WORKING PAPER

Submitted for:
The ASEAN International Relations Student
Conference (AIRSC)
held by Budi Luhur University
Jakarta, October, 26-30, 2008

Human Security in the New ASEAN:

Securitization of Agenda
and Norm Internalization

ANGGALIA PUTRI PERMATASARI

Department of International Relations

Padjadjaran University
Bandung-Indonesia

October 2008
Abstract

The end of 2007 saw a critical point in the history of ASEAN. The signing of ASEAN
Charter marked a point of departure in a way that it drives ASEAN to be a more rules-based
organization focused more on the people. The people-centrism is a goal that coincides with
increasing demand of paradigm shift in ASEAN’s conception of security. The state-centric nature
of ASEAN’s security conception coupled by the perpetuation of non-interference norm was largely
criticized on the ground that it allows ASEAN members to turn blind eye on gross human rights
violations and political repression, to name a few, taking place the region. It is also seen as
inadequate to address new security threats that besiege the most vulnerable groups in the region.
Human security is found among the new approaches to security seeking to move the focus
away from national security to security of individuals. Although the concept itself is largely
criticized, human security issues have gained more prominence in the region, thanks to civil-
society organizations’ efforts in consistently pushing them into the organization’s agenda.
Although still in the search of the best formula to balance state and human security, ASEAN has
shown progress, however slow, in recognizing the need to move beyond its ‘old-faithful,’ albeit
comprehensive, conception of security.
The main task of this paper is to examine the way through which human security agenda is
finding a place in the regional security discourse by using securitization approach. Furthermore, it
wishes to examine the state of human security in ASEAN’s security discourse in terms of norm
internalization and the potential changes that may take place if the organization finally adheres to
such norm. The first task is carried out by addressing the speech acts taking place in the discourse
of ASEAN Regional Forum. The second task is handled by addressing the role of civil-society
organizations in promoting human security in terms of norm internalization and the way ASEAN
responds to it. Finally, the latest task is handled by using insights from normative institutionalism
theory.
This paper contends that human security agenda has made its way to enter the regional
security discourse, albeit not explicitly framed in human security terms. This means that
securitization of human security agenda has been taking place, although not all the issues in the
agenda get securitized. However, as a norm, human security continues to be denied internalization
despite its success in reaching the norm cascade stage. Formal acceptance of and adherence to the
norm is impeded by the ambivalence of member states trying to uphold the old established norms
in order to preserve their own interests or avoid risking the organization’s cohesion and acting
capacity. Following the inclusion of human security agenda in the regional security discourse, there
are implications on the regional governance while the norm internalization, if eventually takes
place, may result in change in member states’ behaviour. Regarding the Charter, the spirit of
people-centrism has not been followed by ASEAN’s willingness to internalize human-centric
norms while human-centric agenda continues to find its way in its security discourse.

Key words: securitization, human security, norm internalization, communicative action, speech
act, security discourse

2
 Human Security in the New ASEAN:
Securitization of Agenda and Norm Internalization

Anggalia Putri Permatasari

Student of Department of International Relations
Padjadjaran University

Introduction
Since November, 20, 2007, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has
retained the privilege of having a constitution, marked by the signing of the ASEAN
Charter on the 13th ASEAN Summit held in Singapore. It was historic in a sense that
ASEAN finally braced itself to adhere to one prime legally-binding agreement that gives it
a distinctive legal personality. The content and spirit of the Charter is no less remarkable,
especially in the light of strong criticisms spurted at the organization concerning its
efficacy in tackling new challenges emerging in the post-Cold War era. One crucial angle
of the criticisms points at ASEAN’s lack of political will and mechanism in dealing with
member states involved in human rights violation, especially in the wake of Myanmar ‘s
violent way of handling protesters in the country not so long ago. Even before that, most of
ASEAN member states were given bad credits for their human rights record.1 Although
one cannot argue that human rights concerns are the prime factors that pushed ASEAN
member states to craft the Charter in the way they did, it is hard to deny that it was
partially aimed to answer the critics conveying doubts on ASEAN’s efficacy and even
relevance.
One of the criticisms that the Charter might want to answer (although not
necessarily silence) is the statements made by various elements of international society,
especially civil-society organizations (CSOs) that ASEAN had ignored the people’s point
of view in its build-up and had been an elitist organization focusing mainly and solely on
nation-state’s or regime’s well-being at the expense of the people’s. In other words,
ASEAN has been criticized as being overly state-centric in its doctrines and mechanisms
of various sectors (notably in the sectors of politics, economy, and security), a condition
that might have served the organization well during the Cold War era but that is now seen
as obsolete, even dangerous. ASEAN’s state-centrism in security sector is striking because
it is inextricably linked to the fundamental norm that have been upholding the

1
For this notion, one can consult human right watch at http://www.humanrightswatch.com

3
organization’s existence and guarding its cohesion for more than four decades, being the
norm of non-interference.
ASEAN’s approach to security was built upon principles born amid the Cold War
predicament. The notion of regional security could not be separated from and was in fact a
function of national or domestic security and stability. The region’s pursuit of domestic
and regional stability through economic development put the state as the dominant actor
and main referent object of security. Interstate relation within the region was given the
utmost consideration due its direct impact on regional stability. Therefore, national security
was seen primarily as a guarantor of regional security while state was seen as the provider
of security for its people. Following the logic, it was natural to assume that security of the
people in each member state was automatically secured when security of the state was
intact.
Nevertheless, the 1997 financial crisis that left the region shambling opened the
door to a possible rethinking of the regional security discourse. The fact that member states
of ASEAN were incapacitated to protect their people from economic disruptions, as a
function of their failure in saving the national economies, gave way to voices demanding a
shift of security focus from the state to the individuals. Adding to significance, voices
demanding ASEAN to change its way of ‘handling the business’ finally made their way to
be heard and seriously dealt with. Melly Caballero-Anthony in fact has marked the 1997
financial crisis as one tipping point where human security found the road smoother.2
However, she mentioned another tipping point that countermanded it, namely the 9/11
World Trade Organization terrorist attack which she claimed has turned regional security
discourse back to its state-centric nature.3
Human security has travelled a quite long journey since 1994 when United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) first engaged in promoting the concept through its
annually-published Human Development Report, therefore formally popularized it.
However, ASEAN’s treatment of the paradigm continues to be in question, disregarding
the positive developments made by the organization in institutional terms. This paper
therefore seeks to examine the ways in which human security, divided for analytical
purpose into human security as an agenda and human security as a norm, is finding a place
in the regional security discourse and practice. It also whishes to inquire human security in
2
Melly Caballero-Anthony, “Revisioning Human Security in Southeast Asia,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 28 No
3 (2004), pp. 155-189.
3
Ibid..

4
terms of norm internalization and address the potential change following human security
inclusion in the regional security discourse. Concerning the first task, analysis will be
carried out by borrowing analytical power of securitization approach, with some caveats
that will be addressed later. The second task will be dealt with using the lens of normative
institutionalism focusing on norms’ life-cycle. The method used in the inquiry is mainly in
the form of document analysis, including analysis of formal documents (such as the
Charter), statements of ASEAN and ASEAN Regional Forum, speeches, remarks, and
statements made by ASEAN and domestic leaders.
For purposes of structure, the paper will be divided into five parts, beginning with
introduction, theoretical and conceptual framework consisting of human security,
securitization approach, and normative institutionalism, analysis comprising four sections:
(1) ASEAN’s approach to security, (2) the securitization of human security agenda (3)
human security in terms of norm internalization, and 4) the potential change, ending with
conclusion.

Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

Human Security
One can never bee too cautious in dealing with the concept of human security. Despite
its great appeal, the concept has been criticized as being too slippery, ambiguous, and
distracting the focus of security studies and analysis. Roland Paris once argued that:

“Human security is like sustainable development-everyone is for it, but few people have idea what
it means. Existing definitions of human security tend to be extraordinarily expansive and
vague...which provides policymakers with little guidance in the prioritization of competing policy
goals and academic little sense of what, exactly, is being studied.4

However, human security paradigm continues to evolve in the study and practice of
security and has informed many policymaking agendas of governments and international
organizations. For example, human security has been a vocal point in Japan’s, Canada’s,
Norway’s, and Thailand’s foreign policy, despite different emphasis each country makes.5
The popularity of this concept is propelled by at least two factors, the first being the
emergence of the so called ‘new threats’ to security transcending the national barriers, e.g.

4
Roland Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air,” International Security, Vol. 26 No. 2 (2001),
pp. 87-102, quoted in Melly Caballero-Anthony, “Revisioning Human Security in Southeast Asia,” Asian
Perspective, Vol. 28 No 3 (2004), pp. 155-189, see also http://www.humansecuritygateway.com.
5
See for example Thailand’s Annual Security Outlook, Canada’s Foreign Policy Directions, and Japan
Development Assistance.

5
terrorist attacks, contagious diseases, organized transnational crimes, and ecological
dangers like climate change, global warming, ozone and natural resources depletion and
the rising incidence of civil wars and intra-state conflicts. The second factor is the
increased opportunity to tackle those new challenges through various institutional
mechanisms.6 In other words, amid the new threats besieging humans’ lives, why missing
opportunities and wasting potentials to act?
According to Amitav Acharya, human security “represents a powerful but
controversial attempts by sections of the academic and policy community to redefine and
broaden the meaning of security.”7 As many writers argue, the nature of security
conception and practice have changed a lot since the Cold War era.8 Traditionally, security
meant protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states from external military
threats, which was the essence of national security concept dominating security analysis
and policymaking during the Cold War period. 9
Since then, security studies have been expanded to include for example economic
and environmental concerns (in the 70s and 80s), but the main referent object of security
remained the state.10 However, immediately after the Cold War, there were attempts to roll
back the realm of security studies, as shown by Stephen Walt’s remark in 1991, “Security
studies should focus on threat, use, and control of military force,”11 although the urge
received little support.
The concept of human security challenges the state-centric notion of security by
focusing on the individual as the main referent object of security, therefore speaking of
security for the people, rather than of states or governments (regimes). 12 Referring to the
concept of human security as contained in the 1994 Human Development Report, the scope
of human security includes seven areas:13

6
Sabina Alkire, "A Conceptual Framework for Human Security,” Centre for Research on Inequality, Human
Security, and Ethnicity (CRISE), Working Paper 2, London: University of Oxford, 2003,
7
Amitav Acharya, “Human Security” in John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (eds.), The
Globalization of World Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), h. 492.
8
For convincing arguments, consult for example John Baylis, “International and Global Security” in Ibid.
and Anthony Burke, “What Security Makes Possible: Some Thoughts on Critical Security Studies,”
(Canberra: Department of International Relations of Australian National University, 2007).
9
Loc cit., h. 492.
10
Ibid..
11
Stephen Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol 35 No.2 (1991),
pp.211-39, quoted in Anthony Burke, “What Security Makes Possible: Some Thoughts on Critical Security
Studies,” (Canberra: Department of International Relations of Australian National University, 2007).
12
Op cit..
13
UNDP, Human Development Report 1994, quoted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_security

6
 • Economic security — Economic security requires an assured basic income for
individuals, usually from productive and remunerative work or, as a last resort,
from a publicly financed safety net. Unemployment problems constitute an
important factor underlying political tensions and ethnic violence.
• Food security — Food security requires that all people at all times have both
physical and economic access to basic food.
• Health security — Health security aims to guarantee a minimum protection from
diseases and unhealthy lifestyles.
• Environmental security — Environmental security aims to protect people from the
short- and long-term ravages of nature, man-made threats in nature, and
deterioration of the natural environment.
• Personal security — Personal security aims to protect people from physical
violence, whether from the state or external states, from violent individuals and
sub-state actors, from domestic abuse, or from predatory adults.
• Community security — Community security aims to protect people from the loss of
traditional relationships and values and from sectarian and ethnic violence.
• Political security — Political security is concerned with whether people live in a
society that honors their basic human rights. According to a survey conducted by
Amnesty International, political repression, systematic torture, ill treatment or
disappearance was still practiced in 110 countries. Human rights violations are
most frequent during periods of political unrest. Along with repressing individuals
and groups, governments may try to exercise control over ideas and information.
Always having been a contested concept, there are many definitions of human
security, among them are the following:
“Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from chronic
threats as hunger, diseases, and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and
hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life-whether in homes, jobs, or in communities.
Such threats can exist at all levels of national income and development.” (UNDP 1994)

“The concept of human security had better be confined to freedom from fear of man-made
physical violence, also referred to as direct, personal violence...” (Sverre Lodgaard 2000)

“Human security may be defined as the preservation and protection of the life and dignity of
human beings...human security can be ensured when the individual is confident of a life free
of fear and free of want.” (Japanese Foreign Ministry Official 2002)

7
 “Human security...must encompass economic development, social justice, environmental
protection, democratization, disarmaments, and respect for human rights and the rule of
law...” (Kofi Annan 2001)

“The objective of human security is to safeguard the ‘vital core of all human lives in ways
that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment’”.” (UN Commission on Human
Security 2003)

“Human security describes ‘a condition of existence’ which entails basic material needs,
human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, and an active
and substantive notion of democracy from the local to the global.” (Caroline Thomas 2000)14

The above definitions illustrate debates concerning human security. While the
UNDP 1994 report originally argued that human security requires attention to both
freedom from fear and freedom from want, divisions have gradually emerged over the
proper scope of that protection (e.g. over what threats individuals should be protected
from) and over the appropriate mechanisms for responding to these threats. Thus, two
camps of human security emerged:
• Freedom from Fear — This school seeks to limit the practice of human security to
protecting individuals from violent conflicts while recognizing that these violent
threats are strongly associated with poverty, lack of state capacity and other forms
of inequities.15
• Freedom from Want — The school advocates a holistic approach in achieving
human security and argues that the threat agenda should be broadened to include hunger,
disease and natural disasters because they are inseparable concepts in addressing the root
of human insecurity.16
The ambiguity of the term renders us with the need to be cautious in applying the
concept of human security in any inquiry. However, as David Bosold argued, human
security may not be a theoretically-informed, analytically-grounded policy approach, but
rather a political praxis that is constructed and reconstructed on the basis of daily
negotiation and personal encounters at the national and the global level, therefore requiring
us to use a more detailed analysis of language, discourse, and the underlying speech acts.17
As Buzan et al. (1998: 24) put it:

14
Caroline Thomas,.”Global Governance, Development and Human Security The Challenge of Poverty and
Inequality,”.( London and Sterling: VA: Pluto Press, 2000). quoted from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_security
15
Human Security Centre. “What is Human Security.,” http://www.humansecurityreport.info/index.php?
option=content&task=view&id=24&itemid=59
16
United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994
17
David Bosold, “(Re-)Constructing Canada’s Human Security Agenda,” retrieved from
http://www.staff.uni-marburg.de/~bosold/pdf/Reconstructing_HumanSecurity_Oslo.pdf

8
 “the meaning of a concept lies in its usage and is not something we can define analytically or
philosophically according to what would be ‘best’. The meaning lies not in what people
consciously think the concept means but in how they implicitly use it in some ways and not
others.”

