ARTICLE VI

THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

SECTION 1

A. NON-DELEGABILITY

1. Rubi v. Provincial Board, No. 14078, March 7, 1919

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: In general, it is a maxim of constitutional law that delegation of legislative power is
forbidden. An exception to the general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to
delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to make
the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comrs. Clinton County
[1852], 1 Ohio St., 88). The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." In this case, the Supreme
Court characterized the delegation as one stemming from necessity – the section in the Administrative Code allowed
provincial governors, with the approval of the provincial board and the Secretary of the Interior to direct Manguianes to live
in areas they deem favorable to their improvement. The Supreme Court rhetorically asked who would be better equipped
to select such sites than the provincial governor with the approval of the provincial board and Secretary of the Interior.

Nature of the case: Habeas Corpus

F: The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes to take up their habitation
in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board.
The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the
Secretary of the Interior as required by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the
Administrative Code.

I: Whether or not section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 was a valid delegation of legislative power by the
legislature to the provincial governor, provincial board and Department Head?

H: YES

R: That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously protected, we
agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not been violated in this instance. The rule has
nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney: "The true distinction therefore is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."
Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed
by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or
subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U. S. vs.
Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the
case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of section 2145 of the
Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the
provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"?
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the general rule,
sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities.
The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial
governor and the provincial board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better
qualified to judge "when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order ?" As officials charged with
the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which
have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine
Legislature to provincial officials and a department head.

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 2. Pelaez v. Auditor General, No. L-23825, December 24, 1965

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in
the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential that said law: (a) be complete in itself,
setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard—the
limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable—to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, insofar as it grants to the President the power to create
municipalities, does not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the
enforcement of a law. The creation of municipalities is not an administrative function, but one that is essentially
and eminently legislative in character. The question of whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of such
power is not one of fact. It is "purely a legislative question.”

Nature of the case: Taxpayer’s suit; Special Civil Action; Writ of Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction

F: During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1064 the President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos, 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating
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thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964
petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil
action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his
representatives and agents from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive
orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void,
upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power.

I: Whether or not Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code is an undue delegation of legislative power?

H: YES

R: The power to fix common boundaries, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining
municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature—involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry
into effect the law creating said municipalities. However, the authority to create municipal corporations is
essentially legislative in nature; in the language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" or "solely
and exclusively the exercise of legislative power." As the Supreme Court of Washington has put it "municipal corporations
are purely the creatures of statutes."
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential that said law: (a) be complete in itself, setting forth therein
the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fix a standard—the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable—to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, insofar as it grants to the President the power to create
municipalities, does not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the
enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. If the validity of
said delegation of powers made in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, were upheld there would no longer be
any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be
required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of
Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total collapse of the democratic system established by the
Constitution.
It is true that in Calalang vs. WiIliams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had
upheld "public welfare" and "public interest," respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority to
execute the law. But the doctrine laid down in these cases must be construed in relation to the specific facts and issues
involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute precedents and have no binding effect. Both cases involved
grants to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the
determination of questions of fact. Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code. The creation of municipalities being essentially and eminently legislative in character, the question
whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. It is purely a legislative question or
a political question.
The fact that Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 128 to 129, creating thirty-three municipalities, were
issued after the legislative bills for the creation of the said municipalities had failed to pass Congress, is the best proof that
their issuance entails the exercise of purely legislative functions.

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 3. Cebu Oxygen v. Drilon, G.R. No. 82849, August 2, 1989

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: It is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of
law it is designed to implement. The provisions of Republic Act No. 6640, do not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary
wage increases for purposes of compliance with Republic Act No. 6640. The implementing rules cannot provide for such a
prohibition not contemplated by the law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its
general provisions. The law itself cannot be expanded by such regulations. An administrative agency cannot amend an
act of Congress.

Nature of the case:

F: A provision in the CBA between petitioner and the union provided that the pay increase given under that CBA would be
credited to any mandatory government wage adjustment. On December 14, 1987, Republic Act No. 6640 was passed
increasing the minimum wage. The Secretary of Labor issued the pertinent rules to implement R.A. 6650. Section 8 of the
implementing rules prohibits the employer from crediting anniversary wage increases negotiated under a collective
bargaining agreement against such wage increases mandated by Republic Act No. 6640. Pursuant thereto, the Assistant
Regional Director ordered petitioner to pay the deficiency of P200.00 in the monthly salary and P231.00 in the 13th month
pay of its employees for the period stated. Petitioner protested the Order of the Regional Director on the ground that the
anniversary wage increases under the CBA can be credited against the wage increase mandated by Republic Act No.
6640. Hence, petitioner contended that inasmuch as it had credited the first year increase negotiated under the CBA, it
was liable only for a salary differential of P62.00 and a 13th month pay differential of P31.00. Petitioner argued that the
payment of the differentials constitutes full compliance with Republic Act No. 6640. Apparently, the protest was not
entertained. The thrust of the argument of petitioner is that Section 8 of the rules implementing the provisions of Republic
Act No. 6640 particularly the provision excluding anniversary wage increases from being credited to the wage increase
provided by said law is null and void on the ground that the same unduly expands the provisions of the said law.

I: Whether or not an Implementing Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) can provide for a prohibition
not contemplated by the law it seeks to implement?

H: No

R: It is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of law it is designed to
implement. The provisions of Republic Act No. 6640, do not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary wage increases for
purposes of compliance with Republic Act No. 6640. The implementing rules cannot provide for such a prohibition not
contemplated by the law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must
be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general
provisions. The law itself cannot be expanded by such regulations. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of
Congress. Thus petitioner’s contention that the salary increases granted by it pursuant to the existing CBA including
anniversary wage the wage increase mandated by Republic Act No. 6640, is correct. However, the amount that should
only be credited to petitioner is the wage increase for 1987 under the CBA when the law took effect. The wage increase
for 1986 had already accrued in favor of the employees even before the said law was enacted. Petitioner therefor
correctly credited its employees P62.00 for the differential of two (2) months increase and P31.00 each for the differential
in 13th month pay, after deducting the P200.00 anniversary wage increase for 1987 under the CBA.
Indeed, it is stipulated in the CBA that in case any wage adjustment or allowance increase decreed by law, legislation or
presidential edict in any particular year shall be higher than the foregoing increase in that particular year, then the
company (petitioner) shall pay the difference

4. Chiongbian v. Orgos, G.R. No. 96754, June 22, 1995

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal
boundaries which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor General as “administrative in nature.” There is, therefore, no
abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions.
With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy
underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit: “to
promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national
goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public
business.”

Nature of the case: special civil action certiorari and prohibition; constitutionality
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F: These suits challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(R.A. 6734), authorizing the President of the Philippines to “merge” by administrative determination the regions remaining
after the establishment of the Autonomous Region, and the Executive Order issued by the President pursuant to such
authority, “Providing for the Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanao.” In accordance with the constitutional
provision, provinces that vote in favor of creating an autonomous region by plebiscite become the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, while those that do not may remain in existing administrative regions subject to President’s prerogative
to merge the existing regions.

I: Whether or not the president R.A. 6734 is unconstitutional by unduly delegating legislative power to the President by
authorizing him to merge the existing regions and provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated?

H: No

R: As this Court observed in Abbas, “while the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the
Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of
general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, §4 of the Constitution].” The regions themselves are not territorial
and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are “mere groupings of contiguous
provinces for administrative purposes.” The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust
municipal boundaries which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor General as “administrative in nature.” There
is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the power to merge
administrative regions. The question is whether Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which the President is to
be guided in the exercise of the power granted and whether in any event the grant of power to him is included in the
subject expressed in the title of the law.
First, the question of standard. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or
implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as
that of the challenged legislation.
With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy
underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit: “to
promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national
goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public
business.” Indeed, as the original eleven administrative regions were established in accordance with this policy, it is
logical to suppose that in authorizing the President to “merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions” in
view of the withdrawal from some of those regions of the provinces now constituting the Autonomous Region, the purpose
of Congress was to reconstitute the original basis for the organization of administrative regions.
The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than a redefinition or redrawing of the lines separating
administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by the
President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services. There will be no “transfer” of local governments from
one region to another except as they may thus be regrouped so that a province like Lanao del Norte, which is at present
part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX. The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a
redistricting or to the division or merger of local governments, which all have political consequences on the right of people
residing in those political units to vote and to be voted for. It cannot be overemphasized that administrative regions are
mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not for political representation.

5. U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, No. 17122, February 27, 1922

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: "The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate
a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action to
depend." no state or nation, living under a republican form of government, under the terms and conditions specified in Act
No. 2868, has ever enacted a law delegating the power to any one, to fix the price at which rice should be sold. That
power can never be delegated under a republican form of government.

Nature of the case: criminal case

F: At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly
and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution
and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary
rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose." On August 1, 1919, the Governor-General
issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an
excessive price than that allowed by the Governor-General’s proclamation.
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 The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-
General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with
the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to
issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very
terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General.
The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General
shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for any cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any
cause" to the discretion of the Governor-General.

I: Whether or not Act No. 2868, which authorizes the Governor-general to issue a proclamation fixing the price of rice and
to make selling rice above said price a crime is constitutional?

