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T he poorest people of Johannesburg, South Africa saw some measure of hope with
a judicial reaffirmation of the country’s constitutional right to water in April 2008.
However, their fight is not over because the powers arrayed against them have ap-
pealed the decision.
High Court Judge Moroa Tsoka ruled that the city water
utility’s policy of forced installation of prepaid water meters
without providing an alternative water supply was unlawful
and unconstitutional. What’s more, the meters were placed
only in poor, black areas to require people there to pay for
water before they used it. In essence, the meters were a
method of controlling water on credit. They were not of-
fered the choice of a full credit, metered water supply.
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Food & Water Watch
registered only about 80,000 of them. So, this was just an-
other part of the plan to identify poor people and then force
them to accept pre-paid water meters and, ultimately, fur-
ther restrict water consumption.7
After apartheid ended, this mandate for everyone having the right to water was written into the Bill of Rights in South Africa’s
constitution.
But the ANC changed course after coming to power, wrote McKinley. “It gave water bureaucrats the authority to provide water
only if there was a full cost recovery of operating, maintenance and replacement costs.” The government “went even further and
located the policies of water and other basic needs within a neo-liberal macro-economic policy framework that ensured water
(and all basic needs/services) would be turned into market commodities, to be bought and sold on the basis of private ownership
and the profit motive.”
The ANC followed the neo-liberal economic advice of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and various western gov-
ernments. In line with that, it “drastically decreased grants and subsidies to local municipalities and city councils and supported
the development of financial instruments for privatised delivery. This effectively forced local government, with Johannesburg at
the forefront, to turn towards commercialisation and privatisation of basic services as a means of generating the revenue no lon-
ger provided by the national state.”
Johannesburg, like other local governments, privatized public water utilities by contracting with multinational water corporations
to service and manage water delivery.
A new corporate water utility, Johannesburg Water Company, was established. The city government maintained formal public
ownership, but it outsourced the management and operations to French multinational Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux, which was done
through the Johannesburg Water Management Company. “Almost as if on cue, JOWCO increased water tariffs, necessarily hitting
poor communities in and around Johannesburg the hardest. The first price hike instituted was an astronomical 55%. The price
increases were only further catalysed by the need to ‘recover’ additional huge costs associated with the corruption-riddled, World
Bank-funded Lesotho Highlands Water Project, designed mainly to provide new sources of water for the Johannesburg Metropoli-
tan area. Similar privatisation programmes in both urban and peri-urban areas across South Africa soon followed...As a result,
water has ceased to be a public good that is accessible and affordable to all South Africans. Instead, water has become a market
commodity to be bought and sold on a for-profit basis.”
According to Richard Mokolo, leader of the Crisis Water Committee formed to resist water privatization effort in the Orange Farm
township: “Privatisation is a new kind of apartheid. Privatisation separates the rich from the poor.”10
Fortunately, when the Suez contract was up for renewal in 2006, the City of Johannesburg bowed to massive public pressure and
ended the partnership. But now Johannesburg Water runs what is really an internal private company, which has floated loans to
finance the pre-paid water meters under Operation Conserve Water.
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The Push for Water and Justice in South Africa
Endnotes
1
Dugard Ph.D., Jackie. Personal interview. Senior Researcher and Acting
Director, Centre for Applied Legal Studies at the University of the Witwa-
tersrand. She also serves on the legal team representing Phiri residents
who sued over the pre-paid water meters. May 31, 2008.
2
McKinley, Dale. Personal interview. Coalition Against Water Privatiza-
tion, May 28, 2008.
Cautious Victory 3
Ibid.
Fortunately, the people of Phiri didn’t go for it, but instead 4
Op cit., Dugard interview.
pressed their case in court. After the arguments were heard
in December 2007, a decision came the following April.
5
OpCit, McKinley interview.
6
Op cit. Dugard interview.
“We thought we might get some of what we were asking 7
Op Cit. McKinley interview.
for,” McKinley said. “But we got the correct interpretation 8
Ibid.
of the constitutional right to water.”
9
McKinley, Dale T. “Water is Life The Anti-Privatisation Forum & the
Not only were the water meters struck down, but Judge Struggle Against Water Privatisation.” Available at:
www.waterjustice.org/uploads/attachments/pdf59.doc
Tsoka increased the free daily water allocation from 25 to
50 liters per person.
10
Bond, Patrick. “Africa Files: The battle over water in South Africa,”
2003. Available at: www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=4564
On the downside, both the pre-paid water meters that have Copyright © June 2008 by Food & Water Watch.
already been rolled out and the existing free water alloca- All rights reserved.
tion will remain until the conclusion of the appeals process.