Case Digest: Primicias vs Municipality of Urdaneta

Facts:

On February 8, 1965, Primicia was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when he was found
violating Municipal Order 3, Series of 1964 for overtaking a truck. The Courts of First Instance decided that
from the action initiated by Primicias, the Municipal Order was null and void and had been repealed by
Republic Act 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code

Issues:

1. Whether or not Municipal Order 3 of Urdaneta is null and void

2. Whether or not the Municipal Order is not definite in its terms or ambiguous.

Held:

1. Municipal Order 3 is null and void as there is an explicit repeal in RA 4136 and as per general rule, the later
law prevails over an earlier law and any conflict between a municipal order and a national law must be ruled in
favor of the statute.
2. Yes, the terms of Municipal Order 3 was ambiguous and not definite. “Vehicular Traffic” is not defined and
no distinctions were made between cars, trucks, buses, etc.

Appealed decision is therefore AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. L-42571-72 – 123 SCRA 569 – Political Law – Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title – Police Power
Not Validly Exercise

Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of
1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said
Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their
business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers.
Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84.
is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS
AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION
OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”•.
Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then
appealed citing that they were deprived of due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade,
the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant
to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.

HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the
assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the
general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the
State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under
the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a
measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by
overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather
than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate
not prohibit the business of cabarets.
Song Kiat Chocolate Factory v. Central Bank of the Philippines

Facts:
During the period from January 8, 1953 to October 9, 1953, the plaintiff appellant imported sun dried cocoa
beans for which it paid the foreign exchange tax of 17 per cent totaling P74,671.04. Claiming exemption from
said tax under section 2 of same Act, it sued the Central Bank that had exacted payment; and in its amended
complaint it included the Treasurer of the Philippines. CFI Manila dismissed the case on the ground that the
term "chocolate" does not include sun-dried cocoa beans.

Issue:
Whether or not cocoa beans may be considered as "chocolate" for the purposes of exemption from the foreign
exchange tax imposed by Republic Act No. 601 as amended.

Held:
No, exemption from Section 2 of chocolate does not include cocoa beans. Having in mind the principle of strict
construction of statutes exempting from taxation,3 we are of the opinion and so hold, that the exemption for
"chocolate" in the above section 2 does not include "cocoa beans". The one is raw material, the other
manufactured consumer product; the latter is ready for human consumption; the former is not.
On the other hand, the congress approved Republic Act 1197 amending section 2 by substituting "cocoa
beans" for "chocolate.". However, since statutes operate prospectively, the amendments cannot be applied in
the case at bar. The appellant's cocoa beans had been imported during January - October 1953, i.e. before the
exemption decree which is after September 3, 1954 pursuant to Proclamation No. 62,.

ENDENCIA VS. DAVID

FACTS
This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance in Manila declaring section 13 of RA No.
590 unconstitutional and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to refund to
Justice Pastor Endencia and to Justice Fernando Jugo the income tax collected on their salary. When the SC
held in the Perfecto case that judicial officers exempt from salary tax because the collection thereof was a
decrease or diminution of their salaries which is prohibited by the Constitution, the Congress thereafter
promulgated RA No. 590, authorizing and legalizing the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial
officers.

ISSUE
Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional

HELD
When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it is the
duly of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional. Section 13, RA No. 590 is a clear example of
interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase found in section 9, Art. VIII of the Constitution
which refers to the salaries of judicial officers. This act interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the
Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The
Legislature may not legally provide therein that a statue be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a
Constitutional prohibition, thus the unconstitutionality of Section 13 of RA No. 590.
Magtajas Vs Pryce Properties

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,

vs.

PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,

FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro
City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its
tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.he
reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992,
it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-
93Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor
and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared
the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement

ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid

HELD: No

Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which
are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should
not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of
a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings
for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their
praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and
are therefore ultra vires and void.

Lambino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006

FACTS:

On August 25, 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold plebiscite that will ratify
their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of RA 6735.

The Lambino Group claims that their petition has the support of 6,327,952 individuals satisfying the
requirement that the signatories of the petition constitute 12% of all registered voters with each legislative
district represented by at least 3% of its registered voters.

The Lambino Group’s initiative petition modifies Sections 1-7 of Article VI and Sections 1-4 of Article VII of the
Constitution and adds Article XVIII entitled ‘Transitory Provisions” to it shifting the country’s form of government
from Bicameral-Presidential to Unicameral-Parliamentary.

