto and the parts to which each is entitled and it is that judicial decree of
distribution, once final, that vests title in the distributees. If the decree was
erroneous or not in conformity with law or the testament, the same should have
been corrected by opportune appeal; but once it had become final, its binding
effect is like that of any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack
of jurisdiction or fraud.
CHUA V. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
G.R. No. L-29901, AUGUST 31, 1977

FACTS: In the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar, he sired
three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel. When Patricia died, Jose
Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with Consolacion de la Torre with
whom he had a child named Juanito Frias Chua. Manuel died without leaving any
issue. Jose died intestate leaving his widow Consolacion and his son Juanito of
the second marriage and sons Ignacio and Lorenzo of his first marriage. The
lower court issued an order adjudicating the one-half (1/2,) portion of Lot no. 399
in favor of Jose Frias Chua's widow, the other half in favor of Juanito Frias Chua.
After his death, his mother succeeded to his share of Lot No. 399. Consolacion
died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the descending or ascending line
except her brother and sisters. The petitioners herein filed the complaint praying
that the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito
Frias but which passed to Consolacion upon the latter's death, be declared as a
reservable property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias
Chua from his father Jose Frias Chua gratuitously to constitute the property as
reservable.
RULING: No. The property in question was not acquired by Consolacion and
Juanito Frias Chua gratuitously but for a consideration, namely, that the legatees
were to pay the interest and cost and other fees resulting from a Civil Case. As
such it is undeniable that the lot in question is not subject to a reserva troncal,
and as such the plaintiff's complaint must fail. The complaint of petitioners to
recover the one-half portion of Lot No. 399 which originally belonged to Juanito
Frias Chua has not prescribed when it was filed on. It must be remembered that
the petitioners herein are claiming as reservees did not arise until the time the
reservor, Consolacion, died in March 1966. When the petitioners therefore filed
their complaint to recover the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 399, they were very
much in time to do so.
VERA V. NAVARRO
G.R. No. L-27745, OCTOBER 18, 1977

FACTS: Elsie M. Gaches died on March 9, 1966 without a child. The deceased,
however, left a last will and testament. The respondent Judge Bienvenido Tan,
Sr. filed a petition for the probate of the aforesaid will. Judge Tan was appointed
as executor without a bond. To pay the taxes, Atty. Medina prayed in her offer of
that she be authorized to make use of the funds of the estate on deposit. Atty.
Medina filed with this court manifestation stating that she received a demand
letter from the Commissioner for the payment of the estate tax. Atty. Medina
claimed the said demands to be erroneous for the following reasons: as to the
estate tax, the time deposit in the Overseas Bank of Manila of P700,000.00 plus
interest earned of P60,000.00 as of March 1968 would more than cover the said
tax and the certificates of time deposits were already endorsed to the
Commissioner. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue garnished the properties
of a decedent while the taxes had not yet been paid. But the trial judge ordered a
partial distribution of the estate among the heirs on the supposition that the
estate still had enough assets with which to pay the taxes. And so it lifted the writ
of garnishment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the actuation of the judge was improper and is
considered a grave abuse of discretion.

RULING: Yes. Section 103 of the National Internal Revenue unequivocally

provides that "No judge shall authorize the executor or judicial administrator to
deliver a distributive share to any party interested in the estate unless it shall
appear that the estate tax has been paid." The aforesaid orders of the
respondent Judge are clearly in diametric opposition to the mentioned Section
103 of the Tax Code and, consequently, the same cannot merit approval of this
Court.
SEBIAL V. SEBIAL
G.R. No. L-23419, JUNE 27, 1975