Mindful of that, this paper adopts the broader conception of human security, also
known as the ‘freedom from want’ school. Furthermore, for analytical purposes, this paper
divides human security into two analytical categories. The first is human security as an
agenda, which means that when we talk about human security, we talk about a list of items
or issues pertaining to human security, such as concerns about human rights, political
repression, diseases, civil wars, extreme poverty, political participation, environmental
degradation, etc. The second is human security as a norm, meaning that the concept will
be treated as a socially-enforced set of rules constraining actions of actors.

Securitization
One of the most prominent new perspectives toward security is the so called
Copenhagen School. The school, pioneered by the work of Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and
Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998), has succeeded in
providing an alternative to the mainstream security conception in a way that it broadened
the terrain of security studies as to include at least five sectors of security (see Buzan,
People, States, and Fear), stressing the need to embrace societal security, and provided the
study with an analytical tool to examine how an issue is brought into security realm.
Securitization theory, developed by the Copenhagen School, is part of explorations
of the role of argument, action, and ethics. The Copenhagen School treats security as the
outcome of specific social process in which issues become treated as security issues
through speech acts. Speech acts do not simply convey information about existing security
situations, but they are acts of themselves: saying something is doing something.
Consequently, the actor moves an issue into a specific sphere by uttering 'security'. By
understanding security as a speech act, securitization is located with the realm of political
argument and discursive legitimation. Treating security as a speech act allows a significant
broadening of security agenda beyond the state and military security, but the narrow
understanding of speech act limits the analysis.18

18
Constructing Security through Communicative Action”
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p71040_index.html

9
 The Copenhagen School thereby rejects security as something objectively “given,”
but rather regards it as a social process applicable to any perceived value, any chosen
referent object. A referent object is thus what is considered to be existentially threatened
by the securitizing actor, traditionally the state. But anything can be made into a referent
object. Security is a social construct and must be analyzed as such.”19
Reaching understanding on securitization is considered to be a process of reaching
agreement among actors. Every new utterance of security is a test, as the definition of the
situation proposed by the speaker is confirmed, modified or placed in question. Since
agreement rests on common convictions, the speech act succeeds only if the partner
accepts the offer contained in it. Ultimately security rests, therefore, among the subjects,
not with the objects of the subjects. Because threats are not some 'real' phenomena that
exist out there, the foundation of security policy is not given by 'nature' but chosen by
decision-makers to end up on the security political agenda. 20
As mentioned earlier, the main argument of securitization theory is that security is a
speech act, that alone by uttering ‘security’ something is being done. “It is by labeling
something a security issue that it becomes one.”21 A securitizing actor by stating that a
particular referent object is threatened in its existence claims a right to extraordinary
measures to ensure the referent objects’ survival. The issue is then moved out of the sphere
of normal politics into the realm of emergency politics, where it can be dealt with swiftly
and without the normal (democratic) rules and regulations of policy making. For security
this means that it has no longer any given (pre-existing) meaning but that it can be
anything a securitizing actor says it is. Security is a social and intersubjective construction.
That is the meaning of security.
Buzan et al (1998:25) state that securitization can be studied the following way:
“The way to study securitization is to study discourse (speech) and political constellations
(gathering): When does an argument with a particular rhetorical and semiotic structure
achieve sufficient effects to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would
otherwise have to be obeyed? If by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of
an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules
he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization,”22

19
Karsten Friis, “From Liminars to Others: Securitization Through Myths,” Peace and Conflict Studies, A
Journal of The Network of Peace and Conflict Studies (2000), retrieved from
http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol7_2.pdf,
20
Ibid..
21
Ole Wæver, Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen New Schools in Security Theory and the Origins: between
Core and Periphery, ISA Conference Montreal March 2004, p.13, quoted in Rita Taureck, “Positive and
Negative Securitization - Bringing Together Securitization Theory and Normative Critical Security Studies,”
June 16, 17, 18 2005, retrieved from http://critical.libertysecurity.org/documents/Taureck.doc

10
 To limit ‘everything’ from becoming a security issue, a successful securitization
consists of three steps. These are: (1) identification of existential threats, (2) emergency
action and (3) effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules.23 To present an issue
as an existential threat is to say that: “If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will
be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own
way).”24 This first step towards a successful securitization is called a securitizing move. A
securitizing move is in theory an option open to any unit, because only once an actor has
convinced an audience (inter-unit relations) of its legitimate need to go beyond otherwise
binding rules and regulations (emergency mode) can we identify a case of securitization.
However, some argue that it does not have to be an emergency mode, but can settle with
the so called “special measures.”
In addition to the three steps required to securitize an issue, there is a model of
securitization based on the "medicalization of deviance" model in sociology, which
consists of five-stages as follow: 25
• defining something as a security issue
• prospecting, the equivalent being dusting off some old intelligence report (or data
back-up)
• claims-making, the equivalent being some powerful interest group backing the idea
• turf-battling, the equivalent being a politician using strong rhetoric
• designating, the equivalent is the passing of authorization to use force (or commit
special resources).
Meanwhile, Balzacq (2005) has mentioned three faces of securitization:
• identities -- the ways that individuals label themselves
• norms -- rules that are socially enforced, whether written or unwritten
• cultures -- the ways people classify, codify, and communicate their experiences26
In borrowing lens from the securitization theory, this paper wishes to stress two
points. The first is concerned with the securitizing actor. While in most of the literature
22
Erik Asplund, “A Two Level Approach to Securitization: An Analysis of Drug Trafficking in China and
Russia”
23
Barry Buzan; Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, Security - A New Framework for Analysis, (London: Lynne
Rienner, 1998), p.6, quoted in Op cit..
24
Ibid..
25
“Securitization: What Makes Something A Security Threat,” retrieved from
http://www.apsu.edu/oconnort/GSS2010/GSS2010lect01a.htm.
26
T Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience, and Context.,” European
Journal of International Relations, Vol. 11 No. 2 (2005), pp.171-201, italics made by the author of this
paper.

11
about securitization, the securitizing actor commonly refers to the state in the context of
national security, in this inquiry, it refers to the participants of ARF (which are states)
moving issues to be addressed in ARF meetings, but not in the context of national security
of the member states per se, but primarily in the context of regional security. The second
point concerns the issues in the ‘observation list’. They are picked from the broader
conception of human security as mentioned earlier.
Meanwhile, this paper recognizes that some writers argue that the Copenhagen
27
School’s conceptualization blocks the path to human security. However, this paper
endorses Rita Floyd’s stance that such incompatibility does not necessarily exist if human
security is conceptualized as a securitizing move.28

Normative Institutionalism
Originating in the subfield of organization theory, normative institutionalism
redirects attention from rationality and means-ends efficiency to the role of norms and
values. Against the “logic of instrumentality” or “logic of consequences” it posits the
“logic of appropriateness.” The principal focus of normative institutionalism is on the ways
institutions constrain individual choice. With its ideational angle, normative
institutionalism conceives of institutional change in terms of learning (Peters, 1999: 33-
34), while at the same time reminding us that existing institutions tend to structure the field
of vision of those contemplating change (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 953).29
Analyses based on normative institutionalism are relatively rare in International
Relations. It has to do with the traditional understanding that in the international
environment “a logic of consequences is likely to be more compelling than a logic of
appropriateness because rules can be in conflict, hierarchical structures of authority are
absent, power asymmetries are high, and the benefits derived from pursuing instrumental
policies can be great” (Krasner, 1999b: 210).30
More recently, constructivists within IR have extended the basic logic of the English
school and pointed to the importance of international norms for state behavior in the

27
Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Immigration and the Politics of Security,” Security Studies, Vol 8, No.2/3 (1998-
99): p.80 and Karen Fierke, Critical Approaches to International Security, (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), p.110.
28
Rita Floyd, “Human Security and the Copenhagen
School’s Securitization Approach: Conceptualizing Human Security as a Securitizing Move,” Human
Security Journal, Vol. 5 (Winter 2007), http://www.peacecenter.sciences-po.fr/journal/issue5pdf/6.Floyd.pdf
29
Christer Jönsson and Jonas Tallberg, “Institutional Theory in International Relations”
30
Ibid..