Days later, the Lambino Group filed an amended petition with the COMELEC. However, the COMELEC issued
its resolution denying due course to the Lambino Groups’s petition invoking Santiago v. Commission on
Elections, which found RA 6735 as inadequate, in stating that there is no enabling law governing initiative
petitions such as that of the Lambino Group to amend the Constitution.

The Lambino Group is petitioning for the issuance of writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the
COMELEC Resolution of August 31, 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative
petition. The petitioners and supporting intervenors hold the view that COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in relying on Santiago.

Opposing intervenors maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent and they also challenge:

 The Lambino Group’s standing to file the petition

 The validity of the signature gathering and verification process
 The Lambino Group’s compliance with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution The nature of the
proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments.
 The Lambino Group’s compliance with RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complied with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution –
NO.

2. Whether the Court should revisit its ruling on Santiago v. COMELEC which declared RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause proposals to amend
the Constitution – NO

3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group’s
petition – NO.

RATIO:

1. The Lambino Group failed to comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

a. The petition is not directly proposed by the people.

The Lambino Group’s Initiative does comply with the requirement that the amendment be “directly proposed by
the people upon a petition” because the Lambino group failed to present the full text of the proposed changes
to the Constitution to the signatories and thus it cannot be assumed that the signatories had knowledge of the
full nature and effect of the changes they were supporting. Given that the Initiative first gathered signatures
without showing the full text of the proposed amendments, it can be seen as a “gigantic fraud on the people.”

While Section 2, Article XVII does not explicitly state that the full text of proposed amendments to the
constitution should be presented to the people before they sign the petition, as shown on the record of the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it was the intent of the framers that an amendment is “directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains the
full text of the proposed amendments.

A signature requirement would be meaningless if the signatories have not first been informed of the full extent
of the proposal he/she is signing, and that the attachment of the full text proposal would provide the
assumption that people would be informed in their decision whether to sign or not.
Moreover, the signature sheet submitted by the Lambino Group to the Court does not contain the full text of the
proposed changes to the Constitution; instead, the signature sheet merely asks whether the people approve a
shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government.

The petitioners alleged that they circulated the draft of their 30 August 2006 amended petition during the
signature gathering from February to August 2006, having the Court believe that they prepared their amended
petition almost seven months earlier in February 2006 and even before they filed their 25 August 2006 petition.
While Aumentado gives as evidence ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, as proof that the amended petition was
circulated six months before the petitions were filed, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize
petitioner Aumentado to prepare the petitions, rather, it only states that ULAP “supports the proposals of the
Consultative Commission on Charter Change” which are vastly different from the proposals of the Lambino
Group, thus the ULAP Resolution does not establish that the Lambino Group circulated the draft of the petition.

There is inconsistency in the story of the Lambino Group as it was first stated that they circulated both the 25
August 2006 petion and the 30 August 2006 amended petion; however, Atty. Lambino later changed the story
stating that only the amended petition was circulated.

Even with the assumption that the amended petition was indeed circulated while the signatures were being
gathered it could still be concluded that there would not be enough copies of the petition for all the signatories
to see. As per Atty. Lambino’s own admission only 100,000 copies could be confirmed to have been printed as
these were printed by Lambino himself. Assuming that each signature sheet, which had space for 10
signatures, was attached with a copy of the petition, there would be enough copies for only 1 million people, far
from the 6,327,952 signatures gathered by the Lambino Group.

Having proved that majority of the signatories were not able to see the full text of the of the proposed changes
proposed signing, they could not have known the full nature and effect of the proposed changes which include
three controversial amendments:

 The lifting of term limits on the members of the legislature.

 The interim Parliament will continue to function indefinitely until it decides to call for parliamentary
elections thus enabling its members to determine when they will end their term.
 Within 45 days after the proposed changes, the interim Parliament will convene to propose further
amendments to the constitution.

This provision is determined by the Court to be totally unrelated to the stated objective of the initiative and is
considered logrolling.

Logrolling refers to the incorporation of an unrelated subject matter in the same petition thus creating two
propositions within one petition thus putting the people in a dilemma where since they can only say yes or no
to the whole petition they cannot agree to one proposition without also agreeing to the other.

Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people.

