Republic of the Philippines (4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session
SUPREME COURT assembled, passed the following resolution:
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO,
and DIONISIO C. MAYOR,respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the
Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further
cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against
the election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the
first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the
respondents are as follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose
A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and
Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of
the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of
Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers,
proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly
for the said district, for having received the most number of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of
office;
[No. 8]
RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE
AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES NO SE
HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA.
Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los
Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere presentado
debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de
la presente resolucion sean, como por la presente,
son aprobadas y confirmadas.
Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua
filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against
the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only
protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and
praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared
elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of
Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a
resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides:
6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se
haya presentado en o antes de este dia.
(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before
the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging
(a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that
Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the
period during which protests against the election of its members
should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its
object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period;
and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed
period;
 (8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro
Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that
there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation
of a protest against the election of a member of the National
Assembly after confirmation;
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of
Dismissal";
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral
Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying
herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the
issuance of the writ prayed for:
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the
electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested
elections to the National Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to
regulate the proceedings of said election contests, which power has
been reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government or
the National Assembly;
(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in
pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive jurisdiction relates
solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted to them for
decision and to matters involving their internal organization, the
Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings only if the
National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so
regulate such proceedings;
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore,
valid and should be respected and obeyed;
(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended
to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-
McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States) as
well as under section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article
VIII of the Constitution, this Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass
upon the fundamental question herein raised because it involves an
interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines.
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in
behalf of the respondent Electoral Commission interposing the following
special defenses:
(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the
Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department
invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935,
fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests
against the election of any member of the National Assembly, it
acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the
implied powers granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and
regulations essential to carry out the power and functions conferred
upon the same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its
resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the
petitioner to dismiss the election protest in question, and declaring
itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it acted in
the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions a an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth
Government, and hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or
control of the Supreme Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3,
1935, confirming the election of the members of the National
Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not
and did not deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to
take cognizance of election protests filed within the time that might
be set by its own rules:
(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-
judicial functions, created by the Constitution as an instrumentality
of the Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or
corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of section 226
and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against which prohibition
would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his
own behalf on March 2, 1936, setting forth the following as his special
defense:
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral
Commission on December 9, 1935, there was no existing law fixing
the period within which protests against the election of members of
the National Assembly should be filed; that in fixing December 9,
1935, as the last day for the filing of protests against the election of
members of the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was
exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution,
by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes;
(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the
Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by
paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral Commission;
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction
over the protest filed by said respondent and over the parties
thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission of January
23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an
act within the jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not
reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;
(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation
by the National Assembly of the election of its members, and that
such confirmation does not operate to limit the period within which
protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of
jurisdiction over protest filed subsequent thereto;
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created
by the Constitution, endowed with quasi-judicial functions, whose
decision are final and unappealable;
( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is
not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person, within the
terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and
that neither under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II
(should be article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of
section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in
the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions to a writ of prohibition
from the Supreme Court;
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No.
127 of the 73rd Congress of the united States) has no application to
the case at bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted
for decision, the petitioner prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of
injunction against the respondent Electoral Commission which petition was
denied "without passing upon the merits of the case" by resolution of this
court of March 21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents.
The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following
two principal propositions:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission
and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related
facts, and in the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the
election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of
the controversy. However, the question of jurisdiction having been
presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a case primæ
impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty to overlook
the broader aspect of the question and leave it undecided. Neither would we
be doing justice to the industry and vehemence of counsel were we not to
pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our
consideration.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division
in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be
kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.
For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a
check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment
of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become
a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of
two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly.
The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session
whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as
a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its
Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain
officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to
the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what
courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their
jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly
controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also
exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in
turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to
declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in
bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the
judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of
functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes
makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In
times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In
cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ
which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral or constituent
units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection
and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people,
acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the
expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican
government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under
a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and
restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no
uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental
powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it
would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism
by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels,
for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights
mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere
political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and restrictions embodied in our
Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the
United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their
constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to
speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by
popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In
our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of article VIII of our constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to
determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution
itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it
does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
"judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by
the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More
than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the governments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in
our Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered that, in the
language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of
constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must
also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice
to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the
Last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our government in the
unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts
than in consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of
December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to the said
body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution
adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of
protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the
National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the
resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of
the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted after
December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of
December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as
contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power
of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then
the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed
said date as the last day for filing protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of
a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one
hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very nature of
the republican government established in our country in the light of
American experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown
the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and
defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall
have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a
specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.
Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and
while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is
beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people
and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral
Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it
were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between
department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily
determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. Discarding
the English type and other European types of constitutional government, the
framers of our constitution adopted the American type where the written
constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In
some countries which have declined to follow the American example,
provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts
from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as
a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of
direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their function.
For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that
courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap.
IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In
countries whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed
this power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa.
Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional
Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts.
121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931) especial
constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary
laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity
of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between
two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take
cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the
conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus
created in our constitutional system which may be in the long run prove
destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer
them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our
constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of
the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the
present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and
extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly."
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass
upon the second proposition and determine whether the Electoral
Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its
resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance of the
protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation thereof by the National Assembly on December 3,
1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on
the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution which
provides:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice
of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members
chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the
party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the
second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the
Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we
delve into the origin and history of this constitutional provision and inquire
into the intention of its framers and the people who adopted it so that we
may properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule that "the assembly shall be the
judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken
from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States
providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and
Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29,
1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word
"sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of Representatives,
respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members . . ." apparently in order to
emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the particular case s therein
specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to
the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, as "full,
clear and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar
[1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the
purpose of deciding contested elections to the legislature was taken by the
sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on Constitutional
Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which sub-committee
submitted a report on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of a
Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to hear legislature but also
against the election of executive officers for whose election the vote of the
whole nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment proceedings
against specified executive and judicial officer. For the purpose of hearing
legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed of three justices
designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the house of the
legislature to which the contest corresponds, three members to be designed
by the majority party and three by the minority, to be presided over by the
Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member in which case the
latter shall preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee
on Constitutional Guarantees to the Convention on September 15, 1934, with
slight modifications consisting in the reduction of the legislative
representation to four members, that is, two senators to be designated one
each from the two major parties in the Senate and two representatives to be
designated one each from the two major parties in the House of
Representatives, and in awarding representation to the executive
department in the persons of two representatives to be designated by the
President.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its
report. As submitted to the Convention on September 24, 1934 subsection 5,
section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative Department, reads as
follows:
The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either
house and all cases contesting the election of any of their members
shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each
House, by three members elected by the members of the party
having the largest number of votes therein, three elected by the
members of the party having the second largest number of votes,
and as to its Chairman, one Justice of the Supreme Court designated
by the Chief Justice.
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive
jurisdiction as proposed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees
which was probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of
the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in favor of the
proposition of the Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar body
with reduced powers and with specific and limited jurisdiction, to be
designated as a Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified
the proposal of the Committee on Legislative Power with respect to the
composition of the Electoral Commission and made further changes in
phraseology to suit the project of adopting a unicameral instead of a
bicameral legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on
October 26, 1934, reads as follows:
(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its
Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of
three members elected by the party having the largest number of
votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the
party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices
of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the
Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.
During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador,
Abordo, and others, proposing to strike out the whole subsection of the
foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "The National
Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive judge of the elections, returns,
and qualifications of the Members", the following illuminating remarks were
made on the floor of the Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as
to the scope of the said draft:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope
of the meaning of the first four lines, paragraph 6, page 11 of the
draft, reading: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting the
election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral
Commission, . . ." I should like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz
whether the election and qualification of the member whose
elections is not contested shall also be judged by the Electoral
Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the
members, there is nothing to be judged; that is why the word
"judge" is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no question
about the election of a member, there is nothing to be submitted to
the Electoral Commission and there is nothing to be determined.
Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral
Commission shall confirm also the election of those whose election is
not contested?
Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman
knows, the action of the House of Representatives confirming the
election of its members is just a matter of the rules of the assembly.
It is not constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his
credentials that he has been elected, that is sufficient, unless his
election is contested.
Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have
observed that for purposes of the auditor, in the matter of election
of a member to a legislative body, because he will not authorize his
pay.
Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal
president who is elected? What happens with regards to the
councilors of a municipality? Does anybody confirm their election?
The municipal council does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims —
in this case the municipal council proclaims who has been elected,
and it ends there, unless there is a contest. It is the same case;
there is no need on the part of the Electoral Commission unless
there is a contest. The first clause refers to the case referred to by
the gentleman from Cavite where one person tries to be elected in
place of another who was declared elected. From example, in a case
when the residence of the man who has been elected is in question,
or in case the citizenship of the man who has been elected is in
question.
However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the
commission, it may do so by certain maneuvers upon its first
meeting when the returns are submitted to the assembly. The
purpose is to give to the Electoral Commission all the powers
exercised by the assembly referring to the elections, returns and
qualifications of the members. When there is no contest, there is
nothing to be judged.
Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.
Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.
Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that
propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos Norte when I arose a
while ago. However I want to ask more questions from the delegate
from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases
contesting the election as separate from the first part of the sections
which refers to elections, returns and qualifications.
Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of
contested elections are already included in the phrase "the elections,
returns and qualifications." This phrase "and contested elections"
was inserted merely for the sake of clarity.
Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission,
at its own instance, refuse to confirm the elections of the members."
Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.
Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?
THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.
Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.
Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that
unless this power is granted to the assembly, the assembly on its
own motion does not have the right to contest the election and
qualification of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this
draft is retained as it is, even if two-thirds of the assembly believe
 that a member has not the qualifications provided by law, they
cannot remove him for that reason.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by
the Electoral Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.
Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the
members.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly
has the right to question the eligibility of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go
to the Electoral Commission and make the question before the
Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide
whether the election is contested or not contested.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.
Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the
Electoral Commission has power and authority to pass upon the
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly even though
that question has not been raised.
Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they
can only judge.
In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly
and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship Committee in response to an
amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols,
Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the difference between the original
draft and the draft as amended, Delegate Roxas speaking for the
Sponsorship Committee said:
xxx xxx xxx
Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, señor Presidente, consiste solamente en
obviar la objecion apuntada por varios Delegados al efecto de que la
primera clausula del draft que dice: "The elections, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly" parece que
da a la Comision Electoral la facultad de determinar tambien la
eleccion de los miembros que no ha sido protestados y para obviar
esa dificultad, creemos que la enmienda tien razon en ese sentido, si
enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se lea como sigue: "All cases
contesting the election", de modo que los jueces de la Comision
Electoral se limitaran solamente a los casos en que haya habido
protesta contra las actas." Before the amendment of Delegate
Labrador was voted upon the following interpellation also took place:
El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera
El Sr. PRESIDENTE. ¿Que dice el Comite?
El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la
mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y tres a la Corte Suprema, ¿no
cree Su Señoria que esto equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a
los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la Commission
esta constituido en esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria
como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema
consideraran la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que
el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.
El Sr. CONEJERO. ¿Cree Su Señoria que en un caso como ese,
podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria
prescindieran del partidismo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el
triunfo.
xxx xxx xxx
The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others
seeking to restore the power to decide contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly to the
National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98) against
fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to
amend the draft by reducing the representation of the minority party and the
Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two members each, so as to
accord more representation to the majority party. The Convention rejected
this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus
maintaining the non-partisan character of the commission.
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:
(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of
the Members of the National Assembly shall be judged by an
Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the
party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly,
three elected by the members of the party having the second largest
number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over
by one of said justices.
The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three
Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and
of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom
shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes,
and three by the party having the second largest number of votes
therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its chairman.
The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of the election,
returns, and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly.
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935,
the Style Committee, through President Recto, to effectuate the original
intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the phrase "All contests relating
to" between the phrase "judge of" and the words "the elections", which was
accordingly accepted by the Convention.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the legislature long lodged in the legislative
body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means
a mere experiment in the science of government.
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition,
chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives a vivid account of the "scandalously
notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in the disposition of
contests by the House of Commons in the following passages which are
partly quoted by the petitioner in his printed memorandum of March 14,
1936:
153. From the time when the commons established their right to be
the exclusive judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of
their members, until the year 1770, two modes of proceeding
prevailed, in the determination of controverted elections, and rights
of membership. One of the standing committees appointed at the
commencement of each session, was denominated the committee of
privileges and elections, whose functions was to hear and investigate
all questions of this description which might be referred to them, and
to report their proceedings, with their opinion thereupon, to the
house, from time to time. When an election petition was referred to
this committee they heard the parties and their witnesses and other
evidence, and made a report of all the evidence, together with their
opinion thereupon, in the form of resolutions, which were considered
and agreed or disagreed to by the house. The other mode of
proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the house itself. When
this court was adopted, the case was heard and decided by the
house, in substantially the same manner as by a committee. The
committee of privileges and elections although a select committee.
The committee of privileges and elections although a select
committee was usually what is called an open one; that is to say, in
order to constitute the committee, a quorum of the members named
was required to be present, but all the members of the house were
at liberty to attend the committee and vote if they pleased.
154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions
relating to the right of membership gradually assumed a political
character; so that for many years previous to the year 1770,
controverted elections had been tried and determined by the house
of commons, as mere party questions, upon which the strength of
contending factions might be tested. Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir
Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks upon his government,
resigned his office in consequence of an adverse vote upon the
Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial of election
cases, as conducted under this system, that "Every principle of
decency and justice were notoriously and openly prostituted, from
whence the younger part of the house were insensibly, but too
successfully, induced to adopt the same licentious conduct in more
 serious matters, and in questions of higher importance to the public
welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a distinguished member of the house
of commons, undertook to propose a remedy for the evil, and, on
the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the house
to bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial of controverted elections, or
returns of members to serve in parliament." In his speech to explain
his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr. Grenville alluded to the
existing practice in the following terms: "Instead of trusting to the
merits of their respective causes, the principal dependence of both
parties is their private interest among us; and it is scandalously
notorious that we are as earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of
the opposite sides, as if we were wholly self-elective, and not bound
to act by the principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of
our own inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in every contested
election, many members of this house, who are ultimately to judge
in a kind of judicial capacity between the competitors, enlist
themselves as parties in the contention, and take upon themselves
the partial management of the very business, upon which they
should determine with the strictest impartiality."
155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr.
Grenville brought in a bill which met with the approbation of both
houses, and received the royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770.
This was the celebrated law since known by the name of the
Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it "was one of the
nobles works, for the honor of the house of commons, and the
security of the constitution, that was ever devised by any minister or
statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of the evil, or the
apparent success of the remedy, may have led many of the
contemporaries of the measure to the information of a judgement,
which was not acquiesced in by some of the leading statesmen of
the day, and has not been entirely confirmed by subsequent
experience. The bill was objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey,
afterwards chief justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson,
who had been clerk of the house, and Mr. Charles James Fox, chiefly
on the ground, that the introduction of the new system was an
essential alteration of the constitution of parliament, and a total
abrogation of one of the most important rights and jurisdictions of
the house of commons.
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of
insuring the non-partisan settlement of the controverted elections of its
members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of the King's Bench of
the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with rules of
court made for the purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has
become imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act,
1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and
Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and Illegal
Practices Preventions Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws
Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p.
408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which
were originally heard by the Committee of the House of Commons, are since
1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the Commonwealth of Australia,
election contests which were originally determined by each house, are since
1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all
protests against the election of members of the Upper House of the Diet are
to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap.
2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19)
and the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest
the authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly
in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests, the
Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution
of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the
Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for
an Electoral Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both
from the legislature and the judiciary is by no means unknown in the United
States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to the
number of electoral votes received by each of the two opposing candidates.
As the Constitution made no adequate provision for such a contingency,
Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large,
vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission
composed of five members elected by the Senate, five members elected by
the House of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the
fifth justice to be selected by the four designated in the Act. The decision of
the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two houses voting
separately. Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from
the experience of America in this regard, judging from the observations of
Justice Field, who was a member of that body on the part of the Supreme
Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States and its
Appellate Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913] — Relentless
Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the experiment has at
least abiding historical interest.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental
law were in their majority men mature in years and experience. To be sure,
many of them were familiar with the history and political development of
other countries of the world. When , therefore, they deemed it wise to create
an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the
exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have
done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view
the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the
Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the
framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous
opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as
hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58.
All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the constitutional the
creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and
"ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address,
March 4, 1861.)
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the
purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by
the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to
an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge
and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the
long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan
considerations which prompted the people, acting through their delegates to
the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission.
With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and
minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its
deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by
including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the
necessary authority in the performance and execution of the limited and
specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power
in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes,
when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to
be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other. The location
of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article
VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its
compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of
members of the legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent
of the legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in
the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power
by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the
legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex
parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A.,
1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National
Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral
Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period
within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the commission
would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be
invested with the power to determine contested cases involving the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but
subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not
only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally
transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual
authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from
time to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral
Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases
referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that
authority effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly has
chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the
framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the
National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate
control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral
Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the
constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel
for the petitioner regarding the importance and necessity of respecting the
dignity and independence of the national Assembly as a coordinate
department of the government and of according validity to its acts, to avoid
what he characterized would be practically an unlimited power of the
commission in the admission of protests against members of the National
Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the
Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in
character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance
should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general
power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for
the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred
(Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the
absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to
be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the
incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise
of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the
Electoral Commission may abuse its regulative authority by admitting
protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity
and peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But the
possibility of abuse is not argument against the concession of the power as
there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. In the second place, if any
mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and
in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy
is political, not judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary processes
of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to
be corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in
creating the Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body
in the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as they
have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for
decision. All the agencies of the government were designed by the
Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional organ
working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be
deemed to be animated with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the
great ends for which they were created by the sovereign will. That the
actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in
given instances, is inherent in the perfection of human institutions. In the
third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that
its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenge in
appropriate cases over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case,
there are considerations of equitable character that should not be overlooked
in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the controversy. The
Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on
which date the Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in section
6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National Assembly
convened on November 25th of that year, and the resolution confirming the
election of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara was approved by that body on
December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua
against the election of the petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same
year. The pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was
formally organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the
Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing
said date as the last day for the filing of election protest. When, therefore,
the National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming
the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral
Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had
actually been organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified copies of
official records on file in the archives division of the National Assembly
attached to the record of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the
three justices of the Supreme Court the six members of the National
Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were respectively designated
only on December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National
Assembly confirming non-protested elections of members of the National
Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of
protests, the result would be that the National Assembly — on the
hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of regulation in such
cases — had already barred the presentation of protests before the Electoral
Commission had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and
method to be followed in a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by
the Constitution. This result was not and could not have been contemplated,
and should be avoided.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming
the election of members against whom no protests had been filed at the time
of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation
upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have
been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election
of members of the legislature at the time when the power to decide election
contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the
legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the
authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all
contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests.
Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members against
whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes,
unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its resolution of
January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss
the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election
of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge
his duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper
provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a
seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said
body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6,
1935).
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in
the Congress of the United States, confirmation is neither necessary in order
to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The return of the proper election
officers is sufficient, and the member-elect presenting such return begins to
enjoy the privileges of a member from the time that he takes his oath of
office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C.
A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of
contested elections where the decision is adverse to the claims of the
protestant. In England, the judges' decision or report in controverted
elections is certified to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and the
House, upon being informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker, is
required to enter the same upon the Journals, and to give such directions for
confirming or altering the return, or for the issue of a writ for a new election,
or for carrying into execution the determination as circumstances may
require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed,
the order or decision of the particular house itself is generally regarded as
sufficient, without any actual alternation or amendment of the return
(Cushing, Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each
house of the Philippine Legislature fixed the time when protests against the
election of any of its members should be filed. This was expressly authorized
by section 18 of the Jones Law making each house the sole judge of the
election, return and qualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec.
478, Act No. 3387) empowering each house to respectively prescribe by
resolution the time and manner of filing contest in the election of member of
said bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time fixed by its rules for the
filing of protests had already expired, each house passed a resolution
confirming or approving the returns of such members against whose election
no protests had been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted
as cutting off the filing of further protests against the election of those
members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second
Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third
District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon],
Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 637-640;
Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature,
Record — First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth
Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893).
The Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387,
section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for the
reason that with the power to determine all contest relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is
inseparably linked the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of
that power. There was thus no law nor constitutional provisions which
authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on
December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the election of
its members. And what the National Assembly could not do directly, it could
not do by indirection through the medium of confirmation.
Summarizing, we conclude:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows
fundamentally the theory of separation of power into the legislative,
the executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of
functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the
powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and
among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court
as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised
finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in
actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power
and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional
creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform,
closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of
the other two departments of the governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present
Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was
respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to
the Electoral Commission.
 (i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral
Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex
necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and
regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission
was to have an independent constitutional organ pass upon all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National
Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations
regarding the manner of conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only
section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine
Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No.
3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time
and manner of filing contests against the election of its members,
the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or
bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of
contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is
contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect may
discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the
National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of
any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said
confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission
of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests
against the election of any member of the National Assembly should
be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the
election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of
the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the
time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within
such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the
Electoral Commission as a constitutional creation and as to the scope and
extent of its authority under the facts of the present controversy, we deem it
unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior
tribunal, corporation, board or person within the purview of sections 226 and
516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is
hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C.
TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA
RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO
QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III,
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO
REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO
OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS,
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL
DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO,
x---------------------------------------------------------x GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE,
CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN,
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003 ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-
CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA,
GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,
LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR.,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN,
INC., petitioners-in-intervention,
RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA,
vs.
JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT,
CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA.
CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR.,
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S.
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
MALLARI, petitioners,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
vs.
OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P.
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF
FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM
REPRESENTATIVES,respondents,
BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR
ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAÑON,
JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO x---------------------------------------------------------x
SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS
LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN,
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M.
GONZALES, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN
MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO
MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO
GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA,
GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR.,
RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN,
MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P.
GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER
CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE,
WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO
BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA,
SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO
LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA,
JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU
RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO
GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON.
SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY
HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX
FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND
ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER
AND MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83
HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON.
REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE
OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE
PRESIDENT, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003 G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003

U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners,
PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA vs.
D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH
CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, x---------------------------------------------------------x
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST
GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES
CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U.
OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO
VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST
SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE,
JR. respondents. x---------------------------------------------------------x

x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003

G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH
SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x
x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003

G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003

NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,

DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY
vs.
CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN
PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER,
REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF
ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY
IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC],
AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE
REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE
ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC],
VENECIA, respondents.
REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ,
FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA],
REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT
OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO
AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU
CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE
G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE
PRESIDENT, respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how
passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the
determination by the independent branches of government of the nature,
scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the
Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at
times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal
branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the
legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart
antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous
sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the
present controversy subject of the instant petitions – whether the filing of
the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided
in the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question
– has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it
was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is
sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this
Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort
to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally
permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in
adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is
ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of
powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government
by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of
that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has
been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of
each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their
indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government,
intended as they are to insure that governmental power is wielded only for
the good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and
coordination among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting,
interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of
governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of
the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and
the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for,
and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public
trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have
the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
 resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress.
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House
referred to the proper Committee within three session days Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW
session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
RULES
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by
the House within ten session days from receipt thereof. RULE II RULE V

