STATE POLICY (FOCUS ON THE LABOR CODE)

Title: STAR PAPER CORPORATION, JOSEPHINE ONGSITCO & SEBASTIAN CHUA,

petitioners, vs. RONALDO D. SIMBOL, WILFREDA N. COMIA & LORNA E. ESTRELLA,
respondents.

Facts:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals by respondents
reversing the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed the
ruling of the Labor Arbiter filed by the petitioners.

History:
Petitioner Star Paper Corporation (the company) is a corporation engaged in trading — principally
of paper products and Josephine Ongsitco is its Manager of the Personnel and Administration
Department, and RESPONDENTS Ronaldo D. Simbol (Simbol), Wilfreda N. Comia (Comia) and
Lorna E. Estrella (Estrella) were all regular employees of the company. 1
 Simbol met Alma Dayrit, and Comia met Howard Comia, a co-employee, whom also an
employee of the company, get married. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the
couples that should they decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a
company policy promulgated in 1995, 2 viz.:
1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has [a] relative, up to
[the] 3rd degree of relationship, already employed by the company.
2. In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic ], one male and another female)
developed a friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then decided to get
married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated above. 3
Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998 pursuant to the company policy. Comia resigned on
June 30, 2000.

 Estrella met Luisito Zuñiga (Zuñiga), also a coworker. Petitioners stated that Zuñiga, a
married man, got Estrella pregnant. The company allegedly could have terminated her
services due to immorality but she opted to resign on December 21, 1999. 6

Respondents’ Arguments:
The respondents each signed a Release and Confirmation Agreement. They stated
therein that they have no money and property accountabilities in the company and that they
release the latter of any claim or demand of whatever nature. Respondents offer a different
version of their dismissal.

Simbol and Comia allege that they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign
in view of an illegal company policy. As to respondent Estrella, she alleges that she had a
relationship with co-worker Zuñiga who misrepresented himself as a married but separated
man but discovered that he was not separated. Thus, she severed her relationship with him
to avoid dismissal due to the company policy. Then she met an accident and was advised by
the doctor at the Orthopedic Hospital to recuperate for twenty-one (21) days. She returned to
work after 21 days but she was onhold and was denied entry. And she was handed a
memorandum that she was being dismissed for immoral conduct. She refused to sign the
memorandum because she was on leave for twenty-one (21) days and has not been given
a chance to explain. The management asked her to write an explanation. However, after
submission of the explanation, she was nonetheless dismissed by the company. Due to
her urgent need for money, she later submitted a letter of resignation in exchange for her
thirteenth month pay. 8

Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal,
separation pay and attorney's fees. They averred that the aforementioned company policy is
illegal and contravenes Article 136 of the Labor Code. They also contended that they were
dismissed due to their union membership which Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol del Rosario
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, viz.:
[T]his company policy was decreed pursuant to what the respondent corporation perceived as
management prerogative. Except as provided for or limited by special law, an employer is
free to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment all the aspects of
employment. 9
On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC in a
Resolution.
They appealed to respondent court via Petition for Certiorari and the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the NLRC decision, and a new one is entered as follows:
(1) Declaring illegal, the petitioners' dismissal from employment and ordering private respondents
to reinstate petitioners to their former positions without loss of seniority rights with full
backwages from the time of their dismissal until actual reinstatement; and
(2) Ordering private respondents to pay petitioners attorney's fees amounting to 10% of the
award and the cost of this suit. 13

Petitioners’ Argument:
On appeal to this Court, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that:
1. . . . THE SUBJECT 1995 POLICY/REGULATION IS VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TOWARDS MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY OF
EMPLOYEES AND OF ARTICLE 136 OF THE LABOR CODE; AND
2. . . . RESPONDENTS' RESIGNATIONS WERE FAR FROM VOLUNTARY. 14
We affirm.

Issue:
WON the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the same company violates the
rights of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid exercise of
management prerogative.

Ruling:
The 1987 Constitution
Article II, Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect
the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
xxx xxx xxx
Article XIII, Sec. 3. guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining
and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with
law. , be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage, participate
in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law, and recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of
enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth.

The Civil Code

Art. 1700. The relation between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so
impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore,
such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and
lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.
Art. 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor
of the safety and decent living for the laborer.

