WEEK 4

SUCCESSION
CASE DIGESTS

Dela Cerna v. Potot

12 SCRA 576

FACTS:

Spouses Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will ad
testament where they willed that their 2 parcels of land be given to Manuela Rebaca, their
niece and that while each of them are living, he/she will continue to enjoy the fruits of
the lands mentioned.

Bernabe died. Gervasia submitted the will for probated. By order of Oct. 31, 1939, the
Court admitted for probate the said will but only for the part of Bernabe.

When Gervasia died, another petition for probate was instituted by Manuela, but because
she and her attorney failed to appear in court, the petition was dismissed. When the same
was heard, the CFI declared the will void for being executed contrary to the prohibition on
joint wills. On appeal, the order was reversed.

ISSUE:

W/N the will may be probated.

HELD:

Admittedly the probate of the will in 1939 was erroneous, however, because it was
probated by a court of competent jurisdiction it has conclusive effect and a
final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole
world. However, this is only with respect to the estate of the husband but cannot affect
the estate of the wife; considering that a joint will is a separate will of each testator.

The joint will being prohibited by law, its validity, in so far as the estate of the wife
is concerned, must be reexamine and adjudicated de novo.

The undivided interest of the wife should pass upon her death to her intestate heirs and
not to the testamentary heir. Thus as to the disposition of the wife, the will cannot be given
effect.

A decree of probate decree is conclusive on the due execution and the formal validity of
the will subject to such probate.
Vda. De Perez vs. Tolete

Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American
citizens and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New York, containing
provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known which one of
the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife).
Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was
named trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills.

Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael
opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He contended
that since the wills were executed in New York, New York law should govern. He further
argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Jose’s heirs and as
such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give.

For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two
wills were in accordance with New York law. But before she could present evidence to
prove the law of New York, the reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing the
wills.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed

HELD:

Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens

The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be
effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of
the Philippines:

Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made
with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according
to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code
prescribes.

Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or
by Philippine laws is imperative.

Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines

The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been
probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in
accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country
and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4)
the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country
on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court,
1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil.
610 [1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the
needed evidence.

The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the
foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice
of them.

On Lack of Notice to Jose’s Heirs

This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact -
petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and
because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably
failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant
petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is
being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215
SCRA 876 [1992]).

The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice
thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised
Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated
abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for
probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76,
which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees,
and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not
the petitioner, are required.

The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are
entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76
of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the
time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other
known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "

WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow
petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate
of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr.
Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the
probate proceedings.

Gonzales v. CA
90 SCRA 183

FACTS:

Isabel Gabriel died on June 7, 1961 without issue. Lutgarda Santiago (respondent),
niece of Isabel, filed a petition for probate of Isabel’s will designating her as the
principal beneficiary and executrix. The will was typewritten in Tagalog and was
executed 2 months prior to death of Isabel.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gonzales (petitioner), also a niece of Isabel, on
the following grounds: 1. the will is not genuine, 2. will was not executed and attested as
required by law, 3. the decedent at the time of the making of the will did not have
testamentary capacity due to her age and sickness, and 4. the will was procured
through undue influence.
The trial court disallowed the probate of the will but the Court of Appeals Reversed the
said decision of the trial court. The petitioner filed a petition for review with SC claiming
that the CA erred in holding that the will of the decedent was executed and attested as
required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the 3 instrumental witnesses
are credible.

ISSUE:

1. 1. Can a witness be considered competent under Art 820-821 and still not
be considered credible as required by Art. 805?

2. Is it required that there must be evidence on record that the witness to a will has good
standing in his/her community or that he/she is honest or upright?

HELD:

1.Yes. The petitioner submits that the term credible in Article 805 requires something
more than just being competent and, therefore, a witness in addition to being competent
under Articles 820-821 must also be credible under Art. 805. The competency of a
person to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined by the statute (Art. 820 and
821), whereas his credibility depends on the appreciation of his testimony and arises
from the belief and conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth. In the
case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May
3, 1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that: “Competency as a witness is one thing,
and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept what
he says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a given matter
because he is competent, but may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe
his testimony.”
2. No. There is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time
during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for
trustworthiness and for being reliable, his honesty and uprightness (such attributes are
presumed of the witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party)
in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough
that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with,
such that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to
the questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his
appearance, testimony , or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is
not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of the
Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code.

