1. Tan v.
De La Vega appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or
OA: Petition for quieting of title and declaration of nullity of
Free Patent against heirs of Macario Mencias.
1992: Respondents learned that the defendant-heirs are
ejecting the occupants of the contested lot – that Mencias
obtained a title of the said lot previously and such has been
inherited by his heirs. Respondents state that the said lot is a
mere portion of their own lot which is covered by their TCT.
Plaintiff-heirs state that their right to the said lot arises from a
different TCT and that Respondents’ assertion is incorrect.
Said lot was sold already by the respondent-heirs to New
Atlantis Real Estate who joins this petition as co-plaintiff raising
the defense of buyers in good faith (given that the annotation
was not seen in the TCT of the heirs).
For failure to file their Answer, defendant Aurora M. Gabat,
public defendants Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, Director of Land Management Bureau
and the Register of Deeds of Marikina, were declared in default.
2003: Respondents filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, granted. RTC ruled in favor of respondents and ruled
that free-patent of Mencias is void and the subsequent sale is
invalid. CA affirms.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment on the pleadings is proper
in this case
HELD:
In this case, we find that the trial court erred in rendering
judgment on the pleadings because the pleadings filed by the
parties generated ostensible issues that necessitate the
presentation of evidence. Respondents’ action for declaration
of nullity of Free Patent No. 495269 and the titles derived
therefrom is based on their claim that the lot titled in the name
of petitioners, is a portion of a bigger tract of land previously
titled in the name of their (respondents) predecessors-in-
interest.
It is clear from the foregoing that the pleadings filed in the
instant case generated the following issues: (1) whether
respondents’ TCT No. 257152 is valid; (2) whether Lot 89 is
covered by TCT No. 257152; and (3) whether petitioners are
purchasers in good faith. This is clearly not a proper case for
judgment on the pleadings considering that the Answers
tendered factual issues. The trial court rendered a summary
judgment on March 21, 2003 and not a judgment on the
pleadings.
In any case, a summary judgment is likewise not warranted in
this case as there are genuine issues which call for a full blown
trial. A "genuine issue" is an issue of fact which requires the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham,
fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded
genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary
judgment is called for. The party who moves for summary
judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence
of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the
complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial. Trial courts have limited authority to
render summary judgments and may do so only when there is
clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts
as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested,
proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of
trial.
In the instant case, presentation of evidence is necessary to
determine the validity of TCT No. 22395 from which
respondents’ title (TCT No. 257152) was derived. As alleged by
defendant heirs, TCT No. 22395 was a mere reconstitution of
TCT No. 45046, which per verification from the Register of
Deeds of Rizal pertain to a different piece of land measuring
only about 356 square meters and located in San Juan, Rizal.
These allegations were never refuted by respondents, hence,
they cannot be simply brushed aside by the trial court.
2. Evangelista v. Santiago
In this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioners pray for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dismissing petitioners’ Complaint for declaration of
nullity of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 670 and all other
titles emanating therefrom.
In their Complaint, petitioners alleged that they occupied and
possessed parcels of land, by virtue of several Deeds of
Assignment, dated 15 April 1994 and 02 June 1994, executed
by a certain Ismael Favila y Rodriguez.
According to the Deeds of Assignment, the Subject Property
was part of a vast tract of land called "Hacienda Quibiga,"
awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by the Queen of Spain
and evidenced by a Spanish title. Ismael Favila claimed to be
one of the heirs and successors-in-interest of Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez. Acting as Attorney-in-Fact pursuant to a Special
Power of Attorney executed by his "mga kapatid" on 25
February 1965, Ismael Favila signed the aforementioned Deeds
of Assignment, assigning portions of the Subject Property to the
petitioners, each portion measuring around 500 to 1,000
square meters, in exchange for the labor and work done on the
Subject Property by the petitioners and their predecessors.
Petitioners came by information that respondent was planning
to evict them from the Subject Property. Two of the petitioners
had actually received notices to vacate. Their investigations
revealed that the Subject Property was included in Transfer
Certificates of Titles (TCTs) No. 53028, No. 281660, No. N-
39258 and No. 205270, all originating from OCT No. 670, and
now in the name of respondent.5
OCT No. 670 was issued in the name of respondent’s mother,
Isabel Manahan y Francisco, and three other individuals,
pursuant to Decree No. 10248, dated 13 February 1913, in Case
No. 8502 of the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine
Islands. The whole property covered by OCT No. 670 was
subsequently adjudicated in favor of Isabel Manahan Santiago
(formerly Isabel Manahan y Francisco). Consequently, OCT No.
670 was cancelled and TCT No. T-53028 was issued exclusively
in the name of Isabel Manahan Santiago. On 28 December
1968, Isabel Manahan Santiago executed a Deed of Donation
transferring the property to her son, respondent herein, who
subsequently secured TCTs No. 281660, No. N-39258 and No.
205270 in his own name.
Petitioners filed with the trial court, on 29 April 1996, an action
for declaration of nullity of respondent’s certificates of title on
the basis that OCT No. 670 was fake and spurious.
Respondent filed his Answer with Prayer for Preliminary
Hearing on the Affirmative Defenses on 03 July 1996. According
to respondent, "[t]he allegations in the Complaint would readily
and patently show that the same are flimsy, fabricated,
malicious, without basis in law and in fact.
As an affirmative defense, respondent claimed that the
petitioners had no legal capacity to file the Complaint, and thus,
the Complaint stated no cause of action. Since OCT No. 670 was
genuine and authentic on its face, then OCT No. 670 and all of
respondent’s land titles derived therefrom, are
incontrovertible, indefeasible and conclusive against the
petitioners and the whole world.
Citing the consolidated cases of Director of Forestry, et al. v.
Hon. Emmanuel M. Muñoz, et al. and Pinagcamaligan Indo-
Agro Development Corporation v. Hon. Macario Peralta, Jr., et
al., respondent argued that the Spanish title, on which
petitioners based their claim, was neither indefeasible nor
imprescriptible. Moreover, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 892,
which took effect on 16 February 1976, required all holders of
Spanish titles or grants to apply for registration of their lands
under Republic Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act, within six months from effectivity of the
decree. After the given period, Spanish titles could no longer be
used as evidence of land ownership in any registration
proceedings under the Torrens System.
Respondent also raised the affirmative defense of prescription.
He pointed out that any action against his certificates of title
already prescribed, especially with regard to OCT No. 670,
which was issued in 1913 or more than 83 years prior to the
filing of the Complaint by the petitioners. At the very least,
respondent contended, "it must be presumed that the
questioned land titles were issued by the public officials
concerned in the performance of their regular duties and
functions pursuant to the law."13
Even assuming arguendo that the petitioners entered and
occupied the Subject Property, they did so as mere intruders,
squatters and illegal occupants, bereft of any right or interest,
since the Subject Property was already covered by Torrens
certificates of title in the name of respondent and his
predecessors-in-interest.
Lastly, respondent denied knowing the petitioners, much less,
threatening to evict them. In fact, petitioners were not included
as defendants in Civil Case No. 783 entitled, "Carmelino M.
Santiago v. Remigio San Pascual, et al.," which respondent
instituted before the same trial court against squatters
occupying the Subject Property.
The Court believes that the trial court rightfully dismissed
petitioners’ Complaint, but for reasons different from those
relied upon by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners alleged in their Complaint, and respondent
hypothetically admitted that:
(1) Petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest, in the concept of
owners, had been in actual, physical, open, continuous and
adverse possession of the Subject Property against the whole
world since time immemorial;
(2) The Subject Property was part of the vast tract of land called
"Hacienda Quibiga" awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by
the Queen of Spain by virtue of a Spanish title;
(3) Ismael Favila, an heir and successor-in-interest of Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez, acting as Attorney-in-Fact pursuant to
a Special Power of Attorney executed by his "mga kapatid" on
25 February 1965, executed Deeds of Assignment covering the
Subject Property in favor of petitioners;
(4) Petitioners still occupied and possessed the Subject
Property, on which their houses were erected, when they
discovered that the Subject Property was already covered by
Torrens certificates of title in the name of respondent; and (5)
That petitioners filed the Complaint to prevent their eviction by
the respondent. To determine whether these allegations are
sufficient to constitute a cause of action, it is important for this
Court to establish first the nature of petitioners’ action.
In their instant Petition, petitioners further averred that rather
than an action for nullity of respondent’s certificates of title,
theirs was more appropriately an action to remove a cloud on
or to quiet their title over the Subject Property.
Article 476 of the Civil Code, on removal of a cloud on or
quieting of title, provides that:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or
any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or
effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable,
or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action
may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being
cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.
Respondent’s certificates of title over the Subject Property
appeared valid or effective; but according to the petitioners,
they were fake, spurious and/or fraudulent, and a cloud on
their title to the same property that needed to be removed. A
cloud on title has been defined as follows:
Cloud on Title. – A cloud on title is an outstanding instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is actually
invalid or inoperative, but which may nevertheless impair or
affect injuriously the title to property. The matter complained
of must have a prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy. The cloud on title is a semblance of title which appears
in some legal form but which is in fact unfounded. The invalidity
or inoperativeness of the instrument is not apparent on the
face of such instrument, and it has to be proved by extrinsic
evidence
Even as this Court agrees with the petitioners that their action
was one for removal of a cloud on or quieting of title, it does
arrive at the same conclusion as the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that petitioners had no personality to file the said
action, not being the parties-in-interest, and their Complaint
should be dismissed for not stating a cause of action.
According to Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff, in an
action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title, must have legal or
equitable title to, or interest in, the real property which is the
subject matter of the action. Petitioners failed to establish in
their Complaint that they had any legal or equitable title to, or
legitimate interest in, the Subject Property so as to justify their
right to file an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
Title to real property refers to that upon which ownership is
based. It is the evidence of the right of the owner or the extent
of his interest, by which means he can maintain control and, as
a rule, assert right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the
property.
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed title to the Subject
Property by virtue of their actual and continuous possession of
the same since time immemorial, by themselves and through
their predecessors-in-interest. Yet, the Deeds of Assignment
executed by Ismael Favila in their favor, attached to and an
integral part of their Complaint, revealed that petitioners’
predecessors-in-interest based their right to the Subject
Property on the Spanish title awarded to Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez.
There existed a contradiction when petitioners based their
claim of title to the Subject Property on their possession thereof
since time immemorial, and at the same time, on the Spanish
title granted to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Possession since
time immemorial carried the presumption that the land had
never been part of the public domain or that it had been private
property even before the Spanish conquest. If the Subject
Property was already private property before the Spanish
conquest, then it would have been beyond the power of the
Queen of Spain to award or grant to anyone.
The title to and possession of the Subject Property by
petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest could be traced only as far
back as the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.
Petitioners, having acquired portions of the Subject Property by
assignment, could acquire no better title to the said portions
than their predecessors-in-interest, and hence, their title can
only be based on the same Spanish title.
Respondent maintained that P.D. No. 892 prevents petitioners
from invoking the Spanish title as basis of their ownership of
the Subject Property. P.D. No. 892 strengthens the Torrens
system by discontinuing the system of registration under the
Spanish Mortgage Law, and by categorically declaring all lands
recorded under the latter system, not yet covered by Torrens
title, unregistered lands. It further provides that within six
months from its effectivity, all holders of Spanish titles or grants
should apply for registration of their land under what is now
P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration
Decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles can no longer be used as
evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings
under the Torrens system. Indubitably, P.D. No. 892 divests the
Spanish titles of any legal force and effect in establishing
ownership over real property.
P.D. No. 892 became effective on 16 February 1976. The
successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez had only until 14
August 1976 to apply for a Torrens title in their name covering
the Subject Property. In the absence of an allegation in
petitioners’ Complaint that petitioners’ predecessors-in-
interest complied with P.D. No. 892, then it could be assumed
that they failed to do so. Since they failed to comply with P.D.
No. 892, then the successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez
were already enjoined from presenting the Spanish title as
proof of their ownership of the Subject Property in registration
proceedings.
Registration proceedings under the Torrens system do not
create or vest title, but only confirm and record title already
created and vested. By virtue of P.D. No. 892, the courts, in
registration proceedings under the Torrens system, are
precluded from accepting, confirming and recording a Spanish
title. Reason therefore dictates that courts, likewise, are
prevented from accepting and indirectly confirming such
Spanish title in some other form of action brought before them
(i.e., removal of cloud on or quieting of title), only short of
ordering its recording or registration. To rule otherwise would
open the doors to the circumvention of P.D. No. 892, and give
rise to the existence of land titles, recognized and affirmed by
the courts, but would never be recorded under the Torrens
system of registration. This would definitely undermine the
Torrens system and cause confusion and instability in property
ownership that P.D. No. 892 intended to eliminate.
Petitioners argued that the Spanish title may still be presented
as proof of ownership on the basis of the exception provided in
the fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892, which reads:
WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been
brought under the operation of the Torrens system, being
subject to prescription, are now ineffective to prove ownership
unless accompanied by proof of actual possession; . . .
Since Petitioners alleged that they were in actual possession of
the Subject Property, then they could still present the Spanish
title as evidence of their ownership of the Subject Property.
This Court cannot sustain petitioners’ argument. Actual proof
of possession only becomes necessary because, as the same
whereas clause points out, Spanish titles are subject to
prescription. A holder of a Spanish title may still lose his
ownership of the real property to the occupant who actually
possesses the same for the required prescriptive period.
Because of this inherent weakness of a Spanish title, the
applicant for registration of his Spanish title under the Torrens
system must also submit proof that he is in actual possession of
the real property, so as to discount the possibility that someone
else has acquired a better title to the same property by virtue
of prescription.
Moreover, legislative intent must be ascertained from a
consideration of the statute as a whole, and not just a particular
provision alone. A word or phrase taken in the abstract may
easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually
intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered
with those with which it is associated. An apparently general
provision may have a limited application if read together with
other provisions of the statute.
The fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892 should be
interpreted and harmonized with the other provisions of the
whole statute.40 Note that the tenor of the whole presidential
decree is to discontinue the use of Spanish titles and to strip
them of any probative value as evidence of ownership. It had
clearly set a deadline for the filing of applications for
registration of all Spanish titles under the Torrens system (i.e.,
six months from its effectivity or on 14 August 1976), after
which, the Spanish titles may no longer be presented to prove
ownership.
All holders of Spanish titles should have filed applications for
registration of their title on or before 14 August 1976. In a land
registration proceeding, the applicant should present to the
court his Spanish title plus proof of actual possession of the real
property. However, if such land registration proceeding was
filed and initiated after 14 August 1976, the applicant could no
longer present his Spanish title to the court to evidence his
ownership of the real property, regardless of whether the real
property was in his actual possession.
Therefore, the fact that petitioners were in actual possession of
the Subject Property when they filed the Complaint with the
trial court on 29 April 1996 does not exclude them from the
application of P.D. No. 892, and their Spanish title remain
inadmissible as evidence of their ownership of the Subject
Property, whether in a land registration proceeding or in an
action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
The preceding discussion does not bar holders of Spanish titles
from claiming ownership of the real property on some other
basis, such as those provided in either the Land Registration
Decree or the Public Land Act. Petitioners though failed to
allege any other basis for their titles in their Complaint aside
from possession of the Subject Property from time immemorial,
which this Court has already controverted; and the Spanish
title, which is already ineffective to prove ownership over the
Subject Property.
Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject
Property, the petitioners lacked the personality to file an action
for removal of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and their
Complaint was properly dismissed for failing to state a cause of
action. In view of the dismissal of the case on this ground, it is
already unnecessary for this Court to address the issue of
prescription of the action.
Wherefore, this Court DENIES the instant petition and AFFIRMS
the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 29 July 2002, and
the Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal,
Branch 77, dated 05 February 1999, dismissing petitioners’
Complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
SO ORDERED.
3. Director of Lands v. CA (GR 50340)
This is an application for the registration of 291 hectares of land
located on both sides of the Sorsogon-Albay national highway
at Barrios Salvacion and Esperanza, Pilar, Sorsogon.
In its 1977 decision, the Court of Appeals denied the
application. However, in its 1979 resolution, it reversed itself
and granted the application. The Director of Lands appealed to
this Court.
The issue is whether that big tract of land is registerable under
section 48(b) of the Public Land Law as amended by Republic
Act No. 1942, considering that it was declared alienable and
disposable by the Director of Forestry only on April 28, 1961
Applicant's evidence shows that on March 13, 1952 Tomas
Cevallos, single, a Filipino citizen residing at Barrio Salvacion,
Pilar, Sorsogon and his sister, Alberta Cevallos Vda. de Vasquez,
a Spanish citizen residing at Esgueva 18 Valladolid, Spain sold
for P50,000 to Soledad Fajardo Vda. de Salazar, a resident of
Legaspi City, five lots with a total area of 291.5 hectares
assessed at P40,670. The deed of sale does not indicate how
the Cevalloses became the owners of that land. They had no
Spanish title.
More than thirteen years later, or on July 30, 1965, Mrs. Salazar
allegedly sold the five lots to her four children named Jose,
Jesus, Pedro and Aurora, for P20,000 only. The three Salazar
brothers and their sister secured tax declarations for their
respective lots. Their total assessed value was P49,880.
The 1965 tax declarations disclosed that out of the total area of
291 hectares, only about 96 hectares were supposed to be
planted to coconuts, rice and abaca and the rest, or 195
hectares were cogon or uncultivated land. It is noteworthy that
the 37-hectare Lot 2 allocated to Aurora F. Salazar (single) had
no permanent improvements in 1966. Five hectares of Lot 2
were planted to rice and the rest of 32 hectares were cogon
land.
On September 22, 1965, or barely two months after their
purchase of the five lots, the Salazars filed their application for
registration. They alleged that the 291-hectare land was
occupied by their overseer, Nicolas Millevo, a resident of Barrio
Esperanza. Millevo did not testify at the hearing. So, his alleged
possession of the land in behalf of the Salazar applicants was
never proven.
The application was opposed by the Director of Lands and by
twenty-five occupants of the land.
Land Inspector Baldomero Esperida in his report dated May 21,
1968 recommended that the application be opposed. During
his ocular inspection of the lots, he ascertained the nature of
the improvements thereon and the persons who effected
them. He found that "the improvements introduced on these
five parcels of land were first made by the ancestors of the
present occupants (meaning the private oppositors), which
occupation have (has) been open, continuous, peaceful and
exclusive, and in concept of owner" and that "due perhaps to
sheer ignorance, the present occupants nor their predecessors-
ancestors has (have) never filed any public land applications for
the respective parcels that they have been occupying".
As indicated in Esperida's findings, quoted below, the
occupants refused to acknowledge the alleged ownership of
the applicants.
"In the year 1966 one Aurora Salazar came to the premises and
informed the occupant-farmers that the lands (that) they were
cultivating for a long time are the properties of the Salazar
family.
"The occupant-farmers were likewise informed that from then
on they must give 20% share of the harvest of whatever crops
that they may produce on the land. They were also requested
to sign contract papers regarding their cultivation and stay on
the respective parcels.
"These occupant-farmers refused to sign these contract papers
presented to them, on the belief that they have a better right
to the land against any other persons due to the length of time
that they have occupied the land.
"Almost all of these occupant-farmers were born on the very
parcels that they are presently cultivating".
Esperida found that Lot I, with an area of 75.99 hectares, was
fully cultivated by eleven occupant-farmers.
Each of them occupies an average of four hectares planted to
upland rice, coconuts, fruit trees and root crops. They
constructed houses near the areas cultivated by them and the
national road.
Ten other farmers have occupied and cultivated an area of ten
hectares and built their respective houses thereon.
But the northern portion of Lot 1, where there are 300 fruit-
bearing coconut trees, is in the possession of Rufino Balayo, Jr.,
the overseer of the Salazar family, who has a house in that
portion. Nevertheless, Felix Llantos, who lives on the other side
of the road opposite the coconut trees, claims that he and his
deceased father planted those coconuts and that it was only in
1966 when the possession thereof was taken from him against
his will.
Land Inspector Esperida found that Lot 2, with an area of 37.5
hectares planted to coconuts, fruit trees, upland rice, bananas
and root crops, was occupied by fourteen farmers with houses
on the said lot, namely.
Felix Llantos informed Esperida that the Salazars also deprived
him of the possession of more than one hundred coconut trees
(some of which are more than fifty years old) planted on Lot 2.
His house is in the said lot.
Inspector Esperida found that Lot 3, with an area of 121.3
hectares, planted also to coconuts, fruit trees, upland rice,
bananas and root crops, was occupied by twenty farmers with
portions of around two and a half hectares each and with
houses where their families resided.
According to Esperida, about fifty hectares of Lot 3 were
enclosed by the Salazars in 1965 with a barbed wire fence and
used as a ranch for about 80 head of cattle. The former
occupants of that pasture land planted it to abaca, bananas,
upland rice and root crops. They had to vacate that portion
because the cattle of the Salazars destroyed their plants. The
cattle also destroyed the crops of the farmers cultivating
portions of Lot 3 contiguous to the ranch.