The Labor Code

The Labor Code is the most comprehensive piece of legislation protecting labor. The
case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides:
Art. 136. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or
continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman employee shall be deemed resigned
or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a
woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.

Respondents submit that their dismissal violates the above provision. Petitioners allege that its
policy "may appear to be contrary to Article 136 of the Labor Code" but it assumes a new
meaning if read together with the first paragraph of the rule. The rule does not require the
woman employee to resign.
It is true that the policy of petitioners prohibiting close relatives from working in the same
company takes the nature of an anti-nepotism employment policy focus upon the potential
employment problems arising from the perception of favoritism exhibited towards relatives.

With more women entering the workforce, employers are also enacting employment policies
specifically prohibiting spouses from working for the same company. We note that two types of
employment policies involve spouses: policies banning only spouses from working in the same
company (no-spouse employment policies), and those banning all immediate family members,
including spouses, from working in the same company (anti-nepotism employment policies).

Unlike in our jurisdiction where there is no express prohibition on marital discrimination.

In challenging the anti-nepotism employment policies in the United States, complainants utilize
two theories of employment discrimination:
1. disparate treatment the plaintiff must prove that an employment policy is discriminatory on its
face. Under the disparate treatment analysis,
No spouse employment policies requiring an employee of a particular sex to either
quit, transfer, or be fired are facially discriminatory

2. disparate impact, the complainants must prove that a facially neutral policy has a
disproportionate effect on a particular class. For example, although most employment policies do
not expressly indicate which spouse will be required to transfer or leave the company, the policy
often disproportionately affects one sex.

The courts narrowly 25 interpreting marital status to refer only to a person's status
as married, single, divorced, or widowed reason. They construe marital status discrimination to
include only whether a person is single, married, divorced, or widowed and not the "identity,
occupation, and place of employment of one's spouse." These courts have upheld the questioned
policies and ruled that they did not violate the marital status discrimination provision of their
respective state statutes. ADScCE

The courts that have broadly 26 construed the term "marital status" rule that it encompassed the
identity, occupation and employment of one's spouse. They strike down the no-spouse
employment policies based on the broad legislative intent of the state statute. They reason that
the no-spouse employment policy violate the marital status provision because it arbitrarily
discriminates against all spouses of present employees without regard to the actual effect
on the individual's qualifications or work performance.

These courts also find the no-spouse employment policy invalid for failure of the employer to
present any evidence of business necessity other than the general perception that spouses in
the same workplace might adversely affect the business.
They hold that the absence of such a bona fide occupational qualification which are:
(1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the
job involved; and,
(2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the
qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job),
invalidates a rule denying employment to one spouse due to the current employment of
the other spouse in the same office. Thus, they rule that unless the employer can prove that
the reasonable demands of the business require a distinction based on marital status and there
is no better available or acceptable policy which would better accomplish the business purpose,
an employer may not discriminate against an employee based on the identity of the employee's
spouse. The exception is interpreted that there must be a compelling business necessity for
which no alternative exists other than the discriminatory practice.

[NOTE: There are business necessity and bona fide occupational qualification]
In the recent case of Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO and Pedro Tecson v. Glaxo
Wellcome Philippines, Inc., we passed on the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical company
prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor company. We held that
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and
other confidential programs and information from competitors. We considered the prohibition
against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo's
employees reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might
compromise the interests of Glaxo. In laying down the assailed company policy, we recognized
that Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will
gain access to its secrets and procedures.

[NOTE: Absent of business necessity and bona fide occupational qualifications]

The requirement that a company policy must be reasonable under the circumstances to qualify
as a valid exercise of management prerogative was also at issue in the 1997 case of Philippine
Telegraph and Telephone Company v. NLRC. 36 In said case, the employee was dismissed in
violation of petitioner's policy of disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts
marriage. We held that the company policy violates the right against discrimination
afforded all women workers under Article 136 of the Labor Code, but established a
permissible exception, viz.:
[A] requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be justified as a "bona fide
occupational qualification," or BFOQ, where the particular requirements of the job would justify
the same, but not on the ground of a general principle, such as the desirability of spreading
work in the workplace. A requirement of that nature would be valid provided it reflects an
inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job
performance. 37 (Emphases supplied.)

It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were found fit for
the job, but were asked to resign when they married a coemployee. Petitioners failed to show
how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an
employee of the Repacking Section, nor Wilfreda Comia, then a Production Helper in the
Selecting Department, who married Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter-machine could
be detrimental to its business operations.

