EQUAL PROTECTION Court of First Instance upheld the constitutionality of the
ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant
1. ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC. v. THE
TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, G.R. No. L-
23794, February 17, 1968
DOCTRINE: Equal protection clause applies only to
persons or things identically situated and does not bar a
reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and
a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2)
these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the
classification applies not only to present conditions but also
to future conditions which are substantially identical to
those of the present; and (4) the classification applies only
to those who belong to the same class.
FACTS: On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of
Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964,
imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar
milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a
municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export
sale to the United States of America and other foreign
countries."
March 20, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. paid
taxes under protest. Petitioner’s argument: The ordinance is
unconstitutional for being violative of:
o The equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III,
Constitution) and
o The rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art.
VI, Constitution), aside from being an export tax
forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
o The tax is neither a production nor a license tax
which Ormoc City under Section 15-kk of its
charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act 2264,
otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, is
authorized to impose; and
o That the tax amounts to a customs duty, fee or
charge in violation of paragraph 1 of Section 2 of
Republic Act 2264 because the tax is on both the
sale and export of sugar.
Defendant’s contention:
o The tax ordinance was within defendant city's
power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and
that the same did not violate the afore-cited
constitutional limitations.
chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to
include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not
excluded in its charter.
ISSUES: Whether the equal protection process clause were
infringed
RULING: YES. The Constitution in the bill of rights
provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs.
Salas, 5 We ruled that the equal protection clause applies
only to persons or things identically situated and does not
bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation,
and a classification is reasonable where
(1) it is based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences;
(2) these are germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) the classification applies not only to present
conditions but also to future conditions which are
substantially identical to those of the present;
(4) the classification applies only to those who
belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the
questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes
only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time
of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the
city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable,
should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well.
The taxing ordinance should not be singular and
exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established
sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the
coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar
company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because
the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar
Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
2. THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION v.
HON. PETE PRADO, G.R. No. 105371 November
11, 1993
DOCTRINE: Equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others. The equal protection clause
does not require the universal application of the laws on all
persons or things without distinction. What the clause
requires is equality among equals as determined according
to a valid classification. By classification is meant the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in
certain particulars and different from all others in these
same particulars.
FACTS: The main target of this petition is Section 35 of
R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal
Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. These
measures withdraw the franking privilege 1 from the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial
Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial
Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its
Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government
offices. The petitioners are members of the lower courts
who feel that their official functions as judges will be
prejudiced by the above-named measures.
ISSUE: WON R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional on the
grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject
and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the
required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed
copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed
among the members before its passage; and (3) it is
discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the
Judiciary.
RULING:
I. We do not agree that the title of the
challenged act violates the Constitution. The
title of the bill is not required to be an index
to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single
detail of the measure. It has been held that if
the title fairly indicates the general subject,
and reasonably covers all the provisions of the
act, and is not calculated to mislead the
legislature or the people, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional
requirement. The withdrawal of the franking
privilege from some agencies is germane to
the accomplishment of the principal
objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the
creation of a more efficient and effective
postal service system. Our ruling is that, by
virtue of its nature as a repealing clause,
Section 35 did not have to be expressly
included in the title of the said law.
1
(Franking privilege refers to the privilege of sending mail
without payment of postage. This privilege is exercised in
pursuance of personal or official designations.)
II. Under the doctrine of separation powers, the
Court may not inquire beyond the certification
of the approval of a bill from the presiding
officers of Congress. Casco Philippine
Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule
that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the
Judiciary (except in matters that have to be
entered in the journals like
the yeas and nays on the final reading of the
bill). The journals are themselves also binding
on the Supreme Court. Applying these
principles, we shall decline to look into the
petitioners' charges that an amendment was
made upon the last reading of the bill that
eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that
copies thereof in its final form were not
distributed among the members of each House.
Both the enrolled bill and the legislative
journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI,
Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound
by such official assurances from a coordinate
department of the government, to which we
owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
III. (RELATED TO THE TOPIC)
Petitioners: R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory
because while withdrawing the franking privilege from
the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the
Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines;
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives,
the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the
Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office;
and the general public in the filing of complaints against
public offices and officers.
Respondents: the law is based on a valid
classification in accordance with the equal protection
clause. In fact, the franking privilege has been withdrawn
not only from the Judiciary but also to other offices and
departments.
According to a long line of decisions, equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar
subjects, in other words, should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and
unjustly discriminate against others. The equal
protection clause does not require the universal
application of the laws on all persons or things without
distinction. What the clause requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. By
classification is meant the grouping of persons or things
similar to each other in certain particulars and different
from all others in these same particulars.
The grant of the franking privilege was the
perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation,
which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by
the Corporation in the interest of providing for a
smoother flow of communication between the
government and the people. Assuming that basis, we
cannot understand why, of all the departments of the
government, it is the Judiciary, that has been denied the
franking privilege. There is no question that if there is any
major branch of the government that needs the privilege, it
is the Judicial Department, as the respondents themselves
point out.
Respondents: because of this considerable volume
of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be
withdrawn from it. They use the mails too much and it does
not help in making Phil. Postal Corp. viable.
The argument is self-defeating. The respondents
are in effect saying that the franking privilege should be
extended only to those who do not need it very much,
but not to those who need it badly. It is like saying that
a person may be allowed cosmetic surgery although it is
not really necessary but not an operation that can save
his life. If the problem of the respondents is the loss of
revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, is to
withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government,
including those who do not need it. The problem is not
solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from
others, especially where there is no substantial distinction
between those favored, which may or may not need it at all,
and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is
not solved by violating the Constitution.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices
from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn,
Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category
to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of
the President of the Philippines and the members of
Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason
why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater
need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal
Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation,
was created and is expected to operate for the purpose
of promoting the public service. While it may have been
established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse
itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of
the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by
the government and the many advantages it enjoys under
its charter. Among the services it should be prepared to
extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the
government that need the franking privilege in the
discharge of their own public functions.
We are unable to agree with the respondents that
Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of
discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the
contrary, we find its repealing clause to be a
discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons
or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the
law is superficial. It is not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences between the
Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege. In
sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its
subject is not expressed in its title and that it was not passed
in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we
annul Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1,
of the Constitution providing that no person shall "be
deprived of the equal protection of laws."