Molo vs. Molo

G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
Bautista Angelo, J. (Ponente)

Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation

Facts:
1. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The
latter will contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He
died without any forced heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana.
The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and nieces.

2. Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the
probate of the 1939 will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on
ground that the petitioner failed to prove its due execution.

3. As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this
time. Again the oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the
1939 will. They contended that despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation
clause is valid and thus effectively nullified the 1918 will.

Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the
subsequent disallowed 1939 will

RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a
subsequent will,containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for
the reason that it was not executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of
annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.

There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator
deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory
clause contained in the will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated
under the principle of dependent relative revocation.The doctrine applies when a
testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a
will with the intention to make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for
the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason.

Diaz v. De Leon
G.R. No. 17714 May 31, 1922

Facts:
1. Jesus de Leon executed 2 wills, the second will was not deemed in conformance to
the requirements under the law. After executing his first will, he asked it to be
immediately returned to him. As it was returned, he instructed his servant to tear it. This
was done in the testator's presence and his nurse. After sometime, he was asked by his
physician about the incident wherein he replied that the will has already been destroyed.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will

RULING: Yes. His intention to revoke is manifest from the facts that he was anxious to
withdraw or change the provisions he made in the first will. This fact was shown from his
own statements to the witnesses and the mother superior of the hospital where he was
subsequently confined. The original will which was presented for probate is deemed
destroyed hence, it cannot be probated as the last will and testament of testator.

Casiano v. CA
158 SCRA 451

FACTS:

On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the
petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the private respondents
Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a
last will and testament, these four heirs commenced on November 4, 1963 an intestate
proceeding for the settlement of their aunt’s estate in the CFI of Iloilo. While the case
was still pending the parties — Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino — executed an
agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana’s estate. The agreement provided for
the division of the estate into four equal parts among the parties. The Malotos then
presented the extrajudicial settlement agreement to the trial court for approval which the
court did on March 21, 1964.

3 years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adriana’s counsel, the late
Atty. Eliseo Hervas, discovered a document entitled “KATAPUSAN NGA
PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento),” dated January 3,1940, and purporting to be the last
will and testament of Adriana. Atty. Palma claimed to have found the testament, the
original copy, while he was going through some materials inside the cabinet
drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas. The document was submitted to the clerk of court
of the Iloilo CFI. Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said
will, Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares in
the estate of Adriana than what they received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial
settlement they had earlier signed. The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other
parties, among them being the petitioners Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of
Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.

Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and legatees named in the will,
filed in the same court which approved the EJ settelement a motion for reconsideration
and annulment of the proceedings therein and for the allowance of the will which was
denied by the CFI. Upon petition to the SC for certiorari and mandamus, the SC
dismissed that petition and advised that a separate proceeding for the probate of the
alleged will would be the appropriate vehicle to thresh out the matters raised by the
petitioners. The CFI and CA found that the will to be probated had been revoked by the
burning thereof by the housemaid upon instruction of the testatrix.

ISSUE:

W/N the will was revoked by Adriana.

HELD:

No. The provisions of the new Civil Code pertinent to the issue can be found in Article
830.

The physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se
constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus
revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be
done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person but under the
express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying
that the document destroyed must be the will itself.
“Animus revocandi” is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of
a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt
physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the
testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction.

There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the
document or papers burned by Adriana’s maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily
established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the
burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And
then, the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were
one in stating that they were the only ones present at the place where the stove
(presumably in the kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a will were
burned.

The two witnesses were illiterate and does not appear to be unequivocably positive that
the document burned was indeed Adriana’s will. Guadalupe believed that
the papers she destroyed was the will only because, according to her, Adriana told her
so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his information that the burned document was
the will because Guadalupe told him so, thus, his testimony on this point is double
hearsay.

It is an important matter of public interest that a purported win is not denied legalization
on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will be
shaken to its very foundations.

Gago v. Mamuyac
49 P 902

FACTS:

Miguel Mamuyac died on January 2, 1922. It appears from the record that Miguel
executed a last will and testament on July 27, 1918. Gago presented such will for
probate which was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac et. al. Said petition for probate was
denied on the ground that the deceased executed another will on April 16, 1919. Gago
presented the April 16 will for probate which was again opposed by Cornelio et. al.
alleging that the will presented by Gago is a carbon copy of the original April 16 will;
such will was cancelled during the lifetime of the deceased; and that said will was not
the last will and testament of the deceased. The RTC found that the deceased executed
another will on December 30, 1920.