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall INITIATING BAR AGAINST
be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles IMPEACHMENT INITIATION OF
of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary IMPEACHMENT
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded. Section 2. Mode of PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
Initiating Impeachment. – THE SAME OFFICIAL
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is Impeachment shall be initiated
filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same only by a verified complaint Section 16. –
shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate for impeachment filed by any Impeachment
shall forthwith proceed. Member of the House of Proceedings Deemed
Representatives or by any Initiated. – In cases where
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the citizen upon a resolution of a Member of the House files
same official more than once within a period of one year. endorsement by any Member a verified complaint of
thereof or by a verified impeachment or a citizen
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases complaint or resolution of files a verified complaint that
of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall impeachment filed by at least is endorsed by a Member of
be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is one-third (1/3) of all the the House through a
on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but Members of the House. resolution of endorsement
shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence against an impeachable
of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. officer, impeachment
proceedings against such
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than official are deemed initiated
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the on the day the Committee on
Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall Justice finds that the verified
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and complaint and/or resolution
punishment according to law. against such official, as the
case may be, is sufficient in
substance, or on the date the
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
House votes to overturn or
effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis
affirm the finding of the said
and underscoring supplied)
Committee that the verified
complaint and/or resolution,
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the as the case may be, is not
12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the sufficient in substance.
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment
Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House
 In cases where a verified
complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or
endorsed, as the case may
be, by at least one-third
(1/3) of the Members of the
House, impeachment
proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of
the filing of such verified
complaint or resolution of
impeachment with the
Secretary General.
RULE V Section 17. Bar Against
Initiation Of
BAR AGAINST Impeachment
IMPEACHMENT Proceedings. – Within a
period of one (1) year from
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – the date impeachment
No impeachment proceedings proceedings are deemed
shall be initiated against the initiated as provided in
same official more than once Section 16 hereof, no
within the period of one (1) impeachment proceedings,
year. as such, can be initiated
against the same official.
(Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which
directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation
of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."6 The
complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B.
Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of
Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by
any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon
a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by
the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the
same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in
plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first
complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on
Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint 11 was filed
with the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third
District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded
on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned
House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by
a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third
(1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et.
al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of
Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within
a period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that
he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all
available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the
issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of
transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the
capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring
an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had
been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House
Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the
House of Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and
Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2)
this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of
Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of
the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike
it off the records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules
which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently
enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the
second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens
and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental
importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a
writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from
filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate;
and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate
and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has
accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad
Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves
public interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the
impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the
issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further
proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court
has recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in
the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the
second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers
and members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for
an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting,
adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment
complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and
Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of
Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only
constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition
for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act
proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they
have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending of
taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme
Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and
pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment
complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and
void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from
taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment
complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its
prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act
on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose
members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a
citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their
petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that
Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second
impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and
a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in
their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and
Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging
that it is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the
Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections
16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House
Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of
Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be
declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et.
al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class
suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in
behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ
prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from
conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and
that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment
complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in interfering
with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino,
alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and
transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial
Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered
operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in
accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting
the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment
to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the
impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in
his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the
time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without
any legal power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the
Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief
Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L.
Hofileña, alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest in
the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains
to a constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of
their students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from
endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that
the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging
his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is
founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF)
was spent in accordance with law and that the House of Representatives
does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof,
prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of
Action and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be declared
null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the
issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve
matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all
proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent
House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from
accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings
thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens
and taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the
second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and
impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null
and void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be
prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief
Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be
prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263,
the first three of the eighteen which were filed before this Court,18 prayed for
the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction
to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the
Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for
the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null
and void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295,
which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition,
petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House
Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by
the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of
fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of
Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second impeachment
complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried
because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and
as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be
forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October
28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the
Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court
directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its
Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b)
require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the
Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of
November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5,
2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici
curiae.20 In addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to
maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in
their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions
moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives
through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way
of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court
has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of
Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of
government under the Constitution, from the performance of its
constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date,
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to
Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the
consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over
the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power,
authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and
decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the
respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article
XI of the Constitution."22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court
resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b)
require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of
November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5,
2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate
President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is
concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in
fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable
issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute
itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the
Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised
by the petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of
Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to
Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and
160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on
October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress
and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of
all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial
determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino
Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene
and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No.
160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the
Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene"
in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and
160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's
Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention
were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and
the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney
Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues
outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
 Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be
invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and
whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of
impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-
a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising
from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions
presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has
sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel
issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising
from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-
requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled;
and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be
discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of
judicial review to determine the validity of the second impeachment
complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of
the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by
Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions,
unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in
Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice
Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if
not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking
perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power
of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however
limited, has established a republican government intended to
operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of
checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and
restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets
forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and
limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If
these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would
be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a
mechanism by which to direct the course of government
along constitutional channels,for then the distribution of powers
would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of
sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in
our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution.
In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found
 in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power
of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development
there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of
more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating
power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from
section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who
is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such
powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth
all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to
actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity
of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions
and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than
that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide
by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the
proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to
direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in
all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which
is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not
explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has
"been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and
a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v.
Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief
Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what
shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first
mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but
those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution,
have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the
United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed
to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law
repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as
well as other departments, are bound by that
instrument.28(Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in
the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our
courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted
political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches of our government in fact
effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil
Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations
shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or
the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an
integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which,
together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the
bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast
powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government. It obtains not through express provision
but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate
and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in
turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively
checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino
Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential for the maintenance and
enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among
the three great departments of government through the definition and
maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them."33 To
him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation –
or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in that balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of
discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of government," the
afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first
time into its history, into block letter law the so-called
"expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for
which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of
its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto
Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It
says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first
and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of
our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has
some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary
during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the
circumstance that in a number of cases against the
government, which then had no legal defense at all, the
solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and
got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning
particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts
to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related
to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the
government set up the defense of political question. And the
Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority
to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that
this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It
did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of
the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations
thereof during the martial law regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of
power of the agencies and offices of the government as well
as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the
final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as
to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
 power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means
that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle
matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this
Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-
settled principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique
Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search
for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is
where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed in
which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it
being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be
present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as
possible should be understood in the sense they have in common
use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the
courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the
need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its
framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held
that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if
any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will
be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was
framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced
the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular
provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished
thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the
words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that
purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking
through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with
the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that
the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the
adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed
that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided
mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as
a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice
Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could
not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely
for the benefit of one person without considering that it
could also affect others.When they adopted subsection 2,
they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should
function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not
by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of
that great document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court
affirmed that:
 It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction
that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated
from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be
brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate
the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a
particular subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be
made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and
must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word
operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and
nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to
other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at
the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort
thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes,
but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who
did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose
votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental
law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore
depends more on how it was understood by the people
adopting it than in the framers's understanding
thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement
and jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that
respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel
raise the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment
proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et.
al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial
character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the
impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole
power to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of
judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to
determine constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings.49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment
proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker
De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American
authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United
States.50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the
framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try
impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and
balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the
judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning
relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution to
show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the
American Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to
support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide
impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the
Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all
issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of
the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the
impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that
it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to
determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American
Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling
within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as
Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs.
COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be
beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable
because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and
needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to
that of the United States, their paths of development have long since
diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the
umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme
Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial
review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is
discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and
lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a
power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to
include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the
Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of
Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution
bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives
without limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of
Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment
cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as
embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These
limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the
one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments
undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress
and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial
statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should
defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full
well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride."56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-
mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution
did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the
language of Baker v. Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for
determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power
of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by
respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment power is
beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern
the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to
perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power
of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power
of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona,
Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the
Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of
the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions
and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the
Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held
that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of
the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a resolution
of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding
the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal
for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v.
Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of
the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is
subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the
House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held
that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested
exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to
pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral
Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the
election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is
not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy
the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the
system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted
as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." 67 Both
are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the
powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of
judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is
subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act
must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions
and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than
that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide
by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.68 (Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends
that petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has
sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice
Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have
standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers,
voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public
interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and that procedural matters are
subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of
the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution
and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to
them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is
of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-
entrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to
vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief
Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this
Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest
and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil
procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the
arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate
the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus
standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in
interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note .
. . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy
underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a
particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue.
Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that
only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions
require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader
policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain
areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some
cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally
injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public
interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is
whether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations
omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the
alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the
petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief
Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own
rights – as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a
class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession – which were
supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and
legislators when specific requirements have been met have been given
standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to
show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is
about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of
the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to
any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the
power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he
has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a
taxpayer's suit should be entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to
most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal
to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the
Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official
action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a
member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate
the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his
office.83
While an association has legal personality to represent its
members,84 especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the
outcome will affect their vital interests,85 the mere invocation by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal
profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more,
although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its
interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional
issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness,
novelty and weight as precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to
relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens,
persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the
interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all
interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle,
binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before the
court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently
represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous
petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail.
Since petitioners additionallyallege standing as citizens and taxpayers,
however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground
of transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No.
160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the
following instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds
or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent
agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other
party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being
raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues
raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on
the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue
of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality does not, however,
mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter
is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence
of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In
petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does
not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules
of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof.
While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts
when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law
authorizing intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case,
they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since,
save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same
standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has
been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of
Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,
Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking
their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this
insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of Representatives is
successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention had been
complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental
importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed
a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional
issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief
Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the
Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the
Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the
respective motions to intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the
limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs
with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's
jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the independence of
the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of
Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives.
Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
he being a member of Congress against which the herein petitions are
directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating
to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as
earlier stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be
denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the
standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v.
Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the
expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said
petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent
in violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses of
legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by
respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent
from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege
that the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or
in public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his
mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with
standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that
for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that
something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture."96 Only then may the courts pass
on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an
appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of
the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance
with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the
constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been
carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the
House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already
promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional
act should be accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v.
Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant
petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R.
Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a
decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality
anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate
should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law
who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to
encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw
their signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for
an opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves
when the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to
the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the
Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of
their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the
Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House
Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a
withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment
complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and
(3) of Article XI of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would
continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or
both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact
that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the
Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of
constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or
otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier
quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought
from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
defined the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other
words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.99(Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without
any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance
of cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid
behind the cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its
power of judicial review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming
political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction
whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case
of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the
1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the
political question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the
people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to
refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime
motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional
Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its
application on issues involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the
usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three major
branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the
executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its
decisions or commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience
which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other
powers without exception. x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I will
proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It
says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first
and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our
experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the
deposed regime was marred considerably by the
circumstance that in a number of cases against the
government, which then had no legal defense at all, the
solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and
got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles
concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is,
the authority of courts to order the release of political
detainees, and other matters related to the operation and
effect of martial law failed because the government set up
the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said:
"Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The
Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper
solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request
an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in
effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the
martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar
with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the
Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start
with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case
of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial
law was announced on September 22, although the proclamation
was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its
publication was that the administration had apprehended and
detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So that when
martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly
published anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any
story not only because our main writers were already incarcerated,
but also because those who succeeded them in their jobs were
under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party.
The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and
by September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had
barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say
that upon the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that
1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up.
One of them was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon.
So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by
representatives of Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished what the
delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to
accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution
was presented to the President around December 1, 1972,
whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which
suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law
decree which prohibited discussions, much less public discussions of
certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to
allow a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a
plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a
word famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the
interregnum, however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed
and criticized with such a telling effect that Malacañang felt the
danger of its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the
holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would consult the
people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15.
But the questions to be submitted in the referendum were not
announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the
supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of
what was then designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays."
Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to be
propounded were released with proposed answers thereto,
suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the
answers given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes
cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the
Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be
suspended. When the motion was being heard before the Supreme
Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation
of the President declaring that the new Constitution was already in
force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the
referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the
departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session room
where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and the
parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973
Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential
proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the
government was that the issue was a political question and that the
court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to
January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution.
Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of
Manila, but none of them had been notified of any referendum in
their respective places of residence, much less did they participate in
the alleged referendum. None of them saw any referendum
proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a
majority of the members of the Court felt that there had been no
referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a
big difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But
another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue
was a political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the
case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of
"political question" was set up. There have been a number
of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected
because the issue was clearly justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its
functions, it faced the following questions: What is judicial power?
What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to
settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are
demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed
by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided
case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform
her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her
duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but
we cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to
her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are
so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be
highly derogatory to human dignity."
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or
enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide,
hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of government,
the Supreme Court has, also another important function.
The powers of government are generally considered divided
into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the
Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and
independent of the others. Because of that supremacy
power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is
vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of
power of the agencies and offices of the government as well
as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the
final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as
to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.
 This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which
means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to
settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the
Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the subject of
the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice
Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial
power" but judicial power is not vested in the Supreme
Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be created
by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman
seems to identify political questions with jurisdictional
questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to
ordinary cases but where there is a question as to whether
the government had authority or had abused its authority to
the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction,
that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the
duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided
by the Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for
votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away
with the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse
of discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not
intended to do away with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to
define what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice
it says, "judicial power includes" and the reason being that
the definition that we might make may not cover all possible
areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems
arising from the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact
that truly political questions are beyond the pale of judicial
power.104 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a
duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature
called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to
clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away
with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there
are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2)
those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for
respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the
other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can
review questions which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP
College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction
over questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the
present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice
Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question
doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which
the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to
the political departments to decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro
Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court
must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent
case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an
obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The
jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been
given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that
obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said
provision by no means does away with the applicability of
the principle in appropriate cases."108 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court
ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even
less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature,
we would still not be precluded from resolving it under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable
political questions and non-justiciable political questions, however.
Identification of these two species of political questions may be problematic.
There has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker v.
Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.112(Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are
interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion
that the others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American
concept of judicial review is radically different from our current concept, for
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less
discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional
issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-
justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether
there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to
examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly
acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the
present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment
complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the
Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in
accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on
Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional
 infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the
judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on
Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for
violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment
complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More
importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to
make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense.
Such a determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such
an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds
for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of
public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no
better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and
other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of
both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard
therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable
political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under
Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the
constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever possible.
Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a
constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or
invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it
is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon
which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be
adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon
such question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act
No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction
over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the
essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question
are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or
controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must have been
opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the
question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the
case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is
truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the
invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several
constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could
possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the
remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by
the related cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is
applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among
other reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly
resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF,
which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be
unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on
investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of
separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the
judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the
studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said
Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue
of the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the
resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule
of constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of
legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is required
by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened
by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their
petition which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative
inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate
Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both
houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus,
Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution.
Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure"
and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the right rights of
persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the
right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify against
one's self.123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino
Quadra, while joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et.
al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment
complaint was verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro,
Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions
of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and
trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives
signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy
the requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section in that the
"verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least
one-third of all the Members of the House." With the exception of
Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution
are alleged to have verified the same merely as a "Resolution of
Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of
Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement
of the abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto
Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution
requires in order for said second impeachment complaint to automatically
become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin
"forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by
at least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not
having complied with this requirement, they concede that the second
impeachment complaint should have been calendared and referred to the
House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the
Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by
any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon
a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by
the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined
that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be
76 or more representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment
complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution
of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of
the House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of
impeachment contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of
endorsement being necessary only from at least one Member whenever a
citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra,
does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on
impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption
as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the
fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No.
160262, have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second
impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis
for deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for
naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the
efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for
the determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said
intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of
Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their own.
Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as
they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether
Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by
the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section
3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the
second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of
the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground
that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try
and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the
power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues
in impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that
"[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over
the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to
impeachment."125But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature
has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because
Members of the House of Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option
before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is
not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no
other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this
Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the
Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-
bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words
of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a
solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is
vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of
government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because
no other office has the authority to do so.128 On the occasion that this Court
had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon
the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable
duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his]
appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary]
their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits
of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless
in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person,
interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to
resist the temptations lurking in [his] office."130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had
already been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In
that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal
a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof
from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that
all of them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This
would have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-
Members whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the
matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the
substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other
colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the
substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but
to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but
which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its
entire membership of Senators.
 To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal
be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the
power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public
interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than
the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the
framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the
possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senators—
elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon.
Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992
elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the
Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or
mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of
Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be
sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and
hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the
Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and
collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from
sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal.
Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates,
refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he
sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in
the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely
saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire
membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can
confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid
adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly
a majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court
itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law.
Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And
if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise
the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this
Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to
the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the
very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass
disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no
alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge
if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of
Justices.133 (Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it
exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the
"seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by
US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in
a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide
such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a
necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy
between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a
friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the
courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the
Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely
necessary to a decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other
ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found
most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of
two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will
decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state
challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution
are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on
an independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon
complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its
operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more
striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a
 personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official
interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be
entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the
dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the
Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts
v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not
entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its
citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at
the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question,
and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided (citations omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized
in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as
required by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the
operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in
the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge;
he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial
restraint the possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead
to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They
stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest
in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and
humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the
judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable
official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of
this Court to enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the
diminution of its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in
the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated
by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional
crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution
in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties
just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or
executive act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has
passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment
has not only juridical effects but also political consequences. Those
political consequences may follow even where the Court fails to
grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the
necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one
way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and
validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and
"in the end there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to
sustain respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was
disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the martial law
regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the
coordinate branches of the government would behave in a lawless manner
and not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the
laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches
of government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval,
violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental
law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by
the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of
justice. If [public officers], under the guise of religious or political
beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within
which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office,
then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men
excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting
under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by
the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or
favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or
even the interference of their own personal beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues
that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not
violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that
the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that
it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not
possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the
Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a
verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of
Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by
any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House.
Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar
prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as
the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on
it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term
"initiate." Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution,
Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice
of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered
and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the
Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado)
as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions
held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating"
included the act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt
that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of
the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries
do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New
International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means
"to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's
position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral
arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a
comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end.
The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the
Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading
to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or
the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the
Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by
Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment
is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of
impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the
Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment
proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The
language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal
fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual
initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking
into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the
procedure and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I
understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these
would need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the
Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of
which have been furnished the Members of this body. This is borne
out of my experience as a member of the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last
impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang
Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the
resolution covers several steps in the impeachment
proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker
committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the
report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment
by the Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a
reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by
Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking
that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment
on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was
that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And
what is actually done on the floor is that the committee
resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one
approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the
Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor.
If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the
impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the
Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the
resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was
the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which
initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the
resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style
could help in rearranging these words because we have to be very
technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the
House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules
are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with
me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already
decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of
the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect
the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of
the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States
regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of
this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we
delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment
proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the
word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then
capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by"
with OF, so that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least
one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either
to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the
Committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each
Member shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as
far as the House of Representatives of the United States is
concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified
complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it
the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles
of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct
filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the
House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment
will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the
uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United
States Congress. Thank you, Madam President.143 (Italics in the
original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and
accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of
the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained
that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment
proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3)
was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the
initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the
complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of
impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was
already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section
3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as
is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5)
means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by
an action to set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the
word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on
impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis
supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to
initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object
in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle
of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from
the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that
must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that
the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the
Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all
cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision
is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to
arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which
comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand,
proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end.
It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several
steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the
House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of
the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this
complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or
uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the
complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further
processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the
House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the
Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the
members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint,
Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at
this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point
that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or
she is successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate
as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not
initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because
that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another
proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding"
initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the
Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The
action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its
initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a
verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for
action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that
follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary
meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of
at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary…
to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete
the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate
impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus
the line was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment
proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within
a period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be
accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his
explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of
the meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the
Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as
they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into
ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they
understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can
initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the
principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with
"impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus
curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a
doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and
referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House
Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members
of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House,
the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint
may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules,
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by
the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution
is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns
the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement
before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified
complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of
the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since
the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and
referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could
not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of
Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that
"their personal opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the
Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's
our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded
utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states
that this Court likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention
to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent
spectators may know more about the real meaning because of the latter's
balanced perspectives and disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions.
There are at present only two members of this Court who participated in the
1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf
Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for
obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal
opinions now given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has
examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of
Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power
to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is
premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to
promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its
rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section."
Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the
phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these
rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said
rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI
clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by
the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
 (3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall
be necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles
of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is
filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same
shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate
shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the
fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power,
then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the
meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of
either House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge
of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta
v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief
Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice
Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to
be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the
question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De
Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente
Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers
each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that
there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of method are
open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v.
De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine
setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the
Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by
the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we
will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we
assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United
States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an
impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power
on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1)
as a window to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where
the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of
the judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house
may determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in
pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed
this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the
Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the
hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and
recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names
of the members voting, and be counted and announced in
determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House
Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The
question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not
what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for
determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the
Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal.
Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of
such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the
courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings.
It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or
violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceedings established by the rule and the result which is
sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of
method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be
better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the
validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in
force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which
once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always
subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations
suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or
tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass
upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they
are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was
found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional
restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its
method had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be
attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its
jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of
separation of powers.154
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling
reason for courts to categorically reject the political
question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse
of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution
was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x x to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." This power is new and was not granted to our
courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also
xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state
constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to
our courts in view of our experience under martial law
where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from
judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question
doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking
powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the Legislative
departments of government.155
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this
Court is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise.
Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution
imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a
branch or instrumentality of government or any of its
officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution
has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other
branches of government despite their more democratic character,
the President and the legislators being elected by the people.156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the
courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government'
constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional
Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis-à-vis the other
branches of government. This provision was dictated by our
experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and
more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in
government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts
of government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new
Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This
transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not
merely evolutionary but revolutionary.Under the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by
initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987
Constitution, there is a shift in stress – this Court is
mandated to approach constitutional violations not by
finding out what it should not do but what it must do. The
Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past
that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious
consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case at bar
once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review
violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to our
trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we
refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with
 timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to
unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly
emboldened other branches of government to denigrate, if
not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view
of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the
latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation
should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign
jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own
history should provide us the light and not the experience of
foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant
petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the violation of private rights and
the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as
basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of
Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed,
the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that "the House of
Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing
more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be
exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court
concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of a constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This
reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine
House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated,
furnishes several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be
exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if
there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House
itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the
verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by
the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at
least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5)
of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the
initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a
one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by
former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along
with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to
the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003
violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a
phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual and collective
consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama,
conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the
controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two
weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally
exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle
to articulate what they respectively believe to be the correct position or view
on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for
or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed
with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter.
Various sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the
academe and denominations of faith – offered suggestions for a return to a
state of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches
affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability upon areas of national
life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment
had been constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and
argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the
prosecution by the House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint
against the subject respondent public official. When the present petitions
were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor
for non-interference was made through what are now the arguments of "lack
of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at
halting the Court from any move that may have a bearing on the
impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the
question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been
already explained, the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite
conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of
judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the
construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the
land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which
only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in
accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of
government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls
under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it
to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the
process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial
supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved
on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings
initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed
one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction
where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of
decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court
to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the
government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to complement the
discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers to bring about
ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society
upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality
of the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of
this Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the
members' interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of
the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has
long held and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting
legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions.
This Court has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by
whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever
imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered
judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted
to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is the highest
ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that
the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branch's
official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there
are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in
a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now from
the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of
impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply
a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any
legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential
to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and
obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch
or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal
equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning
and ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the
high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not
above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just
because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in
law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights
irrespective of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to
test once again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario
Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution
in search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in
government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to
have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important
that it went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover
that it can resolve differences without the use of force and aggression upon
each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently,
the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House
of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section
3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937
GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.
Vicente Sotto for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine
Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of
prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and
selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that
he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration
in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress,
organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of
what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member
of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the
Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the
respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs
of the postage stamps for printing as follows:
"In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border
design. The stamps are blue, green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange,
1 inch by 1,094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50
centavos." The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater
part thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is
sought to be prevented by the petitioner herein.
The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper
legal remedy in the instant case, although he admits that the writ may
properly restrain ministerial functions. While, generally, prohibition as an
extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the performance
of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J., 6580, its issuance
and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue
to . . . inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether
excercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are without or in excess of
the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person, . . . ." (Secs.
516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms "judicial" and "ministerial"
used with reference to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly
comprehensive and include the challenged act of the respondent Director of
Posts in the present case, which act because alleged to be violative of the
Constitution is a fortiorari "without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction." The
statutory rule, therefore, in the jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is
not confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits
of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching upon the
jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an
officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not
infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly
administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law
in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions."
(Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)
The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the
Constitution by the respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. It is
alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of
section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines,
which provides as follows:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or
used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any
sect, church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or system of
religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when
such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed
forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of
separation of church and state. Without the necessity of adverting to the
historical background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say
that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that
the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for ocassions might arise
when the estate will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon
in the furtherance of their recognized this principle of separation of church
and state in the early stages of our constitutional development; it was
inserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of
December 10, 1898, reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions of the
Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the
autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied in the constitution of
the Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino people. It is almost
trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil
freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest,
in taking their oath to support and defend the constitution, bind themselves
to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom,
with its inherent limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated
that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere
religious toleration.
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of
profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human
affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the
minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution,
implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government
that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the
nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their
posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the
destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human
society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions
are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our
Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to
religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines
and sec. 1, subsec. 4, Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec.
344, par. [c]. Adm. Code). Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest,
preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned
to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium 9
sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious
instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5,
Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Adm. Code).
Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and
Sundays and made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the
secular idea that their observance is conclusive to beneficial moral results.
The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain
crimes against religious worship are considered crimes against the
fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal Code).
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued
the postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the
Philippine Legislature. This Act is as follows:
No. 4052. — AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY
THOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF
ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE
APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF
POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Legislature assembled and by the authority of the
same:
SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and
made immediately available out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, for the costs of plates and printing of postage
stamps with new designs, and other expenses incident thereto.
SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, is hereby authorized to dispose of the whole or
any portion of the amount herein appropriated in the manner indicated and
as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government.
SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not
revert to the Treasury.
SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, February 21, 1933.
It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for
the costs of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs and
other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to
dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as
may be deemed advantageous to the Government". The printing and
issuance of the postage stamps in question appears to have been approved
by authority of the President of the Philippines in a letter dated September 1,
1936, made part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The
respondent alleges that the Government of the Philippines would suffer
losses if the writ prayed for is granted. He estimates the revenue to be
derived from the sale of the postage stamps in question at P1,618,17.10 and
states that there still remain to be sold stamps worth P1,402,279.02.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the
Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance
of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of
course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize
the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use
or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of
a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the
postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian
denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the
Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the
stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter of
the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the
petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps
was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country."
The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of
international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people"
(Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to the
President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is
significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit
2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned,
contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and
an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress,
Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but
Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is
obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be
said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the
resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was
not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the
Government should not be embarassed in its activities simply because of
incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in
view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate
legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to
mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U.
S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)
We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the
petitioner to maintain inviolate the complete separation of church and state
and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional inhibition.
Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance and
prescription, care should be taken that at this stage of our political
development nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may lead
to the belief that the Government is taking sides or favoring a particular
religious sect or institution. But, upon very serious reflection, examination of
Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to
the conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at
bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage
stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the
Government." Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a
poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the
case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a
poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists
which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act
assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.
The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered
EN BANC
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, G.R No. 187167
AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA
HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. Present:
ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF CORONA, C.J.,
LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA CARPIO,
BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE VELASCO, JR.,
ALFERES, CZARINA MAY LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, BRION,
SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR PERALTA,
BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, BERSAMIN, TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO,

ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE DEL CASTILLO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and

PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN ABAD, MARCELINO VELOSO III,

MARRI CAETE, VANN ALLEN VILLARAMA, JR., Petitioners,

DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PEREZ,

- versus -
PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON MENDOZA, and
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS
ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, SERENO, JJ.
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN
SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO
FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO,
ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE,
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON.
MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY,
ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY
MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI,
AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT,
HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS
MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT
CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF
REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY
THE NATIONAL MAPPING &
RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV,
RESOURCE INFORMATION
CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE
AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO
ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA
DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
PERMANENT MISSION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Promulgated:
TO THE UNITED NATIONS,
Respondents. July 16, 2011
x -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the countrys
archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby
territories.
The Antecedents
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)2 demarcating the
maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State.3 This law
followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I),4 codifying, among others, the
sovereign right of States parties over their territorial sea, the breadth of
which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the
second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile.
Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades,
save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446])
correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines
around Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the
statute now under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make
RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),5 which the Philippines ratified on 27 February
1984.6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length,
and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines7 and sets
the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental
shelf.8 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline,
optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago
and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG)
and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands generate
their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their
respective capacities as citizens, taxpayers or x x x legislators,9 as the case
may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds,
namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the
reach of the Philippine states sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the
1987 Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris11 and
ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the countrys waters landward of
the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining
Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the countrys
nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions.13
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522s treatment of the KIG as
regime of islands not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also
prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.14 To buttress their
argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for
what it excluded and included its failure to reference either the Treaty of
Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS IIIs framework of regime of islands to
determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.
Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues
questioning (1) the petitions compliance with the case or controversy
requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners alleged lack of locus
standi and (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail
the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA
9522 as the countrys compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving
Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that
RA 9522 does not undermine the countrys security, environment and
economic interests or relinquish the Philippines claim over Sabah.
Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of
petitioners assertion that what Spain ceded to the United States under the
Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the
boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.
We left unacted petitioners prayer for an injunctive writ.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
Preliminarily
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and
2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper
remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.
3. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
The Ruling of the Court
On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to
bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition are
proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we
find no basis to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional
On the Threshold Issues
Petitioners Possess Locus Standi as Citizens
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators
and taxpayers because the petition alleges neither infringement of legislative
prerogative15 nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by the passage and
implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners locus
standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of
the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national
significance necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar
nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants
possessing a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit, thus
satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing.17
The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition Are Proper Remedies to Test
the Constitutionality of Statutes
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds,
respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of the writs of certiorari
and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of
grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the
part of petitioners.18
Respondents submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this
Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review, however, we have,
by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial
vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes,19 and indeed, of acts of other
branches of government.20 Issues of constitutional import are sometimes
crafted out of statutes which, while having no bearing on the personal
interests of the petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this nation that
the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance of the case
and pass upon the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of
procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is
one such law.
RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional
RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool
to Demarcate the Countrys
Maritime Zones and Continental
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to
Delineate Philippine Territory
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 dismembers a large portion of the national
territory21 because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine
territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded
in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps
any treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control
over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty
of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue
that from the Treaty of Paris technical description, Philippine sovereignty
over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the
Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the
Treaty of Paris.22
Petitioners theory fails to persuade us.
 UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of
territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights
over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the
baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive
economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental
shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of
decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms
regulating the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and submarine areas,
recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated authority over a
limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by
UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts
from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as
geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and
continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours
could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. The
breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic
zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic
baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for
UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their
maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest
of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights,
namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the
jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the
contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living
resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf
(Article 77).
Even under petitioners theory that the Philippine territory embraces
the islands and all the waters within the rectangular area delimited in the
Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn
in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the
baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn
from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in
the Treaty of Paris, but from the outermost islands and drying reefs of the
archipelago.24
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition,
enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional
international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory
through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription,25 not by executing
multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes
to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental
shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are
instead governed by the rules on general international law.26
RA 9522s Use of the Framework
of Regime of Islands to Determine the
Maritime Zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent
with the Philippines Claim of Sovereignty
Over these Areas
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522s use of UNCLOS IIIs regime of islands
framework to draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of the
applicable maritime zones of the KIG, weakens our territorial claim over that
area.27 Petitioners add that the KIGs (and Scarborough Shoals) exclusion
from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of about 15,000
square nautical miles of territorial waters, prejudicing the livelihood of
subsistence fishermen.28 A comparison of the configuration of the baselines
drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space
encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522
and its congressional deliberations, vis--vis the Philippines obligations under
UNCLOS III, belie this view.
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows
that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for
at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of
basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with
UNCLOS IIIs limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA
3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of
the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable
cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners argument branding RA
9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines claim over the KIG,
assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose.
Petitioners assertion of loss of about 15,000 square nautical miles of
territorial waters under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law.
On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of
basepoints, increased the Philippines total maritime space (covering its
internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
square nautical miles, as shown in the table below:29 the Sea (UNCLOS):
Extent of maritime area using Extent of maritime a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under
RA 3046, as amended, taking area using RA 9522, Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
into account the Treaty of taking into account
Paris delimitation (in square UNCLOS III (in square b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.
nautical miles) nautical miles) (Emphasis supplied)

Internal or Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough
archipelagic Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have
waters 166,858 171,435 ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of
UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that [t]he drawing of
such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago. Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III
Territorial 274,136 32,106 requires that the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles,
Sea save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can
reach up to 125 nautical miles.31

Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over

Exclusive the KIG32 and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying
Economic areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of
Zone the Philippine archipelago,33 such that any straight baseline loped around
382,669
them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably depart to an appreciable
extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.
TOTAL 440,994 586,210

The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam

Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone
drawn under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the waters covered by the
rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there
are overlapping exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent States,
there will have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with
UNCLOS III.30
Further, petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine
territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is
negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the
Philippines continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and
the Scarborough Shoal:
Defensor-Santiago, took pains to emphasize the foregoing during the Senate
deliberations:
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the
world call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are outside our
archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might
be accused of violating the provision of international law which states: The
drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago. So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat
magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi
natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by
international law to claim them as our own.

SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the

This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We
Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be
see that our archipelago is defined by the orange line which
determined as Regime of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines
[we] call[] archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang
 maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal,
itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the
Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis
pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang
masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at
baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the
rule that it should follow the natural configuration of the
archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded
UNCLOS IIIs limits. The need to shorten this baseline, and in addition, to
optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became imperative
as discussed by respondents:
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the
Philippines to draw the outer limits of its maritime zones including the
extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS
III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer
from some technical deficiencies, to wit:
1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of
3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06 nautical miles x x
x. This exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article
47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which states that The length of
such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except
that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines
enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a
maximum length of 125 nautical miles.
2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9
basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the baselines
system. This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles
of water.
3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in
1968, and not established by geodetic survey methods.
Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west
coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were later found to be
located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and
drying reefs as prescribed by Article 47.35
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines claim over the KIG and
the Scarborough Shoal, Congress decision to classify the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal as Regime[s] of Islands under the Republic of the
Philippines consistent with Article 12136 of UNCLOS III manifests the
Philippine States responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation
under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any naturally formed
area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide, such
as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of regime of islands,
whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.37
Statutory Claim Over Sabah under
RA 5446 Retained
Petitioners argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize
the Philippines claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2
of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing
the baselines of Sabah:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the
Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the
delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the
territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the
Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
(Emphasis supplied)
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not
Incompatible with the Constitutions
Delineation of Internal Waters
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend
that the law unconstitutionally converts internal waters into archipelagic
waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes
passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that
these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear
and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution.38
Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Article I of the
Constitution39 or as archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]),
the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward
of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas
underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
 Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the
air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and
subsoil.
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic
State extends to the waters enclosed
by the archipelagic baselines drawn in
accordance with article 47, described as
archipelagic waters, regardless of their
depth or distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air
space over the archipelagic waters, as
well as to their bed and subsoil, and
the resources contained therein.
xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage
established in this Part shall not in other respects affect
the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea
lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its
sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed
and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
(Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of
municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or
archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of
maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with
the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically,
the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent
discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating
routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes
passage.40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are
now pending in Congress.41
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now
codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the
territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys limitations and
conditions for their exercise.42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a
customary international law,43 thus automatically incorporated in the corpus
of Philippine law.44 No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to
absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with
customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the
international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are
subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage45 does
not place them in lesser footing vis--viscontinental coastal States which are
subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right
of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of these
passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a
concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the
waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from
the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More
importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States archipelago and the
waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the
treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III.46 Separate
islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between
islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States
territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States
under UNCLOS III.47
Petitioners invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in
Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies)48 must also fail. Our
present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere
legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x.49 Article II provisions serve
as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as
in interpreting executory provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa v.
Factoran50 treated the right to a healthful and balanced ecology under
Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks factual
basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional violation. The other
provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article
XII, Section 2, paragraph 251) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII,
Section 752), are not violated by RA 9522.
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to
delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the
exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a
maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation
is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary
to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will
refuse to be bound by it.
 UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines.
UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space the exclusive economic
zone in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new
rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this
zone up to 200 nautical miles.53 UNCLOS III, however, preserves the
traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone
beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
RA 9522 and the Philippines Maritime Zones
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of
UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522.54 We have looked at
the relevant provision of UNCLOS III55and we find petitioners reading
plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to
Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option
comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law,
an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of
internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime
zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted
disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely
enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around
our archipelago; and second, it weakens the countrys case in any
international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are
consequences Congress wisely avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the
Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows
an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines
maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step
on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent
with the Constitution and our national interest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-25843 July 25, 1974
MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant.
Seno, Mendoza & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.Emilio Benitez, Jr. for
defendant-appellant.
FERNANDO, J.:p
The disputants in this appeal from a question of law from a lower court
decision are the mother and the uncle of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds
of an insurance policy issued on the life of her deceased father. The dispute
centers as to who of them should be entitled to act as trustee thereof. The
lower court applying the appropriate Civil Code provisions decided in favor of
the mother, the plaintiff in this case. Defendant uncle appealed. As noted,
the lower court acted the way it did following the specific mandate of the
law. In addition, it must have taken into account the principle that in cases
of this nature the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration. It is
not an unreasonable assumption that between a mother and an uncle, the
former is likely to lavish more care on and pay greater attention to her. This
is all the more likely considering that the child is with the mother. There are
no circumstances then that did militate against what conforms to the natural
order of things, even if the language of the law were not as clear. It is not to
be lost sight of either that the judiciary pursuant to its role as an agency of
the State as parens patriae, with an even greater stress on family unity
under the present Constitution, did weigh in the balance the opposing claims
and did come to the conclusion that the welfare of the child called for the
mother to be entrusted with such responsibility. We have to affirm.
The appealed decision made clear: "There is no controversy as to the facts.
"1 The insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married
woman, the plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas. She was ten years old at the time
the complaint was filed on October 10, 1964. The defendant, Francisco
Pilapil, is the brother of the deceased. The deceased insured himself and
instituted as beneficiary, his child, with his brother to act as trustee during
her minority. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to him. Hence this
complaint by the mother, with whom the child is living, seeking the delivery
of such sum. She filed the bond required by the Civil Code. Defendant would
justify his claim to the retention of the amount in question by invoking the
terms of the insurance policy.2
After trial duly had, the lower court in a decision of May 10, 1965, rendered
judgment ordering the defendant to deliver the proceeds of the policy in
question to plaintiff. Its main reliance was on Articles 320 and 321 of the
Civil Code. The former provides: "The father, or in his absence the mother, is
the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental
authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father
or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First
Instance."3 The latter states: "The property which the unemancipated child
has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative
title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or
mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he
lives; ...4
Conformity to such explicit codal norm is apparent in this portion of the
appealed decision: "The insurance proceeds belong to the beneficiary. The
beneficiary is a minor under the custody and parental authority of the
plaintiff, her mother. The said minor lives with plaintiff or lives in the
company of the plaintiff. The said minor acquired this property by lucrative
title. Said property, therefore, belongs to the minor child in ownership, and
in usufruct to the plaintiff, her mother. Since under our law the usufructuary
is entitled to possession, the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the
insurance proceeds. The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above
quoted provision of law, is pro tanto null and void. In order, however, to
protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should file an
additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this
Court to raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5,000.00."5
It is very clear, therefore, considering the above, that unless the applicability
of the two cited Civil Code provisions can be disputed, the decision must
stand. There is no ambiguity in the language employed. The words are
rather clear. Their meaning is unequivocal. Time and time again, this Court
has left no doubt that where codal or statutory norms are cast in categorical
language, the task before it is not one of interpretation but of
application.6 So it must be in this case. So it was in the appealed decision.
1. It would take more than just two paragraphs as found in the brief for the
defendant-appellant7 to blunt the force of legal commands that speak so
plainly and so unqualifiedly. Even if it were a question of policy, the
conclusion will remain unaltered. What is paramount, as mentioned at the
outset, is the welfare of the child. It is in consonance with such primordial
end that Articles 320 and 321 have been worded. There is recognition in the
law of the deep ties that bind parent and child. In the event that there is less
than full measure of concern for the offspring, the protection is supplied by
the bond required. With the added circumstance that the child stays with the
mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the
decision arrived at can stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. It is further
fortified by the assumption, both logical and natural, that infidelity to the
trust imposed by the deceased is much less in the case of a mother than in
the case of an uncle. Manresa, commenting on Article 159 of the Civil Code
of Spain, the source of Article 320 of the Civil Code, was of that view: Thus
"El derecho y la obligacion de administrar el Patrimonio de los hijos es una
consecuencia natural y lógica de la patria potestad y de la presunción de que
nadie cuidará de los bienes de acquéllos con mas cariño y solicitude que los
padres. En nuestro Derecho antiguo puede decirse que se hallaba reconocida
de una manera indirecta aquelia doctrina, y asi se desprende de la sentencia
del Tribunal Supremeo de 30 de diciembre de 1864, que se refiere a la ley
24, tit. XIII de la Partida 5. De la propia suerte aceptan en general dicho
principio los Codigos extranjeros, con las limitaciones y requisitos de que
trataremos mis adelante."8
2. The appealed decision is supported by another cogent consideration. It is
buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency
of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit
of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest.
It may happen, as it did occur here, that family relations may press their
respective claims. It would be more in consonance not only with the natural
order of things but the tradition of the country for a parent to be preferred. it
could have been different if the conflict were between father and mother.
Such is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the
judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae,
cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea. In a recent case,9 there
is this quotation from an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This
prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every
State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature,
and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted
by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the
destruction of their liberties." What is more, there is this constitutional
provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: "The State shall strengthen the
family as a basic social institution." 10 If, as the Constitution so wisely
dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not
admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still
deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to
decide as it did.
WHEREFORE, the decision of May 10, 1965 is affirmed. Costs against
defendant-appellant.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch I, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL,
THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, and THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF
MANILA, THE CLERK OF COURT, Court of First Instance of Cebu, P.
J. KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINO UNCHUAN, AND INTERNATIONAL
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Bernardo P.
Pardo for petitioner.
Andres T. Velarde and Marcelo B. Fernan for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding
challenges the validity of an order issued by respondent Judge Guillermo P.
Villasor, then of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I,1 declaring a
decision final and executory and of an alias writ of execution directed against
the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines subsequently issued in
pursuance thereof, the alleged ground being excess of jurisdiction, or at the
very least, grave abuse of discretion. As thus simply and tersely put, with the
facts being undisputed and the principle of law that calls for application
indisputable, the outcome is predictable. The Republic of the Philippines is
entitled to the writs prayed for. Respondent Judge ought not to have acted
thus. The order thus impugned and the alias writ of execution must be
nullified.
In the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 1969, a
summary of facts was set forth thus: "7. On July 3, 1961, a decision was
rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P. J.
Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction
Corporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration
award in the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. 8. On
June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order
declaring the aforestated decision of July 3, 1961 final and executory,
directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City [as well as] Manila to
execute the said decision. 9. Pursuant to the said Order dated June 24,
1969, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution [was issued] dated June 26,
1969, .... 10. On the strength of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution
dated June 26, 1969, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal (respondent herein)
served notices of garnishment dated June 28, 1969 with several Banks,
specially on the "monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form
of deposits sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of
Execution"; the Philippine Veterans Bank received the same notice of
garnishment on June 30, 1969 .... 11. The funds of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine
Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are public
funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of
retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for
maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as per
Certification dated July 3, 1969 by the AFP Controller,..."2. The paragraph
immediately succeeding in such petition then alleged: "12. Respondent
Judge, Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, acted in excess of jurisdiction [or]
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting
the issuance of an alias writ of execution against the properties of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, hence, the Alias Writ of Execution and notices of
garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null and void."3 In the answer filed
by respondents, through counsel Andres T. Velarde and Marcelo B. Fernan,
the facts set forth were admitted with the only qualification being that the
total award was in the amount of P2,372,331.40.4
The Republic of the Philippines, as mentioned at the outset, did right in filing
this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. What was done by respondent
Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. .
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic
concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune
from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it must
be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from
suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the
logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends."5 Sociological
jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was indicated in a
recent decision, Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the
Philippines,6 with its affirmation that "a continued adherence to the doctrine
of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that
may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the
obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if
such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial
remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known propensity on the part
of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and
energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic
principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be
imagined."7
This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made
explicit in the revised charter. It is therein expressly provided: "The State
may not be sued without its consent."8 A corollary, both dictated by logic and
sound sense from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object
of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been
previously granted and the state liability adjudged. Thus in the recent case
of Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego,9 such a well-settled
doctrine was restated in the opinion of Justice Teehankee: "The universal
rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties
either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action 'only up to the
completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the
power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government
funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of
public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public
services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law." 10 Such a principle applies even to an
attempted garnishment of a salary that had accrued in favor of an
employee. Director of Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion, 11 speaks to
that effect. Justice Malcolm as ponente left no doubt on that score. Thus: "A
rule which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands
of public officers, although it may be due government employees, is not
liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment. One
reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its
own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to
subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is
prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as
long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the
Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment
may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which
covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy
forbids it." 12
In the light of the above, it is made abundantly clear why the Republic of the
Philippines could rightfully allege a legitimate grievance.
WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, nullifying
and setting aside both the order of June 24, 1969 declaring executory the
decision of July 3, 1961 as well as the alias writ of execution issued
thereunder. The preliminary injunction issued by this Court on July 12, 1969
is hereby made permanent.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J, took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1648 August 17, 1949
PEDRO SYQUIA, GONZALO SYQUIA, and LEOPOLDO
SYQUIA, petitioners,
vs.
NATIVIDAD ALMEDA LOPEZ, Judge of Municipal Court of Manila,
CONRADO V. SANCHEZ, Judge of Court of First Instance of Manila,
GEORGE F. MOORE, ET AL., respondents.
Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha for petitioner.
J. A. Wolfson for respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
For the purposes of this decision, the following facts gathered from and
based on the pleadings, may be stated. The plaintiffs named Pedro, Gonzalo,
and Leopoldo, all surnamed Syquia, are the undivided joint owners of three
apartment buildings situated in the City of Manila known as the North Syquia
Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments located at
1131 M. H. del Pilar, 1151 M. H. del Pilar and 1188 A. Mabini Streets,
respectively.
About the middle of the year 1945, said plaintiffs executed three lease
contracts, one for each of the three apartments, in favor of the United States
of America at a monthly rental of P1,775 for the North Syquia Apartments,
P1,890 for the South Syquia Apartment, and P3,335 for the Michel
Apartments. The term or period for the three leases was to be "for the
duration of the war and six months thereafter, unless sooner terminated by
the United States of America." The apartment buildings were used for
billeting and quartering officers of the U. S. armed forces stationed in the
Manila area.
In March 1947, when these court proceedings were commenced, George F.
Moore was the Commanding General, United States Army, Philippine Ryukus
Command, Manila, and as Commanding General of the U. S. Army in the
Manila Theatre, was said to control the occupancy of the said apartment
houses and had authority in the name of the United States Government to
assign officers of the U. S. Army to said apartments or to order said officers
to vacate the same. Erland A. Tillman was the Chief, Real Estate Division,
Office of the District Engineers, U. S. Army, Manila, who, under the
command of defendant Moore was in direct charge and control of the lease
and occupancy of said three apartment buildings. Defendant Moore and
Tillman themselves did not occupy any part of the premises in question.
Under the theory that said leases terminated six months after September 2,
1945, when Japan surrendered, plaintiffs sometime in March, 1946,
approached the predecessors in office of defendants Moore and Tillman and
requested the return of the apartment buildings to them, but were advised
that the U. S. Army wanted to continue occupying the premises. On May 11,
1946, said plaintiffs requested the predecessors in office of Moore and
Tillman to renegotiate said leases, execute lease contract for a period of
three years and to pay a reasonable rental higher than those payable under
the old contracts. The predecessors in office of Moore in a letter dated June
6, 1946, refused to execute new leases but advised that "it is contemplated
that the United States Army will vacate subject properties prior to 1 February
1947." Not being in conformity with the continuance of the old leases
because of the alleged comparatively low rentals being paid thereunder,
plaintiffs formally requested Tillman to cancel said three leases and to
release the apartment buildings on June 28, 1946. Tillman refused to comply
with the request. Because of the alleged representation and assurance that
the U.S. Government would vacate the premises before February 1, 1947,
the plaintiffs took no further steps to secure possession of the buildings and
accepted the monthly rentals tendered by the predecessors in office of
Moore and Tillman on the basis of a month to month lease subject to
cancellation upon thirty days notice. Because of the failure to comply with
the alleged representation and assurance that the three apartment buildings
will be vacated prior to February 1, 1947, plaintiffs on February 17, 1947,
served formal notice upon defendants Moore and Tillman and 64 other army
officers or members of the United States Armed Forces who were then
occupying apartments in said three buildings, demanding (a) cancellation of
said leases; (b) increase in rentals to P300 per month per apartment
effective thirty days from notice; (c) execution of new leases for the three or
any one or two of the said apartment buildings for a definite term,
otherwise, (d) release of said apartment buildings within thirty days of said
notice in the event of the failure to comply with the foregoing demands. The
thirty-day period having expired without any of the defendants having
complied with plaintiffs' demands, the plaintiffs commenced the present
action in the Municipal Court of Manila in the form of an action for unlawful
detainer (desahucio) against Moore and Tillman and the 64 persons
occupying apartments in the three buildings for the purpose of having them
vacate the apartments, each occupants to pay P300 a month for his
particular apartment from January 1, 1947 until each of said particular
defendant had vacated said apartment; to permit plaintiffs access to said
apartment buildings for the purpose of appraising the damages sustained as
the result of the occupancy by defendants; that defendants be ordered to
pay plaintiffs whatever damages may have been actually caused on said
property; and that in the event said occupants are unable to pay said P300 a
month and/or the damages sustained by said property, the defendants
Moore and Tillman jointly and severally be made to pay said monthly rentals
of P300 per month per apartment from January 1, 1947 to March 19, 1947,
inclusive, and/or the damages sustained by said apartments, and that
defendants Moore and Tillman be permanently enjoined against ordering any
additional parties in the future from entering and occupying said premises.
Acting upon a motion to dismiss filed through the Special Assistant of the
Judge Advocate, Philippine Ryukus Command on the ground that the court
had no jurisdiction over the defendants and over the subject matter of the
action, because the real party in interest was the U.S. Government and not
the individual defendants named in the complaint, and that the complaint did
not state a cause of action, the municipal court of Manila in an order dated
April 29, 1947, found that the war between the United States of America and
her allies on one side and Germany and Japan on the other, had not yet
terminated and, consequently, the period or term of the three leases had not
yet expired; that under the well settled rule of International Law, a foreign
government like the United States Government cannot be sued in the courts
of another state without its consent; that it was clear from the allegations of
the complaint that although the United States of America has not been
named therein as defendant, it is nevertheless the real defendant in this
case, as the parties named as defendants are officers of the United States
Army and were occupying the buildings in question as such and pursuant to
orders received from that Government. The municipal court dismissed the
action with costs against the plaintiffs with the suggestion or opinion that a
citizen of the Philippines, who feels aggrieved by the acts of the Government
of a foreign country has the right to demand that the Philippine Government
study his claim and if found meritorious, take such diplomatic steps as may
be necessary for the vindication of rights of that citizen, and that the matter
included or involved in the action should be a proper subject matter of
representations between the Government of the Government of the United
States of America and the Philippines. Not being satisfied with the order,
plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Manila, where the motion to dismiss was
renewed.
The Court of First Instance of Manila in an order dated July 12, 1947,
affirmed the order of the municipal court dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. It
conceded that under the doctrine laid down in the case of U. S. vs. Lee, 106
U. S., 196 and affirmed in the case of Tindal vs. Wesley, 167 U. S., 204
ordinarily, courts have jurisdiction over cases where private parties sue to
recover possession of property being held by officers or agents acting in the
name of the U. S. Government even though no suit can be brought against
the Government itself, but inasmuch as the plaintiffs in the present case are
bringing this action against officers and agents of the U. S. Government not
only to recover the possession of the three apartment houses supposedly
being held illegally by them in the name of their government, but also to
collect back rents, not only at the rate agreed upon in the lease contracts
entered into by the United States of America but in excess of said rate, to
say nothing of the damages claimed, as a result of which, a judgment in
these proceedings may become a charge against the U. S. Treasury, then
under the rule laid down in the case of Land vs. Dollar, 91 Law. ed., 1209,
the present suit must be regarded as one against the United States
Government itself, which cannot be sued without its consent, specially by
citizens of another country.
The plaintiffs as petitioners have brought this case before us on a petition for
a writ of mandamus seeking to order the Municipal Court of Manila to take
jurisdiction over the case. On October 30, 1947, counsel for respondents
Almeda Lopez, Sanchez, Moore and Tillman filed a motion to dismiss on
several grounds. The case was orally argued on November 26, 1947. On
March 4, 1948, petitioners filed a petition which, among other things,
informed this Court that the North Syquia Apartments, the South Syquia
Apartments and Michel Apartments would be vacated by their occupants on
February 29, March 31, and May 31, 1948, respectively. As a matter of fact,
said apartments were actually vacated on the dates already mentioned and
were received by the plaintiff-owners.
On the basis of this petition and because of the return of the three
apartment houses to the owners, counsel for respondents Almeda Lopez,
Sanchez, Moore and Tillman filed a petition to dismiss the present case on
the ground that it is moot. Counsel for the petitioners answering the motion,
claimed that the plaintiffs and petitioners possession of the three apartment
houses, reserving all of their rights against respondents including the right to
collect rents and damages; that they have not been paid rents since January
1, 1947; that respondents admitted that there is a total of P109,895 in
rentals due and owing to petitioners; that should this case be now dismissed,
the petitioners will be unable to enforce collection; that the question of law
involved in this case may again come up before the courts when conflicts
arise between Filipino civilian property owners and the U.S. Army authorities
concerning contracts entered into in the Philippines between said Filipinos
and the U.S. Government. Consequently, this Court, according to the
petitioners, far from dismissing the case, should decide it, particularly the
question of jurisdiction.
On June 18, 1949, through a "petition to amend complaint" counsel for the
petitioners informed this court that petitioners had already received the U. S.
Army Forces in the Western Pacific the sum of P109,895 as rentals for the
three apartments, but with the reservation that said acceptance should not
be construed as jeopardizing the rights of the petitioners in the case now
pending in the courts of the Philippines or their rights against the U. S.
Government with respect to the three apartment houses. In view of this last
petition, counsel for respondents alleging that both respondent Moore and
Tillman had long left the Islands for other Army assignments, and now that
both the possession of the three apartments in question as well as the
rentals for their occupation have already been received by the petitioners
renew their motion for dismissal on the ground that this case has now
become moot.
The main purpose of the original action in the municipal court was to recover
the possession of the three apartment houses in question. The recovery of
rentals as submitted by the very counsel for the petitioner was merely
incidental to the main action. Because the prime purpose of the action had
been achieved, namely, the recovery of the possession of the premises,
apart from the fact that the rentals amounting to P109,895 had been paid to
the petitioners and accepted by them though under reservations, this Court
may now well dismiss the present proceedings on the ground that the
questions involved therein have become academic and moot. Counsel for the
petitioners however, insists that a decision be rendered on the merits,
particularly on the question of jurisdiction of the municipal court over the
original action, not only for the satisfaction of the parties involved but also to
serve as a guide in future cases involving cases of similar nature such as
contracts of lease entered into between the Government of the United States
of America on one side and Filipino citizens on the other regarding properties
of the latter. We accept the suggestion of petitioners and shall proceed to
discuss the facts and law involved and rule upon them.
We shall concede as correctly did the Court of First Instance, that following
the doctrine laid down in the cases of U. S. vs. Lee and U. S. vs. Tindal,
supra, a private citizen claiming title and right of possession of a certain
property may, to recover possession of said property, sue as individuals,
officers and agents of the Government who are said to be illegally witholding
the same from him, though in doing so, said officers and agents claim that
they are acting for the Government, and the court may entertain such a suit
altho the Government itself is not included as a party-defendant. Of course,
the Government is not bound or concluded by the decision. The philosophy
of this ruling is that unless the courts are permitted to take cognizance and
to assume jurisdiction over such a case, a private citizen would be helpless
and without redress and protection of his rights which may have been
invaded by the officers of the government professing to act in its name. In
such a case the officials or agents asserting rightful possession must prove
and justify their claim before the courts, when it is made to appear in the
suit against them that the title and right of possession is in the private
citizen. However, and this is important, where the judgment in such a case
would result not only in the recovery of possession of the property in favor of
said citizen but also in a charge against or financial liability to the
Government, then the suit should be regarded as one against the
government itself, and, consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly
entertained by the courts except with the consent of said Government.
(See case of Land vs. Dollar, 91 Law. ed., 1209.)
From a careful study of this case, considering the facts involved therein as
well as those of public knowledge of which we take judicial cognizance, we
are convinced that the real party in interest as defendant in the original case
is the United States of America. The lessee in each of the three lease
agreements was the United States of America and the lease agreement
themselves were executed in her name by her officials acting as her agents.
The considerations or rentals was always paid by the U. S. Government. The
original action in the municipal court was brought on the basis of these three
lease contracts and it is obvious in the opinion of this court that any back
rentals or increased rentals will have to be paid by the U. S. Government not
only because, as already stated, the contracts of lease were entered into by
such Government but also because the premises were used by officers of her
armed forces during the war and immediately after the terminations of
hostilities.
We cannot see how the defendants and respondents Moore and Tillman
could be held individually responsible for the payments of rentals or
damages in relation to the occupancy of the apartment houses in question.
Both of these army officials had no intervention whatsoever in the execution
of the lease agreements nor in the initial occupancy of the premises both of
which were effected thru the intervention of and at the instance of their
predecessors in office. The original request made by the petitioners for the
return of the apartment buildings after the supposed termination of the
leases, was made to, and denied not by Moore and Tillman but by their
predecessors in office. The notice and decision that the U. S. Army wanted
and in fact continued to occupy the premises was made not by Moore and
Tillman but by predecessors in office. The refusal to renegotiate the leases
as requested by the petitioners was made not by Moore but by his
predecessors in office according to the very complaint filed in the municipal
court. The assurance that the U. S. Army will vacate the premises prior to
February 29, 1947, was also made by the predecessors in office of Moore.
As to the defendant Tillman, according to the complaint he was Chief, Real
State Division, Office of the District Engineer, U. S. Army, and was in direct
charge and control of the leases and occupancy of the apartment buildings,
but he was under the command of defendant Moore, his superior officer. We
cannot see how said defendant Tillman in assigning new officers to occupy
apartments in the three buildings, in obedience to order or direction from his
superior, defendant Moore, could be held personally liable for the payment of
rentals or increase thereof, or damages said to have been suffered by the
plaintiffs.
With respect to defendant General Moore, when he assumed his command in
Manila, these lease agreement had already been negotiated and executed
and were in actual operation. The three apartment buildings were occupied
by army officers assigned thereto by his predecessors in office. All that he
must have done was to assign or billet incoming army officers to apartments
as they were vacated by outgoing officers due to changes in station. He
found these apartment buildings occupied by his government and devoted to
the use and occupancy of army officers stationed in Manila under his
command, and he had reasons to believe that he could continue holding and
using the premises theretofore assigned for that purpose and under
contracts previously entered into by his government, as long as and until
orders to the contrary were received by him. It is even to be presumed that
when demand was made by the plaintiffs for the payment of increased
rentals or for vacating the three apartment buildings, defendant Moore, not a
lawyer by profession but a soldier, must have consulted and sought the
advise of his legal department, and that his action in declining to pay the
increased rentals or to eject all his army officers from the three buildings
must have been in pursuance to the advice and counsel of his legal division.
At least, he was not in a position to pay increased rentals above those set
and stipulated in the lease agreements, without the approval of his
government, unless he personally assumed financial responsibility therefor.
Under these circumstances, neither do we believe nor find that defendant
Moore can be held personally liable for the payment of back or increased
rentals and alleged damages.
As to the army officers who actually occupied the apartments involved, there
is less reason for holding them personally liable for rentals and supposed
damages as sought by the plaintiffs. It must be remembered that these army
officers when coming to their station in Manila were not given the choice of
their dwellings. They were merely assigned quarters in the apartment
buildings in question. Said assignments or billets may well be regarded as
orders, and all that those officers did was to obey them, and, accordingly,
occupied the rooms assigned to them. Under such circumstances, can it be
supposed or conceived that such army officers would first inquire whether
the rental being paid by the government for the rooms or apartments
assigned to them by order of their superior officer was fair and reasonable or
not, and whether the period of lease between their government and the
owners of the premises had expired, and whether their occupancy of their
rooms or apartments was legal or illegal? And if they dismissed these
seemingly idle speculations, assuming that they ever entered their minds,
and continued to live in their apartments unless and until orders to the
contrary were received by them, could they later be held personally liable for
any back rentals which their government may have failed to pay to the
owners of the building, or for any damages to the premises incident to all
leases of property, specially in the absence of proof that such damages to
property had been caused by them and not by the previous occupants, also
army officers who are not now parties defendant to this suit? Incidentally it
may be stated that both defendants Moore and Tillman have long left these
Islands to assume other commands or assignments and in all probability
none of their 64 co-defendants is still within this jurisdiction.
On the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of the belief and we hold
that the real party defendant in interest is the Government of the United
States of America; that any judgment for back or increased rentals or
damages will have to be paid not by defendants Moore and Tillman and their
64 co-defendants but by the said U. S. Government. On the basis of the
ruling in the case of Land vs. Dollar already cited, and on what we have
already stated, the present action must be considered as one against the U.
S. Government. It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the
Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for
unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and
interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U. S. Government has
not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her,
though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit
against his own Government without the latter's consent but it is of citizen
filing an action against a foreign government without said government's
consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of
his country. The principles of the law behind this rule are so elementary and
of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in
support thereof.
In conclusion we find that the Municipal Court of Manila committed no error
in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction and that the Court of First
Instance acted correctly in affirming the municipal court's order of dismissal.
Case dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Tuason and Reyes, JJ., concur
G.R. No. 142396 February 11, 2003
KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Sometime in May 1986, an Information for violation of Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 6425, otherwise also known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,"
was filed against petitioner Khosrow Minucher and one Abbas Torabian with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 151, of Pasig City. The criminal charge
followed a "buy-bust operation" conducted by the Philippine police narcotic
agents in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where a quantity of
heroin, a prohibited drug, was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents
were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who would, in due
time, become one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. On 08
January 1988, Presiding Judge Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision
acquitting the two accused.
On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case No. 88-45691 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, of Manila for damages on account of
what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made
by Arthur Scalzo. The Manila RTC detailed what it had found to be the facts
and circumstances surrounding the case.
"The testimony of the plaintiff disclosed that he is an Iranian national. He
came to the Philippines to study in the University of the Philippines in 1974.
In 1976, under the regime of the Shah of Iran, he was appointed Labor
Attaché for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila, Philippines.
When the Shah of Iran was deposed by Ayatollah Khomeini, plaintiff became
a refugee of the United Nations and continued to stay in the Philippines. He
headed the Iranian National Resistance Movement in the Philippines.
"He came to know the defendant on May 13, 1986, when the latter was
brought to his house and introduced to him by a certain Jose Iñigo, an
informer of the Intelligence Unit of the military. Jose Iñigo, on the other
hand, was met by plaintiff at the office of Atty. Crisanto Saruca, a lawyer for
several Iranians whom plaintiff assisted as head of the anti-Khomeini
movement in the Philippines.
"During his first meeting with the defendant on May 13, 1986, upon the
introduction of Jose Iñigo, the defendant expressed his interest in buying
caviar. As a matter of fact, he bought two kilos of caviar from plaintiff and
paid P10,000.00 for it. Selling caviar, aside from that of Persian carpets,
pistachio nuts and other Iranian products was his business after the
Khomeini government cut his pension of over $3,000.00 per month. During
their introduction in that meeting, the defendant gave the plaintiff his calling
card, which showed that he is working at the US Embassy in the Philippines,
as a special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of
Justice, of the United States, and gave his address as US Embassy, Manila.
At the back of the card appears a telephone number in defendant’s own
handwriting, the number of which he can also be contacted.
"It was also during this first meeting that plaintiff expressed his desire to
obtain a US Visa for his wife and the wife of a countryman named Abbas
Torabian. The defendant told him that he [could] help plaintiff for a fee of
$2,000.00 per visa. Their conversation, however, was more concentrated on
politics, carpets and caviar. Thereafter, the defendant promised to see
plaintiff again.
"On May 19, 1986, the defendant called the plaintiff and invited the latter for
dinner at Mario's Restaurant at Makati. He wanted to buy 200 grams of
caviar. Plaintiff brought the merchandize but for the reason that the
defendant was not yet there, he requested the restaurant people to x x x
place the same in the refrigerator. Defendant, however, came and plaintiff
gave him the caviar for which he was paid. Then their conversation was
again focused on politics and business.
"On May 26, 1986, defendant visited plaintiff again at the latter's residence
for 18 years at Kapitolyo, Pasig. The defendant wanted to buy a pair of
carpets which plaintiff valued at $27,900.00. After some haggling, they
agreed at $24,000.00. For the reason that defendant did not yet have the
money, they agreed that defendant would come back the next day. The
following day, at 1:00 p.m., he came back with his $24,000.00, which he
gave to the plaintiff, and the latter, in turn, gave him the pair of
carpets.1awphi1.nét
"At about 3:00 in the afternoon of May 27, 1986, the defendant came back
again to plaintiff's house and directly proceeded to the latter's bedroom,
where the latter and his countryman, Abbas Torabian, were playing chess.
Plaintiff opened his safe in the bedroom and obtained $2,000.00 from it,
gave it to the defendant for the latter's fee in obtaining a visa for plaintiff's
wife. The defendant told him that he would be leaving the Philippines very
soon and requested him to come out of the house for a while so that he can
introduce him to his cousin waiting in a cab. Without much ado, and without
putting on his shirt as he was only in his pajama pants, he followed the
defendant where he saw a parked cab opposite the street. To his complete
surprise, an American jumped out of the cab with a drawn high-powered
gun. He was in the company of about 30 to 40 Filipino soldiers with 6
Americans, all armed. He was handcuffed and after about 20 minutes in the
street, he was brought inside the house by the defendant. He was made to
sit down while in handcuffs while the defendant was inside his bedroom. The
defendant came out of the bedroom and out from defendant's attaché case,
he took something and placed it on the table in front of the plaintiff. They
also took plaintiff's wife who was at that time at the boutique near his house
and likewise arrested Torabian, who was playing chess with him in the
bedroom and both were handcuffed together. Plaintiff was not told why he
was being handcuffed and why the privacy of his house, especially his
bedroom was invaded by defendant. He was not allowed to use the
telephone. In fact, his telephone was unplugged. He asked for any warrant,
but the defendant told him to `shut up.’ He was nevertheless told that he
would be able to call for his lawyer who can defend him.
"The plaintiff took note of the fact that when the defendant invited him to
come out to meet his cousin, his safe was opened where he kept the
$24,000.00 the defendant paid for the carpets and another $8,000.00 which
he also placed in the safe together with a bracelet worth $15,000.00 and a
pair of earrings worth $10,000.00. He also discovered missing upon his
release his 8 pieces hand-made Persian carpets, valued at $65,000.00, a
painting he bought for P30,000.00 together with his TV and betamax sets.
He claimed that when he was handcuffed, the defendant took his keys from
his wallet. There was, therefore, nothing left in his house.
"That his arrest as a heroin trafficker x x x had been well publicized
throughout the world, in various newspapers, particularly in Australia,
America, Central Asia and in the Philippines. He was identified in the papers
as an international drug trafficker. x x x
In fact, the arrest of defendant and Torabian was likewise on television, not
only in the Philippines, but also in America and in Germany. His friends in
said places informed him that they saw him on TV with said news.
"After the arrest made on plaintiff and Torabian, they were brought to Camp
Crame handcuffed together, where they were detained for three days
without food and water."1
During the trial, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, filed a special
appearance for Scalzo and moved for extension of time to file an answer
pending a supposed advice from the United States Department of State and
Department of Justice on the defenses to be raised. The trial court granted
the motion. On 27 October 1988, Scalzo filed another special appearance to
quash the summons on the ground that he, not being a resident of the
Philippines and the action being one in personam, was beyond the processes
of the court. The motion was denied by the court, in its order of 13
December 1988, holding that the filing by Scalzo of a motion for extension of
time to file an answer to the complaint was a voluntary appearance
equivalent to service of summons which could likewise be construed a waiver
of the requirement of formal notice. Scalzo filed a motion for reconsideration
of the court order, contending that a motion for an extension of time to file
an answer was not a voluntary appearance equivalent to service of summons
since it did not seek an affirmative relief. Scalzo argued that in cases
involving the United States government, as well as its agencies and officials,
a motion for extension was peculiarly unavoidable due to the need (1) for
both the Department of State and the Department of Justice to agree on the
defenses to be raised and (2) to refer the case to a Philippine lawyer who
would be expected to first review the case. The court a quo denied the
motion for reconsideration in its order of 15 October 1989.
Scalzo filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, there docketed
CA-G.R. No. 17023, assailing the denial. In a decision, dated 06 October
1989, the appellate court denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the
trial court. Scalzo then elevated the incident in a petition for review on
certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 91173, to this Court. The petition, however,
was denied for its failure to comply with SC Circular No. 1-88; in any event,
the Court added, Scalzo had failed to show that the appellate court was in
error in its questioned judgment.
Meanwhile, at the court a quo, an order, dated 09 February 1990, was
issued (a) declaring Scalzo in default for his failure to file a responsive
pleading (answer) and (b) setting the case for the reception of evidence. On
12 March 1990, Scalzo filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to
admit his answer to the complaint. Granting the motion, the trial court set
the case for pre-trial. In his answer, Scalzo denied the material allegations of
the complaint and raised the affirmative defenses (a) of Minucher’s failure to
state a cause of action in his complaint and (b) that Scalzo had acted in the
discharge of his official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice.
Scalzo interposed a counterclaim of P100,000.00 to answer for attorneys'
fees and expenses of litigation.
Then, on 14 June 1990, after almost two years since the institution of the
civil case, Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that,
being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration,
he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic
Note No. 414 of the United States Embassy, dated 29 May 1990, addressed
to the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines and a Certification,
dated 11 June 1990, of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the
note is a true and faithful copy of its original. In an order of 25 June 1990,
the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
On 27 July 1990, Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with this
Court, docketed G.R. No. 94257 and entitled "Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., vs. Hon.
Wenceslao Polo, et al.," asking that the complaint in Civil Case No. 88-45691
be ordered dismissed. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals, there
docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 22505, per this Court’s resolution of 07 August
1990. On 31 October 1990, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
sustaining the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordering the dismissal of
the complaint against him. Minucher filed a petition for review with this
Court, docketed G.R. No. 97765 and entitled "Khosrow Minucher vs. the
Honorable Court of Appeals, et. al." (cited in 214 SCRA 242), appealing the
judgment of the Court of Appeals. In a decision, dated 24 September 1992,
penned by Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr., this Court reversed
the decision of the appellate court and remanded the case to the lower court
for trial. The remand was ordered on the theses (a) that the Court of
Appeals erred in granting the motion to dismiss of Scalzo for lack of
jurisdiction over his person without even considering the issue of the
authenticity of Diplomatic Note No. 414 and (b) that the complaint contained
sufficient allegations to the effect that Scalzo committed the imputed acts in
his personal capacity and outside the scope of his official duties and, absent
any evidence to the contrary, the issue on Scalzo’s diplomatic immunity could
not be taken up.
The Manila RTC thus continued with its hearings on the case. On 17
November 1995, the trial court reached a decision; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is
hereby rendered for the plaintiff, who successfully established his claim by
sufficient evidence, against the defendant in the manner following:
"`Adjudging defendant liable to plaintiff in actual and compensatory
damages of P520,000.00; moral damages in the sum of P10 million;
exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00; attorney's fees in the sum of
P200,000.00 plus costs.
`The Clerk of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is ordered to take note of the
lien of the Court on this judgment to answer for the unpaid docket fees
considering that the plaintiff in this case instituted this action as a pauper
litigant.’"2
While the trial court gave credence to the claim of Scalzo and the evidence
presented by him that he was a diplomatic agent entitled to immunity as
such, it ruled that he, nevertheless, should be held accountable for the acts
complained of committed outside his official duties. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and sustained the defense of
Scalzo that he was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity during his
term of duty and thereby immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of
the "Receiving State" pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention.
Hence, this recourse by Minucher. The instant petition for review raises a
two-fold issue: (1) whether or not the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment, following the decision rendered by this Court in G.R. No. 97765,
should have precluded the Court of Appeals from resolving the appeal to it in
an entirely different manner, and (2) whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed
entitled to diplomatic immunity.
The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, or its kindred rule of res
judicata, would require 1) the finality of the prior judgment, 2) a valid
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties on the part of the court
that renders it, 3) a judgment on the merits, and 4) an identity of the
parties, subject matter and causes of action.3 Even while one of the issues
submitted in G.R. No. 97765 - "whether or not public respondent Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that private respondent Scalzo is a diplomat immune
from civil suit conformably with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations" - is also a pivotal question raised in the instant petition, the ruling
in G.R. No. 97765, however, has not resolved that point with finality. Indeed,
the Court there has made this observation -
"It may be mentioned in this regard that private respondent himself, in his
Pre-trial Brief filed on 13 June 1990, unequivocally states that he would
present documentary evidence consisting of DEA records on his investigation
and surveillance of plaintiff and on his position and duties as DEA special
agent in Manila. Having thus reserved his right to present evidence in
support of his position, which is the basis for the alleged diplomatic
immunity, the barren self-serving claim in the belated motion to dismiss
cannot be relied upon for a reasonable, intelligent and fair resolution of the
issue of diplomatic immunity."4
Scalzo contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to
which the Philippines is a signatory, grants him absolute immunity from suit,
describing his functions as an agent of the United States Drugs Enforcement
Agency as "conducting surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers in
the Philippines believed to be the source of prohibited drugs being shipped
to the U.S., (and) having ascertained the target, (he then) would inform the
Philippine narcotic agents (to) make the actual arrest." Scalzo has submitted
to the trial court a number of documents -
1. Exh. '2' - Diplomatic Note No. 414 dated 29 May 1990;
2. Exh. '1' - Certification of Vice Consul Donna K. Woodward dated
11 June 1990;
3. Exh. '5' - Diplomatic Note No. 757 dated 25 October 1991;
4. Exh. '6' - Diplomatic Note No. 791 dated 17 November 1992; and
5. Exh. '7' - Diplomatic Note No. 833 dated 21 October 1988.
6. Exh. '3' - 1st Indorsement of the Hon. Jorge R. Coquia, Legal
Adviser, Department of Foreign Affairs, dated 27 June 1990
forwarding Embassy Note No. 414 to the Clerk of Court of RTC
Manila, Branch 19 (the trial court);
 7. Exh. '4' - Diplomatic Note No. 414, appended to the 1st
Indorsement (Exh. '3'); and
8. Exh. '8' - Letter dated 18 November 1992 from the Office of the
Protocol, Department of Foreign Affairs, through Asst. Sec.
Emmanuel Fernandez, addressed to the Chief Justice of this Court.5
The documents, according to Scalzo, would show that: (1) the United States
Embassy accordingly advised the Executive Department of the Philippine
Government that Scalzo was a member of the diplomatic staff of the United
States diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October
1985 until his departure on 10 August 1988; (2) that the United States
Government was firm from the very beginning in asserting the diplomatic
immunity of Scalzo with respect to the case pursuant to the provisions of the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; and (3) that the United States
Embassy repeatedly urged the Department of Foreign Affairs to take
appropriate action to inform the trial court of Scalzo’s diplomatic immunity.
The other documentary exhibits were presented to indicate that: (1) the
Philippine government itself, through its Executive Department, recognizing
and respecting the diplomatic status of Scalzo, formally advised the "Judicial
Department" of his diplomatic status and his entitlement to all diplomatic
privileges and immunities under the Vienna Convention; and (2) the
Department of Foreign Affairs itself authenticated Diplomatic Note No. 414.
Scalzo additionally presented Exhibits "9" to "13" consisting of his reports of
investigation on the surveillance and subsequent arrest of Minucher, the
certification of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States
Department of Justice that Scalzo was a special agent assigned to the
Philippines at all times relevant to the complaint, and the special power of
attorney executed by him in favor of his previous counsel6 to show (a) that
the United States Embassy, affirmed by its Vice Consul, acknowledged Scalzo
to be a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic
mission from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his
departure on 10 August 1988, (b) that, on May 1986, with the cooperation of
the Philippine law enforcement officials and in the exercise of his functions
as member of the mission, he investigated Minucher for alleged trafficking in
a prohibited drug, and (c) that the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs
itself recognized that Scalzo during his tour of duty in the Philippines (14
October 1985 up to 10 August 1988) was listed as being an Assistant Attaché
of the United States diplomatic mission and accredited with diplomatic status
by the Government of the Philippines. In his Exhibit 12, Scalzo described the
functions of the overseas office of the United States Drugs Enforcement
Agency, i.e., (1) to provide criminal investigative expertise and assistance to
foreign law enforcement agencies on narcotic and drug control programs
upon the request of the host country, 2) to establish and maintain liaison
with the host country and counterpart foreign law enforcement officials, and
3) to conduct complex criminal investigations involving international criminal
conspiracies which affect the interests of the United States.
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was a codification of
centuries-old customary law and, by the time of its ratification on 18 April
1961, its rules of law had long become stable. Among the city states of
ancient Greece, among the peoples of the Mediterranean before the
establishment of the Roman Empire, and among the states of India, the
person of the herald in time of war and the person of the diplomatic envoy in
time of peace were universally held sacrosanct.7 By the end of the 16th
century, when the earliest treatises on diplomatic law were published, the
inviolability of ambassadors was firmly established as a rule of customary
international law.8Traditionally, the exercise of diplomatic intercourse among
states was undertaken by the head of state himself, as being the preeminent
embodiment of the state he represented, and the foreign secretary, the
official usually entrusted with the external affairs of the state. Where a state
would wish to have a more prominent diplomatic presence in the receiving
state, it would then send to the latter a diplomatic mission. Conformably with
the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, by
and large, the representation of the interests of the sending state and
promoting friendly relations with the receiving state.9
The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include
(a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state,10 (b)
envoys,11 ministers or internuncios accredited to the heads of states; and (c)
charges d' affairs12 accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs.13 Comprising
the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission" are the diplomatic staff, the
administrative staff and the technical and service staff. Only the heads of
missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff, excluding the members
of the administrative, technical and service staff of the mission, are accorded
diplomatic rank. Even while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
provides for immunity to the members of diplomatic missions, it does so,
nevertheless, with an understanding that the same be restrictively applied.
Only "diplomatic agents," under the terms of the Convention, are vested with
blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. The Convention
defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of missions or members of the
diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding the same privileges from all
others. It might bear stressing that even consuls, who represent their
respective states in concerns of commerce and navigation and perform
certain administrative and notarial duties, such as the issuance of passports
and visas, authentication of documents, and administration of oaths, do not
ordinarily enjoy the traditional diplomatic immunities and privileges accorded
diplomats, mainly for the reason that they are not charged with the duty of
representing their states in political matters. Indeed, the main yardstick in
ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the
determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature.
Scalzo asserted, particularly in his Exhibits "9" to "13," that he was an
Assistant Attaché of the United States diplomatic mission and was accredited
as such by the Philippine Government. An attaché belongs to a category of
officers in the diplomatic establishment who may be in charge of its cultural,
press, administrative or financial affairs. There could also be a class of
attaches belonging to certain ministries or departments of the government,
other than the foreign ministry or department, who are detailed by their
respective ministries or departments with the embassies such as the military,
naval, air, commercial, agricultural, labor, science, and customs attaches, or
the like. Attaches assist a chief of mission in his duties and are
administratively under him, but their main function is to observe, analyze
and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the host
country and submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the
home government.14 These officials are not generally regarded as members
of the diplomatic mission, nor are they normally designated as having
diplomatic rank.
In an attempt to prove his diplomatic status, Scalzo presented Diplomatic
Notes Nos. 414, 757 and 791, all issued post litem motam, respectively, on
29 May 1990, 25 October 1991 and 17 November 1992. The presentation did
nothing much to alleviate the Court's initial reservations in G.R. No. 97765,
viz:
"While the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, the public respondent
gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Civil Case No. 88-45691 on the
basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because of the diplomatic
note, the private respondent is clothed with diplomatic immunity, thereby
divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person.
"x x x x x x x x x
"And now, to the core issue - the alleged diplomatic immunity of the private
respondent. Setting aside for the moment the issue of authenticity raised by
the petitioner and the doubts that surround such claim, in view of the fact
that it took private respondent one (1) year, eight (8) months and seventeen
(17) days from the time his counsel filed on 12 September 1988 a Special
Appearance and Motion asking for a first extension of time to file the Answer
because the Departments of State and Justice of the United States of
America were studying the case for the purpose of determining his defenses,
before he could secure the Diplomatic Note from the US Embassy in Manila,
and even granting for the sake of argument that such note is authentic, the
complaint for damages filed by petitioner cannot be peremptorily dismissed.
"x x x x x x x x x
"There is of course the claim of private respondent that the acts imputed to
him were done in his official capacity. Nothing supports this self-serving
claim other than the so-called Diplomatic Note. x x x. The public respondent
then should have sustained the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss.
Verily, it should have been the most proper and appropriate recourse. It
should not have been overwhelmed by the self-serving Diplomatic Note
whose belated issuance is even suspect and whose authenticity has not yet
been proved. The undue haste with which respondent Court yielded to the
private respondent's claim is arbitrary."
A significant document would appear to be Exhibit No. 08, dated 08
November 1992, issued by the Office of Protocol of the Department of
Foreign Affairs and signed by Emmanuel C. Fernandez, Assistant Secretary,
certifying that "the records of the Department (would) show that Mr. Arthur
W. Scalzo, Jr., during his term of office in the Philippines (from 14 October
1985 up to 10 August 1988) was listed as an Assistant Attaché of the United
States diplomatic mission and was, therefore, accredited diplomatic status by
the Government of the Philippines." No certified true copy of such "records,"
the supposed bases for the belated issuance, was presented in evidence.
Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of
the executive branch of the government. In World Health Organization vs.
Aquino,15 the Court has recognized that, in such matters, the hands of the
courts are virtually tied. Amidst apprehensions of indiscriminate and
incautious grant of immunity, designed to gain exemption from the
jurisdiction of courts, it should behoove the Philippine government,
specifically its Department of Foreign Affairs, to be most circumspect, that
should particularly be no less than compelling, in its post litem motam
issuances. It might be recalled that the privilege is not an immunity from the
observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal
liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial
jurisdiction.16 The government of the United States itself, which Scalzo claims
to be acting for, has formulated its standards for recognition of a diplomatic
agent. The State Department policy is to only concede diplomatic status to a
person who possesses an acknowledged diplomatic title and "performs duties
of diplomatic nature."17 Supplementary criteria for accreditation are the
possession of a valid diplomatic passport or, from States which do not issue
such passports, a diplomatic note formally representing the intention to
assign the person to diplomatic duties, the holding of a non-immigrant visa,
being over twenty-one years of age, and performing diplomatic functions on
an essentially full-time basis.18 Diplomatic missions are requested to provide
the most accurate and descriptive job title to that which currently applies to
the duties performed. The Office of the Protocol would then assign each
individual to the appropriate functional category.19
But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious,
it was sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States
Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of
suspected drug activities within the country on the dates pertinent to this
case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting well within his
assigned functions when he committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the
present controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrine of
State Immunity from Suit.
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign
state is a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely
identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit20 and,
with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the
person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the
state itself in its sovereign capacity.21 If the acts giving rise to a suit are
those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not
necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the
complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit
without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in
effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit
of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim -
par in parem, non habet imperium - that all states are sovereign equals and
cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.22 The implication, in broad
terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself
to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation
of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit
must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been
formally impleaded.23
In United States of America vs. Guinto,24 involving officers of the United
States Air Force and special officers of the Air Force Office of Special
Investigators charged with the duty of preventing the distribution,
possession and use of prohibited drugs, this Court has ruled -
"While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits against
the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against
officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of
their duties. x x x. It cannot for a moment be imagined that they were acting
in their private or unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later
testified against the complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties
as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts
imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. x x x
As they have acted on behalf of the government, and within the scope of
their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally,
[who were] responsible for their acts."25
This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. Thus, Shauf vs. Court of
Appeals26 elaborates:
"It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his
capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of the
plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau
of Telecommunications, et al., vs. Aligaen, et al. (33 SCRA 368): `Inasmuch
as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of
government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action
against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the
State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it
has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or
the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act
for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the
plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority
which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the
constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent.
The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be
used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
"x x x x x x x x x
"(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked
where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as
an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents
of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual
capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without
authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled
principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with
malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority and
jurisdiction."27
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity
from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the
directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an
indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns.
Guinto and Shauf both involve officers and personnel of the United States,
stationed within Philippine territory, under the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement. While evidence is wanting to show any similar agreement
between the governments of the Philippines and of the United States (for the
latter to send its agents and to conduct surveillance and related activities of
suspected drug dealers in the Philippines), the consent or imprimatur of the
Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the facts heretofore
elsewhere mentioned. The official exchanges of communication between
agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from officials
of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States
Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics
Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the residence of
Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the
"diplomatic status" of the latter but they give enough indication that the
Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the
activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to
conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having
ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be
expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on
Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation,
and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher,
Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official
function or duties.
All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an
agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the
Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the
problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from
suit.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa
D.D.; MOST REV. DEOGRACIAS S. INIGUEZ, JR., Bishop-Emeritus of
Caloocan, FRANCES Q. QUIMPO, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR.,
Kalikasan-PNE, MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, RENATO M. REYES,
JR., Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, HON. NERI JAVIER
COLMENARES, Bayan Muna Partylist, ROLAND G. SIMBULAN, PH.D.,
Junk VF A Movement, TERESITA R. PEREZ, PH.D., HON. RAYMOND
V. PALATINO, Kabataan Party-list, PETER SJ. GONZALES,
Pamalakaya, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG, PH. D., Agham, ELMER C.
LABOG, Kilusang Mayo Uno, JOAN MAY E. SALVADOR, Gabriela,
JOSE ENRIQUE A. AFRICA, THERESA A. CONCEPCION, MARY JOAN
A. GUAN, NESTOR T. BAGUINON, PH.D., A. EDSEL F.
TUPAZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SCOTT H. SWIFT in his capacity as Commander of the US. 7th Fleet,
MARK A. RICE in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS
Guardian, PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, HON.
ALBERT F. DEL ROSARIO, Secretary, pepartment of Foreign Affair.s,
HON. PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Executiv~.:Secretary, Office of the
President, . HON. VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN, Secretary, Department of
National Defense, HON. RAMON JESUS P. P AJE, Secretary,
Department of Environment and Natural Resoz!rces, VICE ADMIRAL
JOSE LUIS M. ALANO, Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command,
Armed Forces of the Philippines, ADMIRAL RODOLFO D. ISO RENA,
Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard, COMMODORE ENRICO EFREN
EVANGELISTA, Philippine Coast Guard Palawan, MAJOR GEN.
VIRGILIO 0. DOMINGO, Commandant of Armed Forces of the
Philippines Command and LT. GEN. TERRY G. ROBLING, US Marine
Corps Forces. Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercise Co-
Director, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR, J.:
Before us is a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for
the issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under
Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (Rules), involving violations of environmental laws and
regulations in relation to the grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian
over the Tubbataha Reefs.
Factual Background
The name "Tubbataha" came from the Samal (seafaring people of southern
Philippines) language which means "long reef exposed at low tide."
Tubbataha is composed of two huge coral atolls - the north atoll and the
south atoll - and the Jessie Beazley Reef, a smaller coral structure about 20
kilometers north of the atolls. The reefs of Tubbataha and Jessie Beazley are
considered part of Cagayancillo, a remote island municipality of Palawan. 1
In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of
Proclamation No. 306 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on August 11,
1988. Located in the middle of Central Sulu Sea, 150 kilometers southeast of
Puerto Princesa City, Tubbataha lies at the heart of the Coral Triangle, the
global center of marine biodiversity.
In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site. It
was recognized as one of the Philippines' oldest ecosystems, containing
excellent examples of pristine reefs and a high diversity of marine life. The
97,030-hectare protected marine park is also an important habitat for
internationally threatened and endangered marine species. UNESCO cited
Tubbataha's outstanding universal value as an important and significant
natural habitat for in situ conservation of biological diversity; an example
representing significant on-going ecological and biological processes; and an
area of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance.2
On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067,3 otherwise
known as the "Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure
the protection and conservation of the globally significant economic,
biological, sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the Tubbataha
Reefs into perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and future generations."
Under the "no-take" policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated
and many human activities are prohibited and penalized or fined, including
fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the resources within the TRNP.
The law likewise created the Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board
(TPAMB) which shall be the sole policy-making and permit-granting body of
the TRNP.
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US
Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested
diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to enter and exit the territorial
waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the
purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty."4 On
January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on
January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.1âwphi1
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port
of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while
transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South
Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No
cine was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking
fuel or oil.
On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift,
expressed regret for the incident in a press statement.5 Likewise, US
Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a meeting at the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on February 4, "reiterated his regrets
over the grounding incident and assured Foreign Affairs Secretazy Albert F.
del Rosario that the United States will provide appropriate compensation for
damage to the reef caused by the ship."6 By March 30, 2013, the US Navy-
led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship
from the coral reef.
On April 1 7, 2013, the above-named petitioners on their behalf and in
representation of their respective sector/organization and others, including
minors or generations yet unborn, filed the present petition agairtst Scott H.
Swift in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet, Mark A. Rice in his
capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian and Lt. Gen. Terry G.
Robling, US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercises Co-
Director ("US respondents"); President Benigno S. Aquino III in his capacity
as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), DF A
Secretary Albert F. Del Rosario, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr.,
Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin (Department of National Defense), Secretary
Jesus P. Paje (Department of Environment and Natural Resources), Vice-
Admiral Jose Luis M. Alano (Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command, AFP),
Admiral Rodolfo D. Isorena (Philippine Coast Guard Commandant),
Commodore Enrico Efren Evangelista (Philippine Coast Guard-Palawan), and
Major General Virgilio 0. Domingo (AFP Commandant), collectively the
"Philippine respondents."
 The Petition
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations
of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of
such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan,
Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte,
Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights
to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from this
Court for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts
committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection
with the grounding incident.
Specifically, petitioners cite the following violations committed by US
respondents under R.A. No. 10067: unauthorized entry (Section 19); non-
payment of conservation fees (Section 21 ); obstruction of law enforcement
officer (Section 30); damages to the reef (Section 20); and destroying and
disturbing resources (Section 26[g]). Furthermore, petitioners assail certain
provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court
to nullify for being unconstitutional.
The numerous reliefs sought in this case are set forth in the final prayer of
the petition, to wit: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Petitioners
respectfully pray that the Honorable Court: 1. Immediately issue upon the
filing of this petition a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO)
and/or a Writ of Kalikasan, which shall, in particular,
a. Order Respondents and any person acting on their behalf, to
cease and desist all operations over the Guardian grounding
incident;
b. Initially demarcating the metes and bounds of the damaged area
as well as an additional buffer zone;
c. Order Respondents to stop all port calls and war games under
'Balikatan' because of the absence of clear guidelines, duties, and
liability schemes for breaches of those duties, and require
Respondents to assume responsibility for prior and future
environmental damage in general, and environmental damage under
the Visiting Forces Agreement in particular.
d. Temporarily define and describe allowable activities of ecotourism,
diving, recreation, and limited commercial activities by fisherfolk and
indigenous communities near or around the TRNP but away from the
damaged site and an additional buffer zone;
2. After summary hearing, issue a Resolution extending the TEPO
until further orders of the Court;
3. After due proceedings, render a Decision which shall include,
without limitation:
a. Order Respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, following the
dispositive portion of Nicolas v. Romulo, "to forthwith negotiate with
the United States representatives for the appropriate agreement on
[environmental guidelines and environmental accountability] under
Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V[] of the VFA ... "
b. Direct Respondents and appropriate agencies to commence
administrative, civil, and criminal proceedings against erring officers
and individuals to the full extent of the law, and to make such
proceedings public;
c. Declare that Philippine authorities may exercise primary and
exclusive criminal jurisdiction over erring U.S. personnel under the
circumstances of this case;
d. Require Respondents to pay just and reasonable compensation in
the settlement of all meritorious claims for damages caused to the
Tubbataha Reef on terms and conditions no less severe than those
applicable to other States, and damages for personal injury or death,
if such had been the case;
e. Direct Respondents to cooperate in providing for the attendance
of witnesses and in the collection and production of evidence,
including seizure and delivery of objects connected with the offenses
related to the grounding of the Guardian;
f. Require the authorities of the Philippines and the United States to
notify each other of the disposition of all cases, wherever heard,
related to the grounding of the Guardian;
g. Restrain Respondents from proceeding with any purported
restoration, repair, salvage or post salvage plan or plans, including
cleanup plans covering the damaged area of the Tubbataha Reef
absent a just settlement approved by the Honorable Court;
h. Require Respondents to engage in stakeholder and LOU
consultations in accordance with the Local Government Code and
R.A. 10067;
i. Require Respondent US officials and their representatives to place
a deposit to the TRNP Trust Fund defined under Section 17 of RA
10067 as a bona .fide gesture towards full reparations;
j. Direct Respondents to undertake measures to rehabilitate the
areas affected by the grounding of the Guardian in light of
Respondents' experience in the Port Royale grounding in 2009,
among other similar grounding incidents;
k. Require Respondents to regularly publish on a quarterly basis and
in the name of transparency and accountability such environmental
damage assessment, valuation, and valuation methods, in all stages
of negotiation;
l. Convene a multisectoral technical working group to provide
scientific and technical support to the TPAMB;
m. Order the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of National
Defense, and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
to review the Visiting Forces Agreement and the Mutual Defense
Treaty to consider whether their provisions allow for the exercise of
erga omnes rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and for
damages which follow from any violation of those rights;
n. Narrowly tailor the provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement for
purposes of protecting the damaged areas of TRNP;
o. Declare the grant of immunity found in Article V ("Criminal
Jurisdiction") and Article VI of the Visiting Forces Agreement
unconstitutional for violating equal protection and/or for violating the
preemptory norm of nondiscrimination incorporated as part of the
law of the land under Section 2, Article II, of the Philippine
Constitution;
p. Allow for continuing discovery measures;
q. Supervise marine wildlife rehabilitation in the Tubbataha Reefs in
all other respects; and
4. Provide just and equitable environmental rehabilitation measures
and such other reliefs as are just and equitable under the
premises.7 (Underscoring supplied.)
Since only the Philippine respondents filed their comment 8 to the petition,
petitioners also filed a motion for early resolution and motion to proceed ex
parte against the US respondents.9
Respondents' Consolidated Comment
In their consolidated comment with opposition to the application for a TEPO
and ocular inspection and production orders, respondents assert that: ( 1)
the grounds relied upon for the issuance of a TEPO or writ of Kalikasan have
become fait accompli as the salvage operations on the USS Guardian were
already completed; (2) the petition is defective in form and substance; (3)
the petition improperly raises issues involving the VFA between the Republic
of the Philippines and the United States of America; and ( 4) the
determination of the extent of responsibility of the US Government as
regards the damage to the Tubbataha Reefs rests exdusively with the
executive branch.
The Court's Ruling
As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute on the legal standing of
petitioners to file the present petition.
Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question."10 Specifically, it is "a party's personal and substantial interest in a
case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the
act being challenged, and "calls for more than just a generalized
grievance."11 However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this
Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when
the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.12
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 we recognized the "public
right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first
time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law." We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other
civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the
inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications.1âwphi1 Such right carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.14
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in
Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing
to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in
representation of their own and future generations. Thus:
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created
world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife,
off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present a:: well as
future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to
the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full 1:njoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion
of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.15 (Emphasis supplied.)
The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to
minors and generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which
allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on
citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct
interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature."16
Having settled the issue of locus standi, we shall address the more
fundamental question of whether this Court has jurisdiction over the US
respondents who did not submit any pleading or manifestation in this case.
The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign
immunity or non-suability of the State,17is expressly provided in Article XVI of
the 1987 Constitution which states:
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,18 we discussed the principle of
state immunity from suit, as follows:
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now · expressed
in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally
accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the
law of our land under Article II, Section 2. x x x.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally
accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation.
Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are
deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and
consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission
to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these
principles in its relations with other states.
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the
justification given by Justice Holmes that ''there can be no legal right against
the authority which makes the law on which the right depends." [Kawanakoa
v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349] There are other practical reasons for the
enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be
impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the
maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals
and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition
would, in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of
nations." [De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171]
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state
for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The
rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself
to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,. such as the appropriation
of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit
must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally
impleaded. [Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120] In such a situation, the
state may move to dismiss the comp.taint on the ground that it has been
filed without its consent.19 (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the American Constitution, the doctrine is expressed in the Eleventh
Amendment which reads:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.
In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals,20 we further expounded on the
immunity of foreign states from the jurisdiction of local courts, as follows:
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a
long-standing rule of customary international law then closely identified with
the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the
emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of
the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself
in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit arc those of a foreign
government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic
personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred
by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing
a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself.
The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the
State, in whose service he is, under the maxim -par in parem, non habet
imperium -that all states are soverr~ign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction
over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment
against an official would rec 1uire the state itself to perform an affirmative
act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to
pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being
against the state itself, although it has not been formally
impleaded.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the same case we also mentioned that in the case of diplomatic immunity,
the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law of the
territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity
from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction.22
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,23 one of the consolidated cases
therein involved a Filipino employed at Clark Air Base who was arrested
following a buy-bust operation conducted by two officers of the US Air Force,
and was eventually dismissed from his employment when he was charged in
court for violation of R.A. No. 6425. In a complaint for damages filed by the
said employee against the military officers, the latter moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that the suit was against the US Government which had
not given its consent. The RTC denied the motion but on a petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed before this Court, we reversed the RTC and
dismissed the complaint. We held that petitioners US military officers were
acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-
bust operation against the complainant and thereafter testified against him
at his trial. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United
States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their
principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.
This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being
sued in the courts of another State without the former's consent or waiver
has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and
governmental acts (Jure imperil") from private, commercial and proprietary
acts (Jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State
immunity extends only to acts Jure imperii. The restrictive application of
State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs.24
In Shauf v. Court of Appeals,25 we discussed the limitations of the State
immunity principle, thus:
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his
capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of
plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by JustiGe Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau
of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. : "Inasmuch as the
State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of
government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action
against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the
State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it
has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or
the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act
for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the
plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority
which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the
constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent."
The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be
used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
xxxx
The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the
doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where
the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an
ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of
the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual
capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without
authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled
principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with
malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction.26 (Emphasis supplied.) In this case, the US respondents were
sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who
had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged
act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian
on the TRNP was committed while they we:re performing official military
duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials
will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US
government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle
of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court
over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the
position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a
restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the
TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained
that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as
extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to
this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of
the coastal State regarding passage through the latter's internal waters and
the territorial sea.
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the
UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by
customary international rules on the "traditional uses of the oceans" as
codified in UNCLOS, as can be gleaned from previous declarations by former
Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and the US judiciary in the case of United
States v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd.27
The international law of the sea is generally defined as "a body of treaty
rules arid customary norms governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of
its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a
branch of public international law, regulating the relations of states with
respect to the uses of the oceans."28 The UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty
which was opened for signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay,
Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984 but came into force on
November 16, 1994 upon the submission of the 60th ratification.
The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance
State sovereignty (mare clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high
seas (mare liberum).29 The freedom to use the world's marine waters is one
of the oldest customary principles of international law.30 The UNCLOS gives
to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different
zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3)
contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also
gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending
on where the vessel is located.31
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal
State exercises sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of
international law. Such sovereignty extends to the air space over the
territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.32
In the case of warships,33 as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to
enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:
Article 30
Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal
State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal
State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any
request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may
require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.
Article 31
Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship
or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage
to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other
government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and
regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial
sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international
law.
Article 32
Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-
commercial purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and
31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other
government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. (Emphasis
supplied.) A foreign warship's unauthorized entry into our internal waters
with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which the
above provisions may apply. But what if the offending warship is a non-party
to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?
An overwhelming majority - over 80% -- of nation states are now members
of UNCLOS, but despite this the US, the world's leading maritime power, has
not ratified it.
While the Reagan administration was instrumental in UNCLOS' negotiation
and drafting, the U.S. delegation ultimately voted against and refrained from
signing it due to concerns over deep seabed mining technology transfer
provisions contained in Part XI. In a remarkable, multilateral effort to induce
U.S. membership, the bulk of UNCLOS member states cooperated over the
succeeding decade to revise the objection.able provisions. The revisions
satisfied the Clinton administration, which signed the revised Part XI
implementing agreement in 1994. In the fall of 1994, President Clinton
transmitted UNCLOS and the Part XI implementing agreement to the Senate
requesting its advice and consent. Despite consistent support from President
Clinton, each of his successors, and an ideologically diverse array of
stakeholders, the Senate has since withheld the consent required for the
President to internationally bind the United States to UNCLOS.
While UNCLOS cleared the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC)
during the 108th and 110th Congresses, its progress continues to be
hamstrung by significant pockets of political ambivalence over U.S.
participation in international institutions. Most recently, 111 th Congress
SFRC Chairman Senator John Kerry included "voting out" UNCLOS for full
Senate consideration among his highest priorities. This did not occur, and no
Senate action has been taken on UNCLOS by the 112th Congress.34
Justice Carpio invited our attention to the policy statement given by
President Reagan on March 10, 1983 that the US will "recognize the rights of
the other , states in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the
convention [UNCLOS], so long as the rights and freedom of the United
States and others under international law are recognized by such coastal
states", and President Clinton's reiteration of the US policy "to act in a
manner consistent with its [UNCLOS] provisions relating to traditional uses of
the oceans and to encourage other countries to do likewise." Since Article 31
relates to the "traditional uses of the oceans," and "if under its policy, the US
'recognize[s] the rights of the other states in the waters off their coasts,"'
Justice Carpio postulates that "there is more reason to expect it to recognize
the rights of other states in their internal waters, such as the Sulu Sea in this
case."
As to the non-ratification by the US, Justice Carpio emphasizes that "the US'
refusal to join the UN CLOS was centered on its disagreement with UN CLOS'
regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and
deep seabed commonly owned by mankind," pointing out that such "has
nothing to do with its [the US'] acceptance of customary international rules
on navigation."
It may be mentioned that even the US Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps
publicly endorses the ratification of the UNCLOS, as shown by the following
statement posted on its official website:
The Convention is in the national interest of the United States because it
establishes stable maritime zones, including a maximum outer limit for
territorial seas; codifies innocent passage, transit passage, and archipelagic
sea lanes passage rights; works against "jurisdictiomtl creep" by preventing
coastal nations from expanding their own maritime zones; and reaffirms
sovereign immunity of warships, auxiliaries anJ government aircraft.
xxxx
Economically, accession to the Convention would support our national
interests by enhancing the ability of the US to assert its sovereign rights over
the resources of one of the largest continental shelves in the world. Further,
it is the Law of the Sea Convention that first established the concept of a
maritime Exclusive Economic Zone out to 200 nautical miles, and recognized
the rights of coastal states to conserve and manage the natural resources in
this Zone.35
We fully concur with Justice Carpio's view that non-membership in the
UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the
Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We
thus expect the US to bear "international responsibility" under Art. 31 in
connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the
Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and
trading partner, which has been actively supporting the country's efforts to
preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to
compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal
waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership
in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all
nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine
environment as provided in Article 197, viz:
 Article 197
Cooperation on a global or regional basis
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional
basis, directly or through competent international organizations, in
formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended
practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection
and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account
characteristic regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is
beyond dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships
from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the.latter's territorial
sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial '::;ea
immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and
they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other
government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.
Petitioners argue that there is a waiver of immunity from suit found in the
VFA. Likewise, they invoke federal statutes in the US under which agencies
of the US have statutorily waived their immunity to any action. Even under
the common law tort claims, petitioners asseverate that the US respondents
are liable for negligence, trespass and nuisance.
We are not persuaded.
The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States
troops and personnel visiting the Philippines to promote "common security
interests" between the US and the Philippines in the region. It provides for
the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines
the rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter
of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.36 The invocation of US
federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper considering that it is
the VF A which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew
navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement.
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for
issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17,
Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a
violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately:
SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.-The filing of a petition for the
issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of separate civil,
criminal or administrative actions.
In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the application or non-
application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VF A to US personnel who
may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be
premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We
also find it unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of
State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant
damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The
Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of
administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that
deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an
environmental law.37
Section 15, Rule 7 enumerates the reliefs which may be granted in a petition
for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan, to wit:
SEC. 15. Judgment.-Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is
submitted for decision, the court shall render judgment granting or denying
the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from
committing acts or neglecting the performance of a duty in violation
of environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction or
damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, govemment agency,
private person or entity to protect, preserve, rehabilitate or restore
the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency,
private person or entity to monitor strict compliance with the
decision and orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or
private person or entity to make periodic reports on the execution of
the final judgment; and
 (e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection, preservation,
rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of
damages to individual petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.)
We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting that this petition
has become moot in the sense that the salvage operation sought to be
enjoined or restrained had already been accomplished when petitioners
sought recourse from this Court. But insofar as the directives to Philippine
respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef stn icture and marine
habitat adversely affected by the grounding incident are concerned,
petitioners are entitled to these reliefs notwithstanding the completion of the
removal of the USS Guardian from the coral reef. However, we are mindful
of the fact that the US and Philippine governments both expressed readiness
to negotiate and discuss the matter of compensation for the damage caused
by the USS Guardian. The US Embassy has also declared it is closely
coordinating with local scientists and experts in assessing the extent of the
damage and appropriate methods of rehabilitation.
Exploring avenues for settlement of environmental cases is not proscribed by
the Rules. As can be gleaned from the following provisions, mediation and
settlement are available for the consideration of the parties, and which
dispute resolution methods are encouraged by the court, to wit:
RULE3
xxxx
SEC. 3. Referral to mediation.-At the start of the pre-trial conference, the
court shall inquire from the parties if they have settled the dispute;
otherwise, the court shall immediately refer the parties or their counsel, if
authorized by their clients, to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) unit for
purposes of mediation. If not available, the court shall refer the case to the
clerk of court or legal researcher for mediation.
Mediation must be conducted within a non-extendible period of thirty (30)
days from receipt of notice of referral to mediation.
The mediation report must be submitted within ten (10) days from the
expiration of the 30-day period.
SEC. 4. Preliminary conference.-If mediation fails, the court will schedule the
continuance of the pre-trial. Before the scheduled date of continuance, the
court may refer the case to the branch clerk of court for a preliminary
conference for the following purposes:
(a) To assist the parties in reaching a settlement;
xxxx
SEC. 5. Pre-trial conference; consent decree.-The judge shall put the parties
and their counsels under oath, and they shall remain under oath in all pre-
trial conferences.
The judge shall exert best efforts to persuade the parties to arrive at a
settlement of the dispute. The judge may issue a consent decree approving
the agreement between the parties in accordance with law, morals, public
order and public policy to protect the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology.
xxxx
SEC. 10. Efforts to settle.- The court shall endeavor to make the parties to
agree to compromise or settle in accordance with law at any stage of the
proceedings before rendition of judgment. (Underscoring supplied.)
The Court takes judicial notice of a similar incident in 2009 when a guided-
missile cruiser, the USS Port Royal, ran aground about half a mile off the
Honolulu Airport Reef Runway and remained stuck for four days. After
spending $6.5 million restoring the coral reef, the US government was
reported to have paid the State of Hawaii $8.5 million in settlement over
coral reef damage caused by the grounding.38
To underscore that the US government is prepared to pay appropriate
compensation for the damage caused by the USS Guardian grounding, the
US Embassy in the Philippines has announced the formation of a US
interdisciplinary scientific team which will "initiate discussions with the
Government of the Philippines to review coral reef rehabilitation options in
Tubbataha, based on assessments by Philippine-based marine scientists."
The US team intends to "help assess damage and remediation options, in
coordination with the Tubbataha Management Office, appropriate Philippine
government entities, non-governmental organizations, and scientific experts
from Philippine universities."39
A rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at the cost of the
violator is also a major relief that may be obtained under a judgment
rendered in a citizens' suit under the Rules, viz:
RULES
SECTION 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.-If warranted, the court may grant to the
plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the protection, preservation or
rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorney's fees, costs
of suit and other litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to
submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, the
costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special
trust fund for that purpose subject to the control of the court.1âwphi1
In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the
matter of compensation and rehabilitation measures through diplomatic
channels. Resolution of these issues impinges on our relations with another
State in the context of common security interests under the VFA. It is settled
that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed
by the Constitution to the executive and legislative-"the political" --
departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in
the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or
decision."40
On the other hand, we cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for in the
petition to order a review of the VFA and to nullify certain immunity
provisions thereof.
As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec.
Zamora,41 the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has
been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by
the duly authorized representative of the United States government. The VF
A being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter
of international law to abide by its terms and provisions.42 The present
petition under the Rules is not the proper remedy to assail the
constitutionality of its provisions. WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance
of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan is hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 109095-109107 February 23, 1995
ELDEPIO LASCO, RODOLFO ELISAN, URBANO BERADOR,
FLORENTINO ESTOBIO, MARCELINO MATURAN, FRAEN BALIBAG,
CARMELITO GAJOL, DEMOSTHENES MANTO, SATURNINO BACOL,
SATURNINO LASCO, RAMON LOYOLA, JOSENIANO B. ESPINA, all
represented by MARIANO R. ESPINA, petitioner,
vs.
UNITED NATIONS REVOLVING FUND FOR NATURAL RESOURCES
EXPLORATION (UNRFNRE) represented by its operations manager,
DR. KYRIACOS LOUCA, OSCAR N. ABELLA, LEON G. GONZAGA, JR.,
MUSIB M. BUAT, Commissioners of National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City and
IRVING PETILLA, Labor Arbiter of Butuan City, respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to
set aside the Resolution dated January 25, 1993 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City.
We dismiss the petition.
I
Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent,
the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration
(UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of the United
Nations. The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of the Philippine
Government and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island.
Petitioners are the complainants in NLRC Cases Nos. SRAB 10-03-00067-91
to 10-03-00078-91 and SRAB 10-07-00159-91 for illegal dismissal and
damages.
In its Motion to Dismiss, private respondent alleged that respondent Labor
Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since it enjoyed diplomatic
immunity pursuant to the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities
of the United Nations. In support thereof, private respondent attached a
letter from the Department of Foreign Affairs dated August 26, 1991, which
acknowledged its immunity from suit. The letter confirmed that private
respondent, being a special fund administered by the United Nations, was
covered by the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations of which the Philippine Government was an original signatory
(Rollo, p. 21).
On November 25, 1991, respondent Labor Arbiter issued an order dismissing
the complaints on the ground that private respondent was protected by
diplomatic immunity. The dismissal was based on the letter of the Foreign
Office dated September 10, 1991.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. Thus, an appeal was filed
with the NLRC, which affirmed the dismissal of the complaints in its
Resolution dated January 25, 1993.
Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari without first seeking a
reconsideration of the NLRC resolution.
II
Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, provides that
decisions of the NLRC are final and executory. Thus, they may only be
questioned through certiorari as a special civil action under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Ordinarily, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for
reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an
opportunity to correct its assigned errors (Liberty Insurance Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 37 [1993]).
In the case at bench, petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration is
fatal to the instant petition. Moreover, the petition lacks any explanation for
such omission, which may merit its being considered as falling under the
recognized exceptions to the necessity of filing such motion.
Notwithstanding, we deem it wise to give due course to the petition because
of the implications of the issue in our international relations.
Petitioners argued that the acts of mining exploration and exploitation are
outside the official functions of an international agency protected by
diplomatic immunity. Even assuming that private respondent was entitled to
diplomatic immunity, petitioners insisted that private respondent waived it
when it engaged in exploration work and entered into a contract of
employment with petitioners.
Petitioners, likewise, invoked the constitutional mandate that the State shall
afford full protection to labor and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all (1987 Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 3).
The Office of the Solicitor General is of the view that private respondent is
covered by the mantle of diplomatic immunity. Private respondent is a
specialized agency of the United Nations. Under Article 105 of the Charter of
the United Nations:
1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of its
Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary
for the fulfillment of its purposes.
2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations
and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the
independent exercise of their functions in connection with
the organization.
Corollary to the cited article is the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, to which the
Philippines was a signatory (Vol. 1, Philippine Treaty Series, p. 621). We
quote Sections 4 and 5 of Article III thereof:
Sec. 4. The specialized agencies, their property and assets,
wherever located and by whomsoever held shall enjoy
immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as
in any particular case they have expressly waived their
immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of
immunity shall extend to any measure of execution
(Emphasis supplied).
Sec. 5. The premises of the specialized agencies shall be
inviolable. The property and assets of the specialized
agencies, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall
be immune from search, requisition, confiscation,
 expropriation and any other form of interference, whether
by executive, administrative, judicial or legislative action
(Emphasis supplied).
As a matter of state policy as expressed in the Constitution, the Philippine
Government adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
(1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2). Being a member of the United Nations
and a party to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, the Philippine Government
adheres to the doctrine of immunity granted to the United Nations and its
specialized agencies. Both treaties have the force and effect of law.
In World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242, (1972), we had
occasion to rule that:
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our
system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is
essentially a political question and courts should refuse to
look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the
government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is
recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the
government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the
courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate
suggestion by the principal law officer of the government,
the Solicitor General or other officer acting under his
direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that
courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and
detention of property, as to embarrass the executive arm of
the government in conducting foreign relations, it is
accepted doctrine that "in such cases the judicial department
of (this) government follows the action of the political
branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an
antagonistic jurisdiction (Emphasis supplied).
We recognize the growth of international organizations dedicated to specific
universal endeavors, such as health, agriculture, science and technology and
environment. It is not surprising that their existence has evolved into the
concept of international immunities. The reason behind the grant of
privileges and immunities to international organizations, its officials and
functionaries is to secure them legal and practical independence in fulfilling
their duties (Jenks, International Immunities 17 [1961]).
Immunity is necessary to assure unimpeded performance of their functions.
The purpose is "to shield the affairs of international organizations, in
accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by
the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and
to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions" (International
Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]).
In the International Catholic Migration Commission case, we held that there
is no conflict between the constitutional duty of the State to protect the
rights of workers and to promote their welfare, and the grant of immunity to
international organizations. Clauses on jurisdictional immunity are now
standard in the charters of the international organizations to guarantee the
smooth discharge of their functions.
The diplomatic immunity of private respondent was sufficiently established
by the letter of the Department of Foreign Affairs, recognizing and
confirming the immunity of UNRFNRE in accordance with the 1946
Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations where the
Philippine Government was a party. The issue whether an international
organization is entitled to diplomatic immunity is a "political question" and
such determination by the executive branch is conclusive on the courts and
quasi-judicial agencies (The Holy See v. Hon. Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr., G.R.
No. 101949, Dec. 1, 1994; International Catholic Migration Commission v.
Calleja, supra).
Our courts can only assume jurisdiction over private respondent if it
expressly waived its immunity, which is not so in the case at bench
(Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of
the United Nations, Art. III, Sec. 4).
Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in the Philippines.
Its presence here is by virtue of a joint project entered into by the Philippine
Government and the United Nations for mineral exploration in Dinagat
Island. Its mission is not to exploit our natural resources and gain pecuniarily
thereby but to help improve the quality of life of the people, including that of
petitioners.
This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse. Section 31 of the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of
the United Nations states that "each specialized agency shall make a
provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of
contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized
agency is a party."
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 106483 May 22, 1995
ERNESTO L. CALLADO, petitioner,
vs.INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
Did the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) waive its immunity from
suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-employee relationship?
We rule in the negative and vote to dismiss the petition.
Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI from April
11, 1983 to December 14, 1990. On February 11, 1990, while driving an
IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport and
back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.
Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation
conducted by the IRRI's Human Resource Development Department
Manager in a Memorandum dated March 5, 1990. 1 In view of the aforesaid
findings, he was charged with:
(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under
the influence of liquor;
(2) Serious misconduct consisting of your failure to report to
your supervisors the failure of your vehicle to start because
of a problem with the car battery which, you alleged,
required you to overstay in Manila for more than six (6)
hours, whereas, had you reported the matter to IRRI, Los
Baños by telephone, your problem could have been solved
within one or two hours;
2
(3) Gross and habitual neglect of your duties.
In a Memorandum dated March 9, 1990, petitioner submitted his answer and
defenses to the charges against him. 3After evaluating petitioner's answer,
explanations and other evidence, IRRI issued a Notice of Termination to
petitioner on December 7, 1990. 4
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint on December 19, 1990 before the
Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay with
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
On January 2, 1991, private respondent IRRI, through counsel, wrote the
Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal
process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it
invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international
organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the
same. 6
IRRI likewise wrote in the same tenor to the Regional Director of the
Department of Labor and Employment. 7
While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless,
cited an Order issued by the Institute on August 13, 1991 to the effect that
"in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its immunity," 8 and,
accordingly, considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in
resolving the case. The dispositive portion of the Labor arbiter's decision
dated October 31, 1991, reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering respondent to reinstate complainant to his
former position without loss or (sic) seniority rights and
privileges within five (5) days from receipt hereof and to pay
his full backwages from March 7, 1990 to October 31, 1991,
in the total amount of P83,048.75 computed on the basis of
his last monthly salary. 9
The NLRC found merit in private respondent' s appeal and, finding that IRRI
did not waive its immunity, ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor
Arbiter set aside and the complaint dismissed. 10
Hence, this petition where it is contended that the immunity of the IRRI as
an international organization granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No.
1620 may not be invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as it waived the
same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of
dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620." 11
It is also petitioner's position that a dismissal of his complaint before the
Labor Arbiter leaves him no other remedy through which he can seek
redress. He further states that since the investigation of his case was not
referred to the Council of IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM), he was
denied his constitutional right to due process.
We find no merit in petitioner's arguments.
IRRI's immunity from suit is undisputed.
Presidential Decree No. 1620, Article 3 provides:
Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall
enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative
proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been
expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or
his authorized representatives.
In the case of International Catholic Migration Commission v. Hon. Calleja, et
al. and Kapisanan ng Manggagawa at TAC sa IRRI v. Secretary of Labor and
Employment and IRRI, 12 the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
aforequoted law. After the Court noted the letter of the Acting Secretary of
Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of Labor dated June 17, 1987, where the
immunity of IRRI from the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and
Employment was sustained, the Court stated that this opinion constituted "a
categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that . . .
IRRI enjoy(s) immunities accorded to international organizations, which
determination has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the
Courts in order not to embarass a political department of Government. 13 We
cited the Court's earlier pronouncement in WHO v. Hon. Benjamin Aquino, et
al., 14 to wit:
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our
system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is
essentially a political question and courts should refuse to
look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the
government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is
recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the
government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the
courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate
suggestion by the principal law officer of the government . .
. or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in
adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so
exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to embarass the executive
arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is
accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial department
of (this) government follows the action of the political
branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an
antagonistic jurisdiction. 15
Further, we held that "(t)he raison d'etre for these immunities is the
assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies
concerned.
The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to . . . and IRRI
is clearly necessitated by their international character and
respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of
partiality and interference by the host country in their
internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the
Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the
very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of
international organizations, in accordance with international
practice, from political pressure or control by the host
country to the prejudice of member States of the
organization, and to ensure the unhampered the
performance of their functions. 16
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express
waiver by its Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or
abandon this immunity.
On the matter of waiving its immunity from suit, IRRI had, early on, made its
position clear. Through counsel, the Institute wrote the Labor Arbiter
categorically informing him that the Institute will not waive its diplomatic
immunity. In the second place, petitioner's reliance on the Memorandum
with "Guidelines in handling cases of dismissal of employees in relation to
P.D. 1620" dated July 26, 1983, is misplaced. The Memorandum reads, in
part:
 Time and again the Institute has reiterated that it will not those cases where IRRI opts to waive its immunity. It is not
use its immunity under P.D. 1620 for the purpose of a declaration of waiver for all cases. This is apparent from
terminating the services of any of its employees. Despite the use of the permissive term "may" rather than the
continuing efforts on the part of IRRI to live up to this mandatory term "shall" in the last paragraph of the memo.
undertaking, there appears to be apprehension in the minds Certainly the memo cannot be considered as the express
of some IRRI employees. To help allay these fears the waiver by the Director General as contemplated by P.D.
following guidelines will be followed hereafter by the 1620, especially since the memo was issued by a former
Personnel/Legal Office while handling cases of dismissed Director-General. At the very least, the express declaration
employees. of the incumbent Director-general supersedes the 1983
memo and should be accorded greater respect. It would be
xxx xxx xxx equally important to point out that the Personnel and Legal
Office has been non-existent since 1988 as a result of major
2. Notification/manifestation to MOLE or labor arbiter reorganization of the IRRI. Cases of IRRI before DOLE are
handled by an external Legal Counsel as in this particular
case. 18 (Emphasis supplied)
If and when a dismissed employee files a complaint against the Institute
contesting the legality of dismissal, IRRI's answer to the complaint will:
The memorandum, issued by the former Director-General to a now-defunct
division of the IRRI, was meant for internal circulation and not as a pledge of
1. Indicate in the identification of IRRI that it is an international
waiver in all cases arising from dismissal of employees. Moreover, the IRRI's
organization operating under the laws of the Philippines
letter to the Labor Arbiter in the case at bench made in 1991 declaring that it
including P.D. 1620. and
has no intention of waiving its immunity, at the very least, supplants any
2. Base the defense on the merits and facts of the case as well
pronouncement of alleged waiver issued in previous cases.
as the legality of the cause or causes for termination.