The 1965 tax declaration in the name of Jesus F. Salazar shows
that ten hectares of Lot No. 4 were planted to abaca, eight
hectares were planted to upland rice and thirty-eight hectares
were uncultivated or cogon land. Lot No. 5 with an area of 4,592
square meters is devoted to upland rice.
As already stated, the crucial legal issue raised by the Director
of Lands is that the Appellate Court erred in holding that the
courts may classify lands into agricultural or forestal and in
disregarding the certification of the Bureau of Forestry that the
land in question became alienable or disposable only on April
28, 1961. That contention is meritorious.
The classification, delimitation and survey of lands of the public
domain are vested by sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Public Land Law
in the President of the Philippines upon the recommendation
of the Minister of Natural Resources. The assignment of forest
land for agricultural purposes is vested in the Minister, formerly
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Oppositors Felix Granadillos (whose father tilled the land even
during the Spanish regime), Apolinar Bolaños, Santiago Obligar,
Benito Burabud, Juan Castuira, Julian Oca and Higino Mancion
all testified that they wanted to file homestead applications for
the portions occupied by them but the officials of the Bureau
of Lands apprised them that the land was within the forest zone
and, therefore, not disposable. This point was omitted by the
trial court in its truncated summary of the evidence.
The Appellate Court held correctly through Justice Mariano
Serrano in its decision that whatever possession of the land the
Salazars and their predecessors might have had prior to April
28, 1961 cannot be credited to the thirty-year requirement
under section 48 (b).
Thus, forestal land, which was released for agricultural
purposes by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
in 1961, could not be registered immediately thereafter.
Land that was a part of the forest zone was not susceptible of
private ownership until November 28, 1923 when it was
reclassified and considered disposable and alienable by the
Director of Forestry.
Forestal land is not registerable. Its inclusion in a title, whether
the title be issued during the Spanish regime or under the
Torrens system, nullifies the title.
Section 48(b) cannot apply to forestal land before it is
declassified to form part of disposable public agricultural land.
A patent issued for forestal land is void. The State may sue for
its reversion to the public domain. Possession of forestal lands
cannot ripen into private ownership.
The other contention of the Director of Lands is that no
competent evidence was offered by the Salazars that they and
their predecessors have been in continuous, uninterrupted,
open, exclusive and notorious possession in the concept of
owner of the land for more than thirty years prior to 1965 when
they filed their application.
Tomas Cevallos originally claimed possession of 231 hectares
located in Barrio Esperanza. When he caused it to be surveyed
in 1949, the area of the land had been increased to 291
hectares or an increase of 60 hectares. The land extended to
Barrio Salvacion, a place not mentioned in his tax declarations.
How he came to have possessory right over 291 hectares is not
established in the record. His relationship to Policarpia Cevallos
who was mentioned in the early tax declaration, was not
shown.
It is noteworthy that while the two parcels with a total area of
231 hectares have as natural boundaries the Cagbacong River
and a brook, on the other hand, the five lots have as natural
boundaries not only the Cagbacong River but also the Kawilan
Creek, Lonoy Creek and a dried up creek. It was simply an
unwarranted appropriation of the public domain, a notorious
practice in land registration cases.
It is not clear whether the declarations and tax receipts refer to
the land acquired by the Salazars. For example, Exhibit N-8 was
presented as receipt for payment of the realty taxes for the
period from April 12, 1950 to April 12, 1951. Actually, it is a
receipt for P25 issued by the municipal treasurer of Pilar "for
annual firearm fee" for the .45 caliber pistol of Cevallos.
Applicant's Exhibit N may also be cited. This is a receipt dated
May 21, 1946 issued by the municipal treasurer of Pilar showing
that Cevallos paid P29.58 as full payment of the 1946 realty tax
of land located at Barrio Cagbacong, covered by Tax Declaration
No. 11833 with an assessed value of P3,380.
It is true that there is a tax declaration No. 11833 in the name
of Cevallos, identified as Exhibit H-12. It is dated September 12,
1928 but it refers to a parcel of land with an area of 175.6
hectares located at Barrio Esperanza (not Cagbacong) and with
a total assessed value of P26,900 (not merely P3,380) consisting
of P12,340 for the land and P14,560 for the improvements or
plantings thereon. Exhibit N is manifestly irrelevant to this case.
Exhibit N-2, a tax receipt dated May 30, 1946 issued to Cevallos,
is also irrelevant to this case because it refers to his two parcels
of land located in Barrio Esperanza covered by Tax Declarations
No. 13967 and 11832 which do not cover the land involved in
this case. The tax receipts identified as Exhibits N-3, N-4, N-5
and N-6 likewise do not refer to the land sought to be
registered.
Anyway, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not
supported by other evidence.
Such proofs are lacking in this case. The evidence shows that
numerous persons are in possession of portions of the disputed
land. It results that the Salazars failed to prove that they are
entitled to register the 291-hectare land in question.
WHEREFORE, the Appellate Court's resolution dated March 23,
1979 is reversed and set aside. Its decision of August 31, 1977
is affirmed. The application for registration is dismissed. Costs
against respondents Salazar.
SO ORDERED.
4. Tottoc v. IAC
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the former
Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. CV No. 00034, 1
reversing in toto the decision in Civil Case No. 2212 of the then
Court of First Instance.
The antecedental facts which led to the filing of the original
action below are undisputed and are hereinunder set forth as
synthesized by the court a quo and adopted by respondent
court.
On April 9, 1949, petitioner applied for the lease of a pasture
land consisting of 78.6 hectares, situated at Lacangan, Barrio
Madiangat, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, before the Bureau of
Forestry, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
thru the office of the Provincial Forester at Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya. By virtue of said application, petitioner was granted
Ordinary Pasture Permit Ps-993 after a survey of the area
involved. Thereafter, petitioner occupied said 78.6 hectares of
pasture land and fenced the same, without anybody disturbing
his possession thereof. Private respondent, being a neighbor of
petitioner, was aware of such occupation of the land by
petitioner since 1949.
On September 21, 1951, petitioner was again granted Ordinary
Pasture Permit Ps-993 Extension by Director of Forestry
Florencio Tamesis, authorizing the former to occupy the same
area, the first permit having expired on June 30, 1952. Finally,
on August 6, 1958, petitioner entered into a lease agreement
with the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Juan
de G. Rodriguez, under Pasture Lease Agreement No. 1228
covering the identical area for a period of 11 years.
Meanwhile, private respondent, upon verification from the
Bureau of Forestry supposedly before 1963 that the pasture
land in question was reportedly untouched and outside the
pasture land of petitioner, filed his application for a homestead
with the Bureau of Lands and entered the northern portion of
the land, clearing and cultivating an area of less than 4 hectares
in 1963.
On January 7, 1965, private respondent secured a certification
from Assistant Chief Maximo A. Abuan of the Bureau of Forestry
office in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, certifying to the fact that
the land in question is alienable and disposable. Private
respondent further claims to have secured another certification
from an employee of the Bureau of Lands who based the same
on a certification on file in the Bureau of Lands office as
furnished by the Bureau of Forestry.
On February 25, 1966, petitioner caused the relocation survey
of his pasture land in the presence of Bureau of Lands Inspector
Marcelino Hernaez and private respondent. It was found in said
survey that a portion of the land subject of private respondent's
application was within the pasture land of petitioner and within
the so-called Forest Zone. In view thereof, petitioner requested
Inspector Hernaez to send a telegram to the Director of Lands
in Manila reading: "Lands Director Jorge, Manila. Please hold
action homestead application Saturnino Doctor and Luis Carub,
Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. Re-investigation in progress. Land
claimed by Mayor Tottoc. Investigator Hernaez."
Aside from this survey, petitioner requested in a letter to the
office of the Bureau of Forestry at Nueva Vizcaya the relocation
survey of his pasture land pursuant to which the district
forester sent Forester Nicasio Pascua to relocate the same on
April 26, 1966. A cartographer of the Bureau of Lands, Eladio
Miranda, herein petitioner and private respondent, as well as
several laborers, were present during said relocation survey.
Thereafter, Forester Pascua submitted his memorandum,
dated May 3, 1966, to the bureau director indicating the
different positions of the lots that had encroached on the
pasture land of petitioner. Consequent to such findings,
Forester Pascua recommended that all certifications and/or
patents issued in favor of the lot owners or claimants of said
encroaching lots be nullified for the good of the public service.
On March 8, 1967, petitioner was granted another ordinary
pasture permit by Acting Director of Forestry Antonio Quejado
to occupy and use for pasture another 42 hectares of public
forest land situated in Inatub, Lacangan, Carolet and Buliwao,
Quezon, Nueva Vizcaya which made a total of 120.6 hectares of
land granted to petitioner for pasture purposes. Said additional
area was likewise fenced by petitioner.
On June 17, 1968, Original Certificate of Title No. P-3428 under
Homestead Patent No. 124175 was issued to private
respondent over a parcel of land situated in Inatub, Quezon,
Nueva Vizcaya, containing an area of approximately 20
hectares. Thereafter, private respondent and one Luis Carub
requested the Bureau of Forestry to relocate the pasture land
of petitioner to determine any encroachment on his land.
Forester Buenaventura Caguioa, on the instructions of the
Director of Forestry dated November 25, 1971 thru District
Forester Geronimo Falloran, conducted the relocation survey.
On March 1, 1972, Forester Caguioa submitted his
memorandum to the district forester indicating that the area in
the title granted to private respondent traversed a portion of
the pasture land of petitioner and that only 3.5 hectares, more
or less, was verified to be within the alienable and disposable
area. In view thereof, a recommendation was made that the
application filed by petitioner for the renewal of the pasture
lease agreement, which expired on June 30, 1969, be approved
and that only 3.5 hectares of land be retained by private
respondent.
On March 23, 1972, said memorandum report of District
Forester Falloran, was forwarded to the Director of Forestry,
Manila, through the Regional Director of the Bureau of
Forestry, Region No. 2, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, who in turn
indorsed the same on June 23, 1972. On November 29, 1972,
Mr. Aniceto Bueno, Officer-in-Charge of the Parks, Range and
Wildlife Division of the Bureau of Forest Development,
furnished petitioner a copy of the renewed Pasture Lease
Agreement No. 1228, dated November 9, 1972, entered into by
the petitioner with the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, Jose D. Drilon, Jr. The lease was for a period of 25
years, to expire on June 30, 1994, and covered the 120 hectares
of pasture land in Lacangan, Inatub, Carolet, Madiangat and
Buliwao, Quezon, Nueva Vizcaya.
With these documents in favor of petitioner, private
respondent was prevented from occupying and cultivating the
disputed portion of 16.5459 hectares. As a consequence,
private respondent, filed an action for recovery of possession
with damages. After trial, the court a quorendered judgment
on May 28, 1981 in favor of therein defendant and against the
plaintiff, and ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant the
amount of P1,400.00 as actual and litigation expenses,
P3,000.00 for attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of the suit.
On a "Partial Motion for Reconsideration" filed by petitioner,
and a "Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial" of private
respondent, as defendant and plaintiff, respectively, said
decision was amended by a resolution issued on January 7,
1982, the decretal portion whereof reads:
As stated at the outset, said decision and resolution were
appealed to respondent court which reversed and set aside the
same. A motion for reconsideration, dated October 15, 1984,
was filed by petitioner with respondent court with a
supplemental memorandum in support thereof, but the same
was denied in respondent court's resolution of January 28,
1985.
The present recourse is before us as a consequence. Succinctly
reduced to salient terms, petitioner's submissions are that
respondent court committed errors of law (1) in concluding
that the land in dispute is alienable by relying on the
certification issued by District Forester Abuan and in
disregarding the contrary testimonies and certifications of
Foresters Pascua and Caguioa; (2) in concluding that petitioner,
a pasture lease permittee, has no legal personality to question
the patent and title of private respondent Doctor over the
disputed area; and (3) when it ruled that private respondent is
entitled to the award of damages.
On the first assignment of error, petitioner maintains that
respondent court should not have relied on the certification
issued by District Forester Abuan, it being hearsay evidence by
reason of Abuan's failure to testify thereon. Moreover,
petitioner assails respondent courts disregard of the
testimonies of Foresters Pascua and Caguioa who certified that
the land was within the Forest Zone after having conducted an
actual verification survey of the area.
We agree with petitioner, but not only for the reason that the
evidence-in-chief of private respondent may, in point of strict
law, be constitutive of hearsay. The question as to whether a
particular portion of land is forestal or any other class of land is
a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular
case. 7 Thus, the mere classification or certification made by
the Bureau of Forestry that a part of the public domain is
timberland is not controlling in all cases.
We have reviewed the testimonies of the witnesses for private
respondent and nowhere do we find any cogent basis for the
certification made by District Forester Abuan. The testimony of
Sabino Delizo, District Land Officer of Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, which could possibly have energized private
respondent's case, is itself plagued with not a few vacuities.
Aside from his assertion and admission that the sole basis for
his certification was merely an office copy of the certification
also of Forester Abuan himself, Delizo further admitted that he
had not made any actual verification of the subject area. 9
Neither could he even conclusively establish that the lot
mentioned in his certification was identical to the lot in
question.
In diametrical contrast, the pasture lease permit granted to
petitioner was issued after a series of actual investigations,
ocular and technical, of the subject area by Foresters Pascua
and Caguioa conducted in the presence of all the interested
parties, including private respondent. While private respondent
denies having received any copy of the memoranda executed
by the foresters despite his admitted presence during the
surveys and investigations, 11 the same does not relieve him of
the consequences of imputed knowledge of the findings
therein considering the facility in obtaining copies of the same.
Besides, it is an affront to credulity that a person like private
respondent who, despite his zeal and desire to possess and own
the land in controversy, would prefer to remain in deliberate
ignorance of the results of said surveys through his unexplained
inaction and inexplicable indifference.
Notably, even before the relocation survey made by Forester
Caguioa, Bureau of Lands Inspector Hernaez conducted his own
survey and found that the land subject of private respondent's
application for a homestead patent was within the pasture land
of petitioner and within the Forest Zone. Precisely, an advice to
hold said application was sent to the Director of Lands in Manila
upon petitioner's request.
It will also be recalled that consequent to Forester Pascua's
survey and findings, a further recommendation was made to
the Director of Forestry for the nullification of all certifications
and/or patents issued in favor of the owners and/or claimants
whose lots had intruded upon petitioner's land area, including
private respondent himself, such invalidation being
necessitated for the good of the public service. 13 All these on-
the-spot surveys, the findings where from are unassailed and
uncontradicted, more than preponderate over and definitely
override the enervated evidentiary value of the certification of
Abuan and Delizo.
While we admit an exception to the rule that the Bureau of
Forestry has the power to set aside for forestry or mineral
purposes a particular land in question, 1 4 and that is when
there was prior intervention of private interests, said exception
cannot find application in private respondent's favor since
petitioner's interests commenced and vested very much earlier
than any claim thereon by the former.
Petitioner had open, uninterrupted and peaceful possession
and occupation of the disputed land since 1949, being a
grantee of pasture lease permits which expired in 1969. Private
respondent, on the other hand, started his controversial
cultivation of the lot only in 1963 and secured the questioned
certification in 1965. 15 The long period of time from 1949 to
1969 during which the land was under pasture lease permits
granted to petitioner all the more lends credence to the fact
that said land was within the Forest Zone as only lands of the
category of public forest land can be the subject of such
permits.
The Court neither loses sight of the presumption, in lieu of
contrary proof, that the land is agricultural in character, rather
than forestal, as it is for the good of the country to have the
large public domain come under private ownership. 17 It is to
be emphasized, however, that such presumption obtains only
when the conflict of interest is between a private citizen and
the Government, not when it involves opposing rights of private
citizens against each other.
On the second assigned error, private respondent makes the
riposte that petitioner cannot question the validity of the title
registered in the former's name. If there is any party who can
question his title on the ground that it includes therein a forest
land, private respondent posits that it should be the Bureau of
Forest Development. This counter-argument is an effete
pretension.
In the case of Gatchalian vs. Pavilin, et al., 19 the Court had the
occasion to render the following ruling:
"As to the alleged lack of personality of defendants-appellants
to assail appellee's land grant and certificate of title for the
reason that said appellants are mere prospective homestead
applicants, it is sufficient to remark that by reason of their prior
occupancy and cultivation, these parties have already acquired
possessory rights that they may vindicate and defend against
intruders without better title. And if it be true that the Bureau
of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue a patent in favor of
appellee Francisco Gatchalian because the land involved was
still inalienable forest land when granted, then it may be
plausibly contended that her patent title would be ab initio void
subject to attack at any time by any party adversely affected
(Civil Code, Arts. 1409, 1421; Vano vs. Insular Gov't., 41 Phil.
161; Adorable vs. Dir. of Forestry, L-13663, 25 March 1960). . .
."
Moreover, in Vallarta, et al. vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al., 20 where the original proceeding was also
between private citizens, we held:
"It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that
forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not
registrable. The adverse possession which can be the basis of a
grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot
commence until after forest land has been declared alienable
and disposable. Possession of forest land, no matter how long
cannot convert it into private property. . . . If somehow forest
land happens to have been included in a Torrens Title, the title
is null and void insofar as the forest land is concerned. . . .."
Ironically, it was private respondent himself who initiated the
original action below for recovery of possession with damages.
As a consequence, petitioner was virtually compelled to litigate
in order to protect his own right to possession which in part
hinged on the nature of the land in dispute. Were we to uphold
private respondent's theory that petitioner is devoid of
personality to question the invalidity of the former's patent and
title, that would be a procedural inequity since it would thereby
prevent petitioner from fully protecting his interests or, at the
very least, divest him of valid defenses.
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision and resolution of
respondent court are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
decision of the trial court, dated January 7, 1982, on the partial
motion for reconsideration by herein petitioner as defendant
therein, except as to the award of attorney's fees and the
payment of the costs of suit both of which have no legal bases
and are consequently ordered deleted, is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
5. Alba Vda. De Raz v. CA
Private respondent Jose Lachica filed an application for title to
land on April 28, 1958 with the claim that the land applied for
was purchased by him and his wife, Adela Raz from one Eulalio
Raz. Petitioners filed an opposition to the application for title
contending that they have been in peaceful, continuous and
open possession, under claim of ownership, of the substantial
portion of the land applied for titling. On the basis of the
testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the
applicant and the oppositors, the court a quo rendered
judgment declaring the parcel of land described in Plan Psu-
161277 and the improvements thereon be brought under the
operation of the Property Registration Decree and the title
thereto be registered in the name of Jose Lachica. The
opposition filed by petitioners was dismissed for lack of merit.
Dissatisfied, petitioners interposed an appeal, but the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this
appeal. The primordial issue to be resolved is whether or not
the private respondent/applicant is entitled to the confirmation
of his ownership in fee simple for the 4,845 square meter parcel
of land he applied for.
The Court found the petition meritorious. The Court ruled that
both the trial and appellate courts erred in awarding the
questioned land totally to private respondent. A circumspect
scrutiny of the evidence extant on record revealed that with the
exception of 620 square meters, there had been no satisfactory
showing of how private respondent/applicant acquired the
remainder of the subject land. Particularly, respondent did not
produce the alleged deeds of conveyance evidencing the
purported transfers made by Eulalio Raz and Eufrocino Alba in
his favor. Instead he relied on secondary evidence to prove the
existence thereof which was sustained by both the trial and the
appellate courts. Such reliance on secondary evidence vis-a-vis
the peculiar facts prevailing in this case rest on infirm legal
bases much more so in the fact of the overwhelming
documentary evidence of petitioners arrayed against it.
Moreover, there were glaring variances in the identities and
technical descriptions of the land applied for by private
respondent/applicant and the land purportedly purchased
from Eufrocino Alba. Furthermore both trial and appellate
courts placed undue reliance on Tax Declaration No. 14181
considering that there was no satisfactory explanation on how
the area of land covered by said Tax Declaration geometrically
ballooned from a modest 620 square meter lot to a huge parcel
measuring 4,845 square meters. In sum, the Court had
reservation on the propriety of adjudicating to petitioners the
contested portions of the subject land, in view of their failure
to present the technical descriptions of these areas.
Furthermore, there was no sufficient evidence showing that
petitioners have been in open, adverse, exclusive, peaceful and
continuous possession thereof, in the concept of owner,
considering that the testimony of petitioner Octabela Alba vda.
De Raz was stricken off the record. The decision of the trial
court was modified
Property; Tax Declaration by Itself; Is Not Conclusive Evidence Of
Ownership; Case At Bar. — A tax declaration, by itself, is not
conclusive evidence of ownership. Tax declarations for a certain
number of years, although constituting proof of claim of title to
land, is not incontrovertible evidence of ownership unless they
are supported by other effective proof. It was, thus, held in one
case that where realty taxes covering thirty-one (31) years were
paid only a few months prior to the filing of an application, such
payment does not constitute sufficient proof that the applicant
had a bona fide claim of ownership prior to the filing of the
application. Still in another case, the claim that the application
had been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the
disputed land was not given credence because it was negated
by the fact that he declared the land for taxation purposes in
October 1959 when he filed his application for registration
although he could have done so in 1937 when he allegedly
purchased the land. A belated declaration is, furthermore,
indicative that the applicant had no real claim of ownership
over the subject land prior to the declaration and where there
are serious discrepancies in the tax declarations as in this case,
registration must be denied. If at all, the foregoing facts only
serves to underscore private respondent/applicant's crafty
attempt to cloak with judicial color his underhanded scheme to
seize the adjoining parcels of land and to enrich himself at the
expense of its rightful owners.
