NELLA FAYE A. RICO STUDENT NO.

32

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
FREEDOM OF RELIGION

ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR

(A.M. No. P-02-1651, / 492 SCRA 1, June 22, 2006)

FACTS:

Estrada requested RTC Judge of Las Piñas City for an investigation of Soledad Escritor,
court interpreter in said court, for living with a man not her husband and having borne a child.
According to the complainant, Escritor should not be allowed to remain employed in the
judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act. Being a member of the religious sect
known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her
conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years
of living together, she executed a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which was approved by
the congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for
a couple to legalize their union.

ISSUE:

WON Escritor's right to religious freedom should carve out an exception from the
prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government employees are held
administratively liable.

HELD:

YES. The Court held that in resolving claims involving religious freedom (1) benevolent
neutrality or accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and
framework underlying the religion clauses in our Constitution; and (2) in deciding respondent’s
“plea of exemption based on the Free Exercise Clause”, it is the compelling state interest test, the
strictest test, which must be applied.

Our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not
offend compelling state interests. The case being one of first impression, the claim of religious
freedom is subjected to the “compelling state interest” test. . In applying the test, the first inquiry
is whether Escritor's right to religious freedom has been burdened. There is no doubt that
choosing between keeping her employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice and
family on the one hand, and giving up her employment and keeping her religious practice and
family on the other hand, puts a burden on her free exercise of religion. The second step is to
ascertain Escritor's sincerity in her religious belief.

The case is one of first impression, thus the parties were not aware of the burdens of
proof they should discharge in the Court's use of the "compelling state interest" test. To properly
settle the issue, the government should be given the opportunity to demonstrate the compelling
state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing Escritor's stance that her conjugal arrangement is not
immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection. Thus, the
Supreme Court find that in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, respondent
Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption
from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that
state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms - including religious freedom - may be
enjoyed.
NELLA FAYE A. RICO STUDENT NO. 32

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
FREEDOM OF RELIGION

AGLIPAY V. RUIZ
(64 PHIL 201, March 13, 1937)

FACTS:

Aglipay seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against Director of Posts from issuing
and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. He
contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating that no public funds
shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion, etc. This provision
is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the
occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends
and aims. On other hand, Director of Posts contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act
No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and issuance of
postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.

HELD:

NO. What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious
toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of
its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest
principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No.
4052 “advantageous to the government” does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The
issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious
denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage
stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the
Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Congress.” The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila,
being the seat of that congress. This was to “to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists,” the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance.
Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church,
any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the
Government.
NELLA FAYE A. RICO STUDENT NO. 32

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
FREEDOM OF RELIGION

FONACIER VS. COURT OF APPEALS

(96 PHIL 417)

FACTS:

Case was filed by Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI) against Bishop Fonacier seeking to
render an accounting of his administration of all the temporal properties and to recover the same
on the ground that he ceased to be the supreme bishop of IFI. Isabelo De los Reyes Jr. had been
elected as the Supreme Bishop.
Fonacier claims that he was not properly removed as Supreme Bishop and his legal successor
was Juan Jamias. Thus, two factions of the IFI were created. The bishop and priests under Mons.
De los Reyes, Jr., had increased from 252 to 293 while those under Mons. Jamias were only 64
and Mons. De los Reyes, Jr. was duly registered as "corporation sole for the administration of the
temporalities of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente.” CFI rendered judgment declaring Isabelo
De Los Reyes, Jr. as the sole and legitimate Supreme Bishop of IFI and ordered Fonacier to
render an accounting of his administration of the properties and funds of the church.

ISSUE:

WON the civil courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the ouster of certain
bishops of the IPI, to determine the proper faction to hold the church’s property, and/or pass
upon matters involving the church’s amendment of its constitution.

HELD:

NO. Where a decision of an ecclesiastical court plainly violates the law it professes to
administer, or is in conflict with the laws of the land, it will not be followed by the civil courts.
In some instances, not only have the civil courts assumed the right to inquire into the jurisdiction
of religious tribunals and the regularity of their procedure, but they have subjected their
decisions to the test of fairness or to the test furnished by the constitution and laws of the church.
Thus, it has been held that expulsion of a member without notice or an opportunity to be heard is
not conclusive upon the civil courts when a property right is involved. Where there is a schism
which leads to a separation into distinct and conflicting bodies, the rights of such bodies to the
use of the property must be determined by ordinary principles which govern voluntary
associations.

Herein, the properties of the IFI are held by a religious congregation, and that the
numerical majority is on the side of the faction of Mons. de los Reyes, et. al. where the number
of its bishops and priests. On the other hand, the amendments of the constitution, restatement of
articles of religion and abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged by Mons.Fonacier, having to
do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church
and having reference to the power of excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of
membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil
courts.
NELLA FAYE A. RICO STUDENT NO. 32

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
FREEDOM OF RELIGION

UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.

vs BRADFORDUNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, INC.,
(G.R. No. 171905. June 20, 2012)

FACTS:

Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI) built a fence that said to encroached the
right of way allocated by United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) to the Cebu
Conference Inc. (CCI). UCCP favored CCI and the series of events then followed led to the
breakup of BUCCI from UCCP. BUCCI then disaffiliated itself from UCCP and filed
its Amended Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws which provided for and effected its
disaffiliation from UCCP, which approved by the SEC. UCCP filed a complaint for rejection of
decision, alleging that separate incorporation and registration of BUCCI is not allowed under the
UCCP Constitution and By-laws. SEC dismissed UCCP's petition and defended the right of
BUCCI to disassociate itself from UCCP in recognition of its constitutional freedom to associate
and disassociate. CA affirmed the decision of SEC, thus UCCP maintains that it has the sole
power to decide whether BUCCI could disaffiliate from it as this involves a purely ecclesiastical
affair.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the determination of the validity of disaffiliation of respondents is purely

an ecclesiastical affair.