H: No

R: In so far as Act No. 2868 undertakes to authorize the Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a proclamation fixing
the price of rice and to make the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a crime, it is unconstitutional and void.
It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary
rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say, the
Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgment
and discretion of the Governor- General to say what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an
extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying out
the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing
the minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a
criminal. There may not have been any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have
been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is
sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime. Act No. 2868 is nothing more than a floating law, which, in the
discretion and by a proclamation of the Governor-General, makes it a floating crime to sell rice at a price in excess of the
proclamation, without regard to grade or quality.
The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself and within
itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry it into
effect, then the Legislature created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the act
within itself does not define a crime and is not complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a
crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, the act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional
and void.
After the passage of Act No. 2868, and without any rules and regulations of the Governor-General, a dealer in rice
could sell it at, any price and he would not commit a crime. There was no legislative act which made it a crime to sell rice
at any price. When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the Proclamatlon of the Governor-General which
constitutes the crime. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because of the Proclamation by the Governor-General.
By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States, all powers are vested in the
Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute; and of
the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law; the Executive has no
authority to make or construe the law; and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law.

6. Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No. 102782, December 11, 1991

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular
requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations. According to
Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be
unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. A careful study of the Gonong decision will show
that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The
pertinent law is PD 1605. PD1605 does not allow either the removal of the license plates or the confiscation of driver’s
licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila.

F: In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic Distict v. Gonong, the Supreme Court held that the confiscation of the
license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro
Manila Commission under P.D. 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the case of
stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that even the confiscation of driver’s licenses for
traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the
Commission. Subsequently, several letters and complaints were received by the Court related to confiscation of driver’s
licenses and license plates. Those who confiscated the licenses and/or plates cited municipal ordinances as the source of
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their authority. While these cases were pending, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of
1991 authorizing itself to “to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles
illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.” The Court issued a resolution stating that the provision
appeared to be in conflict with the Metropolitan Traffic Comand v. Gonong case and ordered the Metropolitan Manila
Authority to file their comments.
In its Comment, the Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted
pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392, It particularly cited Section 2 thereof vesting in the Council (its
governing body) the responsibility among others of:
1. 1.Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination or consolidation for the Authority;
and
2. 2.Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide application, approval of a code of basic
services requiring coordination, and exercise of its rule-making powers. (Emphasis supplied)
The Authority argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance because the latter was meant
to supplement and not supplant the latter. It stressed that the decision itself said that the confiscation of license plates was
invalid in the absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted. The Authority also
pointed out that the ordinance could not be attacked collaterally but only in a direct action challenging its validity.
For his part, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an
invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD
1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver’s
licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.

I: Whether or not the exercise of delegated power in this case was valid?

H: NO

R: The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that the
requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are: 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation;
and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard. Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in
all its terms and provisions such that all the delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it. What
only can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law shall be but the discretion to determine how the law
shall be enforced. This has been done in the case at bar. As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only
in accordance with a sufficient standard, the function of which is to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and
thus “prevent the delegation from running riot.” This requirement has also been met. It is settled that the “convenience and
welfare” of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at bar, is an acceptable sufficient standard to
delimit the delegate’s authority.
But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question we must resolve
is the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature.
Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts
in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted
principles governing municipal corporations.
According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2)
must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5)
must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. A careful study of the Gonong
decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to
existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD1605 does not allow either the removal of the license plates or the
confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila.
The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions
are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that
the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere
agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local
government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the
enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect
of a statute.

7. People v. Dacuycuy, G.R. No. 45127, May 5, 1989

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have
been provided by the legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the
length of service of a term of imprisonment that must be encompassed within specific or designated limits provided by
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law. The absence of designated limits will constitute an undue delegation, if not an outright intrusion into or assumption, of
legislative power. Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither
a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority. The courts are thus given too much
latitude in its discretion to fix the term of imprisonment. Without the benefit of any sufficient standard, a judge may be
allowed to fix the duration within the range of one minute to the life span of the accused. Thus, Section 32 of the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers was declared unconstitutional (without prejudice to other constitutional provisions).

Nature of the case: criminal case

F: Private respondents were charged for violating Republic Act No. 4670 otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers. Private respondents alleged, among others, that Section 32 of said law, is unconstitutional as it
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the
discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative department of the Government. The disputed section of Republic
Act No. 4670 provides:
___
“Sec. 32. Penal Provision. A person who shall willfully interfere with, restrain or coerce any teacher in the exercise of
his rights guaranteed by this Act or who shall in any other manner commit any act to defeat any of the provisions of this
Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand
pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.” (Italics supplied).”

I: Whether or not a law that gives the court the discretion to impose a sentence of imprisonment without limits is a valid
delegation of legislative power?

H: NO

R: An apparent exception to the general rule forbidding the delegation of legislative authority to the courts exists in cases
where discretion is conferred upon said courts. It is clear, however, that when the courts are to exercise discretion, it must
be a mere legal discretion, which is exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law and which, when discerned, it is
the duty of the court to follow. So it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States that the principle of separation of
powers is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to the length of sentence or the amount of fine between
designated limits in sentencing persons convicted of a crime.
In the case under consideration, the respondent judge erronneously assumed that since the penalty of imprisonment
has been provided for by the legislature, the court is endowed with the discretion to ascertain the term or period of
imprisonment. We cannot agree with this postulate. It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points
of reference have been provided by the legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of
discretion to fix the length of service of a term of imprisonment which must be encompassed within specific or designated
limits provided by law, the absence of which designated limits will constitute such exercise as an undue delegation, if not
an outright intrusion into or assumption, of legislative power.
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither a minimum
nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide latitude of
discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without even the benefit of any sufficient standard, such that the duration
thereof may range, in the words of respondent judge, from one minute to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this
cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as applied to this
case, does violence to the rules on separation of powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative powers. This time,
the presumption of constitutionality has to yield. On the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the separability clause
in Section 34 of Republic Act No. 4670, the penalty of imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof should be, as it is
hereby, declared unconstitutional.

8. Abakada v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what
job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority. While the power to tax cannot be delegated to
executive agencies, details as to the enforcement and administration of an exercise of such power may be left to them,
including the power to determine the existence of facts on which its operation depends. The case before the Court is not a
delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and
administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate
effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of
the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No discretion would be exercised by the
President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word shall is used in the common proviso, which
connotes a mandatory order. Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the
existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. In the present case, in making his recommendation to the
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President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is acting as the agent of the legislative
department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance
becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all
the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them.

F: This is a consolidation of several petitions that assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9334 or the VAT Reform
Act. One of their contentions centered on the provision that allowed the President to raise the VAT rate to 12% from 10%
if certain conditions are met. The petitioners allege that such provision constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power and constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes.
SEC. 106. Value-Added Tax on Sale of Goods or Properties.—
(A) Rate and Base of Tax.—There shall be levied, assessed and collected on every sale, barter or exchange of goods or
properties, a value-added tax equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the gross selling price or gross value in money of the
goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged, such tax to be paid by the seller or transferor: provided, that the
President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of
value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied. (i)value-added
tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth
percent (2 4/5%) or(ii)national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
one-half percent (1 ½%).

I: Whether or not giving the President stand-by authority to raise the VAT rate from 10% to 12% when a certain condition
is met constitutes undue delegation of the legislative power to tax?

H: No

R: With respect to the Legislature, Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that “the Legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” The powers
which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative.
Purely legislative power, which can never be delegated, has been described as the authority to make a complete
law—complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable—and to determine the
expediency of its enactment. Thus, the rule is that in order that a court may be justified in holding a statute
unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power, it must appear that the power involved is purely legislative in
nature—that is, one appertaining exclusively to the legislative department. It is the nature of the power, and not the liability
of its use or the manner of its exercise, which determines the validity of its delegation. Nonetheless, the general rule
barring delegation of legislative powers is subject to the following recognized limitations or exceptions: (1) Delegation of
tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution; (2) Delegation of emergency powers to
the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution; (3) Delegation to the people at large; (4) Delegation to
local governments; and (5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if
the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate;
and (b) fixes a standard—the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable—to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits,
maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the
delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
The legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies the power to determine certain facts or conditions, or
the happening of contingencies, on which the operation of a statute is, by its terms, made to depend, but the legislature
must prescribe sufficient standards, policies or limitations on their authority. While the power to tax cannot be
delegated to executive agencies, details as to the enforcement and administration of an exercise of such power
may be left to them, including the power to determine the existence of facts on which its operation depends. The
rationale for this is that the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for the enactment of legislation is not of itself a
legislative function, but is simply ancillary to legislation. Thus, the duty of correlating information and making
recommendations is the kind of subsidiary activity which the legislature may perform through its members, or which it may
delegate to others to perform. Intelligent legislation on the complicated problems of modern society is impossible in the
absence of accurate information on the part of the legislators, and any reasonable method of securing such information is
proper. The Constitution as a continuously operative charter of government does not require that Congress find for itself
every fact upon which it desires to base legislative action or that it make for itself detailed determinations which it has
declared to be prerequisite to application of legislative policy to particular facts and circumstances impossible for
Congress itself properly to investigate.
The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of
facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has
made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the
! 8!
entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No
discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word shall is
used in the common proviso. The use of the word shall connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an
imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be
taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed. Thus, it is the
ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified
by Congress. This is a duty which cannot be evaded by the President. Inasmuch as the law specifically uses the
word shall, the exercise of discretion by the President does not come into play. It is a clear directive to impose the 12%
VAT rate when the specified conditions are present. The time of taking into effect of the 12% VAT rate is based on the
happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or body
other than the legislature itself.
In the present case, in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two
conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. In such
instance, he is not subject to the power of control and direction of the President. He is acting as the agent of the legislative
department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance
becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all
the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is
to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by
Congress is present. His personality in such instance is in reality but a projection of that of Congress. Thus, being the
agent of Congress and not of the President, the President cannot alter or modify or nullify, or set aside the findings of the
Secretary of Finance and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Congress simply granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact, namely,
whether by December 31, 2005, the value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%) or the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of
the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 1/2%). If either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary
of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President. Then the 12% VAT rate must be
imposed by the President effective January 1, 2006. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the
discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions
or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority;
in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
As to the argument of petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al. that delegating to the President the legislative power
to tax is contrary to the principle of republicanism, the same deserves scant consideration. Congress did not delegate the
power to tax but the mere implementation of the law. The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from
Congress and the task of the President is to simply execute the legislative policy. That Congress chose to do so in such a
manner is not within the province of the Court to inquire into, its task being to interpret the law.

9. Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: As to the legislators’ PDAF - Legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the
power of appropriation, which — as settled in Philconsa— is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must
be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. To understand what
constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor (Bengzon), held that
the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a
specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund
from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that
they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in
Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said
legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with
the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as
unconstitutional. As to the President’s PDAF - Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with
respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.

Nature of the case:

F: In the Philippines, “Pork Barrel” has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the
Legislature although, as will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive.
While the term “Pork Barrel” has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of Congress,
! 9!
the present cases and the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the term’s usage has expanded
to include certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund. Recently, or in
July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that “the government
has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of
96
lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects.” The investigation was spawned by sworn
affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation — “JLN” standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles)
— had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for “ghost projects” using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an
entire decade. While the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared that
the money was diverted into Napoles’ private accounts. Criminal complaints were filed. As for the “Presidential Pork
Barrel”, whistle-blowers alleged that “[a]t least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project
off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy [NGO].”

Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions were
lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the “Pork Barrel System” be declared unconstitutional.

I: Whether or not PDAF violates the principle of non-delegability of legislative power?

H: YES

R: In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification
authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation, which — as settled in Philconsa— is lodged in Congress. That the
power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which states that: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.” To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and
Insular Auditor (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain
sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators
are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go
to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise
of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual
legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the
Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court
hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar
legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
The Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay
down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the purpose for
which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public
funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the government” under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the
general word or phrase is to be construed to include — or be restricted to — things akin to, resembling, or of the same
kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government”states a singular and general class and hence,
cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase “for such other purposes” may
be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development programs of the
government; and, third, the Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related
purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited only to “energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government.” Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may
have passed the completeness test since the policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase
“and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under the same provision of law should
nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the
delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of
the Malampaya Funds “to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government,” remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned
phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used — as it should be used — only in accordance with
the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.

SECTION 3

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A. IMPOSITION OF OTHER QUALIFICATIONS

10. Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: The COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in
addition to what the Constitution prescribes. In this case, COMELEC rules required candidates for public office to submit
to a drug-test and be certified ‘drug-free.’ The Supreme Court declared the same an additional qualification that violates
the Constitution, which enumerates the exclusive list of qualifications for senators.

Nature of the case: election law

F: In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue. In essence,
Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional
qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate
for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2)
voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for
senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the
Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard,
7
evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

I: Whether or not requiring candidates for senators to be certified as ‘drug-free’ to run for and serve as senator is
constitutional?

H: NO

R: The COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations
to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution
prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be
sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to
be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in
the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be
certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like
effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of
his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum,
requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be
hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume
office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.

11. Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION:

Nature of the case:

F: Petitioners assail R.A. No. 7854, entitled, “An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to
be known as the City of Makati” alleging, specifically Section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter
provides:
“SEC. 52. Legislative Districts.—Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at leasttwo
(2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic
Act No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at the next national elections to be held after
the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmariñas, and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu
of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second district.” (italics supplied)

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 6
They contend that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment cannot
7
be made by a special law; (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of the bill; and (3) Makati’s
population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).

I: Whether or not Congress may enact a special law that reapportions the number of legislative districts a city is entitled to
represent in the House of Representatives? Whether or not Congress must reapportion ALL legislative districts
comprehensively and in one action under Section 5(4) of Article VI of the Constitution in order for reapportionment to be
valid?

H: YES; NO

R: These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. In said case, we ruled that reapportionment
of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly
provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by
law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other
than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing
for an increase in Makati’s legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general
apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would
create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative
representation for an indeterminate period of time. That intolerable situation will deprive the people of a new city or
province a particle of their sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be
forever whole or it is not sovereignty. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population
requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000).

12. Montejo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION:

Nature of the case: COMELEC does not have the power of legislative reapportionment. It may only make minor
adjustments of reapportionment, which do not entail a change in the allocations of the districts or any other substantial
change. Thus, the COMELEC Resolution that transferred one municipality to a different legislative district was declared
null and void.

F: Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of Section 1 of
Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in
Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation.

I: Whether or not COMELEC has the power of legislative reapportionment?

H: NO

R: The basic powers of respondent COMELEC, as enforcer and administrator of our election laws, are spelled out in black
and white in Section 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution. Rightly, respondent COMELEC does not invoke this provision but
relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally
regarded as part of the power to make laws. The Ordinance is entitled “Apportioning the Seats of the House of
Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines to the Different Legislative Districts in Provinces and Cities and the
Metropolitan Manila Area.”
Clearly then, the Constitutional Commission denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative apportionment as
it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC “to make minor adjustments of
the reapportionment herein made.” Consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, Section 3 of the
Ordinance did not give COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district.
The power granted by Section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities)
“apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created . . .”
Examples of minor adjustments were illustrated by Mr. Davide during the Constitutional Commission debates: “Minor,
meaning, that there should be no change in the allocations per district. However, it may happen that we have forgotten a
municipality in between, which is still in the territory of one assigned district, or there may be an error in the correct name
of a particular municipality because of changes made by the interim Batasang Pambansa and the Regular Batasang
Pambansa. There were many batas pambansa enacted by both the interim and the Regular Batasang Pambansa
changing the names of municipalities”
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 Prescinding from these premises, we hold that respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated Section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736 transferring the municipality of
Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.
It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought about an imbalance in the
distribution of voters and inhabitants in the five (5) legislative districts of the province of Leyte. This imbalance, depending
on its degree, could devalue a citizen’s vote in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Be that as it
may, it is not proper at this time for petitioner to raise this issue using the case at bench as his legal vehicle. The issue
involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioner’s remedy lies with Congress. Section 5(4),
Article VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to reapportion, thus: “Within three (3) years following
the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section.” In Macias v. COMELEC, we ruled that the validity of a legislative apportionment is a justiciable
question. But while this Court can strike down an unconstitutional reapportionment, it cannot itself make the
reapportionment as petitioner would want us to do by directing respondent COMELEC to transfer the municipality
of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte.

13. Aldaba v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078, March 15, 2010

10
R: By presenting these alternative population indicators with their widely divergent population figures, the COMELEC
unwittingly highlighted the danger of relying on non-NSO authorized certifications. EO 135’s stringent standards ensuring
reliability of population census cannot be diluted as these data lie at the core of crucial government decisions and, in this
case, the legislative function of enforcing the constitutional mandate of creating congressional districts in cities with at
least 250,000 constituents.
There can be no doubt on the applicability of EO 135 to test the constitutionality of RA 9591. The COMELEC
11
invoked EO 135 to convince the Court of the credibility and authoritativeness of Miranda’s certificate. It is hardly alien for
the Court to adopt standards contained in a parallel statute to fill gaps in the law in the absence of an express
12
prohibition. Indeed, one is hard-pressed to find any distinction, statistically speaking, on the reliability of an NSO
certification of a city’s population for purposes of creating its legislative district and for purposes of converting it to a
13
highly-urbanized or an independent component city. Congress itself confirms the wisdom and relevance of EO 135’s
paradigm of privileging NSO certifications by mandating that compliance with the population requirement in the creation
and conversion of local government units shall be proved exclusively by an NSO certifica-tion.
Unquestionably, representation in Congress is no less important than the creation of local government units in enhancing
our democratic institutions, thus both processes should be subject to the same stringent standards.
Third. Malolos City is entitled to representation in Congress only if, before the 10 May 2010 elections, it breaches the
250,000 population mark following the mandate in Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution that “any
city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately
following election to at least one Member.” COMELEC neither alleged nor proved that Malolos City is in compliance with
Section 3 of the Ordinance.
Fourth. Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution on the population requirement, the
creation by RA 9591 of a legislative district for Malolos City, carving the city from the former First Legislative
15
District, leaves the town of Bulacan isolated from the rest of the geographic mass of that district. This
contravenes the requirement in Section 5(3), Article VI that each legislative district shall “comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.”