6. South City Homes, Inc. v. Republic
The subject of this dispute is a strip of land between two lots
owned by the petitioner. It has an area of 613 square meters
and is situated in Calabuso, Biñan, Laguna. It was discovered
only in 1983 after a survey conducted by the Bureau of Lands
and is now identified as Lot No. 5005 of the Biñan Estate. 1
Registration thereof in the name of the petitioner was decreed
in 1984 by the trial court pursuant to the Property Registration
Law. 2 On appeal, the order was reversed by a special division
of the respondent court, with two members dissenting. 3 The
petitioner is now before us, claiming that the reversal was
erroneous.
The two lots bordering the subject property are Lot No. 2381,
containing an area of 36,672 square meters, and Lot No. 2386-
A, containing an area of 32,011 square meters. Both are now
registered in the name of the petitioner. The history of these
lots is described by the trial court as follows:
The record shows that Lot 2381 was purchased on installment
basis by Basilia Dimaranan, and Lot 2386 was acquired under
similar condition by Fernando Guico, both from the Friar Lands
Division of the Bureau of Lands (Exhs. "S" and "R") in the year
1910. Eight (8) years thereafter, installment-payment for Lot
2386 was completed in favor of Basilia Dimaranan. On the other
hand, Lot 2381 was on September 12, 1911 assigned to
Bartolome Peña who continued and completed the installment
payments culminating into the issuance in his name of Patent
No. 19138 on September 26, 1919. From Bartolome Peña, Lot
2381 was acquired by Fidel M. Cabrera, Sr. and the title was
transferred to his name (Exh. "F") while Lot 2386 was acquired
by the Garcias (Exh. "J-2"). On August 27, 1981, Lot 2386-A was
sold by the Garcias to the applicant South City Homes, Inc. (Exh.
"J"). Lot 2381 was on February 25, 1977 sold by Fidel M.
Cabrera, Sr. to Koo Jun Eng (Exh. "G") who in turn assigned the
property to the applicant in February of 1981 (Exh. "H"). 4
It is the position of the petitioner that Lot No. 5005 should be
registered in its name for either of two reasons. The first is that
the disputed strip of land really formed part of Lots 2381 and
2386-A but was omitted therefrom only because of the
inaccuracies of the old system of cadastral surveys. The second
is that it had acquired the property by prescription through
uninterrupted possession thereof in concept of owner, by itself
and its predecessors-in-interest, for more than forty years.
For its part, the Republic of the Philippines argues that the
elongated piece of land between the two lots now owned by
the petitioner used to be a canal which could not have been
appropriated by the purchasers of the adjacent lots or their
successors-in-interest. Neither could it be deemed included in
the lots now owned by the petitioner because their respective
technical descriptions indicate otherwise. Prescription is also
not applicable because the petitioner has not established the
requisite possession of the lot, as to manner and length, to
justify judicial confirmation of title in its name.
The parties also differ on the nature of the disputed lot. The
petitioner insists it is patrimonial property of the State, being
part of the so-called Friar Lands, while the Republic maintains
it is part of the public domain and cannot therefore be acquired
by a private corporation. But this disagreement is irrelevant, as
will appear later.
The Court has considered the issues and the arguments of the
parties and finds that the petition has no merit.
To argue that Lot No. 5005 is really a part of the other two lots
owned by the petitioner is to oppose the obvious. What is
obvious is the technical descriptions of the two lots whose
areas do not include the strip of land between them. The
petitioner points to the original survey of the lands in 1906
which states that the two lots adjoin each other, without
mention of what is now Lot No. 5005. But it forgets that it has
itself suggested that the old surveys were inaccurate, which
could explain the omission.
If it is true that there was no canal between the two lots at the
time of their survey, then the disputed strip of land should have
been included as part of either of the two adjoining lots. It was
not. The petitioner itself insists that the canal, if there ever was
one, had disappeared after it had been filled with silt and dirt.
The result was the segregation of a third and separate lot, now
known as Lot No. 5005. Notably, the area of that dried-up canal
is not negligible as to come under what the petitioner calls the
allowable margin of error in the original survey.
The Republic submits that the petitioner and its predecessors-
in-interest could not have appropriated the strip of land
because it used to be a canal over which they could not have
acquired any exclusive right. The applicable law is Act No. 1120,
otherwise known as the Friar Lands Act, providing in its Section
19 as follows:
No purchaser or lessee under this Act shall acquire any
exclusive rights to any canal, ditch, reservoir, or other irrigation
works, or to any water supply upon which such irrigation works
are or may be dependent, but all of such irrigation works and
water supplies shall remain under the exclusive control of the
Government of the Philippine Islands and be administered
under the direction of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands
for the common benefit of those interest dependent upon
them. And the Government reserves as a part of the contract
of sale in each instance the right to levy an equitable
contribution or tax for the maintenance of such irrigation
works, the assessment of which shall be based upon the
amount of benefits received, and each purchaser under this
Act, by accepting the certificate of sale or deed herein provided
to be given, shall be held to assent thereto. And it is further
provided that all lands leased or conveyed under this Act shall
remain subject to the right of such irrigation canals, ditches,
and reservoirs as now exist or as the Government may
hereafter see fit to construct.
According to the respondent court, the fact that the canal had
been filled up did not change its nature as a canal; it was still a
canal although it had dried up. We do not think so. A canal
without water is not a canal. The status of a canal is not
perpetual. Consequently, the above provision is not applicable
and cannot defeat the petitioner's claim to the disputed
property either as part of two other lots or as a separate lot.
As we have already rejected the contention that the third lot
was part of the other two lots, the petitioner must fall back on
its claim of acquisitive prescription over it as a separate lot. Its
submission is that its possession of the lot dates back to "time
immemorial," by which tired phrase it is intended to convey the
idea that the start of such possession can no longer be
recollected. Indeed, it can be. The petitioner's possession does
not in fact go back to "time immemorial" but only to the recent
remembered past.
The petitioner presented only two witnesses whose testimony
regarding its supposed possession of Lot No. 5005 is essentially
hearsay and inherently inadequate. Thus, Rogelio Constantino,
an employee of the petitioner, declared on the stand:
A Yes sir, as a matter of fact we were duly informed that since
the beginning even from the time of their predecessors-in-
interest, such strip of land was believed to be forming part of
the two parcels of land and since the beginning they have been
cultivating the same and treating the said strip of land as their
own, publicly, notoriously and in the concept of owner.
The other witness, Meliton Casunuran, was more explicit but
his testimony is largely hearsay also, let alone the fact that the
possession he sought to establish is likewise insufficient.
According to him, he worked as a tenant on the land for the
previous owners of the other two lots before these were
acquired by the petitioner and that the subject property was
regarded as part of their lots by their respective owners. Thus
he declared:
According to them, it happened this way — that from time
immemorial, there was an irrigation canal constructed on this
strip of land. After the cadastral survey of the lots in Biñan, this
canal gradually disappeared by the filing up of dirt and silt, until
such time that no one could notice anymore a canal on this strip from Koo Jun Eng and the Garcia spouses. However, even if it
of land, such that the same was taken possession of by both the be conceded that the previous owners of the other two lots
owners of Lot 2381 and Lot 2386 and had it planted with rice in possessed the disputed lot, their possession cannot be tacked
the same way that the two parcels of riceland were planted at to the possession of the petitioner. The simple reason is that
that time. And I was likewise informed by my predecessor that the possession of the said lot was not and could not have been
I have also to till the strip of land, the same having been transferred to the petitioner when it acquired Lots Nos. 2381
considered as properly owned and forming part and parcel of and 2386-A because these two lots did not include the third lot.
Lots 2381 and 2386 and owned by the respective owners.
Article 1138 of the Civil Code provides that —
The underscored portions stress the unreliableness of these
(1) The present possessor may complete the period necessary
declarations, which, in the case of Constantino, is also suspect
for prescription by tacking his possession to that of his grantor
as self-serving.
or predecessor-in-interest.
The testimony falls short of establishing the manner and length
However, tacking of possession is allowed only when there is a
of possession required by law to vest prescriptive title in the
privity of contract or relationship between the previous and
petitioner to Lot No. 5005. For one thing, as the Solicitor
present possessors. In the absence of such privity, the
General points out in his Comment, the claim of adverse
possession of the new occupant should be counted only from
ownership to the strip of land between their respective lots was
the time it actually began and cannot be lengthened by
not exclusive but shared by the predecessors-in-interest of the
connecting it with the possession of the former possessors.
petitioner. For another, and more importantly, the length of
Thus it has been held:
possession claimed by the petitioner is not sufficient to vest
prescriptive title in it. A deed, in itself, creates no privity as to land outside its calls.
Nor is privity created by the bare taking of possession of land
Casunuran's allegation that the claim of the petitioner's
previously occupied by the grantor. It is therefore the rule,
predecessors-in-interest to the disputed strip of land was "in
although sharply limited, that a deed does not of itself create
the concept of owner, open, public and adversely against the
privity between the grantor and the grantee as to land not
whole world" was fed to him with a leading question during the
described in the deed but occupied by the grantor in
ex parte hearing, thus:
connection therewith, although the grantee enters into
The witness was a farmer and could hardly be expected to possession of the land not described and uses it in connection
understand the legal significance of the question, to which he with that conveyed.
could have give only the short and simple answer "Yes." He did
Where a grantor conveys a specific piece of property, the
not and was not asked to elaborate. The statement was also not
grantee may not tack onto the period of his holding of an
corroborated by other witnesses or supported by documents
additional piece of property the period of his grantor's
showing that, indeed, the former owners of the two lots also
occupancy thereof to make up the statutory period. His grantor
asserted claims of ownership over the land in question. In fact,
has not conveyed such property or his interest therein, and
the only other evidence of such claim is the tax declaration on
there is no privity.
the said lot, which was made only in 1980.
It is said, in Hanlon v. Ten Hove, supra, that this role is not harsh,
But the more telling consideration, as the Court sees it, is this.
the court using the following language: "If A purchases and by
By the testimony of the two witnesses, the petitioner obviously
adverse possession obtains title to an adjoining 40 acres, it
meant to tack the possession of the two lots by the previous
would hardly be contended that a conveyance by him of the 40
owners to its own possession. There was no need for this
acquired by deed would carry with it title to the 40 acquired by
because the petitioner acquired ownership of Lot No. 2381 by
adverse possession. So if A acquires by deed a 40 acres and
assignment and Lot No. 2386-A by purchase; and such
obtains an adjoining strip 2 rods wide or some interest in it, his
ownership includes the right of possession. The petitioner is not
conveyance of the 40 acquired by deed does not carry with it
claiming prescriptive rights to these two lots, which had
his interest in the adjoining strip. If the sole defense here was
previously been registered in the name of the transferors. The
that of adverse possession, we would be obliged to hold that it
lot it is claiming by prescription is Lot No. 5005, which it did not
had not been made out."
acquire from the owner of the other two lots, or from any
previous private registered owner of the lot, as there was none. It should also be noted that, according to Article 1135 of the
Civil Code:
Neither of the owners of Lots Nos. 2381 or 2386-A, in their
respective deeds, transferred Lot No. 5005 to the petitioner; as In case the adverse claimant possesses by mistake an area
already explained, Lot No. 5005 was not part of either of the greater, or less, than that expressed in his title, prescription
two lots. The petitioner merely occupied the disputed strip of shall be based on the possession.
land believing it to be included in the two lots it had acquired
This possession, following the above quoted rulings, should be
limited only to that of the successor-in-interest; and in the case
of the herein petitioner, it should begin from 1981 when it
acquired the two adjacent lots and occupied as well the lot in
question thinking it to be part of the other two.
It follows that when the application for registration of the lot in
the name of the petitioner was filed in 1983, the applicant had
been in possession of the property for less than three years.
This was far too short of the prescriptive period required for
acquisition of immovable property, which is ten years if the
possession is in good faith and thirty years if in bad faith, or if
the land is public.
The weakness of the petitioner's position prevents this Court
from affirming the claim to the lot in question either as part of
the two other lots or by virtue of acquisitive prescription. And
having made this ruling, we find it unnecessary to determine
whether the land is patrimonial in nature or part of the public
domain.
The case of Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
12 on which the petitioner relied so strongly (to the point of
simply invoking it in a supplemental petition instead of filing its
memorandum), is not applicable. That decision, which reversed
the case of Manila Electric Co. v. Castro-Bartolome, 13 involved
a situation where the public land automatically became private
as a result of prescription clearly and indubitably established by
the claimant. In the case at bar, the petitioner's claim is rejected
not because it is a private corporation barred from acquiring
public land but because it has failed to establish its title to the
disputed lot, whatever its nature.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the
petitioner.
7. Palali v. Awisan
A person occupying a parcel of land, by himself and through his
predecessors-in-interest, enjoys the presumption of
ownership. Anyone who desires to remove him from the
property must overcome such presumption by relying solely on
the strength of his claims rather than on the weakness of the
defense.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Juliet Awisan claimed to be the owner5 of a parcel
of land in Sitio Camambaey, Tapapan, Bauko, Mountain
Province, allegedly consisting of 6.6698 hectares6 and covered
by Tax Declaration No. 147 in her name.7 On March 7, 1994,
she filed an action for quieting of title against petitioner
Modesto Palali, alleging that the latter occupied and
encroached on the northern portion of her property and
surreptitiously declared it in his name for tax purposes.8 We
shall refer to this land occupied by petitioner, which allegedly
encroached on the northern portion of respondent’s 6.6698-
hectare land, as the "subject property". Respondent prayed to
be declared the rightful owner of the northern portion, for the
cancellation of petitioner’s tax declaration, and for the removal
of petitioner and his improvements from the property.9
Respondent’s (Plaintiff’s) Allegations
According to respondent, the 6.6698 hectare land was
originally owned by her father, Cresencio Cadwising. The latter
testified that he and his wife were able to consolidate
ownership over the land by declaring them from public land as
well as by purchasing from adjoining landowners. He admitted
including in his tax declaration a communal sacred lot
(patpatayan) even if he did not acquire free patent title over
the same. As for the properties he bought, these were generally
purchased without any documentation, save for two.10
Cadwising also claimed having introduced improvements on
the subject property as early as the 1960s.11 The 6.6698
hectare land was mortgaged to the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP), which acquired it in the foreclosure sale. DBP
then sold the land to one Tico Tibong, who eventually donated
the same to respondent.
Petitioner’s (Defendant’s) Allegations
In his defense, petitioner denied the encroachment and
asserted ownership over the subject property. He maintained
that he and his ancestors or predecessors-in-interest have
openly and continuously possessed the subject land since time
immemorial. He and his siblings were born on that land and, at
that time, the area around the house was already planted with
bananas, alnos, and coffee.12 When his mother died, he buried
her in the lot beside the house in 1975; while his father was
buried near the same plot in 1993.13 His own home had been
standing on the property for the past 20 years. Petitioner
insisted that during this entire time, no one disturbed his
ownership and possession thereof.14
Sometime in 1974, petitioner declared the said land in his name
for taxation purposes.15 The said Tax Declaration indicates that
the property consists of 200 square meters of residential lot
and 648 square meters of rootcrop land (or a total of 848
square meters).
Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court
It is worth mentioning that both the complaint16 and the pre-
trial brief17 of respondent alleged encroachment only on the
northern portion of her 6.6698-hectare land. During trial,
however, respondent’s attorney-in-fact, Gregorio Awisan,18
and respondent’s predecessor-in-interest, Cresencio
Cadwising,19 both alleged that there was an encroachment in
the southern portion also. This was done without amending the
allegations of the complaint.
Confronted with this new allegation of encroachment on the
southern portion, petitioner tried to introduce his tax
declaration over the same (in the name of his deceased father),
but was objected to by respondent on the ground of
immateriality.20 After such objection, however, respondent
surprisingly and inconsistently insisted that the ownership of
the southern portion was included in the complaint and was an
issue in the case. The ensuing confusion over the subject of the
case is revealed in the following exchange between the parties’
lawyers:
The trial court, apparently relying on the allegations of the
complaint, ruled on the northern portion as the subject
property of the case.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After due trial, the Regional Trial Court of Bontoc, Mountain
Province, Branch 35, dismissed22 the complaint. It based its
decision on respondent’s failure to prove her allegation of
physical possession of the land. Going by the results of its ocular
inspection23 of the land in question, the trial court noted that
Cadwising (respondent’s predecessor-in-interest) could not
pinpoint and the court did not see any of the improvements
that Cadwising had allegedly introduced to the land.24 Thus,
the trial court held that respondent’s claim of ownership was
supported solely by her tax declarations and tax payment
receipts which, by themselves, are not conclusive proof of
ownership.25
In contrast, the trial court duly verified during the ocular
inspection the existence of the improvements introduced by
petitioner and his predecessors on the subject property.26
Moreover, the trial court observed that the witnesses for the
petitioner all lived continuously since their births within or near
Sitio Camambaey in Tapapan and that they knew the land very
well. They knew petitioner and his predecessors, as well as the
improvements introduced by them to the land. Thus, the trial
court found that the petitioner presented overwhelming proof
of actual, open, continuous and physical possession of the
property since time immemorial. Petitioner’s possession,
coupled with his tax declarations, is strong evidence of
ownership which convinced the court of his better right to the
property.
For purposes of clarity, we cite the dispositive portion of the
trial court’s Decision thus:
Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the defendant Modesto Palali and against the
plaintiff Juliet C. Awisan, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact,
Gregorio B. Awisan, as follows:
a) Ordering the dismissal of the complaint and costs against the
plaintiff;
b) Adjudging the defendant Modesto Palali as the owner and
lawful possessor of the subject property; and
c) The court cannot however grant the counterclaim of
defendant for lack of evidence to prove the same.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Respondent appealed the trial court’s decision to the CA, which
reversed the same. The CA found that petitioner failed to prove
actual possession of the entire 6.6698 hectare land, which the
CA believed to be the subject of the case. According to the
appellate court, petitioner was only able to prove actual
occupation of the portion where his house was located and the
area below where he had planted fruit-bearing plants.29
The CA also ruled that based on the ocular inspection report of
the trial
court, petitioner’s possession did not extend to the entire
6.6698 hectares. In its own words:
Likewise, the report on the ocular inspection of the land in
question divulges that the alleged possession of the land by
[petitioner] Modesto Palali does not extend to the entire
6.6698 hectares of the subject land. Not even in the sketch plan
of the land does it illustrate that the possession of the
[petitioner] refers to the entire subject land. Instead, the
possession of [petitioner] merely points to certain portions of
the subject land as drawn and prepared by the tax mappers.
From the foregoing testimony, no sufficient indicia could be
inferred that the possession of the [petitioner] refers to the
entire portion of the land.30
The appellate court also refused to give credence to
petitioner’s tax declaration. The CA held that petitioner’s Tax
Declaration No. 31793, which covers only an 848-square meter
property, is incongruous with his purported claim of ownership
over the entire 6.6698-hectare land.
Proceeding from this premise, the CA gave greater weight to
the documentary and testimonial evidence of respondent. The
presumption of regularity was given to the public documents
from which respondent traced her title to the subject property.
Thus, the CA awarded the entire 6.6698-hectare property to
respondent and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s tax
declaration (except for the 200-square meter residential lot
thereof which was not being claimed by respondent).31
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the unfavorable
Decision, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
Preliminary Matter
The CA Decision is based on a mistaken understanding of the
subject property
It is apparent that the CA Decision proceeded from an
erroneous understanding of what the subject property actually
is and what the trial court actually ruled upon. The CA was
under the mistaken impression that the subject property was
the entire 6.6698 hectares of land allegedly owned by
respondent under her Tax Declaration No. 147. Because of this,
the CA ruled against petitioner on the ground that he failed to
prove possession of the entire 6.6698 hectares. The CA also
disregarded petitioner’s Tax Declaration No. 31793 (despite
being coupled with actual possession) because the said tax
declaration covered only an 848-square meter property and did
not cover the entire 6.6698 hectare property. This is clear from
the following text lifted from the CA Decision:
The trial court’s finding that the defendant-appellee had
acquired the subject land by virtue of acquisitive prescription
cannot be countenanced. At the outset, the subject land being
claimed by the plaintiff-appellant as described in the complaint
is the 6.6698 hectares land [boundaries omitted]. The said
description is with the exclusion of the portion of land where
the residential house of the defendant-appellee is erected.