HELD:

No. The issue is not a purely ecclesiastical affair. An ecclesiastical affair is one that
concerns doctrine, creed or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement
within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of the
membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy
of membership. Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship
between the church and its members and relate to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship,
and governance of the congregation.

UCCP and BUCCI, being corporate entities and grantees of primary franchises, are
subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A provides that
SEC shall have absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over all corporations. Even with
their religious nature, SEC may exercise jurisdiction over them in matters that are legal and
corporate. BUCCI, as a juridical entity separate and distinct from UCCP, possesses the freedom
to determine its steps. BUCCI’s decision concerns its legal right as a religious corporation to
disaffiliate from another religious corporation via legitimate means- a secular matter well within
the civil court’s purview.
NELLA FAYE A. RICO STUDENT NO. 32

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
FREEDOM OF RELIGION

EBRALINAG vs. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU

(219 SCRA 256)

FACTS:

Respondents ordered expulsion of 68 HS and GS students of Cebu. Public

school authorities expelled these students for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem and recite the pledge required by RA 1265. They are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that
by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings. They
contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against official
control and religious freedom.

ISSUE:

WON religious freedom been violated.

HELD:

YES. Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority. The 2 fold aspect of
right to religious worship is: 1.) Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm of
thought. 2.) Freedom to act on one’s belief regulated and translated to external acts. The only
limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety,
morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent. The expulsion of the petitioners
from the school is not justified. Jehovah’s Witnesses may be exempted from observing the flag
ceremony but this right does not give them the right to disrupt such ceremonies.

In the case at bar, the students expelled were only standing quietly during ceremonies. By
observing the ceremonies quietly, it doesn’t present any danger so evil and imminent to justify
their expulsion. What the petitioner’s request is exemption from flag ceremonies and not
exclusion from public schools. The expulsion of the students by reason of their religious beliefs
is also a violation of a citizen’s right to free education. The non-observance of the flag ceremony
does not totally constitute ignorance of patriotism and civic consciousness. Love for country and
admiration for national heroes, civic consciousness and form of government are part of the
school curricula. Therefore, expulsion due to religious beliefs is unjustified.
NELLA FAYE A. RICO STUDENT NO. 32

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
FREEDOM OF RELIGION

AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY VS. CITY OF MANILA,

(101 Phil. 386, [No. L-9637], April 30, 1957)

FACTS:

In the course of its ministry, the Philippine agency of American Bible Society (a foreign,
non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation) has been distributing and selling bibles
and/or gospel portions thereof throughout the Philippines. The City of Manila questioned the act
of the Society for conducting a business of general merchandise, without providing itself with
the necessary Mayor’s permit and municipal license, in violation of several Ordinances. The
Society paid such under protest and filed suit questioning the legality of the ordinances under
which the fees are being collected.

ISSUE:

WON the exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship include the right of
dissemination of religious beliefs.

HELD:

YES. The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any
restraints of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the
grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the
right to prevent".

The Court held that a city ordinance requiring those engaged in the business or
occupation of selling merchandise for profit to obtain a permit and pay license fees to the city
government was not applicable to the American Bible Society. The ordinance could not be
applied to the Society, which disturbed and sold bibles and other religious pamphlets throughout
the Philippines, because doing so would impair its exercise and enjoyment of its religious
profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.
NELLA FAYE A. RICO STUDENT NO. 32

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
FREEDOM OF RELIGION

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

618 SCRA 32, [G.R. No. 190582], ( April 8, 2010)

FACTS:

Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and
trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to COMELEC.
However, due to moral grounds, COMELEC denied the said petition and cited certain biblical
and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and
contrary to public policy, they are considered nuisance. Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of
accreditation violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political
agenda to benefit the nation. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among
the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941.

ISSUE:

WON a government agency utilize the Bible and Koran in justifying its actions without
violating the non-establishment clause.

HELD:

No.Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what
our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
“governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.”
Hence, it was a grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the Commission on Elections
to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify its refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad LGBT Party as a
party-list organization under R.A. No. 7941 of the Party-List System Act. Government must act
for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects.
NELLA FAYE A. RICO STUDENT NO. 32

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
FREEDOM OF RELIGION

IMBONG VS. OCHOA

(721 SCRA 146, [G.R. No. 204819], April 8, 2014)

FACTS:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress. Imbong et al., were
assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the ground, among others, that Sections 7, 23, and
24 of the law violated an individual’s freedom of religion.

The RH Law, Sections 7, 23, and 24 mandate a hospital or a medical practitioner to

immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible
healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections bases on religious or ethical beliefs.

ISSUE:

WON RH bill violate Right to Freedom of Religion.

HELD:

YES. According to the Supreme Court, in a situation where the free exercise of religion is
allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test finds
application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant
an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in
demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular
objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law
deserves no less than strict scrutiny.

In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to
religious freedom has been burdened. There is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a
conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the abandonment of
his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of
penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose
religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.

The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the
religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against
his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services,
procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to
perform an act against his beliefs. Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out
clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes pro-life health providers complicit in
the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in
conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is
equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.