The geographic lay-out of the First Legislative District is not an insuperable condition making compliance with Section 5(3)
impracticable. To adhere to the constitutional mandate, and thus maintain fidelity to its purpose of ensuring efficient
representation, the practicable alternative for Congress was to include the municipality of Bulacan in Malolos City’s
legislative district. Although unorthodox, the resulting contiguous and compact district fulfills the constitutional
requirements of geographic unity and population floor, ensuring efficient representation of the minimum mass of
constituents.

B. PARTY LIST SYSTEM

14. BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009

R: We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941
is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued
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operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive
ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following
procedure shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number
of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. 4. Each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats”
are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded
in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system.
On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list
elections through their sectoral wings.
By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties
from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-
list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia

15. Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013

SECTION 6

A. RESIDENCE QUALIFICATION:

16. Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: Residence, for election purposes, is used synonymously with domicile. Domicile includes
the twin elements of “the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place” and animus manendi, or the intention of
returning there permanently. Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a
certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. If a person’s intent is to
remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. Thus, it is
perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single
domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. It is
the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or
not an individual has satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement. The Supreme Court reiterated the
following from Larena vs. Teves: First, a minor follows the domicile of his parents. Second, domicile of origin is not easily
lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 1) an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; 2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and 3) acts
which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of
origin should be deemed to continue. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the following facts did not constitute intent
to abandon her original domicile or at least proved that she had chosen her original domicile as her present domicile: 1)
having been a registered voter for several years in the past in San Juan, Manila; 2) having different residences in Metro
Manila, Ilocos, etc.; and 3) Mrs. Marcos’ marriage to Mr. Marcos.

Nature of the case: election case

F: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte. The pertinent entries are as follows:

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 7.RESIDENCE (complete Address):Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION
PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

8.RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE

ELECTION:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ Years and SevenMonths.

Based on the above the incumbent representative of the First District of Leyte filed a Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification with the Commission on Elections alleging that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency
requirement for candidates to the House of Representatives. In that same petition, it was also alleged that Mrs. Marcos
had been a registered voter in San Juan, Manila and resided in different locations with her late husband for several years
in the past.
Mrs. Marcos filed a petition to Amend/Correct Certificate of Candidacy but the same was denied by the
Commission on Elections for being filed out of time. In her Answer to the Petition for Disqualification, Mrs. Marcos alleged
that her entry of the word “seven” was the result of an honest misinterpretation. She alleges that her interpretation of the
provision was that it asked for the time she had lived in her actual residence and not how long she had been domiciled in
the district where she seeks to be elected. COMELEC disagreed and granted the disqualification. Having garnered the
most votes, she filed a petition on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

I: Whether or not the petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of at least
one year as provided by Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution?

H: YES

R: The Supreme Court ruled that the Commission on Elections had confused the concepts of “domicile” and “residence in
election law. Residence, for election purposes, is used synonymously with domicile. So settled is the concept (of domicile)
in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual
from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.

Domicile includes the twin elements of “the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place” and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the
physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country.
The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when
the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure,
business, or health. If a person’s intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his
purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in
various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons
his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining
whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement. The said statement
becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly
make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting down the word “seven”
in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned
entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay
in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First District, which was “since childhood” in the space provided.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner’s
claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her actual residence in a space which
required her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8—the first
requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile—coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s
registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified.
This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were
established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
In Larena vs. Teves, we stressed:
First, a minor follows the domicile of his parents. Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a
change of domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

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 In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to
continue. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness
required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred.
To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner’s former domicile with an intent to supplant
the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result
of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. The term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or
under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is
concerned—affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife—the term residence should only be interpreted to
mean “actual residence.” The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that
when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not
a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new “domicile” after her marriage and only acquired
a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner’s acts following her return to the country clearly indicate
that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her
domicile. This “choice” was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought
the PCGG’s permission to “rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them
livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland.” Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate
in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother’s house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a
state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her “homes” and “residences” following her arrival in various
parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or “actual residences,” not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from
our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses
a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her
original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist within
the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.

17. Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995

R: Clearly, the place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution
refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual
conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera is “to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the
conditions and needs of the community” from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for
electoral gain.
While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon, the fact
that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims
to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac) “indicate that the sole
purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical residence” is not to acquire a new residence or domicile “but only to
qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City.” The absence of clear and positive proof
showing a successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions stated above, the lack of identification—sentimental,
actual or otherwise—with the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected all
belie petitioner’s claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution, in the Second District of Makati.
Modern-day carpetbaggers cannot be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new political districts by suddenly
transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of
existing conditions in these areas. It will be noted, as COMELEC did in its assailed resolution, that petitioner was
disqualified from running in the Senate because of the constitutional two-term limit, and had to shop around for a place
where he could run for public office. Nothing wrong with that, but he must first prove with reasonable certainty that he has
effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law. This he has not effectively done.

18. Domino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999

R: It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical presence in Alabel, Sarangani since December 1996 was
sufficiently established affidavits and certifications under oath of the residents of that place that they have seen petitioner
and his family residing in their locality. While this may be so, actual and physical is not in itself sufficient to show that from
said date he had transferred his residence in that place. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the
place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. While “residence” simply requires bodily presence in a
given place, “domicile” requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to
make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode, one’s home.
! 16!
As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as
a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of these elements is
absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor
does the fact of physical presence without intention.
The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease
contract may be indicative of DOMINO’s intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency
required to prove abandonment of one’s original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence,
no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus the date of the
contract of lease of a house and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997, cannot be used, in the
absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement.
Further, Domino’s lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is further strengthened by his act of
registering as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to
a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where DOMINO registered in his former barangay. Exercising
the right of election franchise is a deliberate public assertion of the fact of residence, and is said to have decided
preponderance in a doubtful case upon the place the elector claims as, or believes to be, his residence. The fact that a
party continuously voted in a particular locality is a strong factor in assisting to determine the status of his domicile.

B. CITIZENSHIP QUALIFICATION:

19. Co v. HRET, G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30, 1991

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION:

Nature of the case:

F: The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern
Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with
grave abuse of discretion.
Jose Ong Chuan, Jose Ong’s Jr’s father, took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of
naturalization was issued to him. At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine
years was finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the
Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of
the mother’s citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent’s full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The
Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the
article on this subject. The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of their family
business decided to be of greater service to his province and ran for public office. Hence, when the opportunity came in
1987, he ran in the elections for representative in the second district of Northern Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative in Congress.

R: It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly, and,
therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either before or
after the effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was meant to correct the
inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid which would have been nil at the
time had it not been for the curative provisions. (SeeDevelopment Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA
342[1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent’s mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to
this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born
of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural
and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his
father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of
age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969
electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement
would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines “election” as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and
the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact
pronouncement of the Court, we held:
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Esteban’s exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship”. (p. 52; emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the
Philippines.
The Supreme Court also considered the basis alluded to by the Constitutional Commission when they declared
respondent’s brother a natural-born citizen. The grandfather of respondent had set up his domicile in the Philippines since
1895, or before April 11, 1899, which included in the definition of ‘Spaniards’ ‘those without such papers, who may have
acquired domicile in any town in the Monarchy.’

SECTION 7

A. TERM AND TENURE

20. Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., G.R. No. 96859

F: Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative of the 2nd District of Lanao del Sur. He took his oath and
thereafter, performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and privileges pertaining to the office. He filed a Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Upon being informed
that Dimaporo filed a Certificate of Candidacy, the Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded his
name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, as provided in Sec. 67, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election
Code, which provides that: Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one in which
he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of certificate of candidacy. When Dimaporo lost in the autonomous region elections, he sent
a letter to the Speaker expressing his intentions to resume performing his duties and function as an elected member of
the Congress. Dimaporo failed to regain his seat, resulting to him filing the present petition, questioning the removal of his
name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives.

I: Whether or not filing a certificate of candidacy in general constitutes voluntary renunciation of tenure as a representative
of the House?

H: YES

R: He failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this statutory provision seeks
to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office
and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to
their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with
utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.
In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress, petitioner
seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office. As succinctly distinguished by the Solicitor General: "The term of office
prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during
which an officer actually holds the office (tenure), may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said
officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the
term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12)."
As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office produces automatically the permanent forfeiture of
the elective position being presently held, it is not necessary, as petitioner opines, that the other position be actually held.
The ground for forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Section
67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2 of Article
VI of the Constitution.

SECTION 10

A. SALARIES

21. Philconsa v. Mathay

R: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators becomes fully
effective, the constitutional provision refers to "all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives" in the
same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them.
This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the "expiration of the full term" of the
Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form, and not the plural, despite the
! 18!
difference in the terms of office (six years for Senators and four for Representatives thereby rendering more evident the
intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word
"term" in the singular, when combined with the following phrase "all the members of the Senate and of the House",
underscores that in the application of Article VI, Section 14, the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all
members of the Legislature that enacted the measure (whether Senators or Representatives) must have expired before
the increase in compensation can become operative.