However, the adverse and exclusive possession offered by the
defendant-appellee, which includes his tax receipt, does not
refer to the entire land consisting of 6.6698 hectares being
claimed by the plaintiff-appellant. x x x The witnesses for the
defendant-appellee testified that indeed Modesto Palali’s
predecessors-in-interest have once built a house in
Camambaey, Tapapan, Bauko, Mt. Province, but whether or not
the defendant-appellee or his predecessor-in-interest have
actually, exclusively, notoriously, and adversely possessed the
entire 6.6698 hectares of land could not be deduced from their
testimonies. It could be gleaned from the testimony of
Consigno Saligen, that what the defendant-appellee actually
possessed and claim as their own is merely that portion where
the house is erected and that portion of land below the house
where Modesto Palali planted fruit-bearing plants. x x x
Likewise, the report on ocular inspection of the land in question
divulges that the alleged possession of the land by defendant-
appellee Modesto Palali does not extend to the entire 6.6698
hectares of the subject land. Not even in the sketch plan of the
land does it illustrate that the possession of the defendant-
appellee refers to the entire subject land. Instead, the
possession of the defendant-appellee merely points to certain
portions of the subject land as drawn and prepared by the "tax
mappers".
From the foregoing testimony, no sufficient indicia could be
inferred that the possession of the defendant-appellee refers
to the entire portion of the land.32
This was perhaps not entirely the appellate court’s fault,
because a reading of the issues presented by respondent to the
CA gives the wrong impression that the subject property is the
entire 6.6698 hectares:
x x x [T]he plaintiff-appellant elevated the matter on appeal
assigning the following errors committed by the trial court:
I
The trial court erred in failing to consider the overwhelming
superior documentary and oral evidence of the plaintiff Juliet
C. Awisan showing her ownership on (sic) the land in question
consisting of 6.6698 hectares described in her complaint
II
The trial court erred in adjudicating the land in question to the
defendant Modesto Palali who is a squatter on the land whose
tax declaration merely overlapped or duplicated that of the
plaintiff and which covered only a small portion of 200 square
meters of residential portion [sic] and 648 square meter of
rootcrop land.
xxxx
The foregoing formulation of the issues presented by
respondent before the CA erroneously described "the land in
question" as "consisting of 6.6698 hectares" and erroneously
stated that the trial court "adjudicated the land in question to
[petitioner]". Said formulation is very misleading because the
case before the trial court did not involve the ownership of the
entire 6.6698 hectares, but merely the northern portion
thereof – the property actually occupied by petitioner and
much smaller than 6.6698 hectares. Even if we go back to the
respondent’s complaint, we would find there that respondent
is claiming encroachment merely of the "northern portion" of
her 6.6698-hectare property, and not of the entire 6.6698
property.
Neither did the trial court adjudicate to petitioner the entire
6.6698-hectare land; it simply upheld petitioner’s right to the
property he is actually occupying. It only declared petitioner as
the lawful owner and possessor of the "subject property",
which is the property to the north of the 6.6698-hectare land
and occupied by petitioner. This is evident from the trial court’s
summary of the facts established by the respondent and her
witnesses, to wit:
During the hearing of the case, plaintiff and her witnesses
established and disclosed: x x x that only a portion of the entire
6.6 hectares in its northern portion located below and above
the residential house of the defendant Modesto Palali is now
the land in question as properly shown in the sketch of the land
covered by Tax Declaration No. 147 in the name of Juliet Awisan
x x x.35
Proceeding from a wrong premise as to what is the subject
property, the CA utterly failed to appreciate the evidence as
they relate to the parties’ claims. Thus, while the general rule is
that this Court is not a trier of facts, and that in a petition for
review under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised, the
Court is behooved to admit the instant case as an exception.
Issue
The issue in this case is who between the parties has the better
right to the subject property.
Our Ruling
Having gone over the parties’ evidence before the trial court,
we find adequate support for the trial court’s ruling in favor of
petitioner. The CA erred in reversing the trial court’s findings,
particularly because, as discussed above, such reversal was
premised on the CA’s erroneous understanding of the subject
property.
As found by the trial court, petitioner was able to prove his and
his predecessors’ actual, open, continuous and physical
possession of the subject property dating at least to the pre-
war era (aside from petitioner’s tax declaration over the subject
property). Petitioner’s witnesses were long time residents of
Sitio Camambaey. They lived on the land, knew their neighbors
and were familiar with the terrain. They were witnesses to the
introduction of improvements made by petitioner and his
predecessors-in-interest.
From their consistent, unwavering, and candid testimonies, we
find that petitioner’s grandfather Mocnangan occupied the
land during the pre-war era. He planted camote on the
property because this was the staple food at that time. He then
gave the subject property to his daughter Tammam, while he
gave a separate one to his son Pacolan Mocnangan. In the
1960s, Tammam and her husband Palalag cultivated the land,
built a cogon home, and started a family there. Palalag
introduced terraces and, together with his sons, built earth
fences around the property. Palalag’s family initially planted
bananas, coffee, and oranges; they later added avocadoes,
persimmons, and pineapples. When Tammam and Palalag died,
their son, petitioner herein, buried them in the subject property
and continued cultivating the land. He also constructed a new
home.
On the other hand, respondent relied merely on her tax
declaration, but failed to prove actual possession insofar as the
subject property is concerned. To be sure, respondent
attempted to prove possession of the subject property. Her
predecessor-in-interest, Cadwising, had allegedly introduced
improvements like a piggery, poultry, terracing, plantings, and
a barbed wire fence. However, not one of these alleged
improvements was found during the ocular inspection
conducted by the trial court. The absence of all his alleged
improvements on the property is suspicious in light of his
assertion that he has a caretaker living near the subject
property for 20 years. Cadwising did not even bother to explain
the absence of the improvements. The trial court’s rejection of
Cadwising’s assertions regarding the introduction of
improvements is therefore not baseless.
Thus, respondent having failed to prove possession, her claim
rests solely on her tax declaration. But tax declarations, by
themselves, are not conclusive evidence of ownership of real
property. In the absence of actual, public, and adverse
possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does
not prove ownership.37 Respondent’s tax declaration,
therefore, cannot serve as basis to oust petitioner who has
been in possession (by himself and his predecessors) of the
subject property since before the war.
Neither can respondent rely on the public instruments dealing
with the 6.6698-hectare property covered by her tax
declaration. Such public documents merely show the
successive transfers of the property covered by said
documents. They do not conclusively prove that the transferor
actually owns the property purportedly being transferred,
especially as far as third parties are concerned. For it may very
well be that the transferor does not actually own the property
he has transferred, in which case he transfers no better right to
his transferee. No one can give what he does not have – nemo
dat quod non habet.38 Thus, since respondent’s predecessor-
in-interest Cadwising appeared not to have any right to the
subject property, he transferred no better right to his
transferees, including respondent.
All told, we hold that as between the petitioner and the
respondent, it is the petitioner who has the better claim or title
to the subject property. While the respondent merely relied on
her tax declaration, petitioner was able to prove actual
possession of the subject property coupled with his tax
declaration. We have ruled in several cases that possession,
when coupled with a tax declaration, is a weighty evidence of
ownership.39 It certainly is more weighty and preponderant
than a tax declaration alone.
The preponderance of evidence is therefore clearly in favor of
petitioner, particularly considering that, as the actual possessor
under claim of ownership, he enjoys the presumption of
ownership.40 Moreover, settled is the principle that a party
seeking to recover real property must rely on the strength of
her case rather than on the weakness of the defense.41 The
burden of proof rests on the party who asserts the affirmative
of an issue. For he who relies upon the existence of a fact
should be called upon to prove that fact. Having failed to
discharge her burden to prove her affirmative allegations, we
find that the trial court rightfully dismissed respondent’s
complaint.
A final note. Like the trial court, we make no ruling regarding
the southern portion of the property (or Lot 3, as referred to by
the parties), because this property was not included in
respondent’s complaint. Although the Rules of Court provide
that "when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated
in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings,"42
such rule does not apply here. Respondent objected43 when
petitioner tried to prove his ownership of Lot 3 on the ground
of immateriality, arguing that ownership of Lot 3 was not an
issue. Respondent cannot now insist otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 27,
2002 Decision as well as the April 25, 2003 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52942 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The May 24, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Bontoc, Mountain Province, Branch 35 is REINSTATED
and AFFIRMED. Costs against respondent.
8. Republic v. Alconaba
To serve the ends of social justice, which is the heart of the
1987 Constitution, the State promotes an equitable distribution
of alienable agricultural lands of the public domain to deserving
citizens, especially the underprivileged. A land registration
court must, therefore, exercise extreme caution and prudent
care in deciding an application for judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title over such lands so that the public domain may
not be raided by unscrupulous land speculators.
At bar is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking to set aside the decision 2 of the Court of
Appeals of 26 August 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 64323, which
affirmed the decision 3 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Cabuyao, Laguna, 4 of 1 September 1998 in MTC LRC Case No.
06 ordering the registration in favor of the respondents of
parcels of land situated at Barangay Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On 14 November 1996, the respondents filed before the MTC
of Cabuyao, Laguna, an application 5 for registration of title
over five parcels of land, each with an area of 5,220 square
meters, situated in Barangay Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna. In their
application, they stated, among other things, that they are the
sole heirs of Spouses Melencio E. Melendez, Sr.,and Luz
Batallones Melendez, original owners of Lot 2111 of CAD-455,
with an area of 2.6 hectares. Their parents had been in
possession of the said property since 1949, more or less. After
the death of their mother and father on 19 February 1967 and
5 May 1976, respectively, they partitioned the property among
themselves and subdivided it into five lots, namely, Lots 2111-
A, 2111-B, 2111-C, 2111-D, and 2111-E. Since then they have
been in actual possession of the property in the concept of
owners and in a public and peaceful manner.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG),opposed the application on the
following grounds: (a) neither the respondents nor their
predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to the property
or have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question since 1945
or prior thereto; (b) the muniments of title, i.e., tax declaration
and tax receipts, presented by the respondents do not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide
right to registration of the land under Section 48(b),
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as The Public
Land Act, 6 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073; (c)
the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of a Spanish
title or grant can no longer be availed of by the respondents;
and (d) the land is part of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines.
At the trial on the merits, respondents Mauricio B. Melendez,
Jr.,and Carmencita M. Alconaba testified to establish their claim
over the subject lots. Mauricio claimed that he and his co-
respondents acquired by inheritance from their deceased
parents Lot 2111 of Cad-455, which is an agricultural land. Their
parents had been in possession of the said land since 1949 and
had been religiously paying the taxes due thereon. When their
parents died, he and his siblings immediately took possession
of said property in the concept of an owner, paid taxes, and
continued to plant rice thereon. On 24 June 1996, he and his
co-heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement with Partition
over the said lot and subdivided it into five lots.
For her part, Carmencita testified that Lot 2111 of Cad-455 had
been in the possession of their parents since 1940 and that
after the death of their parents she and her siblings
immediately took possession of it and religiously paid the taxes
thereon. The land is being cultivated by Julia Garal, their tenant.
She admitted that no improvements have been introduced by
their family on the lot. On cross examination, she admitted that
plans to sell the property were at hand.
In its decision of 1 September 1998, the trial court found that
the respondents have sufficiently established their family's
actual, continuous, adverse, and notorious possession of the
subject property for more than fifty-seven years, commencing
from the possession of their predecessors-in-interest in 1940,
and that such possession was in an adverse and public manner.
Likewise, it found that the land in question is alienable and
disposable and is not within any reservation or forest zone.
Thus, it confirmed the title of the respondents over the said
lots; directed the Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch,
to cause the registration of said parcels of land in the name of
the respondents upon payment of fees; and ordered the
issuance of a Decree of Registration once the decision becomes
final and executory.
Upon appeal 10 by the petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
The OSG argues that both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals erred in (a) giving weight to the self-serving
testimonies of Mauricio and Carmencita that the respondents
and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, and adverse possession of the lots in question in
the concept of an owner for at least thirty years; and (b) holding
that respondents' tax declaration is sufficient proof that they
and their parents have been in possession of the property for
at least thirty years, despite the fact that the said tax
declaration was only for the year 1994 and the property tax
receipts presented by the respondents were all of recent dates,
i.e., 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1996, and 1997. Finally, the OSG
states that even granting for the sake of argument that the
respondents have been in possession of the property since
1940, their adverse possession should be reckoned only from
28 September 1981 when the property was declared to be
within alienable and disposable zone.
The petition is meritorious.
While the rule is well settled that the findings of fact of
appellate courts are conclusive upon us, 11 there are
recognized exceptions thereto, among which is where the
findings of fact are not supported by the record or are so
glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of
discretion. 12 This exception is present in this case.
Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No.
1942, 13 reads as follows:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
This provision was further amended by P.D. No. 1073 14 by
substituting the phrase "for at least thirty years" with "since
June 12, 1945"; thus:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c),
Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the
sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
by the applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-interest,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945.
The date "12 June 1945" was reiterated in Section 14(1) of P.D.
No. 1529, 15 otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally
or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.(Emphasis
supplied).
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore,
prove the following: (a) that the land forms part of the
disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time
immemorial or since 12 June 1945.
There is no doubt that the subject property is part of the
disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain. But it is not clear as to when it was classified as
alienable and disposable by proper authorities.
We do not find merit in OSG's claim that the subject property
was classified as within the alienable and disposable zone only
on 28 September 1981, and hence, possession by respondents'
predecessors-in-interest before that date cannot be
considered. In support of this claim, the OSG relies on a
statement appearing in the survey plan marked as Exhibit "Q,"
which reads:
This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project
No. 23-A L.C. Map No. 004 certified on September 28, 1981 and
is outside any civil or military reservation.
As postulated by the respondents, the phrase "certified on
September 28, 1981" could not have meant that Lot 2111
became alienable and disposable only on 28 September 1981.
That date obviously refers to the time that Project No. 23-A L.C.
Map No. 004 was certified.
Neither can we give weight to the contention of the
respondents that since Project No. 23-A L.C. Map No. 004 of
which Lot 2111 forms part was approved on 31 December 1925
by the then Bureau of Forestry, Lot 2111 must have been
disposable and alienable as early as of that date. There is
nothing to support their claim that 31 December 1925 is the
date of the approval of such project or the date of the
classification of the subject property as disposable and
alienable public land. It is settled that a person who seeks
registration of title to a piece of land must prove his claim by
clear and convincing evidence. 16 The respondents have failed
to discharge the burden of showing that Lot 2111 was classified
as part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of
public domain as of 12 June 1945 or earlier.
Likewise, the respondent have miserably failed to prove that
they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject property under a bona fide claim of
ownership either since time immemorial or since 12 June 1945.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals based the finding of
fifty-seven years of possession by the respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest on the testimonies of Carmencita and
Mauricio. The two were aged 62 17 and 60, 18 respectively,
when they testified in 1997. Thus, they must have been born in
1935 and 1937, respectively. If the asserted possession lasted
for a period of fifty-seven years at the time they testified, the
same must have commenced sometime in 1940, or at the time
that Carmencita was just 5 years old and Mauricio, about 3
years old. It is quite impossible that they could fully grasp,
before coming to the age of reason, the concept of possession
of such a big tract of land and testify thereon nearly six decades
later. In short their testimonies could not be relied upon to
prove the adverse possession of the subject parcel of land by
their parents.
In any case, respondents' bare assertions of possession and
occupation by their predecessors-in-interest since 1940 (as
testified to by Carmencita 19 ) or since 1949 (as testified to by
Mauricio 20 and declared in respondents' application for
registration) are hardly "the well-nigh incontrovertible"
evidence required in cases of this nature. Proof of specific acts
of ownership must be presented to substantiate their claim.
They cannot just offer general statements which are mere
conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession. 21 Even
granting that the possession by the respondents' parents
commenced in 1940, still they failed to prove that their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these
words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention
of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other.
Possession is broader than occupation because it includes
constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the
word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect
of constructive possession. Taken together with the words
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to
qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. 22 Actual
possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally
exercise over his own property.
No evidence on record shows that Spouses Mauricio and Luz
Melendez cultivated, had control over, or used the whole or
even a greater portion of the tract of land for agricultural
purposes. 24 Moreover, only one tenant worked on the land,
and there is no evidence as to how big was the portion occupied
by the tenant. Moreover, there is no competent proof that the
Melendez Spouses declared the land in their name for taxation
purposes or paid its taxes. While tax receipts and declarations
are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they
constitute, at the least, proof that the holder has a claim of title
over the property. 25 The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes not only manifests one's sincere
and honest desire to obtain title to the property, but also
announces an adverse claim against the State and all other
interested parties with an intention to contribute needed
revenues to the government. Such an act strengthens one's
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
The respondents claim that they immediately took possession
of the subject land upon the death of their parents, Mauricio
and Luz Melendez, who died on 5 May 1976 and 19 February
1967, respectively, and that they had been religiously paying
the taxes thereon. If that were so, why had they not themselves
introduced any improvement on the land? 27 We even find
unsubstantiated the claim of Carmencita that they had a tenant
on the land. They did not present any tenant. In any case, we
wonder how one tenant could have cultivated such a vast tract
of land with an area of 2.6 hectares.
The records also reveal that the subject property was declared
for taxation purposes by the respondents only for the year
1994. They paid the taxes thereon only for the years 1990,
1991, 1992, 1994, 1996, and 1997. Being of recent dates, we
cannot trust the assertion of the respondents that they
immediately took possession of the property in the concept of
an owner after the death of their parents. While belated
declaration of a property for taxation purposes does not
necessarily negate the fact of possession, 28 tax declarations or
realty tax payments of property are, nevertheless, good indicia
of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right
mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or, at least, constructive possession.
Likewise, it is noteworthy that none of the respondents reside
on the subject property. Carmencita even admitted that plans
of selling the property were at hand. Thus, it would be rational
to conclude that this move for registration is just but a
camouflage by smart land speculators who saw in the land
applied for expected profits from its existence.
In a nutshell, the respondents did not have in their favor an
imperfect title over the land subject of the application at the
time MTC LRC Case No. 06 was filed with the trial court. They
failed to prove that (1) Lot 2111 was classified as part of the
disposable and alienable agricultural lands of public domain as
of 12 June 1945 or earlier; (2) they and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in continuous, exclusive, and adverse
possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owners
from 12 June 1945 or earlier.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decisions of the
Court of Appeals of 26 August 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 64323
and of the Municipal Trial Court of Cabuyao, Laguna, of 1
September 1998 in MTC LRC Case No. 06 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The land registration case MTC LRC Case No. 06
is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
9. Republic v. Nicolas
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 filed by the Republic
of the Philippines to assail the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 2
and Resolution 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 81678. The CA affirmed the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision, 4 which granted the
Petition 5 filed by respondent Rosario L. Nicolas for the
registration of title to a parcel of land located in Barangay
(Brgy.) San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal. 6 The appellate court agreed
with the conclusion of the RTC that respondent had
convincingly established her ownership of the land and was
therefore entitled to judicial confirmation and registration of
title.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On 22 March 1996, respondent filed a Petition before the RTC
of San Mateo, Rizal, 8 seeking to register her title over Lot 2 of
Survey Plan Psu-213331, a parcel of land located in Brgy. San
Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal, with an area of 118,448 square meters.
9 She asserted that she was entitled to confirmation and
registration of title, as she had been in "natural, open, public,
adverse, continuous, uninterrupted" possession of the land in
the concept of an owner since October 1964.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed an Opposition 11 to
the Petition. It contended that (a) neither respondent nor her
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land since 12 June
1945; 12 (b) the Tax Declarations attached to the Petition did
not constitute sufficient evidence of the acquisition or
possession of the property; 13 (c) respondent failed to apply for
registration of title within six months from 16 February 1976 as
required by Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 892; 14 and (d) the
land in question was part of the public domain and not subject
to private appropriation.
After the conduct of proceedings to confirm compliance with
jurisdictional requisites, 16 the RTC directed respondent to
submit documents to establish that (a) the property that was
the subject of the application for registration of title was not
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the
Government; (b) there were no tenants on the property; and
(c) the land was not subject to any homestead, free patent, or
grant of title from the Land Registration Authority (LRA), the
Bureau of Lands, or the Department of Agrarian Reform. 17
Respondent was also directed to begin the presentation of her
evidence.
In line with this directive, the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) submitted a Report 19 on the
results of its verification of the existing records on the subject
property. The Report stated that the land "appears to be [n]ot
covered by any public land application nor embraced by any
administrative title." 20 However, the entry with respect to
whether the land was within the alienable and disposable zone
was left blank with a notation that the area was "not projected
due to [u]navailability of coordinates re[:] Tala Estate Tie-Line."
The LRA likewise submitted a Report 22 stating that it "was not
in a position to verify whether or not the parcel of land subject
of registration is already covered by land patent and is within
the area classified as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain." 23 Hence, the LRA recommended that the CENRO of
Antipolo, Rizal, be ordered to submit a report on the status of
the land. 24 This proposal was adopted by the RTC in an Order
25 dated 28 December 1998.