12
international as well as domestic arena (Finnemore, 1996; Checkel, 1997; Finnemore and
Sikkink, 1998).31
Many international norms that set standards for the appropriate behavior of states
originate as domestic norms and become international through the efforts of entrepreneurs
of different kinds, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and transnational
“advocacy networks” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). The interplay between domestic and
international norms works the other way as well, as states “are socialized to accept new
norms, values and perceptions of interest” (Finnemore, 1996: 5). There is thus “a two-level
norm game occurring in which the domestic and the international norms tables are
increasingly linked” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 893).32
Furthermore, Finnemore and Sikkink developed the norm’s life cycle. The first stage
is ‘norm emergence’ whereby ‘norm entrepreneurs’ attempt to convince states to embrace
new norms. The second stage, ‘norm cascade,’ occurs where the socialized states which
become ‘norm leaders’ attempt to socialize other states to be ‘norm followers’. Finally, the
last stage, the ‘norm internalization’ may or may not occur. If it does take place, the new
norm will not be debated anymore and will be treated as the ‘standard of appropriateness’33

Discussion
ASEAN’s Approach to Security
When we talk about ASEAN’s security conception, we talk about the distinctive
nature of ASEAN’s security doctrines and practices. Melly Caballero-Anthony argued that
“Southeast Asia....has his own history of reconceptualizing security.”34There are three
important points about ASEAN’s security conception according to her, including:
• Notion of ‘comprehensive security’. This notion is mentioned explicitly in formal
speeches of ASEAN leaders, for example in the speech of the former Secretary-
General of ASEAN,

31
Ibid..
32
Ibid..
33
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,’
International Organization 52 (1998), 887-917. (p. 892), quoted in Kasira Cheeppensook, “The ASEAN
Way on Human Security,” retrieved from
http://humansecurityconf.polsci.chula.ac.th/Documents/Presentations/Kasira.pdf
34
Melly Caballero-Anthony, “Revisioning Human Security in Southeast Asia,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 28
No 3 (2004), p. 158.

13
 “ASEAN has long recognized the need for a comprehensive approach to security. The 1976
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation called it “national resilience” in political, economic, and
socio-cultural spheres. The ASEAN Vision 2020 called it “total human development.”
Finally, our most recent guide, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, specifically stated that
ASEAN ‘subscribes to the principle of comprehensive security as having broad political,
economic, social and cultural aspects’.”35

• Emphasis on economic development. Economic development was used as a major

means of instrument to bring about domestic stability.
• Linkage between national resilience (domestic stability) and regional security. 36
The three points, according to Caballero-Anthony, reified the position of the state
as the primary unit of analysis where it is further legitimized by its role in bringing about
economic development and in shaping security doctrines. Consequently, the discourses on
security typically regard the state as the only security referent.37
Besides the doctrines, we can observe the ‘style’ of regional security practice in
ASEAN. Still referring to Caballero-Anthony, “ASEAN regional security approaches are
built upon norm-building, building trust and confidence, and developing cooperative
approaches with the like minded and non-like minded states to address non-traditional
threats of security.”38 The approach is seen as being low-key, stressing the habit of
dialogue, observance of regional norms, building of informal institutions and processes
oriented to prevent regional conflicts.
Therefore, we can say that the traditional conception of security in ASEAN has
been state-centric and centered around the concept of national, albeit comprehensive,
security. The conception has been challenged on the ground that it was seen impertinent to
the real security condition of the people in ASEAN. According to Acharya (2007), whether
going by the narrow (freedom from fear) or broad (free from want) conception, Southeast
Asia faces some of the most critical challenges of human insecurity in the world. He stated
that the region has witnessed “some of the worst violence of the twentieth century.” For
example, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia killed about 1,7 million between 1975-79, anti-
Communist riot in Indonesia in the mid-60s claimed about 400.000 lives, US war in
Vietnam produced 250.000 South Vietnamese, 1,1 million North Vietnamese, and 60.000
American casualties, ethnic and separatist movements in East Timor and Aceh have
35
Welcome Remarks, H.E Ong Keng Yong, Secretary-General of ASEAN at the
ASEAN-UNESCO Concept Workshop on Human Security in Southeast Asia
Jakarta, 26-27 October 2006, http://www.aseansec.org/
36
Op cit..
37
Ibid..
38
Ibid., p. 162.

14
claimed 200.000 and more than 2000 lives, respectively, and ethnic separatism in
Myanmar claimed more than 600.000 lives, not mentioning challenges coming from
internal conflicts in Southern Thailand, Southern Philippines, and Myanmar. 39 Recently,
the political stability of some of the member states were shaken down, as in the case of
Thailand’s coup d’ etat and changes in government regime, Indonesia’s perilous transition
to democracy, and Malaysia’s struggle amid the ethnic tensions in the country.
Southeast Asia is also prone to other threats to human security. Although absolute
poverty levels have declined, the prevalence of underweight children under 5 years age in
the region is the third highest in the world (28%) after sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia,
national HIV infection in Southeast Asia is the highest in Asia, while the outbreaks of
H5N1 avian influenza in the region are the largest and most severe on record. 40Human
insecurity in the region is exacerbated by the impact of the intensifying globalization and
regional economic integration.
In addition, Southeast Asia has also experienced a range of transnational threats in
recent years, including the Asian economic crisis of 1997 (and the shake-down of the
global economy just now), environmental problems (transboundary haze, Indian Ocean
Tsunami, and the the most recent Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar), human trafficking, drugs
trafficking, and many more.41 According to Caballero-Anthony, “Human security is the
concept that embodies the security concerns of societies in the region and where the most
vulnerable can find answers to articulate their security in their own terms without being
excluded and alienated.”42

Securitization of Human Security Agenda

As noted earlier in the section of theoretical and conceptual framework, security is a
speech act, therefore, by uttering ‘security,’ an actor is doing an action. In our case, by
referring a particular issue or issue area as something pertaining to regional security (or
national security), an actor is conducting the first stage of securitization, namely the
securitizing move in order to move such issue out of the “normal” political realm into the

39
Amitav Acharya, “Human Security” in John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (eds.), The
Globalization of World Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.501.
40
Ibid..
41
Ibid..
42
Melly Caballero-Anthony, “Revisioning Human Security in Southeast Asia,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 28
No 3 (2004), p. 158.

15
security realm where special measures (or in extreme cases, emergency measures) can be
set up and legitimized.
In the case of ASEAN, security matters were mainly relegated to discussions or
consultations, sometimes formal but mostly informal taking place among national
representatives at stake. The process had been carried out loosely on bilateral and or
multilateral basis with ASEAN acting as facilitator (in cases of good offices, mediation, or
merely as provider of space and time to meet and talk). However, as the institution
building took place in the organization, member states have been more reliant on security
mechanisms built within the ASEAN framework. The ARF mechanisms are the center of
the established regional security practices in the ASEAN. Therefore, we will briefly
address the nature and characteristics of the Forum.

