ECHEGARAY v. SEC.

OF JUSTICE

October 26, 2012 § Leave a comment

January 19, 1999 (G.R. No. 132601)

PARTIES:
Petitioner: LEO ECHEGARAY
Respondents: SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL

FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on
that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the
action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the
executive to grant reprieve.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered…
that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive
function.

HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not
exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an
accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three
branches of our government.

Fortich vs Corona

289 SCRA 624 | Doctrine of Res Judicata

Facts

On March 29, 1996, strikers went on protest concerning the decision of the Office of the President issued
through the executive secretary Ruben Torres which approved the conversion of a 144 hectare of
agricultural land to an agro-industrial (institutional) area. That event led to the issuance of the so-called
“win-win” resolution made by the Office of the President on November 7, 1997 through then Deputy
Executive Secretary, Renato Corona, which substantially modified its earlier decision after it had become
final and executory. The said resolution modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial
area only to the extent of 44 hectares and has ordered that the remainder of 100 hectares to be distributed
to the qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

The Case

The case involves a 144 hectare land owned by Norberto Quisumbing Sr. Management and Development
Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation
to the Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Philippines Inc.) which is a multinational
corporation for a period of 10 years under the Crop Producer and Grower’s Agreement. The said lease
had expired in April 1994. In October 1991, in the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian
Reform placed the entire land under compulsory acquisition. NQSRMDC resisted the action committed
by DAR; in February 1992, sought and was granted by DAR adjudication board (DARAB), through its
provincial agrarian reform adjudicator, a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction.

Pangalan.com

Despite the order from DARAB, the DAR regional director issued a memorandum directing the Land
Bank to open a trust account in the name of NQSRMDC and conduct summary proceedings to determine
the just compensation of the subjected property. NQSRMDC objected to these and filed an Omnibus
Motion on June 9, 1992 to enforce the DAR regional director and Land Bank on the valuation of the
subjected property.

DARAB acted favorably on the Omnibus Motion by

ordering the DAR regional director and Land Bank “to seriously comply with the terms of the order dated
nullifying the DAR regional director’s memorandum and the summary proceedings conducted pursuant
thereto; and
directing the Land Bank “to return the claim folder of petitioner NQRSMDC’s subjected property to DAR
until further orders.
Meanwhile, Governor Fortich passed Resolution No. 6 designating particular areas along Bukidnon-Sayre
Highway as part of the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones where the subjected property is located. On
November 14, 1994, DAR (through its Secretary Garilao) issued an order denying the instant application
for the conversion of the subjected property from agricultural to an agro-industrial and, in lieu, placed it
under compulsory coverage of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The governor
(Fortich) appealed the said order to the Office of the President and prayed for the conversion or
classification of the subjected property as the same would be favorable to the people of Bukidnon.

Appeal with the Court of Appeals

On June 29, 1995, an appeal was filed with the Court of Appeals; a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the preliminary injunction. In resolving this, the Office of the President, through then executive
secretary, Ruben Torres, issued a decision approving the application of the petitioners. Subsequently,
DAR filed a motion for reconsideration. NQSRMDC filed a complaint with the RTC of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon for the annulment and cancellation of the title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141
others. The RTC issued a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction restraining DAR and 141 others from
entering, occupying and wresting from NQSRMDC the possession of the subjected property.

Shop at Zalora now!

An order was issued by then executive secretary on June 23, 1997 denying the motion for reconsideration
having been filed by DAR beyond the reglementary period of 15 days. The said order further declared
that the decision (by the Office of the President) on March 29, 1996 had become final and executory.
DAR filed a second motion for reconsideration on July 11, 1997 for the June 23, 1997 order of the Office
of the President.

On August 12, 1997, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC was challenged by some
farmers before the CA (Court of Appeals) through a petition (for certiorari and prohibition) praying for
the lifting of the injunction and for issuance of writ of prohibition from further trying the RTC case. Some
alleged farmer-beneficiaries went on a hunger strike on October 9, 1997 in front of the DAR compound in
Quezon City protesting about the decision made by the Office of the President on March 29, 1996. The
Office of the President resolved the strikers’ protest by issuing the so-called “win-win” resolution, which
was drafted by then deputy executive secretary Renato Corona, on November 7, 1997.

Governor Fortich and NQSRMDC received a copy of the said “win-win” resolution and filed the present
petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with urgent prayer of TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction against then deputy secretary Renato Corona and DAR secretary Ernesto Garilao. A motion for
leave to intervene was filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, through counsel, claiming that they are real
parties in interest.

In seeking the annulment of the “win-win” resolution, the petitioners claim that the OP came up with a
purely political decision to appease the farmers by reviving and modifying the decision (made on March
29, 1996) which has been declared final and executory in an order issued on June 23, 1997. They
(petitioners) also allege that the respondent (then deputy secretary) committed grave abuse of discretion
and acted beyond his jurisdiction when he drafted the questioned resolution on November 7, 1997.

Issue

Whether or not the doctrine of Res Judicata applies in the case at bar

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the acts of the petitioner does not constitute forum shopping, “that there is
forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable
opinion other than by appeal or certiorari in another”. The principle applies not only with respect to suits
filed in the courts but also in connection with litigation commenced in the courts while administrative
proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes in anticipation of an
favorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This specially so, as in this case, where the
court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction. Furthermore, the court has explained that
the test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping is where the elements of
litis pendentia are present or where a final judgement in one case will amount to res judicata in the other,
which are absent in the case at bar.