The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the

questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee's right to be free from arbitrary
discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in one
company.
Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our
jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners. The protection given to labor in our jurisdiction
is vast and extensive that we cannot prudently draw inferences from the legislature's
silence that married persons are not protected under our Constitution and declare valid a
policy based on a prejudice or stereotype. Thus, for failure of petitioners to present
undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule that the questioned policy is
an invalid exercise of management prerogative. Corollarily, the issue as to whether
respondents Simbol and Comia resigned voluntarily has become moot and academic.HT

As to respondent Estrella, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their ruling on the singular fact
that her resignation letter was written in her own handwriting. Both ruled that her
resignation was voluntary and thus valid. The respondent court failed to categorically rule
whether Estrella voluntarily resigned but ordered that she be reinstated along with Simbol
and Comia.

Estrella avers that she went back to work on December 21, 1999 but was dismissed due to
her alleged immoral conduct. At first, she did not want to sign the termination papers but
she was forced to tender her resignation letter in exchange for her thirteenth month pay.

The contention of petitioners that Estrella was pressured to resign because she got
impregnated by a married man and she could not stand being looked upon or talked about
as immoral is incredulous. If she really wanted to avoid embarrassment and humiliation,
she would not have gone back to work at all. Nor would she have filed a suit for illegal
dismissal and pleaded for reinstatement. We have held that in voluntary resignation, the
employee is compelled by personal reason(s) to dissociate himself from employment. It is done
with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment. Thus, it is
illogical for Estrella to resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal. Given the lack
of sufficient evidence on the part of petitioners that the resignation was voluntary,
Estrella's dismissal is declared illegal.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73477
dated August 3, 2004 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARRIAGE LICENSE
Title: ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL,
INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, vs . NORMA BAYADOG,
respondent
Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones and born the petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by
Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985.

One year and 8 months, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
license which they executed an affidavit that they had
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a
marriage license. However, Pepito died in a car accident.

After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license because
it will affect successional rights.

Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they
are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47
of the Family Code.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed
the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the
following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant filing annulity of marriage
although the father already died
(2) Whether or not the second marriage is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after
it was dissolved due to their father's death.

However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the
petition for review.

Supplementary to the Main Issue

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code. The
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement
and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested which recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as
a basic "autonomous social institution."

EXCEPTION
Provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at
least five years before the marriage.
With no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of
persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a
marriage license.
The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from
legitimizing their status.
To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the
law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for
five years without the benefit of marriage, the five-year common-law cohabitation period,
which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of the marriage.

This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise,
if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether
the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law
would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with
their spouse.

Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall
be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior
marriage was dissolved or annulled.

From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed which is not the cohabitation
contemplated by law.

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the
absence of such element.

ISSUE:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after
his death?

RULING:
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code cannot be applied even by
analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.

Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an
annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical.
A marriage that is annullable is valid until otherwise declared by the court, generally ratified
or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription, and cannot be assailed collaterally except in a
direct proceeding ; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never
to have taken place and cannot be the source of rights, can never be ratified, and can be
attacked collaterally.

Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after
death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage
had been perfectly valid.

Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law

concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership
through actual joint contribution, and its effect on the children born to such void marriages
as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of
the Family Code.

On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal
partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.

Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged
marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds
from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage, unless for the purpose of remarriage.

The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40
of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and
SETASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED. cdtai
SO ORDERED.
MARRIAGE LICENSE
Title: JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO and husband DR. GERARD C. SALGADO , petitioners, vs. LUIS
G. ANSON, respondent.
FACTS:
On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson (Luis) filed a civil case Jo-Ann and Gerard Salgado
along with Maria Luisa and Gaston Maya, seeking the annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds of
Sale and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis .

Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse of the late Severina de Asis-
Anson (Severina) married on December 28, 1966.
Prior to the celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on
December 30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina's daughter from a previous relationship.

During marital union with Severina, they acquired 6 real properties

located in San Juan, Metro Manila but without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed
three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale transferring 3 properties to Jo-Ann. When Severina died,
Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina de
Asis adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir of the 3 remaining properties. With this, Luis
claimed that he was divested of his lawful share in the conjugal properties and of his inheritance
as a compulsory heir of Severina.