ASEAN Regional Forum

The end of the Cold War had altered the configuration of international relations in
East Asia. The new environment presented historic opportunities for the relaxation of
tensions in the region through multilateral consultations, confidence building, and
eventually the prevention of conflict. Thus, the Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
and Post Ministerial Conference, which were held in Singapore on 23-25 July 1993, agreed
to establish the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The inaugural meeting of the ARF was
held in Bangkok on 25 July 1994.43
Initially, the Forum participants included the ASEAN members, the other Southeast
Asian states that were not yet ASEAN members, ASEAN’s then seven dialogue partners,
Papua New Guinea, an ASEAN observer, and China and Russia, then still “consultative
partners” of ASEAN. India became a participant on becoming a dialogue partner in 1996.
Mongolia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were admitted in 1999 and
2000.44
The objectives of the ARF are outlined in the First ARF Chairman's Statement
(1994), namely:
a. to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of
common interest and concern; and

43
ASEAN Overview, retrieved from http://www.asean.org/
44
ARF Establishment, retrieved from http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/

16
 b. to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and
preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.45
Since its establishment more than a decade ago, ARF claimed to have done more
than something good. On the tenth year of the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ARF
Ministers met in Phnom Penh on 18 June 2003 and declared that "despite the great
diversity of its membership, the forum had attained a record of achievements that have
contributed to the maintenance of peace, security and cooperation in the region." They
cited in particular:
• The usefulness of the ARF as a venue for multilateral and bilateral dialogue
and consultations and the establishment of effective principles for dialogue and
cooperation, featuring decision-making by consensus, non-interference, incremental
progress and moving at a pace comfortable to all;
• The willingness among ARF participants to discuss a wide range of security
issues in a multilateral setting;
• The mutual confidence gradually built by cooperative activities;
• The cultivation of habits of dialogue and consultation on political and
security issues;
• The transparency promoted by such ARF measures as the exchange of
information relating to defense policy and the publication of defense white papers;
and
• The networking developed among national security, defense and military
officials of ARF participants.
Examining the issues in ARF’s agenda can shed light to the securitization taking
place in the region’s security conceptions and practices. We may not be able to trace the
entire process by looking only at the results. However, by looking at the issues moved and
sustained (or overruled) as issues pertaining to regional security, we may tell when a
securitization is taking place, when it is successfully done and when it is not.
Although the establishment of the ARF more or less coincided with the publication
of the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, and although UNDP was in fact the
Forum’s one and only non-state dialogue partner, apparently there was no linkage of
security conception between the two. As noted in ARF concept paper, the key challenges
that had to be acknowledged are as following:

45
ARF Objectives, retrieved from Ibid..

17
 • The significant shifts in power relations due to the periods of rapid
economic growth that can lead to conflict
• The divergence among ARF participants concerning approaches to peace
and security
• The territorial tensions and disputes among ARF participants46
As we can see above, the security concerns of ARF in the earlier period of its
existence were traditional in nature in which the state was reified as the only security
referent. ARF did not seem to ever consider human security issues as the key challenges to
regional peace and security. Therefore, we may say that there was no securitization of
human security agenda taking place or completed at the earlier period of ARF’s existence.
Even if some of the participants had tried to do the securitizing move by saying that a
particular issue pertained to regional security and should be addressed in ARF meetings,
the absence of such issue in the agenda means that the securitization stopped at the
securitizing move (stage one), where the actor identified something as an existential threat
requiring emergency or special measures.
The actor(s) might have done the process of defining, prospecting, claims-making,
and turf-battling (in terms of the model sketched out earlier) in the adoption of the agenda
session of ARF meetings, but failed to push that particular issue(s) to the agenda, therefore
left the securitization incomplete (it could not be called securitization at all because it was
incomplete). That was one possibility. Another possibility is that there had never been any
actor securitizing issues pertaining to human security agenda simply because they did not
consider them as security concerns.
One has to be careful in identifying a particular issue as pertaining to human
security agenda, especially because ASEAN has long had a conception of ‘comprehensive
security’ comprising non-traditional security concerns, e.g. economic security and
environmental security. However, the comprehensive notion of security is lacking the
people’s emphasis or focus, and is directed primarily towards securing the state or the
national entity, not individuals. Nevertheless, in the first section of this discussion, the
purpose is to show whether or not that ASEAN has witnessed securitization of issues
pertaining to human security, even although it does not embrace the whole assumptions in
human security as a perspective.

46
ASEAN Regional Forum: The Concept Paper, retrieved from http://www.asean.org/

18
 It is also important to note that not all the issues moved to ARF’s agenda are meant
to be security concerns because ARF is also meant to be a venue to discuss political issues
among its participants. In order not to confuse the two distinct realms (in fact, the
distinction of political and security realm is the basis of securitization approach!), we will
stick to the rhetoric or speech act when an actor tried to make a motion to add the
particular issue to ARF’s agenda.
Having examined the initial spirit surrounding the earlier periods of ARF existence,
we will now move to the question whether or not securitization of human security agenda
ever takes place in the Forum’s discourse. First, let us take a look at the list of Track I
activities conducted by the Forum from the year of its establishment to the latest summit in
May, 2008. Several issues that could be the result of securitization process are the
followings:
• Search, Rescue, and Disaster Relief Related Activities, including actions devoted to
tackle natural disasters and infectious diseases
• Non-Traditional Security Issues, including tropical hygiene, infectious diseases,
transnational crimes, SARS, Avian Influenza, and narcotics control
• Energy Security
• Environmental Related Issues
• Economic security
The above issues are those pertaining to human security agenda or at least having
human security dimension, but they are not necessarily security concerns (and therefore
not the result of securitizations). So, we have to examine the rhetoric, the labeling, the
naming. Three of them are obviously dragged out of the normal realm of politics to the
security realm; non-traditional security issues, energy security and economic security.
They are made security concerns while before such securitization took place, were
confined in the normal realm of politics. This process can be described as such: by uttering
‘energy security,’ one is doing the securitizing move; identifying the lack of energy supply
or access as an existential threat to the core values of a particular referent object. Once the
participants by consensus accept the term, therefore approve to the securitizing move, the
securitization is complete.
The same logic applies to economic security and non-traditional security issues.
Economic security is the first sector of human security mentioned in the 1994 UNDP’s
Human Development Report. The ARF participants have managed to pass the issue

19
through the selective process of agenda adoption, therefore the securitization can be said to
have taken place.
It is worth noting that there was not even one occasion when the term ‘human
security’ was announced or used in Track I activities. This shows an obvious evasion of
ARF participants to securitize the issues pertaining to individual insecurity for reasons that
will be addressed later. If human security ever entered the ARF agenda, it would mean so
much. As David Bosolf argues,

.”..invoking a notion, such as ‘human security,’ represents a ‘securitizing move’ in that human
insecurity (as the opposite of human security) in its various aspects, issues and facets is
presented as a threat which, eventually, becomes part of a discourse, hence a dialogical
practice.”

