CASE DIGESTS

17. Acebedo v. Arquero

A.M. No. P-94-1054, March 11, 2003

Facts: Edwin Acebedo charged Eddie Arquero of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Brooke’s Point, Palawan
for immorality, alleging that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former stenographer of the said court and Arquero
unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as husband and wife. Arquero claimed that Acebedo himself had been
cohabitating with another woman. Arquero further justified that his having a relationship with Irader was solely
based on a “Kasunduan” or written agreement entered into by Acebedo and Irader, purportedly consenting to
and giving freedom to either of them to seek and live with any partner.

Issue: Is contract of marriage subject to stipulation?

Held: No. The Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the validity of the marriage between
complainant and his wife. Article 1 of the Family Code provides that marriage is an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. It is an institution
of public order or policy governed by rules established by law which cannot be made inoperative by the
stipulation of the parties.
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18. Espinosa v. Atty. Julieta A. Omaña

A.C. No. 9081, October 12, 2011

Facts: Complainant Espinosa and his wife Marantal sought Atty. Omaña’s legal advice on whether they could
dissolve their marriage and live separately. Consequently, Omaña prepared and notarized a document entitled
“Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay” containing terms and conditions implanted by the couple. However, Marantal
eventually took custody of all their children and took possession of most of the property they acquired during
their union. This led Espinosa to seek legal advice from his law graduate friend, who told him that the contract
they signed was not valid. Subsequently, Espinosa and his friend hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint
against Omaña before the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).

Issue: Is the aforesaid Kasunduaan ng Paghihiwalay valid?

Held: No. It bears to stress that husbands and wives can dissolve their conjugal partnership and live separately
if it is approved by the court, otherwise, it is void. This is the Court’s ruling in the case at bar, declaring that the
extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void. The Court also ruled that
a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation
of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Atty. Omaña did in
this case.
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19. Vda. de Avenido v. Avenido

G.R. No. 173540, January 12, 2014

Facts: This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the same
man, now deceased. It stemmed from a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage instituted by Tecla
Avenido against Peregrina Vda. de Avenido on the ground that Tecla is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio
Avenido.

To recall, Tecla and Eustaquio got married in 1942 and their corresponding marriage certificate was recorded
with the Local Civil Registrar, the records of which were destroyed during World War II. Sometime in 1954,

1
 Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not known thereafter. In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband
Eustaquio got married to Peregrina, which marriage she claimed must be declared null and void.

The trial court ruled in favor of Peregrina, relying on Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to
Eustaquio. On appeal, the CA ruled in favor of Tecla, holding that there was a presumption of lawful marriage
between Tecla and Eustaquio.

Issue: Is the marriage between petitioner Peregrina Vda. de Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido valid?

Held: No, the marriage in question is bigamous. The Court upheld the reversal by the CA of the trial court’s
decision, declaring that while a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is
not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may
be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may
be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents, aside from the testimony of the witness
who was present during the marriage ceremony, and that of the petitioner herself.
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20. Republic v. Albios

G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013

Facts: Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen. Albios later on filed a petition
to nullify their marriage. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with
any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null
and void ab initio. She stated that in consideration of $2,000.00, Fringer will help her process her application for
American citizenship.

The RTC ruled that their marriage is one entered into in jest and therefore void. On appeal by the OSG, the CA
affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Issue: Should the marriage of Albios and Fringer be declared null and void?

Held: No, the marriage between Fringer and Albios is valid as both of them freely consented thereto. Under
Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of
a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately
enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of
the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence. The court finds real consent in the instant case because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by
any vice of consent. In fact, there was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully
comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship.

The court also explained that “there is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other
than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as
all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.”
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21. Santiago v. People

G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015

Facts: Four (4) months after solemnization of their marriage, Leonila Santiago and Nicanor Santos were served
an information for Bigamy on the ground that the latter was still married to Estela Gelang when he entered into
the 2nd marriage. Santiago admitted that they got married under Article 34 of the Family Code as they have

2
 cohabited long before their marriage. Nevertheless, Santiago was convicted and moved that the judgment be
reconsidered contending that her marriage is void due to lack of license. She asserted that they did not live
together as husband and wife for five (5) years prior to their marriage. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial
court’s decision. Before the Supreme Court, Santiago argued that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid
second marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue: Is the marriage between Santiago and Santos valid thereby making them liable for bigamy?