Petitioner's allegation that he was denied due process is unfounded and has
3) Waiving immunity under P.D. 1620
no basis.
If the plaintiff's attorney or the arbiter, asks if IRRI will
It is not denied that he was informed of the findings and charges resulting
waive its immunity we may reply that the Institute will be
from an investigation conducted of his case in accordance with IRRI policies
happy to do so, as it has in the past in the formal manner
and procedures. He had a chance to comment thereon in a Memorandum he
required thereby reaffirming our commitment to abide by
submitted to the Manager of the Human Resource and Development
the laws of the Philippines and our full faith in the integrity
Department. Therefore, he was given proper notice and adequate
and impartially of the legal system. 17 (Emphasis in this
opportunity to refute the charges and findings, hereby fulfilling the basic
paragraphs ours)
requirements of due process.
From the last paragraph of the foregoing quotation, it is clear that in cases
Finally, on the issue of referral to the Council of IRRI Employees and
involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity,
Management (CIEM), petitioner similarly fails to persuade the Court.
signifying that such waiver is discretionary on its part.

The Court, in the Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa at TAC sa

We agree with private respondent IRRI that this memorandum cannot, by
IRRI case, 19 held:
any stretch of the imagination, be considered the express waiver by the
Director-General. Respondent Commission has quoted IRRI's reply thus:
Neither are the employees of IRRI without remedy in case of
dispute with management as, in fact, there had been
The 1983 . . . is an internal memo addressed to Personnel
organized a forum for better management-employee
and Legal Office and was issued for its guidance in handling
 relationship as evidenced by the formation of the Council of
IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM) wherein "both
management and employees were and still are represented
for purposes of maintaining mutual and beneficial
cooperation between IRRI and its employees." The existence
of this Union factually and tellingly belies the argument that
Pres. Decree No. Decree No. 1620, which grants to IRRI the
status, privileges and immunities of an international
organization, deprives its employees of the right to self-
organization.
We have earlier concluded that petitioner was not denied due process, and
this, notwithstanding the non-referral to the Council of IRRI Employees and
Management. Private respondent correctly pointed out that petitioner, having
opted not to seek the help of the CIEM Grievance Committee, prepared his
answer by his own self. 20 He cannot now fault the Institute for not referring
his case to the CIEM.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 115634. April 27, 2000]
FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of
ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN,
SAMAR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T.
BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision.[1] dated May 27, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 29191, denying the petition filed by herein petitioners
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in order to annul the Order dated
May 27, 1992, by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar. Said Order
had denied petitioners (a) Motion to Dismiss the replevin case filed by herein
private respondents, as well as (b) petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order of said trial court dated April 24, 1992, granting an application for
a Writ of replevin..[2] h Y
The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are as follows:
On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the
DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles, described as follows:
"1. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733 loaded with one
thousand and twenty six (1,026) board feet of illegally
sourced lumber valued at P8,544.75, being driven by one Pio
Gabon and owned by [a certain] Jose Vargas.
2. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. FCN-143 loaded with one
thousand two hundred twenty four and ninety seven
(1,224.97) board feet of illegally-sourced lumber valued at
P9,187.27, being driven by one Constancio Abuganda and
owned by [a certain] Manuela Babalcon. ".[3]
Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to
present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team
seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENR-PENR
(Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Provincial Environment
and Natural Resources) Office in Catbalogan..[4] Seizure receipts were issued
but the drivers refused to accept the receipts..[5] Felipe Calub, Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed before the Provincial
Prosecutors Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against Abuganda, in
Criminal Case No. 3795, for violation of Section 68 [78), Presidential Decree
705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised
Forestry Code.[6] Mis sc
On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon
and Abuganda from the custody of the DENR, prompting DENR Officer Calub
this time to file a criminal complaint for grave coercion against Gabon and
Abuganda. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the Public
Prosecutor..[7]
On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate number FCN 143,
was again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENR in Catbalogan
and Philippine Army elements of the 802nd Infantry Brigade at Barangay
Buray, Paranas, Samar. It was again loaded with forest products with an
equivalent volume of 1,005.47 board feet, valued at P10,054.70. Calub duly
filed a criminal complaint against Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia,
and several John Does, in Criminal Case No. 3625, for violation of Section 68
[78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise
known as the Revised Forestry Code..[8]
In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and Abuganda
were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. But note the trial court
ordered that a copy of the decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice, in
order that the necessary criminal action may be filed against Noe Pagarao
and all other persons responsible for violation of the Revised Forestry Code.
For it appeared that it was Pagarao who chartered the subject vehicle and
ordered that cut timber be loaded on it..[9]
Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle
owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the
recovery of possession of the two (2) impounded vehicles with an application
for replevin against herein petitioners before the RTC of Catbalogan. The
trial court granted the application for replevin and issued the corresponding
writ in an Order dated April 24, 1992..[10] Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
which was denied by the trial court.[11]
Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the present
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with application for
Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order. The Court
issued a TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge from conducting further
proceedings in the civil case for replevin; and enjoining private respondents
from taking or attempting to take the motor vehicles and forest products
seized from the custody of the petitioners. The Court further instructed the
petitioners to see to it that the motor vehicles and other forest products
seized are kept in a secured place and protected from deterioration, said
property being in custodia legis and subject to the direct order of the
Supreme Court..[12] In a Resolution issued on September 28, 1992, the Court
referred said petition to respondent appellate court for appropriate
disposition..[13]
On May 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit.
It ruled that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authority
granted by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277
does not automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis. According to
the appellate court, such authority of the Department Head of the DENR or
his duly authorized representative to order the confiscation and disposition of
illegally obtained forest products and the conveyance used for that purpose
is not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws, regulations, or
policies on that matter, added the appellate court. The DENR Administrative
Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the appellate court said.
For it prescribes the guidelines in the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition
of conveyances used in the commission of offenses penalized under Section
68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277..[14]
Additionally, respondent Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners failed to
observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series
of 1990. They were unable to submit a report of the seizure to the DENR
Secretary, to give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to render
a report of their findings and recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover,
petitioners failure to comply with the procedure laid down by DENR
Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by the admission
of petitioners counsel that no confiscation order has been issued prior to the
seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit. Therefore, in failing
to follow such procedure, according to the appellate court, the subject
vehicles could not be considered in custodia legis..[15]
Respondent Court of Appeals also found no merit in petitioners claim that
private respondents complaint for replevin is a suit against the State.
Accordingly, petitioners could not shield themselves under the principle of
state immunity as the property sought to be recovered in the instant suit had
not yet been lawfully adjudged forfeited in favor of the government.
Moreover, according to respondent appellate court, there could be no
pecuniary liability nor loss of property that could ensue against the
government. It reasoned that a suit against a public officer who acted
illegally or beyond the scope of his authority could not be considered a suit
against the State; and that a public officer might be sued for illegally seizing
or withholding the possession of the property of another..[16]
Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners based
on the claim that the subject vehicles were validly seized and held in custody
because they were contradicted by its own findings..[17] Their petition was
found without merit.[18] Rtc spped
Now, before us, the petitioners assign the following errors: .[19]
(1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
MERE SEIZURE OF A CONVEYANCE PURSUANT TO SECTION
68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705 AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE
ORDER 277 DOES NOT PLACE SAID CONVEYANCE
IN CUSTODIA LEGIS;
 (2) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE OPERATIVE ACT GIVING RISE FOR THE SUBJECT
CONVEYANCE TO BE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS IS ITS LAWFUL
SEIZURE BY THE DENR PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-
A] OF P.D. NO. 705, AS AMENDED BY E.O. NO. 277; AND
(3) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN AGAINST THE PETITIONERS IS
NOT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE.
In brief, the pertinent issues for our consideration are:
(1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN
143, is in custodia legis.
(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of
impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit against the
State.
We will now resolve both issues.
The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all conveyances
used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78. Section 78
states:
Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and or Collecting Timber, or
Other Forest Products without License. Any person who shall
cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forestland, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land, without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Codeslx mis
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in
the area where the timber or forest products are found.
This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products
without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable with the
penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of
the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles were
loaded with forest products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no
permit evidencing authority to possess and transport said load of forest
products was duly presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally
sourced. Thus there was a prima facieviolation of Section 68 [78] of the
Revised Forestry Code, although as found by the trial court, the persons
responsible for said violation were not the ones charged by the public
prosecutor.
The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances used in
the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78 of the Revised
Forestry Code is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the same Code. They
read as follows: Sc
Sec. 78-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head
or His Duly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation.
-- In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws,
rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly
authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any
forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or
possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by
land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to
dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws,
regulations or policies on the matter.
Sec. 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. -- A forest
officer or employee of the Bureau [Department] or any
personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Philippine National
Police shall arrest even without warrant any person who has
committed or is committing in his presence any of the
offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and
confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and
equipment used in committing the offense... [Emphasis
supplied.]
Note that DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implements
Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code, as follows:
Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture.
-- All conveyances used in the transport of any forest
product obtained or gathered illegally whether or not
covered with transport documents, found spurious or
 irregular in accordance with Sec. 68-A [78-A] of P.D. No.
705, shall be confiscated in favor of the government or
disposed of in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or
policies on the matter.
Sec. 4. Who are Authorized to Seize Conveyance. -- The
Secretary or his duly authorized representative such as the
forest officers and/or natural resources officers, or deputized
officers of the DENR are authorized to seize said
conveyances subject to policies and guidelines pertinent
thereto. Deputized military personnel and officials of other
agencies apprehending illegal logs and other forest products
and their conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR field
offices, and turn over said forest products and conveyances
for proper action and disposition. In case where the
apprehension is made by DENR field officer, the conveyance
shall be deposited with the nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED
Office as the case may be, for safekeeping wherever it is
most convenient and secured. [Emphasis supplied.]
Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported
without pertinent documents that could evidence title to or right to
possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and
their load was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry
Code. Slxs c
Note further that petitioners failure to observe the procedure outlined in
DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained.
Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a
written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following
the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly
took the impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again,
when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the
second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the
DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because
private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of
replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their
apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be
absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before said
seizure could be effected under the circumstances.
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was
in accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed
in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is
property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the
custody of the law, and not otherwise..[20]
In Mamanteo, et. al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-1264,
promulgated on July 28, 1999, the case involves property to be seized by a
Deputy Sheriff in a replevin suit. But said property were already impounded
by the DENR due to violation of forestry laws and, in fact, already forfeited in
favor of the government by order of the DENR. We said that such property
was deemed in custodia legis. The sheriff could not insist on seizing the
property already subject of a prior warrant of seizure. The appropriate action
should be for the sheriff to inform the trial court of the situation by way of
partial Sheriffs Return, and wait for the judges instructions on the proper
procedure to be observed.
Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the
subject of a replevin suit. In Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun , we
elucidated further:
". . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by
unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel earlier taken
for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code, tax
assessment, attachment or execution. Officers of the court,
from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be
vigilant in their execution of the law otherwise, as in this
case, valid seizure and forfeiture proceedings could easily be
undermined by the simple devise of a writ of
replevin...".[21] Scslx
On the second issue, is the complaint for the recovery of possession of the
two impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, a suit against the
State?
Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its
consent..[22] And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect,
a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately
liable..[23] However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine
generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good
faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption.[24] In the present case,
the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed
by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are
clearly official in nature.[25] In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and
89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were
performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so
within the limits of their authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on
their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a
suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the States consent.
Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the
Solicitor Generals line for the defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion of
administrative remedies. We ought only to recall that exhaustion must be
raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss..[26] If not
invoked at the proper time, this ground for dismissal could be deemed
waived and the court could take cognizance of the case and try it.[27] Mesm
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191 is SET ASIDE. Consequently, the
Order issued by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, dated May 27, 1992,
and the Writ of replevin issued in the Order dated April 24, 1992,
are ANNULLED. The Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan,
Branch 29, is directed to take possession of the subject motor vehicle, with
plate number FCN 143, for delivery to the custody of and appropriate
disposition by petitioners. Let a copy of this decision be provided the
Honorable Secretary of Justice for his appropriate action, against any and all
persons responsible for the abovecited violation of the Revised Forestry
Code.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-9990 September 30, 1957
ENRIQUE J. L. RUIZ and JOSE V. HERRERA, in their behalf and as
minority stockholders of the Allied Technologists, Inc., plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
HON. SOTERO B. CABAHUG, Secretary of National Defense, Col.
NICOLAS JIMENEZ, Head of the Engineer Group, Office of the
Secretary of National Defense, THE FINANCE OFFICER of the
Department of National Defense, the AUDITOR of the Department
of the National Defense, PABLO D. PANLILIO and ALLIED
TECHNOLOGISTS INC., defendants-appellees.
Diokno and Sison for appellants.
L. D. Panlilio for appellee Pablo Panlilio.
Manuel Sales for defendant Allied Technologists, Inc.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrocio Padilla and Assistant Solicitor Jose G.
Bautista for appellees Hon. Sotero Cabahug and Col. Nicolas Jimenez, et al.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing
plaintiffs' amended complaint.
The facts upon which plaintiffs' first cause of action are based are allowed as
follows:
On July 31, 1950 the Secretary of National Defense accepted the bid of the
Allied Technologists, Inc., to furnish the architectural and engineering
services in the construction of the Veterans Hospital at a price of P302,700.
The plans, specifications, sketches and detailed drawings and other
architectural requirements submitted by the Allied Technologists through
thereof its architects, Messrs. Enrique J. L. Ruiz, Jose V. Herrera and Pablo
D. Panlilio were approved by the United States Veterans Administration in
Washington, D.C. Because of the technical objection to the capacity of the
Allied Technologists, Inc. to practice architecture and upon the advice of the
Secretary of Justice, the contract was signed on the part of the Allied
Technologists, Inc. by E.J.L. Ruiz as President and P.D. Panlilio as Architect.
When the defendants-officials paid the Allied Technologists the contract price
for the architectural engineering service, they retained 15 per cent of the
sum due, for the reason that defendant Panlilio has asserted that he is the
sole and only architect of the Veterans Hospital to the exclusion of plaintiffs
Ruiz and Herrera, assertion aided and abetted by defendant Jimenez. Unless
defendants are prevented from recognizing defendant Panlilio as the sole
architect of the contract and from paying the 15 per cent retained, plaintiffs
will be deprived of the monetary value of their professional services and their
professional prestige and standing would be seriously impaired.
Under the second cause of action the following facts are alleged: Under Title
II of the contract entered into between plaintiffs and the Secretary of
National Defense, at any time prior to six months after completion and
acceptance of the work under Title I, the Government may direct the Allied
Technologists, Inc. to perform the services specified in said Title II. But
notwithstanding such completion or acceptance, the Government has refused
to direct the plaintiffs to perform the work, entrusting such work to a group
of inexperienced and unqualified engineers.
The prayer based on the first cause of action is that defendants desist from
recognizing Panlilio as the sole and only architect of the Veterans Hospital
and from paying him 15 per cent retained as above indicated, and that after
hearing Ruiz, Herrera and Panlilio be recognized as the architects of the
Veterans Hospital. Under the second cause of action it is prayed that the
defendants be directed to turn over the supervision called for by Title II of
the contract.
The court a quo dismissed the complaint on the ground that the suit involved
is one against the Government, which may not sued without its consent. It is
held that as the majority of the stockholders of the Allied Technologists, Inc.
have not joined in the action, the minority suit does not lie. It dismissed the
second cause of action on the ground that the optional services under Title II
have already been performed.
On this appeal the plaintiffs assign the following errors:
I defendant Jimenez is claimed to have "aided and abetted defendant Panlilio
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRESENT SUIT IS ONE
AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE VALIDLY
ENTERTAINED BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT BE SUED WITHOUT
ITS CONSENT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ACT
3038, AS AMENDED BY COMMONWEALTH ACT 327 ARE APPLICABLE TO
THIS CASE; IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM SHOULD
HAVE BEEN FILED WITH THE AUDITOR GENERAL.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE MINORITY SUIT IS
UNTENABLE.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
INJUNCTION.
Evidently, the plaintiffs-appellants do not question the dismissal of the
second cause of action. So, the appeal has relation to the first cause of
action only.
A careful study of the allegations made in the amended complaint discloses
the following facts and circumstances: The contract price for the
architectural engineering services rendered by the Allied Technologists, Inc.
and the plaintiffs is P231,600. All of that sum has been set aside for payment
to the Allied Technologists, Inc. and its architects, except the sum of
P34,740, representing 15 per cent of the total costs, which has been
retained by the defendants-officials. Insofar as the Government of the
Philippines is concerned, the full amount of the contract price has been set
aside and said full amount authorized to be paid. The Government does not
any longer have any interest in the amount, which the defendants-officials
have retained and have refused to pay to the plaintiffs, or to the person or
entity to which it should be paid. And the plaintiffs do not seek to sue the
Government to require it to pay the amount or involve it in the litigation. The
in depriving the Allied Technologists, Inc. and its two architects (Ruiz and
Herrera) of the honor and benefit due to them under the contract Annex `C`
thereof." It is further claimed by plaintiffs that the defendant-officials are
about to recognize Panlilio as the sole architect and are about to pay him the
15 per cent which they had retained, and thus deprive plaintiffs of their right
to share therein and in the honor consequent to the recognition of their
right. The suit, therefore, is properly directed against the officials and against
them alone, not against the Government, which does nor have any interest
in the outcome of the controversy between plaintiffs on the one hand, and
Panlilio on the other. The suit is between these alone, to determine who is
entitled to the amount retained by the officials; and if the latter did aid and
abet Panlilio in his pretense, to the exclusion and prejudice of plaintiffs, it is
natural that they alone, and not the Government, should be the subject of
the suit. He said officials chosen not to take sides in the controversy between
the architects, and had disclaimed interest in said controversy, the suit would
have been converted into one of interpleader. But they have acted to favor
one side, and have abetted him in his effort to obtain payment to him of the
sum remaining unpaid and credit for the work, to the exclusion of the
plaintiffs. Hence, the suit.1âwphïl.nêt
We are not wanting in authority to sustain the view that the State need not
be a party in this and parallel cases.
There is no proposition of law which is better settled than the
general rule that a sovereign state and its political subdivision cannot
be sued in the courts except upon the statutory consent of the state.
Numerous decisions of this court to that effect may be cited; but it is
enough to note that this court, in banc in a recent case, State vs.
Woodruff (Miss.), 150 So. 760, Hasso held; and therein overruled a
previous decision which had adjudicated that such consent could be
worked out of a statute by implication, when express consent was
absent from the terms of that statute.
But the rule applies only when the state or its subdivision is actually
made a party upon the record, or is actually necessary to be made a
party in order to furnish the relief demanded by the suit. It does not
apply when the suit is against an officer or agent of the state, and
the relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative discharge of
any obligation which belongs to the state in its political capacity,
even though the officers or agents who are made defendants
disclaim any personal interest in themselves and claim to hold or to
act only by virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and
servants.
Thus it will be found, as illustrative of what has been above said,
that nearly all the cases wherein the rule of immunity from suit
against the state or a subdivision thereof, has been applied and
upheld, are those which demanded a money judgment, and wherein
the discharge of the judgment, if obtained, would require the
appropriation or an expenditure therefrom, which being legislative in
its character is a province exclusively of the political departments of
the state. And in the less frequent number of cases where no money
judgment is demanded, and the rule of immunity is still upheld, it
will be found in them that the relief demanded would be,
nevertheless, to require of the state or its political subdivision the
affirmative performance of some asserted obligation, belong to the
state in its political capacity.
When, therefore, officers or agents of the state, although acting
officially and not as individuals, seize the private property of a
citizen, the state having no valid right or title thereto, or trespass
upon that property or damage it, the jurisdiction of the courts to
eject the officers or agents, is as well settled in the jurisprudence of
this country as is the general rule first above mentioned; for in such
a suit no relief is demanded which requires any affirmative action on
the part of the state. Such a suit is only to the end that the officers
and agents of the state stay off the property of the citizen and cease
to damage that property, the state having no right or title thereto."
(State Mineral Lease Commission vs. Lawrence [1934], 157 So. 897,
898-899.).
We hold that under the facts and circumstances alleged in the amendment
complaint, which should be taken on its face value, the suit is not one
against the Government, or a claim against it, but one against the officials to
compel them to act in accordance with the rights to be established by the
contending architects, or to prevent them from making payment and
recognition until the contending architects have established their respective
rights and interests in the funds retained and in the credit for the work done.
The order of dismissal is hereby reversed and set aside, and the case is
remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. With costs against the
defendants-appellees.1âwphïl.nêt
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16524 June 30, 1964
FRANCISCO S. OLIZON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendant-appellant.
Bienvenido L. Garcia for plaintiff-appellee.
Nat. M. Balboa and F. E. Evangelista for defendant-appellant.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
rendered in Case No. 40215, ordering the appellant Central Bank to refund
to the herein appellee the sum of P9,713.94 plus interest, cost and attorney's
fees.
The facts giving rise to this suit, as recited in the lower court decision and
borne by the records transmitted to Us, are as follows:
... . The defendant on March 21, 1952, December 4, 1952,
November 25, 1953, and January 4, 1955, collected from the plaintiff
(herein appellee) the amounts of P3,186.24, P840.65, P2,488.98,
and P2,734.53, under Central Bank Official Receipts Nos. 047895,
052279, 491743, and 663339, respectively, in payment of Special
Excise Tax on Foreign Exchange covering transactions, the details of
which are described in said receipts, that those amounts, as
 admitted by the defendant, were collected pursuant to its Monetary
Board Resolution No. 286, dated May 3, 1951 (Answer to Request
for Admission, par. 7); That on March 10, 1958, plaintiff requested
the defendant to refund to him the amounts abovestated, plus the
sum of P463.54, which is supported by a statement from the
Philippine National Bank; subsequently, requests were made by the
plaintiff citing various rulings of the Supreme Court in support
thereof but the Central Bank refused to accede to these requests.
prescription applicable to the case is ten (10) years from date of
payment. To support this contention, Article 1144, paragraph (2) is
cited, which provides:
"ART. 1144. The following actions must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) ...

