Public Interest v.

Elma

There also is no merit in the respondents' motion to refer the case to the Court
en banc. What is in question in the present case is the constitutionality of respondent Elma's
concurrent appointments, and not the constitutionality of any treaty, law or agreement. The mere
application of constitutional provisions does not require the case to be heard and decided en banc.
Contrary to the allegations of the respondent, the decision of the Court in this case does not modify
the ruling in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary. It should also be noted that Section 3
of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated 7 February 1989 clearly provides that the Court
en banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division may be
appealed.

City of Tagaytay v. Guerrero

The foregoing ponencia is now the controlling precedent on the matters being raised anew by
petitioners. We can no longer digress from such ruling. The determination of the questions of fact
and of law by this Court in G.R. No. 106812 already attained finality, and may not now be disputed
or relitigated by a reopening of the same questions in a subsequent litigation between the same
parties and their privies over the same subject matter. Section 4, sub-paragraph (3), Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by
the Supreme Court en banc or its Divisions may be modified or reversed except by the
Court sitting en banc. Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy, judicial time, and
interests of litigants, as well as the peace and order of society, all require that stability be accorded
the solemn and final judgments of the courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction. There can be no
question that such reasons apply with greater force to final judgments of the
highest Court of the land.

In re: Seniority

For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, therefore, the date the commission has been
signed by the President — which is the date appearing on the face of such document — is the
date of the appointment. Such date will determine the seniority of the members of the Court
of Appeals in connection with Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246. In other
words, the earlier the date of the commission of an appointee, the more senior he/she is over the
other subsequent appointees. It is only when the appointments of two or more appointees
bear the same date that the order of issuance of the appointments by the President
becomes material. This provision of statutory law (Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by
RA 8246) controls over the provisions of the 2009 IRCA which gives premium to the order of
appointments as transmitted to this Court. Rules implementing a particular law cannot override but
must give way to the law they seek to implement.

De La Llana v. Alba

Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of
a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. No removal or separation of
petitioners from the service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. It is
well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the
incumbents. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an
illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must
be made in good faith. The test remains whether the abolition is in good faith. As that element is
conspicuously present in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this
petition becomes even more apparent. The legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme
Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new
appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National
Assembly the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts,
subject to certain limitations in the case of the Supreme Court. Removal is, of course, to be
distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure
to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there
is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position.

De Castro v. JBC

For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with:

(a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded;
(b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law;
(c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law;
(d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and
(e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.

The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the President's
mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose
names will be in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The
object of the petitions for mandamus herein should only refer to the duty to submit to the
President the list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to
constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in performing that duty. For
mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there should be an unexplained delay on its part in
recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President.

CSC v. DBM

This phrase "subject to availability of funds" does not, however, contradict the present ruling that
the funds of entities vested with fiscal autonomy should be automatically and regularly released, a
shortfall in revenues notwithstanding. What is contemplated in the said quoted phrase is a situation
where total revenue collections are so low that they are not sufficient to cover the total
appropriations for all entities vested with fiscal autonomy. In such event, it would be
practically impossible to fully release the Judiciary's appropriations or any of the entities also
vested with fiscal autonomy for that matter, without violating the right of such other entities to an
automatic release of their own appropriations. It is under that situation that a relaxation of the
constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly release appropriations is allowed.
Considering that the budget for agencies enjoying fiscal autonomy is only a small portion of the
total national budget, only in the most extreme circumstances will the total revenue collections fall
short of the requirements of such agencies.

RE: CLARIFYING AND STRENGTHENING THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND

ADMINISTRATIVE SET-UP OF THE PHILIPPINE
JUDICIAL ACADEMY

The authority of the DBM to review Supreme Court issuances relative to court personnel on
matters of compensation is even more limited, circumscribed as it is by the provisions of the
Constitution, specifically Article VIII, Section 3 on fiscal autonomy and Article VIII, Section 6 on
administrative supervision over court personnel. Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside
control. In downgrading the positions and salary grades of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer and SC
Supervising Judicial Staff Officer in the PHILJA, the DBM overstepped its authority and
encroached upon the Court's fiscal autonomy and supervision of court personnel as enshrined in
the Constitution; in fine, a violation of the Constitution itself. The authority of the DBM to "review"
the plantilla and compensation of court personnel extends only to "calling the attention of the
Court" on what it may perceive as erroneous application of budgetary laws and rules on position
classification. The DBM may not overstep its authority in such a way as to cause the amendment
or modification of Court resolutions even if these pertain to administration of compensation and
position classification system. Only after its attention to an allegedly erroneous application of the
pertinent law or rule has been called by the DBM may the Court amend or modify its resolution, as
its judgment and discretion may dictate under the law.

Ongsuco v. Malones

For a writ of prohibition, the requisites are:

(1) the impugned act must be that of a "tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions"; and
(2) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."

PAGCOR v. Thunderbird

The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing
of a petition for certiorari.