Interestingly, the term “human security dimension” appears once in the list of ARF
Track II activities in the form of Workshop Group Meeting on Human Security Dimension
(13-15 November 2003). The Track II has served as think-thank group or epistemic
communities consisting of experts, government officials acting in personal capacity, and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs). However, the Track II can be said to be lacking
the authority and capability in completing the securitization (although by uttering ‘human
security,’ they are already doing the securitizing move).
We have investigated the securitization of human security agenda from ARF
participants Track I activities. Now we will take a look at recent concerns and issues of
ARF participants, they include territorial and jurisdictional disputes in the South China
Sea; self-determination for East Timor; nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia and South
Asia; weapons of mass destruction; and the impact of globalization. 47 From the issues, we
may expect the self-determination for East Timor as containing high element of human
security. However, from the way it is described (remember, in a discourse, to utter
something is to act), it is not an issue in which human security gains primary attention. The
following statement will make it clear that the referent object was primarily the state
(Indonesia): .”..ASEAN has declared its position that a united, democratic and
economically prosperous Indonesia is basic to the maintenance of regional security. In this
context, the association emphasized its support for Indonesia’s territorial integrity.”
How about the issue of globalization impact? Quite a surprise, the description of the
issue includes the utterance of human security term shown in the following statement:

47
ASEAN Overview (2000), retrieved from http://www.asean.org/

20
“The Seventh ARF also considered the economic, social and human components of security. It discussed
both the positive effects and the repercussions of globalization, including greater economic interdependence
among nations and the multiplication of security threats like transnational crime. ARF has reaffirmed the
need for Southeast Asian countries to continue efforts, through dialogue and cooperation at national and
international levels, in dealing with the economic, social and political impacts of globalization so as to ensure
sustained economic and social development.”

Restraining ourselves from exclaiming “Eureka!,” we finally find an explicit

utterance of human security (although in the form of “human component of security”) in a
formal statement of ASEAN. Therefore, it can be argued that there has not only been the
securitization of human security agenda as shown in the analysis of ARF Participants
Track I activities, but there has also been the securitizing move of individual’s insecurity
(in as many aspects as it may contain) as the term human security was invoked in the
region’s security discourse. However, it is worth noting that the ‘consideration of human
component of security’ as stated in ASEAN Overview was limited to economic realm,
especially economic impact of globalization. It is an imprudent move to say that the notion
of human security was fully welcomed at that moment (year 2000). The fact is, it was not.

The Other Mechanism: ASEAN Ministerial Meeting

In 2006, ASEAN-UNESCO held a workshop named ASEAN-UNESCO Concept
Workshop on Human Security in Southeast Asia to attempt to reach convergence on the
concept so it can be translated into policymaking. It is not clear whether the workshop
really amounted to something because in the latest ASEAN’s annual report (2007), there
has not been a single utterance of human security. Therefore, it is safe to assume that
human security as a whole (not only issues pertaining to human security agenda) has not
moved from the initial stage of securitization, namely securitizing move.
However, in the welcome remarks of the then Secretary-General of ASEAN, Ong
Keng Yong, we can see more clearly that the securitizing move has taken place. The
Secretary-General mentioned some of ASEAN activities and agreements pertaining to
human security, including:
• Providing social protection that (a) address poverty, equity and health impacts of
economic growth; (b) promote environmental sustainability and sustainable natural
resource management that meets current and future needs; (c) promote social
governance that manages impacts of economic integration; and (d) preserve and
promote the region's cultural heritage and cultural identity.(in Vientiane Action
Programme)

21
 • ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime carrying out the ASEAN Plan
of Action to Combat Transnational Crime (the meeting has identified the following
threats to human security as follows: illicit drug trafficking; trafficking in persons;
arms smuggling; terrorism; and various forms of economic crimes
• The Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (disaster relief)
• The Regional Framework for the Control and Eradication of Highly Pathogenic
Avian Influenza (public health)
• The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution
• Addressing the social impact of regional integration and globalization, working
towards narrowing the development gaps not only among ASEAN Members
Countries, but also at the national levels, one set of measures being contained in
the ASEAN Action Plan on Rural Development and Poverty Eradication.
Once the term “human security” was uttered by the Secretary General and used in
the ministerial meeting, it became part of the discourse of ASEAN’ security conception.

Human Security in Terms of Norm Internalization

For constructivists, the importance of norms in any institution is beyond doubt.

Norms can influence identities and shape the definition of interests. They can therefore
structure behaviour. Because norms are socially enforced, after being set up, they need to
be internalized.
Meanwhile, the change in ASEAN security norms could be accounted for by
examining how ASEAN multilateral diplomacy works. The formal channel, i.e.
interactions among official representatives of governments, is known as ‘Track I’
diplomacy. Other dialogues taking place outside Track I, involving experts and
governments’ officials participating in their private capacities (although there are also
NGOs), are referred to as ‘Track II’. ‘Track III’ referred to non-governmental sectors and
independent academics with different agendas from what propelled by Track I and Track
II.48

48
William D. Davidson and Joseph V. Montville, ‘Foreign Policy According to Freud,’ Foreign
Policy 45 (1981-1982), 145-157; Joann F. Aviel, ‘The Growing Role of NGOs in ASEAN,’ Asia-
Pacific Review 6 (1999), 78-92, quoted in Kasira Cheeppensook, “The ASEAN Way on Human Security,”
retrieved from
http://humansecurityconf.polsci.chula.ac.th/Documents/Presentations/Kasira.pdf

22
 Track I and Track II agendas are often similar due to the reliance of the latter on the
former in terms of financial and political support.49 Therefore, it is not surprising that
comprehensive security, which regards the state as a referent of security, prevails
throughout Track I and Track II dialogue, despite the slight move towards human security
recently. On the other hand, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and scholars
constituting Track III diplomacy have been trying to incorporate ‘traditionally non-security
concerns in the Asia-Pacific into the security discourse’.50
Now we will examine the state human security in the ASEAN in terms of norm
internalization using insights from normative institutionalism, especially the norm’s life
cycle developed by Finnemore and Sikkink.

Norm Emergence
As pointed out by several writers addressing the question of human security in
ASEAN51 (which are quite abundant), the emergence of human security norm owes to the
efforts of civil-society organizations (CSOs) acting as “norms entrepreneurs.” They have
been trying to socialize human security norm by engaging with ASEAN’s security
discourse through the so called Track III diplomacy. In the attempt to raise people’s sense
of belonging towards ASEAN, ASEAN leaders somehow intensified the organization’s
contact with transnational advocacy network,52 consisting not only of those CSOs
associated with it (the Track II)53, but also those holding critical stance towards the
organization, for example CSOs under ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA), Focus on
Global South, Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma, etc.
Melly Caballero-Anthony mentioned that “Civil-Society Organizations have been
playing that pivotal in framing human security through their transnational work in
promoting human rights and human development”54 Furthermore, she argued that the
Track III diplomacy can play the following roles:
49
Mely Caballero-Anthony, ‘Revisioning Human Security in Southeast Asia,’ Asian Perspective, 28
(2004), 155-189; Herman Joseph S. Kraft, ‘The Autonomy Dilemma of Track Two Diplomacy in
Southeast Asia,’ Security Dialogue 31 (2000): 343-356, quoted in Ibid..
50
Herman Joseph S. Kraft, ‘Human Security and ASEAN Mechanisms,’ in The Quest for Human
Security: The Next Phase of ASEAN?, ed. by Pranee Thiparat (Bangkok: Institute of Security and
International Studies, 2001), pp. 135-147 (p. 138), quoted in Ibid..
51
See for example Melly Caballero-Anthony, “Revisioning Human Security in Southeast Asia,” Asian
Perspective, Vol. 28 No 3 (2004), pp. 155-189 and Kasira Cheeppensook, “The ASEAN Way on Human
Security”
52
See ASEAN Annual Report 2007
53
See the annexes in ASEAN Charter