The Central Bank concedes the illegality of the resolution under which it (2) Upon an obligation created by law.
made the levy. It expressly adverts to the cases of PNB v. Zulueta, G.R. No.
L-7271, August 30, 1957, 55 O.G. pp. 222-231 and PNB and Central Bank v.
since, it is claimed, the payment here was made by reason of a
Union Books, Inc. G.R. No. L-8490, August 30, 1957 and says that "there
mistake in the interpretation of Republic Act 601, the obligation to
was no longer any necessity for this Honorable Court (the lower court) to
return arises by virtue of Article 2155, in relation to Article 2154 of
declare Monetary Board Resolution No. 286 dated May 3, 1951, as illegal.
the New Civil Code and is, therefore, one created by law.
There is no dispute about this."
Movant-appellee is partly correct. However, Articles 2154 and 2155
Despite the above admission, however, the Bank still refused to grant the
relied upon, specifically refer to obligations of the nature of solutio
refund on the ground that the claim for the same had already prescribed. It
indebiti which are expressway classified as quasi-contracts under
vigorously argued the theory that "for purposes of recovering a tax paid
Section 2, Chapter I of Title XVII Of the New Civil Code.
illegally or erroneously ..., the action should be filed within five (5) years,
Consequently, the law regarding prescription applicable to the action
from the date of payment of the tax." It arrived at the said period on the
herein involved is not Article 1144 (2) cited by the movant, but
reasoning that since the tax code does not provide for the same, the
Article 1145 (2) of the New Civil Code providing:
deficiency should be governed by Article 1149 of the Civil Code which says:
(1) "ART. 1145. The following actions mug be commenced within six
All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other
years:
laws must be brought within five years from the time the right by
action accrues.
(2) ...
After the dispute was tried in the lower court, the trial judge rejected the
appellant's theory and ruled that the prescriptive period was ten (10) years, (3) Upon a quasi-contract."
holding that the obligation to refund was one created by law and which,
therefore, under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, prescribed in ten years. In view of the ruling in the above-mentioned the Central Bank filed a
Hence, this appeal. memorandum conceding the refundability of all the claims except for the
amount of P436.54. The Bank claims that "there is no way to determine
During the pendency of the appeal, however, this Court handed down its whether the action for refund of this amount has already prescribed or not"
decision in the case of Belman Cia, Inc. v. Central Bank, G.R. No. L-15044, as the papers necessary for its proper processing were no longer available or
May 30, 1960, expressly ruling (in the Resolution to a Motion for have been lost. Further more, however, of the claims it concedes to have
reconsideration filed thereto by the same Central Bank herein) that the been filed within the prescriptive period and of which it accepts the
prescriptive period is six (6) years. obligation to refund, the Bank asserts "should be refunded" only "upon
presentation of satisfactory proof."
Plaintiff-appellee has filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that
this action was still timely because, it is argued, the period of
We do not understand just what exactly the appellant Bank means by the
"presentation of satisfactory proof." It admits it received from the appellee
the of P9,713.94.
On various dates and under Central Bank Official receipts hereunder
indicated, plaintiff-appellee paid as 17% special excise tax through
the Philippine National Bank, in settlement of various collection bills,
due to foreign suppliers from plaintiff-appellee the total sum of
P9,713.94, itemized as follows: (Statement of Facts, Appellant's
Brief, p. 5.) (Emphasis supplied)
It likewise admits that the Monetary Board Resolution on the authority of
which it exacted the said amount is illegal.
We respectfully contend that there was no longer any necessity for
this Honorable Court (the lower court) to declare Monetary Board
Res. 286 dated May 3, 1951, as illegal. There is no dispute about
this. No allegation can be found in defendant's pleadings (Answer to
Request for Admission, and Answer to Interrogatories) to the effect
that defendant still upholds the validity of said resolution. ... (pp.
239-240, Record on Appeal)
Lastly, it admits its obligation to refund as well as the timeliness of the claim
of the same.
As shown by the letter of the Philippine National Bank to the Legal
Counsel of the Central Bank dated June 15, 1959, the remittances of
the foreign exchange involved in the collection bills with respect to
the seven items were made on various dates between August 23,
1949 and November 28, 1949. If the dollar proceeds for the account
of Francisco Olizon were all in 1949, before the effectivity of the
special excise tax law (March 28, 1951), therefore, the assessment
and collection of the exchange taxes in question were erroneous and
illegal. In accordance with Arts. 2154 and 2155 of the new Civil Code
of the Philippines, there would be an obligation on the part of
defendant Central Bank to refund the said amounts received by
reason of a mistake in the construction or application of a doubtful
question of law (p. 6, Memorandum in lieu of Oral Argument.)
It has been verified from the Foreign Department, Philippine National
Bank, that all foreign exchange (U.S. dollars) involved in said
collection bills were remitted to the United States on the various
dates between August 28, 1949 and November 28, 1949, before
March 28, 1951, when the Exchange Tax Law took effect. (pp. 6-7,
Statement of Facts, Appellant's Brief). (Emphasis in the above two
paragraphs supplied.)
In the face of all these admissions, We do not see what else needs be
proved. This case was submitted on the issue of prescription the appellant
contending that the period was five (5) years. It now admits its error and
accepts the correct period to be six years. Therefore, insofar as this suit is
concerned, the inquiry need not go beyond determining whether the claim,
for refund was filed within the six-year period or not. And, since the Bank
explicitly and unequivocably confirms that the claims were made within that
time, it ought not be too technical, but, on the contrary, it should earnestly
endeavor to remove or overcome the minor technicalities that might stand in
the way of a prompt refund.
It is next urged that inasmuch as the amounts here involved have already
been turned over to the national treasury the present action may no longer
be maintained since it would, in effect, be a suit against the State without its
consent.1äwphï1.ñët
We cannot agree to the proposition. This suit is brought against the Central
Bank of the Philippines, an entity authorized by its charter to sue and be
sued. The consent of the State to thus be sued, therefore, has been given.
As We said in the case of Central Azucarera San Pedro v. Central Bank, G.R.
No. L-7713, September 29, 1958, in suits for refund, "being a corporation
that may sue and be sued, the Central Bank is the proper party defendant
pursuant to section 5 of Republic Act No. 601, which provides that "the
refund of taxes pursuant to sections two and three of this Act shall be made
by the Central Bank of the Philippines."
In the memorandum submitted in lieu of oral argument, the appellant Bank
represented for the first time that the plaintiff-appellee has an outstanding
liability of P4,963.62 by way of unpaid 17% special excise tax on the
remittance of foreign exchange to import cotton goods and gladiolus bulbs."
It then urged that whatever term this Court should order to be refunded
should be set off against the said "outstanding liability" of the appellee.
The representation impresses Us as untenable. The matter of appellee's
outstanding unpaid accounts with the Bank is a fit subject for a counter-
claim and the Rules of Court provide for the manner by which they may be
impleaded or raised in this suit. These rules were devised not only to provide
a more adequate and elastic procedure for the prompt dispatch of litigation,
but more importantly, to fully protect the rights of the parties. Verily,
therefore, the public policy involved in the observance of those rules should
not be lightly estimated. Within the perspective of the foregoing discussion
therefore, it would seem that the appellant has not only withheld proper
deference for the rules; it has been unfair to the appellee as well. For in
raising a counterclaim at so late a stage in the proceeding as the period for
oral argument, it denies to the appellee full and complete protection of his
rights since by then the proceedings in the court have practically terminated
and the appellee would hardly have time to explain or defend himself from
the countersuit.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from and the
awards made thereunder are hereby affirmed. Costs against the appellant.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15751 January 28, 1961
BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR and MARIANO
LEDESMA, petitioners,
vs.
THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU),
PACIFICO ADVINCULA, ROBERTO MENDOZA, PONCIANO ARGANDA
and TEODULO TOLERAN, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.
Eulogio R. Lerum for respondents.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to
annul Certain orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to
restrain it from further proceeding in the action for unfair labor practice
pending before it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Giving due course to
the petition, this Court ordered the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for without bond.
The action in question was — upon complaint of the respondents Bureau of
Printing Employees Association (NLU) Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza,
Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran — filed by an acting prosecutor of
the Industrial Court against herein petitioner Bureau of Printing, Serafin
Salvador, the Acting Secretary of the Department of General Services, and
Mariano Ledesma the Director of the Bureau of Printing. The complaint
alleged that Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma have been engaging in
unfair labor practices by interfering with, or coercing the employees of the
Bureau of Printing particularly the members of the complaining association
petition, in the exercise of their right to self-organization an discriminating in
regard to hire and tenure of their employment in order to discourage them
from pursuing the union activities.
Answering the complaint, the petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador
and Mariano Ledesma denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed
to the and, by way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things, that
respondents Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza Ponciano Arganda and
Teodulo Toleran were suspended pending result of an administrative
investigation against them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations
petitions; that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue and
be sued; that said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern engaged for
the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic performing government
functions. For relief, they prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. Thereafter, before the case could be heard, petitioners filed an
"Omnibus Motion" asking for a preliminary hearing on the question of
jurisdiction raised by them in their answer and for suspension of the trial of
the case on the merits pending the determination of such jurisdictional
question. The motion was granted, but after hearing, the trial judge of the
Industrial Court in an order dated January 27, 1959 sustained the jurisdiction
of the court on the theory that the functions of the Bureau of Printing are
"exclusively proprietary in nature," and, consequently, denied the prayer for
dismissal. Reconsideration of this order having been also denied by the court
in banc, the petitioners brought the case to this Court through the present
petition for certiorari and prohibition.
We find the petition to be meritorious.
The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the
Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the
Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive
Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with the execution of all
printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes, required
by the National Government and such other work of the same character as
said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive
Secretary, be authorized to undertake . . .." (See. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code). It
has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the
General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the
Government, it is primarily a service bureau and obviously, not engaged in
business or occupation for pecuniary profit.
It is true, as stated in the order complained of, that the Bureau of Printing
receives outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for overtime
work on regular working days and on holidays, but these facts do not justify
the conclusion that its functions are "exclusively proprietary in nature."
Overtime work in the Bureau of Printing is done only when the interest of the
service so requires (sec. 566, Rev. Adm. Code). As a matter of administrative
policy, the overtime compensation may be paid, but such payment is
discretionary with the head of the Bureau depending upon its current
appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for holding that the functions of
said Bureau are wholly proprietary in character. Anent the additional work it
executes for private persons, we find that such work is done upon request,
as distinguished from those solicited, and only "as the requirements of
Government work will permit" (sec. 1654, Rev. Adm. Code), and "upon terms
fixed by the Director of Printing, with the approval of the Department Head"
(sec. 1655, id.). As shown by the uncontradicted evidence of the petitioners,
most of these works consist of orders for greeting cards during Christmas
from government officials, and for printing of checks of private banking
institutions. On those greeting cards, the Government seal, of which only the
Bureau of Printing is authorized to use, is embossed, and on the bank
cheeks, only the Bureau of Printing can print the reproduction of the official
documentary stamps appearing thereon. The volume of private jobs done, in
comparison with government jobs, is only one-half of 1 per cent, and in
computing the costs for work done for private parties, the Bureau does not
include profit because it is not allowed to make any. Clearly, while the
Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it cannot be
pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business concern. The additional
work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its function, and
although such work may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no
showing that the employees performing said proprietary function are
separate and distinct from those employed in its general governmental
functions.
From what has been stated, it is obvious that the Court of Industrial
Relations did not acquire jurisdiction over the respondent Bureau of Printing,
and is thus devoid of any authority to take cognizance of the case. This
Court has already held in a long line of decisions that the Industrial Court
has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the complaint for unfair labor
practice filed against institutions or corporations not organized for profit and,
consequently, not an industrial or business organization. This is so because
the Industrial Peace Act was intended to apply only to industrial
employment, and to govern the relations between employers engaged in
industry and occupations for purposes of gain, and their industrial
employees. (University of the Philippines, et al. vs. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-
15416, April 28, 1960; University of Sto. Tomas vs. Villanueva, et al., G.R.
No. L-13748, October 30, 1959; La Consolacion College vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-
13282, April 22, 1960; See also the cases cited therein.) .
Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical
personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of
Court). Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any
effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government
itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its
consent, much less over its objection. (See Metran vs. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz.
2835; Angat River Irrigation System, et al. vs. Angat River Workers' Union,
et. al., G.R. Nos. L-10943-44, December 28, 1957).
The record also discloses that the instant case arose from the filing of
administrative charges against some officers of the respondent Bureau of
Printing Employees' Association by the Acting Secretary of General Services.
Said administrative charges are for insubordination, grave misconduct and
acts prejudicial to public service committed by inciting the employees, of the
Bureau of Printing to walk out of their jobs against the order of the duly
constituted officials. Under the law, the Heads of Departments and Bureaus
are authorized to institute and investigate administrative charges against
erring subordinates. For the Industrial Court now to take cognizance of the
case filed before it, which is in effect a review of the acts of executive
officials having to do with the discipline of government employees under
them, would be to interfere with the discharge of such functions by said
officials. WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The
orders complained of are set aside and the complaint for unfair labor practice
against the petitioners is dismissed, with costs against respondents other
than the respondent court.
G.R. No. L-23139 December 17, 1966
MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE and BUREAU of
CUSTOMS, defendants-appellees.
Alejandro Basin, Jr. and Associates for plaintiff-appellant.
Felipe T. Cuison for defendants-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville"
sometime in November of 1962, consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration,
Inc., Manila. The shipment arrived at the Port of Manila on April 10, 1963,
and was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit
of the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein. The
Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee three
cases only of the shipment.
On April 4, 1964 Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of
First Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau
of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case in the amount of
P18,493.37 plus other damages.
On April 20, 1964 the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that not being persons under the law, defendants cannot be
sued.
After plaintiff opposed the motion, the court, on April 25, 1964, dismissed
the complaint on the ground that neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor
the Bureau of Customs is suable. Plaintiff appealed to Us from the order of
dismissal.
Raised, therefore, in this appeal is the purely legal question of the
defendants' suability under the facts stated.
Appellant contends that not all government entities are immune from suit;
that defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of the arrastre service at the
Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be sued
by private individuals.
The Rules of Court, in Section 1, Rule 3, provide:
SECTION 1. Who may be parties.—Only natural or juridical persons
or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
Accordingly, a defendant in a civil suit must be (1) a natural person; (2) a
juridical person or (3) an entity authorized by law to be sued. Neither the
Bureau of Customs nor (a fortiori) its function unit, the Customs Arrastre
Service, is a person. They are merely parts of the machinery of Government.
The Bureau of Customs is a bureau under the Department of Finance (Sec.
81, Revised Administrative Code); and as stated, the Customs Arrastre
Service is a unit of the Bureau of Custom, set up under Customs
Administrative Order No. 8-62 of November 9, 1962 (Annex "A" to Motion to
Dismiss, pp. 13-15, Record an Appeal). It follows that the defendants herein
cannot he sued under the first two abovementioned categories of natural or
juridical persons.
Nonetheless it is urged that by authorizing the Bureau of Customs to engage
in arrastre service, the law thereby impliedly authorizes it to be sued as
arrastre operator, for the reason that the nature of this function (arrastre
service) is proprietary, not governmental. Thus, insofar as arrastre operation
is concerned, appellant would put defendants under the third category of
"entities authorized by law" to be sued. Stated differently, it is argued that
while there is no law expressly authorizing the Bureau of Customs to sue or
be sued, still its capacity to be sued is implied from its very power to render
arrastre service at the Port of Manila, which it is alleged, amounts to the
transaction of a private business.
The statutory provision on arrastre service is found in Section 1213 of
Republic Act 1937 (Tariff and Customs Code, effective June 1, 1957), and it
states:
SEC. 1213. Receiving, Handling, Custody and Delivery of Articles.—
The Bureau of Customs shall have exclusive supervision and control
over the receiving, handling, custody and delivery of articles on the
wharves and piers at all ports of entry and in the exercise of its
functions it is hereby authorized to acquire, take over, operate and
superintend such plants and facilities as may be necessary for the
receiving, handling, custody and delivery of articles, and the
convenience and comfort of passengers and the handling of
baggage; as well as to acquire fire protection equipment for use in
the piers: Provided, That whenever in his judgment the receiving,
handling, custody and delivery of articles can be carried on by
private parties with greater efficiency, the Commissioner may, after
public bidding and subject to the approval of the department head,
contract with any private party for the service of receiving, handling,
custody and delivery of articles, and in such event, the contract may
include the sale or lease of government-owned equipment and
facilities used in such service.
In Associated Workers Union, et al. vs. Bureau of Customs, et al., L-21397,
resolution of August 6, 1963, this Court indeed held "that the foregoing
statutory provisions authorizing the grant by contract to any private party of
the right to render said arrastre services necessarily imply that the same is
deemed by Congress to be proprietary or non-governmental function." The
issue in said case, however, was whether laborers engaged in arrastre
service fall under the concept of employees in the Government employed in
governmental functions for purposes of the prohibition in Section 11,
Republic Act 875 to the effect that "employees in the Government . . . shall
not strike," but "may belong to any labor organization which does not
impose the obligation to strike or to join in strike," which prohibition "shall
apply only to employees employed in governmental functions of the
Government . . . .
Thus, the ruling therein was that the Court of Industrial Relations had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, but not that the Bureau of
Customs can be sued. Said issue of suability was not resolved, the resolution
stating only that "the issue on the personality or lack of personality of the
Bureau of Customs to be sued does not affect the jurisdiction of the lower
court over the subject matter of the case, aside from the fact that
amendment may be made in the pleadings by the inclusion as respondents
of the public officers deemed responsible, for the unfair labor practice acts
charged by petitioning Unions".
Now, the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function
proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said
non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental
function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit
extended to such government entity. This is the doctrine recognized
in Bureau of Printing, et al. vs. Bureau of Printing Employees Association, et
al., L-15751, January 28, 1961:
The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the
Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality
of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the
Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with the
execution of all printing and binding, including work incidental to
those processes, required by the National Government and such
other work of the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by
order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be
authorized to undertake . . . ." (Sec. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code.) It has
no corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the
General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of
the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and, obviously, not
engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary profit.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake
private printing jobs, it cannot be pretended that it is thereby an
industrial or business concern. The additional work it executes for
private parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such
work may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing
that the employees performing said proprietary function are separate
and distinct from those emoloyed in its general governmental
functions.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or
juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued (Sec. 1,
Rule 3, Rules of Court.) Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it
were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or
proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that
the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over
its objection. (See Metran vs. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz. 2835; Angat
River Irrigation System, et al. vs. Angat River Workers Union, et al.,
G.R. Nos. L-10943-44, December 28, 1957.)
The situation here is not materially different. The Bureau of Customs, to
repeat, is part of the Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Rev. Adm. Code), with
no personality of its own apart from that of the national government. Its
primary function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful
revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees,
charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this function, arrastre
service is a necessary incident. For practical reasons said revenues and
customs duties can not be assessed and collected by simply receiving the
importer's or ship agent's or consignee's declaration of merchandise being
imported and imposing the duty provided in the Tariff law. Customs
authorities and officers must see to it that the declaration tallies with the
merchandise actually landed. And this checking up requires that the landed
merchandise be hauled from the ship's side to a suitable place in the
customs premises to enable said customs officers to make it, that is, it
requires arrastre operations.1
Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed
proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the primary and governmental
function of the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in the same does not
necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not
perform its governmental function without necessarily exposing itself to suit.
Sovereign immunity, granted as to the end, should not be denied as to the
necessary means to that end.
And herein lies the distinction between the present case and that of National
Airports Corporation vs. Teodoro, 91 Phil. 203, on which appellant would
rely. For there, the Civil Aeronautics Administration was found have for its
prime reason for existence not a governmental but a proprietary function, so
that to it the latter was not a mere incidental function:
Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics Administration
are, under Section 3, to execute contracts of any kind, to purchase
property, and to grant concessions rights, and under Section 4, to
charge landing fees, royalties on sales to aircraft of aviation gasoline,
accessories and supplies, and rentals for the use of any property
under its management.
These provisions confer upon the Civil Aeronautics Administration, in
our opinion, the power to sue and be sued. The power to sue and be
sued is implied from the power to transact private business. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a
private entity. Although not a body corporate it was created, like the
National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function
of government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if
revenues be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of
travel and the convenience of the travelling public. . . .
Regardless of the merits of the claim against it, the State, for obvious
reasons of public policy, cannot be sued without its consent. Plaintiff should
have filed its present claim to the General Auditing Office, it being for money
under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions
under which money claims against the Government may be filed.
It must be remembered that statutory provisions waiving State immunity
from suit are strictly construed and that waiver of immunity, being in
derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred. (49 Am. Jur., States,
Territories and Dependencies, Sec. 96, p. 314; Petty vs. Tennessee-Missouri
Bridge Com., 359 U.S. 275, 3 L. Ed. 804, 79 S. Ct. 785). From the provision
authorizing the Bureau of Customs to lease arrastre operations to private
parties, We see no authority to sue the said Bureau in the instances where it
undertakes to conduct said operation itself. The Bureau of Customs, acting
as part of the machinery of the national government in the operation of the
arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a necessary
incident of its prime governmental function, is immune from suit, there being
no statute to the contrary.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
costs against appellant. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-30044 December 19, 1973
LORENZO SAYSON, as Highway Auditor, Bureau of Public Highways,
Cebu First Engineering District; CORNELIO FORNIER, as Regional
Supervising Auditor, Eastern Visayas Region; ASTERIO, BUQUERON,
ADVENTOR FERNANDEZ, MANUEL S. LEPATAN, RAMON QUIRANTE,
and TEODULFO REGIS, petitioners,
vs.
FELIPE SINGSON, as sole owner and proprietor of Singkier Motor
Service, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Bernardo P.
Pardo for petitioners.
Teodoro Almase and Casiano U. Laput for respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
The real party in interest before this Court in this certiorari proceeding to
review a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu is the Republic of the
Philippines, although the petitioners are the public officials who were named
as respondents1 in a mandamus suit below. Such is the contention of the
then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice, Felix V. Makasiar,2 for as he did
point out, what is involved is a money claim against the government,
predicated on a contract. The basic doctrine of non-suability of the
government without its consent is thus decisive of the controversy. There is
a governing statute that is controlling.3 Respondent Felipe Singson, the
claimant, for reasons known to him, did not choose to abide by its terms.
That was a fatal misstep. The lower court, however, did not see it that way.
We cannot affirm its decision.
As found by the lower court, the facts are the following: "In January, 1967,
the Office of the District Engineer requisitioned various items of spare parts
for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer, ... . The requisition (RIV No. 67/0331) was
signed by the District Engineer, Adventor Fernandez, and the Requisitioning
Officer (civil engineer), Manuel S. Lepatan. ... It was approved by the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Antonio V. Raquiza. It is
noted in the approval of the said requisition that "This is an exception to the
telegram dated Feb. 21, 1967 of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications." ... So, a canvass or public bidding was conducted on May
5, 1967 ... . The committee on award accepted the bid of the Singkier Motor
Service [owned by respondent Felipe Singson] for the sum of P43,530.00. ...
Subsequently, it was approved by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications; and on May 16, 1967 the Secretary sent a letter-order to
the Singkier Motor Service, Mandaue, Cebu requesting it to immediately
deliver the items listed therein for the lot price of P43,530.00. ... It would
appear that a purchase order signed by the District Engineer, the
Requisitioning Officer and the Procurement Officer, was addressed to the
Singkier Motor Service. ... In due course the Voucher No. 07806 reached the
hands of Highway Auditor Sayson for pre-audit. He then made inquiries
about the reasonableness of the price. ... Thus, after finding from the
indorsements of the Division Engineer and the Commissioner of Public
Highways that the prices of the various spare parts are just and reasonable
and that the requisition was also approved by no less than the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications with the verification of V.M. Secarro a
representative of the Bureau of Supply Coordination, Manila, he approved it
for payment in the sum of P34,824.00, with the retention of 20% equivalent
to P8,706.00. ... His reason for withholding the 20% equivalent to P8,706.00
was to submit the voucher with the supporting papers to the Supervising
Auditor, which he did. ... The voucher ... was paid on June 9, 1967 in the
amount of P34,824.00 to the petitioner [respondent Singson]. On June
10,1967, Highway Auditor Sayson received a telegram from Supervising
Auditor Fornier quoting a telegraphic message of the General Auditing Office
which states: "In view of excessive prices charge for purchase of spare parts
and equipment shown by vouchers already submitted this Office direct all
highway auditors refer General Office payment similar nature for appropriate
action." ... In the interim it would appear that when the voucher and the
supporting papers reached the GAO, a canvass was made of the spare parts
among the suppliers in Manila, particularly, the USI (Phil.), which is the
exclusive dealer of the spare parts of the caterpillar tractors in the
Philippines. Said firm thus submitted its quotations at P2,529.64 only which
is P40,000.00 less than the price of the Singkier. ... In view of the
overpricing the GAO took up the matter with the Secretary of Public Works in
a third indorsement of July 18, 1967. ... The Secretary then circularized a
telegram holding the district engineer responsible for overpricing."4 What is
more, charges for malversation were filed against the district engineer and
the civil engineer involved. It was the failure of the Highways Auditor, one of
the petitioners before us, that led to the filing of the mandamus suit below,
with now respondent Singson as sole proprietor of Singkier Motor Service,
being adjudged as entitled to collect the balance of P8,706.00, the contract
in question having been upheld. Hence this appeal by certiorari.
1. To state the facts is to make clear the solidity of the stand taken by the
Republic. The lower court was unmindful of the fundamental doctrine of non-
suability. So it was stressed in the petition of the then Solicitor General
Makasiar. Thus: "It is apparent that respondent Singson's cause of action is a
money claim against the government, for the payment of the alleged balance
of the cost of spare parts supplied by him to the Bureau of Public Highways.
Assuming momentarily the validity of such claim, although as will be shown
hereunder, the claim is void for the cause or consideration is contrary to law,
morals or public policy, mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the
collection of such claim against the State but a ordinary action for specific
performance ... . Actually, the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel
the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the
State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the
consent of the State ... . In other words, the respondent should have filed
his claim with the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of Com. Act
327 ... which prescribe the conditions under which money claim against the
government may be
filed ...."5 Commonwealth Act No. 327 is quite explicit. It is therein provided:
"In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those
of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same
within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their presentation.
If said accounts or claims need reference to other persons, office or offices,
or to a party interested, the period aforesaid shall be counted from the time
the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by
him."6 Thereafter, the procedure for appeal is indicated: "The party
aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an
account or claim may, within thirty days from receipt of the decision, take an
appeal in writing: (a) To the President of the United States, pending the final
and complete withdrawal of her sovereignty over the Philippines, or (b) To
the President of the Philippines, or (c) To the Supreme Court of the
Philippines if the appellant is a private person or entity."7
2. With the facts undisputed and the statute far from indefinite or
ambiguous, the appealed decision defies explanation. It would be to
disregard a basic corollary of the cardinal postulate of non-suability. It is true
that once consent is secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing to
prevent the State, however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain
administrative proceedings be had and be exhausted. Also, the proper forum
in the judicial hierarchy can be specified if thereafter an appeal would be
taken by the party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the Auditor
General. Even had there been such, the court to which the matter should
have been elevated is this Tribunal; the lower court could not legally act on
the matter. What transpired was anything but that. It is quite obvious then
that it does not have the imprint of validity.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu of
September 4, 1968 is reversed and set aside, and the suit for mandamus
filed against petitioners, respondents below, is dismissed. With costs against
respondent Felipe Singson.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972
VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.:p
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in
its Civil Case No. R-5977, dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No.
639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City as shown by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-18060, which superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
3272 (T-3435) issued to her by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1,
1924. No annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in
the property appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior
expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot,
with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the construction of the Mango and
Gorordo Avenues.
It appears that said avenues were already existing in 1921 although "they
were in bad condition and very narrow, unlike the wide and beautiful
avenues that they are now," and "that the tracing of said roads was begun in
1924, and the formal construction in
1925." *
On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the
Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been
appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor
General, who disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement dated December 9, 1958.
A copy of said indorsement was transmitted to Amigable's counsel by the
Office of the President on January 7, 1959.
On February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which
was later amended on April 17, 1959 upon motion of the defendants, against
the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and
possession of the 6,167 square meters of land traversed by the Mango and
Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the payment of compensatory damages in
the sum of P50,000.00 for the illegal occupation of her land, moral damages
in the sum of P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00 and the
costs of the suit.
Within the reglementary period the defendants filed a joint answer denying
the material allegations of the complaint and interposing the following
affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the action was premature, the claim not
having been filed first with the Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the
right of action for the recovery of any amount which might be due the
plaintiff, if any, had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit
against the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney's fees and
costs had no valid basis since as to these items the Government had not
given its consent to be sued; and (4) that inasmuch as it was the province of
Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of
Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.
During the scheduled hearings nobody appeared for the defendants
notwithstanding due notice, so the trial court proceeded to receive the
plaintiff's evidence ex parte. On July 29, 1959 said court rendered its
decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action
for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of her lot in
question on the ground that the government cannot be sued without its
consent; that it had neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and
decide plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00,
the same being a money claim against the government; and that the claim
for moral damages had long prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said
claim because the government had not given its consent to be sued.
Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed. Unable to secure a
reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
subsequently certified the case to Us, there being no question of fact
involved.
The issue here is whether or not the appellant may properly sue the
government under the facts of the case.
In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu,1 involving a
claim for payment of the value of a portion of land used for the widening of
the Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City, this Court, through Mr. Justice Enrique M.
Fernando, held that where the government takes away property from a
private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of
expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain
a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit without its consent. We there said: .
... . If the constitutional mandate that the owner be
compensated for property taken for public use were to be
respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should
not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government
followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the
time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon
payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or
after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the
amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon
the land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the
public use defined in the judgment." If there were an
observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be
in the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that
precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the
law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is
just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to
legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were
to be maintained. It is not too much to say that when the
government takes any property for public use, which is
conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be
judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to
the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the
doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately
invoked.
Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the
back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of
conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant
remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an
action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime
because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since
restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither
convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for
road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due
compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine
the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value
thereof at the time of the taking.2
As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form
of legal interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the
time that payment is made by the government.3 In addition, the government
should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the
trial court after hearing.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case
remanded to the court a quo for the determination of compensation,
including attorney's fees, to which the appellant is entitled as above
indicated. No pronouncement as to costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35645 May 22, 1985
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY,
WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER, petitioners,
vs.
HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First
Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna & Manalo & Feliciano Law for petitioners.
Albert, Vergara, Benares, Perias & Dominguez Law Office for respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain the
respondent judge from trying Civil Case No. 779M of the defunct Court of
First Instance of Rizal.
The factual background is as follows:
At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base
in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases
Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.
Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for
the following projects
1. Repair offender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay,
Philippines.
2. Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to
shoreline revetment, NAVBASE Subic; and repair to Leyte Wharf approach,
NAVBASE Subic Bay, Philippines.
Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids.
Subsequent thereto, the company received from the United States two
telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its
bonding company. The company complied with the requests. [In its
complaint, the company alleges that the United States had accepted its bids
because "A request to confirm a price proposal confirms the acceptance of a
bid pursuant to defendant United States' bidding practices." (Rollo, p. 30.)
The truth of this allegation has not been tested because the case has not
reached the trial stage.]
In June, 1972, the company received a letter which was signed by Wilham I.
Collins, Director, Contracts Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command,
Southwest Pacific, Department of the Navy of the United States, who is one
of the petitioners herein. The letter said that the company did not qualify to
receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory
performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings
of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The letter further said that the
projects had been awarded to third parties. In the abovementioned Civil
Case No. 779-M, the company sued the United States of America and
Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members
of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the
defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in
the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the
defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into
contracts with third parties for work on the projects.
The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of
questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the
complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the
complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of
defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given
her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in
the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)
Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which
included an opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
The company opposed the motion. The trial court denied the motion and
issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail.
Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
trial court.
The petition is highly impressed with merit.
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in
the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a
necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of
States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are
constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have
multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary
acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to
acts jure imperil The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule
in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in western
Europe. (See Coquia and Defensor Santiago, Public International Law, pp.
207-209 [1984].)
The respondent judge recognized the restrictive doctrine of State immunity
when he said in his Order denying the defendants' (now petitioners) motion:
" A distinction should be made between a strictly governmental function of
the sovereign state from its private, proprietary or non- governmental acts
(Rollo, p. 20.) However, the respondent judge also said: "It is the Court's
considered opinion that entering into a contract for the repair of wharves or
shoreline is certainly not a governmental function altho it may partake of a
public nature or character. As aptly pointed out by plaintiff's counsel in his
reply citing the ruling in the case of Lyons, Inc., [104 Phil. 594 (1958)], and
which this Court quotes with approval, viz.:
It is however contended that when a sovereign state enters
into a contract with a private person, the state can be sued
upon the theory that it has descended to the level of an
individual from which it can be implied that it has given its
consent to be sued under the contract. ...
xxx xxx xxx
We agree to the above contention, and considering that the
United States government, through its agency at Subic Bay,
entered into a contract with appellant for stevedoring and
miscellaneous labor services within the Subic Bay Area, a
U.S. Naval Reservation, it is evident that it can bring an
action before our courts for any contractual liability that that
political entity may assume under the contract. The trial
court, therefore, has jurisdiction to entertain this case ...
(Rollo, pp. 20-21.)
The reliance placed on Lyons by the respondent judge is misplaced for the
following reasons:
In Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. The United States of America, supra, plaintiff
brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to collect several sums of
money on account of a contract between plaintiff and defendant. The
defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction over defendant and over the subject matter of the action. The
court granted the motion on the grounds that: (a) it had no jurisdiction over
the defendant who did not give its consent to the suit; and (b) plaintiff failed
to exhaust the administrative remedies provided in the contract. The order of
dismissal was elevated to this Court for review.
In sustaining the action of the lower court, this Court said:
It appearing in the complaint that appellant has not
complied with the procedure laid down in Article XXI of the
contract regarding the prosecution of its claim against the
United States Government, or, stated differently, it has failed
to first exhaust its administrative remedies against said
Government, the lower court acted properly in dismissing
this case.(At p. 598.)
It can thus be seen that the statement in respect of the waiver of State
immunity from suit was purely gratuitous and, therefore, obiter so that it has
no value as an imperative authority.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be
said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed
to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval
base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order;
they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the
conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is shown
in Syquia vs. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949). In that case the plaintiffs leased
three apartment buildings to the United States of America for the use of its
military officials. The plaintiffs sued to recover possession of the premises on
the ground that the term of the leases had expired. They also asked for Teehankee, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, * Escolin,
increased rentals until the apartments shall have been vacated. Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

The defendants who were armed forces officers of the United States moved Fernando, C.J., took no part.
to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction in the part of the court. The
Municipal Court of Manila granted the motion to dismiss; sustained by the Republic of the Philippines
Court of First Instance, the plaintiffs went to this Court for review on SUPREME COURT
certiorari. In denying the petition, this Court said: Manila