The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as

(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the
lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject
matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such
relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceeding were ex-parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to
object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

The Court sees no novel issues of transcendental importance to justify its action of skipping the
hierarchy of the courts and coming directly to us via certiorari petition. Although Section 5(1) of
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus,
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is not exclusive but concurrent with that of the CA and RTC.
The rationale behind this policy arises from the necessity of preventing
(1) inordinate demands upon the time and attention of the Court, which is better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; and,
(2) Further overcrowding of the Court’s docket.

Abalos v. Darapa

A question of law does not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
by the litigants or any of them and the resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances.

Court of Appeals' factual findings, affirming that of the trial court, are final and conclusive on this
Court and may not be reviewed on appeal, except for the most compelling of reasons, such as
when:
(1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based;
(7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record;
(8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and
(11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.

Republic v. De Guzman

As a rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and this Court will
only review them under the following recognized exceptions:
(1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based;
(9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence
and are contradicted by the evidence on record.

BCDA v. Reyes

Under Section 2, Rule 4133 of the Rules of Court, there are two (2) modes of appealing a
judgment or final order of the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction:
(a) If the issues raised involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, the proper
recourse is an ordinary appeal to the CA in accordance with Rule 41 in relation to Rule 44 of the
Rules of Court; and
(b) If the issues raised involve only questions of law, the appeal shall be to the Court by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Corollary thereto, should a party raise only questions of law through an ordinary appeal taken
under Rule 41, Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that the said appeal shall be
dismissed.

Republic v. Ortigas

Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals taken from the Regional Trial
Court to the Court of Appeals raising only pure questions of law are not reviewable by the Court of
Appeals. In which case, the appeal shall not be transferred to the appropriate court. Instead, it shall
be dismissed outright. Appeals from the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, raising purely
questions of law must, in all cases, be taken to the Supreme Court on a petition for review
on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

League of Cities v. COMELEC

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the rule on a tie-vote situation, i.e., Sec. 7, Rule 56 and
the complementary A.M. No. 99-1-09- SC, respectively, providing that:
SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. - Where the court en banc is equally divided in
opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall again be deliberated on,
and if after such deliberation no decision is reached, the original action commenced in the
court shall be dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand
affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC
- x x x A motion for reconsideration of a decision or resolution of the Court En Banc or of a Division
may be granted upon a vote of a majority of the En Banc or of a Division, as the case may be, who
actually took part in the deliberation of the motion. If the voting results in a tie, the motion for
reconsideration is deemed denied.

But since the instant cases fall under Sec. 4 (2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, the aforequoted
provisions ought to be applied in conjunction with the prescription of the Constitution that the
cases "shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the instant cases and voted thereon." The
deadlocked vote on the second motion for reconsideration did not definitely settle the
constitutionality of the cityhood laws, the Court is inclined to take another hard look at the
underlying decision.

German Machineries v. Endaya

The assailed resolution is not the “decision” contemplated under Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution. The mandate embodied in this constitutional provision is applicable only in “cases
submitted for decision” i.e., given due course and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or
other pleadings, but not where a resolution is issued denying due course to a petition and stating
the legal basis thereof. When the court, after deliberating on a petition and subsequent
pleadings, decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised
are factual or there is no reversible error in the respondent court’s decision, there is
sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. In the present case, the Court of
Appeals denied due course and outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by herein
petitioner on the grounds that the factual issues had already been passed upon by the NLRC,
and since its factual findings are in agreement with the findings of the labor arbiter, the
same are binding and conclusive upon the Court of Appeals; and that the questions raised are
too unsubstantial to require consideration. It is settled that resort to a judicial review of the
decisions of the NLRC in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is
confined only to issues of want or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the rendering tribunal, board or office. It does not include an inquiry as to the correctness of the
evaluation of evidence which was the basis of the labor official or officer in determining his
conclusion. It is not for the appellate court to reexamine conflicting evidence, reevaluate the
credibility of witnesses nor substitute the findings of fact of an administrative tribunal which has
gained expertise in its specialized field. Considering that the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC are supported by evidence on record, the same must be accorded due respect and
finality.

Mengelen v. CA

IAC reversed itself.

The challenged decision leaves much to be desired.

Now, if such decision had to be completely overturned or set aside, upon the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, in a subsequent action via a resolution or modified decision, such resolution or
decision should likewise state the factual and legal foundation relied upon. The reason is obvious:
aside from being required by the Constitution, the court should be able to justify such a
sudden change of course; it must be able to convincingly explain the taking back of its solemn
conclusions and pronouncements in the earlier decision. In the instant case, the public respondent
miserably failed to do so; this is reflected in the quoted resolution of 12 July 1989 which leaves in
limbo the trial court's challenged decision because it is not the latter which is reversed but rather
the public respondent's own decision of 30 January 1989. Public respondent simply restored the
parties to the status quo obtaining prior to 30 January 1989. Clearly, therefore, an amended
decision on the appeal proper or on the merits of the decision of the trial court would be in order.