SECTION 11

A. PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH AND DEBATE

22. Jimenez v. Cabangbang, No. L-15905, August 3, 1966

R: The phrase “speech or debate therein,” used in Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution, refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in
the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in
session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices,
in the official discharge of their duties as Members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to
perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.
An open letter to the President of the Philippines when Congress was not in session which defendant-Congressman
caused to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines is not a communication which the
defendant published while he was performing his official duty, either as a Member of Congress, or as officer of any
Committee thereof. Said communication is not absolutely privileged.

B. PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST

23. People v. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76, February 3, 2000

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION:

Nature of the case:

F: The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.

I: Whether or not there is a constitutional or legal basis for a member of Congress to be allowed to fully discharge his
duties as a member of Congress even after his conviction in the lower court pending appeal?

H: NO

R: True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects
to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task
is to ascertain the applicable law. We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government-executive,
legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that
election or appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of general law.
Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the
requirement of obedience rather than exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the latter
customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows
that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special
privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication
or equitable considerations.

! 19!
 Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A
congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim
parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or
whose convictions were pending appeal, x x x For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was
no immunity from arrest. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from
the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to
attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a
crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional
foundations.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense. Society
must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others. A person charged with crime is taken into custody
for purposes of the administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo, it is the injury to the public which State
action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court,
the accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to
the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.

SECTION 14

A. PROHIBITIONS

24. Puyat v. De Guzman, Jr., No. L-51122, March 25, 1982

I: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez violated the prohibition imposed on members of Congress to personally
appear as counsel before administrative bodies?

H: YES

R: Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as
counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private respondents
His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter
in litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and respected
counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fer-nandez in the SEC
Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares.
He acquired them “after the fact”, that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after
the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case
before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to
appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the
validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to “intervene” on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.
And it may be noted that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for
defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect “appearance as
counsel before x x x an administrative body” and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition.
The “intervention” was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To
believe
the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable
outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel indirectly.

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SECTION 16

A. CONGRESSIONAL OFFICERS

25. Avelino v. Cuenco, No. L-2821, March 4, 1949

F: Only 12 senators were present for the election of the Senate President, considering that, of the 24 members, one was
in the hospital while another one was abroad. The case called for an interpretation of Art. VI, 10(2) of the 1935
Constitution which provided that "A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business. . . ."

I: What is the basis in determining the existence of a quorum?

H: The total number of Senators who are in the country and within the coercive jurisdiction of the State (Nachura)

R: The Court held that there was a quorum in the session of the Philippine Senate (composed of twenty-four Senators) in
which twelve Senators were present, one Senator being in the United States. The subject matter of this quo warranto
proceeding—to declare petitioner the rightful President of the Philippine Senate and oust respondent—is not within the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy
(Alejandrino vs. Quezon 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with nor
taken over by the judiciary. The selection of the presiding officer of the Philippine Senate affects only the senators
themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them.

While initially declining to assume jurisdiction, this Court finally took cognizance of the matter. As Justice Perfecto, whose
separate opinion in support of the assumption of jurisdiction was one of the reasons which persuaded the Court to
intervene in the Senate imbroglio, stated, "Whether there was a quorum or not in the meeting of twelve Senators . . . is a
question that calls for the interpretation, application and enforcement of an express and specific provisions of the
Constitution." In his view, "The word quorum is a mathematical word. It has, as such, a precise and exact mathematical
meaning. A majority means more than one-half (1/2)."

26. Santiago v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a
House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All
4
that the Charter says is that “[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” To our mind,
the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred
by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this
Court. Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there
an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the
holders thereof. In the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis
upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept
of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of
courts to direct Congress how to do its work. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or
irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona’s assumption and exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader.
Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

Nature of the case: quo warranto

F: Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad (Petitioners) instituted an original petition for quo
warranto seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of
Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
Petitioners contend that the constitutional provision requiring the election of the Senate President “by majority
vote of all its members” carries with it a judicial duty to determine the concepts of “majority” and “minority,” as well as who
may elect a minority leader. They argue that “majority” in the aforequoted constitutional provision refers to that group of
senators who (1) voted for the winning Senate President and (2) accepted committee chairmanships.
Accordingly, those who voted for the losing nominee and accepted no such chairmanships comprise the minority,
to whom the right to determine the minority leader belongs. As a result, petitioners assert, Respondent Guingona cannot
be the legitimate minority leader, since he voted for Respondent Fernan as Senate President. Furthermore, the members

! 21!
of the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP cannot choose the minority leader, because they did not belong to the minority, having voted
for Fernan and accepted committee chairmanships.

I: Whether or not Section 16 of the Constitution provides the method upon which the Senate minority and majority leaders
are to be elected?

H: NO

R: The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a total or
aggregate, it simply “means the number greater than half or more than half of any total.” The plain and unambiguous
words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one
half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the “majority,” much less the
“minority,” in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual
meanings of these terms. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a
number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote
for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation
states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

Majority may also refer to “the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,” not necessarily more than one half.
This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is “a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes
or adherents than the majority.” Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number
would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal
groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a
government with a multiparty system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be
several minority parties, one of which has to be identified by the Comelec as the “dominant minority party” for purposes of
the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political
parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribes which of the many minority groups or the
independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says
4
is that “[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” To our mind, the method of choosing
who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power “to determine the rules of its
proceedings.” Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules to govern its internal affairs. Notably,
the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause
providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At
any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate
relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the
internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing
the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.
The specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has
not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Absent any
clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona’s assumption and
exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown
to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

B. INTERNAL DISCIPLINE

27. Osmeña v. Pendatun, No. L-17144, October 28, 1960

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION:

Nature of the case:

F: Congressman Sergio Osmeña questions House Resolution No. 59, which suspends him for 15 months due to his
speech
Entitled Message to Garcia.
! 22!
I: Whether or not the House of Representatives has the power to discipline its members?

H: YES

R: While parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made
responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall, however, it
does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered
by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. For unparliamentary conduct, members of Congress can be
censured, committed to prison, suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.
Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived
or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate
the action taken by a deliberate body when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The
House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour. The courts will not assume a jurisdiction
in any case which will amount to an interference by the judicial department with the legislature.
The House of Representatives of the United States has taken the position that personal attacks upon the Chief Executive
constitutes unparliamentary conduct or breach of order. And in several instances, it took action against offenders, even
after other business had been considered. While under the Jones Law, the Senate had no power to suspend appointive
member (Alejandrino vs.Quezon, 46 Phil., 83), at present Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension
which the Constitution did not impair.

28. Pimentel, Jr. v. Senate Committee, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011

F: The Senate adopted the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges (Committee Rules) which was
10
published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009. On 20 April 2009, Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech where
he stated that he would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. On 27 April
11
2009, Senator Lacson delivered another privilege speech where he stated that the Ethics Committee was not a
kangaroo court. However, due to the accusation that the Ethics Committee could not act with fairness on Senator Villar’s
case, Senator Lacson moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the Senate, acting as a
Committee of the Whole. The motion was approved with ten members voting in favor, none against, and five abstentions.

Respondent Senate Committee of the Whole conducted its hearings on 4 May 2009, with eleven Senators present, and
on 7 May 2009, with eight Senators present. On both hearings, petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the
Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole. In particular, petitioners questioned the determination of the
quorum. On 11 May 2009, petitioners proposed 11 amendments to the Rules of the Ethics Committee that would
constitute the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, out of which three amendments were adopted. On 14 May
2009, Senator Pimentel raised as an issue the need to publish the proposed amended Rules of the Senate Committee of
the Whole. On even date, respondent proceeded with the Preliminary Inquiry on P.S. Resolution 706.

I: Whether or not publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required for their effectivity?

H: YES

R: The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the House or
the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need not be published, unless
such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take effect.
In this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published
before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under the Constitution, publication of the Rules
of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate their publication. The majority of
the members of the Senate approved the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, and the publication requirement
which they adopted should be considered as the will of the majority. Respondent cannot dispense with the publication
requirement just because the Rules of the Ethics Committee had already been published in the Official Gazette.
Incidentally, we note that Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is an exact
reproduction of Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges which states that the
Ethics Committee shall be composed of seven members, contrary to the fact that the Senate Committee of the Whole
consists of all members of the Senate. In addition, Section 5(B), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole is an exact reproduction of Section 5(B), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and
Privileges which states that only two members of the Ethics Committee shall constitute a quorum, contrary to
respondent’s allegation in its Comment that eight members of the Senate Committee of the Whole shall constitute a
quorum.

! 23!
 However, if the Senate is constituted as a Committee of the Whole, a majority of the Senate is required to constitute a
quorum to do business pursuant to Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Otherwise, there will be a circumvention of
this express provision of the Constitution on quorum requirement. Obviously, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole require modification to comply with requirements of quorum and voting which the Senate must have overlooked in
this case. In any event, in case of conflict between the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole and the Constitution,
the latter will of course prevail.