During trial, respondent presented three witnesses to prove
her right to register the property: Leonila Alfaro, her daughter
and attorney-in-fact, who testified that respondent had
occupied the land since 1940 and had paid the real estate taxes
therefor since 1969; 26 Santiago Eulin, who was allegedly hired
by respondent to plant vegetables and fruit trees on the land
and who acted as its caretaker since 1942; 27 and Roberto M.
Valdez of the LRA, who identified the original tracing cloth plan
for the property.
The following documents were likewise submitted to the trial
court: Survey Plan PSU-213331, 29 a Surveyor's Certificate 30
and technical descriptions of the property, 31 which
purportedly proved that the land had been duly surveyed by
the Land Management Sector; various Tax Declarations and
receipts; and a Certification issued by the CENRO that the land
applied for was not covered by any public land application.
Petitioner, on the other hand, decided to have the case
submitted for resolution without any further submission.
THE RULING OF THE RTC
In a Decision dated 31 July 2002, the RTC granted the Petition
and ordered the issuance of a Decree of Registration in favor of
respondent. 35 It declared that she had acquired ownership of
the land by way of open, continuous, public, adverse, actual and
bona fide possession in the concept of an owner since 1940. 36
Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA. In the
Appellant's Brief, 37 the Republic argued that respondent had
failed to clearly and convincingly establish that she had actual,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the property
since 12 June 1945 or earlier as required by Section 14 (1) of
P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree. 38 Petitioner
further asserted that there was no basis for the finding of the
RTC that she had occupied the land since 1940.
Respondent failed to file an appellee's brief. 40 Consequently,
the CA considered the case submitted for resolution.
THE RULING OF THE CA
On 23 August 2007, the CA dismissed petitioner's appeal. 42
According to the appellate court, the evidence presented
proved that respondent had occupied the land since 1940. Even
assuming that her possession of the property started only when
she had it privately surveyed in 1964, she had been its occupant
for more than 30 years. 43 As such, she was still entitled to
registration of title under Section 14 (2) of P.D. 1529.
The CA further characterized the land as private property:
The fact that the subject land is covered by a private survey
(PSU) (EXH. "J") way back in 1964, which survey was approved
on April 1965 by Director Nicanor Jorge of the then Bureau of
Lands, is a clear indication that it is already private in nature.
Moreover, applicant's evidence consisting of the DENR-CENRO
Certifications (Exhs. "O" and "P") that Lot 2 of PSY 213331 is not
covered by any public land application and that its equivalent is
Lot No. 10549 of the Montalban Cadastre have substantial
probative value which established (sic) that the land is alienable
and disposable and not covered by any land grant from the
government.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Decision. 44 The
CA, however, denied the motion in a Resolution 45 dated 22
January 2008, prompting petitioner to elevate the case to this
Court.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT
In its Petition for Review, the Republic argues that (a) the
decision of the CA and the RTC to confirm the title of
respondent to the land based on her possession and
occupation thereof was not supported by evidence; and (b) the
testimonial and documentary evidence she presented did not
establish possession of the property in the manner and period
required by law, that is, her possession of the property since 12
June 1945 or earlier. Petitioner also emphasizes that the lower
courts gave undue importance to the Tax Declarations and
receipts presented, 46 as well as to the testimonies of
respondent's witnesses, notwithstanding the inconsistencies in
their statements.
On 26 September 2008, respondent filed a Manifestation and
Comment 47 in which she pointed out that the grounds relied
upon by petitioner all pertain to allegedly erroneous findings of
fact. She argued that these grounds could not be raised in a
Rule 45 proceeding; hence, the dismissal of the petition was
warranted. 48
Petitioner reiterated its arguments in its Reply 49 and
Memorandum 50 filed on 17 March 2009 and 19 February
2010, respectively.
ISSUES
Based on the submissions of the parties and the Decisions of
the CA and the RTC, two issues are presented for resolution by
this Court:
(1) Whether the CA erroneously allowed the judicial
confirmation of respondent's title to the property under
Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529; and
(2) Whether the CA erred in declaring that respondent is
likewise entitled to registration of title based on ownership by
acquisitive prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529.
OUR RULING
We GRANT the Petition.
Applications for registration of title to land, both public and
private, are governed by Section 14 of P.D. 1529:
SECTION 14. Who May Apply. — The following persons may file
in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or
abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under
the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other
manner provided for by law.
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall
file the application jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor
a retro may file an application for the original registration of the
land, provided, however, that should the period for redemption
expire during the pendency of the registration proceedings and
ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro,
the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may
continue the proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original
registration of any land held in trust by him, unless prohibited
by the instrument creating the trust.
Each paragraph of Section 14 refers to a distinct type of
application depending on the applicable legal ground. Since
each type is governed by its own set of legal principles, the
framework for analysis to be used in resolving an application
would vary depending on the paragraph invoked. 51 Hence, it
is important for the Court to first determine the exact legal
ground used by an applicant for registration.
In this case, we note that the application filed by respondent
before the RTC did not state the exact legal basis of her request.
At best, the pleading implied that her claim was one for
registration and confirmation of title based on her possession
and occupation of the property:
COMES NOW Petitioner Rosario L. Nicolas, of legal age, widow,
Pilipino [sic] with address at Brgy. San Isidro, Rodriguez
(formerly Montalban), Rizal Province, Philippines, by her
undersigned counsel and to this Honorable Court respectfully
petitions to have the land hereinafter described below brought
under the operation of the Land Registration Act and to have
said land titled, registered and confirmed in her name and
further declares that:
xxx xxx xxx
6. Petitioner acquired the subject parcel of land by way of
occupation and has been in natural, open, public, adverse,
contin[u]ous, uninterrupted and in the concept of an
owner/possessor thereof since October 1964 up to the present.
53 (Emphases supplied) aDSIHc
From the foregoing allegations, it appears that the claim of
respondent is anchored on either of the first two paragraphs of
Section 14. However, it is unclear whether she sought judicial
confirmation and registration of her title pursuant to Section 14
(1) of P.D. 1529, or of the registration of her title on the ground
of acquisitive prescription under Section 14 (2) of the same law.
Similarly, no specific provision in P.D. 1529 was identified by the
RTC when it granted the Petition. 54 Its mention of the Civil
Code, however, seems to indicate an application of the
principle of acquisitive prescription. The CA, for its part,
delineated the differences between the first two paragraphs of
Section 14, but decided to apply both clauses. In its Decision, it
ruled that respondent is entitled to register her title under
either paragraph:
From the evidence adduced, applicant-appellee has
convincingly established her registrable title to the subject land,
which is entitled to confirmation and registration by the trial
court. As testified by the daughter of applicant, her mother
commenced occupying the subject land since 1940 and up to
the present which (sic) has been planted with fruit-bearing
trees and vegetables by their caretaker. Her testimony was
corroborated by Santiago Eulin, their caretaker since 1942 who
took over after his father, the original caretaker. These
witnesses declared that they even stayed on the land in
question where the applicant has a hut. It was also established
that the applicant had the property surveyed in 1964 resulting
in the approval of Plan PSU 21331 by the Bureau of Lands. This
qualifies applicant under Section 14, par. 1 of the Property
Registration Decree.
Even assuming that applicant's occupation and possession of
the subject land did not start on July 12, 1945 or earlier but only
in 1964 when she had it surveyed, still she can apply for
registration of title under Sec. 14, par. 2 of the Property
Registration Decree as she has been occupying the land
continuously for more than thirty (30) years from the time the
application was filed in 1996. 55 (Emphases supplied)
Given these findings, the Court has examined the application
for registration in this case under the legal framework of both
Section 14 (1) and (2) of P.D. 1529. We find that respondent has
failed to sufficiently establish the requisites of both paragraphs;
in particular, with respect to the classification and the character
of the land in question. Hence, we are constrained to reverse
the CA and the RTC Decisions allowing the registration of her
title to the property.
Respondent has failed to prove that the property is alienable
and disposable agricultural land that may be registered under
Section 14 (1) of P.D. 1529.
Section 14 (1) of P.D. 1529 governs applications for registration
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. This
paragraph operationalizes Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 as amended. 56 This provision grants occupants of
public land the right to judicial confirmation of their title. Based
on these two provisions and other related sections of C.A. 141,
registration is allowed provided the following requisites have
been complied with:
1. The applicant is a Filipino citizen. 57
2. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-
interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the property since 12 June 1945.
58
3. The property has been declared alienable and disposable as
of the filing of the application. 59
4. If the area applied for does not exceed 12 hectares, the
application should be filed by 31 December 2020.
As earlier stated, respondent failed to establish the third
requisite, i.e., that the property subject of the application is
alienable and disposable agricultural land.
The Court has emphasized in a long line of cases 61 that an
applicant for registration under Section 14 (1) must prove that
the subject property has been classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land by virtue of a positive act of the
Executive Department. In Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, 62
we declared:
While a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two generally limited to a review of errors of law, the Court may
categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those conduct its own review of the evidence if the findings of the
classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the lower courts are bereft of legal and factual bases. 65 In this
Civil Code, without limitation; and (b) lands of the public case, the conclusions of the RTC and the CA are not only
domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but contradicted by the evidence on record; they are likewise
with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. contrary to law and jurisprudence. As a result, the Court is
Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or constrained to set aside these pronouncements.
national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition
To prove that the property subject of an application for original
unless they are reclassified as agricultural. A positive act of the
registration is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, and
public domain, applicants must "identify a positive act of the
the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing
government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying
laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. x
inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or
x x Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its
other purposes." 66 To sufficiently establish this positive act,
prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or
they must submit (1) a certification from the CENRO or the
the President declares that the State no longer intends the land
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO);
to be used for public service or for the development of national
and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the
wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
In this case, we note that both the RTC and the CA glossed over custodian of the official records.
this requirement. The RTC, for instance, only made a general
Here, respondent presented the following pieces of evidence
conclusion as to the classification and alienability of the
to establish her claim that the land had been classified as
property, but without any discussion of the evidence
agricultural and considered alienable and disposable:
presented:
(1) A CENRO Report 68 stating that the land was not covered by
From the evidence adduced, applicant-appellee has
any public land application or embraced by any administrative
convincingly established her registrable title to the subject land
title, but with a notation that that the alienability of the land
which is entitled to confirmation and registration by the trial
was "[n]ot projected due to unavailability of coordinates re:
court. x x x It was also established that the applicant had the
Tala Estate Tie-line";
property surveyed in 1964 resulting in the approval of Plan PSU-
213331 by the Bureau of Lands. This qualifies applicant under (2) A CENRO Certification 69 that the lot "is not covered by any
Sec. 14, par. 1 of the Property Registration Decree. kind of public land application";
The CA, on the other hand, simply relied on the fact that the (3) A Report 70 from the Land Registration Authority (LRA)
property had been the subject of a private survey in 1964: declaring that it was "not in a position to verify whether or not
the parcel of land subject of registration is already covered by
From the evidence adduced, the following facts have been duly
land patent and is within the area classified as alienable and
proved:
disposable land of the public domain"; and
xxx xxx xxx
(4) The testimonies of Leonila Alfaro, 71 her daughter, and
That the land applied for is neither subject to any water, oil/nor Santiago Eulin 72 (the caretaker of the land) confirming that the
(sic) mineral rights, not within any government reservation, property is agricultural in nature.
naval or military, or mineral rights, within the forest zone, and
It is evident from the foregoing enumeration that respondent
neither is it part of the inalienable or undisposable land of the
not only neglected to submit the required CENRO/PENRO
public domain nor covered by the Code on Comprehensive
certification and DENR classification, but also presented
Agrarian Reform or subject to any subsisting Public Patent
evidence that completely failed to prove her assertion.
application;
First, the testimonies of Leonila and Santiago on the
xxx xxx xxx
classification of the land have very little evidentiary value. That
That the said parcel of land applied for is duly surveyed for they consider the property agricultural in nature is irrelevant,
registration (Exh. "J"), classified as agricultural; that they as their statements are mere opinions bereft of any legal
planted mangoes, buko, sometimes corn in the area through significance.
their caretaker x x x. 64
Second, none of the documents submitted by respondent to
the trial court indicated that the subject property was
agricultural or part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. At most, the CENRO Report and Certification
stated that the land was not covered by any kind of public land
application. This was far from an adequate proof of the
classification of the land. In fact, in Republic v. Lualhati, 73 the
Court rejected an attempt to prove the alienability of public
land using similar evidence:
Here, respondent failed to establish, by the required evidence,
that the land sought to be registered has been classified as
alienable or disposable land of the public domain. The records
of this case merely bear certifications from the DENR-CENRO,
Region IV, Antipolo City, stating that no public land application
or land patent covering the subject lots is pending nor are the
lots embraced by any administrative title. Said CENRO
certifications, however, do not even make any pronouncement
as to the alienable character of the lands in question for they
merely recognize the absence of any pending land patent
application, administrative title, or government project being
conducted thereon. But even granting that they expressly
declare that the subject lands form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, these certifications
remain insufficient for purposes of granting respondent's
application for registration. As constantly held by this Court, it
is not enough for the CENRO to certify that a land is alienable
and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove
that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification
and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. Unfortunately for
respondent, the evidence submitted clearly falls short of the
requirements for original registration in order to show the
alienable character of the lands subject herein.
Applying these standards to the instant case, we declare that
the RTC did not have sufficient basis for its finding that the
property in question was alienable and disposable.
The Court also finds that the ruling of the CA on the evidentiary
value of the private survey is untenable. The fact that the land
has been privately surveyed is not sufficient to prove its
classification or alienable character. While the conduct of a
survey and the submission of the original tracing cloth plan are
mandatory requirements for applications for original
registration of land under P.D. 1529, they only serve to
establish the true identity of the land and to ensure that the
property does not overlap with another one covered by a
previous registration. 74 These documents do not, by
themselves, prove alienability and disposability of the property.
In fact, in several cases, 75 the Court has declared that even a
survey plan with a notation that the property is alienable
cannot be considered as sufficient evidence of alienability.
Here, the survey plan and original tracing cloth plan submitted
by respondent does not even bear that notation. Consequently,
it was grave error for the CA to consider the mere conduct of a
private survey as proof of the classification and the alienability
of the land.
Respondent has failed to prove that the land subject of the
application is part of the patrimonial property of the State that
may be acquired by prescription under Section 14 (2) of P.D.
1529.
As previously noted, the CA also allowed the registration of the
property under Section 14 (2) of P.D. 1529 based on the
following findings: (1) the property is "private in nature" as
shown by the fact that it is "covered by a private survey"; 76 (2)
respondent had occupied the land continuously for more than
30 years from the time of the filing of the application in 1996;
77 and (3) the land is not covered by any public land application
based on the DENR-CENRO Certifications submitted by
respondent. 78
We do not agree. The Court finds no sufficient basis to allow
the registration of the property under Section 14 (2).
By express provision of the law, only private lands that have
been acquired by prescription under existing laws may be the
subject of applications for registration under Section 14 (2). The
starting point of the Court's evaluation must, therefore, be
whether the property involved falls within the scope of the
paragraph.
Under the Civil Code, all things within human commerce are
generally susceptible of prescription. 79 Properties of the
public dominion, or those owned by the State, are expressly
excluded by law from this general rule, 80 unless they are
proven to be patrimonial in character. As the Court explained
in Republic of the Philippines v. Tan:
Only private property can be acquired by prescription. Property
of public dominion is outside the commerce of man. It cannot
be the object of prescription because prescription does not run
against the State in its sovereign capacity. However, when
property of public dominion is no longer intended for public use
or for public service, it becomes part of the patrimonial
property of the State. When this happens, the property is
withdrawn from public dominion and becomes property of
private ownership, albeit still owned by the State. The property
is now brought within the commerce of man and becomes
susceptible to the concepts of legal possession and
prescription. 81 (Emphasis supplied)
To establish that the land subject of the application has been
converted into patrimonial property of the State, an applicant
must prove the following:
1. The subject property has been classified as agricultural land.
2. The property has been declared alienable and disposable.
3. There is an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial, or is no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth.
It must be emphasized that without the concurrence of these
three conditions, the land remains part of public dominion and
thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.
Here, the records show that respondent has failed to allege or
prove that the subject land belongs to the patrimonial property
of the State. As earlier discussed, the evidence she has
presented does not even show that the property is alienable
and disposable agricultural land. She has also failed to cite any
government act or declaration converting the land into
patrimonial property of the State.
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the DENR-CENRO Certifications
submitted by respondent are not enough; they cannot
substitute for the three conditions required by law as proof that
the land may be the subject of prescription under the Civil
Code. For the same reason, the mere conduct of a private
survey of a property — even with the approval of the Bureau of
Lands — does not convert the lot into private land or
patrimonial property of the State. Clearly, the appellate court
erred when it relied on the survey to justify its conclusion that
the land is private in nature.
Considering the absence of sufficient evidence that the subject
land is a patrimonial property of the State, we must consider it
part of public dominion and thus immune from acquisitive
prescription.
As a final note, the Court must point out that proof of the
classification, alienability and disposability of the subject
property is of particular significance in applications for the
registration of land. Given the general rule that public lands
may not be alienated, 86 it is the burden of applicants to prove
that the land they seek to register falls within the classifications
enumerated in Section 14 of P.D. 1529; in particular, the
specific paragraph they invoke as basis for registration. 87
Absent that proof, no length of possession or occupation would
vest any right of ownership over the property, 88 and
registration under P.D. 1529 cannot be sanctioned by this
Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated 23 August 2007 and Resolution dated
22 January 2008 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent's
application for land registration is DENIED for lack of merit.
10. Republic v. T.A.N. Properties Inc.
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 21
August 2002 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 66658. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the 16
December 1999 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of
Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 (trial court) in Land Registration
Case No. T-635.
The Antecedent Facts
This case originated from an Application for Original
Registration of Title filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc. covering Lot
10705-B of the subdivision plan Csd-04-019741 which is a
portion of the consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas
Cadastre. The land, with an area of 564,007 square meters, or
56.4007 hectares, is located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas,
Batangas.
On 31 August 1999, the trial court set the case for initial hearing
at 9:30 a.m. on 11 November 1999. The Notice of Initial Hearing
was published in the Official Gazette, 20 September 1999 issue,
Volume 95, No. 38, pages 6793 to 6794,4 and in the 18 October
1999 issue of People’s Journal Taliba,5 a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing was
also posted in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the
Municipal Building of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, as well as in a
conspicuous place on the land.6 All adjoining owners and all
government agencies and offices concerned were notified of
the initial hearing.
On 11 November 1999, when the trial court called the case for
initial hearing, there was no oppositor other than the
Opposition dated 7 October 1999 of the Republic of the
Philippines represented by the Director of Lands (petitioner).
On 15 November 1999, the trial court issued an Order8 of
General Default against the whole world except as against
petitioner.
During the hearing on 19 November 1999, Ceferino Carandang
(Carandang) appeared as oppositor. The trial court gave
Carandang until 29 November 1999 within which to file his
written opposition.9 Carandang failed to file his written
opposition and to appear in the succeeding hearings. In an
Order10 dated 13 December 1999, the trial court reinstated
the Order of General Default.
During the hearings conducted on 13 and 14 December 1999,
respondent presented three witnesses: Anthony Dimayuga
Torres (Torres), respondent’s Operations Manager and its
authorized representative in the case; Primitivo Evangelista
(Evangelista), a 72-year old resident of San Bartolome, Sto.
Tomas, Batangas since birth; and Regalado Marquez, Records
Officer II of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), Quezon City.
The testimonies of respondent’s witnesses showed that
Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) had peaceful, adverse,
open, and continuous possession of the land in the concept of
an owner since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was
succeeded by his son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27
September 1960, Antonio executed a Deed of Donation
covering the land in favor of one of his children, Fortunato
Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later, however, Antonio gave Fortunato
another piece of land. Hence, on 26 April 1961, Antonio
executed a Partial Revocation of Donation, and the land was
adjudicated to one of Antonio’s children, Prospero Dimayuga
(Porting).11 On 8 August 1997, Porting sold the land to
respondent.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated
the land in favor of respondent.
The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation
could apply for registration of land provided such entity and its
predecessors-in-interest have possessed the land for 30 years
or more. The trial court ruled that the facts showed that
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest possessed the land in
the concept of an owner prior to 12 June 1945, which
possession converted the land to private property.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Order of
General Default, the Court hereby adjudicates and decrees Lot
10705-B, identical to Lot 13637, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre,
on plan Csd-04-019741, situated in Barangay of San Bartolome,
Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas, with an area
of 564,007 square meters, in favor of and in the name of T.A.N.
Properties, Inc., a domestic corporation duly organized and
existing under Philippine laws with principal office at 19th Floor,
PDCP Bank Building, 8737 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.