Held: No, the second marriage is void for lack of formal requisite of valid marriage license. It is clear that the
marriage between Santiago and Santos took place without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement
is purportedly explained in their Certificate of Marriage, which revealed that their union was celebrated under
Article 34 of the Family Code. It was proved, however, that the couple did not live together as husband and wife
for five (5) years prior to their marriage in order to be qualified under the said Article. Albeit their marriage is
void, the Court still affirmed the lower courts’ decision in view of the well-settled rule that knowledge of the
second wife of the fact of her spouse’s existing prior marriage, constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the
commission of Bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice, and not as co-accused. This was the
lower courts’ consistent findings that petitioner Santiago indeed knew of the first marriage as shown by the
surrounding circumstances and evidence on record.
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22. Ronulo v. People

G.R. No. 182438, July 2, 2014

Facts: Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to get married, but on the day of the wedding, the
church's officiating priest refused to solemnize the marriage because of lack of a marriage license. The couple
then went to an independent church where an Aglipayan priest Ronulo agreed to solemnize marriage despite
having been informed that they had no marriage license. After that event, the priest was served an information
for violating Art 352 of the RPC for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.

Ronulo was eventually charged of violating Article 352 of the RPC for performing an illegal marriage ceremony.
Ronulo contended that he was merely blessing the couple and his act of blessing does not tantamount to a
solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law. However, it was established during trial that there was
indeed a marriage ceremony which took place before the solemnizing officer and with the couple’s personal
declaration that they took each other as husband and wife which was followed by the signing of a document.

Issue: Was there a marriage ceremony in the case at bar?

Held: Yes. Article 6 of the Family Code provides for the minimum standards in determining whether marriage
ceremony had been conducted. Undoubtedly, petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge
that the essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. Thus, the marriage is void ab
initio, and the marriage ceremony conducted by Ronulo is illegal punishable under Article 352 of the Revised
Penal Code.
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23. Bangayan v. Bangayan Jr.

G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013

Facts: In September 1979, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. married Azucena Alegre. In 1982, while Alegre was outside
the Philippines, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go. Sally’s father was against this. In
order to appease her father, Sally convinced Benjamin to sign a purported marriage contract in March 1982. In
1994, the relationship between Sally and Benjamin soured. Sally filed a bigamy case against Benjamin. Benjamin
on the other hand filed an action to declare his alleged marriage to Sally as non-existent. To prove the existence
of their marriage, Sally presented a marriage license allegedly issued to Benjamin.

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 Issue: Whether the marriage is null and void ab initio and non-existent.

Held: Yes. Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena in 1973 was duly established before the trial court, evidenced by a
certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage
in 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.

The registration officer of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City testified that there was no valid marriage license
issued to Benjamin and Sally. She confirmed that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage
License in question to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove
the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative
value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was void
from the beginning for lack of a marriage license.
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24. Kho v. Republic

G.R. No. 187462, June 1, 2016

Facts: One afternoon in 1972, petitioner’s parents summoned a clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer and
instructed him to prepare and procure the necessary papers for the intended marriage between their son, petitioner
Raquel Kho and respondent Veronica Borata. Before dawn of the following day, the two exchanged marital
vows in a marriage ceremony at the town’s church without the required marriage license as the clerk was not
able to secure it due to the shortness of time. After 25 years of marital relationship, petitioner filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage before the RTC which rendered decision in his favor, declaring their marriage
null and void ab initio because the marriage was solemnized without the corresponding marriage license. On
appeal, the CA reversed the trial court’s decision, declaring that the marriage is valid and subsisting.

Issue: Is the marriage in question valid and subsisting as declared by the Court of Appeals?

Held: In resolving the issue in this case, the Court is confronted with the question of the existence of the subject
marriage license which is being disputed by the contending parties. Indubitably, the answer to such question will
determine whether the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is valid or null and void. Hence, the
Court found that there was indeed an absence of the pertinent marriage license as it concluded that based on the
Certification from the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar, coupled with respondent's failure to produce a
copy of the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show that such license was ever issued, no valid
marriage license was, in fact, issued by the said office. Pursuant to Article 80(3) of the Civil Code, therefore, a
marriage solemnized without the requisite marriage license is void from the beginning as in the case at bar.
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25. Niñal v. Bayadog

G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000

Facts: Petitioners’ parents, Pepito and Teodulfa Niñal got married sometime in 1974. More than ten years later,
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito married respondent
Norma Badayog without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit, stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years thereby exempting them from securing a
marriage license. Another ten years after, Pepito died in a car accident.