According to the Compulsory Counterclaim of Jo-Ann which considered as the Answer of

her husband, Gerard, and Spouses Maya, that Luis and Severina had a common-law relationship
which they both acknowledged and formally terminated through 2 Partition Agreement. Thus, Luis
had already received the properties apportioned to him by virtue of the said agreement while the
6 mentioned properties were acquired exclusively and under the name of Severina. After that Luis
went to US, married to other and had a son, while his daughter, Maria Luisa left under the
guardianship and custody of her mother.

Trial ensued thereafter. After Luis gave his testimony and presented
documentary evidence which included a certified true copy of his marriage contract with Severina
and admitted the Partition Agreement, while the Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed their
respective Demurrers to Evidence disputed the validity of the marriage due to lack of marriage
license.

On February 16, 2006, the trial court denied both demurrers, explaining that the sufficiency
of evidence presented by Luis is evidentiary in nature and may only be controverted by evidence
to the contrary.

The Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed their separate motions for reconsideration, which
the trial court denied. Consequently, both the Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed their
respective petitions for certiorari with the CA.

Resolving the petition for certiorari on the demurrer to evidence filed by the Spouses
Salgado, the CA Second Division directed the trial court "to properly resolve with deliberate
dispatch the demurrer to evidence in accordance with Section 3, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure by stating clearly and distinctly the reason therefor on the basis of [the Spouses
Salgado's] proffered evidence" 35 whereas the CA Ninth Division dismissed the petition of the
Spouses Maya and ordered the trial court to decide the case with deliberate dispatch.

The RTC, in compliance with the order of the CA to resolve the demurrer to evidence in more
specific terms, denied the twin demurrers to evidence for lack of merit and held that the totality of
evidence presented by Luis has sufficiently established his right to obtain the reliefs prayed for in
his complaint.
The RTC still in favor of Luis and he has the conjugal rights of the properties disposed to Jo-ann
and Maria Luisa which he must also agreed upon.
The Spouses Maya and Luis entered into Compromise Agreement which was approved by CA,
while Spouses Salgado appealed was denied by CA.
However, Spouses Salgado raise the matter before the Court.

ISSUE:
WON the CA committed reversible error in af􀀻rming the RTC decision which declared the
marriage between Luis and Severina valid and the subject lands as conjugal properties.

RULING:
the Court shall first tackle the procedural issue raised by Luis which pertains to the propriety of
the filing of this petition for review on certiorari.

In any event, while the jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the appellate court
is, as a general rule, limited to reviewing errors of law, there are
exceptions
by the Court, such as when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

The marriage is not of an exceptional character

the parties are exempted from complying with the required issuance of marriage license insofar
as the subsequent religious ceremony is concerned because it is evident that the twin
requirements of the provision, which are: prior civil marriage between the parties and a ratifying
religious ceremony, were not complied with. There is no prior ceremony to ratify. Thus, this
marriage is not of an exceptional character and a marriage license is required for Luis and
Severina's marriage to be valid.

Absence of marriage license

In upholding the supposed validity of the marriage, the RTC and the CA failed to
consider the glaring statements in the marriage contract that no marriage license was exhibited
to the solemnizing officer and that the marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of
the Civil Code, the latter statement being fallacious.

Partition Agreement is Valid

As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each
other at the time of their cohabitation and considering that their marriage is void from the beginning
for lack of a valid marriage license and Luis admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity
of the Partition Agreement under Article 1079 of the Civil Code that "partition, in general, is the
separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may
belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value."

The Court decided that:

"The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would
lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties,
which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite
for a valid marriage. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the
defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well."

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 6, 2012 and the Resolution
dated November 26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint 􀀻led in Civil Case No. 69611 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE IS NOT ESSENTIAL OR A FORMAL REQUISITE
Title: VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondent.
FACTS:

Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia
Ancajas on April 10, 1990 by Judge Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. In 1991,
when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes
on November 10, 1986, which they have 2 children, showing a photocopy of a marriage contract
between him and Villareyes stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes his conjugal
dwellings.