Once this Decision shall have become final, let the
corresponding decree of registration be issued.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed from the trial court’s Decision. Petitioner
alleged that the trial court erred in granting the application for
registration absent clear evidence that the applicant and its
predecessors-in-interest have complied with the period of
possession and occupation as required by law. Petitioner
alleged that the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres are
general in nature. Considering the area involved, petitioner
argued that additional witnesses should have been presented
to corroborate Evangelista’s testimony.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in
toto the trial court’s Decision.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelista’s knowledge of the
possession and occupation of the land stemmed not only from
the fact that he worked there for three years but also because
he and Kabesang Puroy were practically neighbors. On
Evangelista’s failure to mention the name of his uncle who
continuously worked on the land, the Court of Appeals ruled
that Evangelista should not be faulted as he was not asked to
name his uncle when he testified. The Court of Appeals also
ruled that at the outset, Evangelista disclaimed knowledge of
Fortunato’s relation to Kabesang Puroy, but this did not affect
Evangelista’s statement that Fortunato took over the
possession and cultivation of the land after Kabesang Puroy’s
death. The Court of Appeals further ruled that the events
regarding the acquisition and disposition of the land became
public knowledge because San Bartolome was a small
community. On the matter of additional witnesses, the Court of
Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to cite any law requiring the
corroboration of the sole witness’ testimony.
The Court of Appeals further ruled that Torres was a competent
witness since he was only testifying on the fact that he had
caused the filing of the application for registration and that
respondent acquired the land from Porting.
Petitioner comes to this Court assailing the Court of Appeals’
Decision. Petitioner raises the following grounds in its
Memorandum:
The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in allowing the
grant of title to applicant corporation despite the following:
1. Absence of showing that it or its predecessors-in-interest had
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation in the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or
earlier; and
2. Disqualification of applicant corporation to acquire the
subject tract of land.13
The Issues
The issues may be summarized as follows:
1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;
2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in the concept of an owner since June
1945 or earlier; and
3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of
the land under the Public Land Act.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Respondent Failed to Prove that the Land is Alienable and
Disposable
Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has
the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land forms
part of the public domain. Petitioner insists that respondent
failed to prove that the land is no longer part of the public
domain.
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be
clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the State.14
The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the
presumption that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable and disposable rests with the
applicant.15
In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
The 3 June 1997 Certification by the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas City,16
certified that "lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated
at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with an area
of 596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 30, Land Classification
Map No. 582 certified [on] 31 December 1925." The second
certification17 in the form of a memorandum to the trial court,
which was issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest
Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated "that
the subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land,
Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec. 31,
1925 per LC No. 582."
The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order
(DAO) No. 20,18 dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions
and authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under DAO No.
20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land
classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues
certificate of land classification status for lands covering over
50 hectares. DAO No. 38,19 dated 19 April 1990, amended DAO
No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the
authority of the CENRO to issue certificates of land classification
status for areas below 50 hectares, as well as the authority of
the PENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for
lands covering over 50 hectares.20 In this case, respondent
applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot
10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The
CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of
596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of
1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as
alienable and disposable.
The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority
under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land
classification. Under DAO No. 20, the Regional Technical
Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products (OM)
permits except rattan;
2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five
hectares for public infrastructure projects; and
4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for logs, poles,
piles, and lumber dealers.
Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products]
(OM) permits except rattan;
2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs, poles,
and piles and lumber dealers;
3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters
within calamity declared areas for public infrastructure
projects; and
5. Approves original and renewal of special use permits
covering over five hectares for public infrastructure projects.
Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical
Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a memorandum to the trial
court, has no probative value.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that
a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved
the land classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject
of the application for registration falls within the approved area
per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In
addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established to prove that the land
is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because
the certifications presented by respondent do not, by
themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager, identified the
certifications submitted by respondent. The government
officials who issued the certifications were not presented
before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court
should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as
proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are
presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no
probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and
disposable.
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last
wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public
documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for
any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody
of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the
official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the
DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and
disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official
publication21 of the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the
land alienable and disposable.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting
of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty
by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against
a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and
of the date of the latter.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR,
certifications do not fall within the class of public documents
contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132.
The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records made
in the performance of a duty by a public officer," such as entries
made by the Civil Registrar22 in the books of registries, or by a
ship captain in the ship’s logbook.23 The certifications are not
the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original
official records in the legal custody of a government office. The
certifications are not even records of public documents.24 The
certifications are conclusions unsupported by adequate proof,
and thus have no probative value.25 Certainly, the
certifications cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR,
certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the
alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR
Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere
issuance, prove the facts stated therein.26 Such government
certifications may fall under the class of documents
contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132.
As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due
execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted
as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof
of the facts stated therein.27 Here, Torres, a private individual
and respondent’s representative, identified the certifications
but the government officials who issued the certifications did
not testify on the contents of the certifications. As such, the
certifications cannot be given probative value.28 The contents
of the certifications are hearsay because Torres was
incompetent to testify on the veracity of the contents of the
certifications.29 Torres did not prepare the certifications, he
was not an officer of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not
conduct any verification survey whether the land falls within
the area classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and
disposable.
Petitioner also points out the discrepancy as to when the land
allegedly became alienable and disposable. The DENR Secretary
certified that based on Land Classification Map No. 582, the
land became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925.
However, the certificate on the blue print plan states that it
became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985.
We agree with petitioner that while the certifications
submitted by respondent show that under the Land
Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and
disposable on 31 December 1925, the blue print plan states
that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985.
Respondent alleged that "the blue print plan merely serves to
prove the precise location and the metes and bounds of the
land described therein x x x and does not in any way certify the
nature and classification of the land involved."30 It is true that
the notation by a surveyor-geodetic engineer on the survey
plan that the land formed part of the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain is not sufficient proof of the land’s
classification.31 However, respondent should have at least
presented proof that would explain the discrepancy in the
dates of classification. Marquez, LRA Records Officer II, testified
that the documents submitted to the court consisting of the
tracing cloth plan, the technical description of Lot 10705-B, the
approved subdivision plan, and the Geodetic Engineer’s
certification were faithful reproductions of the original
documents in the LRA office. He did not explain the discrepancy
in the dates. Neither was the Geodetic Engineer presented to
explain why the date of classification on the blue print plan was
different from the other certifications submitted by
respondent.
There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious
Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner
Petitioner alleges that the trial court’s reliance on the
testimonies of Evangelista and Torres was misplaced. Petitioner
alleges that Evangelista’s statement that the possession of
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest was open, public,
continuous, peaceful, and adverse to the whole world was a
general conclusion of law rather than factual evidence of
possession of title. Petitioner alleges that respondent failed to
establish that its predecessors-in-interest had held the land
openly, continuously, and exclusively for at least 30 years after
it was declared alienable and disposable.
We agree with petitioner.
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in
possession of the land before 1945. Yet, Evangelista only
worked on the land for three years. Evangelista testified that
his family owned a lot near Kabesang Puroy’s land. The Court of
Appeals took note of this and ruled that Evangelista’s
knowledge of Kabesang Puroy’s possession of the land
stemmed "not only from the fact that he had worked thereat
but more so that they were practically neighbors."32 The Court
of Appeals observed:
In a small community such as that of San Bartolome, Sto.
Tomas, Batangas, it is not difficult to understand that people in
the said community knows each and everyone. And, because of
such familiarity with each other, news or events regarding the
acquisition or disposition for that matter, of a vast tract of land
spreads like wildfire, thus, the reason why such an event
became of public knowledge to them.
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by
Fortunato. However, he admitted that he did not know the
exact relationship between Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato,
which is rather unusual for neighbors in a small community. He
did not also know the relationship between Fortunato and
Porting. In fact, Evangelista’s testimony is contrary to the
factual finding of the trial court that Kabesang Puroy was
succeeded by his son Antonio, not by Fortunato who was one
of Antonio’s children. Antonio was not even mentioned in
Evangelista’s testimony.
The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires
that the testimony of a single witness needs corroboration.
However, in this case, we find Evangelista’s uncorroborated
testimony insufficient to prove that respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in
the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. We cannot
consider the testimony of Torres as sufficient corroboration.
Torres testified primarily on the fact of respondent’s acquisition
of the land. While he claimed to be related to the Dimayugas,
his knowledge of their possession of the land was hearsay. He
did not even tell the trial court where he obtained his
information.
The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting
1955. While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership.34
Respondent did not present any credible explanation why the
realty taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim
that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the land
before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes starting 1955
gives rise to the presumption that the Dimayugas claimed
ownership or possession of the land only in that year.
Land Application by a Corporation
Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation,
cannot apply for registration of the land of the public domain in
this case.
We agree with petitioner.
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.
Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified
by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted.
Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not
hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease,
for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more
than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve
hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology,
and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian
reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands
of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held,
or leased and the conditions therefor.
The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,35 the Court traced the
law on disposition of lands of the public domain. Under the
1935 Constitution, there was no prohibition against private
corporations from acquiring agricultural land. The 1973
Constitution limited the alienation of lands of the public domain
to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Under the
1973 Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly owned
by Filipino citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable
lands of the public domain. The present 1987 Constitution
continues the prohibition against private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.36 The
Court explained in Chavez:
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973
Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations
to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease.
xxxx
[I]f the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings,
the Constitution could have simply limited the size of alienable
lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire. The
Constitution could have followed the limitations on individuals,
who could acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable lands
of the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not
more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size
farms, placing the land in the name of a corporation would be
more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the
farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the
death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the
corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This
would prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into
smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the
constitutional limitation on individuals from acquiring more
than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain.
Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already
acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public
domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more
alienable public lands. An individual could own as many
corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could
even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his
nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation
is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional
limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the
public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a limited area of
alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual.
This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision
prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the
constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable public
lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-growing
population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence
to this constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of
the public domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the
practical benefit arising from the constitutional ban.
In Director of Lands v. IAC,38 the Court allowed the land
registration proceeding filed by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc. (Acme) for five parcels of land with an area of 481,390
square meters, or 48.139 hectares, which Acme acquired from
members of the Dumagat tribe. The issue in that case was
whether the title could be confirmed in favor of Acme when the
proceeding was instituted after the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution which prohibited private corporations or
associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares. The Court ruled
that the land was already private land when Acme acquired it
from its owners in 1962, and thus Acme acquired a registrable
title. Under the 1935 Constitution, private corporations could
acquire public agricultural lands not exceeding 1,024 hectares
while individuals could acquire not more than 144 hectares.
In Director of Lands, the Court further ruled that open,
exclusive, and undisputed possession of alienable land for the
period prescribed by law created the legal fiction whereby the
land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and
without the need of judicial or other sanction ceases to be
public land and becomes private property. The Court ruled:
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability
of considering possession of public land which is of the
character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent
of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the
statute itself that the possessor(s) "x x x shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title x
x x." No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive
presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little
more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining
whether the possession claimed is of the required character
and length of time; and registration thereunder would not
confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the land from public
to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already
effected by operation of law from the moment the required
period of possession became complete.
x x x [A]lienable public land held by a possessor, personally or
through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively for the prescribed statutory period of (30 years
under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso
jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed
facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private
property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme.
Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the
time no prohibition against said corporation’s holding or
owning private land. x x x.40 (Emphasis supplied)
Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case. In
Director of Lands, the "land x x x was already private property
at the time it was acquired x x x by Acme." In this case,
respondent acquired the land on 8 August 1997 from Porting,
who, along with his predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to
have been, as of that date, in open, continuous, and adverse
possession of the land for 30 years since 12 June 1945. In short,
when respondent acquired the land from Porting, the land was
not yet private property.
For Director of Lands to apply and enable a corporation to file
for registration of alienable and disposable land, the
corporation must have acquired the land when its transferor
had already a vested right to a judicial confirmation of title to
the land by virtue of his open, continuous and adverse
possession of the land in the concept of an owner for at least
30 years since 12 June 1945. Thus, in Natividad v. Court of
Appeals,41 the Court declared:
Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the above rulings,
the parcels of land in question had already been converted to
private ownership through acquisitive prescription by the
predecessors-in-interest of TCMC when the latter purchased
them in 1979. All that was needed was the confirmation of the
titles of the previous owners or predecessors-in-interest of
TCMC.
Being already private land when TCMC bought them in 1979,
the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against corporations
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain except through
lease (Article XIV, Section 11, 1973 Constitution) did not apply
to them for they were no longer alienable lands of the public
domain but private property.
What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to
apply is for the corporate applicant for land registration to
establish that when it acquired the land, the same was already
private land by operation of law because the statutory
acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed.
The length of possession of the land by the corporation cannot
be tacked on to complete the statutory 30 years acquisitive
prescriptive period. Only an individual can avail of such
acquisitive prescription since both the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions prohibit corporations from acquiring lands of the
public domain.
Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original
registration of land under the doctrine in Director of Lands.
Republic Act No. 917642 (RA 9176) further amended the Public
Land Act43 and extended the period for the filing of
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and
incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain until 31 December 2020. Thus:
Sec. 2. Section 47, Chapter VIII of the same Act, as amended, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are
hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020
within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided,
That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does
not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the
several periods of time designated by the President in
accordance with Section Forty-five of this Act shall apply also to
the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this
Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any of said
persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the
period fixed by the President.
Sec. 3. All pending applications filed before the effectivity of this
amendatory Act shall be treated as having been filed in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.
Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is
limited only to 12 hectares, consistent with Section 3, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution that a private individual may only
acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and disposable
land. Hence, respondent, as successor-in-interest of an
individual owner of the land, cannot apply for registration of
land in excess of 12 hectares. Since respondent applied for
56.4007 hectares, the application for the excess area of
44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and thus void ab initio. In
applying for land registration, a private corporation cannot
have any right higher than its predecessor-in-interest from
whom it derived its right. This assumes, of course, that the
corporation acquired the land, not exceeding 12 hectares,
when the land had already become private land by operation of
law. In the present case, respondent has failed to prove that
any portion of the land was already private land when
respondent acquired it from Porting in 1997.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658 and the 16 December
1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas,
Branch 6 in Land Registration Case No. T-635. We DENY the
application for registration filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
11. Ting v. Heirs of Lirio
In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration Case
(LRC) No. N-983, then Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 7, granted the
application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza
for registration of title to Lot No. 18281 (the lot) of the Cebu
Cadastral 12 Extension, Plan Rs-07-000787.
The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory on
January 29, 1977. Judge Marigomen thereafter issued an order
of November 10, 1982 directing the Land Registration
Commission to issue the corresponding decree of registration
and the certificate of title in favor of the spouses Lirio.
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu an application for
registration of title to the same lot. The application was
docketed as LRC No. 1437-N.
The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora A.
Lirio, Amelia L. Roska, Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque,
Adelaida L. David, Efren A. Lirio and Jocelyn Anabelle L. Alcover,
who were afforded the opportunity to file an opposition to
petitioner's application by Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, filed
their Answer calling attention to the December 10, 1976
decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become final and
executory on January 29, 1977 and which, they argued, barred
the filing of petitioner's application on the ground of res
judicata.
After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of
the Cebu RTC, on motion of respondents, dismissed petitioner's
application on the ground of res judicata.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari which
raises the sole issue of whether the decision in LRC No. N-983
constitutes res judicata in LRC No. 1437-N.
Petitioner argues that although the decision in LRC No. N-983
had become final and executory on January 29, 1977, no decree
of registration has been issued by the Land Registration
Authority (LRA); it was only on July 26, 2003 that the "extinct"
decision belatedly surfaced as basis of respondents' motion to
dismiss LRC No. 1437-N; and as no action for revival of the said
decision was filed by respondents after the lapse of the ten-
year prescriptive period, "the cause of action in the dormant
judgment passé[d] into extinction."
Petitioner thus concludes that an "extinct" judgment cannot be
the basis of res judicata.
The petition fails.
Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property
Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance
of decree. — The judgment rendered in a land registration
proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days to
be counted from the date of receipt of notice of the judgment.
An appeal may be taken from the judgment of the court as in
ordinary civil cases.
After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve
upon the court to forthwith issue an order in accordance with
Section 39 of this Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance
of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificate
of title in favor of the person adjudged entitled to registration.
(Emphasis supplied)
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a
private land, with or without opposition, the judgment of the
court confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor, as the
case may be, and ordering its registration in his name
constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole world. 9
It becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary
period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and
registration.
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land
registration court's approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego
Lirio and Flora Atienza's application for registration of the lot
settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole world
including petitioner.
Explaining his position that the December 10, 1976 Decision in
LRC No. N-983 had become "extinct," petitioner advances that
the LRA has not issued the decree of registration, a certain Engr.
Rafaela Belleza, Chief of the Survey Assistance Section, Land
Management Services, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), Region 7, Cebu City having claimed
that the survey of the Cebu Cadastral Extension is erroneous
and all resurvey within the Cebu Cadastral extension must first
be approved by the Land Management Services of the DENR,
Region 7, Cebu City before said resurvey may be used in court;
and that the spouses Lirio did not comply with the said
requirement for they instead submitted to the court a mere
special work order.
There is, however, no showing that the LRA credited the alleged
claim of Engineer Belleza and that it reported such claim to the
land registration court for appropriate action or
reconsideration of the decision which was its duty.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land
registration officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It
is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the
court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision
of the court and with the data found in the record, and they
have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt
upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of
the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They
act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as
administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court.
They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts
in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings." 12
(Emphasis supplied)
As for petitioner's claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court reading:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A final
and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse
of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived
judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is
barred by the statute of limitations[,] the December 10, 1976
decision became "extinct" in light of the failure of respondents
and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the same
within the prescriptive period, the same does not lie.
Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al. 13 enunciates the raison d'etre why
Section 6, Rule 39 does not apply in land registration
proceedings, viz:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE
DECISION RENDERED IN THIS LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON
NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT YET
BECOME FINAL AND UNENFORCEABLE.
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in
support of the above assignment, except in so far as it supports
his theory that after a decision in a land registration case has
become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period
of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the
judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision
in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be
enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but
within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of
the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because
a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment
that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to
act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided
in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the
losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish
a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the
ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and
confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to
enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse
or losing party had been in possession of the land and the
winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act
similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment
in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in
possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a
land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in
possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the
expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing
discussions, DENIED.
Costs against petitioner, Rolando Ting.
12. Samson v. CA
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals,
now the Intermediate Appellate Court, which reversed and set
aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cavite in Land
Registration Case No. TM-35.
Petitioner Angelina M. Samson filed an application for
registration of title in the Court of First Instance of Cavite of
three parcels of land all located in Ternate, Cavite.
The application for registration was premised on Section 48 of
the Public Land Law, Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended
by Republic Act 1942, which entities a person to obtain a
certificate of title if he and his predecessors-in- interest had
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership for at least thirty
(30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure.
The applicant alleged that she and her predecessors-in-interest
had occupied and possessed the properties openly,
continuously, and in the concept of the owner for more than 60
years prior to the filing of the application for registration.
With regard to the parcel of land covered by Plan PSU-200554,
the petitioner stated that she bought the northern portion from
Melanio Martinez through a deed of sale executed on February
12, 1963. She claimed to have purchased the southern portion
from Hilarion Villacarlos and the latter's children as shown by a
document entitled extra-judicial partition and sale executed on
August 20, 1963.
With regard to the parcel of land covered by Plan PSU-202594,
the petitioner alleged that she bought the northern portion
from Generoso Distor by virtue of a deed of absolute sale
executed on February 25, 1963, and the southern portion from
Bonifacio Tampis by virtue of a deed of absolute sale executed
on October 1, 1963.
No opposition was filed against the application for registration
of the parcel of land covered by Plan PSU-199064. Hence, in a
partial decision dated July 9, 1964, the trial court, ordered the
registration of this parcel of land in favor of the applicant.
The application for the registration of the two parcels covered
by Plan PSU-200554 (Exhibit "A") and Plan PSU-202594 (Exhibit
"G") was opposed by the Director of Lands, Felicisima Rielo and
Jaime T. Alberto. Of the three, only Rielo pursued her
opposition. The Director of Lands withdrew his opposition while
Alberto did not present evidence in his favor.
Rielo died during the pendency of the proceedings. She was
substituted by her sons, oppositors Presbitero R. Velasco and
Pedro R. Velasco, to whom the aforementioned parcels of land
were adjudicated pursuant to an extra-judicial partition dated
May 2, 1967 of the estate of their decease parents Eustaquio
Velasco and Felicisima Rielo.
The Velasco's claimed ownership over the two parcels of land
on the basis of their alleged open and continuous possession in
the concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years. The two
parcels are alleged to form part of a large parcel of land covered
by Plan PSU-217187 consisting of six (6) lots with a combined
area of 2,964,206 square meters located in the sitios of
Paniman and Cayugno barrio of Sapang Ternate, Cavite owned
by the heirs of Eustaquio Velasco. They alleged that Lots 2 and
4 of Plan PSU-217187 correspond to the parcels of land covered
by Plan PSU-202594 and Plan PSU-200554 respectively.
After trial on the merits, the lower court ruled in favor of the
applicant and the subject parcels of lands were ordered
registered in her name.
The oppositors appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.