Anticipating the adverse effect of their father’s second marriage on their successional rights, petitioners then
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that such marriage was void
for lack of a marriage license. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of

4
 action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for annulment of marriage under Article 47
of the Family Code.

Applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code, the trial court ruled that petitioners are not among the
persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. It further stated that petitioners should have filed
the action to declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death.

Issue: Is the second marriage of Pepito null and void as sought by the petitioners?

Held: Yes. The Court declared that upon the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband
and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, such five-year period should be computed on the basis
of cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate
the union. In other words, there should be no legal impediments for the couple to marry each other during the 5-
year period of exclusive, continuous and unbroken cohabitation. Accordingly, Pepito and Norma’s 5-year
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Briefly stated, the Court has determined that the
second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license,
hence, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

As to the trial judge’s ruling, the Court held that Article 47 of the Family Code cannot be applied even by analogy
to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. It is, therefore, inapplicable in the case at bar. Article 47
pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity
of marriage.
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26. Republic v. Dayot

G.R. No. 175581, March 28, 2008

Facts: Jose and Felisa Dayot who were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board got
married at the Pasay City Hall sometime in 1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit
that they had lived together for at least 5 years. Four years later, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina
Pascual. Felisa then filed an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of
the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint one month thereafter for annulment and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent
was secured through fraud.

The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service
for one year without emolument. The trial court, on the other hand, rendered a decision dismissing his complaint
as it ruled that the marriage celebrated between him and Felisa was valid. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial
court’s decision, but reversed it later by declaring the marriage between Jose and Felisa void ab initio.

Issue: Is the marriage between Jose and Felisa void ab initio?

Held: Yes, it is void ab initio for lacking the requirement of valid marriage license as the couple failed to qualify
for the exemption thereof. The sworn affidavit that Jose and Felisa purportedly executed is merely a scrap of
paper because they started living together five months only before the celebration of their marriage. The five-
year common-law cohabitation period under Article 34 requires that it covers the years immediately preceding
the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity, meaning no third party should be involved at any time
within such period of continuous and unbroken cohabitation. The solemnization of a marriage without prior
license is a clear violation of the law as in the case at bar thereby rendering the marriage between Jose and Felisa
void ab initio. In fine, the Court finally stressed that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible as the
right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
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5
27. Llave v. Republic, et al.
G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011

Facts: Around 11 months before his death in 1993, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita Llave twice – initially under
the Islamic laws and tradition and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge. In their
marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil status was indicated as “divorced.” The following year, private
respondents Zorayda Tamano and her son Adib Tamano, in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen.
Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC for the declaration of nullity of
marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. Accordingly, Sen. Tamano married Zorayda
in 1958 under a civil rite, and that such marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.

Both the RTC and CA adjudged that Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano is void ab initio for being bigamous
under Article 35 of the Family Code and under Article 83 of the Civil Code, which does not provide for an
absolute divorce.

Issue: Is the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano bigamous thereby rendering it void ab initio?

Held: Yes. The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under
civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-
Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any
given time. In other words, divorce is not recognized as provided therein. Thus, Sen. Tamano’s subsequent
marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio as their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083 (Muslim Code). It
bears stressing that such Decree cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law
applies to “marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim
and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.” But
said Article does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites, as in
the case at bar. Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot
retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda.
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28. Uy v. Sps. Lacsamana

G.R. No. 206220, August 19, 2015

Facts: This case stemmed from a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents with Damages filed by
petitioner Luis Uy against respondents Rosca and spouses Lacsamana. Uy alleged that he was the lawful husband
of Rosca. He further stated that they lived together as husband and wife from the time they were married in 1944
until 1973 when they separated and lived apart. Uy contended, among others, that the sale of subject property
by Rosca to spouses Lacsamana was void for failure to obtain his marital consent, the property being conjugal
in nature. On her part Rosca averred that she and Uy cohabited and attempted to formalize their marital union
with a marriage ceremony, but it was not consummated due to the bombings at that time. Spouses Lacsamana,
on the other hand, claimed that they were buyers in good faith and for value as they relied on the Torrens title
which showed that Rosca was the owner of the property in question. At any rate, Uy prayed that the aforesaid
Deed of Sale executed by Rosca in favor of spouses Lacsamana be declared null and void. The RTC, however,
held that there was no valid marriage between Uy and Rosca, and the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca in favor
of spouses Lacsamana was valid. This was then affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Was there a valid marriage between Uy and Rosca thereby rendering the subject Deed of Sale without
Uy's consent null and void?

