Transportation Case Digest:

Mayer Steel Pipe Corp. V. CA

(1997)
G.R. No. 124050 June 19, 1997
Lessons Applicable: Ancillary Contracts (transportation)

FACTS:

 1983: Hongkong Government Supplies Department

(Hongkong) contracted Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation
(Mayer) to manufacture and supply various steel pipes
and fittings
 August to October, 1983: Mayer shipped the pipes and
fittings to Hongkong as evidenced by Invoice Nos. MSPC-
1014, MSPC-1015, MSPC-1025, MSPC-1020, MSPC-1017
and MSPC-1022
 Prior to the shipping, Mayer insured the pipes and fittings
against all risks with South Sea Surety and Insurance Co.,
Inc. (South Sea) and Charter Insurance Corp. (Charter)
 South Sea:Invoice Nos. MSPC-1014, 1015 and 1025 for
US$212,772.09
 Charter: Invoice Nos. 1020, 1017 and 1022 for
US$149,470.00
 Mayer and Hongkong jointly appointed Industrial
Inspection (International) Inc. as third-party inspector to
examine whether the pipes and fittings are manufactured
in accordance with the specifications in the contract
 Industrial Inspection certified all the pipes and fittings to
be in good order condition before they were loaded in the
vessel
 When the goods reached Hongkong, it was discovered
that a substantial portion thereof was damaged
 Mayer and Hongkong a claim against private respondents
for indemnity under the insurance contract
 Charter paid petitioner Hongkong the amount of
HK$64,904.75
 demanded payment of the balance of HK$299,345.30
which was refused
 April 17, 1986: filed an action to recover HK$299,345.30
 Defense: insurance surveyor's report allegedly showed
that the damage is a factory defect
 Trial Court: in favor of Mayer and Hongkong
 CA: reversed
 affirmed the finding of the trial court that the damage is
not due to factory defect and that it was covered by the
"all risks" insurance policies
 BUT held that Section 3(6) of the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act provides that "the carrier and the ship shall be
discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage
unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the
goods or the date when the goods should have been
delivered
 applies not only to the carrier but also to the insurer
ISSUE: W/N Section 3(6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea
also applies to insurer

HELD: NO. Petition is granted. CA reversed. RTC reinstated

 Section 3(6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act states
that the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all
liability for loss or damage to the goods if no suit is filed
within one year after delivery of the goods or the date
when they should have been delivered. Under this
provision, only the carrier's liability is extinguished if no
suit is brought within one year. But the liability of the
insurer is not extinguished because the insurer's liability
is based not on the contract of carriage but on the
contract of insurance - governed by the Insurance Code
 An insurance contract is a contract whereby one party, for
a consideration known as the premium, agrees to
indemnify another for loss or damage which he may suffer
from a specified peril
 "all risks" insurance policy covers all kinds of loss other
than those due to willful and fraudulent act of the insured
 prescribes in ten years, in accordance with Article 1144 of
the New Civil Code

Malayan Insurance Co. Inc. v Arnaldo (Insurance)

G.R. No. L-67835 October 12, 1987

MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC. (MICO), petitioner,
vs. GREGORIA CRUZ ARNALDO, in her capacity as
the INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, and CORONACION
PINCA, respondents.

FACTS:
On June 7, 1981, the petitioner (hereinafter called
(MICO) issued to the private respondent, Coronacion
Pinca, Fire Insurance Policy No. F-001-17212 on her
property for the amount of P14,000.00 effective July 22,
1981, until July 22, 1982.
On October 15,1981, MICO allegedly cancelled the
policy for non-payment, of the premium and sent the
corresponding notice to Pinca.
On December 24, 1981, payment of the premium for
Pinca was received by Domingo Adora, agent of MICO.
On January 15, 1982, Adora remitted this payment to
MICO, together with other payments. On January 18,
1982, Pinca's property was completely burned.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) Insurance Commission: granted claim for
compensation for burned property.

ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid insurance contract at the
time of the loss.

RULING:
Yes.
A valid cancellation must, therefore, require
concurrence of the following conditions:
(1) There must be prior notice of cancellation to the
insured;
(2) The notice must be based on the occurrence, after
the effective date of the policy, of one or more of the
grounds mentioned;
(3) The notice must be
(a) in writing,
(b) mailed, or delivered to the named insured,
(c) at the address shown in the policy;
(4) It must state
(a) which of the grounds mentioned in Section 64 is
relied upon and
(b) that upon written request of the insured, the insurer
will furnish the facts on which the cancellation is based.
MICO's claims it cancelled the policy in question on
October 15, 1981, for non-payment of premium. To
support this assertion, it presented one of its
employees, who testified that "the original of the
endorsement and credit memo" —presumably meaning
the alleged cancellation — "were sent the assured by
mail through our mailing section" However, there is no
proof that the notice, assuming it complied with the
other requisites mentioned above, was actually mailed
to and received by Pinca.
We also look askance at the alleged cancellation, of
which the insured and MICO's agent himself had no
knowledge, and the curious fact that although Pinca's
payment was remitted to MICO's by its agent on January
15, 1982, MICO sought to return it to Adora only on
February 5, 1982, after it presumably had learned of the
occurrence of the loss insured against on January 18,
1982. These circumstances make the motives of the
petitioner highly suspect, to say the least, and cast
serious doubts upon its candor and bona fides.