As earlier stated, the appellate court reversed and set aside the
decision. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
A motion for reconsideration filed by the applicant-appellee
was denied by the appellate court. After her second motion for
reconsideration was denied, the applicant-appellee filed a
motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The
motion was also denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
The issues raised by the petitioner are two-fold. The first issue
is anchored on the appellate court's factual findings which the
petitioner contends are not supported by the evidence on
record. This issue is anchored on the appellate court's having
allegedly erred when it denied the motion for new trial.
Considering that the factual findings of the appellate court are
diametrically opposed to those of the trial court, we have
scrutinized the bases of the respondent court's factual findings
and given extra careful review to the parties' allegations on any receipt of his payment of taxes. He stated that he had
appeal to determine if there is any merit in the petitioner's tenants but did not know their names. . . .
contentions.
xxx xxx xxx
It is to be noted that the petitioner's alleged possession of the
The testimony of Generoso Distor as to his possession and
two subject parcels of land commenced only in 1963 and that
ownership of the northern portion of the lot covered by PSU-
she filed her application for registration of title over the same
202594 sold by him to the applicant also fails to inspire belief.
in 1964. Under these circumstances, her right to register the
He claim to have possessed the land from the time he bought it
subject parcels of land depends on whether or not her
from a certain Rufino Tibayan in 1956 or 1957. He cannot
predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed The
remember the exact date of the sale nor produce the alleged
same openly, continuously, and in the concept of owner within
document of sale. He could not remember the notary public
the required thirty-year period prior to the time she filed the
who notarized the same, nor the price he paid. He does not
application for registration pursuant to Section 48 of the Public
know his immediate neighbors, except Tecla Tampis. He had
Land Act.
not introduced any improvement on the land nor paid the taxes
We find the petitioner's contention as regards the factual on the same. The first time he declared it for tax purposes in his
findings of the appellate court unfounded. name was on February 5, 1963 or 20 days before he sold the
property to the applicant on February 25, 1963 pursuant to the
We agree with the appellate court's factual findings to the
deed of sale (Exhibit Q) While the property he supposedly
effect that not one of the petitioner's predecessors-in-interest
bought from Tibayan was only 4 hectares in area, the parcel of
was able to submit convincing proof of actual, peaceful, and
land he sold to the applicant pursuant to Exhibit Q had an area
adverse possession in the concept of owner over the subject
of 14 hectares. . . .
parcels of land sought to be registered within the period
contemplated by law. As the appellate court said: The fourth predecessor-in-interest of the applicant, a certain
Bonifacio Tampis, was not made to testify. According to the
Melanio Martinez declared that he possessed the land sold by
Court a quo, the failure of Bonifacio Tampis to testify in his
him to the applicant only since 1936. When asked who was in
stead was because ho was insane at that time. . . .
possession prior to 1936, he answered 'I do not know'. Even if
his possession since 1936 were tacked to that of the applicant, xxx xxx xxx
it did not amount to thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the
. . . It is to be noted that the tax receipt, Exhibit S-4, in the name
application for registration on May 7, 1964. Martinez even
of Bonifacio Tampis shows that the tax was paid on June 25,
admitted that his possession was not continuous, he having left
1962 not only for that particular year but for all the years
the property during the Japanese time and returned to the
starting 1953 to 1961. At the time the said taxes were paid, the
same only in 1946 after the war. Moreover, he only visited the
applicant had already been laying cassava over the property
land about three times a week in 1961 to 1964 to visit his cows,
subject matter of the instant application for registration. It had
inasmuch as he was then the chief of police of Ternate, Cavite.
been testified to by oppositors' witness Gorgonio Velasco that
... Melanio Martinez stated that he used the land merely as a
the applicant manifested a claim of ownership over the land in
pasturage of his cows which numbered four at that time. He did
question since 1959. This assertion was not denied by the
not fence the land or construct an enclosure so as to indicate
applicant, and is in fact sustained by the contents of Tax
ownership of the portion claimed to be his own. He further
Declaration No. 369 which the applicant secured in her name
admitted that aside from himself, there were several other
on July 6, 1964, but which she made to retroact starting with
people who had their huts in the same area which he was using
the year 1961 exhibit S-1). On the face of the said tax
as a grazing land for his cows. Although he claimed to be
declaration, it appears that the applicant declared in her name
possessing the property since 1936, the earliest tax declaration
the area of the lot shown in PSU-202594 consisting of 199,120
that could be presented to show that it was declared for tax
square meters. If the applicant wanted to make it appear that
purposes in his name was only for the year 1961.
she was already possessing the land shown in PSU-202594 since
The testimony of Hilarion Villacarlos is similarly sketchy and 1961, it is not understood why she had to purchase the same
unreliable. Lie claimed that the property he sold to the property from Generoso Distor and Bonifacio Tampis in 1963.
applicant was inherited by him from his mother, but later By said act, applicant showed not only lack of sincerity of her
declared that he bought the same. He admitted that he started claim of ownership over the property in question manifested
possessing the property only since 1945 (Ibid, p. 3) which is only since 1959, so much so she had to acknowledge her own lack
about 19 years prior to the filing of this application for of basis to acquire said land on the ground of possession by
registration. Although he claimed that he paid taxes on the purchasing the lands from the supposed possessors of the
land, he could not present any tax declaration in his name nor same.
On the other hand, the factual findings of the appellate court
that the respondents were able to submit competent evidence
to show acts of possession over the subject parcels of land since
1910 are convincing. The court stated:
Gorgonio Velasco, Benjamin Velasco and oppositor Pedro
Velasco testified as to the possession by the Velascos of the
parcel of land in question by their deceased father Eustaquio
Velasco and, after the latter's death in 1922, by their mother
Felicisima Rielo. They declared that since the time they came to
the age of reason, they knew that the lands shown in PSU-
217187 had been occupied by Eustaquio Velasco who planted
the same with mango trees and bamboos; that they had a Titulo
de Possession Informatoria dated 1895 but said papers were
burned during the war; that although the land was declared as
part of the military reservation by the Americans for military
practices, their mother continued cultivating and gathering
fruits from the land with the consent of the military authorities;
that nobody disturbed them in the possession of the land up to
the year 1959, when they learned that an adverse claim over
the land was being manifested by a certain Samson; that they
have been paying the land taxes of the land in question; that
the tax declarations corresponding to the period before the war
were burned during the war; that Generoso Distor and Hilarion
Villacarlos had no properties in the vicinity; that Rufino Tibayan
from whom Generoso Distor allegedly purchased the land that
he sold to the applicant did not own any property in that area
and was merely a tenant of Gorgonio Velasco in Paniman; and
that the overseer of the land was a certain Miguel Macaraig
who was succeeded in said position by his nephew, oppositors'
witness Emiliano Macaraig.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Even disregarding the testimonial evidence coming from the
mouths of oppositor Pedro R. Velasco, his brothers Gorgonio
and Benjamin and their overseer Emiliano Macaraig, the
documentary proofs presented by the oppositor show
adequately the veracity of their claim of possession. They
presented tax receipts showing that, as early as 1910, their
father Eustaquio Velasco had been paying taxes for lands
located in Sapang, Ternate (Exhibits 3, 3-A to 3-1). While the
said tax receipts refer to lands located in Barrio Sapang,
Ternate, it was explained that the properties in question are
actually located in Barrio Sapang, and that Cayladme and
Cayugno-Paniman where the lands shown in PSU-200554 and
PSU-202594 are located according to the plans submitted by
the applicant, are merely sitios of Barrio Sapang, as indicated in
the oppositors' Plan' PSU-217187, Exhibit 1. Applicant was not
able to show that the said tax receipts refer to other parcels of
land belonging to Eustaquio Velasco in Ternate, Cavite.
The testimonies of the witnesses for the oppositor may not be
disbelieved on the ground that they are more biased and
interested, as compared with the witnesses of the applicant.
While Gorgonio and Benjamin Velasco are brothers of
oppositors Presbiterio and Pedro Velasco and are expected to
testify favorably for the latter, the same thing may be said of
applicant's witnesses Melanio Martinez, Hilarion Villacarlos and
Generoso Distor whose interest may be said to be more direct
and personal, inasmuch as they were the ones who sold the
lands which the applicant is seeking to register in her name. The
failure of the oppositors to reconstitute the tax declarations in
their names until 1961 is similarly true with the applicant and
her predecessors-in-interest none of whose tax declarations
and tax receipts covering the lands in question date earlier than
1961. While Gorgonio Velasco might be unfamiliar with the
land, he is not the oppositor herein, and the possession of the
Velascos over the property was not claimed to be by Gorgonio
Velasco alone. With respect to the relative credibility of the
witnesses for the oppositors and the applicant based on their
social standing and official positions, the witnesses of the
oppositors do not suffer by the comparison. While it is true that
Melanio Martinez was at one time chief of police of Ternate,
Gorgonio Velasco is the internal auditor of UP-Los Banos, while
Benjamin Velasco is a physician who was formerly the district
health officer of Palawan. oppositor Pedro R. Velasco himself is
the chief of the Bureau of Internal Revenue office for the
province of Cavite. Appellant's witness Generoso Distor,
contrary to the finding of the trial Judge, was not the municipal
treasurer of Ternate, Cavite but only a son of Municipal
Treasurer Alejandro Distor.
It is not true that the testimony of respondent Pedro Velasco
concerning the tax receipts is hearsay, hazy vague and not
worthy of evidence. It was clearly shown that the questioned
tax receipts beginning the year 1910 were actually issued for
the payment of taxes on the lands in question. Hence, on direct
examination, Velasco stated.
On cross-examination, Velasco reiterated his earlier testimony
that the tax payment receipts pertain to the two subject parcels
of land.
The appellate court's findings that the oppositors had a better
right to the registration of the two subject parcels of land are
based on substantial evidence. It is obvious that the appellate
court's findings are based not only on the tax receipts
submitted by the oppositors but the oral testimonies of the
oppositors and their witnesses who testified on the open and
continuous possession of the oppositors and their predecessor-
in-interest beginning the year 1910 to the present. We see no
compelling reason to deviate from the nile that factual findings
of the Court of Appeals based on substantial evidence cannot
be reviewed in a petition for review on certiorari (Montesa v.
Court of Appeals 117 SCRA 700) and that the Court of Appeals,
as a rule, is the final arbiter on questions of facts. (Enriquez v.
Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 658). The contention of the
petitioner that the case at bar fails within the known and
recognized exceptions to the general rule is not meritorious.
The tax receipts accompanied by actual and continuous
possession of the subject parcels of land by the respondents
and their parents before them for more than thirty years qualify
them to register title to the said subject parcels of land. We
ruled in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, (131 SCRA 533)
that.
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations
of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership they become strong evidence of
ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by
proof of actual possession. of the property.
With regard to the petitioner's contention that the oppositors
did not present documentary proof of ownership sufficient to
warrant registration of the subject parcels of land in their favor,
we restate our ruling in the case of Zuniga v. Court of Appeals
(95 SCRA 740) to wit:
The purpose of the applicant is to prove that he has an absolute
or simple title over the property sought to be registered,
otherwise his application will be denied. An absolute oppositor
claims a dominical right totally adverse to that of the applicant.
If successful, registration will be decreed in favor of the
oppositor. As to whether or not private respondents have
absolute or fee simple title over the property sought to be
registered necessarily requires a resolution of the question as
to whether or not the oppositors had a dominical right totally
adverse to that of the applicants.
The respondents' documents were not only deemed sufficient
by the appellate court for registration of title in their names but
they are more convincing proof than the exhibits adduced for
the petitioner.
We also find no error in the appellate court's denying the
petitioner's motion for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence.
The newly discovered evidence sought to be presented by
petitioner consist of two "ancient" documents and the
testimonies of Rufino Tibayan, Petronilo Gulpo, Segunda Fabis
and Demetrio Zapanta. The "ancient" documents are: (1)
Receipt No. 01436276 dated August 9, 1910 in the name of
Emiliana Villacarlos which shows that taxes were paid for 3
parcels of land in the amounts of P1.75, P4.00 and P l.66; and
(2) Escritura de Particion de Fincas Rusticas executed on April
20, 1920 by descendants of Luis Villacarlos. By themselves, the
supposed newly discovered evidence would not show that they
refer to the land in question.
Section 1, Rule 53 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Petition. — Before a final order or judgment
rendered by the Court of Appeals becomes executory, a motion
for new trial may be filed on the ground of newly discovered
evidence which could not have been discovered prior to the
trial in the court below by the exercise of due diligence and
which is of such a character as would probably change the
result. The motion shall be accompanied by affidavits showing
the facts constituting the gounds therefore and the newly
discovered evidence.
In the instant case, there is no showing that Rufino Tibayan,
Petronilo Gulpo, Segunda Fabis and Demetrio Zapanta could
not have been discovered and produced during the trial. Hence
their testimonies would not constitute newly discovered
evidence.
The sincerity of the petitioner in producing the two documents
after so long a time is doubtful, The case was filed on May 7,
1964 and had been pending in court for 11 years before the
petitioner discovered the said documents and filed the motion
for new trial. In fact, it was only after the denial of her second
motion for reconsideration and the oral arguments held in the
appellate court that she filed the said motion. The records do
not show that the petitioner could not have discovered the two
documents prior to the trial by use of due diligence. Moreover,
granting that the two documents can be considered as newly
discovered evidence, a new trial would only be useless and
ineffective. There is no showing that these documents would
be sufficient proof to overthrow the appellate court's findings
that Hilarion Villacarlos and his predecessors-in-interest did not
possess the disputed parcel of land for the required number of
years to qualify the petitioner for a certificate of title pursuant
to Section 48 of the Public Land Law as amended. Mere tax
declarations do not vest ownership of the property in the
declarant.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit. The appellate court's questioned decision is
AFFIRMED.
13. NPC v. CA
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of
February 2, 1977 of the Court of Appeals affirming the Order of
November 25, 1971 of the then Court of First Instance of
Bulacan which denied the National Power Corporation's
petition for the review of the decree of registration previously
issued by the said lower court.
On August 21, 1968 respondent Mamot filed with the then
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title
over six parcels of land or Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Psu-
162460. Copies of the application were thereafter duly
published and posted in conspicuous places in the municipality.
As no one opposed the application, on May 6, 1969, the court
issued an order of general default.
Mamot then submitted his evidence ex-parte before the
Deputy Clerk of Court who had been so commissioned by the
lower court. On June 23, 1969, the same court promulgated a
decision confirming the order of general default and ordering
the registration of the six parcels of land in favor of Mamot and
the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration after
the decision shall have become final.
On the same date, however, Sarmiento filed a motion praying
that he be allowed to file an opposition to Mamot's application
for registration of title. Mamot moved to strike the motion from
the records. Later, Sarmiento filed a motion to set aside the
order of general default. Acting on these motions, the lower
court issued the Order of September 23, 1969 granting
Sarmiento ten days within which to file his written opposition.
In the meantime, however, Mamot and Sarmiento tried to
settle amicably the dispute between them. Their effort resulted
in the execution of a deed of sale involving Lot 4 in favor of
Sarmiento. Accordingly, Sarmiento withdrew his opposition
and moved that the Decision of June 23, 1969 be amended by
adjudicating Lot 4 to him.
Thus, on November 13, 1969, the lower court rendered an
amended decision awarding Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 to Mamot
and Lot No. 4 to Sarmiento.
Mamot having moved for the issuance of a decree of
registration, on December 17, 1969, the lower court issued an
"Order for the Issuance of Decree" directing the Commissioner
of Land Registration "to comply with Section 41 of Act 496 as
amended by Section 21 of Act 2347." Thereafter, the Chief
Surveyor and Chief of the Division of Original Registration,
acting for the Commissioner, rendered a report stating that
"the platting of said Lots 1 to 6 of Psu-162460-Amd., on our
Municipal Index Map, shows that they are inside Proclamation
No. 599 (National Power Corporation)."
The lower court then summoned the NPC to a hearing on the
report. Upon learning at the hearing that a decision had been
rendered in favor of Mamot, on February 25, 1970, the NPC
filed a petition for relief from judgment. The NPC alleged
therein that the hearing for the application for registration was
conducted without proper notice having been given it; that
Mamot committed fraud in failing to allege in his application
that the lots he applied for are covered by Proclamation No.
599, that the Angat access road traversed the lots he applied
for, and that NPC had rights and interests over the properties
involved; that had Mamot not committed said fraudulent act,
the court would have discovered that he had no lawful rights
over the property; and that it had good and strong evidence to
counteract Mamot's claim.
Alleging that the NPC had no personality to file a petition for
relief from judgment because an order of general default had
been issued in the case and that the decision of the lower court
having become final and executory, what remained to be done
was the ministerial act of the Land Registration Commissioner
to issue the decree of registration, Mamot moved to strike out
the petition for relief from judgment.
However, finding merit in the said petition, the lower court
granted the prayer for relief from judgment in its Order of
March 17, 1970 which also lifted the general order of default
and directed the NPC to file its opposition. Consequently, the
NPC filed its opposition, to the application for registration
alleging that neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-
interest possessed sufficient title over the parcels of land
involved as they had not acquired them either by composition
title from the Spanish government or by possessory
information title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894;
that neither Mamot nor his predecessors-in-interest had been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the application, and that the parcels of land involved
are within the Angat Reservation pursuant to Presidential
Proclamation No. 599 and as such, they are under the
administration of the NPC. The Solicitor General, appearing for
the Director of Lands, also filed an opposition to the application
alleging basically the same grounds as the NPC.
Mamot objected to these oppositions and moved for the
reconsideration of the Order of March 17, 1970. Another
claimant to the land, one Fabian Castillo, filed a motion to lift
the general order of default.
On February 3, 1971, the lower court issued an order denying
Castillo's motion and dismissing the petition for relief from
judgment filed by the NPC. The order is premised on the
following:
"Movants Fabian Castillo, et al. may advance the argument
that, at this stage, the judgment in this case is considered
reopened because the Court granted the petition for relief from
judgment of oppositor NPC. It appears, however, that the Court
was not aware yet of any decree in the instant application when
it granted the petition for relief of the National Power
Corporation on March 17, 1970, for the decree in this case was
issued by the Land Registration Commission on May 7, 1970.
The petition for relief from judgment is, therefore, also no
longer available at this stage. However, oppositor NPC may
likewise resort to a petition for review which it can file within
one year from the issuance of the decree on the ground of
actual fraud."
Heeding the court's advice, the NPC filed a petition for the
review of the decree of registration. Dated May 7, 1971, the
petition reiterated the NPC's allegations in its petition for relief
from judgment charging Mamot with fraud. Mamot moved for
the dismissal of the said petition.
On November 25, 1971, the lower court issued an Order
denying NPC's petition for review of the decree of registration.
Pertinent portions of the two-page Order states:
"Assuming that applicant Alejandro C. Mamot failed to notify
the National Power Corporation of the filing of his application
for original registration of title to land, such failure or omission
does not constitute actual fraud as contemplated under Act
496. Besides, it cannot be claimed by the National Power
Corporation that it was not notified of said application since
there was proper publication.
As regards the claim of the National Power Corporation that the
lots involved are covered by Proclamation No. 599 dated June
23, 1951, in its favor, said proclamation expressly provides that
the land described therein is withdrawn 'from sale of (sic)
settlement and reserved for the Angat River Project of the
National Power Corporation under its administration, subject to
private rights, if any there be x x x.' (Underscoring supplied)
It appearing that applicant Alejandro C. Mamot was in actual
possession of the subject lots long before the Proclamation, his
rights are respected and recognized by the very proclamation,
not to mention the fact that the National Power Corporation
has instituted Civil Case No. 2526 before Branch II of this Court,
an action for eminent domain, against several persons
occupying the area covered by the proclamation.
This Court also noted that the petition for review was filed after
the lapse of one year from the issuance of the decree, and on
this score alone, the petition could be dismissed."
Its motion for reconsideration of the Order of November 25,
1971 having been denied, NPC appealed to the Court of
Appeals. It assailed as erroneous the trial court's holding that:
(a) the registration of the parcels of land was not procured
through fraud; (b) the decree of registration was valid even if it
was based on a decision which had been set aside, and (c) the
parcels of land are registerable under Sec. 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.
In its decision of February 2, 1977, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the lower court. Noting that the appeal
was from the Order of the trial court denying the NPC's petition
for review of decree and not from the judgment decreeing the
registration of the subject parcels of land in favor of Mamot and
Sarmiento, the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to discuss
the second and third assigned errors as "they do not relate to
the dismissal of the petition for review of decree."
Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled that actual fraud alone does
not warrant the review of a decree of registration as it must be
coupled with a showing of the petitioner's dominical right over
the subject properties. Emphasizing that Proclamation No. 599
is "not an absolute grant of reservation" as it is subject to
private rights, the Court of Appeals held that the NPC "failed to
show its real dominical right over the subject lots" and that, on
such failure alone, the appeal could not succeed. The Court of
Appeals added that the issue of actual fraud had become moot
and academic because "whether there is actual fraud or none,
this Court cannot order the reopening of the final decree."