3. TIU v. CA, JANUARY 20, 1999
DOCTRINE: The constitutional right to equal protection
of the law is not violated by an executive order, issued
pursuant to law, granting tax and duty incentives only to
businesses and residents within the secured area of the
Subic Special Economic Zone and denying them to those
who live within the Zone but outside such fenced-in
territory. The Constitution does not require absolute
equality among residents. It is enough that all persons
under like circumstances or conditions are given the same
privileges and required to follow the same obligations. In
short, a classification based on valid and reasonable
standards does not violate the equal protection clause.
FACTS: Congress, with the approval of the President,
passed into law RA 7227 entitled "An Act Accelerating the
Conversion of Military Reservations into Other Productive
Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development
Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and
for Other Purposes." Section 12 thereof created the Subic
Special Economic Zone and granted there to special
privileges. In the zone, there were no exchange controls.
Such were liberalized. There was also tax incentives and
duty free importation policies under this law.
President Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97,
clarifying the application of the tax and duty incentives.
The President issued Executive Order No. 97-A, specifying
the area within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege was
operative.
The petitioners challenged before this Court the
constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly being violative
of their right to equal protection of the laws. This was due
to the limitation of tax incentives to Subic and not to the
entire area of Olongapo City. This Court referred the matter
to the Court of Appeals. Proclamation No. 532 was issued
by President Ramos. It delineated the exact metes and
bounds of the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone,
pursuant to Section 12 of RA 7227. The court a quo also
explained that the intention of Congress was to confine the
coverage of the SSEZ to the "secured area" and not to
include the "entire Olongapo City and other areas
mentioned in Section 12 of the law.
Respondent CA held that "there is no substantial
difference between the provisions of EO 97-A and Section
12 of RA 7227. In both, the 'Secured Area' is precise and
well-defined as '. . . the lands occupied by the Subic Naval
Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered
and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between
the Philippines and the United States of America, as
amended . . .'"
Hence, this was a petition for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 97-A violates
the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Specifically
the issue is whether the provisions of Executive Order No.
97-A confining the application of R.A. 7227 within the
secured area and excluding the residents of the zone outside
of the secured area is discriminatory or not.
RULING: No. Petition dismissed.
Citing Section 12 of RA 7227, petitioners contend
that the SSEZ encompasses (1) the City of Olongapo, (2)
the Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and (3) the area
formerly occupied by the Subic Naval Base. However, they
claimed that the E.O. narrowed the application to the naval
base only.
According to the OSG, The E.O. was a
valid classification.
We rule in favor of the constitutionality and
validity of the assailed EO. Said Order is not violative of
the equal protection clause; neither is it discriminatory.
Rather, we find real and substantive distinctions between
the circumstances obtaining inside and those outside the
Subic Naval Base, thereby justifying a valid and reasonable
classification.
The fundamental right of equal protection of the
laws is not absolute but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized
by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one
class may be treated and regulated differently from another.
The classification must also be germane to the purpose of
the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same
class.
Citing Inchong v Hernandez- Equal protection does
not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on
substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of
the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
RA 7227 aims primarily to accelerate the
conversion of military reservations into productive uses.
This was really limited to the military bases as the law's
intent provides. Moreover, the law tasked the BCDA to
specifically develop the areas the bases occupied. Among
such enticements are: (1) a separate customs territory
within the zone, (2) tax-and-duty-free importations, (3)
restructured income tax rates on business enterprises within
the zone, (4) no foreign exchange control, (5) liberalized
regulations on banking and finance, and (6) the grant of
resident status to certain investors and of working visas to
certain foreign executives and workers. The target of the
law was the big investor who can pour in capital.
Even more important, at this time the business
activities outside the "secured area" are not likely to have
any impact in achieving the purpose of the law, which is to
turn the former military base to productive use for the
benefit of the Philippine economy. Hence, there was no
reasonable basis to extend the tax incentives in RA 7227.
 It is well-settled that the equal-protection
guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of
laws. As long as there are actual and material
differences between territories, there is no violation of
the constitutional clause.
From the above provisions of the law, it can easily
be deduced that the real concern of RA 7227 is to convert
the lands formerly occupied by the US military bases into
economic or industrial areas. In furtherance of such
objective, Congress deemed it necessary to extend
economic incentives to attract and encourage investors,
both local and foreign. Among such enticements are: (1) a
separate customs territory within the zone, (2) tax-and-
duty-free importations, (3) restructured income tax rates on
business enterprises within the zone, (4) no foreign
exchange control, (5) liberalized regulations on banking
and finance, and (6) the grant of resident status to certain
investors and of working visas to certain foreign executives
and workers.
We believe it was reasonable for the President to
have delimited the application of some incentives to the
confines of the former Subic military base. It is this specific
area which the government intends to transform and
develop from its status quo ante as an abandoned naval
facility into a self-sustaining industrial and commercial
zone, particularly for big foreign and local investors to use
as operational bases for their businesses and industries.
Why the seeming bias for big investors? Undeniably, they
are the ones who can pour huge investments to spur
economic growth in the country and to generate
employment opportunities for the Filipinos, the ultimate
goals of the government for such conversion. The
classification is, therefore, germane to the purposes of
the law.
Certainly, there are substantial differences
between the big investors who are being lured to establish
and operate their industries in the so-called secured area and
the present business operators outside the area. On the one
hand, we are talking of billion-peso investments and
thousands of new jobs. On the other hand, definitely none
of such magnitude. In the first, the economic impact will be
national; in the second, only local. Even more important, at
this time the business activities outside the secured area are
not likely to have any impact in achieving the purpose of
the law, which is to turn the former military base to
productive use for the benefit of the Philippine economy.
There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to extend to
them the benefits and incentives accorded in RA 7227.
Additionally, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, it will be
easier to manage and monitor the activities within the
secured area, which is already fenced off, to prevent
fraudulent importation of merchandise or smuggling.
It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee
does not require territorial uniformity of laws. As long as
there are actual and material differences between territories,
there is no violation of the constitutional clause. And of
course, anyone, including the petitioners, possessing the
requisite investment capital can always avail of the same
benefits by channeling his or her resources or business
operations into the fenced-off free port zone.