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas,
before Judge Lee, Jr. of Cebu City of Branch 15. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage,
Ancajas verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner which
Villareyes confirmed in a handwritten letter that he is her husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a
complaint for bigamy against petitioner. The Information, which was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 013095-L, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential
requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT:
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty". During the trial, petitioner admitted
having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children. However, he
denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage
ceremony took place to solemnize their union. He alleged that he signed a marriage contract
merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman.
He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether
there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said
marriage.

To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented

(1) a certification issued by the National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995; and
(2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997.
Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage
celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.

Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays
for his acquittal.

On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a
decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:
I.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS
CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL — WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT A QUO CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF
BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY
OF EVIDENCE.
II.THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY
DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL
FORCE AND EFFECT.

ISSUE:
WON the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on
the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individual's criminal liability for bigamy.
RULING:
We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar
as the Philippines' penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy,
notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity.

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed
judgment. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy
are:
(1)that the offender has been legally married;
(2)that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3)that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4)that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

Petitioner's defense must fail on both counts.

First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the
existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence
presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes
which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto
Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila; and
(2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that
Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.

All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court
provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract,
Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7.Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. — When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).

ANSWER ON THE FIRST DEFENSE OF THE PETITIONER

This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in
custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract
plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November
10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents.

Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary

evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the
invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.

The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the
existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater
credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage,
especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage
contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity
of a marriage.

The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided
all requisites for its validity are present. There is no evidence presented by the defense that
would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for
validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself.
Balanced against this testimony are:
1. Villareyes' letter, Ancajas' testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the
valid first marriage, and
2. petitioner's own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the
requisites for validity.

Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first
marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is
significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics Office and the
City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively.
Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accused's marriage to his second wife,
private respondent in this case.

As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to
prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.

SECOND DEFENSE OF THE PETITIONER

The second tier of petitioner's defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.

This argument is not impressed with merit.

Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails
to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State's penal laws are
concerned.

Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically

void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of
criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes
"any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings".

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during
the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated. Moreover, the requisites for the validity which satisfied the second marriage as
classified by the Family Code into:
1. essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the
presence of the solemnizing officer); and
2. formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony
wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in
the presence of at least two witnesses). Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily
contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of
the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.

As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a
third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this
is irrelevant in the determination of the accused's guilt for purposes of this particular case,
the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the
State does not look kindly on such activities.

Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an
individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the State's basic
social institution, the State's criminal laws on bigamy step in.

Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which sentenced
petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years, and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE IRREGULARITIES IN FORMAL
REQUISITES
Title: In Re Charges of LILIAN F. VILLASANTA for Immorality, vs .
HILARION M. PERALTA, respondent.

FACTS:
G. R. No. L-9513 has a direct bearing on the present complaint. Said case originated from a
criminal action filed in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan by the complainant against the
respondent for a violation of Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code of which the respondent was
found guilty. The verdict, when appealed to the Court of Appeals, was affirmed. The appeal by
certiorari taken to this Court by the respondent was dismissed for lack of merit.

The complaint seeks to disqualify the respondent, a 1954 successful bar candidate, from being
admitted to the bar. The basic facts are the same as those found by the Court of Appeals, to wit:
On April 16, 1939, the respondent was married to Rizalina E. Valdez in Rizal, Nueva Ecija. On or
before March 8, 1951, he courted the complainant who fell in love with him. To have carnal
knowledge of her, the respondent procured the preparation of a fake marriage contract which was
then a blank document. He made her sign it on March 8, 1951.

A week after, the document was brought back by the respondent to the complainant, signed by
the Justice of the Peace and the Civil Registrar of San Manuel, Tarlac, and by two witnesses.
Since then the complainant and the respondent lived together as husband and wife. Sometime
later, the complainant insisted on a religious ratification of their marriage and on July 7, 1951, the
corresponding ceremony was performed in Aparri by the parish priest of said municipality. The
priest no longer required the production of a marriage license because of the civil marriage
contract shown to him. After the ceremony in Aparri, the couple returned to Manila as husband
and wife and lived with some friends.

The complainant then discovered that the respondent was previously married to someone
else; whereupon, she filed the criminal action for a violation of Article 350 of the Revised Penal
Code in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan and the present complaint for immorality in this
court.