While Atty. Lambino states that this provision is not necessary and should thus be ignored, the Court does not
agree since this provision could effectively invalidate the whole exercise of the people’s initiative as through
this provision the interim Parliament could, in theory, propose amendments not agreed upon by the signatories
of the initial petition.

b. People’s initiative can only be done for constitutional amendments and not revisions.
Based on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the framers intentionally made a distinction
between amendments and revisions. It was the intent, as is written, that only Congress or a constitutional
convention can propose revisions while a people’s initiative is limited only to the proposal of amendments.
A revision implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution while amendment refers to a change
that adds, reduces, or deletes, without altering the basic principle of the constitution. A change in a single word
could already be considered a revision as long as it overhauls the structure of government and the ideological
basis of the Constitution.

There are two tests to determine whether a change is an amendment or a revision:

 Quantitative test – examines the number of provisions, not the degree of change, in order to test how
extensive the proposed changes are.
 Qualitative test – based on qualitative effects, asks whether the proposed changes create far reaching
changes in the nature of the basic governmental plan thus amounting to a revision.

The prosed changes by the Lambino Group significantly alter the basic plan of government as it would
effectively alter the separation of powers through the abolition of the Office of the President and merging of the
legislative and executive, and alter the system of checks and balances within the legislature through the
abolition of one chamber of Congress.

Under both quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s proposed changes constitute a revision and
not simply an amendment as it “radically alters the framework of government set forth in the Constitution.

The Court states that since the proposed changes constitute a revision and would require far-reaching
amendments in not just the specified articles and provisions but also in several others, a deliberative body with
recorded proceedings would be the best vehicle to undertake them, as was intended by the framers and is
stated in the constitution, and not a people’s initiative.

2. There is no need to revisit the Court’s ruling in Santiago since an affirmation or reversal of the said
ruling would not change the outcome of this petition.

Even if it is assumed RA 6735 is valid, contrary to the ruling in Santiago, the outcome of the Lambino Group’s
petition would not change since before referring to RA 6735 a petition must first comply with Section 2, Article
XVII, and as was previously established, it does not.

The Lambino Group’s petition also does not comply with RA 6735. Indeed, It violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735
requiring that the signatories, consistitng of 12% of the total number of registered voters, sign the petition since
it has already been established that the 6 million signatories only signed a signature sheet and not the petition
itself.

It also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735, which states that no more than 1 subject can be embraced by a
petition, through its provision which mandates the interim Parliament to propose further amendments which as
determined earlier is unrelated to the subject of a shift from presidential to parliamentary form of government.

3. The COMELEC did not commit a grave of abuse of discretion in dismissing the Lambino Group’s
Initiative petition.

Since the COMELEC merely followed the Court’s ruling in Santiago, the Commission did not gravely abuse its
discretion.
Cariño v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher, among them
the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association
(MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook “mass concerted actions” to “dramatize and
highlight” their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had
time and again been brought to the latter’s attention.

The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They complained to CHR.

ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations
RULING: No.

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the character of finality and
definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education and
subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may
take appeals to the CSC on said matter, if still timely.

The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do so; whether or
not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the
power to try and decide, or dear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights
violations involving civil or political rights.

The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law to be
another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the
latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate,
i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of justice,
or even a quasi judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the
facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to “investigate,” cannot and not “try and resolve on the
merits” (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it
means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings
against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political
rights had been transgressed.
PNOC vs CA
G.R. No. 107518 October 8, 1998

FACTS:

 September 21, 1977 early morning: M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by Maria Efigenia Fishing
Corporation on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila collided with the vessel Petroparcel owned by the Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation (LSC)
 Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard Commandant Simeon N. Alejandro found Petroparcel to
be at fault
 Maria Efigenia sued the LSC and the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo praying for an award of
P692,680.00 representing the value of the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia
XV with interest at the legal rate plus 25% as attorney’s fees and later on amended to add the lost value
of the hull less the P200K insurance and unrealized profits and lost business opportunities
 During the pendency of the case, PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation sought to be substituted in
place of LSC as it acquired Petroparcel
 Lower Court: against PNOC ordering it to pay P6,438,048 value of the fishing boat with interest plus P50K
attorney's fees and cost of suit
 CA: affirmed in toto

ISSUE: W/N the damage was adequately proven

HELD: YES. affirming with modification actual damages of P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary bases
therefor. P2M nominal damages instead.