We believe that the classification set forth by the
executive issuance does not apply merely to existing
conditions. As laid down in RA 7227, the objective is to
establish a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial
and investment center in the area. There will, therefore, be
a long-term difference between such investment center and
the areas outside it.
Lastly, the classification applies equally to all
the resident individuals and businesses within the
secured area. The residents, being in like circumstances or
contributing directly to the achievement of the end purpose
of the law, are not categorized further. Instead, they are all
similarly treated, both in privileges granted and in
obligations required.
4. CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
INC. v. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS,
DECEMBER 15, 2004
DOCTRINE: All that is required of a valid classification
is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class.
FACTS: On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central
Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of
the Philippines, and created a new BSP. On June 8, 2001,
almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653,
petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees
Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against
BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the
President, to restrain respondents from further
implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of
R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
The thrust of petitioner’s challenge is that the
above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two
classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the
BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the
Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2)
the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or
those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-
exempt class). It is contended that this classification is a
classic case of class legislation, allegedly not based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences, but
solely on the SG of the BSP personnel’s position. Petitioner
also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section
15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of
which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all
levels in the BSP.
In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is
not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.[8] Petitioner
also stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a separability
clause, which will allow the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the proviso in question without
affecting the other provisions; and (b) the urgency and
propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file
employees have been prejudiced since 1994 when
the proviso was implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1)
since the inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law,
respondents implementation of such amounts to lack of
jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except
through this petition for prohibition, which this Court
should take cognizance of, considering the transcendental
importance of the legal issue involved.[9]
Issue: Whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article
II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional
mandate that "No person shall be. . . denied the equal
protection of the laws."[12]
Ruling:
A. Under the present standards of equal
protection, section 15(c), article ii of r.a. No.
7653 is valid.
Jurisprudential standards for equal protection
challenges indubitably show that the classification created
by the questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation,
bears no constitutional infirmities. It is settled in
constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does
not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of
individuals or objects upon which different rules shall
operate - so long as the classification is not unreasonable.
A law is not invalid because of simple inequality.
All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and that it must apply equally to each member of the class.
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations
that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the
SSL was intended to address the BSPs lack of
competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers
and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against
the rank-and-file.
B. The enactment, however, of subsequent laws -
exempting all other rank-and-file
employees of gfis from the ssl - renders the
continued application of the challenged
provision a violation of the equal protection
clause.
While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure
well within the legislatures power, we hold that
the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-
file employees of other GFIs leeched all validity out of the
challenged proviso.
1. The concept of relative constitutionality.
A statute valid at one time may become void at
another time because of altered circumstances.[25] Thus, if a
statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or
confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former
adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the
light of changed conditions. In the Philippine setting, this
Court declared the continued enforcement of a valid law as
unconstitutional as a consequence of significant changes in
circumstances. The question now to be determined is, is the
period of eight (8) years which Republic Act No. 342 grants
to debtors of a monetary obligation contracted before the
last global war and who is a war sufferer with a claim duly
approved by the Philippine War Damage Commission
reasonable under the present circumstances? It should be
noted that Republic Act No. 342 only extends relief to
debtors of prewar obligations who suffered from the
ravages of the last war and who filed a claim for their losses
with the Philippine War Damage Commission. It is therein
provided that said obligation shall not be due and
demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and after
settlement of the claim filed by the debtor with said
Commission. But we should not lose sight of the fact that
these obligations had been pending since 1945 as a result of
the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at
present their enforcement is still inhibited because of the
enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and would continue to
be unenforceable during the eight-year period granted to
prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate
themselves, which in plain language means that the
creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least twelve
(12) years before they could effect a liquidation of their
investment dating as far back as 1941. This period seems to
us unreasonable, if not oppressive.
In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent
with what we believe to be as the only course dictated by
justice, fairness and righteousness, we feel that the only
way open to us under the present circumstances is to
declare that the continued operation and enforcement of
Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is unreasonable
and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute
longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and
void and without effect.
2. Enactment of R.A. Nos. 7907 + 8282 + 8289 + 8291 +
8523 + 8763 + 9302 = consequential
unconstitutionality of challenged proviso.
It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the
subsequent charters of the seven other GFIs share this
common proviso: a blanket exemption of all their
employees from the coverage of the SSL, expressly or
impliedly.
(Gi enumerate sa case ang mga affected laws so
refer to the full text nalang for the provisions)
Thus, eleven years after the amendment of the BSP
charter, the rank-and-file of seven other GFIs were granted
the exemption that was specifically denied to the rank-and-
file of the BSP. And as if to add insult to petitioners injury,
even the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was
granted the same blanket exemption from the SSL in
2000![39] The prior view on the constitutionality of R.A. No.
7653 was confined to an evaluation of its classification
between the rank-and-file and the officers of the
BSP, found reasonable because there were substantial
distinctions that made real differences between the two
classes.
The above-mentioned subsequent enactments,
however, constitute significant changes in
circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the
continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c),
Article II of Republic Act No. 7653, thereby exposing
the proviso to more serious scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny
relates to the constitutionality of the classification - albeit
made indirectly as a consequence of the passage of eight
other laws - between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the
seven other GFIs. In this second level of scrutiny, the
inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere
assertion that each exemption (granted to the seven other
GFIs) rests on a policy determination by the
legislature. In fine, the policy determination argument may
support the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-
file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the
inequality of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and
other GFIs who are similarly situated. It fails to appreciate
that what is at issue in the second level of scrutiny is not
the declared policy of each law per se, but the oppressive
results of Congress inconsistent and unequal
policy towards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the seven
other GFIs. At bottom, the second challenge to the
constitutionality of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act
No. 7653 is premised precisely on the irrational
discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its treatment
of persons similarly situated.
For as regards the exemption from the coverage of
the SSL, there exist no substantial distinctions so as to
differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other rank-
and-file of the seven GFIs. On the contrary, our legal
history shows that GFIs have long been recognized as
comprising one distinct class, separate from other
governmental entities. Before the SSL, Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 985 (1976) declared it as a State policy (1) to
provide equal pay for substantially equal work, and (2) to
base differences in pay upon substantive differences in
duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements
of the positions. But even then, GFIs and government-
owned and/or controlled corporations (GOCCs) were
already identified as a distinct class among government
employees.