C. JOURNALS

29. United States v. Pons, No. 11530, August 12, 1916

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: The courts in the Philippine Islands are bound, judicially, to take notice of what the law is
and, to enable them to determine whether the legal requisites to the validity of a statute have been complied with, it is
their right, as well as their duty, to take notice of the legislative journals. When the legislative journals show with certainty
the time of adjournment of the Legislature and are clear and unambiguous respecting the same, they are conclusive; and
extraneous evidence cannot be admitted to show a different date of adjournment.

Nature of the case: criminal case

F: Defendant contends that the statute under which hew as being prosecuted was invalid for having been passed after the
last allowable day of legislative session. He claimed that the legislature’s clock had been stopped at midnight on the last
day of session and that it was in fact after midnight that the staute was passed. The legislative journal, however, indicated
that the statute was passed before midnight when the legislature adjourned sine die.

I: Whether or not the courts may look beyond the journal to determine the actual date of adjournment?

H: No

R: The courts in the Philippine Islands are bound, judicially, to take notice of what the law is and, to enable them to
determine whether the legal requisites to the validity of a statute have been complied with, it is their right, as well as their
duty, to take notice of the legislative journals. When the legislative journals show with certainty the time of adjournment of
the Legislature and are clear and unambiguous respecting the same, they are conclusive; and extraneous evidence
cannot be admitted to show a different date of adjournment

Counsel for the appellant, in order to establish his contention, must necessarily depend upon the memory or recollection
of witnesses, while the legislative journals are the acts of the Government or sovereign itself. From their very nature and
object the records of the Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary, and to inquire into the veracity of the
journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter
and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate
and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the
Legislature. But counsel in his argument says that the public knows that the Assembly's clock was stopped on February
28, 1914, at midnight and left so until the determination of the discussion of all pending matters. Or, in other words, the
hands of the clock were stayed in order to enable the Assembly to effect an adjournment apparently within the time fixed
by the Governor's proclamation for the expiration of the special session, in direct violation of the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902. If the clock was, in fact, stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of
altering the probative force and character of legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action depend upon
uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery of memory.
Long, long centuries ago, these considerations of public policy led to the adoption of the rule giving verity and
unimpeachability to legislative records. If that character is to be taken away for one purpose, it must be taken away for all,
and the evidence of the laws of .the state must rest upon a foundation less certain and durable than that afforded by the
law to many contracts between private individuals concerning comparatively trifling matters."

! 24!
 D. ENROLLED BILL

30. Casco v. Gimenez, No. L-17931, February 28, 1963

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION:

Nature of the case:

F: “urea” AND “formaldehyde” v. “urea formaldehyde”

I: Whether or not the enrolled bill is conclusive on the courts and prevails over statements made by individual Senators on
the floor of the Senate?

H: YES

R: Individual statements made by Senators on the floor of the Senate do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate.
Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as
regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in
the printing of a bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive, the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

31. Astorga v. Villegas, No. L-23475, April 30, 1974

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION:

Nature of the case:

F: Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed
into law by the President of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did
not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence the Senate
President, through the Secretary of the Senate, addressed a letter dated July 11, 1964 to the President of the Philippines,
explaining that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both Houses as well as by the
presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly approved by Congress and that he considered his signature on the enrolled
bill as invalid and of no effect. A subsequent letter dated July 21, 1964 made the further clarification that the invalidation
by the Senate President of his signature meant that the bill on which his signature appeared had never been approved by
the Senate and therefore the fact that he and the Senate Secretary had signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment.
On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the presiding officers of both Houses of
Congress informing them that in view of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his signature on House Bill No.
9266 (which had been returned to the Senate the previous July 3), adding that “it would be untenable and against public
policy to convert into law what was not actually approved by the two Houses of Congress.”
Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to the department heads and
chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in
Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five
members of the city police force who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority of Republic Act
4065.
Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition with
this Court on September 7, 1964 for “Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction” to compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil Service, the
Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of
Republic Act 4065.
Respondents’ position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since it was not the bill actually
passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in
the resolution of the issue.

I: Whether or not journal entries may be consulted to determine whether or not a bill had been duly enacted?

H: YES

R: The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a bill. It does not require the
presiding officers to certify to the same. The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on “the respect due to co-equal and
! 25!
independent departments,” which requires the judicial department “to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated.”
However, as far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the
presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The law-making process in Congress ends when the bill is
approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present
upon its passage. In other words, it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is
essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that “[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be
presented to the President.” Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is
not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its
due enactment. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill 9266 signed by the Chief Executive
was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this
Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for that purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent
to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which
admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This
we do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures
therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the
Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill
has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-
making body.

E. QUORUM

32. Datu Abas Kida v. Senate, G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011

Nature of the case:

F: The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and
thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote in order to become effective.

R: Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting
requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the
character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands.
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a “majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business.” In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present,
these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is
generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the
House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this
2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the
plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. The Court’s pronouncement in City of
33
Davao v. GSIS on this subject best explains the basis and reason for the unconstitutionality:
“Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the
actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do
the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in a legislative body, and a
legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of
omniscience.
xxx
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its
territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the
federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws
except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors.
This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is
in its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind 301a future legislature to a particular mode
of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent
legislation upon existing statutes.” (Emphasis ours.)
Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution
requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future
legislators’ room for action and flexibility.

! 26!
SECTION 17

A. THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS

33. Robles v. House Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990

F: Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos were candidates for the position of Congressman of
the 1st district of Caloocan City in the last May 11, 1987 congressional elections. Petitioner Robles was proclaimed the
winner on December 23, 1987.
On January 5, 1988, Santos filed an election protest with respondent HRET. He alleged, among others, that the
elections in the 1st District of Caloocan City held last May 11, 1987 were characterized by the commission of electoral
frauds and irregularities in various forms, on the day of elections, during the counting of votes and during the canvassing
of the election returns. He likewise prayed for the recounting of the genuine ballots in all the 320 contested precincts (pp.
16-20, Rollo).
On January 14, 1988, petitioner filed his Answer (pp. 22-26, Rollo) to the protest. He alleged as among his
affirmative defenses, the lack of residence of protestant and the late filing of his protest.
On August 15, 1988, respondent HRET issued an order setting the commencement of the revision of contested ballots on
September 1, 1988 and directed protestant Santos to identify 25% of the total contested precincts which he desires to be
revised first in accordance with the House Rules.
On September 8, 1988, Robles filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision and on September 12, 1988, Santos
filed a Motion to Withdraw Protest on the unrevised precincts (pp. 78-80, Rollo).
No action on Robles’ motion to suspend revision and Santos’ motion to withdraw protest on unrevised precincts were yet
taken by respondent HRET when on September 14, 1988, Santos filed an Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard
Withdrawal of Protest (pp. 81-85, Rollo). On September 19, 1988, Robles opposed Santos’ Motion to Recall and
Disregard Withdrawal of Protest in an Urgent Motion to Cancel Continuation of Revision with Opposition to Motion to
Recall Withdrawal (pp. 86-91, Rollo). On the same day, respondent HRET issued a resolution which, among others,
granted Santos’ Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest.
It is petitioner’s main contention in this petition that when private respondent Santos filed the Motion to Withdraw
Protest on Unrevised Precincts and Motion to Set Case for Hearing dated September 12, 1988, respondent HRET lost its
jurisdiction over the case, hence, when respondent HRET subsequently ordered the revision of the unrevised protested
ballots, notwithstanding the withdrawal of the protest, it acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

R: The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested precincts, without any action on the part
of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is
not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated (Jimenez v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-
37933, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 1).
Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders upon all questions pertaining to the cause are orders
within its jurisdiction, and however erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari (Santos v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 56614, July 28, 1987, 152 SCRA 378; Paramount Insurance Corp. v. Luna, G.R. No. 61404, March 16,
1987, 148 SCRA 564). This rule more appropriately applies to respondent HRET whose independence as a constitutional
body has time and again been upheld by Us in many cases. As explained in the case of Lazatin v. The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Timbol, G.R. No. 84297, December 8, 1988, thus:
“The use of the word ‘sole’ emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred [Angara v. Electoral
Commission,supra, at 162]. The exercise of the Power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been
described as ‘intended to be complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature’ [Id. at 175].
Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as ‘full, clear and complete’ [Veloso v.
Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was
unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal [Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)] and it
remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission [Lachica v.
Yap, G.R. No. L-25379, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 140]. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution. Thus, ‘judicial review of decisions or final resolutions of the House
Electoral Tribunal is (thus) possible only in the exercise of this Court’s so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, x x x upon a
determination that the tribunal’s decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion.
Further, petitioner’s objections to the resolutions issued by respondent tribunal center mainly on procedural technicalities,
i.e., that the motion to withdraw, in effect, divested the HRET of jurisdiction over the electoral protest. This argument aside
from being irrelevant and baseless, overlooks the essence of a public office as a public trust. The right to hold an elective
! 27!
office is rooted on electoral mandate, not perceived entitlement to the office. This is the reason why an electoral tribunal
has been set up in order that any doubt as to right/mandate to a public office may be fully resolved vis-a-vis the
popular/public will. To this end, it is important that the tribunal be allowed to perform its functions as a constitutional body,
unhampered by technicalities or procedural play of words.