Ang Giok Chip v Springfield G.R.

No. L-33637 December 31, 1931
J. Malcolm

Facts:
Ang insured his warehouse for the total value of Php 60,000. One of
these, amounting to 10,000, was with Springfield
Insurance Company. His warehouse burned down, then he
attempted to recover 8,000 from Springfield for the indemnity. The
insurance company interposed its defense on a rider in the policy in
the form of Warranty F, fixing the amount of hazardous good that can
be stored in a building to be covered by the insurance. They claimed
that Ang violated the 3 percent limit by placing hazardous goods to as
high as 39 percent of all the goods stored in the building. His suit to
recover was granted by the trial court. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether a warranty referred to in the policy as forming part of
the contract of insurance and in the form of a rider to the insurance
policy, is null and void because not complying with the Philippine
Insurance Act.

Held: No. The warranty is valid. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
The Insurance Act, Section 65, taken from California law, states:
"Every express warranty, made at or before the execution of a policy,
must be contained in the policy itself, or in another instrument signed
by the insured and referred to in the policy, as making a part of it."
Warranty F, indemnifying for a value of Php 20,000 and pasted on the
left margin of the policy stated:
It is hereby declared and agreed that during the currency of this
policy no hazardous goods be stored in the Building to which this
insurance applies or in any building communicating therewith,
provided, always, however, that the Insured be permitted to stored a
small quantity of the hazardous goods specified below, but not
exceeding in all 3 per cent of the total value of the whole of the goods
or merchandise contained in said warehouse, viz; . . . .
Also, the court stated a book that said, "any express warranty
or condition is always a part of the policy, but, like any other part of
an express contract, may be written in the margin, or contained in
proposals or documents expressly referred to in the policy, and so
made a part of it."
“It is well settled that a rider attached to a policy is a part of the
contract, to the same extent and with like effect as
it actuallyembodied therein. In the second place, it is equally well
settled that an express warranty must appear upon the face of the
policy, or be clearly incorporated therein and made a part thereof by
explicit reference, or by words clearly evidencing such intention.”
The court concluded that Warranty F is contained in the policy itself,
because by the contract of insurance agreed to by the parties it was
made to be a part. It wasn’t aseparate instrument agreed to by the
parties.
The receipt of the policy by the insured without objection binds him. It
was his duty to read the policy and know its terms. He also never
chose to accept a different policy by considering the earlier one as a
mistake. Hence, the rider is valid.
Insurance Case Digest: Qua Chee
Gan V. Law Union And Rock
Insurance Co., Ltd. (1955)
G.R. No.L-4611 December 17, 1955
Lessons Applicable: Ambiguous Provisions Interpreted Against
Insurer (Insurance)

FACTS:
 Qua Chee Gan, a merchant of Albay, owned
four bodegas which he insured with Law
Union & Rock Insurance Co., Ltd (Law Union)
since 1937 and the lose made payable to the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) as mortgage
of the hemp and crops, to the extent of its
interest
 July 21, 1940 morning: fire broke out in
bodegas 1,2 and 4 which lasted for almost a
week.
 Qua Chee Gan informed Law Union by
telegram
 Law Union rejected alleging that it was a fraudulent
that the fire had been deliberately
claim
caused by the insured or by other persons in
connivance with him
 Que Chee Gan, with his brother, Qua Chee
Pao, and some employees of his, were
 indicted and tried in 1940 for the crime of
arson but was subsequently acquitted
 During the pendency of the suit, Que Chee
Gan paid PNB
 Law Union states that ff. assignment of errors:
 1. memo of warranty requires 11 hydrants instead of 2
 2. violation of hemp warranty against storage of gasoline
since it prohibits oils
 3. fire was due to fraud
 burned bodegas could not possibly have
4.
contained the quantities of copra and hemp
stated in the fire claims
ISSUE: W/N Qua Chee Gan should be allowed to
claim.

HELD: YES. Affirmed.

 1. It is a well settled rule of law that an

insurer which with knowledge of facts

entitling it to treat a policy as no longer in
force, receives and accepts a preium on the
policy, estopped to take advantage of the
forfeiture
 2. oils (animal and/or vegetable and/or

mineral and/or their liquid products having a

flash point below 300o Fahrenheit", and is
decidedly ambiguous and uncertain; for in
ordinary parlance, "Oils" mean "lubricants"
and not gasoline or kerosene
 by reason of the exclusive control of the
insurance company over the terms and
phraseology of the contract, the ambiguity
must be held strictly against the insurer and
liberraly in favor of the insured, specially to
avoid a forfeiture
 3. trial Court found that the discrepancies
were a result of the insured's erroneous
interpretation of the provisions of the
insurance policies and claim forms, caused
by his imperfect knowledge of English, and
that the misstatements were innocently
made and without intent to defraud.
 4. Similarly, the 20 per cent overclaim on 70
per cent of the hemo stock, was explained by
the insured as caused by his belief that he
was entitled to include in the claim his
expected profit on the 70 per cent of the
hemp, because the same was already
contracted for and sold to other parties
before the fire occurred