Clearly, under R.A. No. 6758, the rank-and-file of
all GFIs were similarly situated in all aspects pertaining to
compensation and position classification, in consonance
with Section 5, Article IX-B of the 1997 Constitution.
Subsequent amendments to the charters of other GFIs
followed. Significantly, each government financial
institution (GFI) was not only expressly authorized to
determine and institute its own compensation and wage
structure, but also explicitly exempted - without distinction
as to salary grade or position - all employees of the GFI
from the SSL
First, the BSP is the central monetary
authority,[48] and the banker of the government and all its
political subdivisions. Hence, the argument that the rank-
and-file employees of the seven GFIs were exempted
because of the importance of their institutions mandate
cannot stand any more than an empty sack can stand.
Second, it is certainly misleading to say that the need for
the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the
particular circumstances of each institution. As point in
fact, the BSP and the seven GFIs are similarly situated in
so far as Congress deemed it necessary for these institutions
to be exempted from the SSL.
 In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as
regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no
characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-
and-file so as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-
file employees were denied. The distinction made by the
law is not only superficial,[56]but also arbitrary. It is not
based on substantial distinctions that make real differences
between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.
It bears stressing that the exemption from the SSL
is a privilege fully within the legislative prerogative to give
or deny. However, its subsequent grant to the rank-and-file
of the seven other GFIs and continued denial to the BSP
rank-and-file employees breached the latter’s right to equal
protection. In other words, while the granting of a
privilege per se is a matter of policy exclusively within the
domain and prerogative of Congress, the validity or legality
of the exercise of this prerogative is subject to judicial
review.
Again, it must be emphasized that the equal
protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. In light of the lack of real
and substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal
treatment between the rank-and-file of BSP from the seven
other GFIs, it is clear that the enactment of the seven
subsequent charters has rendered the continued application
of the challenged proviso anathema to the equal protection
of the law, and the same should be declared as an outlaw.
5. CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM
v. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, G.R. No.
118127. April 12, 2005
DOCTRINE: Equal protection requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar
subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently,
so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate
against others. The guarantee means that no person or
class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws
which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances. ]The “equal protection of the laws is a
pledge of the protection of equal laws. It limits
governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause
extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their
property is concerned.
FACTS: The City Council of Manila encated on 9 March
1993 and approved on 30 March 1993 an ordinance
entitled: AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE
ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES
PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN
THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
It prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke
bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate
District which was notoriously viewed as a red light district
harboring thrill seekers.
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development
Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging
houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which
was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the
Department of Tourism as a hotel. MTDC prayed that
the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as
among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid
and unconstitutional.
One of the reasons raised by MTDC on why the
ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional is that the
Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under the
law as no reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the
operation of motels and inns, but not pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments, and
for prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area but
not outside of this area.
On 28 June 1993, Judge Laguio issued an ex-parte
temporary restraining order against the enforcement of
the Ordinance. And on 16 July 1993, he granted the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC. The ordinance
was declared null and void.
Petitioners made an appeal on the grounds that it It
erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires,
or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise
of police power and that it erred in declaring
the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is invalid on the
ground that it is violates the equal protection clause.
RULING: Yes. Ordinance 7783 is invalid on the ground
that it is violates the equal protection clause.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in
other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give
undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against
others. The guarantee means that no person or class of
persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which
is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances. The “equal protection of the laws is a pledge
of the protection of equal laws. It limits governmental
discrimination. The equal protection clause extends to
artificial persons but only insofar as their property is
concerned.
To quote from J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure
Administration: “The ideal situation is for the law’s benefits
to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere
of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be
excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and
impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the
idea of law.” There is recognition, however, in the opinion
that what in fact exists “cannot approximate the ideal. Nor
is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take
into account the realities of the situation. The constitutional
guarantee then is not to be given a meaning that disregards
what is, what does in fact exist. To assure that the general
welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory
measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property.
Those adversely affected may under such circumstances
invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show
that the governmental act assailed, far from being
inspired by the attainment of the common weal was
prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least,
discrimination that finds no support in reason.”
Classification is thus not ruled out, it being sufficient to
quote from the Tuason decision anew “that the laws
operate equally and uniformly on all persons under
similar circumstances or that all persons must be
treated in the same manner, the conditions not being
different, both in the privileges conferred and the
liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference
cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person
under circumstances which, if not identical, are
analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or
charges, those that fall within a class should be treated
in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some
in the group equally binding on the rest.[102]
Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the
subjects of legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the
law may operate only on some and not all of the people
without violating the equal protection clause.[103] The
classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be
arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements:
1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.
2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
In the Court’s view, there are no substantial
distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments. By
definition, all are commercial establishments providing
lodging and usually meals and other services for the public.
No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not
pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments. The classification in the instant case is
invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as
to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary
as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just
and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for
prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the
Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious
establishment does not become any less noxious if located
outside the area.
The standard “where women are used as tools for
entertainment” is also discriminatory as prostitution one of
the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banish is not a
profession exclusive to women. Both men and women have
an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. This
discrimination based on gender violates equal protection as
it is not substantially related to important government
objectives. Thus, the discrimination is invalid.
Note: Other reason why the ordinance is invalid
and unconstitutional (not related to the current topic)-
Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not
met. In the exercise of police power, a reasonable relation
must exist between the purposes of the police measure and
the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under
the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights
and those pertaining to private property will not be
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the
social ills purportedly spawned by the establishments in the
Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly operated under the
deceptive veneer of legitimate, licensed and tax-paying
nightclubs, bars, karaoke bars, girlie houses, cocktail
lounges, hotels and motels. Petitioners insist that even the
Court in the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila[63] had
already taken judicial notice of the “alarming increase in
the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila
traceable in great part to existence of motels, which provide
a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and
exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and
thrill-seekers.”[64]
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the
promotion and protection of the social and moral values of
the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the
objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City
Council’s police powers, the means employed for the
accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly
oppressive.
The closing down and transfer of businesses or
their conversion into businesses “allowed” under
the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the
accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the
prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per
se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the
community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social
ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the
spread of sexual disease in Manila.