34. Abbas v. House Electoral Tribunal, No. L-83767, October 27, 1988

F: Abbas sought to disqualify all six Senator members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal on the ground that they, together
with all the other Senators, were respondents in the contest filed by the opposition party. He contends that the case
should be decided solely by the three Supreme Court justices in the Electoral Tribunal.

I: Whether or not the Electoral Tribunal composed of only three Members (the Justices of the Supreme Court) may decide
contests without violating Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution?

H: NO

R: It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court and
Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those “Judicial” and “legislative” components commonly share
the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The
respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this proposition when it held that said provision “x x x is a clear
expression of an intent that all (such) contests x x x shall be resolved by a panel or body in which their (the Senators’)
peers in that Chamber are represented.” The other part, of course, is that the constitutional provision just as clearly
mandates the participation in the same process of decision of a representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or
disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his
conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the
light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of
Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid
adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by
any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute’s competence, the
proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty
that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration—that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty
which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its
being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not have been
unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all 24 Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably
have to sit in judgment thereon, Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once
more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for
settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may
be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of
justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.

35. Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, No. L-84297, December 8, 1988

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters
within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power
necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. Thus, it is well within the power of the HRET to
prescribe the period within which protests may be filed before it. This is founded not only on historical precedents and
jurisprudence but, more importantly, on the clear language of the Constitution itself. The power granted to the Electoral
Tribunal is full, clear and complete and “excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any
wise restrict or curtail it or even affect the same.” So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives, any
final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court. Only in
cases where grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the HRET’s judgment. In the instant
case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since no grave abuse of discretion that would
! 28!
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for has been clearly shown.
Consequently, private respondent’s election protest having been filed within the period prescribed by the HRET, the latter
cannot be charged with lack of jurisdiction to hear the case.

Nature of the case: election law

F: Resolution of the instant controversy hinges on which provision governs the period for filing protests in the HRET.
Should Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code be held applicable, private respondent’s election protest would have been
filed out of time. On the other hand, if Section 9 of the HRET Rules is applicable, the filing of the protest would be timely.
Succinctly stated, the basic issue is whether or not private respondent’s protest had been seasonably filed. This special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/ or restraining
order seeks the annulment and setting aside of the resolution of the HRET, which had held that the election protest filed
by private respondent had been filed on time.

I: Whether or not the HRET Rules prevail over the Omnibus Election Code as regards the prescriptive period of filing an
election protest? Whether or not orders or decisions by the HRET may be reviewed by the Supreme Court?

H: Yes; Generally, no

R: The Court is of the view that the protest had been filed on time and, hence, the HRET acquired jurisdiction over it.
Petitioner’s reliance on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code is misplaced. Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code had
ceased to be effective under the 1987 Constitution. First, the Batasang Pambansa has already been abolished and the
legislative power is now vested in a bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in the respective Electoral Tribunals [Art. VI, Sec. 17]. The exclusive original jurisdiction of the
COMELEC is limited by constitutional fiat to election contests pertaining to election regional, provincial and city offices and
its appellate jurisdiction to those involving municipal and barangay offices [Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2)].
Petitioner makes much of the fact that the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on the conduct of the election
were generally made applicable to the congressional elections of May 11, 1987. It must be emphasized, however, that
such does not necessarily imply the application of all the provisions of said code to each and every aspect of that
particular electoral exercise, as petitioner contends. On the contrary, the Omnibus Election Code was only one of several
laws governing said elections.
An examination of the Omnibus Election Code and the executive orders specifically applicable to the May 11,
1987 congressional elections reveals that there is no provision for the period within which to file election protests in the
respective Electoral Tribunals. Thus, the question may well be asked whether the rules governing the exercise of the
Tribunals’ constitutional functions may be prescribed by statute. The Court is of the considered view that it may not.
The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction,
including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from
the general power granted it by the Constitution. This is the import of the ruling in the landmark case of Angara v.
Electoral Commission where the Court, declared: . . . [T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex
necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted (sic) to its cognizance
should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular
power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure
to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also
in the Electoral Commission.
The new Constitution has substantially retained the COMELEC’s purely administrative powers as well as its rule-
making power. In this sense, the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code are fully applicable, except where specific
legislation provides otherwise. But the same cannot be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to hear and
decide election contests. The 1987 Constitution, while lodging in the COMELEC exclusive original jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials and
appellate jurisdiction over contests relating to the election of municipal and barangay officials [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(2)],
expressly makes the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members [Art. VI, Sec. 17]. Therefore, it is well within
the power of the HRET to prescribe the period within which protests may be filed before it. This is founded not only on
historical precedents and jurisprudence but, more importantly, on the clear language of the Constitution itself.
Consequently, private respondent’s election protest having been filed within the period prescribed by the HRET, the latter
cannot be charged with lack of jurisdiction to hear the case.
! 29!
 So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter
within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court. As stated earlier, the power granted to the Electoral
Tribunal is full, clear and complete and “excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any
wise restrict or curtail it or even affect the same.” As early as 1938 in Morrero v. Bocar, the Court declared that “[t]he
judgment rendered by the [Electoral] Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial
interference, except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will
constitute a denial of due process of law.” Under the 1987 Constitution, the power granted to the Court includes the duty
“to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government” [Art. VIII, Sec. 1]. Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the HRET’s judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for
the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since no grave abuse of discretion that would amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for has been clearly shown.

36. Bondoc v. Pineda, G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991

F: Petitioner, Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc (NP) and Respondent, Marciano M. Pineda (LDP) were rival candidates for the
position of Representative for the 4th District of Pampanga in the 1987 election. Pineda was the proclaimed winner.
Bondoc filed a protest to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET was composed of Justices
Herrerra (HRET chairman), Cruz and Feliciano, 5 LDP members (among who was Representative Juanita G. Camasura)
and one NP member.

On October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won by a margin of 23 votes. Not satisfied with the
outcome, the LDP members demanded a recount, which resulted in an increased lead of Bondoc by 107 votes. LDP
member Camasura “consistent with truth and justice and self-respect” made a conscience vote favoring Bondoc, naturally
infuriating his party-mates. Upon learning this, LDP members plotted to neutralize the Pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal
by expelling Camasura from the party, consequently relinquishing his position in the HRET. The Notice of Promulgation of
Decision was on March 14, 1991, during which Bondoc’s proclamation would be formalized. LDP, however, informed
Speaker Mitra and Justice Herrerra that the party had withdrawn the nomination and rescinded the election of
Congressman Camasura to the HRET. The Tribunal issued a resolution canceling the proclamation of Bondoc due to this
development. Without Camasura’s vote, the decision lacked the concurrence of 5 members as required by Section 24 of
the Rules of Tribunal.

I: May the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein, change that party’s
representation in the House Electoral Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an
election contest pending therein?

H: NO

R: The use of the word “sole” in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution
underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although
twothirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians x x x To be able to exercise
exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional
election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality, and independence—even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence,
“disloyalty to party” and “breach of party discipline,” are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. ln
”
expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly
on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of
Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of
expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates
Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure, Members of the HRET, as “sole judge” of congressional election
contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution
(Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 198? Constitution). Therefore; membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated
except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his death, permanent
disability, resignation from-the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or
removal for-other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for “party disloyalty” short
! 30!
of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail to show that
Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from
the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.

37. Guerrero v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 137004, July 26, 2000

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION:

Nature of the case:

F: Petitioner contends that the jurisdiction of the HRET as defined under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution is limited
only to the qualifications prescribed under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. Consequently, he claims that any issue
which does not involve these constitutional qualifications is beyond the realm of the HRET. The filing of a certificate of
candidacy being a statutory qualification under the Omnibus Election Code is outside the pale of the HRET, according to
him. Petitioner further argues that the HRET assumes jurisdiction only if there is a valid proclamation of the winning
candidate. He contends that if a candidate fails to satisfy the statutory requirements to qualify him as a candidate, his
subsequent proclamation is void ab initio. Where the proclamation is null and void, there is no proclamation at all and the
mere assumption of office by the proclaimed candidate does not deprive the COMELEC at all of its power to declare such
nullity, according to petitioner.

I: Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over an alleged irregularity involving a certificate of candidacy once the same
candidate has already own and taken the oath of office?

H: YES

R: This contention lacks cogency and is far from persuasive. Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution cannot be
circumscribed lexically. The word “qualifications” cannot be read as qualified by the term “constitutional.” Ubi lex non
distinguit noc nos distinguire debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish,
the courts should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the application of a law where none is indicated. For
firstly, the drafters of the fundamental law, in making no qualification in the use of a general word or expression, must
have intended no distinction at all. Secondly, the courts could only distinguish where there are facts or circumstances
showing that the lawgiver intended a distinction or qualification. In such a case, the courts would merely give effect to the
lawgiver’s intent.
In an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of
office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this
ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with
due regard to the people’s mandate.
In the present case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it held that its jurisdiction
over Case No. SPA 98-277 had ceased with the assumption of office of respondent Fariñas as Representative for the first
district of Ilocos Norte. While the COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy,
its refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by Fariñas is a recognition of
the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives
(HRET). Under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests
relative to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives,
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs
own jurisdiction begins. Thus, the COMELEC’s decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is justifiable, in
deference to the HRETs own jurisdiction and functions.