23
 • Framing on debates and getting issues on the agenda
• Encouraging discursive commitments from states and other policy
• Causing procedural change at international and domestic level
• Affecting policy
• And influencing behaviour changes in target actors
Concerning the ASEAN Charter, pressures from various CSOs demanding to be
engaged in the drafting process were great since the intention was formally tabled at the
11th ASEAN Summit held in December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia It was seen as a
critical moment since many promises had been given during the Charter’s contemplation
and because it was intended to articulate principles and objectives, give legal personality to
the grouping, and shape its key processes and institutions, therefore playing important role
in norms-making. There was even an expectation of the removal of the non-interference
policy central to the organization since its establishment55, although the proposal finally
faltered.
The Charter was considered unsatisfactory by many critical civil-society
organizations in Track III expecting a relaxed approach of ASEAN to the non-interference
norm and a more institutionalized commitment to human rights. Pessimists doubt the
efficacy of the Charter since the wording are rather loose and because there are several
subtle contradictions. Some question the probability that it will be enforced at all.
However, optimists argue that it was a nice result of compromise stressing that if the
wording had not been loose, it would not have been signed at all. To illustrate some doubts
about the delivery of the Charter’s promises, below will be presented an analysis of the
Charter from one CSOs member, Solidarity for Asian Peoples' Advocacies (SAPA)
Working Group on ASEAN. The SAPA WG on ASEAN is a common platform for
collective action on ASEAN advocacy. The WG-ASEAN is meant to promote the
multiplicity of perspectives, strategies and forms employed by its individual members, as it
strives for specific unities in ASEAN-related advocacy and action. Presently, the SAPA
WG on ASEAN has more than 100 CSOs, national and regional organizations, as
members.56

54
Melly Caballero-Anthony, “Revisioning Human Security in Southeast Asia,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 28
No 3 (2004), pp. 155-189 (158).
55
http://www.wikipedia.org/ASEAN_Charter/
56
http://www.asiasapa.org

24
 SAPA’s Analysis
The Solidarity for Asian Peoples' Advocacies (SAPA) Working Group on ASEAN
tried to engage in the ASEAN Charter building process. SAPA WG on ASEAN made three
formal submissions to the Eminent Persons Group (EPG); on the Political-Security Pillar
(EPG consultation, Ubud, Bali/April 2006), on the Economic Pillar (EPG consultation,
Singapore/June 2006), and on the Socio-Cultural Pillar and Institutional Mechanisms
(Meeting with Ambassador Rosario Manalo, Special Adviser to Mr. Fidel V. Ramos, EPG
Member for the Philippines, Manila/November 2006). The WG also participated in the
only regional consultation held by the High Level Task Force (HLTF) on the drafting of
the ASEAN Charter in March 2007 in Manila, and reiterated the main points of its
submissions.
Aside from the regional consultations that the SAPA WG tried to intervene in, the
different network members also initiated national processes in 2006 and 2007 to help
introduce ASEAN to civil society and inform them of the Charter that was being drafted.
When the Charter content finally leaked to media in November 2007, SAPA-WG on
ASEAN announced that it was a “disappointment...falls short of what is needed to establish
a ‘people-centered’ and ‘people-empowered’ ASEAN. It succeeds in codifying past
ASEAN agreements, and consolidating the legal framework that would define the
Association. However, it fails to put people at the center, much less empower them.”57 The
points of criticism concerning people-centric norms by SAPA are among the followings:
• There are no clear spaces created or procedures established to institutionalize the
role of citizens and civil society organizations in regional community-building
• The market-oriented language of the Charter expresses its bias for the economic
project in the region, without recognition that this may be in conflict with the social
and economic justice that the Charter is also supposed to uphold
• The centrality of redistribution and economic solidarity to the goals of poverty
eradication, social justice and lasting peace, is not acknowledged
• The Charter is gender blind and does not recognize the primacy of the regional
environment.

57
Solidarity for Asian Peoples' Advocacies (SAPA) Working Group on ASEAN
Analysis of the ASEAN Charter, retrieved from http://www.focusweb.org/analysis-of-the-asean-
charter.html?Itemid=94

25
 • The landmark inclusion of human rights in the Preamble and in the statement of
Principles is belied by the lack of detail in the long-awaited human rights body.
SAPA’s criticisms reflect the norms pertaining to human security that they are
trying to uphold through their engagement with the ASEAN, such as the empowerment of
civil society, the centrality of social and economic justice (contrary to the prioritization of
liberal values by the Charter), the importance of gender equality, and of course, human
rights. The norms have been incorporated by the Charter, maybe in a result of perilous
compromise, but in a way seen as still prioritizing the centrality of the state.

Norm Cascade
After a norm or norms emerged from the “norms entrepreneurs” as discussed
above, it is to be seen whether the socialization process still continues, marked by the
emergence of “norms leaders” in the socialized object, in this case being ASEAN.
According to Cheeppensook, “Thailand was persuaded successfully during the norm
emergence stage.... Thailand then acted as a norm leader, and tried to convince other
member states to follow the same path.”58
Thailand’s conception of security has explicitly embraced the term “human
security.” In its annual security outlooks, it states that“In the political and security sense...
countries of the region have to enhance linkages and cooperation and pay greater attention
to human security focusing on the grassroots”59. It also states, .”..security is comprehensive
in the sense that today it encompasses not only political, military , economic and social
aspects, but has also come to embrace the people aspect- or human security -as well.”60
Thailand is the only country in ASEAN that joined the human security network
(HSN). HSN is a group of like-minded countries that maintains dialogue on questions
pertaining to human security at the level of Foreign Ministers.61 The country is also notable
for having proposed an alternative for ASEAN’s non-interference norm, immediately after
the 1997 financial crisis. In 1998, Thailand proposed the notion of “flexible engagement”
to allow for a more relaxed approach of the organization in discussing sensitive matters
58
Kasira Cheeppensook, “The ASEAN Way on Human Security,” retrieved from
http://humansecurityconf.polsci.chula.ac.th/Documents/Presentations/Kasira.pdf
59
Thailand, Annual Security Outlook 2000, retrieved from http://www.aseanregionalforum.org
60
Thailand, Annual Security Outlook 2001, retrieved from http://www.aseanregionalforum.org
61
See ‘The Human Security Network’ (2005), quoted in Kasira Cheeppensook, “The ASEAN Way on
Human Security,” retrieved from
http://humansecurityconf.polsci.chula.ac.th/Documents/Presentations/Kasira.pdf

26
pertaining to domestic affairs of each country. Flexible engagement is not a proposal for
human security per se, although it calls for more “frank” discussion within ASEAN about
sensitive political, economic and social issues, including human rights problems in
troubled states like Burma. But this approach has aroused opposition from other AESAN
members, notably Vietnam and Myanmar62 until it was finally dismissed.
In addition to Thailand, recently, Indonesia has also stated the importance of human
security to be embraced in the regional security discourse as shown in the statement of
Indonesia’s President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono below:

“Today the concept of security extends to what is called “human security.” This means that we have a
common obligation to protect the physical integrity and the dignity of the human being, whether alone or part
of a group, against all attackers—be they terrorists, common criminals, the Avian Flu virus or a tsunami.
The human being must be protected even when— perhaps especially when— the assailant is the state, which
is supposed to protect him. These are the new realities—the pressures and challenges of our time. And if we
are going to have an ASEAN that is a “community of caring societies,” then it must care not only about the
livelihood and the social amenities but also about the fundamental rights of the human being. Moreover, if an
ASEAN Security Community is to be one of the pillars of the ASEAN Community, then it must be a pillar
that the human being can lean on when her formally mandated protector becomes her attacker.”63

While Indonesia previously tended to counter any effort to challenge the

established norms, under SBY administration upholding progressive foreign policy, it can
be said as assuming the “norms leader” position, together with Thailand.