Conceding for the nonce that the Ermita-Malate
area teems with houses of ill-repute and establishments of
the like which the City Council may lawfully prohibit,[65] it
is baseless and insupportable to bring within that
classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars,
night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets,
dance halls, motels and inns. This is not warranted under
the accepted definitions of these terms. The enumerated
establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per
se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.
The City Council instead should regulate human
conduct that occurs inside the establishments, but not to the
detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants,
premiums and blessings of democracy. In the instant case,
there is a clear invasion of personal or property rights,
personal in the case of those individuals desirous of
owning, operating and patronizing those motels and
property in terms of the investments made and the salaries
to be paid to those therein employed.
6. ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A.
TOLENTINO, JR. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698
DOCTRINE: Equal protection clause does not require the
universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here
and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four
requisites:(1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class.
FACTS: Upon a careful review of the case at bar, this
Court resolves to grant the respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) motion for reconsideration of
the 2009 decision which declared the second provisio in the
third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC
Resolution 8678 as unconstitutional mainly on the ground
that they violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8678 states
that: “Any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, and officers and employees in GOCCs
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon filling of his certificate of candidacy.”
RA 9369 provides that: “For this purpose, the
Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of
certificate of candidacy/petition of
registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any
person who files his certificate of candidacy within this
period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of
the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the
start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally,
That any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the armed forces,
and officers and employees in government-owned or -
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same
at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate
of candidacy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a)
of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the
equal protection clause and therefore unconstitutional
RULING: NO. These laws and regulations implement
Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which
prohibits civil service officers and employees from
engaging in any electioneering or partisan political
campaign. The intention to impose a strict limitation on the
participation of civil service officers and employees in
partisan political campaigns is unmistakable.
To emphasize its importance, this constitutional
ban on civil service officers and employees is presently
reflected and implemented by a number of statutes. Section
44(b)(26), Chapter 7 and Section 55, Chapter 8 both of
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 respectively provide in relevant part:
Section 44. Discipline: General
Provisions:
(b) The following shall be grounds for
disciplinary action:
 (26) Engaging directly or indirectly in
partisan political activities by one holding
a non-political office.
Section 55. Political Activity. No officer or
employee in the Civil Service including
members of the Armed Forces, shall
engage directly or indirectly in any
partisan political activity or take part in any
election except to vote nor shall he use his
official authority or influence to coerce the
political activity of any other person or
body. Nothing herein provided shall be
understood to prevent any officer or
employee from expressing his views on
current political problems or issues, or
from mentioning the names of his
candidates for public office whom he
supports: Provided, That public officers
and employees holding political offices
may take part in political and electoral
activities but it shall be unlawful for them
to solicit contributions from their
subordinates or subject them to any of the
acts involving subordinates prohibited in
the Election Code.
Furthermore, equal protection clause does not
require the universal application of the laws to all persons
or things without distinction. What it simply requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and
yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only;
and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class.
The assailed Decision readily acknowledged that
these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third and
fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers
the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of
appointive officials vis-à-vis elected officials is not
germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one
holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils
sought to be prevented by the measure remain."
In the instant case, is there a rational justification
for excluding elected officials from the operation of the
deemed resigned provisions? There is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will,
perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the
people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to
public office by popular vote. Considering that elected
officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite
term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from
the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost
respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other
words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the
electorate that they be served by such officials until the end
of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there
is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are
concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and
elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the
law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the
integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service;
the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of
judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with
the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring
to the sovereign will.
Lasty, the assailed law and regulations is Not
applicable to barangay office: Any elective or appointive
municipal, city, provincial or national official or employee,
or those in the civil or military service, including those in
government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be
considered automatically resigned upon the filing of
certificate of candidacy for a barangay office.
Since barangay elections are governed by a
separate deemed resignation rule, under the present state of
law, there would be no occasion to apply the restriction on
candidacy found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code, and later reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of
RA 9369, to any election other than a partisan one. For this
reason, the overbreadth challenge raised against Section 66
of the Omnibus Election Code and the pertinent proviso in
Section 13 of RA 9369 must also fail.
7. LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO v. THE
PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010,
G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010
DOCTINE: Equal protection requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of
a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s
duly constituted authorities.
The equal protection clause permits classification.
Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test
of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all
members of the same class.
FACTS: This case involves two consolidated cases, both
of which essentially assail the validity and constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled
"Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010."
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to
the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when
then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his
staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his
slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The
Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability
to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good
senator to the presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality,
President Aquino found a need for a special body to
investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly
committed during the previous administration. Thus, at the
dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010,
signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing
the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July
30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office
of the President with the primary task to investigate reports
of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices
and accessories during the previous administration, and
to submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of
an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as
it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render
awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can
do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-
finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if
probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its
functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it
arrogates the power of the Congress to create a
public office and appropriate funds for its
operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31
of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated
authority of the President to structurally reorganize
the Office of the President to achieve economy,
simplicity and efficiency does not include the
power to create an entirely new public office which
was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth
Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and
statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission”
with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not
superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman
created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ
created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as
it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the
previous administration as if corruption is their
peculiar species even as it excludes those of the
other administrations, past and present, who
may be indictable.[The issue pertinent to our
topic]
Respondents, through the OSG, questioned the legal
standing of petitioners and argued that:
1. E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of
Congress because the President’s executive power
and power of control necessarily include the
inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any
event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A.
No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the
President to create or form such bodies.
2. E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress
to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds
already appropriated by Congress.
3. PTC does not duplicate or supersede the functions
of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a
fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and
its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the
latter’s jurisdiction.
4. The Truth Commission does not violate the
equal protection clause because it was validly
created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
 1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file
the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of
separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress to create and to appropriate funds for
public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection
clause.
RULING: The power of judicial review is subject to
limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2)
the person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lismota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power
of the Congress as a body to which they belong as
members. To the extent the powers of Congress are
impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since
his office confers a right to participate in the exercise
of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the
prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they
are allowed to question the validity of any official
action which, to their mind, infringes on their
prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he
sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal
and direct injury attributable to the implementation of
E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of
justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing
is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It
provides that “every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-
party-in interest is “the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.”