ISSUE:
WON the appeal by certiorari taken to the CA is subject for criminial liability for those responsible
for the irregularities in formal requisites

RULING:
Upon consideration of the records of G. R. No. L-9513 and the complaint, this
Court is of the opinion that the respondent is immoral. He made a mockery of marriage
which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His conviction in the
criminal case involves moral turpitude. The act of respondent in contracting the second
marriage (even his act in making love to another woman while his 􀀻rst wife is still alive
and their marriage still valid and existing) is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality.
Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, the
respondent is hereby declared disqualified from being admitted to the bar. So ordered.
PROOF OF MARRIAGE
Title: LEONCIA BALOGBOG and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG , petitioners, vs . HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, RAMONITO BALOGBOG and GENEROSO BALOGBOG, respondents.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu City (Branch IX), declaring private respondents heirs of the
deceased Basilio and Genoveva Balogbog entitled to inherit from them.

Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog
and Genoveva Arnibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. Also Ramonito and
Generoso, the children of their older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing their
parents.

Petitioners said that Gavino died single and bore no child from a woman withnessed by:;
1. Jose Narvasa that Catalina had children by a man she had married before the war, although
he did not know the names of the children. On crossexamination, Narvasa stated that Leoncia
Balogbog, who requested him to testify, was also his bondsman in a criminal case filed by a
certain Mr. Cuyos.

However, Ramonito and Generoso brought witnesses:

1. Priscilo Y. Trazo, 2 then 81 years old, mayor of the municipality of Asturias from 1928 to 1934,
personally knew Gavino and his wife as campaign rallyist and performers, and attended their
wedding;
2. Matias Pogoy, a family friend of private respondents, who testified that private respondents are
the children of Gavino and Catalina where the wedding was solemnized in Catholic Church at
Asturias and help on the preparations.
3. Catalina Ubas testi􀀻ed concerning her marriage to Gavino. She was handed a "receipt,"
presumably the marriage certificate, by Fr. Jomao-as, but it was burned during the war. She said
that she and Gavino lived together in Obogon and begot three children, namely, Ramonito,
Petronilo, and Generoso.

However Local Civil Registrar has no records of the marriage certificate and birth certificates of
the private respondents.

The Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private respondents (plaintiffs
below), ordering petitioners to render an accounting from 1960 until the 􀀻nality of its judgment,
to partition the estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio and
Genoveva, and to pay attorney's fees and costs.

Petitioners filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, contending that the trial court erred
in not giving weight to the certification of the office of the Municipal Treasurer of Asturias (Exh.
10) to the effect that no marriage of Gavino and Catalina was recorded in the Book of Marriages
for the years 1925-1935. Their motion was denied by the trial court, as was their second motion
for new trial and/or reconsideration based on the church records of the parish of Asturias which
did not contain the record of the alleged marriage in that church.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that private respondents failed to overcome the
legal presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are in fact
married; that a child is presumed to be legitimate, and that things happen according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life due to:
1. Petitioners contend that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been proven in
accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at
the time the alleged marriage was celebrated;
2. Petitioners contend that private respondents' reliance solely on testimonial evidence to support
their claim that private respondents had been in the continuous possession of the status of
legitimate children is contrary to Art. 265 of the Civil Code which provides that such status shall
be proven by the record of birth in the Civil Register, by an authentic document or by final
judgment. But in accordance with Arts. 266 and 267, in the absence of titles indicated in Art. 265,
the affiliation of children may be proven by continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child and by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. Thus the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article,
the affiliation shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession
of status, legitimate affiliation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.

ISSUE:
WON Ramonito and Generoso as legitimate children and heirs of Gavino and Catalina.

RULING:
The treasurer of Asturias, Cebu certified that the records of birth of that municipality for the year
1930 could not be found; presumably because they were lost or destroyed during the war (Exh.
L). But Matias Pogoy testi􀀻ed that Gavino and Catalina begot three children, one of whom,
Petronilo, died at the age of six. Catalina testified that private respondents Ramonito and
Generoso are her children by Gavino Balogbog. That private respondents are the children of
Gavino and Catalina Balogbog cannot therefore be doubted.

Moreover, the evidence in the record shows that petitioner Gaudioso Balogbog admitted to the
police of Balamban, Cebu that Ramonito is his nephew.