ISSUE:

W/N the April 16 will was cancelled.

HELD:

YES. With reference to the said cancellation, it may be stated that there is positive
proof, not denied, which was accepted by the lower court, that will in question had
been cancelled in 1920. The law does not require any evidence of the revocation
or cancellation of a will to be preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove
the revocation or cancellation of wills. The fact that such cancellation or revocation has
taken place must either remain unproved of be inferred from evidence showing that
after due search the original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be found is
shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption
is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or
destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready
access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that
such will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of
the testator. The force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator,
while varying greatly, being weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never
conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by the
testator with intent to revoke it.
In view of the fact that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of
the testator Miguel Mamuyac and in view of the positive proof that the same had
been cancelled, we are forced to the conclusion that the conclusions of the lower court
are in accordance with the weight of the evidence. In a proceeding to probate a will the
burden of proofs is upon the proponent clearly to establish not only its execution but its
existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the
contestant to show that it has been revoked. In a great majority of instances in which
wills are destroyed for the purpose of revoking them there is no witness to
the act of cancellation or destruction and all evidence of its cancellation perishes with
the testator. Copies of wills should be admitted by the courts with great caution. When it
is proven, however, by proper testimony that a will was executed in duplicate and each
copy was executed with all the formalities and requirements of the law, then the
duplicate may be admitted in evidence when it is made to appear that the original has
been lost and was not cancelled or destroyed by the testator.

Guevara v. Guevara Digest

Facts:
1. Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests t his
wife, stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a
natural daughter Rosario. Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his natural daughter.
2. In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there
any settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the
land which he adjudicated to himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did
nothing to invoke the acknowledgment, as well as the devise given to her.
3. Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a
portion of a large parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and
based on the assumption that the decedent died intestate because his will was not
probated. She alleged that the disposition in favor of Ernesto should be disregarded.
4. The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory.

Issue: Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with

RULING: No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to
circumvent the last will and testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the
court for probate is mandatory and its allowance is essential and indispensable to its
efficacy.
Suppression of the wil is contrary to law and public policy for without probate, the right
of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.

Heirs of Lasam v. Umengan

trG.R. No. 168156, 6 December 2006, 510 SCRA 496

FACTS:

The subject lots denominated as Lot 5427 and Lot 992 situated in Tugegarao City
belonged to the spouses Pedro Cuntapay and Leona Bunagan. The spouses sold the
said lots to their children Isabel and Irene Cuntapay. It was agreed that the disputed
eastern portion shall belong to Isabel Cuntapay as evidenced by a notarized partition
agreement. Isabel was first married to Domingo Turingan, they had four children named
Abdon, Sado, Rufo and Maria. When the first husband died, Isabel married Rosendo
Lasam. She had two children by him named Trinidad and Rosendo.

In 2001 Rosendo Lasam filed a case against the respondent Vicenta Umengan who is
the daughter of Abdon Turingan, a son of Isabel Cuntapay, for unlawful detainer. The
petitioner anchored their claim on the disputed property on the purported will of Isabel
Cuntapay whereby she bequeathed the said property to Rosendo Lasam. The last will
and testament relied upon was not probated. The MTCC and RTC ruled in favor of the
petitioner on the ground that they are the owners of the property based on the alleged
will of Isabel Cuntapay.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will of Isabel Cuntapay could be relied upon to establish the
petitioner‘s right to possess the subject lot.

RULING:

No. The purported last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay could not properly be
relied upon to establish petitioners‘ right to possess the subject lot because, without
having been probated, the said last will and testament could not be the source of
any right.

Article 838 of the Civil Code is instructive:

“No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court…..”

In Cañiza v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that: “[a] will is essentially ambulatory; at
any time prior to the testator‘s death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted
to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law
being quite explicit: ̳No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved
and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.‘”

Dr. Tolentino, an eminent authority on civil law, also explained that “[b]efore any will can
have force or validity it must be probated. To probate a will means to prove before some
officer or tribunal, vested by law with authority for that purpose, that the instrument
offered to be proved is the last will and testament of the deceased person whose
testamentary act it is alleged to be, and that it has been executed, attested and
published as required by law, and that the testator was of sound and disposing mind. It
is a proceeding to establish the validity of the will.” Moreover, the presentation of the will
for probate is mandatory and is a matter of public policy. Thus, the petition was denied.