FACTS: Gelacio Sebial died intestate in 1943. He and his first wife Leoncia
Manikis, who allegedly died in 1919, begot three children named Roberta,
Balbina and Juliano. By his second wife, Dolores Enad, whom he allegedly
married in 1927, he supposedly begot six children named Benjamina, Valentina,
Ciriaco, Gregoria, Esperanza and Luciano. Benjamina filed a verified petition for
the settlement of Gelacio Sebial's estate. She prayed that she be appointed
administratrix thereof. Roberta opposed the petition on the ground that the estate
had already been partitioned among his children and that, if an administration
proceeding was necessary, she should be the one appointed administratrix and
not Benjamina. In a supplemental opposition the children of the first marriage
contended that the remedy of Benjamina was an action to rescind the partition.
The lower court appointed Benjamina Sebial as administratrix. It found that the
alleged partition of the decedent's estate was invalid and ineffective. Benjamina
filed an inventory and appraisal of the decedent's estate.The oppositors
registered their opposition to the inventory on the ground that the parcels of land
enumerated in the inventory no longer formed part of the decedent's estate.

ISSUE: Whether or not a probate court still has jurisdiction to approve the
inventory of the estate of the deceased, even after the lapse of the 3-month
period mentioned in Section 1, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court.

RULING: Yes. However, the issue of prescription should also be considered.

The probate court should receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the
parties as to the assets of decedent's estate and decide once and for all whether
there are still any assets of the estate that can be partitioned and, if so, to effect
the requisite partition and distribution. If the estate has no more assets and if a
partition had really been made or the action to recover the lands transferred to
third person had prescribed, it should dismiss the intestate proceeding.
HEIRS OF THE LATE JESUS FRAN vs. SALAS
G.R. No. L-53546, JUNE 25, 1992

FACTS: Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo, a widow, died in 1972 with neither

descendants nor ascendants. She executed a last will and testament wherein
she bequeathed to her collateral relatives (brothers, sisters, nephews and
nieces) all her properties, and designated Rosario Tan or, upon the latter's death,
Jesus Fran, as executor to serve without bond. Instrumental witnesses to the will
were Nazario Pacquiao, Alcio Demerre and Primo Miro. Jesus Fran filed a
petition for the probate of Remedios' last will and testament. The petition alleged
that Rosario Tan is not physically well and, therefore, will not be assuming the
position of administratrix. the probate court rendered a decision admitting to
probate the will of the testatrix, Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo, and appointing
petitioner Fran as executor thereof. Private respondents filed an Omnibus Motion
for Reconsideration of the probate judgment and the Order of partition asking the
court to declare the proceedings still open and admit their opposition to the
allowance of the will.

ISSUE: Whether or not the non-distribution of the estate is a ground for the re-
opening of the testate proceedings.

RULING: No. The non-distribution of the estate, which is vigorously denied by

the petitioners, is not a ground for the re-opening of the testate proceedings. A
seasonable motion for execution should have been filed. If the executor or
administrator has possession of the share to be delivered, the probate court
would have jurisdiction within the same estate proceeding to order him to transfer
that possession to the person entitled thereto. This is authorized under Section 1,
Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. However, if no motion for execution is filed within
the reglementary period, a separate action for the recovery of the shares would
be in order.
NUFABLE V. NUFABLE
G.R. No. 126950, JULY 2, 1999

FACTS: Rev. Fr. Esdras Nufable died leaving a Last Will and Testament
disposing of his properties or estate in favor of his four legitimate children,
namely: Angel Custodio Nufable, Generosa Nufable, Vilfor Nufable and Marcelo
Nufable. The said Last Will and Testament was probated and is embodied in the
same order appointing an Administratrix, Generosa Nufable, but to qualify only if
she put up a necessary bond of P1,000.00. Herein legitimate children prefer not
to appoint an Administratrix, as agreed upon by all the heirs, because they have
no objection as to the manner of disposition of their share made by the testator,
the expenses of the proceedings and that they have already taken possession of
their respective shares in accordance with the will. Spouses Angel Custodio and
Aquilina Nufable mortgaged the entire property to the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP). Nelson Nufable, the son of Angel Custodio Nufable purchased
said property from DBP.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Last Will and Testament of Esdras Nufable and its
subsequent probate are pertinent and material to the question of the right of
ownership of petitioner Nelson Nufable who purchased the land in question from,
and as acquired property of the DBP.