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public
suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in
assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as
a representative of the general public. He has to show
that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to
make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the
public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or
“taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have “a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury
as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in
Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional
issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this
Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight
as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that
our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the
President are not limited to those specific powers under
the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the
President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-
mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to
ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into
matters which the President is entitled to know so that
he can be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or
allocations of existing funds already appropriated.
There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of
the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no
need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the
operation of the commission because, whatever funds
the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the
commission. The amount that would be allocated to the
PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and
regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or
erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative
function of the commission will complement those of
the two offices. The function of determining probable
cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before
the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to
obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the
President in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of
its apparent transgression of the equal protection
clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
One of the basic principles on which this government
was founded is that of the equality of right which is
embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is
embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and
fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause,
however, to provide for a more specific guaranty
against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from
the government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But
if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted
partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it
down is the equal protection clause.
Equal protection requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by
its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted
authorities.
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official
state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions
cover all the departments of the government including the
political and executive departments, and extend to all
actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws,
through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. It,
however, does not require the universal application of the
laws to all persons or things without distinction. It simply
requires equality among equals as determined according to
a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid
must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only;
and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all
the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as
to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive
Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the
equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during
the previous administration only. The intent to single out
the previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a
class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class
of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective
retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a
valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past
administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority
to investigate all past administrations. The Constitution is
the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which
all other laws must conform and in accordance with which
all private rights determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution
should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
8. JESUS C. GARCIA vs. THE HONORABLE RAY
ALAN T. DRILON, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013
DOCTRINE: It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to
resolve the constitutionality of a statute, "this authority
being embraced in the general definition of the judicial
power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by
the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law."
The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law,
treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not
only in this Court, but in all RTCs.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons
or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Equality
of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons
according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the
Constitution allows classification. All that is required of a
valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means
that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply
equally to each member of the class. This Court has held
that the standard is satisfied if the classification or
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational
basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
It is a constitutional commonplace that the
ordinary requirements of procedural due process must
yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests,
among which is protection of women and children from
violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may
have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not
only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard
also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded,
there is no denial of procedural due process.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. On the
other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of
carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing
their due observance."
FACTS: On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia
(private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her
minor children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797)
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for
the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO)
against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant
to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse;
emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a
result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with
threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of
financial support.
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when
she was 34 years old and the former was eleven years her
senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J.
Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of petitioner
but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J.
Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years
old.
Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) appears to have
inflicted violence against private respondents. Petitioner
admitted having an affair with a bank manager. H callously
boasted about their sexual relations to the household help.
His infidelity emotionally wounded private respondent.
Their quarrels left her with bruises and hematoma.
Petitioner also unconscionably beat their daughter, Jo-ann,
whom he blamed for squealing on him.
All these drove respondent Rosalie Garcia (wife) to
despair causing her to attempt suicide by slitting her wrist.
Instead of taking her to the hospital, petitioner left the
house. He never visited her when she was confined for 7
days. He even told his mother-in-law that respondent
should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not
cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child with
her.
The private respondent was determined to separate
from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take away
their children and deprive her of financial support. He
warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would not
get a single centavo from him.
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving
mostly the construction of deep wells. He is the President
of three corporations – 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros
Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation – of
which he and private respondent are both stockholders. In
contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said
corporations, private respondent merely draws a monthly
salary of ₱20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros
Rotadrill Corporation. Household expenses amounting to
not less than ₱200,000.00 a month are paid for by private
respondent through the use of credit cards, which, in turn,
are paid by the same corporation together with the bills for
utilities.
After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade
her to hold office. This deprived her of access to full
information about their businesses.
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was
imminent danger of violence against respondent and her
children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Order
(TPO) ordering petitioner, among other things, to surrender
all his firearms including a .9mm caliber firearm and a
Walther PPK
Proceedings before the CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797,
petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a
petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698),
with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order,
challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being
violative of the due process and the equal protection
clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in
the civil case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid
law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-
day Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against the
enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other
orders pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the
appellate court dismissed the petition for failure of
petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings
before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with
jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to
the validity of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition
seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the trial
court constituted a collateral attack on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing
Decision having been denied in the Resolution dated
August 14, 2007.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in dismissing
the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest
opportunity and that, the petition constitutes a
collateral attack on the validity of the law.
2. Whether the court of appeals committed serious
error in failing to conclude that R.A. 9262 is
discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal
protection clause.
3. Whether the court of appeals committed grave
mistake in not finding that R.A. 9262 runs counter
to the due process clause of the constitution.
4. Whether the court of appeals seriously erred in not
declaring R.A. no. 9262 as invalid and
unconstitutional because it allows an undue
delegation of judicial power to the barangay
officials.38
RULING:
1. The appellate court correctly dismissed the petition
for prohibition with prayer for injunction and
temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP.
No. 01698).
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC
of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court
of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of
cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land
registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or
insolvency. It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to
resolve the constitutionality of a statute, "this authority
being embraced in the general definition of the judicial
power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by
the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law."
The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law,
treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only
in this Court, but in all RTCs. We said in J.M. Tuason and
Co., Inc. v. CA48 that, "plainly the Constitution
contemplates that the inferior courts should have
jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any
treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final
judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or
affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality
or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the
issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been
raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the
petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod
City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject
to the review of this Court.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are
summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner from
raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to
the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does
not need to be supported by evidence.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal
or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the
appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall
not stay its enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO,
which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time, should not
be enjoined. The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be
unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a
litigant to have the same enjoined.
 The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the
status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the
case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are
granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children
from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such
orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against
VAWC.
2. R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal
protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-
repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not
a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon
all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in
order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be
affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes
does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely
as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of
rights. The Constitution does not require that things which
are different in fact be treated in law as though they were
the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does not
prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to
operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the
Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as
in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they
agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without
saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable,
which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences;
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it
must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court
has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational
basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential
yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid
classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such,
did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring
women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom
the State extends its protection.
However, we have stressed that the "vagueness"
doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty
for the statute to be upheld – not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is
permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute
are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid
merely because it might have been more explicit in its
wordings or detailed in its provisions.