AUGUSTO MANGAHAS v. HON. JUDGE PAREDES (G.R. No. 157866, February 14, 2007)
Facts:
Avelino Banaag filed an ejectment complaint before the MeTC Caloocan against Mangahas alleging that
Mangahas constructed houses on the property lot without his knowledge and consent and that even after
several demands, they refused to vacate the same. Mangahas, on their answer, claimed that they have
resided in the subject lot with knowledge and conformity of the true owner Pinagkamaligan Indo-Agro
Development Corporation (PIADECO), as evidenced by a Certificate of Occupancy signed in their favor.
Mangahas filed a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground that the subject
property is part of the Tala Estate and that RTC QC issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
MeTC of QC and Caloocan prohibiting the eviction and demolition of all occupants of the Tala Estate.
They argued that the injunction issued by RTC QC is enforceable in Caloocan because both cities are
situated within the NCR. MeTC Caloocan denied the Manifestation and held that the injunction issued by
the RTC QC has binding effect only within the territorial boundaries of the said court and since Caloocan
City is not within the territorial area of the same, the injunction it issued is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction. MeTC Caloocan: ruled in favor of Banaag and held that the TCT in his name is an
indefeasible proof of his ownership of the lot and his inherent right to possess the same. RTC: affirmed in
toto the decision of MeTC. CA: affirmed the ruling of RTC. The decision of CA became final and
executory on Dec. 13, 2002. Dec. 11, 2000
–
Banaag filed with RTC a motion for execution pending appeal. (GRANTED) Sept. 27, 2001
–
issued a Writ of Execution. Mangahas filed a Motion to Suspend Execution. (DENIED)

Issue:
Whether the issuance of Writ of Execution is proper. – YES

Held:
SC DENIED the petition. SC held that once a decision becomes final and executory, it is ministerial duty
of the presiding judge to issue a writ of execution except in certain cases, as when subsequent events
would render execution of judgment unjust. Mangahas did not allege nor proffer evidence that this case
falls within the exception. Hence, there is no reason to vacate the writ of execution issued by the RTC.
The issue involving the binding effect of the injunction issued by RTC of QC became the law of the case
between the parties. Under this legal principle, whatever is irrevocably established as the controlling legal
rule or decision between the parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, so long as the
facts on which the decision was predicated continue. The doctrine holds that once an appellate court has
declared the law in a case that declaration continues to hold even in subsequent appeal. The reason lies in
the fact that public policy dictates that litigations must be terminated at some definite time and that the
prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing
party. Mangahas is therefore barred from assailing the ruling that the injunction issued by RTC of QC has
no binding effect to the court of Caloocan as this issue had already been passed upon with finality. Issues
should be laid to rest at some point; otherwise, there would be no end to litigation

Ching v. CA, 423 SCRA 356, February 23, 2004

FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained two loans from the Allied Banking
Corporation (ABC). (PBMCI) Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching executed a continuing guaranty
with the ABC for the payment of the said loan. The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans so
ABC filed a complaint for sum of money against the PBMCI. Trial court issued a writ of preliminary
attachment against Alfredo Ching requiring the sheriff of to attach all the properties of said Alfredo Ching
to answer for the payment of the loans. Encarnacion T. Ching, wife of Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to
Set Aside the levy on attachment allegeing inter alia that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the
sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds. Petitioner
spouses aver that the source of funds in the acquisition of the levied shares of stocks is not the controlling
factor when invoking the presumption of the conjugal nature of stocks under Art. !21 and that such
presumption subsists even if the property is registered only in the name of one of the spouses, in this case,
petitioner Alfredo Ching. According to the petitioners, the suretyship obligation was not contracted in the
pursuit of the petitioner-husband’s profession or business.44

ISSUE: WON 100,000 shares of stocks may be levied on by the sheriff to answer for the loans guaranteed
by petitioner Alfredo Ching

HELD: No.
RATIO: The CA erred in holding that by executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with
the private respondent for the payment of the PBMCI loans, the petitioner-husband was in the exercise of
his profession, pursuing a legitimate business.

The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners. The
private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his
exclusive money.

The appellate court erred in concluding that the conjugal partnership is liable for the said account of
PBMCI.
Article 121 provides: The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and obligations contracted
by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the
same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.

For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone, there
must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses.
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was
benefited by the petitioner-husband’s act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement
with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private
respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the
fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety,
the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish
that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.

DOMINGO NEYPES, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 141524 (September 14, 2005)

FACTS:

Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or
reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents. Later, in an order,
the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed.
Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day
thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued
another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five
days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3,
1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late.
This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this
too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under
Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the appellate court,
petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the
final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of
appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for
appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal
should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the “final order” appealable
under the Rules.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of the 15-day reglmentary period to appeal, the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the Motion for
Reconsideration.

(2) Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time.

HELD:
(1) The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration should be deemed as the final order.
In the case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared petitioner non-suited and
accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion
to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had
lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his
notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed ― for having been filed out of time. The court a quo
ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this
was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. The SC reversed the trial court and declared that
it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which
constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there. This pronouncement was reiterated
in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where the SC again considered the order denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in
the case. Based on the aforementioned cases, the SC sustained petitioners’ view that the order dated July
1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.

(2) YES. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity
to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file
the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule
43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from
receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial)
or any final order or resolution.

The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15
days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration).
This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal
shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the
disjunctive word “or” signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a
rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of “or” in the above provision
supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15
days from notice of the “final order,” which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order
denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal
period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this
case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period
of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another
opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While
we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time,
we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the
RTC’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final order”) denying his motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if
either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original
appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998
or five days from receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence,
the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.

NOTE:

The “FRESH PERIOD RULE” do not apply to Rule 64 (Review of Judgments and Final Orders or
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit) because Rule 64 is derived
from the Constitution. It is likewise doubtful whether it will apply to criminal cases.