This admission of relationship is admissible against Gaudioso although made in another case. It
is considered as a reliable declaration against interest (Rule 130, Section 22). Signi􀀻cantly,
Gaudioso did not try to offer any explanation to blunt the effects of that declaration. He did not
even testify during the trial. Such silence can only mean that Ramonito is indeed the nephew of
Gaudioso, the former being the son of Gavino. cdt
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
LEX LOCI CELEBRATIONIS RECOGNIZED SUBJECT TO EXCEPTIONS AND
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DIVORCE (ART. 26)
Title: IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL , petitioner, vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS
C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING,
respondents.

Facts:
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of
Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage
started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where
their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980.

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
separation de facto between them. After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial
disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in
Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure
of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982.

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the
same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866.

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody
of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was
locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said
marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while
still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as
1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto
A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the
cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city
fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for
adultery against the petitioner. The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled
to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to
Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines
vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala
of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. Which petitioner filed a petition with the
Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the
cases against her be dismissed. The same filed by James Chua. And the Secretary of Justice,
through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent
city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if
not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both
cases to his office for review which the petitioner wish to defer.

As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-
52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal
Case No. 87- 52435 to April 6, 1987, but the petitioner wished to cancel, and motion to quash
which the latter was denied by the respondent judge because of refusal to be arraigned, imposed
fine and detain until submitted to arraignment. While on the other hand, William Chia plead of not
guilty as well as the private respondent.

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court
denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is
without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense
that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner,
does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his
national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint."

On March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for
review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city
fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner.

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue. LexLib
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four other
crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed
by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that
compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. While in
point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the
Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a
mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding and without
which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.

Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is
made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents,
grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule
in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and
concubinage which only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate
the action therefor that necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity
or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a
familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for
a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does
not mean that the same requirement and rationale would not apply.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer
the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. Hence, as cogently
argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the
marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for
adultery. This is a logical consequence since t h e raison d'etre of said provision of law
would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the
alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the
complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, as already
demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he
initiates the action.

ISSUE:
WON an ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute
divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides us
the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved
jurisdictional question.

RULING:

American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari
materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent
spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the
statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a
prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a
divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal
proceedings to a conclusion.

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
" 'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.'
Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have
been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant
insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have
repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in
explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the
unoffending spouse must be such when the
prosecution is commenced." (Emphasis supplied.)

We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our
jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced
that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be
determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery
case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the
accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country,
the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al ., 24 after a divorce was granted by
a United States court between Alice Van Dorn, a Filipina, and her American husband, the latter
filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and
praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to
manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error
of such stance, thus:
"There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of
the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union . . .
"It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law . . .
"Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets . . ."

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the
husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there
would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the
marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into
the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law
on adultery, since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each
other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private
respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333
of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards
declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous
the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to
appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and
unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect".

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta , herein before cited, must
suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended
spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue
was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said
case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of
the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET
ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-
52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on
October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.

LEX LOCI CELEBRATIONIS RECOGNIZED SUBJECT TO EXCEPTIONS AND

RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DIVORCE (ART. 26)
Title: GERBERT R. CORPUZ , petitioner, vs . DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS
and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.

FACTS:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court (present petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization and married to respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina but left for
Canada soon after the wedding because of work.

Several months later, Gerbert returned in the Philippines and surprise Daisylyn but was surprise
because his wife is having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed led him to file divorce
in Canada.

After two years of divorce, Gerbert fall in love with another Filipina and went to
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisylyn's marriage certificate, but his marriage to previous wife still subsists under Philippine
law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982 which he then filed a
petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved
(petition) with the RTC but later on denied in accord with Article 26:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory
relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale
behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision
applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly
stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the
Filipino spouse — an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested
with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be
prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two
marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The
Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments, both support
Gerbert's position.

ISSUE:
WON the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition
a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree .

RULING:
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code as the substantive right it establishes is in
favor of the Filipino spouse
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages — void 15 and
voidable marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other
hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage. Our
family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability
of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can
invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right
under this provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with
legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is
sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the
recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the
divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce
is valid according to his or her national law

If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by
a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce
decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of
the Canadian law on divorce. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino
spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree's registration.

For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite
judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC
may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the
cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not
the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in
the civil registry.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as
requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil
registry — one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the
entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as
the object of special proceedings is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in
terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30,
2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.