Held: No. As stressed by the Court, there is a presumption established in our Rules "that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." Thus, marriage is
always presumed. However, this presumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence.

6
 Consequently, with the presumption of marriage sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of defendant Rosca
shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then became the burden of plaintiff Uy to prove that he and defendant Rosca, were
legally married. It became necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to submit additional proof to show that they were
legally married. However, Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally married to Rosca, hence, their
property relations would be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies when a couple living
together were not incapacitated from getting married. Accordingly, the properties acquired during cohabitation
are presumed co-owned unless there is proof to the contrary. The court agree with both the trial and appellate
courts that Rosca was able to prove that the property in question is not co-owned but is paraphernal. Thus, the
sale in controversy is valid as there was no valid marriage between Uy and Rosca.
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29. Morigo v. People

G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004

Facts: When Lucio Morigo and Lucia got married in 1990, they merely signed the marriage contract without
the presence of solemnizing officer. Since Lucia has been working in Canada for many years, she was able to
obtain a divorce decree in 1991 from a Canadian court. The following year, Lucio contracted a second marriage
with Maria. Another year later, Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage on
the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. On account of his subsequent marriage, Lucio was
charged with bigamy and in that case, he moved for the suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the
civil case pending before the court posed a prejudicial question in the criminal case. Nevertheless, the trial court
eventually held Lucio guilty of bigamy beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue: Is judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage necessary before the spouse may validly contract a
second marriage without committing the crime of bigamy in the case at bar?

Held: No. In this case, it was found out that the first marriage is void ab initio in accordance with Articles 3 and
4 of the Family Code. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage
and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. In other words, there was no marriage to begin with and such
declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. Under Article 40 of the same Code, a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted.
One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy.
However, reiterating the non-existence of a first marriage with Lucia, petitioner Lucio was not guilty of bigamy
for there was no need for the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage which did not exist at all. Petitioner
was, in the eyes of the law, never married, thus he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.

What is contemplated by Article 40 of the Family Code as the void marriage that must be declared void before
a party may contract a subsequent marriage is one that must exist although, it is void.
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30. Lavadia v. Heirs of Luna, et al.

G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014

Facts: Sometime in 1976, Atty. Juan Luces Luna obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with Eugenia from
the court in Dominican Republic. On the same date, Atty. Luna contracted another marriage with Soledad.
Thereafter, the newlywed couple returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife. When the
law firm organized by Atty. Luna in 1977 was dissolved, the firm’s condominium unit was partitioned by the
partners but the same was still registered in common. The parties stipulated that the interest of Atty. Luna over
the condominium unit would be 25/100 share. After the death of Atty. Luna, such share in the condominium unit
as well as his valuable law books became the subject of the complaint filed by Soledad against the heirs of Atty.
Luna. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired during the existence of the marriage
between Atty. Luna Atty. Luna and Soledad through their joint efforts.

7
 The RTC ruled that the condominium unit and the law books pertained to the heirs of Atty. Luna’s first marriage
and to Soledad, respectively. On appeal, the CA modified the trial court’s decision, declaring the aforementioned
heirs to be the owner of all the properties in question.

Issue: Was the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia validly dissolved by the divorce decree obtained
abroad as well as by the subsequent marriage of Atty. Luna with Soledad thereby entitling the latter to any rights
in subject properties acquired during the 2nd marriage?