RULING: As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited only to

passing upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated, the due
execution thereof, the testator’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with
the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. Said court at this stage of the
proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the
provision of the will. The question of the intrinsic validity of a will normally comes
only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. The
subject property was already purchased by petitioner Nelson from DBP and the
latter, by such sale, transferred its rights and obligations to the former.
BUGNAO vs. UBAG
G.R. No. 4445, SEPTEMBER 18, 1909

FACTS: The last will and testament of Domingo Ubag, deceased, was
propounded by his widow, Catalina Bugnao, the sole beneficiary, and probate
was contested by the appellants, who are brothers and sisters of the deceased,
and who would be entitled to share in the distribution of his estate, if probate
were denied, as it appears that the deceased left no heirs in the direct ascending
or descending line. Appellants contend that the evidence of record is not
sufficient to establish the execution of the alleged will in the manner and form
prescribed and that at the time when it is alleged that the will was executed,
Ubag was not of sound mind and memory, and was physically and mentally
incapable of making a will.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testator has the testamentary capacity to make the
will.

RULING: Yes. The testator was, at the time of making the instrument under
consideration, endowed with all the elements of mental capacity set out in the
following definition of testamentary capacity which has been frequently
announced in courts of last resort in England and the United States; and while is
some cases testamentary capacity has been held to exist in the absence of proof
of some of these elements, there can be no question that, in the absence of proof
of very exceptional circumstances, proof of the existence of all these elements in
sufficient to establish the existence of testamentary capacity.
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the
transaction which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to
be disposed of and the person who would naturally be supposed to have claims
upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will
distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.
PASCUAL V. DE LA CRUZ
G.R. No. L-24819, MAY 30, 1969

FACTS: Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any surviving descendant or

ascendant. A petition for the probate of her alleged will was filed by Andres
Pascual, who was named in the said will as executor and sole heir of the
decedent. Opposing the petition, Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and
nieces of Catalina contested the validity of the will on the grounds that the
formalities required by law were not complied with. The probate court rendered
judgment upholding the due execution of the will and appointed petitioner Andres
Pascual executor and administrator of the estate of the late Catalina de la Cruz
without bond. Oppositors-appellees claim that the lower court erred in giving
credence to the testimonies of the subscribing witnesses and the notary that the
will was duly executed, notwithstanding the existence of inconsistencies and
contradictions in the testimonies, and in disregarding their evidence that the will
was not signed by all the witnesses in the presence of one another.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in accepting the concordant testimony
of the instrumental witnesses as warranting the probate of the will in question.

RULING: No. The circumstances marshalled by the contestants certainly fail to

establish actual undue influence or improper pressure exercised on the testatrix
by the proponent. Their main reliance is on the assertion of the latter, in the
course of his testimony, that the deceased "did not like to sign anything unless I
knew it", which does not amount to proof that she would sign anything that
proponent desired. Considering that testarix considered proponent as her own
son, nothing is abnormal in instituting proponent also as her own beneficiary.
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MATILDE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 76648, FEBRUARY 26, 1988

FACTS: Herminia Montinola, who died single, parentless and childless, devised
in her holographic will several of her real properties to specified persons. The
court appointed private respondent as Special Administrator of the testate estate
of deceased. Matilde Montinola Sanson (petitioner), the only surviving sister of
the deceased but who was not named in the said will, filed her Opposition to
Probate of Will, alleging that the subject will was not entirely written, dated and
signed by the testatrix herself and the same was falsely dated or antedated, that
the testatrix was not in full possession of her mental faculties to make
testamentary dispositions, that undue influence was exerted upon the person and
mind of the testatrix by the beneficiaries named in the will, and that the will failed
to institute a residual heir to the remainder of the estate. The probate court
rendered its decision allowing the probate of the disputed will. Petitioner thus
appealed the decision of the probate court to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
in the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the holographic will in question be allowed to probate.
RULING: Yes. The fact that the testatrix disposed of only eleven (11) of her real
properties does not invalidate the will, or is it an indication that the testatrix was
of unsound mind. The portion of the estate undisposed of shall pass on to the
heirs of the deceased in intestate succession. Neither is undue influence present
just because blood relatives, other than compulsory heirs have been omitted, for
while blood ties are strong in the Philippines, it is the testator's right to disregard
non-compulsory heirs. Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making
a testament, otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate. The contention
of undue influence or improper pressure exerted by the beneficiaries of the will
cannot be sustained on mere conjecture or suspicion; as it is not enough that
there was opportunity to exercise undue influence or a possibility that it may have
been exercised. The exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be
supported by substantial evidence that it was actually exercised.
BELEN V. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-14474, OCTOBER 31, 1960