Dissatisfied, the NPC instituted the instant petition for review
on certiorari based on the following grounds: (a) the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan as land registration court lacked
jurisdiction to decree the registration of the six parcels of land
as they are within the Angat River Watershed Reservation
reserved to the NPC by presidential proclamation; (b) the
procurement of a decree over lands which are non-alienable is
equivalent to actual fraud in the procurement of a decree, and
(c) the decree of registration based on a decision previously set
aside by the court is absolutely null and void.
We opt to settle first the third ground for the petition, a
procedural one, to facilitate the determination of the
substantive issues raised herein.
Petitioner contends that since the decree of registration was
issued on May 7, 1970 by the Land Registration Commission
(LRC) after the amended Decision of November 13, 1969 had
been set aside by the allowance of its petition for relief from
judgment by the lower court on March 17, 1970, the decree of
registration was a complete nullity. Although this contention
appears to be meritorious on its face, the circumstances of the
case point to a negative conclusion.
Rule 38, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court provides that where a
judgment is set aside or when a petition for relief from
judgment is granted, the court "shall proceed to hear and
determine the case as if timely motion for a new trial had been
granted therein." Thus, an order granting a petition for relief is
interlocutory unlike an order denying such petition which is
final and appealable. When the LRC issued the decree of
registration, the decision directing such issuance had been set
aside by virtue of the granting of the petition for relief from
judgment. It should be recalled that when a new trial is granted,
"the original judgment shall be vacated, and the action shall
stand for trial de novo." Consequently, the instant case
reverted back to its status prior to the promulgation of the
amended decision. It follows, therefore, that no valid decree of
registration could have sprung from the proceedings in the
lower court because the situation became one where there was
as yet no existing decision directing the issuance of such
decree.
However, when the lower court subsequently denied the same
petition for relief from judgment, an action which was still well
within its discretion to take as no new judgment had as yet been
rendered subsequent to the grant of said petition, the case
returned to its status of being a decided one. Was the denial
based on a valid ground? According to the aforequoted portion
of the February 3, 1971 Order, the, denial or "dismissal" of the
petition was based on the LRC's issuance of the May 7, 1970
decree of registration, which, to the mind of the court,
terminated the proceedings before it. While this may not be a
valid ground as it only shows that the LRC issued the decree of
registration because it had not been notified of the Order
granting the petition for relief from judgment, the denial
nonetheless is proper: a close scrutiny of the records reveals
that the NPC's petition for relief from judgment should have whether the petitioner has a good cause of action. In this case,
been denied in the first instance. the substantive issues raised by the NPC in its petition for relief
from judgment are similar, if not identical to those raised in its
The NPC raised therein the issue of lack of due process by its
petition for review of the decree of registration, the denial of
allegation that no proper notice about the registration
which is the very subject of the instant petition for review on
proceedings had been given it. Lack of personal notice in a
certiorari. It is proper, therefore, that they be discussed
registration proceeding to persons who may claim certain
simultaneously.
rights or interests in the property, however, cannot vitiate or
invalidate the decree or title issued therein because Proclamation No. 599, which was issued by then President
proceedings to register land under Act No. 496 are in rem and Carlos P. Garcia on June 23, 1959, provides:
not in personam. Defendants by publication, including the
"Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Government and its branches and instrumentalities, are bound
Natural Resources and pursuant to the provisions of Section 83
by a decree of registration because all interested parties are
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, I, CARLOS P.
considered as notified by the publication required by law.
GARCIA, President of the Philippines, do hereby withdraw from
Moreover, the NPC's contention that it had not been given
sale or settlement and reserve for the Angat River Project of the
proper notice appears to be grounded on its stand that Mamot
National Power Corporation under its administration, subject to
knew that the land he was trying to register was embraced by
private rights, if any there be, a certain parcel of the public
Proclamation No. 599. This contention does not, however,
domain situated partly in the municipality of Norzagaray, and
substantiate the NPC's claim of lack of due process in view of
partly in the municipality of San Jose, province of Bulacan,
the uncontroverted fact of publication of Mamot's application
Island of Luzon, and more particularly described as follows: x x
for registration.
x." (Underscoring supplied.)
By alleging that Mamot committed fraud in failing to state in his
As correctly interpreted by the Court of Appeals, this provision
application that the lots are covered by Proclamation No. 599
of the presidential proclamation does not bestow upon the NPC
despite his knowledge of NPC's rights and interests on the land,
absolute dominical or proprietary rights. The NPC's powers
the NPC appears to have forgotten the established fact that
over the area designated as the Angat River reserve are
Mamot had been in possession of the property long before the
"subject to private rights, if any there be." This particular
issuance of Proclamation No. 599. In the absence of any
provision cannot but be interpreted to mean that the NPC's
evidence that the omission was deliberate, Mamot cannot be
administrative jurisdiction over the area is delimited by then
faulted for his failure to allege in the complaint that the parcels
existing private rights. Was the claim of Mamot "existing" at the
of land are within the area covered by said proclamation. That
time of the issuance of the proclamation? We quote from the
Mamot was indeed a prior possessor of the land is best shown
uncontroverted findings of the lower court in its November 13,
by the fact that, as found by the trial court, the NPC even made
1969 decision:
Mamot one of the respondents in the eminent domain case it
had filed to pursue its purposes under said proclamation by "From the evidence presented, it appears that portions of the
constructing the Angat access road. parcels of land which are sought to be registered were originally
owned and possessed publicly, peacefully, continuously and
The bases for the NPC's petition for relief from judgment being
adversely by Domingo Mamot and Damasa Calubag, parents of
unmeritorious, the lower court correctly denied it. However, by
the herein applicant, for more than seven (7) years until the
upholding the lower court's second and belated action on the
death of Domingo Mamot on July 22, 1924, whereupon his
said petition, the Court does not stamp its approval on the
ownership and possession thereof was (sic) continued by his
manner by which the said petition was handled. A thorough
wife, Damasa Calubag, and the herein applicant who
study of its grounds would have prevented the court's clearly
immediately succeeded him; that Damasa Calubag and the
flip-flopping stand on the matter, particularly because the
herein applicant, commonly possessed the portions of the
petition was one for relief from judgment. It bears stressing
subject parcels of land which were left by Domingo Mamot,
that a petition for relief from judgment, being an "act of grace,"
peacefully, publicly and continuously, adversely and in the
is not regarded with favor and it should be availed of only in
concept of owners until January 23, 1944, when Damasa
exceptional circumstances or when the demands of equity and
Calubag died and was immediately succeeded in the possession
justice should prompt the court to give the petitioner a last
and ownership thereof by the herein applicant who continued
chance to defend his right or to protect his interest. The
the possession of the same, peacefully, notoriously, publicly
petitioner must satisfactorily show that he has faithfully and
and uninterruptedly up to the present and who executed an
strictly complied with the provisions of Rule 38. Moreover, to
affidavit of adjudication of the property unto himself (Exhibit
obtain relief from judgment, it is necessary to determine not
'I'); that the other portion of said parcels of land was acquired
only the existence of any of the grounds relied on, whether it
by the herein applicant thru cultivation and peaceful, adverse,
be fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, but also
open, and continuous possession thereof from 1928 to the
present which is now more than thirty (30) years; that there are
some persons who tried to claim the subject parcels of land but
they have never been in possession of the same, and Isidro
Ordoña, Pedro Sarmiento, Consolacion Duya and Simeon
Patawaran were even named in the application and were
served with copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing (Exhibit 'A')
by ordinary mail on January 9, 1969, by the Commissioner of
Land Registration (Exhibit 'B') but have not interposed any
opposition to the present application with the exception of
Pedro Sarmiento who, however, later withdrew his opposition
for Lot 4 of plan Psu-162460-Amd. which was being claimed by
him (and) was conveyed to him by the applicant, Alejandro
Mamot, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale which was executed
and entered into by applicant Alejandro Mamot and said Pedro
Sarmiento on September 25, 1969, and acknowledged on the
same date before Nicasio Bartolome, a notary public of
Norzagaray, Bulacan, and registered in his notarial book as
Document No. 644, Page No. 51, Book No. II and Series of 1969;
that the subject parcel of land is not within any military or naval
reservation; and that the land tax for the current year has been
paid (Exhibit 'J')."
With these factual findings, the lower court cannot be faulted
for confirming Mamot's imperfect title because under Sec.
48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic
Act No. 1942, proven occupation and cultivation for more than
thirty (30) years by an applicant and by his predecessors-in-
interest, vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the land
from the mass of public land. When the conditions set by law
are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of
law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. As such, the
land ceases to be part of the public domain and goes beyond
the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. An
application for confirmation of title, therefore, becomes a mere
formality.
The law, however, may not be applied in all cases. The
circumstances of a particular case may require an applicant for
confirmation of an imperfect title under Sec. 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, to prove that the land involved no
longer forms part of the inalienable public domain. Such is the
case in this instant petition. The land sought to be confirmed as
under the ownership of private respondent is within the area
covered by Proclamation No. 599 creating a reservation for the
Angat River Project of the NPC. Mamot knew about the NPC's
authority over the area inasmuch as he had even been named
a respondent in the eminent domain proceeding that the NPC
had filed. While the filing of such proceeding may be construed
as a recognition on the part of the government that the land is
indeed privately owned, the fact that the land is part of the
watershed area reserved for the Angat River Project should be
the paramount consideration. As such, extreme caution should
be exercised in the determination of claims of ownership by
private persons which the proclamation itself recognizes. All
claimants must prove by clear, positive and absolute evidence
that they have complied with all the requirements of the law
for confirmation of an imperfect title to the land applied for.
Hence, Mamot bears the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land still forms part of the non-disposable
public domain. The classification of public lands being an
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department,
presentation of evidence issued by the Director of Lands that
the land he sought to be confirmed as his has been classified as
disposable for private ownership would have helped Mamot in
obtaining approval of his application. Since he failed to present
such evidence, whatever possession he might have had, and
however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
This case has been pending for more than twenty-four years.
To remand it below for a determination of the validity of NPC's
claims under its petition for review of decree would not serve
any purpose except to further delay the resolution of the
application for registration. Moreover, the peculiar
circumstances attending this case demand its immediate
resolution. As discussed above, the NPC has no vested absolute
dominical right over the whole area reserved for the Angat
River Project. Its administrative authority over lands embraced
by the proclamation is delimited by vested private rights. On
the other hand, Mamot had not satisfactorily proven his right
to a confirmation of his imperfect title and to the registration
of the land in his name subject to the rights of Sarmiento who
had acquired Lot 4 by virtue of a deed of sale. Nor had he
presented any proof that the said land has been declared
disposable by the proper government authority. The land in
question must, therefore, remain where it can be of better use
to the general public - as part of the inalienable public domain.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE insofar as it affirms the order of the lower court allowing
the issuance of a decree of registration in favor of private
respondent Alejandro Mamot.
14. Crisolo v. CA
Within a year from the issuance of a decree of registration in a
land registration case, respondent-ward, represented by his
guardian, filed a petition for review of the decree under Section
38 of Act 496 on the ground of fraud which allegedly consisted
in petitioner's taking advantage of the insanity of respondent-
ward to secure the execution of a deed of exchange of
properties by and between the petitioner and said respondent-
ward, and in petitioner's instituting the land registration
proceedings while said ward was confined at the National
Psychopathic Hospital. The trial court dismissed the petition
and held that Section 38 of Act 496 was not applicable because
respondent had opportunity to oppose the registration
proceedings but abandoned his opposition.
Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals and when
petitioner moved to have the appeal certified to the Supreme
Court because it involved purely questions of law, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion and instead sustained the allegation
of fraud. It rendered a decision reversing that of the trial court
and remanding the case to the trial court for further
proceedings. Hence, this petition for certiorari on the grounds
that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction since only
questions of law are involved and private respondent is not
entitled to the re-opening of the land registration proceedings
because he was not denied fraudulently of his day in court but
merely abandoned his opposition thereto despite the
opportunity given to him to oppose the registration.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals, holding that since the appeal involved only
questions of law, it is beyond the latter court's jurisdiction, and
that respondents are not entitled to the remedy under Section
38 of Act 496 because respondent-ward was given opportunity
to oppose the registration but abandoned his opposition.
APPEAL; QUESTION OF FACT; COURT OF APPEALS TO CERTIFY
CASE NOT FALLING WITHIN ITS APPELLATE JURISDICTION TO
SUPREME COURT. — The question as to whether a particular
transaction shows fraud or not is a question of fact. But
whether or not the lower court erred in denying the petition for
re-opening on the ground that the defense of fraud, which
consisted of the alleged nullity of the deed of exchange, was
available to the private respondent during the proceedings in
the original land registration case, but was never availed of
when he abandoned his opposition to the registration of the
land involved, is purely a question of law and, therefore, beyond
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
COURTS; JURISDICTION; APPEAL ON PURE QUESTION OF LAW
WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME
COURT. — Where the question raised on appeal to the Court of
Appeals is one of law, the same falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 17(6) of
the Judiciary Act of 1948 which provides that the Supreme
Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all cases in which
only errors or questions of law are involved.
LAND REGISTRATION; REOPENING OF THE DECREE OF
REGISTRATION; APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 38 OF ACT 496. —
Under Section 38 of Act 496, the persons entitled to a review
of the decree of registration are those who were fraudulently
deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the original
registration case and not those who were not denied for their
day in court by fraud, which the law provides as the sole ground
for reopening the decree of registration. Thus, where an
oppositor, through counsel, announced his opposition to the
registration of the land involved but later abandoned the same,
he cannot claim that he was fraudulently deprived of his day in
court to entitle him of the remedy under Section 38 of Act 496;
and a petition for review of a decree of registration will be
denied where the petitioner had notice of the original
proceeding but failed to substantiate his claim.
FRAUD AS THE SOLE GROUND FOR REOPENING THE DECREE OF
REGISTRATION MUST BE EXTRINSIC AND MUST BE PROVED. —
Mere allegation of fraud is not enough. Specific, intentional acts
to deceive and deprive another of his right, or in some manner
injure him, must be alleged and proved. There must be actual
or positive fraud as distinguished from constructive fraud to
entitle one of the reopening of a decree of registration and it
must be extrinsic not intrinsic fraud. This is necessary to
maintain the stability of judicial decisions and save the precious
time of the courts from being wasted by unnecessary
proceedings. Otherwise, the floodgate of delay will be opened
thus contributing to the perennial problem of clogging of court
dockets. No premium should be given to sheer negligence of
parties, for otherwise delay in the administration of justice will
be encouraged.
15. Fil-Estate Management Inc. v. Trono
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision dated May 20, 1997 and Resolution dated September
5, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40263, "Ayala
Land, Inc., Fil-estate Management Inc. et. al. versus Hon.
Florentino Alumbres, George H. Trono
The petition alleges that on November 9, 1994, Trono heirs,
herein respondents, filed with the RTC an application for
registration of a parcel of land.
Mr. Salvador L. Oriel, Chief of the Docket Division, Land
Registration Authority (LRA), issued a Notice of Initial Hearing.
On August 11, 1995, the above-named petitioners filed their
opposition to LRC Case No. M-228 alleging that as per Survey
Plan Psu-31086, respondents’ property partly overlaps their lot.
As early as April 28, 1989, this lot was registered in their names
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-9182 of the
Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas City.
Earlier, or on July 25, 1995, Ayala Land, Inc. (Ayala Land) also
filed an opposition to respondents’ application for registration
anchored on the ground that the land applied for overlaps the
parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. T-5331, T-41326, T-15644,
T-41325, T-36979, T-36891, and T-36982 registered in its name
in the Registry of Deeds, same city.
During the hearing, respondents presented the July 24, 1995
Report of the LRA and the Survey Report of the Land
Management Services, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, showing that the land they sought to
register under Plan Psu-31086 overlaps the property already
registered in the names of petitioners.
Thereafter, petitioners and Ayala Land filed their respective
motions to dismiss respondents’ application for registration on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They claimed that "since the
property was previously Torrens registered in their names, the
trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
proceedings."
On March 4, 1996, the trial court issued a Resolution denying
the motions to dismiss, holding that the Regional Trial Court has
exclusive original jurisdiction over all applications for original
registration of title to lands.
Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari.
On May 20, 1997, the Appellate Court rendered its Decision
granting the petition for certiorari, holding that:
The incontrovertibility of a title prevents a land registration
court from acquiring jurisdiction over a land that is applied for
registration if that land is already decreed and registered under
the Torrens System.
Petitioners then filed their motion for partial reconsideration
praying that LRC Case No. M-228 be dismissed with prejudice
and to declare that the right of respondents to file any action
for reconveyance of the property has prescribed.
Meanwhile, on July 9, 1997, Ayala Land and respondents
executed a Compromise Agreement. 6 On July 10, 1997, they
filed with the Court of Appeals a "Motion for Judgment Based
on Compromise Agreement."
On July 25, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered an Amendatory
Decision, holding that in view of the Compromise Agreement,
the case as between Ayala Land and respondents has become
moot and academic.
In a Resolution dated September 5, 1997, the Appellate Court
denied petitioners' motion for partial reconsideration.
Petitioners then filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari ascribing to the Court of Appeals the following errors:
In refusing to declare the dismissal of LRC M-228 to be with
prejudice and that any action for reconveyance to have long
ago prescribed, the court of appeals decided the issue not in
accord with law and pertinent jurisprudence, in that —
i. Having already found that the land was titled, the
court of appeals' refusal to dismiss the land
registration case with prejudice contravenes the
doctrines that a) decrees of registration are in
rem, b) titled lands cannot be decreed again and
c) there can be no collateral attack on titles.
ii. Having found that the decrees from which
petitioners' title is derived, were issued in 1966,
the court of appeals' refusal to declare as already
prescribed, any direct attack or action for
reconveyance contravenes section 32 of PD 1529
and the doctrines in Caro vs. CA and Salvatierra
vs. CA.
Petitioners contend that the dismissal of a subsequent
application for original registration of title already covered by a
Torrens title should be with prejudice; that an action for
annulment of title or reconveyance of the property involved
has prescribed; and that respondents’ application for
registration (LRC Case No. M-228) is a collateral attack against
petitioners' land titles.
In their comment, respondents claim that they were misled by
their lawyers and that what they should have filed was a
complaint for nullification of titles instead of an application for
registration of land.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the trial
court has jurisdiction over respondents' application for
registration of a parcel of land.
Section 2 of Presidential Decree (PD) 1529 partly provides:
Sec. 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of
courts. — Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands
throughout the Philippines shall be in rem, and shall be based
on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens
System.
Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all
applications for original registration of title to lands, including
improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed
after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such applications or
petitions.
Pursuant to the above provisions, the Regional Trial Court
(formerly Court of First Instance) has the authority to act, not
only on applications for original registration of title to land, but
also on all petitions filed after the original registration of title.
Thus, it has the authority and power to hear and determine all
questions arising from such applications or petitions.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in ruling that the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 255, Las Piñas City has no
jurisdiction over LRC Case No. M-228 on the ground that the
land subject of respondents' application for registration was
already registered in the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas City.
Significantly, even respondents themselves admit in their
comment on the instant petition that what they should have
filed was a complaint for nullity of petitioners' titles.
Likewise, Section 48 of PD 1529 provides:
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. — A
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.
Respondents' application for registration of a parcel of land incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from the decree of
already covered by a Torrens title is actually a collateral attack registration.
against petitioners' title not permitted under the principle of
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision
indefeasibility of a Torrens title. It is well settled that a Torrens
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40263
title cannot be collaterally attacked; the issue on the validity of
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents’ application for
title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be
registration of land in LRC Case No. M-228 pending before the
raised in an action expressly instituted for the purpose. Hence,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 255, Las Piñas City is ordered
whether or not respondents have the right to claim title over
DISMISSED with prejudice.
the property in question is beyond the province of the instant
proceeding. That should be threshed out in a proper action. It
has been invariably stated that the real purpose of the Torrens
System is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question
as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest
secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the
court, or sitting on the "mirador su casa" to avoid the possibility
of losing his land.

Section 32 of the same law states

Sec. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser

for value. — The decree of registration shall not be reopened
or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of
any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding
in any court for reversing judgment, subject, however, to the
right of any person, including the government and the branches
thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by
such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual
fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for
reopening and review of the decree of registration not later
than one year from and after the date of the entry of such
decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be
entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value
has acquired the land or an interest therein whose rights may
be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for
value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be
deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other
encumbrancer for value.

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of

registration and the certificate of title issued shall become
incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of
registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for
damages against the applicant or any other person responsible
for the fraud.

A decree of registration that has become final shall be deemed

conclusive not only on the questions actually contested and
determined, but also upon all matters that might be litigated or
decided in the land registration proceedings.

As per records of the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas City, TCT

No. T-9182 13 was registered in petitioners’ name as early as
April 28, 1989, or five (5) years before the filing of respondents'
application for registration. Thus, it is too late for them
(respondents) to question petitioners' titles considering that
the Certificates of Title issued to the latter have become