Nepomuceno v. CA
139 SCRA 206

FACTS:

Martin Jugo left a duly executed and notarized Last Will and Testament before he died.
Petitioner was named as sole executtor. It is clearly stated in the Will that he was legally
married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, but he had
been estranged from his lawful wife. In fact, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner
were married despite the subsisting first marriage. The testator devised the free portion
of his estate to petitioner. On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for probate.
On May 13, 1975, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging
undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the
execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having
admitted her living in concubinage with the testator.

The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator
admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner. Petitioner appealed to CA. On June
2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal denying the probate of the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid
except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void.

ISSUE:

W/N the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and
Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision.

HELD:

No. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be
validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared
the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. The general rule is that in probate
proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the
extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.

The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the
will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid
v. Nuguid)

The Will is void under Article 739. The following donations shall be void: (1) Those
made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation; and Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning
donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions.

There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when
Martin Jugo executed his Will. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy
because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom
he had been living in concubinage

Gallanosa v. Arcangel
83 SCRA 676

FACTS:

Florentino Hitosis was a childless widower and was survived by his brother Lito. In his
will, Florentino bequeathed his ½ share in the conjugal estate to his second wife, Tecla,
and, should Tecla predecease him, as was the case, his ½ share would be assigned to
spouses Gallanosa. Pedro Gallanosa was Tecla’s son by her first marriage who grew
up under the care of Florentino. His other properties were bequeathed to his
protégé Adolfo Fortajada.

Upon his death, a petition for the probate of his will was wile. Opposition was registered
by Florentino’s brother, nephews and nieces.

After a hearing, where the oppositors did not present any evidence, the Judge admitted
the will to probate.

The testator’s legal heirs did not appeal from the decree of probate and from the order
of partition and distribution.

Later, the legal heirs filed a case for recovery of 61 parcels of land against Pedro
alleging that they had been in continuous possession of those lands and praying that
they be declared owners thereof.

Pedro moved for a dismissal which was later granted by the Judge on the ground of res
judicata.
The legal heirs did not appeal from the order of dismissal.

15 years after the dismissal of the first civil case and 28 years after the probate of the
will, the legal heirs filed a case for “annulment of the will” alleging fraud and deceit.

The court dismissed said action. However, the court set aside the dismissal after the
heirs filed a motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the legal heirs have a cause of action for the “annulment” of the will of
Florentino and for the recovery of the 61 parcels of land adjudicated under that will to
the petitioners.

HELD:

NO. The SC held that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in setting
aside its order of dismissal and ignoring the testamentary case and the first civil case
which is the same as the instant case. It is evident that second civil case is barred by
res judicata and by prescription.

The decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the will.
That means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time he executed
the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the
will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses, and that
the will is genuine.

Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not

even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will.

After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its
execution cannot be raised anymore.

The SC also held that the decree of adjudication, having rendered in a proceeding in
rem, is binding upon the whole world. Moreover, the dismissal of the first civil case,
which is a judgment in personam, was an adjudication on the merits. Thus. It constitutes
a bar by former judgment under the Rules of Court.

The SC also held that the lower court erred in saying that the action for the recovery of
the lands had not prescribed. The SC ruled that the Art. 1410 of NCC (the action or
defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe) cannot
apply to last wills and testaments.

The Rules of Court does not sanction an action for “annulment” of a will.

A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will.

A decree of adjudication in a testate proceeding is binding on the whole world.After the
period for seeking relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of
court has expired, a final judgment or order can be set aside only on the grounds of: (a)
lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law or (b) that the judgment was obtained
by means of extrinsic or collateral fraud. In the latter case, the period for annulling the
judgment is four (4) years from the discovery of fraud.
The Civil Law rule that an action for declaration of inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe cannot be applied to last wills and testaments.