 in connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy or incompetency or

admissibility, it is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but
admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection
places them beyond the consideration of the court.
 If they are thereafter found relevant or competent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding or
ignoring them
 two kinds of actual or compensatory damages:
 loss of what a person already possesses (daño emergente)
 failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him
 in the case of profit-earning chattels, what has to be assessed is the value of the chattel to its owner as a
going concern at the time and place of the loss, and this means, at least in the case of ships, that regard
must be had to existing and pending engagements
 If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it is in any case virtually certain of profitable
employment, then nothing can be added to that value in respect of charters actually lost, for to do so would
be pro tanto to compensate the plaintiff twice over.
 if the ship is valued without reference to its actual future engagements and only in the light of its profit-
earning potentiality, then it may be necessary to add to the value thus assessed the anticipated profit on a
charter or other engagement which it was unable to fulfill.
 damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award must point out specific facts that could
afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne
 proven through sole testimony of general manager without objection from LSC
 Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to
considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or
not it proves an issue
 Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value.
 In the absence of competent proof on the actual damage suffered, private respondent is `entitled to
nominal damages which, as the law says, is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has
been violated or invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered
 awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punished by
law, and quasi-delicts, or in every case where property right has been invaded.
 damages in name only and not in fact
 amount to be awarded as nominal damages shall be equal or at least commensurate to the injury
sustained by private respondent considering the concept and purpose of such damages
 Ordinarily, the receipt of insurance payments should diminish the total value of the vessel quoted by
private respondent in his complaint considering that such payment is causally related to the loss for which
it claimed compensation.
 Its failure to pay the docket fee corresponding to its increased claim for damages under the amended
complaint should not be considered as having curtailed the lower court’s jurisdiction since the unpaid
docket fee should be considered as a lien on the judgment

CESARIO URSUA, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS AND

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
G.R. No. 112170. April 10,1996.

Facts:

On May 9,1989, provincial governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct an
investigation regarding bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted benefits and it was
found out that the petitioner Cesario Ursua, a Community Environment and Natural Resources officer was
involved in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and illegally-cut logs in the area. So, a complaint was filed
against him which was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

On August 1 1989, Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote to the Office of the Ombudsman to
furnished him a copy of the complaint and asked petitioner to bring that letter to the Office of the Ombudsman
since his messenger had to attend to some personal matters which the latter complied. Before proceeding to
the office of the Ombudsman, he talked to Oscar Perez and the latter advised him that he could sign his name
if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. When he arrived at the Office of the
Ombudsman in Davao City, he was asked to sign his name on a log book and instead of writing his own name,
he wrote “Oscar Perez”, afterwhich he proceeded to the Administrative Division and hand in the letter to Loida
Kahulugan, Chief of the Administrative Division in order to get a furnished copy of the complaint. Before
petitioner left, he was greeted by an acquaintance and from there Loida learned that the one who introduced
his name as Oscar Perez is actually the petitioner himself so the latter reported the matter immediately to the
Deputy Ombudsman who ordered that petitioner be accordingly charged.

On December 18,1990 petitioner without leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of
the prosecution to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name was fatal to its cause.
Petitioner contends that no document from the civil registry was presented to show the registered name of the
accused which according to him was a condition sine qua non for the validity of his conviction.The RTC
rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec.1 of Commonwealth Act No.142 as amended by
R.A. No.6085. On May 31,1993, The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the said petitioner. Petitioner
appealed to the C.A. contending that he has not violated C.A. No.142 as amended by R.A. No.6085 as he
never used any alias name, he only used such name on one occasion with an express consent of Oscar Perez
himself.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner has violated Sec.1 of Commonwealth Act No.142 as amended by R.A.6085 or
otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases.

Ruling:

No, the petitioner did not violateSec.1 of C.A No.142 as amended by R.A. 6085. The court ruled that there is
no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to used that name in addition to his real name. That
name was used in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity.
While the act may be covered by other provisions of law, it does not constitute an offense within the concept of
C.A. No.142

Section 1 of Commonwealth ActNo.142 provides that except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema,
television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of a pseudonym is a
normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one which he was registered at
birth in the office of the civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with
which he was registered in the Bureau of Immigration upon entry, or such substitute name as may have been
authorized by a competent court provided, that persons whose births have not been registered in any local civil
registry and who have not been baptized, have one one year from the approval of this act within which to
register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and
one or two surnames.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner CESARIO URSUA is acquitted
of the crime charged.