Held: At the outset, the Court stressed that the decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending
parties should be entitled to the properties in question. Accordingly, the resolution of the above issue requires
the Court to ascertain the law to be applied in the instant case. Hence, the Court ratiocinated that divorce between
Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. In that case, any settlement
of property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce
obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of
the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage. Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad was void for
being bigamous, on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the
divorce decree, but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna. It should then be justly concluded that the
properties in litis legally pertained to the conjugal partnership of gains of the 1st marriage as of the time of his
death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit,
and of the law books pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna. Thus, this confirmed the
modified decision of the Court of Appeals.
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31. Republic v. Orbecido III

G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005

Facts: Cipriano Orbecindo and Lady Myros Villanueva who were both Filipino citizens got married in 1981.
Five years later, Villanueva went to the U.S. and eventually became a naturalized American citizen. Later on,
she obtained a divorce decree of her marriage with Cipriano and got married to Stanley. When Orbecindo learned
that his wife obtained a divorce decree and remarried, he filed a petition for authority to remarry invoking
paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. Finding merit in the petition, and in the absence of opposition, the
trial court granted the same.

Issue: Is the Filipino spouse legally capacitated to re-marry after the Filipino other half is naturalized as a foreign
citizen and later on obtained a valid divorce decree?

Held: Yes. The Court ruled that taking into account the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code should be interpreted to include cases involving parties, who at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as
a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to re-marry as if
the other party was a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

The Court further stressed that the naturalization of the other spouse and the foreign divorce decree must be
proven. Thus, the party pleading such decree must prove the divorce law as a fact and demonstrate its conformity
to the foreign law allowing it. Likewise, it must be shown that the divorce decree allows the former spouse to
re-marry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that
he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, the Court cannot
declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had

8
 obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such
declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the afore-cited evidence in his favor.
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32. Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.

G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

Facts: Petitioner Corpus was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization.
He returned to the Philippines and got married to Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. Soon after the wedding, he left for
Canada in view of his work and other professional commitments. When he came home, he was shocked to
discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. He then went back to Canada and filed a petition
for divorce which was granted forthwith by the court.

Desirous to marry another Filipina he now loved, Corpus returned to the Philippines and registered the divorce
decree on his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas in the civil registry. Thereupon, he was informed that his
marriage with Sto. Tomas still subsists under Philippine law, and for the foreign divorce decree to be enforceable,
it must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court. Hence, Corpus filed for judicial recognition
of foreign divorce and declaration of marriage as dissolved. However, the trial denied the petition on the basis
that petitioner Corpus lacked locus standi, ratiocinating that the petitioner was not the proper party to institute
such action as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy,
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry under
Philippine law.

Issue: Does the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extend to aliens the right to petition a Philippine
court for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree?

Held: No. Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the 2nd paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, the Court declared that the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the 2nd paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code thereby giving the alien spouse no right to claim under this provision.

Nevertheless, the Court clarified that the unavailability of the afore-cited provision of the Family Code to aliens
does not necessarily strip the petitioner Corpus of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s
national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right
in favor of the petitioner, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of
foreign judgments. Simply stated, such authenticity and conformity need to be proved by the petitioner, but in
the case at bar, Corpus failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce to be attached to his petition.
Thus, the Court ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with its
ruling.
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33. Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.

G.R. No. 196409, June 26, 2013

Facts: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Marinay in the
Philippines. Since Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan for some reasons, they eventually lost contact with
each other. Later on, Marinay and another Japanese, Maekera tied the knot without the first marriage being
dissolved. Maekera then brought Marinay to Japan, but Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekera. She thus left Maekera and started to contact Fujiki, and they were able to reestablish their relationship
when they met in Japan. Subsequently, Marinay with the help of Fujiki, was able to obtain a judgment from
Japan’s family court which declared the marriage between her and Maekera void on the ground of bigamy.

9
 Upon coming to the Philippines, Fujiki filed with the RTC a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
the subsequent marriage between his spouse and Maekera on the ground of bigamy. However, the trial court
dismissed the petition on the basis that the same was in “gross violation” of Sec. 2(a) in relation to Sec. 5(4) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, apparently implying that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or
Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.

Issue: Does Fujiki being the first husband has the personality to file a petition to recognize the divorce decree
obtained abroad?

Held: Yes, Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court’s judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. He can also file a petition under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry
on the basis of such foreign decree.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is
therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. In one case, the Court ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the
aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of
the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse." Being a real party in
interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can
petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact
that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to
cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

In its previous rulings in other cases, the Court held that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country, and the rule therein that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.”
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34. Medina v. Koike, et al.