On the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of the EN BANC

belief and we hold that the real party defendant in interest is
the Government of the United States of America; that any
judgment for back or Increased rentals or damages will have
to be paid not by defendants Moore and Tillman and their 64
co-defendants but by the said U.S. Government. On the
basis of the ruling in the case of Land vs. Dollar already
cited, and on what we have already stated, the present
action must be considered as one against the U.S.
Government. It is clear hat the courts of the Philippines
including the Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction
over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of
lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very
beginning of the action. The U.S. Government has not ,
given its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially
against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a
case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government
without the latter's consent but it is of a citizen filing an
action against a foreign government without said
government's consent, which renders more obvious the lack
of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of
law behind this rule are so elementary and of such general
acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities
in support thereof. (At p. 323.)
In Syquia,the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but
the contracts notwithstanding the States was not deemed to have given or
waived its consent to be sued for the reason that the contracts were for jure
imperii and not for jure gestionis.
G.R. No. 76607 February 26, 1990
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M. SMOUSE AND
YVONNE REEVES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO, Presiding Judge, Branch LVII,
Regional Trial Court, Angeles City, ROBERTO T. VALENCIA,
EMERENCIANA C. TANGLAO, AND PABLO C. DEL PILAR, respondents.
G.R. No. 79470 February 26, 1990
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANTHONY LAMACHIA, T/SGT. USAF,
WILFREDO BELSA, PETER ORASCION AND ROSE
CARTALLA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RODOLFO D. RODRIGO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 7,
Regional Trial Court (BAGUIO CITY), La Trinidad, Benguet and
FABIAN GENOVE, respondents.
G.R. No. 80018 February 26, 1990
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, TOMI J. KINGI, DARREL D. DYE and
STEVEN F. BOSTICK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSEFINA D. CEBALLOS, As Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 66, Capas, Tarlac, and LUIS BAUTISTA, respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the G.R. No. 80258 February 26, 1990
respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against
the private respondent. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL P. C.
CARNS, AIC ERNEST E. RIVENBURGH, AIC ROBIN BLEVINS, SGT.
NOEL A. GONZALES, SGT. THOMAS MITCHELL, SGT. WAYNE L.
BENJAMIN, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. CONCEPCION S. ALARCON VERGARA, as Presiding Judge,
Branch 62 REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Angeles City, and RICKY
SANCHEZ, FREDDIE SANCHEZ AKA FREDDIE RIVERA, EDWIN
MARIANO, AKA JESSIE DOLORES SANGALANG, ET AL., respondents.
Luna, Sison & Manas Law Office for petitioners.
CRUZ, J.:
These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the
doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not
impleaded in the complaints below but has moved to dismiss on the
ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not
consented. It is now contesting the denial of its motions by the
respondent judges.
In G.R. No. 76607, the private respondents are suing several
officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in
connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for
barber services in the said base.
On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office,
Okinawa Area Exchange, U.S. Air Force, solicited bids for such
contracts through its contracting officer, James F. Shaw. Among
those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto
T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar.
Valencia had been a concessionaire inside Clark for 34 years; del
Pilar for 12 years; and Tanglao for 50 years.
The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, over the objection of the
private respondents, who claimed that he had made a bid for four
facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area, which was not
included in the invitation to bid.
The private respondents complained to the Philippine Area
Exchange (PHAX). The latter, through its representatives,
petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse explained that
the Civil Engineering concession had not been awarded to Dizon as
a result of the February 24, 1986 solicitation. Dizon was already
operating this concession, then known as the NCO club concession,
and the expiration of the contract had been extended from June 30,
1986 to August 31, 1986. They further explained that the
solicitation of the CE barbershop would be available only by the end
of June and the private respondents would be notified.
On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the
court below to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel
the award to defendant Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the
barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a
writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions
pending litigation. 1
Upon the filing of the complaint, the respondent court issued an ex
parte order directing the individual petitioners to maintain
the status quo.
On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and
opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground
that the action was in effect a suit against the United States of
America, which had not waived its non-suability. The individual
defendants, as official employees of the U.S. Air Force, were also
immune from suit.
On the same date, July 22, 1986, the trial court denied the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
On October 10, 1988, the trial court denied the petitioners' motion
to dismiss, holding in part as follows:
From the pleadings thus far presented to this Court
by the parties, the Court's attention is called by the
relationship between the plaintiffs as well as the
defendants, including the US Government, in that
prior to the bidding or solicitation in question, there
was a binding contract between the plaintiffs as well
as the defendants, including the US Government. By
virtue of said contract of concession it is the Court's
understanding that neither the US Government nor
the herein principal defendants would become the
employer/s of the plaintiffs but that the latter are the
employers themselves of the barbers, etc. with the
 employer, the plaintiffs herein, remitting the
stipulated percentage of commissions to the
Philippine Area Exchange. The same circumstance
would become in effect when the Philippine Area
Exchange opened for bidding or solicitation the
questioned barber shop concessions. To this extent,
therefore, indeed a commercial transaction has been
entered, and for purposes of the said solicitation,
would necessarily be entered between the plaintiffs
as well as the defendants.
The Court, further, is of the view that Article XVIII of
the RP-US Bases Agreement does not cover such kind
of services falling under the concessionaireship, such
as a barber shop concession. 2
On December 11, 1986, following the filing of the herein petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, we issued a
3
temporary restraining order against further proceedings in the court below.
In G.R. No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter
Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at
the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. It had been ascertained after
investigation, from the testimony of Belsa Cartalla and Orascion, that Genove
had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served
to the club customers. Lamachia, as club manager, suspended him and
thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators conformably to the
collective bargaining agreement between the Center and its employees. The
board unanimously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. This
was effected on March 5, 1986, by Col. David C. Kimball, Commander of the
3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF Clark Air Force Base. Genove's reaction
was to file Ms complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City against the
individual petitioners. 4
On March 13, 1987, the defendants, joined by the United States of America,
moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Lamachia, as an officer of the
U.S. Air Force stationed at John Hay Air Station, was immune from suit for
the acts done by him in his official capacity. They argued that the suit was in
effect against the United States, which had not given its consent to be sued.
This motion was denied by the respondent judge on June 4, 1987, in an
order which read in part:
It is the understanding of the Court, based on the
allegations of the complaint — which have been
hypothetically admitted by defendants upon the filing of
their motion to dismiss — that although defendants acted
initially in their official capacities, their going beyond what
their functions called for brought them out of the protective
mantle of whatever immunities they may have had in the
beginning. Thus, the allegation that the acts complained of
were illegal, done. with extreme bad faith and with pre-
conceived sinister plan to harass and finally dismiss the
plaintiff, gains significance. 5
The petitioners then came to this Court seeking certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction.
In G.R. No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in
Camp O' Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a
buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners herein, namely,
Tomi J. King, Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, officers of the U.S. Air
Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators
(AFOSI). On the basis of the sworn statements made by them, an
information for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act, was filed against Bautista in the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac.
The above-named officers testified against him at his trial. As a result of the
filing of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then
filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners herein
claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed. 6
During the period for filing of the answer, Mariano Y. Navarro a special
counsel assigned to the International Law Division, Office of the Staff Judge
Advocate of Clark Air Base, entered a special appearance for the defendants
and moved for an extension within which to file an "answer and/or other
pleadings." His reason was that the Attorney General of the United States
had not yet designated counsel to represent the defendants, who were being
sued for their official acts. Within the extended period, the defendants,
without the assistance of counsel or authority from the U.S. Department of
Justice, filed their answer. They alleged therein as affirmative defenses that
they had only done their duty in the enforcement of the laws of the
Philippines inside the American bases pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement.
On May 7, 1987, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, having been
retained to represent the defendants, filed with leave of court a motion to
withdraw the answer and dismiss the complaint. The ground invoked was
that the defendants were acting in their official capacity when they did the
acts complained of and that the complaint against them was in effect a suit
against the United States without its consent.
The motion was denied by the respondent judge in his order dated
September 11, 1987, which held that the claimed immunity under the
Military Bases Agreement covered only criminal and not civil cases.
Moreover, the defendants had come under the jurisdiction of the court when
they submitted their answer.7
Following the filing of the herein petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, we issued on October 14, 1987, a temporary
restraining order. 8
In G.R. No. 80258, a complaint for damages was filed by the private
respondents against the herein petitioners (except the United States of
America), for injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the
acts of the defendants. 9 There is a conflict of factual allegations here.
According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed them
and unleashed dogs on them which bit them in several parts of their bodies
and caused extensive injuries to them. The defendants deny this and claim
the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because
they were struggling and resisting arrest, The defendants stress that the
dogs were called off and the plaintiffs were immediately taken to the medical
center for treatment of their wounds.
In a motion to dismiss the complaint, the United States of America and the
individually named defendants argued that the suit was in effect a suit
against the United States, which had not given its consent to be sued. The
defendants were also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for
acts done by them in the performance of their official functions.
The motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court in its order dated August
10, 1987, reading in part as follows:
The defendants certainly cannot correctly argue that they
are immune from suit. The allegations, of the complaint
which is sought to be dismissed, had to be hypothetically
admitted and whatever ground the defendants may have,
had to be ventilated during the trial of the case on the
merits. The complaint alleged criminal acts against the
individually-named defendants and from the nature of said
acts it could not be said that they are Acts of State, for
which immunity should be invoked. If the Filipinos
themselves are duty bound to respect, obey and submit
themselves to the laws of the country, with more reason, the
members of the United States Armed Forces who are being
treated as guests of this country should respect, obey and
submit themselves to its laws. 10
and so was the motion for reconsideration. The defendants submitted their
answer as required but subsequently filed their petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction with this Court. We issued a
temporary restraining order on October 27, 1987. 11
II
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in
Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally
accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the
law of our land under Article II, Section 2. This latter provision merely
reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and
also intended to manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of the
international community.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally
accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation.
Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are
deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and
consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission
to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these
principles in its relations with other states.
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the
justification given by Justice Holmes that "there can be no legal right against
the authority which makes the law on which the right depends." 12 There are
other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of
the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added
inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All
states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.
A contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly
vex the peace of nations." 13
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state
for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The
rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself
to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation
of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit
must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally
impleaded. 14 In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.
The doctrine is sometimes derisively called "the royal prerogative of
dishonesty" because of the privilege it grants the state to defeat any
legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. That is hardly
fair, at least in democratic societies, for the state is not an unfeeling tyrant
unmoved by the valid claims of its citizens. In fact, the doctrine is not
absolute and does not say the state may not be sued under any
circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that the state may not be sued
without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents.
The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or
impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special
law. Consent is implied when the state enters into a contract or it itself
commences litigation.
The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act
No. 3083, under which the Philippine government "consents and submits to
be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between
private parties." In Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 15 a
special law was passed to enable a person to sue the government for an
alleged tort. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to
have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its
sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. 16 Waiver is also
implied when the government files a complaint, thus opening itself to a
counterclaim. 17
The above rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected only
by the will of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted
statute. 18 We have held that not all contracts entered into by the
government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be
made between its sovereign and proprietary acts. 19 As for the filing of a
complaint by the government, suability will result only where the
government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant. 20
In the case of the United States of America, the customary rule of
international law on state immunity is expressed with more specificity in the
RP-US Bases Treaty. Article III thereof provides as follows:
It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the
rights, power and authority within the bases which are
necessary for the establishment, use, operation and defense
thereof or appropriate for the control thereof and all the
rights, power and authority within the limits of the territorial
waters and air space adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the
bases which are necessary to provide access to them or
appropriate for their control.
The petitioners also rely heavily on Baer v. Tizon, 21 along with several other
decisions, to support their position that they are not suable in the cases
below, the United States not having waived its sovereign immunity from suit.
It is emphasized that in Baer, the Court held:
The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a
foreign state without its consent is appropriate. More
specifically, insofar as alien armed forces is concerned, the
starting point is Raquiza v. Bradford, a 1945 decision. In
dismissing a habeas corpus petition for the release of
petitioners confined by American army authorities, Justice
Hilado speaking for the Court, cited Coleman v. Tennessee,
where it was explicitly declared: 'It is well settled that a
foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country
or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or
sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction
of the place.' Two years later, in Tubb and Tedrow v. Griess,
this Court relied on the ruling in Raquiza v. Bradford and
cited in support thereof excerpts from the works of the
following authoritative writers: Vattel, Wheaton, Hall,
Lawrence, Oppenheim, Westlake, Hyde, and McNair and
Lauterpacht. Accuracy demands the clarification that after
the conclusion of the Philippine-American Military Bases
Agreement, the treaty provisions should control on such
matter, the assumption being that there was a manifestation
of the submission to jurisdiction on the part of the foreign
power whenever appropriate. More to the point is Syquia v.
Almeda Lopez, where plaintiffs as lessors sued the
Commanding General of the United States Army in the
Philippines, seeking the restoration to them of the apartment
buildings they owned leased to the United States armed
forces stationed in the Manila area. A motion to dismiss on
the ground of non-suability was filed and upheld by
respondent Judge. The matter was taken to this Court in a
mandamus proceeding. It failed. It was the ruling that
respondent Judge acted correctly considering that the 4
action must be considered as one against the U.S.
Government. The opinion of Justice Montemayor continued:
'It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the
Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the
present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of
jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning
of the action. The U.S. Government has not given its
consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against
her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of
a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without
the latter's consent but it is of a citizen firing an action
against a foreign government without said government's
consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction
of the courts of his country. The principles of law behind this
rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance that
we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof
then came Marvel Building Corporation v. Philippine War
Damage Commission, where respondent, a United States
Agency established to compensate damages suffered by the
Philippines during World War II was held as falling within the
above doctrine as the suit against it would eventually be a
charge against or financial liability of the United States
Government because ... , the Commission has no funds of its
own for the purpose of paying money judgments.' The
Syquia ruling was again explicitly relied upon in Marquez Lim
v. Nelson, involving a complaint for the recovery of a motor
launch, plus damages, the special defense interposed being
'that the vessel belonged to the United States Government,
that the defendants merely acted as agents of said
Government, and that the United States Government is
therefore the real party in interest.' So it was
in Philippine Alien Property Administration v. Castelo, where
it was held that a suit against Alien Property Custodian and
the Attorney General of the United States involving vested
property under the Trading with the Enemy Act is in
substance a suit against the United States. To the same
effect is Parreno v. McGranery, as the following excerpt from
the opinion of justice Tuazon clearly shows: 'It is a widely
accepted principle of international law, which is made a part
of the law of the land (Article II, Section 3 of the
Constitution), that a foreign state may not be brought to suit
before the courts of another state or its own courts without
its consent.' Finally, there is Johnson v. Turner, an appeal by
the defendant, then Commanding General, Philippine
Command (Air Force, with office at Clark Field) from a
decision ordering the return to plaintiff of the confiscated
military payment certificates known as scrip money. In
reversing the lower court decision, this Tribunal, through
Justice Montemayor, relied on Syquia v. Almeda Lopez,
explaining why it could not be sustained.
It bears stressing at this point that the above observations do not confer on
the United States of America a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its
agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they
are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted
as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions.
There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state,
will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered
into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the
contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver
may be implied. This was our ruling in UnitedStates of America v.
Ruiz, 22 where the transaction in question dealt with the improvement of the
wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay. As this was a clearly
governmental function, we held that the contract did not operate to divest
the United States of its sovereign immunity from suit. In the words of Justice
Vicente Abad Santos:
The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being
sued in the courts of another State without its consent or
waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States. However,
the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are
constantly developing and evolving. And because the
activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them — between sovereign and governmental
acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary
acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now
extends only to acts jure imperii The restrictive application of
State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the
United kingdom and other states in Western Europe.
xxx xxx xxx
 The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only
when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions
of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to
have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be
deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only
when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the
naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the
United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of
the government of the highest order; they are not utilized
for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they have acted in the
discharge of their official functions as officers or agents of the United States.
However, this is a matter of evidence. The charges against them may not be
summarily dismissed on their mere assertion that their acts are imputable to
the United States of America, which has not given its consent to be sued. In
fact, the defendants are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in
which the United States itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they
alone must satisfy the judgment.
In Festejo v. Fernando, 23 a bureau director, acting without any authority
whatsoever, appropriated private land and converted it into public irrigation
ditches. Sued for the value of the lots invalidly taken by him, he moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the suit was in effect against the
Philippine government, which had not given its consent to be sued. This
Court sustained the denial of the motion and held that the doctrine of state
immunity was not applicable. The director was being sued in his private
capacity for a personal tort.
With these considerations in mind, we now proceed to resolve the cases at
hand.
III
It is clear from a study of the records of G.R. No. 80018 that the individually-
named petitioners therein were acting in the exercise of their official
functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the
complainant and thereafter testified against him at his trial. The said
petitioners were in fact connected with the Air Force Office of Special
Investigators and were charged precisely with the function of preventing the
distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs and prosecuting those
guilty of such acts. It cannot for a moment be imagined that they were
acting in their private or unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later
testified against the complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties
as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts
imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. As
we observed in Sanders v. Veridiano: 24
Given the official character of the above-described letters,
we have to conclude that the petitioners were, legally
speaking, being sued as officers of the United States
government. As they have acted on behalf of that
government, and within the scope of their authority, it is
that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is
responsible for their acts.
The private respondent invokes Article 2180 of the Civil Code which holds
the government liable if it acts through a special agent. The argument, it
would seem, is premised on the ground that since the officers are designated
"special agents," the United States government should be liable for their
torts.
There seems to be a failure to distinguish between suability and liability and
a misconception that the two terms are synonymous. Suability depends on
the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the
established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not
necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held
liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the
mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does
waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to
prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
The said article establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The government
may be held liable under this rule only if it first allows itself to be sued
through any of the accepted forms of consent.
Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent
even if he is so denominated, as in the case at bar. No less important, the
said provision appears to regulate only the relations of the local state with its
inhabitants and, hence, applies only to the Philippine government and not to
foreign governments impleaded in our courts.
We reject the conclusion of the trial court that the answer filed by the special
counsel of the Office of the Sheriff Judge Advocate of Clark Air Base was a
submission by the United States government to its jurisdiction. As we noted
in Republic v. Purisima, 25 express waiver of immunity cannot be made by a
mere counsel of the government but must be effected through a duly-
enacted statute. Neither does such answer come under the implied forms of
consent as earlier discussed.
But even as we are certain that the individual petitioners in G.R. No. 80018
were acting in the discharge of their official functions, we hesitate to make
the same conclusion in G.R. No. 80258. The contradictory factual allegations
in this case deserve in our view a closer study of what actually happened to
the plaintiffs. The record is too meager to indicate if the defendants were
really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority
when the incident in question occurred. Lacking this information, this Court
cannot directly decide this case. The needed inquiry must first be made by
the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the
parties on the basis of the evidence that has yet to be presented at the trial.
Only after it shall have determined in what capacity the petitioners were
acting at the time of the incident in question will this Court determine, if still
necessary, if the doctrine of state immunity is applicable.
In G.R. No. 79470, private respondent Genove was employed as a cook in
the Main Club located at the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center, also known as
the Open Mess Complex, at John Hay Air Station. As manager of this
complex, petitioner Lamachia is responsible for eleven diversified activities
generating an annual income of $2 million. Under his executive management
are three service restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a Class VI store, a coffee
and pantry shop, a main cashier cage, an administrative office, and a
decentralized warehouse which maintains a stock level of $200,000.00 per
month in resale items. He supervises 167 employees, one of whom was
Genove, with whom the United States government has concluded a collective
bargaining agreement.
From these circumstances, the Court can assume that the restaurant services
offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business
enterprise undertaken by the United States government in its proprietary
capacity. Such services are not extended to the American servicemen for free
as a perquisite of membership in the Armed Forces of the United States.
Neither does it appear that they are exclusively offered to these servicemen;
on the contrary, it is well known that they are available to the general public
as well, including the tourists in Baguio City, many of whom make it a point
to visit John Hay for this reason. All persons availing themselves of this
facility pay for the privilege like all other customers as in ordinary
restaurants. Although the prices are concededly reasonable and relatively
low, such services are undoubtedly operated for profit, as a commercial and
not a governmental activity.
The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke the
doctrine of state immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit against
them by Genove. Such defense will not prosper even if it be established that
they were acting as agents of the United States when they investigated and
later dismissed Genove. For that matter, not even the United States
government itself can claim such immunity. The reason is that by entering
into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary
functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
But these considerations notwithstanding, we hold that the complaint against
the petitioners in the court below must still be dismissed. While suable, the
petitioners are nevertheless not liable. It is obvious that the claim for
damages cannot be allowed on the strength of the evidence before us, which
we have carefully examined.
The dismissal of the private respondent was decided upon only after a
thorough investigation where it was established beyond doubt that he had
polluted the soup stock with urine. The investigation, in fact, did not stop
there. Despite the definitive finding of Genove's guilt, the case was still
referred to the board of arbitrators provided for in the collective bargaining
agreement. This board unanimously affirmed the findings of the investigators
and recommended Genove's dismissal. There was nothing arbitrary about
the proceedings. The petitioners acted quite properly in terminating the
private respondent's employment for his unbelievably nauseating act. It is
surprising that he should still have the temerity to file his complaint for
damages after committing his utterly disgusting offense.
Concerning G.R. No. 76607, we also find that the barbershops subject of the
concessions granted by the United States government are commercial
enterprises operated by private person's. They are not agencies of the
United States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of
right by the American servicemen. These establishments provide for the
grooming needs of their customers and offer not only the basic haircut and
shave (as required in most military organizations) but such other amenities
as shampoo, massage, manicure and other similar indulgences. And all for a
fee. Interestingly, one of the concessionaires, private respondent Valencia,
was even sent abroad to improve his tonsorial business, presumably for the
benefit of his customers. No less significantly, if not more so, all the
barbershop concessionaires are under the terms of their contracts, required
to remit to the United States government fixed commissions in consideration 4. In G.R. No. 80258, the petition is DISMISSED and the
of the exclusive concessions granted to them in their respective areas. respondent court is directed to proceed with the hearing and
decision of Civil Case No. 4996. The temporary restraining
This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the order dated October 27, 1987, is LIFTED.
complaint filed by the private respondents in the court below. The contracts
in question being decidedly commercial, the conclusion reached in the United All without any pronouncement as to costs.
States of America v. Ruiz case cannot be applied here.
SO ORDERED.
The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants as
we have done in G.R. No. 79470, except for the paucity of the record in the Republic of the Philippines
case at hand. The evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the
barbershop concessions is not before us. This means that, as in G.R. No.
80258, the respondent court will have to receive that evidence first, so it can Supreme Court
later determine on the basis thereof if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief Manila
they seek. Accordingly, this case must also be remanded to the court below
for further proceedings.
SECOND DIVISION
IV

There are a number of other cases now pending before us which also involve
the question of the immunity of the United States from the jurisdiction of the REPUBLIC OF
Philippines. This is cause for regret, indeed, as they mar the traditional THE
friendship between two countries long allied in the cause of democracy. It is PHILIPPINES
hoped that the so-called "irritants" in their relations will be resolved in a represented by
spirit of mutual accommodation and respect, without the inconvenience and the
asperity of litigation and always with justice to both parties. PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON
GOOD
WHEREFORE, after considering all the above premises, the Court hereby
GOVERNMENT
renders judgment as follows:
(PCGG),
Petitioner,
1. In G.R. No. 76607, the petition is DISMISSED and the
respondent judge is directed to proceed with the hearing - versus -
and decision of Civil Case No. 4772. The temporary
restraining order dated December 11, 1986, is LIFTED.

2. In G.R. No. 79470, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case SANDIGANBAYAN
No. 829-R(298) is DISMISSED. (SECOND G.R. No. 129406
DIVISION) and
3. In G.R. No. 80018, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case ROBERTO S. Present:
No. 115-C-87 is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining BENEDICTO,
order dated October 14, 1987, is made permanent. Respondents. PUNO, J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
 AZCUNA, and S. Benedicto and others pursuant to Executive Order (EO) No. 14,[3] series of
GARCIA, JJ. 1986.

Pursuant to its mandate under EO No. 1,[4] series of 1986, the PCGG issued
writs placing under sequestration all business enterprises, entities and other
Promulgated: properties, real and personal, owned or registered in the name of private
respondent Benedicto, or of corporations in which he appeared to have
controlling or majority interest. Among the properties thus sequestered and
March 6, 2006 taken over by PCGG fiscal agents were the 227 shares in NOGCCI owned by
private respondent Benedicto and registered in his name or under the names
of corporations he owned or controlled.

Following the sequestration process, PCGG representatives sat as members

of the Board of Directors of NOGCCI, which passed, sometime in October
1986, a resolution effecting a corporate policy change. The change consisted
of assessing a monthly membership due of P150.00 for each NOGCCI
share. Prior to this resolution, an investor purchasing more than one NOGCCI
share was exempt from paying monthly membership due for the second and
subsequent shares that he/she owned.

Subsequently, on March 29, 1987, the NOGCCI Board passed

x----------------------------------------x another resolution, this time increasing the monthly membership due
from P150.00 to P250.00 for each share.
DECISION
As sequestrator of the 227 shares of stock in question, PCGG did not
pay the corresponding monthly membership due thereon
GARCIA, J.: totaling P2,959,471.00. On account thereof, the 227 sequestered shares
were declared delinquent to be disposed of in an auction sale.
Before the Court is this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court to nullify and set aside the March 28, 1995[1] and March 13, Apprised of the above development and evidently to prevent the
1997[2] Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, Second Division, in Civil Case No. projected auction sale of the same shares, PCGG filed a complaint for
0034, insofar as said resolutions ordered the Presidential Commission on injunction with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, thereat
Good Government (PCGG) to pay private respondent Roberto S. Benedicto or docketed as Civil Case No. 5348. The complaint, however, was dismissed,
his corporations the value of 227 shares of stock of the Negros Occidental paving the way for the auction sale for the delinquent 227 shares of stock.
Golf and Country Club, Inc. (NOGCCI) at P150,000.00 per share, registered On August 5, 1989, an auction sale was conducted.
in the name of said private respondent or his corporations.
On November 3, 1990, petitioner Republic and private
The facts: respondent Benedicto entered into a Compromise Agreement in Civil Case
No. 0034. The agreement contained a general release
Civil Case No. 0034 entitled Republic of the Philippines, plaintiff, v. Roberto clause[5] whereunder petitioner Republic agreed and bound itself to lift the
S. Benedicto, et al., defendants, is a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, sequestration on the 227 NOGCCI shares, among other Benedictos
accounting, reconstitution and damages. The case is one of several suits properties, petitioner Republic acknowledging that it was within private
involving ill-gotten or unexplained wealth that petitioner Republic, through respondent Benedictos capacity to acquire the same shares out of his income
the PCGG, filed with the Sandiganbayan against private respondent Roberto from business and the exercise of his profession.[6] Implied in this
undertaking is the recognition by petitioner Republic that the subject shares
of stock could not have been ill-gotten.
In a decision dated October 2, 1992, the Sandiganbayan approved the
Compromise Agreement and accordingly rendered judgment in accordance
with its terms.
In the process of implementing the Compromise Agreement, either of the
parties would, from time to time, move for a ruling by the Sandiganbayan on
the proper manner of implementing or interpreting a specific provision
therein.
On February 22, 1994, Benedicto filed in Civil Case No. 0034 a Motion for
Release from Sequestration and Return of Sequestered
Shares/Dividends praying, inter alia, that his NOGCCI shares of stock
be specifically released from sequestration and returned, delivered or paid to
him as part of the parties Compromise Agreement in that case. In a
Resolution[7] promulgated on December 6, 1994, the Sandiganbayan granted
Benedictos aforementioned motion but placed the subject shares under the
custody of its Clerk of Court, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the said
Motion for Release From Sequestration and Return
of Sequestered Shares/Dividends is hereby
GRANTED and it is directed that said
shares/dividends be delivered/placed under the
custody of the Clerk of Court,
Sandiganbayan, Manila subject to this Courts
disposition.
On March 28, 1995, the Sandiganbayan came out with the herein first
assailed Resolution,[8] which clarified its aforementioned December 6,
1994 Resolution and directed the immediate implementation thereof by
requiring PCGG, among other things:
(b) To deliver to the Clerk of Court the 227 sequestered
shares of [NOGCCI] registered in the name of
nominees of ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO free from all
liens and encumbrances, or in default thereof, to
pay their value at P150,000.00 per share which
can be deducted from [the Republics] cash share in
the Compromise Agreement. [Words in bracket
added] (Emphasis Supplied).
Owing to PCGGs failure to comply with the above directive, Benedicto filed
in Civil Case No. 0034 a Motion for Compliance dated July 25, 1995, followed
by an Ex-Parte Motion for Early Resolution dated February 12, 1996. Acting
thereon, the Sandiganbayan promulgated yet another
Resolution[9] on February 23, 1996, dispositively reading:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the instant motion for early
resolution and considering that, indeed, the PCGG has not
shown any justifiable ground as to why it has not complied
with its obligation as set forth in the Order of December 6,
1994 up to this date and which Order was issued pursuant
to the Compromise Agreement and has already become final
and executory, accordingly, the Presidential Commission on
Good Government is hereby given a final extension of fifteen
(15) days from receipt hereof within which to comply with
the Order of December 6, 1994 as stated hereinabove.
On April 1, 1996, PCGG filed a Manifestation with Motion for
Reconsideration,[10] praying for the setting aside of the Resolution
of February 23, 1996. On April 11, 1996, private respondent Benedicto filed
a Motion to Enforce Judgment Levy. Resolving these two motions, the
Sandiganbayan, in its second assailed Resolution[11] dated March 13,
1997, denied that portion of the PCGGs Manifestation with Motion for
Reconsideration concerning the subject 227 NOGCCI shares and granted
Benedictos Motion to Enforce Judgment Levy.
Hence, the Republics present recourse on the sole issue of whether or not
the public respondent Sandiganbayan, Second Division, gravely abused its
discretion in holding that the PCGG is at fault for not paying the membership
dues on the 227 sequestered NOGCCI shares of stock, a failing which
eventually led to the foreclosure sale thereof.
The petition lacks merit.
To begin with, PCGG itself does not dispute its being considered as a
receiver insofar as the sequestered 227 NOGCCI shares of stock are
concerned.[12] PCGG also acknowledges that as such receiver, one of its
functions is to pay outstanding debts pertaining to the sequestered entity or
property,[13] in this case the 227 NOGCCI shares in question. It contends,
however, that membership dues owing to a golf club cannot be considered
as an outstanding debt for which PCGG, as receiver, must pay. It also claims
to have exercised due diligence to prevent the loss through delinquency sale
of the subject NOGCCI shares, specifically inviting attention to the injunctive
suit, i.e., Civil Case No. 5348, it filed before the RTC of Bacolod City to enjoin
the foreclosure sale of the shares.