Norm Internalization
Some writers argued that human security norm in ASEAN has been in the “norms
cascade” stage, but the “norms internalization” process remains in question. Once the
norms internalization takes place, there will be no more debate about the particular norms,
and they will be accepted as the appropriate standard of behaviour. Therefore, the logic of
appropriateness upheld by normative institutionalists applies. In the case of human security
in ASEAN, it is quite obvious to see that such process has not been taking place. As human
security entered the Track III and Track II lexicon, even mentioned once or twice in the
Track I activities, it is still treated as a foreign norm. The debate surrounding whether or
not human security is compatible with the established norms of ASEAN still continues.

62
Arabinda Acharya, “Human Security in Asia:Conceptual Ambiguities and Common Understandings,”
retrieved from http://www.yorku.ca/robarts/archives/chandigarth/pdf/acharya_delhi.pdf
63
Keynote Speech by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono at the ASEAN Forum: Rethinking ASEAN Towards the
ASEAN Community 2015, Jakarta, 7 August 2007, retrieved from http://www.asean.org

27
 Arguments against human security as a norm centers on the principle of people-
centrality disregarding national barriers and national sovereignty. The “people’s
sovereignty” notion is seen as being incompatible with the sovereignty and non-
interference norms (the latter is derived from the former) that have been the sacred norms
of ASEAN’s build-up reified in the principles section of the Charter as shown below:
Article 2 (Principles):
(a) respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national
identity of all ASEAN Member States;
(e) non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN Member States;64
The established norms are also reified in the ASEAN Security Community’s
principles as shown below:
“ The ASEAN Security Community shall abide by the UN Charter and other principles of international law
and uphold ASEAN’s principles of non-interference, consensus-based decision-making, national and
regional resilience, respect for national sovereignty, the renunciation of the threat or the use of force, and
peaceful settlement of differences and disputes.”

However, there are voices stressing the compatibility of human security concerns and
agenda with ASEAN’s principles, as voiced by M. C. Abad, Jr. below:65
“The human security approach becomes incompatible with regional security when it challenges
certain patterns of resource allocation that favour military security and obsession with
defending national frontiers. It becomes objectionable when it threatens power structures that
entrench the dominance of a few. Human security is incompatible with regional security when
the concerns and priorities of regional civil society are not shared by the political and
bureaucratic elites. They are incompatible when regional alliance building of the civil society is
threatening the narrow and self-serving interpretation of the principle of non-interference in the
internal affairs of states. Incompatibility arises when greed, corruption and the threat or use of
force characterize national and regional governance.”

The incompatibility of human security and regional security as described in a

sarcastic tone above only exists when the regional’s arrangement is meant to be hostile to
the people of ASEAN, which is of course impertinent, at least if taken at face value.
There is, however, a possibility of engagement (even in a form of troubled
engagement) of human security and regional security norm if the member states of
ASEAN manage to reach an understanding in the meaning and limitation of the former
concept to search for its compatibility with the existing norms, as argued by Acharya:
.”..the extent to which a new idea like human security could find acceptance in the region

64
ASEAN Charter
65
M. C. Abad, Jr., “The Challenge of Balancing State Security with Human Security,”
http://www.aseansec.org/14259.htm

28
depends very much on how it resonates with existing ideas and practices concerning
security.”66

Potential to Change
It is too far to assume that ASEAN will replace the old-faithful established norms
in its security discourse with human security norm in the near future. However, the latter
has assumed position in the periphery of the regional security discourse and there is a
potential change following such tendency. According to normative institutionalism,
institutions constrain individual choice. It conceives institutional change in terms of
learning. The admission of human security concerns will bear implications on the process
of defining the interests of ASEAN and the member states. It will also bear implication on
the regional governance as argued by Abad:
“To pursue human security means to: (a) Enhance the capability of regional organizations to advance
universal values effectively and with greater autonomy from its dominant members and local interest groups,
(b) Create a much stronger and more focused campaign within global civil society make regional institutions
accountable to public by adopting democratic decision-making processes, (c) Frame regional cooperation in
terms of global human security agenda.”67

SWOT Analysis
At face value, the admission of human security as a norm (as opposed to human
security as agenda which can be more easily compromised) seems to be detrimental to
ASEAN integration because it is rather (in order not to say very) controversial. The most
controversial aspect of the human security approach is its inclusion of political factors,
such as human rights and liberal democratic governance.68 To risk simplifying the matter,
below is presented a raw SWOT analysis concerning the admission of human security in
the regional security discourse (since norm internalization has not been taking place, and
human security is still in the stage of securitizing move, the SWOT analysis will not be
directed to ASEAN’s potential integration)

STRENGTH
• ASEAN' desire and efforts to be a people-centric organization

66
Quoted in Kasira Cheeppensook, “The ASEAN Way on Human Security,” retrieved from
http://humansecurityconf.polsci.chula.ac.th/Documents/Presentations/Kasira.pdf

67
Loc cit..
68
Ibid..

29
• ASEAN's inclusion of human security dimensions in its principles, agenda, and
mechanisms (not only in the security, but also in the economic and socio-cultural pillars)
• Transition of its member states towards embracing more people-centric norms (in
their respective domestic realm)

WEAKNESSES
• The dominance of member states in shaping ASEAN’s interests
• The dependence of ASEAN institutionalization on its members’ consensus

THREATS
• The divergence of member states concerning the scope of human security
(also threat to ASEAN cohesion)
• The controversial nature of human security concept with the inclusion of
political dimensions of human security (also threat to ASEAN cohesion)
• The perceived incompatibility of human security norm with the established
norms of ASEAN, mainly state’s sovereignty and norm-interference

OPPORTUNITIES
• The supportive global environment in the promotion of human security
• The emergence of norms leaders among the member states of ASEAN
(Thailand and Indonesia)
• The continuous efforts of CSOs in the Track III and increasing socialization
in the Track II

Conclusion
In the discussion section, we tried to answer the following questions: How has
ASEAN approached security? Has securitization of human security agenda been taking
place in ASEAN’s security discourse? How is the state of human security in ASEAN in
terms of norm internalization? What are the potential changes of embracing human
security in the regional security discourse?
The data gathered in this inquiry shows that there has been securitization of human
security agenda in ASEAN’s regional security discourse, meaning that issues pertaining to
human security or having human security dimensions are taken into the regional security

30
discourse, as shown in the ARF’s agenda and activities. This is to say that human security
as an agenda has managed to enter the regional security discourse, albeit still in the
periphery.
For the second question pertaining to internalization of human security as a norm,
the data shows that such process has not been taking place. In the norms’ life-cycle, human
security norm has only managed to reach the second stage, namely norm cascade due to the
lack of consensus among the member states and regional leaders concerning the definition
and implications of the inclusion of human security as a norm and to the perceived
incompatibility of such process with the established norms in ASEAN’s security discourse.
The norm emergence owes to the CSOs efforts in promoting human security agenda and
norm while the norm cascade is primarily done by the socialized member states, namely
Thailand and recently, Indonesia.
Finally, the admission of human security agenda in the regional security discourse
will bear implication on regional governance and the behaviour of ASEAN’s member
states, including the need to further engage CSOs in ASEAN’s activities and decision-
making process and granting more independence to the organization. Meanwhile, change
in behaviour of the member states may be encouraged in the context of learning in which
the norm of human security acts as the appropriate standard of behaviour that shape their
interests.

31
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34