FACTS: Benigno Diaz died and the codicil, together with the will, was admitted to
probate. The estate was put under the administration of the appellee Bank of the
Philippine Islands, as trustee for the benefit of the legatees. Filomena Diaz died,
leaving two legitimate children, Milagros Belen de Olsguera, married, with seven
(7) legitimate children, and Onesima D. Belen, single. Onesima D. Belen filed a
petition contending that the amount that would have appertained to Filomena
Diaz under the codicil should now be divided only between herself and Milagros
Belen de Olaguera, as the surviving children of the said deceased, to the
exclusion of the seven (7) legitimate children of Milagros Belen de Olaguera. The
court denied as the share of Filomena Diaz in the residue of the proceeds of the
sale of the properties does not and should not from part of her estate since it
pertains to her legitimate descendants and the aforesaid share of Filomena Diaz
should be distributed between her children, Milagros Belen de Olaguera and
Onesima D. Belenand her other legitimate descendants.

ISSUE: Whether or not the codicil should be interpreted to mean descendants

nearest in the degree to the original legatee Filomena Diaz.

RULING: The testator's intention being the cardinal rule of succession in the
absence of compulsory (forced) heirs, he could have rendered inoperative all the
articles mentioned, if he had so desired. It was incumbent upon appellant to
prove such intention on the part of the testator; yet she has not done so. In the
absence of other indications of contrary intent, the proper rule to apply in the
instant case is that the testator, by designating a class or group of legatees,
intended all members thereof to succeed per capita. So that the original legacy to
Filomena Diaz should be equally divided among her surviving children and
grandchidren.
IN RE WILL OF LEODEGARIA JULIAN V. MARTINEZ
G.R. No. L-39247, JUNE 27, 1975

FACTS: Leodegaria Julian died survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and
by their six legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio,
Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B.
Pabaonon. Felix Balanay, Jr. filed in a petition for the probate of his mother's
notarial will. Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the
will on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition
of the husband and alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. The
oppositors claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties which
he had received from the testatrix. Felix Balanay, Jr., withdrew his opposition to
the probate of the will and affirmed that he was interested in its probate. He
manifested that he "waived and renounced' his hereditary rights in her estate in
favor of his six children. Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder
contended that the affidavit and "conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void.
The court declared the will void on the basis of its own independent assessment
of its provisions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic
validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in
declaring it void.

RULING: The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity
even before its formal validity had been established. Where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. But the probate court erred
in declaring that the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an
intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its order, it gave effect to the
surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary
rights which presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal estate.
SOLANO V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-41971, NOVEMBER 29, 1983

