BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME”AS A VIABLE PLEA WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF

SELF-DEFENSE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARIVIC GENOSA

G.R. No. 135981. September 29, 2000

Facts: On or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality
of Isabel, province of Leyte, accused Marivic Genosa, with intent to kill, with treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, hit and wound BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard
deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the purpose, inflicting
several wounds which caused his death.
The lower court found the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and sentenced the accused with the penalty
of DEATH.
On appeal, the appellant alleged that despite the evidence on record of repeated and
severe beatings she had suffered at the hands of her husband, the lower court failed to
appreciate her self-defense theory. She claimed that under the surrounding
circumstances, her act of killing her husband was equivalent to self-defense.
Issue: Whether or not the “battered woman syndrome” as a viable plea within the
concept of self-defense is applicable in this case.
Held: No. The court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising
from the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the
phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two
battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final
acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the
battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm, from her batterer and an
honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of
the killing, the batterer must have posed probable—not necessarily immediate and
actual—grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the
former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the
requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all
of these elements were duly established.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NATIVIDAD LUAGUE and WENCESLAO ALCANSARE,
62 PHIL. 504 (OWN DIGEST)

FACTS:

in the morning of February 18, 1935, while the accused Natividad Luague was in her house situated
in the municipality of Calatrava, Occidental Negros, with only her three children of tender age for
company, her husband and co-accused Wenceslao Alcansare having gone to grind corn in Juan
Garing's house several kilometers away. Paulino Disuasido came and began to make love to her;
that as Natividad could not dissuade him from his purpose, bent on satisfying them at all costs, drew
and opened a knife and, threatening her with death. That in preparing to lie with her, Paulino had to
leave the knife on the floor and the accused, taking advantage of the situation, picked up the weapon
and stabbed him in the abdomen; and that Paulino, feeling himself wounded, ran away jumping
through the window and falling on some stones, while the accused set forth immediately for
the poblacion to surrender herself to the authorities and report the incident.

ISSUE:

WON Natividad is exempted from criminal liability.

HELD:

Yes. The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an aggression sufficient to put her in a state of self
defense inasmuch as a woman’s honor cannot be esteemed as a right as precious, if not more than
her very existence; and it is evident that a woman who, thus imperiled, wounds and thereby killed the
offender, should be afforded exemption from criminal liability.

The theory of the prosecution that the accused husband and his wife had conspired to kill Paulino is
overcome by the very facts which the prosecution itself has attempted to prove. If such conspiracy had
really existed, the accused spouses would have been fully prepared to carry it into execution, because
rational beings differ from those who are not in that when they embark on anything, they make the s
equal to its realization. However, these amused, on the on, had neither a rusty bolo nor an outworn
club to cope with Paulino. The weapon with which Paulino was first wounded was his own knife which,
according to the prosecution, the accused wife had to borrow from him on the pretext that she wanted
to cut her nails, and later a stone which the accused husband casually picked up from the ground.
Yarns of this kind make good material for fables.

Witness devoid probability. Both ACCUSED ARE ACQUITTED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. REMEDIOS DE LA CRUZ,

61 PHIL. 344

FACTS:

Defendant REMEDIOS DE LA CRUZ (illiterate barrio girl, unable to write her name and 18
years old) testified that after going to a wake with her friend they went home and when they had
passed a fork in the trail and reached a narrow part, a man named Francisco Rivera suddenly threw
his arms around her from behind, caught hold of her breasts and kissed her, and seized her in her
private parts; that she tried to free herself, but he held her and tried to throw her down; that when
she felt weak and could do nothing more against the strength of the man, she got a knife from her
pocket, opened it, and stabbed him in defense of her honor. She further testified that the man who
attacked her did not say anything; that she asked him who he was but he did not answer; that when
she was seized, she was about two brazas behind her nearest companion; that when she was face
to face with her assailant during the struggle she could scarcely recognize his face in the darkness
and could not be sure that it was Francisco Rivera.

ISSUE:
WON Remedios de la Cruz is exempted from criminal liability.

RULING:

Yes. Whether she did in fact cried for help, as claimed by her or failed to do so because of the
suddenness with which the deceased grabbed her and the fright that which is naturally caused,
taking in consideration the circumstances of the case, she is exempt from the criminal liability in
the defense of her honor. ACCUSED IS ACQUITTED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NICOLAS JAURIGUE and AVELINA JAURIGUE,

76 PHIL. 174

FACTS:

Accused AVELINA JAURIGUE cannot endure anymore what the deceased AMANDO
CAPINA was doing to her (Courting and stalking her). One morning, inside a chapel, the deceased
Amado noticed Avelina and went to the bench where Avelina was sitting. He placed his hand on
the upper right thigh of the accused and she pulled with her right hand a fan knife which she always
brought with her. Amado seized her right hand but she quickly grabbed the knife with her left
hand and stabbed Amado in the left side of his neck, 4 and a half inches deep, which was
necessarily a mortal wound. He died a few minutes later.

ISSUE:
WON Accused AVELINA JAURIGUE acted in self-defense prior to an unlawful aggression.