The filing of the injunction complaint adverted to, without more, cannot
plausibly tilt the balance in favor of PCGG. To the mind of the Court, such
filing is a case of acting too little and too late. It cannot be over-emphasized
that it behooved the PCGGs fiscal agents to preserve, like a responsible
father of the family, the value of the shares of stock under their
administration. But far from acting as such father, what the fiscal agents did
under the premises was to allow the element of delinquency to set in before
acting by embarking on a tedious process of going to court after the auction
sale had been announced and scheduled.
The PCGGs posture that to the owner of the sequestered shares rests the
burden of paying the membership dues is untenable. For one, it lost sight of
the reality that such dues are basically obligations attached to the shares,
which, in the final analysis, shall be made liable, thru delinquency sale in
case of default in payment of the dues. For another, the PCGG as
sequestrator-receiver of such shares is, as stressed earlier, duty bound to
preserve the value of such shares. Needless to state, adopting timely
measures to obviate the loss of those shares forms part of such duty and
due diligence.
The Sandiganbayan, to be sure, cannot plausibly be faulted for finding the
PCGG liable for the loss of the 227 NOGCCI shares. There can be no
quibbling, as indeed the graft court so declared in its assailed and related
resolutions respecting the NOGCCI shares of stock, that PCGGs fiscal agents,
while sitting in the NOGCCI Board of Directors agreed to the amendment of
the rule pertaining to membership dues. Hence, it is not amiss to state, as
did the Sandiganbayan, that the PCGG-designated fiscal agents, no less, had
a direct hand in the loss of the sequestered shares through delinquency and
their eventual sale through public auction. While perhaps anti-climactic to so
mention it at this stage, the unfortunate loss of the shares ought not to have
come to pass had those fiscal agents prudently not agreed to the passage of
the NOGCCI board resolutions charging membership dues on shares without
playing representatives.
Given the circumstances leading to the auction sale of the subject NOGCCI
shares, PCGGs lament about public respondent Sandiganbayan having erred
or, worse still, having gravely abused its discretion in its determination as to
who is at fault for the loss of the shares in question can hardly be given
cogency.
For sure, even if the Sandiganbayan were wrong in its findings, which does
not seem to be in this case, it is a well-settled rule of jurisprudence
that certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment. Corollarily, errors of procedure or mistakes in the courts findings
and conclusions are beyond the corrective hand of certiorari.[14] The
extraordinary writ of certiorari may be availed only upon a showing, in the
minimum, that the respondent tribunal or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion.[15]
The term grave abuse of discretion connotes capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or a lack of
jurisdiction.[16] The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.[17] Sadly, this is completely absent in the present case. For, at
bottom, the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan did no more than to
direct PCGG to comply with its part of the bargain under the compromise
agreement it freely entered into with private respondent Benedicto. Simply
put, the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan have firm basis in fact
and in law.
Lest it be overlooked, the issue of liability for the shares in
question had, as both public and private respondents asserted,
long become final and executory. Petitioners narration of facts in its present
petition is even misleading as it conveniently fails to make reference to two
(2) resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan. We refer to that courts
resolutions of December 6, 1994[18] and February 23, 1996[19] as well as
several intervening pleadings which served as basis for the decisions reached
therein. As it were, the present petition questions only and focuses on
the March 28, 1995[20] and March 13, 1997[21]resolutions, which merely
reiterated and clarified the graft courts underlying resolution of December 6,
1994. And to place matters in the proper perspective, PCGGs failure to
comply with the December 6, 1994 resolution prompted the issuance of the
clarificatory and/or reiteratory resolutions aforementioned.
In a last-ditch attempt to escape liability, petitioner Republic, through the
PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit.[22] As argued, the order for it to pay
the value of the delinquent shares would fix monetary liability on a
government agency, thus necessitating the appropriation of public funds to
satisfy the judgment claim.[23] But, as private respondent Benedicto correctly
countered, the PCGG fails to take stock of one of the exceptions to the state
immunity principle, i.e., when the government itself is the suitor, as in Civil
Case No. 0034. Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the
main case, immunity from suit cannot be effectively invoked.[24] For,
as jurisprudence teaches, when the State, through its duly
authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a private party, it
thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens itself to
whatever counterclaims or defenses the latter may have against
it.[25] PetitionerRepublics act of filing its complaint in Civil Case No.
0034 constitutes a waiver of its immunity from suit. Being itself the plaintiff
in that case, petitioner Republiccannot set up its immunity against private
respondent Benedictos prayers in the same case.
In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private
respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself
of its immunity from suit and placed itself in the same level of its adversary.
When the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents, in
furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional
legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights
and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its
express consent, precisely because by entering into a contract the sovereign
descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from
the very act of entering into such contract,[26] breach of which on its part
gives the corresponding right to the other party to the agreement.
Finally, it is apropos to stress that the Compromise Agreement in Civil Case
No. 0034 envisaged the immediate recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth
without further litigation by the government, and buying peace on the part
of the aging Benedicto.[27] Sadly, that stated objective has come to naught as
not only had the litigation continued to ensue, but, worse, private
respondent Benedicto passed away on May 15, 2000,[28] with the trial of Civil
Case No. 0034 still in swing, so much so that the late Benedicto had to be
substituted by the administratrix of his estate.[29]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916
E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.
Crossfield and O'Brien for plaintiff.
Attorney-General Avanceña for defendant..
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741,
together with the costs of the cause.
Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the
general damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000
as claimed in the complaint," and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was
entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage
accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in
his complaint."
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court
erred: (a) in finding that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and
the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the
chauffeur; (b) in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is
liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision,
even if it be true that the collision was due to the negligence of the
chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum
of P14,741.
The trial court's findings of fact, which are fully supported by the record, are
as follows:
It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the
plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part
of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed
of ten to twelve miles an hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when
he was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets,
the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead
of turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that
it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the
ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and
unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into
the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or
horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six
feet from the southwestern point or from the post place there.
By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely
injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, who examined him on the
very same day that he was taken to the General Hospital, he was
suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a would in the
same place and in the back part of his head, while blood issued from
his nose and he was entirely unconscious.
 The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull
and that the grey matter and brain was had suffered material injury.
At ten o'clock of the night in question, which was the time set for
performing the operation, his pulse was so weak and so irregular
that, in his opinion, there was little hope that he would live. His right
leg was broken in such a way that the fracture extended to the outer
skin in such manner that it might be regarded as double and the
would be exposed to infection, for which reason it was of the most
serious nature.
At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr.
Saleeby noticed that the plaintiff's leg showed a contraction of an
inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and
painful at the point of the fracture. Examination of his head revealed
a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. The
patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a light weakness in his eyes
and in his mental condition. This latter weakness was always noticed
when the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor, especially
when he attempted to use his money for mathematical calculations.
According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the
plaintiff's mental and physical condition prior to the accident was
excellent, and that after having received the injuries that have been
discussed, his physical condition had undergone a noticeable
depreciation, for he had lost the agility, energy, and ability that he
had constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best
constructors of wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a
half of the income that he had secured for his work because he had
lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. As a contractor, he could no longer,
as he had before done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to reach
the highest parts of the building.
As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of
his work as a contractor, he had to dissolved the partnership he had
formed with the engineer. Wilson, because he was incapacitated
from making mathematical calculations on account of the condition
of his leg and of his mental faculties, and he had to give up a
contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco building."
We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the
effect that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance
of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur.
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in
question by the plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the award awarded for permanent
injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages during
the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We
find nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing the amount of
the first. As to the second, the record shows, and the trial court so found,
that the plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1,000 per month.
The court, however, limited the time to two months and twenty-one days,
which the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. In this we think
there was error, because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was
wholly incapacitated for a period of six months. The mere fact that he
remained in the hospital only two months and twenty-one days while the
remainder of the six months was spent in his home, would not prevent
recovery for the whole time. We, therefore, find that the amount of damages
sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part, is P18,075.
As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent
or employee of the Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the
Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom.
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:
An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of
the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said
Islands to appear in said suit.
Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the
Philippine Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting
from a collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital on March twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and
thirteen;
Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it
possible to determine the amount of damages, if any, to which the
claimant is entitled; and
Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General
recommended that an Act be passed by the Legislature authorizing
Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in
order that said questions may be decided: Now, therefore,
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine
Legislature, that:
 SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court
of First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the
Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital,
and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E.
Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the Attorney-
General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to
appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands,
to defendant said Government at the same.
SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, February 3, 1915.
Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its
immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? If only
the former, then it cannot be held that the Act created any new cause of
action in favor of the plaintiff or extended the defendant's liability to any
case not previously recognized.
All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an
individual without its consent. It is also admitted that the instant case is one
against the Government. As the consent of the Government to be sued by
the plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully
into the terms of the consent, and render judgment accordingly.
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in
order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the
damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said
collision, . . . ." These were the two questions submitted to the court for
determination. The Act was passed "in order that said questions may be
decided." We have "decided" that the accident was due solely to the
negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the time an employee of the
defendant, and we have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by the
plaintiff as a result of the collision. Does the Act authorize us to hold that the
Government is legally liable for that amount? If not, we must look elsewhere
for such authority, if it exists.
The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the
Federal and State Governments in the United States," we may look to the
decisions of the high courts of that country for aid in determining the
purpose and scope of Act No. 2457.
In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts
committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly
made so by legislative enactment, is well settled. "The Government," says
Justice Story, "does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of
the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its
operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would
be subversive of the public interest." (Claussen vs. City of Luverne, 103
Minn., 491, citing U. S. vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat, 720; 6 L. Ed., 199; and
Beers vs. States, 20 How., 527; 15 L. Ed., 991.)
In the case of Melvin vs. State (121 Cal., 16), the plaintiff sought to recover
damages from the state for personal injuries received on account of the
negligence of the state officers at the state fair, a state institution created by
the legislature for the purpose of improving agricultural and kindred
industries; to disseminate information calculated to educate and benefit the
industrial classes; and to advance by such means the material interests of
the state, being objects similar to those sought by the public school system.
In passing upon the question of the state's liability for the negligent acts of
its officers or agents, the court said:
No claim arises against any government is favor of an individual, by
reason of the misfeasance, laches, or unauthorized exercise of
powers by its officers or agents. (Citing Gibbons vs. U. S., 8 Wall.,
269; Clodfelter vs. State, 86 N. C., 51, 53; 41 Am. Rep., 440;
Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Green vs.
State, 73 Cal., 29; Bourn vs. Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27 Am. St. Rep.,
203; Story on Agency, sec. 319.)
As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the
state where the cause of action arises out of either fort or contract, the rule
is stated in 36 Cyc., 915, thus:
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from
suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any
cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not
previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a
preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court,
subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided April
16, 1915, the Act of 1913, which authorized the bringing of this suit, read:
 SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher, of the
town of Summit, Waukesha County, Wisconsin, to bring suit in such
court or courts and in such form or forms as he may be advised for
the purpose of settling and determining all controversies which he
may now have with the State of Wisconsin, or its duly authorized
officers and agents, relative to the mill property of said George
Apfelbacher, the fish hatchery of the State of Wisconsin on the Bark
River, and the mill property of Evan Humphrey at the lower end of
Nagawicka Lake, and relative to the use of the waters of said Bark
River and Nagawicka Lake, all in the county of Waukesha, Wisconsin.
In determining the scope of this act, the court said:
Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature
admitted liability on the part of the state for the acts of its officers,
and that the suit now stands just as it would stand between private
parties. It is difficult to see how the act does, or was intended to do,
more than remove the state's immunity from suit. It simply gives
authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's
controversies with the estate. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper
or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit
shall depart from well established principles of law, or that the
amount of damages is the only question to be settled. The act
opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the
question of liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the
absence of the state's immunity from suit. If the Legislature had
intended to change the rule that obtained in this state so long and to
declare liability on the part of the state, it would not have left so
important a matter to mere inference, but would have done so in
express terms. (Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth, 152 Mass.,
28; 24 N.E., 854; 8 L. R. A., 399.)
In Denning vs. State (123 Cal., 316), the provisions of the Act of 1893, relied
upon and considered, are as follows:
All persons who have, or shall hereafter have, claims on contract or
for negligence against the state not allowed by the state board of
examiners, are hereby authorized, on the terms and conditions
herein contained, to bring suit thereon against the state in any of the
courts of this state of competent jurisdiction, and prosecute the
same to final judgment. The rules of practice in civil cases shall
apply to such suits, except as herein otherwise provided.
And the court said:
This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases,
arising under different facts, and in both it was held that said statute
did not create any liability or cause of action against the state where
none existed before, but merely gave an additional remedy to
enforce such liability as would have existed if the statute had not
been enacted. (Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep.,
158; Melvin vs. State, 121 Cal., 16.)
A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to the superior court
"jurisdiction of all claims against the commonwealth, whether at law or in
equity," with an exception not necessary to be here mentioned. In
construing this statute the court, in Murdock Grate Co. vs.
Commonwealth (152 Mass., 28), said:
The statute we are discussing disclose no intention to create against
the state a new and heretofore unrecognized class of liabilities, but
only an intention to provide a judicial tribunal where well recognized
existing liabilities can be adjudicated.
In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of the canal claims had,
by the terms of the statute of New York, jurisdiction of claims for damages
for injuries in the management of the canals such as the plaintiff had
sustained, Chief Justice Ruger remarks: "It must be conceded that the state
can be made liable for injuries arising from the negligence of its agents or
servants, only by force of some positive statute assuming such liability."
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the
Government's liability to any cause not previously recognized, we will now
examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the
negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article
1903 of the Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent,
but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to
whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case
the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:
That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person
causes to another by his fault or negligence is based, as is evidenced
by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated,
by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or omission of
the third party who caused the damage. It follows therefrom that
the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for
the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts
performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions
pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence
can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of
branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents; on
the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on
its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal
an that of private persons interested in its operation. Between these
latter and the state, therefore, no relations of a private nature
governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state
acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting
obligations. (Supreme Court of Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ.,
24.)
That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the
obligations which arise out of fault or negligence; and whereas in the
first article thereof. No. 1902, where the general principle is laid
down that where a person who by an act or omission causes
damage to another through fault or negligence, shall be obliged to
repair the damage so done, reference is made to acts or omissions
of the persons who directly or indirectly cause the damage, the
following articles refers to this persons and imposes an identical
obligation upon those who maintain fixed relations of authority and
superiority over the authors of the damage, because the law
presumes that in consequence of such relations the evil caused by
their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. This legal
presumption gives way to proof, however, because, as held in the
last paragraph of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third persons
ceases when the persons mentioned in said article prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the
damage, and among these persons, called upon to answer in a direct
and not a subsidiary manner, are found, in addition to the mother or
the father in a proper case, guardians and owners or directors of an
establishment or enterprise, the state, but not always, except when
it acts through the agency of a special agent, doubtless because and
only in this case, the fault or negligence, which is the original basis
of this kind of objections, must be presumed to lie with the state.
That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general
principle set forth in article 1902 respond for all the damage that is
occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault
or negligence are made by branches of the central administration
acting in the name and representation of the state itself and as an
external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive
powers, yet said article is not applicable in the case of damages said
to have been occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official,
acting in the exercise of his powers, in proceedings to enforce the
collections of certain property taxes owing by the owner of the
property which they hold in sublease.
That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the
case wherein it acts through a special agent(and a special agent, in
the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a
definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the
duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation
of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes
the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any
executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and
who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are
inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are
regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May
18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)
That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and
the principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the 18th of
May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is
limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly
empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act
or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim,
and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to
a public official charged with some administrative or technical office
who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down
by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not
so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of
damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has
by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902
and 1903 of the Civil Code. (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911;
122 Jur. Civ., 146.)
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine
Islands) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees
when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article
1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General
Hospital was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed,
without costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make
itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the
plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its
employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds
therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with
the Legislature and not with the courts
G.R. No. L-30098 February 18, 1970
THE COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS and the AUDITOR
GENERAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO as Presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, sitting in Quezon City, TESTATE
ESTATE OF N. T. HASHIM (Special Proceedings No. 71131 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila) represented by its Judicial
Administrator, Tomas N. Hashim, TOMAS N. HASHIM, personally,
and as Judicial Administrator of the Estate of Hashim, Special
Proceedings No. 71131 of the Court of ]First instance of Manila, ALL
THE LEGAL OR TESTAMENTARY HEIRS of the Estate of Hashim,
MANUELA C. FLORENDO, personally as Deputy Clerk, Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch IX, BENJAMIN GARCIA as
"Special Sheriff" appointed by respondent Judge Lourdes P. San
Diego, BENJAMIN V. CORUÑA, personally and as Chief
Documentation Staff, Legal Department, Philippine National Bank,
and the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.
Paredes, Poblador, Nazareno, Abada and Tomacruz for respondent Judge
Lourdes P. San Diego.
Jesus B. Santos for respondent Testate estate of N. T. Hashim.
Jose A. Buendia for respondent Manuela C. Florendo.
Emata, Magkawas and Associates for respondent legal heir Jose H. Hashim.
Alberto O. Villaraza for respondents Estate of N.T. Hashim and Tomas N.
Hashim.
Conrado E. Medina for respondent Philippine National Bank.
Benjamin V. Coruña for and in his own behalf.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, the Court declares
null and void the two questioned orders of respondent Court levying upon
funds of petitioner Bureau of Public Highways on deposit with the Philippine
National Bank, by virtue of the fundamental precept that government funds
are not subject to execution or garnishment.
The background facts follow:
On or about November 20, 1940, the Government of the Philippines filed a
complaint for eminent domain in the Court of First Instance of Rizal1 for the
expropriation of a parcel of land belonging to N. T. Hashim, with an area of
14,934 square meters, needed to construct a public road, now known as
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. On November 25, 1940, the Government took
possession of the property upon deposit with the City Treasurer of the sum
of P23,413.64 fixed by the Court therein as the provisional value of all the
lots needed to construct the road, including Hashim's property. The records
of the expropriation case were destroyed and lost during the second world
war, and neither party took any step thereafter to reconstitute the
proceedings.
In 1958, however, the estate of N.T. Hashim, deceased, through its Judicial
Administrator, Tomas N. Hashim, filed a money claim with the Quezon City
Engineer's Office in the sum of P522,620.00, alleging said amount to be the
fair market value of the property in question, now already converted and
used as a public highway. Nothing having come out of its claim, respondent
estate filed on August 6, 1963, with the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch, assigned to Branch IX, presided by respondent
judge,2 a complaint for the recovery of the fair market price of the said
property in the sum of P672,030.00 against the Bureau of Public Highways,
which complaint was amended on August 26, 1963, to include as additional
defendants, the Auditor General and the City Engineer of Quezon City.3
The issues were joined in the case with the filing by then Solicitor General
Arturo A. Alafriz of the State's answer, stating that the Hashim estate was
entitled only to the sum of P3,203.00 as the fair market value of the property
at the time that the State took possession thereof on November 25, 1940,
with legal interest thereon at 6% per annum, and that said amount had been
available and tendered by petitioner Bureau since 1958. The parties
thereafter worked out a compromise agreement, respondent estate having
proposed on April 28, 1966, a payment of P14.00 per sq. m. for its 14,934
sq.m.-parcel of land or the total amount of P209,076.00, equivalent to the
land's total assessed value,4 which was confirmed, ratified and approved in
November, 1966 by the Commissioner of Public Highways and the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications. On November 7, 1966, the
Compromise Agreement subscribed by counsel for respondent estate and by
then Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, now a member of this Court, was
submitted to the lower Court and under date of November 8, 1966,
respondent judge, as prayed for, rendered judgment approving the
Compromise Agreement and ordering petitioners, as defendants therein, to
pay respondent estate as plaintiff therein, the total sum of P209,076.00 for
the expropriated lot.
On October 10, 1968, respondent estate filed with the lower Court a motion
for the issuance of a writ of execution, alleging that petitioners had failed to
satisfy the judgment in its favor. It further filed on October 12, 1968, an ex-
partemotion for the appointment of respondent Benjamin Garcia as special
sheriff to serve the writ of execution. No opposition having been filed by the
Solicitor General's office to the motion for execution at the hearing thereof
on October 12, 1968, respondent judge, in an order dated October 14, 1968,
granted both motions.
On the same date, October 14, 1968, respondent Garcia, as special sheriff,
forthwith served a Notice of Garnishment, together with the writ of execution
dated October 14, 1968, issued by respondent Manuela C. Florendo as
Deputy Clerk of Court, on respondent Philippine National Bank, notifying said
bank that levy was thereby made upon funds of petitioners Bureau of Public
Highways and the Auditor General on deposit, with the bank to cover the
judgment of P209,076.00 in favor of respondent estate, and requesting the
bank to reply to the garnishment within five days. On October 16, 1968,
three days before the expiration of the five-day deadline, respondent
Benjamin V. Coruña in his capacity as Chief, Documentation Staff, of
respondent bank's Legal Department, allegedly acting in excess of his
authority and without the knowledge and consent of the Board of Directors
and other ranking officials of respondent bank, replied to the notice of
garnishment that in compliance therewith, the bank was holding the amount
of P209,076.00 from the account of petitioner Bureau of Public Highways.
Respondent bank alleged that when it was served with Notice to Deliver
Money signed by respondent Garcia, as special sheriff, on October 17, 1968,
it sent a letter to the officials of the Bureau of Public Highways notifying
them of the notice of garnishment.
Under date of October 16, 1968, respondent estate further filed with the
lower Court an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an order ordering
respondent bank to release and deliver to the special sheriff, respondent
Garcia, the garnished amount of P209,076.00 deposited under the account
of petitioner Bureau, which motion was granted by respondent judge in an
order of October 18, 1968. On the same day, October 18, 1968, respondent
Coruña allegedly taking advantage of his position, authorized the issuance of
a cashier's check of the bank in the amount of P209,076.00, taken out of the
funds of petitioner Bureau deposited in current account with the bank and
paid the same to respondent estate, without notice to said petitioner.
Later on December 20, 1968, petitioners, through then Solicitor General Felix
V. Makasiar, wrote respondent bank complaining that the bank acted
precipitately in having delivered such a substantial amount to the special
sheriff without affording petitioner Bureau a reasonable time to contest the
validity of the garnishment, notwithstanding the bank's being charged with
legal knowledge that government funds are exempt from execution or
garnishment, and demanding that the bank credit the said petitioner's
account in the amount of P209,076.00, which the bank had allowed to be
illegally garnished. Respondent bank replied on January 6, 1969 that it was
not liable for the said garnishment of government funds, alleging that it was
not for the bank to decide the question of legality of the garnishment order
and that much as it wanted to wait until it heard from the Bureau of Public
Highways, it was "helpless to refuse delivery under the teeth" of the special
order of October 18, 1968, directing immediate delivery of the garnished
amount.
Petitioners therefore filed on January 28, 1969 the present action against
respondents, in their capacities as above stated in the title of this case,
praying for judgment declaring void the question orders of respondent Court.
Petitioners also sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction for the immediate reimbursement of the garnished sum of
P209,076.00, constituting funds of petitioner Bureau on deposit with the
Philippine National Bank as official depository of Philippine Government
funds, to the said petitioner's account with the bank, so as to forestall the
dissipation of said funds, which the government had allocated to its public
highways and infrastructure projects. The Court ordered on January 31,
1969 the issuance of the writ against the principal respondents solidarily,
including respondent judge therein so that she would take forthwith all the
necessary measures and processes to compel the immediate return of the
said government funds to petitioner Bureau's account with respondent
bank.5
In compliance with the writ, respondent bank restored the garnished sum of
P209,076.00 to petitioner Bureau's account with it.6 The primary
responsibility for the reimbursement of said amount to petitioner Bureau's
account with the respondent bank, however, rested solely on respondent
estate, since it is the judgment creditor that received the amount upon the
questioned execution.
Strangely enough, as appears now from respondent bank's memorandum in
lieu of oral argument,7 what respondent bank did, acting through respondent
Coruña as its counsel, was not to ask respondent estate to reimburse it in
turn in the same amount, but to file with the probate court with jurisdiction
over respondent estate,8 a motion for the estate to depositthe said amount
with it, purportedly in compliance with the writ. Respondent estate
thereupon deposited with respondent bank as a savings account the sum of
P125,446.00, on which the bank presumably would pay the usual interest,
besides. As to the balance of P83,630.00, this sum had been in the interval
paid as attorney's fees to Atty. Jesus B. Santos, counsel for the estate, by
the administrator, allegedly without authority of the probate
court.9 Accordingly, respondent estate has not reimbursed the respondent
bank either as to this last amount, and the bank has complacently not taken
any steps in the lower court to require such reimbursement.
The ancillary questions now belatedly raised by the State may readily be
disposed of. Petitioners may not invoke the State's immunity from suit, since
the case below was but a continuation in effect of the pre-war expropriation
proceedings instituted by the State itself. The expropriation of the property,
which now forms part of Epifanio, de los Santos Avenue, is a fait
accompli and is not questioned by the respondent state. The only question at
issue was the amount of the just compensation due to respondent estate in
payment of the expropriated property, which properly pertained to the
jurisdiction of the lower court. 10 It is elementary that in expropriation
proceedings, the State precisely submits to the Court's jurisdiction and asks
the Court to affirm its lawful right to take the property sought to be
expropriated for the public use or purpose described in its complaint and to
determine the amount of just compensation to be paid therefor.
Neither may the State impugn the validity of the compromise agreement
executed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State with the approval of
the proper government officials, on the ground that it was executed only by
the lawyer of respondent estate, without any showing of having been
specially authorized to bind the estate thereby, because such alleged lack of
authority may be questioned only by the principal or client, and respondent
estate as such principal has on the contrary confirmed and ratified the
compromise agreement. 11 As a matter of fact, the Solicitor General, in
representation of the State, makes in the petition no prayer for the
annulment of the compromise agreement or of the respondent court's
decision approving the same.
On the principal issue, the Court holds that respondent Court's two
questioned orders (1) for execution of the judgment, in pursuance whereof
respondent deputy clerk issued the corresponding writ of execution and
respondent special sheriff issued the notice of garnishment, and (2) for
delivery of the garnished amount of P209,076.00 to respondent estate as
judgment creditor through respondent special sheriff, are null and void on
the fundamental ground that government funds are not subject to execution
or garnishment.
1. As early as 1919, the Court has pointed out that although the
Government, as plaintiff in expropriation proceedings, submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the Court and thereby waives its immunity from suit, the
judgment that is thus rendered requiring its payment of the award
determined as just compensation for the condemned property as a condition
precedent to the transfer to the title thereto in its favor, cannot be realized
upon execution. 12The Court there added that it is incumbent upon the
legislature to appropriate any additional amount, over and above the
provisional deposit, that may be necessary to pay the award determined in
the judgment, since the Government cannot keep the land and dishonor the
judgment.
In another early case, where the government by an act of the Philippine
Legislature, expressly consented to be sued by the plaintiff in an action for
damages and waived its immunity from suit, the Court adjudged the
Government as not being legally liable on the complaint, since the State
under our laws would be liable only for torts caused by its special agents,
specially commissioned to carry out the acts complained of outside of such
agents' regular duties. We held that the plaintiff would have to look to the
legislature for another legislative enactment and appropriation of sufficient
funds, if the Government intended itself to be legally liable only for the
damages sustained by plaintiff as a result of the negligent act of one of its
employees. 13
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by
private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action
"only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution"
and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since
government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution
or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of Public funds must be
covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The
functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate
and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
Thus, as pointed out by the Court in Belleng vs. Republic, 14 while the State
has given its consent to be sued in compensation cases, the pauper-claimant
therein must look specifically to the Compensation Guarantee Fund provided
by the Workmen's Compensation Act for the corresponding disbursement in
satisfaction of his claim, since the State in Act 3083, the general law waiving
its immunity from suit "upon any money claim involving liability arising from
contract express or implied," imposed the limitation in Sec. 7 thereof that
"no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against
the Government of the (Philippines) under the provisions of this Act;" and
that otherwise, the claimant would have to prosecute his money claim
against the State under Commonwealth Act 327.
This doctrine was again stressed by. the Court in Republic vs.
Palacio, 15 setting aside as null and void the order of garnishment issued by
the sheriff pursuant to the lower Court's writ of execution on funds of the
Pump Irrigation Trust Fund in the account of the Government's Irrigation
Service Unit with the Philippine National Bank. The Court emphasized then
and re-emphasizes now that judgments against the State or its agencies and
instrumentalities in cases where the State has consented to be sued, operate
merely to liquidate and establish the plaintiff's claim; such judgments may
not be enforced by writs of execution or garnishment and it is for the
legislature to provide for their payment through the corresponding
appropriation, as indicated in Act 3083.
2. Respondent bank and its Chief, Documentation Staff, respondent Coruña
have advanced two specious arguments to justify their wrongful delivery of
the garnished public funds to respondent estate. Their first contention that
the said government funds by reason of their being deposited by petitioner
Bureau under a current account subject to withdrawal by check, instead of
being deposited as special trust funds, "lost their kind and character as
government funds," 16 is untenable. As the official depositary of the
Philippine Government, respondent bank and its officials should be the first
ones to know that all government funds deposited with it by any agency or
instrumentality of the government, whether by way of general or special
deposit, remain government funds, since such government agencies or
instrumentalities do not have any non-public or private funds of their own.
Their second contention that said government funds lost their character as
such "the moment they were deposited with the respondent bank", 17 since
the relation between a depositor and a depository bank is that of creditor
and debtor, is just as untenable, absolutely. Said respondents shockingly
ignore the fact that said government funds were deposited with respondent
bank as the official depositary of the Philippine Government. Assuming for
the nonce the creation of such relationship of creditor and debtor, petitioner
Bureau thereby held a credit against respondent bank whose obligation as
debtor was to pay upon demand of said petitioner-creditor the public funds
thus deposited with it; even though title to the deposited funds passes to the
bank under this theory since the funds become mingled with other funds
which the bank may employ in its ordinary business, what was garnished
was not the bank's own funds but the credit of petitioner bureau against the
bank to receive payment of its funds, as a consequence of which respondent
bank delivered to respondent estate the garnished amount of P209,076.00
belonging to said petitioner. Petitioner bureau's credit against respondent
bank thereby never lost its character as a credit representing government
funds thus deposited. The moment the payment is made by respondent bank
on such deposit, what it pays out represents the public funds thus deposited
which are not garnishable and may be expended only for their legitimate
objects as authorized by the corresponding legislative appropriation. Neither
respondent bank nor respondent Coruña are the duly authorized disbursing
officers and auditors of the Government to authorize and cause payment of
the public funds of petitioner Bureau for the benefit or private persons, as
they wrongfully did in this case.
3. Respondents bank and Coruña next pretend that refusal on their part to
obey respondent judge's order to deliver the garnished amount, "which is
valid and binding unless annulled, would have exposed them for contempt of
court." 18 They make no excuse for not having asked the lower court for time
and opportunity to consult petitioner Bureau or the Solicitor General with
regard to the garnishment and execution of said deposited public funds
which were allocated to specific government projects, or for not having
simply replied to the sheriff that what they held on deposit for petitioner
Bureau were non-garnishable government funds. They have not given any
cogent reason or explanation, — charged as they were with knowledge of
the nullity of the writ of execution and notice of garnishment against
government funds, for in the earlier case of Republic vs. Palacio, supra, they
had then prudently and timely notified the proper government officials of the
attempted levy on the funds of the Irrigation Service Unit deposited with it,
thus enabling the Solicitor General to take the corresponding action to annul
the garnishment — for their failure to follow the same prudent course in this
case. Indeed, the Court is appalled at the improper haste and lack of
circumspection with which respondent Coruña and other responsible officials
of respondent bank precipitately allowed the garnishment and delivery of the
large amount involved, all within the period of just four days, even before
the expiration of the five-day reglementary period to reply to the sheriff's
notice of garnishment. Failure on the State's part to oppose the issuance of
the writ of execution, which was patently null and void as an execution
against government funds, could not relieve them of their own responsibility.
4. Respondents bank and Coruña further made common cause with
respondent estate beyond the legal issues that should solely concern them,
by reason of their having wrongfully allowed the garnishment and delivery of
government funds, instead assailing petitioners for not having come to court
with "clean hands" and asserting that in fairness, justice and equity,
petitioners should not impede, obstruct or in any way delay the payment of
just compensation to the land owners for their property that was occupied
way back in 1940. This matter of payment of respondent estate's judgment
credit is of no concern to them as custodian and depositary of the public
funds deposited with them, whereby they are charged with the obligation of
assuring that the funds are not illegally or wrongfully paid out.
Since they have gone into the records of the expropriation case, then it
should be noted that they should have considered the vital fact that at the
time that the compromise agreement therein was executed in November,
1966, respondent estate was well aware of the fact that the funds for the
payment of the property in the amount of P209,076.00 still had to be
released by the Budget Commissioner and that at the time of the
garnishment, respondent estate was still making the necessary
representations for the corresponding release of such amount, pursuant to
the Budget Commissioner's favorable
recommendation.19 And with regard to the merits of the case, they should
have likewise considered that respondent estate could have no complaint
against the fair attitude of the authorities in not having insisted on their
original stand in their answer that respondent estate was entitled only to the
sum of P3,203.00 as the fair market value of the property at the time the
State took possession thereof on November 25, 1940, with legal interests
thereon, but rather agreed to pay therefor the greatly revised and increased
amount of P209,076.00 at P14.00 per square meter, not to mention the
consequential benefits derived by said respondent from the construction of
the public highway with the resultant enhanced value of its remaining
properties in the area.
5. The manner in which respondent bank's counsel and officials proceeded to
comply with the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the Court
commanding respondent estate, its judicial administrator and respondents
bank and Coruña, in solidum, to reimburse forthwith the account of
petitioner Bureau in the garnished amount of P209,076.00, does not speak
well of their fidelity to the bank's interests. For while respondent bank had
restored with its own funds the said amount of P209,076.00 to petitioner
Bureau's account, it has not required respondent estate as the party
primarily liable therefor as the recipient of the garnished amount to
reimburse it in turn in this same amount. Rather, said bank officials have
allowed respondent estate to keep all this time the whole amount of
P209,076.00 wrongfully garnished by it. For as stated above, respondent
bank allowed respondent estate merely to deposit with it as a savings
account, of respondent estate, the lesser sum of P125,446.00 on which the
bank presumably has paid and continues paying respondent estate, besides
the usual interest rates on such savings accounts, and neither has it taken
any steps to require reimbursement to it from respondent estate of the
remainder of P83,630.00 which respondent estate of its own doing and
responsibility paid by way of attorney's fees.
It thus appears that all this time, respondent bank has not been reimbursed
by respondent estate as the party primarily liable for the whole amount of
P209,076.00 wrongfully and illegally garnished and received by respondent
estate. This grave breach of trust and dereliction of duty on the part of
respondent bank's officials should be brought to the attention of respondent
bank's Board of Directors and management for the appropriate
administrative action and other remedial action for the bank to recover the
damages it has been made to incur thereby.
6. The Solicitor General has likewise questioned the legality of respondent
Court's Order of October 14, 1968, appointing respondent Garcia as "special
sheriff" for the purpose of effecting service of the writ of execution, simply
on respondent estate's representation that it was desirable "for a speedy
enforcement of the writ."
The Court finds this general practice of the lower courts of appointing
"special sheriffs" for the service of writs of execution to be unauthorized by
law. The duty of executing all processes" of the courts in civil cases,
particularly, writs of execution, devolves upon the sheriff or his deputies,
under Section 183 of the Revised Administrative Code and Rule 39, section 8
of the Rules of Court. Unlike the service of summons which may be made,
aside from the sheriff or other proper court officers, "for special reasons by
any person especially authorized by the judge of the court issuing the
summons" under Rule 14, section 5 of the Rules of Court, the law requires
that the responsibility of serving writs of execution, which involve the taking The Clerk of Court is directed to furnish copies of this decision to the Board
delivery of money or property in trust for the judgment creditor, should be of Directors and to the president of respondent Philippine National Bank for
carried out by regularly bonded sheriffs or other proper court officers. their information and appropriate action. So ordered.
(Sections 183 and 330, Revised Administrative Code). The bond required by
law of the sheriff is conditioned inter alia, "for the delivery or payment to the Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Government, or the persons entitled thereto, of all the property or sums of Fernando and Villamor. JJ., concur. Barredo, J., took no part.
money that shall officially come into his or their (his deputies') hands"
(Section 330, idem), and thus avoids the risk of embezzlement of such
properties and moneys.

Section 185 of the Revised Administrative Code restrictively authorizes the

judge of the Court issuing the process or writ to deputize some suitable
person only "when the sheriff is party to any action or proceeding or is
otherwise incompetent to serve process therein." The only other contingency
provided by law is when the office of sheriff is vacant, and the judge is then
authorized, "in case of emergency, (to) make a temporary appointment to
the office of sheriff ... pending the appointment and qualification of the
sheriff in due course; and he may appoint the deputy clerk of the court or
other officer in the government service to act in said capacity." (Section
189, idem).

None of the above contingencies having been shown to be present,

respondent Court's order appointing respondent Garcia as "special sheriff" to
serve the writ of execution was devoid of authority.

7. No civil liability attaches, however, to respondents special sheriff and

deputy clerk, since they acted strictly pursuant to orders issued by
respondent judge in the discharge of her judicial functions as presiding judge
of the lower court, and respondent judge's immunity from civil responsibility
covers them, although the said orders are herein declared null and void. 20

ACCORDINGLY, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted. The

respondent court's questioned Orders of October 14, and 18, 1968, are
declared null and void, and all further proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-7441
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch IX are abated.
The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction heretofore issued is made
permanent, except as to respondent judge who is excluded therefrom,
without prejudice to any cause of action that private respondents may
have, inter se. Respondent estate and respondent Tomas N. Hashim as
prayed for by respondent Philippine National Bank in its Answer, are ordered
jointly and severally to reimburse said respondent bank in the amount of
P209,076.00 with legal interest until the date of actual reimbursement.
Respondents Estate of N. T. Hashim, Philippine National Bank and Benjamin
Coruña are ordered jointly to pay treble costs.