3. R.A. 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of
the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262,
specifically in the issuance of POs, of all protections
afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. Says
he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and
practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is
stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job,
future employment and reputation, all in a matter of
seconds, without an inkling of what happened."
A protection order is an order issued to prevent
further acts of violence against women and their children,
their family or household members, and to grant other
necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended
parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their
daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain
control of their life.
The rules require that petitions for protection order
be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner thereby
undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every
allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of
VAWC if further violence is to be prevented," the court is
authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before
notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the
victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to
believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from
the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to
prevent such violence, which is about to recur.
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be
challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like
a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without
notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing
will take could be enough to enable the defendant to
abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the
victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing
experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly
even death, if notice and hearing were required before such
acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace
that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process
must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests, among which is protection of women and children
from violence and threats to their personal safety and
security.
The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence
one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard"
does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be
heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
4. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to
barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve
the exercise of judicial power which, under the
Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such
other lower courts as may be established by law" and, thus,
protests the delegation of power to barangay officials to
issue protection orders. The pertinent provision reads, as
follows:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs);
Who May Issue and How. – Barangay Protection Orders
(BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong
Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from
committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A
Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO
shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date
of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the
application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on
the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted
upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is
issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be
accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad
that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the
issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen
(15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte
BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall
personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or
direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer
advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. On the
other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of
carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing
their due observance."
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision,
the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his
unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely
orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical
harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause
the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the
Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in
pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to
"enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public
order in the barangay."
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is
required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts
and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his
official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may
affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial
powers."
In the same manner as the public prosecutor
ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding
"whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an
offense has been committed and the accused is probably
guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine
reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of
violence against the woman and her children exists or is
about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor
is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The
same holds true with the issuance of a BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by
petitioner that since barangay officials and other law
enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to
victims of violence and abuse, it would be very unlikely that
they would remain objective and impartial, and that the
chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by
barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is
consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain
peace and order.
Conclusion
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged
are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict
with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner
as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other
words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable
doubt. In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence
and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to
warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A.
9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by
the highest officer of the co-equal executive department. As
we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, courts must assume
that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and
edges of its plenary powers and passed laws with full
knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting
what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that
"the history of the women's movement against domestic
violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles was
the fight against the violence of law itself. If we keep that
in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of
women for equality but will be its
fulfillment." Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A.
9262 is, as it should be, sustained.
9. SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT
AGENCY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 170139 August 5, 2014
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 582 SCRA
254 (2009), the Supreme Court declared as violative of
the Equal Protection Clause the 5th paragraph of §10
R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995) for discriminating against illegally
dismissed OFWs who still had more than a year to their
contract compared to those who only had less than a
year remaining. The next year, Congress enacted R.A.
No 10222, an amendment to the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act, which practically reinstated the
provision struck down in Serrano.
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency,
Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.
Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus
signed a one-year employment contract for a
monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was
deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd.
(Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her
employment contract, she agreed to work as
quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she
was asked to work as a cutter.
Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a
certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy,
without prior notice, that she was terminated and
that “she should immediately report to their
office to get her salary and passport.” She
was asked to “prepare for immediate
repatriation.” Joy claims that she was told that
from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a
total of NT$9,000.15 According to her,
Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane
ticket to Manila.
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC
against petitioner and Wacoal. LA dismissed the
complaint. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. CA
affirmed the ruling of the National Labor
Relations Commission finding respondent
illegally dismissed and awarding her three
months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of
the cost of her repatriation, and attorney’s fees
ISSUE: WON there is violation of equal protection clause.
We observe that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in
Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to
equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the
Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling change in
the circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the
precedent.
We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime that
limiting wages that should be recovered by an illegally
dismissed overseas worker to three months is both a violation
of due process and the equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.
Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons under
like circumstances and falling within the same class are treated
alike, in terms of “privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.”97 It is a guarantee against “undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or
the oppression of inequality.”98
cralawred
In creating laws, the legislature has the power “to make
distinctions and classifications.”99 In exercising such power, it
has a wide discretion.100
cralawred
The equal protection clause does not infringe on this legislative
power.101 A law is void on this basis, only if classifications are
made arbitrarily.102 There is no violation of the equal
protection clause if the law applies equally to persons within the
same class and if there are reasonable grounds for
distinguishing between those falling within the class and those
who do not fall within the class.103 A law that does not violate
the equal protection clause prescribes a reasonable
classification.104 cralawred
A reasonable classification “(1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4)
must apply equally to all members of the same class.”105
The reinstated clause does not satisfy the requirement of
reasonable classification.
In Serrano, we identified the classifications made by the
reinstated clause. It distinguished between fixed-period
overseas workers and fixed-period local workers.106 It also
distinguished between overseas workers with employment
contracts of less than one year and overseas workers with
employment contracts of at least one year.107 Within the class
of overseas workers with at least one-year employment
contracts, there was a distinction between those with at least a
year left in their contracts and those with less than a year left
in their contracts when they were illegally dismissed.108
The Congress’ classification may be subjected to judicial review.
In Serrano, there is a “legislative classification which
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect
class.”109
cralawred
Under the Constitution, labor is afforded special
protection.110 Thus, this court in Serrano, “[i]mbued with the
same sense of ‘obligation to afford protection to labor,’ . . .
employ[ed] the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it
perceive[d] in the subject clause a suspect classification
prejudicial to OFWs.”111 cralawred
We also noted in Serrano that before the passage of Republic
Act No. 8042, the money claims of illegally terminated overseas
and local workers with fixed-term employment were computed
in the same manner.112 Their money claims were computed
based on the “unexpired portions of their contracts.”113 The
adoption of the reinstated clause in Republic Act No. 8042
subjected the money claims of illegally dismissed overseas
workers with an unexpired term of at least a year to a cap of
three months worth of their salary.114 There was no such
limitation on the money claims of illegally terminated local
workers with fixed-term employment.115 cralawred
We observed that illegally dismissed overseas workers whose
employment contracts had a term of less than one year were
granted the amount equivalent to the unexpired portion of their
employment contracts.116 Meanwhile, illegally dismissed
overseas workers with employment terms of at least a year
were granted a cap equivalent to three months of their salary
for the unexpired portions of their contracts.117 cralawred
Observing the terminologies used in the clause, we also found
that “the subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination
among OFWs whose contract periods are for more than one
year: those who are illegally dismissed with less than one year
left in their contracts shall be entitled to their salaries for the
entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are illegally
dismissed with one year or more remaining in their contracts
shall be covered by the reinstated clause, and their monetary
benefits limited to their salaries for three months only.”118
cralawred
cralawred
We do not need strict scrutiny to conclude that these
classifications do not rest on any real or substantial distinctions
that would justify different treatments in terms of the
computation of money claims resulting from illegal termination.