RULING:

No. She is not exempted from criminal liability because the said chapel was lighted with electric
lights, her father is inside and there were important people accompanying her. Under the
circumstances there was and there could be no possibility of her being raped. The means employed
by her in defense on her honor is evidently excessive. She committed the crime of HOMICIED.
NO REASONABLE MEANS EMPLOYED.
Case of People of the R.P. vs. Oriente
G.R.No. 155094 30January2007

*ARTICLE 11 Par. 1 and ARTICLE 13 Par(s): 3 and 4 OF THE REVISED PENAL

CODE

"FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY (11")

"CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MITIGATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY (13)"

FACTS:

This case is about Manuel Oriente’s appeal of his conviction for the crime of homicide.
The appellant w/ other persons, attacked and assaulted Romulo Vallo, hitting him with a
lead pipe on different parts of the body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death (as confirmed by the
medico- legal). In the case there was one witness for the prosecution; Arnel Tanael.
When the case was tried at the C.A. the court (C.A.) found that the R.T.C erred in
finding two mitigating circumstances were present, namely, lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong and sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party, so
the court modified the penalty imposed by the R.T.C.

ISSUE:

DID THE C.A. AND THE R.T.C ERR IN NOT APPRECIATING THAT THERE WAS AN
UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM, AND THE MEANS
EMPLOYED BY APPELLANT TO PREVENT THE SAME WAS REASONABLE AND
FALLS UNDER THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OR SELF-DEFENSE

- No. Since when self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused
to show that the killing is legally justified. It must be shown by clear and convincing
evidence. The appellant cannot rely on the weakness of the evidence of the
prosecution.
- All three requirements for self- defense must concur; but unlawful aggression is
condition sine qua non.
- The fact that the deceased was not able to make use of his gun after being hit in the
forehead by the weapon of the appellant as alleged by the defense makes their claim of
self-defense unusual
- Injuries sustained by the deceased were extensive
- Importantly, the appellant failed to establish the existence of the gun, that was alleged
to have constituted the “unlawful aggression”
CAN THE ACCUSED BE GRANTED THE OPPORTUNITY OF MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE, DUE TO THE PREMISE THAT THERE WAS LACK OF INTENT IN
THE PART OF THE APPELLANT TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG AND THAT
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION ON THE PART OF THE DECEASED?

- Modification of the penalties was based on the presence of mitigating or aggravating

circumstances.
- The claim of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong cannot be appreciated because
the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did
actually produce the death of the victim
- Provocation in this case cannot be appreciated as well since provocation is deemed
sufficient if it is adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, w/c must be
proportionate in gravity
- The fact that a heated or intense argument preceded the incident is not by itself the
sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party as contemplated by law. Also,
appellant failed to establish by competent evidence that the deceased had a gun and
used it to threaten petitioner.

HELD:
PETITION DENIED. DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF C.A. ARE AFFIRMED W/
MODIFICATIONS, the C.A. erred in imposing 12 years and one day of reclusion
temporal as the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. In the computation of the
maximum term, the law prescribes that the attending circumstances should be
considered. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in this case, the
penalty that should be imposed is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by law,
that is, reclusion temporal in its medium period, or, anywhere between fourteen years,
eight months and one day to seventeen years and four months

Peope Vs. Bumanglag, 41 Phil. 644

FACTS:

Herein defendants Rafael Bumaglag noticed that he lost 40 bundles of Palay which were
kept in his granary. Upon his search of the said Palay on the following morning, he found
them in an enclosed field 100 meters from his granary, for the purpose of ascertaining
who had done it, he left the palay there, and that night, accompanied by Gregorio Bundoc,
Antonio Ribao, and Saturnino Tumamao, he waited near the said field for the person who
might return to get the palay. A man, Guillermo Ribis arrived and approached the palay
and attempted to carry it but at the instant he was approached by Bumanglag and his
companions who assaulted the presumed thief with sticks and stabbing weapons and as
a result of the struggle, Ribis died.
ISSUE:
WON the justifying circumstances of Defense of property is present in this case.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that there is no unlawful aggression present in this
case and there is an absence of other requisites which would fully or partially
exempt the accused from the criminal responsibility. However, the Court took into
consideration the presence of the mitigating circumstance No. 7 of Article 9 of the
Revised Penal Code because the defendant acted with loss of reason and self-
control upon seeing that Ribis was taking material possession of the palay

People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389 (1983)

FACTS:
Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David
Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia
during
the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into
his house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of
construction and
found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying
his house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No,
gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with
his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was running towards the jeep where the
deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the
shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal
battle with the defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of
property. At the time
of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting
of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had
leased his
property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble.
On June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn't
pay rent.
He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2
months after letter. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property.
CFI ruled that
Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he
acted in defense of his person.

No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of the
defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victim. However, this
aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property.
On the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in consideration of the violation of
property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the right of
owners to close and fence their land.

Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article
because his ownership of the land being awarded by the government was still pending,
therefore putting ownership into question. It is accepted that the victim was the original
aggressor.

2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defence

of his rights.

Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable

only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites:
 Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards
appellant's property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should
have left him in peace before time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez's house
and putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also provides that possession
may not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that
every possessor has the right to be respected in his possession
 Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In the case,
killing was disproportionate to the attack.
 Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there
was no provocation at all since he was asleep
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating
circumstances are: voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation (read p. 405
explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not
applicable on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault was not
deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was also
no direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide
is reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete
defense, it can be lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arrestomayor.

3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to pay the
civil indemnity due to the offended party.

No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil indemnity. RA

5465 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to reparation of
damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages and costs of proceedings.
Although it was enacted only after its conviction, considering that RA 5465 is favorable
to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect
pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.

Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and

extenuating circumstance of incomplete self-defense. Penalty is 4 months arresto
mayor and to indemnify
each group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary imprisonment and w/o award for moral
damages. Appellant has already been detained 14 years so his immediate release is
ordered.

Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled with form
of attack on person defending property. In the case at bar, this was not so. Appellant
should then be sentenced to prision mayor. However, since he has served more than
that, he should be released.