People vs Manahan

Facts: Teresita Tibigar, 16 y/o was a stay-in waitress at Espiritu Canteen. Teresita was
raped by Manuel Manahan, brother-in-law of the owner, who was temporarily residing in
the same canteen. Within the same month the raped occurred, Teresita returned to
Pangasinan and thereafter became pregnant. When her parents discovered it and
learned of her story, they brought her to the hospital where she was examined and
proceeded to the police to give her statement. With the assistance of her mother,
Teresita filed a criminal complaint accusing Manuel of rape. Teresita gave birth to
Melanie Tibigar. Court found Manuel guilty and sentenced him to death. He was also
ordered to indemnify the victim 50k as moral damages, pay the costs, and acknowledge
and support the offspring of his indiscretion Case went to SC on automatic review.
Issue: WON Court committed error in acknowledging Melanie as a child of Manuel and
ordering him to support the offspring of his indiscretion.
Decision: SC deleted that portion of the judgment.
“Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape shall also
be sentenced to “acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from
doing so,” and “in every case to support the offspring.” In the case before us,
compulsory acknowledgment of the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a
legal impediment in doing so as it appears that the accused is a married man.”
“As pronounced by this Court in People v. Guerrero,”the rule is that if the rapist is a
married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should
there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.””

Dorotheo v. CA
GR No. 108581, December 8, 1999

FACTS:
Aniceta Reyes died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Thereafter, her
husband Alejandro also died. In 1977, Lourdes Dorotheo filed a special proceeding for
the probate of Alejandro’s last will and testament. The children of spouses filed their
opposition. The RTC ruled that Lourdes being not the wife of Alejandro the will is
intrinsically void; the oppositors are the only heir entitled to the estate. Lourdes filed a
Motion for Consideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she
took care of Alejandro prior to his death although they were not legally married to each
other. This was denied by the trial court. The CA dismissed her appeal for her failure to
wile the same within the extended period.

ISSUE:

May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an
order that has become final and executor still be given effect?

RULING:

No. A final and executor decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no
matter how erroneous it may be.

The Supreme Court ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the
intrinsic provisions thereof are void. Alejandro gave all the property to the concubine.
Such is invalid because one cannot dispose what he does not own. In this case,
the whole property is the conjugal property of Alejandro and Aniceta. Such has become
final and executor. The only instance where a party interested in probate proceeding
may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances
beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence with
circumstances do not concur herein.

Austria v. Reyes
31 SCRA 754

FACTS:

Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for probate, ante
mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the present
petitioners, who are nephews and nieces of Basilia. The will was subsequently allowed
with the bulk of her estate designated for respondents, all of whom were Basilia’s
legally adopted children. The petitioners, claiming to be the nearest of kin of
Basilia, assert that the respondents had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in
accordance with law, thereby making them mere strangers to the decedent and without
any right to succeed as heirs. Petitioners argue that this circumstance should have left
the whole estate of Basilia open to intestacy with petitioners being the compulsory heirs.

It is alleged by petitioners that the language used imply that Basilia was deceived into
believing that she was legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire estate to the
respondents as the latter’s legitime, with the inference that respondents would not have
instituted the respondents as heirs had the fact of spurious adoption been known to her.
The petitioners inferred that from the use of the terms, “sapilitang tagapagmana”
(compulsory heirs) and “sapilitang mana” (legitime), the impelling reason or cause for
the institution of the respondents was the testatrix’s belief that under the law she could
not do otherwise. Thus Article 850 of the Civil Code applies whereby, “the statement of
a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it
appears from the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had
known the falsity of such cause.”

ISSUE:

W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in barring the petitioners
nephews and niece from registering their claim even to properties adjudicated by the
decedent in her will.

HELD:

No. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code,
the following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be
stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must
appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if
he had known the falsity of the cause. The decedent’s will does not state in a specific or
unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. Absent such we look at other
considerations. The decedent’s disposition of the free portion of her estate, which
largely favored the respondents, compared with the relatively small devise of land which
the decedent left for her blood relatives, shows a perceptible inclination on her part to
give the respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them.
Excluding the respondents from the inheritance, considering that petitioner nephews
and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the testate by virtue of intestacy, would subvert
the clear wishes of the decedent.

Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces
an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate, as was
done in this case. Intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator should be
allowed to prevail. Granted that a probate court has found, by final judgment, that the
decedent possessed testamentary capacity and her last will was executed free from
falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence, it follows that giving full expression to her
will must be in order.

Nuguid v. Nuguid
GR L-23445, June 23, 1966

FACTS:
Rosario died single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving were her
legitimate parents, Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters. One of the siblings filed
a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario 11 years before her death and prayed
that she be admitted to the probate and be appointed administrator. The parents
opposed saying that they are the compulsory heirs of the decedent in the direct
ascending line and that the will should be void on the ground of absolute preterition.