FACTS: Bienvenido Garcia and Emeteria Garcia, claiming to be illegitimate

children of Dr. Meliton Solano, filed an action for recognition against him. In his
Answer, Solano denied paternity. When Solano died. Petitioner Zonia Ana
Solano was ordered substituted for the decedent as the only surviving heir
mentioned in his Last Will and Testament probated prior to his death. The
Garcias impugned the recognition of Zonia as an acknowledged natural child with
the prayer that she be declared instead, like them, as an adulterous child of the
decedent. The trial court rendered declaring the plaintiffs Bienvenido S. Garcia
and Emeteria S. Garcia and the defendant Sonia Ana Tuagnon as the illegitimate
children of the late Dr. Meliton Solano under the class of adulterous children, with
all the rights granted them by law. The institution of Sonia Ana Solano as sole
and universal heir of the said deceased in the will is hereby declared null and
void and the three (3) children shall share equally the estate or one- third (1/3)
each, without prejudice to the legacy given to Trinidad Tuagnon and the right of
any creditors of the estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the institution of heir in the last will and testament of Dr.
Meliton Solano, which was duly probated is void.
RULING: The preterition of the Garcias should annul the institution of Zonia as
an heir only insofar as the legitime of the omitted heirs is impaired. The Will,
therefore, is valid subject to that limitation. It is a plain that the intention of the
testator was to favor Zonia with certain portions of his property, which, under the
law, he had a right to dispose of by Will, so that the disposition in her favor
should be upheld as to the one-half (1/2) portion of the property that the testator
could freely dispose of. Since the legitime of illegitimate children consists of one
half (1/2) of the hereditary estate, the Garcias and Zonia each have a right to
participation therein in the proportion of one-third (1/3) each. Zonia's hereditary
share will, therefore, be 1/2 + (1/3 of 1/2) or 4/6 of the estate, while the Garcias
will respectively be entitled to 1/3 of 1/2 or 1/6 of the value of the estate.
NUGUID V. NUGUID
G.R. No. L-23445, JUNE 23, 1966

FACTS: Rosario Nuguid died single, without descendants. Surviving her were
her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6)
brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes
and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid. Petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed for the
probate of the holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid. Felix
Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid entered their opposition on the ground that by
the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased,
oppositors were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.
The court's order held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will
perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and
dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the entire will is void.
RULING: Yes. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now
oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits
both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were
deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear
case of preterition. There is no escaping the conclusion that the universal
institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the
will. Because, the nullification of such institution of universal heir — without any
other testamentary disposition in the will — amounts to a declaration that nothing
at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no
leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up
by the roots the fabric of the statute.
The disputed order declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854
of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering,
however, that the will before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as
universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.
RABADILLA V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 113725. JUNE 29, 2000

FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja
Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was instituted as a devisee of a parcel of land. Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children
Johnny, Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla. Maria Marlena
Coscolluela brought a complaint against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge,
to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the
defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil. The plaintiff then prayed
that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return the lot to
the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza. Petitioner contends that the
testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution.

ISSUE: Whether or not there can is valid substitution.

RULING: No. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject
Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the
instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution. From the
provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, the testatrix intended that subject property
be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. The testatrix imposed an obligation on the
said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to
the private respondent, during the lifetime of the latter. Should the obligation be
not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near
descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not
only on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction
imposed by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should
equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest. Therefore, the
title over the lot, together with its fruits and interests, shall be recoveyed to the
estate of Aleja Belleza.
SALAZAR V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 121510, NOVEMBER 23, 1995

FACTS: Both private respondents Primitive Nepomuceno and Emerenciana

Nepomuceno filed separate complaints with the then Court of Agrarian Relations,
for ejectment against petitioner's deceased husband, Benjamin Salazar. The trial
court rendered its joint decision in favor of private respondents. An appeal
therefrom was interposed in the name of petitioner's deceased husband on the
ground that private respondents herein failed to satisfy the requirements
pertaining to personal cultivation and conversion of the landholdings into non-
agricultural uses. The Court of Appeals rejected such contention upon finding
that the record was replete with evidence justifying private respondents' assertion
of their right of cultivation and conversion of their landholdings. Herein petitioner
assailed the same trial court decision as having been rendered by a court that did
not have jurisdiction over her and the other heirs of her deceased husband
because notwithstanding the fact that her husband had already died, the trial
court still proceeded to render its decision on without effecting the substitution of
heirs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the failure to effectuate a formal substitution of heirs

before rendition of judgment, invalidate such judgment.

RULING: No. The defendant in an ejectment case having died before the
rendition by the trial court of its decision therein, its failure to effectuate a formal
substitution of heirs before its rendition of judgment, does not invalidate such
judgment where the heirs themselves appeared before the trial court, participated
in the proceedings therein, and presented evidence in defense of deceased
defendant, it undeniably being evident that the heirs themselves sought their day
in court and exercised their right to due process. An ejectment, being an action
involving recovery of real property, is a real action which as such, is not
extinguished by the defendant's death.