G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016

Facts: Doreen Medina and a Japanese national Michiyuki Koike were married in the Philippines. After 7 years
of marital union, the couple jointly filed for divorce in Japan pursuant to the laws of that country. Immediately
thereafter, the divorce was granted and a Certificate of Divorce was issued in their favor. Subsequently, Medina
filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to the
2nd paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code before the RTC. The trial court denied the petition, ruling that
in an action for recognition of foreign divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, the foreign
divorce decree and the national law of the alien recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce must be
proven, but Medina fell short of proving the national law of her husband, particularly the existence of the law
on divorce.

Issue: Can a divorce decree obtained by the Filipino and Japanese couple be recognized by RTC under paragraph
2 of Article 26 of the Family Code?

Yes, paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect
of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
the marriage. Jurisprudence, however, has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country. Presentation
solely of the divorce decree will not suffice. The foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven as facts. In this regard, the Court stressed that
it is not a trier of facts. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on
these matters are received with respect and are in fact binding subject to certain exceptions. In this regard, it is

10
 settled that appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals
in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

In the present case, Medina filed the petition directly with this Court (SC) for review of RTC ruling under Rule
45. Thus, the Court referred the case to The Court of Appeals for appropriate action with the end in view of
determining and resolving the pertinent factual issues.
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35. Republic v. Manalo

G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018

Facts: Marelyn Manalo, a Filipina was married to a Japanese national, Minoru Yoshino in the Philippines. While
living in Japan, Manalo initiated a divorce proceeding and obtained a favorable judgment against her alien
spouse. Upon her return in the Philippines, Manalo filed a petition for recognition of foreign divorce decree with
the RTC, but the OSG opposed the petition as it was the Filipina spouse who initiated the proceeding to obtain
the divorce decree and not the alien spouse. The RTC then denied the petition which was subsequently reversed
by the CA as it recognized the foreign divorce and ruled that Manalo had the right to remarry.

Issue: Can a divorce decree initiated and obtained abroad by a Filipino spouse be recognized by Philippine
courts under paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Court?

Held: Yes. In affirming the CA’s decision, the Court ruled that a validly obtained foreign divorce initiated by
the Filipino spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines. Accordingly, Article 26 (2) of
the Family Code only requires that there be a valid marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
and a divorce has been validly obtained abroad. It “does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who
initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino
spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an
alien-initiated proceeding.”

Nonetheless, jurisprudence requires that the fact of divorce must still first be proven before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our courts, and the proper party must demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it. Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating
it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Thus, the Court ordered the remand
of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese
law on divorce.
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36. Juego-Sakai v. Republic

G.R. No. 224015, July 23, 2018

37. Capili v. People, et al.

G.R. No. 183850, July3, 2013

38. Cariño v. Cariño

G.R. No. 132529, February 2, 2001

Facts: During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two marriages, the first with Susan Nicdao
Carino with whom he had two offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee) and with Susan Yee Carino with whom he had no
children in their almost ten year cohabitation. In 1988, Santiago passed away under the care of Susan Yee who

11
 spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and
financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Nicdao was able to collect a
total of P146,000.00 and Yee received a total of P21,000.00. Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money
against Nicdao, contending that the marriage of the latter with Santiago is void ab initio because their marriage
was solemnized without the required marriage license. The trial court ruled in favor of Yee, ordering Nicdao to
pay Yee half of acquired death benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao is void for lack of marriage license.

Held: Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of Nicdao and Carino was solemnized
in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions,
renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, the marriage does not fall within any of those exceptions
and a marriage license therefore was indispensable to the validity of it. This fact is certified by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila. Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of Nicdao and
Carino has been sufficiently overcome and cannot stand. The marriage of Yee and Carino is void ab initio as
well for lack of judicial decree of nullity of marriage of Carino and Nicdao at the time it was contracted. The
marriages are bigamous; under Article 148 of the Family Code, properties acquired by the parties through their
actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. The decision of the trial court and Court of Appeals
is affirmed.
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39. Quiazon, et al. v. Belen, et al.