ISSUE:

Is the will void on the ground of preterition?

RULING:

YES. The decedent left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced
heirs in the direct ascending line her parents. And, the will completely omits both of
them; thus receiving nothing by the testament, depriving them of their legitime; neither
were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Note that A. 854 of
the NCC merely nullifies the “institution of heir”. Considering that the will presented
solely provides for the institution of the petitioner as universal heir and nothing more, the
result is the same. The will is null and void

ACAIN vs. IAC

October 27, 1987

FACTS:

Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio. The
will provided that all his shares from properties he earned with his wife shall be given to
his brother Segundo (father of Constantino). In case Segundo dies, all such property
shall be given to Segundo’s children. Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio.

The oppositors Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased, and the
latter's widow Rosa filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:

(1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;

(2) he is merely a universal heir and

(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.

ISSUE:
 Was there preterition?

HELD:

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned,
they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the
widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from
the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Even if the surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the
inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.

The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia, whose legal
adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Adoption gives to the
adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the
adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be
denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both
adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be
denied that they were not expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition of the
legally adopted child.

Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to

intestate succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in
intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and
respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the
entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the
nullification of such institution of universal heirs - without any other testamentary
disposition in the will - amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.

In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he

must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by
it. Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being
no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or
real property he is called upon to receive. At the outset, he appears to have an interest
in the will as an heir. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of
respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not
an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left
by the deceased.
NERI v. AKUTIN
GR No.L-47799, May 21, 1943
74 PHIL 185

FACTS: This is a case where the testator Agripino Neri in his will left all his property by
universal title to the children by his second marriage, the herein respondents, with
omission of the children by his first marriage, the herein petitioner. The omission of the
heirs in the will was contemplated by the testator with the belief that he had already
given each of the children portion of the inheritance, particularly a land he had
abandoned was occupied by the respondents over which registration was denied for it
turned out to be a public land, and an aggregate amount of money which the
respondents were indebted to their father.

ISSUE: Should there be cancellation of the will, in view of the omission of heirs? Is there
disinheritance in this case?

HELD: Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy on
the ground that testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his
second marriage, without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage but
upon the erroneous belief that he had given them already more shares in his property
than those given to the children by his second marriage. Disinheritance made without a
statement of the cause, if contested, shall annul the institution of heirs in so far as it is
prejudicial to the disinherited person. This is but a case of preterition which annuls the
institution of heirs.

Morales vs. Olondriz

CITATION: G.R. No. 198994, February 3, 2016

PRINCIPLES:
 Preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir from the
testator’s inheritance without the heir’s express disinheritance.

 Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line shall
annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall remain valid
insofar as the legitimes are not impaired. Consequently, if a will does not institute
any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line will
result in total intestacy.

FACTS:
Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. died on June 9, 2003. He was survived by his widow, Ana
Maria Ortigas de Olondriz, and his children: Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr., Alejandro
Marino O. Olondriz, Isabel Rosa O. Olondriz, Angelo Jose O. Olondriz, and Francisco
Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz.

Believing that the decedent died intestate, the respondent heirs filed a petition with the
Las Piñas RTC for the partition of the decedent's estate and the appointment of a
special administrator on July 4, 2003. On July 11, 2003, the RTC appointed Alfonso
Juan O. Olondriz, Jr. as special administrator.

However, on July 28, 2003, Iris Morales filed a separate petition with the RTC alleging
that the decedent left a will dated July 23, 1991. Morales prayed for the probate of the
will and for her appointment as special administratrix.

Notably, the will omitted Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz, an illegitimate son of
the decedent. The respondent heirs moved to dismiss the probate proceedings because
Francisco was preterited from the will.

The RTC observed: (1) that Morales expressly admitted that Francisco Javier Maria
Bautista Olondriz is an heir of the decedent; (2) that Francisco was clearly omitted from
the will; and (3) that based on the evidentiary hearings, Francisco was clearly preterited.
Thus, the RTC reinstated Alfonso Jr. as administrator of the estate and ordered the
case to proceed in intestacy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was no preterition because Francisco received a house and lot
inter vivos as an advance on his legitime.

RULING:
Yes.
Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either because he
is not named or, although he is named as a father, son, etc., he is neither instituted as
an heir nor assigned any part of the estate without expressly being disinherited — tacitly
depriving the heir of his legitime. Preterition requires that the omission is total, meaning
the heir did not also receive any legacies, devises, or advances on his legitime. In other
words, preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir from the
testator’s inheritance without the heir’s express disinheritance.