Overseas workers regardless of their classifications are entitled
to security of tenure, at least for the period agreed upon in
their contracts. This means that they cannot be dismissed
before the end of their contract terms without due process. If
they were illegally dismissed, the workers’ right to security of
tenure is violated.
The rights violated when, say, a fixed-period local worker is
illegally terminated are neither greater than nor less than the
cralawred
rights violated when a fixed-period overseas worker is illegally
terminated. It is state policy to protect the rights of workers
without qualification as to the place of employment.119 In both
cases, the workers are deprived of their expected salary, which
they could have earned had they not been illegally dismissed.
For both workers, this deprivation translates to economic
insecurity and disparity.120 The same is true for the
distinctions between overseas workers with an employment
contract of less than one year and overseas workers with at
least one year of employment contract, and between overseas
workers with at least a year left in their contracts and overseas
workers with less than a year left in their contracts when they
were illegally dismissed.
For this reason, we cannot subscribe to the argument that
“[overseas workers] are contractual employees who can never
acquire regular employment status, unlike local
workers”121 because it already justifies differentiated
treatment in terms of the computation of money claims.122 cralawred
Likewise, the jurisdictional and enforcement issues on overseas
workers’ money claims do not justify a differentiated treatment
in the computation of their money claims.123 If anything, these
issues justify an equal, if not greater protection and assistance
to overseas workers who generally are more prone to
exploitation given their physical distance from our government.
We also find that the classifications are not relevant to the
purpose of the law, which is to “establish a higher standard of
protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers,
their families and overseas Filipinos in distress, and for other
purposes.”124 Further, we find specious the argument that
reducing the liability of placement agencies “redounds to the
benefit of the [overseas] workers.”125 cralawred
Putting a cap on the money claims of certain overseas workers
does not increase the standard of protection afforded to them.
On the other hand, foreign employers are more incentivized by
the reinstated clause to enter into contracts of at least a year
because it gives them more flexibility to violate our overseas
workers’ rights. Their liability for arbitrarily terminating
overseas workers is decreased at the expense of the workers
whose rights they violated. Meanwhile, these overseas workers
who are impressed with an expectation of a stable job overseas
for the longer contract period disregard other opportunities only
to be terminated earlier. They are left with claims that are less
than what others in the same situation would receive. The
reinstated clause, therefore, creates a situation where the law
meant to protect them makes violation of rights easier and
simply benign to the violator.
As Justice Brion said in his concurring opinion in Serrano:
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 affects these well-
laid rules and measures, and in fact provides a
hidden twist affecting the principal/employer’s
liability. While intended as an incentive
accruing to recruitment/manning agencies, the
law, as worded, simply limits the OFWs’
recovery in wrongful dismissal situations. Thus,
it redounds to the benefit of whoever may be
liable, including the principal/employer – the
direct employer primarily liable for the
wrongful dismissal. In this sense, Section 10 –
read as a grant of incentives to
recruitment/manning agencies – oversteps
what it aims to do by effectively limiting what
is otherwise the full liability of the foreign
principals/employers. Section 10, in short,
really operates to benefit the wrong party and
allows that party, without justifiable reason, to
mitigate its liability for wrongful dismissals.
Because of this hidden twist, the limitation of
liability under Section 10 cannot be an
“appropriate” incentive, to borrow the term
that R.A. No. 8042 itself uses to describe the
incentive it envisions under its purpose clause.
What worsens the situation is the chosen mode
of granting the incentive: instead of a grant
that, to encourage greater efforts at
recruitment, is directly related to extra efforts
undertaken, the law simply limits their liability
for the wrongful dismissals of already deployed
OFWs. This is effectively a legally-imposed
partial condonation of their liability to OFWs,
justified solely by the law’s intent to encourage
greater deployment efforts. Thus, the incentive,
from a more practical and realistic view, is
really part of a scheme to sell Filipino overseas
labor at a bargain for purposes solely of
attracting the market. . . .
The so-called incentive is rendered particularly
odious by its effect on the OFWs — the benefits
accruing to the recruitment/manning agencies
and their principals are taken from the pockets
of the OFWs to whom the full salaries for the
unexpired portion of the contract rightfully
belong. Thus, the principals/employers and the
recruitment/manning agencies even profit
from their violation of the security of tenure
that an employment contract embodies.
Conversely, lesser protection is afforded the
OFW, not only because of the lessened
recovery afforded him or her by operation of
law, but also because this same lessened
recovery renders a wrongful dismissal easier
and less onerous to undertake; the lesser cost
of dismissing a Filipino will always be a
consideration a foreign employer will take into
account in termination of employment
decisions. . . .126
chanRoblesvi rtua l Lawlib rary
Further, “[t]here can never be a justification for any form of
government action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but
imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when
the favored sector is composed of private businesses such as
placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is
composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the
Constitution commands. The idea that private business interest
can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is
odious.”127 cralawred
Along the same line, we held that the reinstated clause violates
due process rights. It is arbitrary as it deprives overseas
workers of their monetary claims without any discernable valid
purpose.128 cralawred
Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the
unexpired portion of her contract, in accordance with Section
10 of Republic Act No. 8042. The award of the three-month
equivalence of respondent’s salary must be modified
accordingly. Since she started working on June 26, 1997 and
was terminated on July 14, 1997, respondent is entitled to her
salary from July 15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. “To rule otherwise
would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in
effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and
recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFW’s security of
tenure which an employment contract embodies and actually
profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional
provision of law.”129 cralawred