G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45. Republic v. Sareñogon Jr.
G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016

Facts: Sarenogon filed a petition before the RTC to declare the presumptive death of his wife Netchie. He
testified that they got married and lived together as husband and wife for a month only because he left to work
as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For 3 months, he did not receive any
communication from Netchie and had no idea about her whereabouts. While still abroad, he tried to contact
Netchie’s parents, bu t failed. He returned home after his contract expired, then inquired from Netchie’s relatives
and friends about her whereabouts. They also did not know where she was. Because of these, he had to presume
that his wife Netchie was already dead. He filed the Petition before the RTC so he could contract another
marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code. Jose’s testimony was corroborated by his older brother, and
by Netchie’s aunt. These two witnesses testified that Jose and Netchie lived together as husband and wife only
for one month prior to their leaving the Philippines for separate destinations abroad and added that they had no
information regarding Netchie’s location. The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared for more than four years,
reason enough for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed already dead. The OSG questioned the RTC ruling
via Rule 65 before the CA for the RTC’s error in its misappreciation of evidence. The CA saw no error in the
RTC judgment and further held that Rule 65 is the wrong recourse in elevating a declaration of presumptive
death judgment from the RTC.

Issue: W/N the “well-founded belief” requisite under Article 41 (FC) was complied with (CIVIL LAW)

Held: No. To comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of
diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and
inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of

12
 active effort. In this case, Sarenogon failed to satisfy required “well-founded belief” standard. Sarenogon’s
pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie are notches below the required degree of stringent
diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he had inquired from alleged friends
and relatives as to Netchie’s whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific individuals or persons
whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did
he prove that he sought the assistance of the pertinent government agencies as well as the media. Nor did he
show that he undertook a thorough, determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and
what those years were), and naming the particular places, provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that he
visited, or went to, and identifying the specific persons he interviewed or talked to in the course of his search.
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46. Republic v. Villanueva

G.R. No. 210929, July 29, 2015

Facts: Edna worked as a domestic helper in Singapore in 1992 while her husband worked as a mechanic in
Valencia, Bukidnon. The two got married on December 21, 1978, in Iligan City. While she was in
Singapore(1993) , her children informed her that her husband left their home without telling them his
whereabouts. Due to this news, she was prompted to go back to the Philippines to look and find his husband.
Edna searched and made inquiries about her husband thru their common friends, and parents-in-law in Iligan
and Valencia City and even went far as to his birthplace in Negros Oriental. 15 years later she filed to the RTC
a petition to declare Romeo presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code. During the trial, she was
presented as the lone witness. RTC grants her petition. The OSG thru a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court questioned the decision of the RTC on the ground that the conclusions reached by the RTC
were in direct opposition to established jurisprudence, as ruled by the Court in Republic v. Nolasco, and U.S. v.
Biasbas. CA dismissed the OSG’s petition.

Issue: Whether or not the strict standard approach were followed by Edna before she filed a petition for
declaration of presumptive death of her husband.

Held: NO. Edna claimed that she made diligent search and inquiries to find her husband but it was found out
that it was all consisted of bare assertions without any corroborative evidence on record. Edna did not present
additional witnesses (her children, their common friends, parents-in-law) but herself alone. There was not even
any attempt to seek the aid of the authorities at the time her husband disappeared. Therefore, The petition of
respondent Edna Orcelino-Villanueva to have her husband declared presumptively dead is DENIED
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47. Santos v. Santos

G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014

Facts: On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina)
presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition for
declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007. Ricardo remarried
on September 17, 2008. Ricardo alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. He went to Celerina's parents
in Cubao, Quezon City, but they did not know their daughter's whereabouts. He also inquired about her from
other relatives and friends, but no one gave him any information. Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years
from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition since Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away.
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008 when she could no
longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies. On November
17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived her day in court when Ricardo, despite
his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac City. According
to Celerina, her true residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City. This residence
had been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008. As a result of Ricardo's

13
misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition declaring her
presumptively dead. Celerina claimed that all the allegations of Ricardo were fraudulent, that she never resided
in Tarlac and never left to work as a domestic helper abroad. Further, she also claimed that it was not true that
she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she never left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City.
It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another woman. Celerina referred to a joint
affidavit executed by their children to support her contention that Ricardo made false allegations in his petition.
Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it had never been
published in a newspaper. She added that the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's
Office were not furnished copies of Ricardo's petition. The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated
November 28, 2008, dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of
remedy. According to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil
registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code. Celerina filed a motion
for reconsideration but the same was denied.

Issue: Whether or not Court of Appelas erred in dismissing Celerina’s petition on the ground that the proper
remedy is to file a sworn statement before the civil registry declaring her reappearance as stated in Article 42 of
the Family Code.