The decedent's will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or devisee.
As the decedent's illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in the direct line.
Unless Morales could show otherwise, Francisco's omission from the will leads to the
conclusion of his preterition. Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in
the direct line shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall
remain valid insofar as the legitimes are not impaired. Consequently, if a will does not
institute any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line
will result in total intestacy.

During the proceedings in the RTC, Morales had the opportunity to present evidence
that Francisco received donations inter vivos and advances on his legitime from the
decedent. However, Morales did not appear during the hearing dates, effectively
waiving her right to present evidence on the issue. We cannot fault the RTC for
reaching the reasonable conclusion that there was preterition.

Solano v. CA

G.R. No. L-41971, 29 November 1983, 126 SCRA 122

FACTS:

Bienvenido and Emeteria filed an action for recognition against Melita Solano Meliton
died during the pendency of the petition and his daughter substituted him while asking
for the probate of the will of the decedent. RTC specified the legal issues as 1) the
recognition of Garcias, 2) correct status of Zonia, 3) the hereditary share of each of
them in view of the probated will. In deciding, RTC declared Garcias as illegitimate
children of late Meliton; the institution of Sonia as sole heir declared null and void, the 3
children shall share equally the estate CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not total intestacy resulted from the declaration that the institution of sole
heir from decedents will.

RULING:

That being compulsory heirs, the Garcias were preterited from Meliton’s will, and as a
result, Sonia’s institution as sole heir is null and void pursuant to Art. 854:

“The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir, but the devises and legacies shall be valid xxx

The intention of the decedent is to favor Sonia with certain portions of his property
which the testator had the right to such so that it should be upheld as to the one-half
portion of the property that the testator could freely dispose of Sonia’s share is hereby
declared to be 4/6 of the estate and Garcias 1/6 each. The usufruct in favor of will
should not be invalidated all together.
Aznar v. Duncan
17 SCRA 590

FACTS:

Christensen died testate. The will was admitted to probate. The court declared that
Helen Garcia was a natural child of the deceased. The Court of First
Instance equally divided the properties of the estate of Christensen between
Lucy Duncan (whom testator expressly recognized in his will as his daughter) and Helen
Garcia. In the order, the CFI held that Helen Garcia was preterited in the will thus, the
institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled and the properties passed to both of
them as if the deceased died intestate.

ISSUE:

Whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be equally divided or whether
the inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir should be merely reduced to the extent
necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to ¼ of the entire estate.

HELD:

The inheritance of Lucy should be merely reduced to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia.

Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter and limited
her share to a legacy of P3,600.00. When a testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy
worth less than the legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a
relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons, the heir could not ask that the
institution of the heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed.

Dy Yieng SEANGIO, Barbara D. SEANGIO and Virginia D. SEANGIO, petitioners,

vs. Hon. Amor A. REYES, Alfredo SEANGIO, et al., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 140371-72, November 27, 2006

FACTS:

Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late
Segundo Seangio and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D.
Seangio-Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of Dy Yieng Seangio.
However, petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia opposed the petition contending
that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy; 2) Segundo executed a general power of attorney
in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision
over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to
serve as the administrator of the estate; and 4) Segundo left a holographic will
disinheriting one of the private respondents. Thereafter, a petition for the probate of the
holographic will of Segundo was filed by the petitioner and reiterating that the probate
proceedings should take precedence over the petition filed by the private respondents
because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over the intestate
proceedings. The two petitions were then consolidated. Private respondents moved for
the dismissal of the probate proceedings on the ground that the document purporting to
be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the
deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil
Code, of which petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss. RTC then
issued an order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings. Due to petitioner’s
denial of motion for reconsideration, hence this present action.

ISSUE:

Whether the court erred in dismissing the probate proceeding.

HELD:

Yes. For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same
must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With
regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his
document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a
form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a
sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the
Civil Code.

Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance

instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is
written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis
causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not
make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo,
nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in
the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would
succeed in the absence of Alfredo.

With regard to the issue on preterition, the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in
the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court’s opinion, Segundo’s
last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole
exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir16 to the exclusion of his
other compulsory heirs. Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s
holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will
cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass
either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his
property may be rendered nugatory.