Held: Yes. Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution
has become final, and the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner. The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction. The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain admissions,
presumptions, and conditions. The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four
consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already
dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the subsistence of another marriage.

When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a presumption
arises that the first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is legal. This presumption should prevail
over the continuance of the marital relations with the first spouse. The second marriage, as with all marriages, is
presumed valid. The burden of proof to show that the first marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the
person assailing the validity of the second marriage. The choice of the proper remedy is also important for
purposes of determining the status of the second marriage and the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith,
claimed that the other spouse was absent. The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to
effect the termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was declared presumptively
dead from availing other remedies existing in law. This court had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent marriage
may also be terminated by filing "an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a
declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage. Celerina seeks not merely the termination
of the subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not a
sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the
declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage. Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed
subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until terminated, the "children of such marriage
shall be considered legitimate, and the property relations of the spouses in such marriage will be the same as in
valid marriages. If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived
before the termination shall still be considered legitimate. Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is
a defense against prosecution for bigamy. However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages may be filed solely by the husband or wife." This means that even if Celerina is a real party in interest
who stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the second marriage, this remedy is
not available to her. Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of
nullifying the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an
affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice to file an action for annulment of judgment will,
therefore, lie.
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14
48. Almelor v. RTC-Las Piñas
G.R. No. 79620, August 26, 2008

Facts: Manuel married Leonida in 1989. They are both medical practitioners. They begot 3 children. 11 years
later, Leonida sought to annul her marriage with Manuel claiming that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated
to perform the essential marital obligations. Leonida testified that Manuel is a harsh disciplinarian and that his
policy towards their children are often unconventional and was the cause of their frequent fight. Manuel has an
unreasonable way of imposing discipline towards their children but is remarkably so gentle towards his mom.
He is more affectionate towards his mom and this is a factor which is unreasonable for Leonida. Further, Leonida
also testified that Manuel is a homosexual as evidenced by his unusual closeness to his male companions and
that he concealed his homosexuality from Leonida prior to their marriage. She once caught Manuel talking to a
man affectionately over the phone and she confirmed all her fear when she saw Manuel kiss a man. The RTC
ruled that their marriage is null
and void not because of PI but rather due to fraud by reason of Manuel’s concealment of his homosexuality (Art
45 of the FC). The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due to fraud by reason of
Manuel’s concealment of his homosexuality.

Held: The SC emphasized that homosexuality per se is not a ground to nullify a marriage. It is the concealment
of homosexuality that would. In the case at bar however, it is not proven that Manuel is a homosexual. The lower
court should not have taken the public’s perception against Manuel’s sexuality. His peculiarities must not be
ruled by the lower court as an indication of his homosexuality for those are not conclusive and are not sufficient
enough to prove so. Even granting that Manuel is indeed a homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint or
anywhere in the case was it alleged and proven that Manuel hid such sexuality from Leonida and that Leonida’s
consent had been vitiated by such.
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49. Bugayong v. Ginez

G.R. L-10033, December 28, 1956

Facts: This is a case for legal separation filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan wherein on motion of
the defendant, the case was dismissed. The order of dismissal was appealed to the Court of Appeals, but said
Tribunal certified the case to the Court on the ground that there is absolutely no question of fact involved.

Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the U.S. Navy, was married to defendant Leonila Ginez on August 27,
1949 while on furlough leave. Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived with his sisters in Sampaloc,
Manila. After some time, or about July, 1951, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed
her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan, from which place she
later moved to Dagupan City to study in a local college there.

Benjamin received several information from different people about his wife’s infidelity. This prompted him to
go home and confront his wife. They stayed together in his cousin’s house as husband and wife for a few days.
Instead of answering his questions, she left which made him assume that it was an admission of guilt. He filed
for legal separation on the ground of adultery.

Issue: Whether or not his assumption of his wife’s guilt is enough basis for a legal separation to be granted.

Held: Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation or
“conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has
committed”.

15
 The act of the latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him to the house
of his cousin and slept as husband and wife for one day and two nights; these facts show reconciliation between
them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred
almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.

Although no acts of infidelity might have been committed by the wife, the conduct of the husband despite his
belief that his wife was unfaithful, deprives him of the right of any action for legal separation against the
offending wife, because his said conduct comes within the restriction of Article 100 of the Civil Code.
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50.
51.
52.
53.

16