38. Layug v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192984, February 28, 2012

F: On March 31, 2010, petitioner Rolando D. Layug (Layug), in his capacity as a taxpayer and concerned citizen, filed pro
4
se a Petition to Disqualify (SPA No. 10-016 [DCN]) Buhay Party-List from participating in the May 10, 2010 elections, and
Brother Mike from being its nominee. He argued that Buhay Party-List is a mere “extension of the El Shaddai,” which is a
religious sect. As such, it is disqualified from being a party-list under Section 5, Paragraph 2, Article VI of the 1987
5 6
Constitution, as well as Section 6, Paragraph 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, otherwise known as the “Party-List
System Act.” Neither does Brother Mike, who is allegedly a billionaire real estate businessman and the spiritual leader of

! 31!
El Shaddai, qualify as “one who belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sector xxx”, as required of party-list
nominees by COMELEC.
Respondents contend that the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over questions relatings to their
qualifications because its nominees have already assumed office as representatives.

I: Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the issues in Layug’s petition?

H: NO

R: Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
shall be thesole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its Members. Section 5 (1) of the
same Article identifies who the “members” of the House are: Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropoli- tan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(Underscoring added).
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1) members who shall be elected from
legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations. In this case, Buhay Party-List was entitled to two seats in the House that went to its first
two nominees, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother Mike, being the
fifth nominee, did not get a seat and thus had not become a member of the House of Representatives. Indubitably,
the HRET has no jurisdiction over the issue of Brother Mike’s qualifications.
Neither does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay Party-List, as it is vested by law, specifically,
the Party-List System Act, upon the COMELEC. Section 6 of said Act states that “the COMELEC maymotu proprio or
upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition xxx.” Accordingly, in the case of Abayon vs. HRET, We ruled
that the HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat
Tayo party-list andBantay party-list insofar as they sought the disqualifications of said party-lists. Thus, it is the Court,
under its power to review decisions, orders, or resolutions of the COMELEC provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the
1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that has jurisdiction to hear the instant
petition.

SECTION 18

A. COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

39. Daza v. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION:

Nature of the case:

F: After the congressional elections of May 11,1987, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve
seats in the Commission on Appointments among the several political parties represented in that chamber, including the
Lakas ng Bansa, the PDP-Laban, the NP-Unido, the Liberal Party, and the KBL, in accordance with Article VI, Section 18,
of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal
1
Party.
On September 16,1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment
in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and joined
2
the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members.
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on
Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December
5,1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and
3
including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.
The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on
Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent.

! 32!
I: Whether or not the House of Representatives has the author to change its representation in the Commission on
Appointments at any time?

H: YES

R: The House of Representatives has the authority to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to
reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such
changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of
political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.

The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass the test of time to prove its
permanence is not acceptable.
o Under this theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of the seats in the House of Representatives
(or the Senate) would still not be entitled to representation in the Commission on Appointments as long as
it was organized only recently and has not yet "aged."
o The Liberal Party itself would fall in such a category. That party was created in December 1945 by a
faction of the Nacionalista Party that seceded therefrom to support Manuel A. Roxas's bid for the
12
Presidency of the Philippines in the election held on April 23, 1946. The Liberal Party won. At that time
it was only four months old. Yet no question was raised as to its right to be represented in the
Commission on Appointments and in the Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status as the majority party in
both chambers of the Congress.
The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It now has 157 members in the House of Representatives
and 6 members in the Senate. Its titular head is no less than the President of the Philippines and its President is Senator
Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over recently from Speaker Ramon V. Mitra.
o It is true that there have been, and there still are, some internal disagreements among its members, but
these are to be expected in any political organization, especially if it is democratic in structure. In fact
even the monolithic Communist Party in a number of socialist states has undergone similar dissension,
and even upheavals. But it surely cannot be considered still temporary because of such discord.
If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the House of Representatives would have
to be denied representation in the Commission on Appointments and, for that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal. By the
same token, the KBL, which the petitioner says is now "history only," should also be written off. The independents also
cannot be represented because they belong to no political party. That would virtually leave the Liberal Party only with all
of its seventeen members to claim all the twelve seats of the House of Representatives in the Commission on
Appointments and the six legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal.

40. Coseteng v. Mitra, Jr, G.R. No. 86649, July 12, 1990

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION:

Nature of the case:

F: Coseteng was the only member of Congress from the political party KAIBA. She requested a seat on the Commission
on Appointments and was endorsed by 9 congressmen.

I: Whether or not Coseteng was entitled to a seat on the Commission on Appointments?

H: NO

R: The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79%
of the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission
on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining
two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority
and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this
apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was done “on the basis of proportional
representation of the political parties therein.”
The other political parties or groups in the House, such as petitioner’s KAIBA (which is presumably a member also of the
Coalesced Majority), are bound by the majority’s choices. Even if KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition party, its
lone member (petitioner Coseteng) represents only .4% or less than 1% of the House membership, hence, she is not
entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the Commission on Appointments. To be able to claim proportional membership in
! 33!
the Commission on Appointments, a political party should represent at least 8.4% of the House membership, i.e., it should
have been able to elect at least 17 congressmen or congresswoman.

41. Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION:

Nature of the case:

F: The senatorial elections of 1992 yielded 15 senators: 5 NPC, 3 Lakas-NUCD, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN. On the basis of
proportional representation, therefore the COA could contain 7.5 LDP, 2.5 NPC, 1.5 Lakas, and .5 LP-PDP-LABAN. The
Senate however put in 8 LDP by rounding up 7.5, 2 NPC by ignoring .5, and 1 Lakas also by ignoring .5 and 1 LP-PDP-
LAGAN rounding up .5 to 1.

I: Whether or not the method of rounding up in order to determine proportional representation of the Senate’s contingent
in the Commission on Appointments was constitutional?

H: NO

R: The Court ruled that it deprived Lakas and NPC of .5 each. Nor can the holders of .5 each, while belonging to distinct
parties, form a unity for purposes of obtaining a seat on the Commission. Thus, under the Court’s arithmetic, the result
would be a total of only 11 members. The Court ruled that a full complement of 12 was not mandatory under the
Constitution.

SECTION 21

A. LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS

42. Arnault v. Nazareno, No. L-3820, July 18, 1950

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION:

Nature of the case:

F: On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which created a special committee to investigate the
transactions surrounding the estates. The special committee created by the resolution called and examined various
witnesses, among the most important of whom was Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee sought to
resolve was the apparent lack of necessity and irregularity of the Government’s paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000
for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October,
1949. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the
expense of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the afternoon
of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine
National Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion he drew on
said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the
Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.
It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to the
present case. As Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the money, the senate then approved a resolution that cited him
for contempt. It is this resolution which brought him to jail and is being contested in this petition.

I: Whether or not the Senate has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses for contempt?

H: YES

R: The power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.
The Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than either the Congress of the United States or a
State Legislature, and the field of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider. It is difficult to define any limits by which the
subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded. Suffice it to say that it must be coextensive with the range of legislative
power. No person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House unless his testimony is required in a
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matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the
jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any
question pertinent to the subject of the inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional privilege against selfincrimination
There is no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish. for contempt to the end of every session and
not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. While the existence of the House of
Representatives is limited to four years, that of the Senate is not so limited. The Senate is a continuing body which does
not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as
to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted.

43. Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, G.R. No. 89914, November 20, 1991

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION:

44. Negros Oriental v. Sangguniang Panglungsod, No. 72492, November 5, 1987

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: While the Constitution does not expressly vest Congress with the power to punish non-
members for legislative contempt, the power has nevertheless been invoked by the legislative body as a means of
preserving its authority and dignity in the same way that courts wield an inherent power to “enforce their authority,
preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity, and ensure the effectiveness of the administration of justice.” The exercise
by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that branch of the government vested with the
legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt
power of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis; local legislative bodies cannot correctly claim to possess them for the
same reasons that the national legislature does. The power attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per
se but to the character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government. The
contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative
power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative
bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine
of separation of powers. Thus, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete, much less its Ad Hoc Committee did not
have the authority to order the subpoenas in this case, which are null and void.

Nature of the case: certiorari

F: Petitioners, Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac, Chairman of the Board of Directors and the General Manager,
respectively of petitioner Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative (NORECO II) assail orders by the respondent Ad Hoc
Committee of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete punishing Torres and Umbac for legislative contempt due to
their failure to appear at their investigation in connection with pending legislation related to the operations of public utilities
and their alleged use of inefficient power lines. Petitioners contend that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Dumaguete is bereft of the power to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses, nor the power to order the arrest
of witnesses who fail to obey its subpoena. It is further argued that assuming the power to compel the attendance and
testimony of witnesses to be lodged in said body, it cannot be exercised in the investigation of matters affecting the terms
and conditions of the franchise granted to NORECO II which are beyond the jurisdiction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Respondents, for their part, claim that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the respondent Sangguniang
Panlungsod is the power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in
inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction

I: Whether or not local legislative bodies have the power to punish for contempt and subpoena witnesses in relation to
their investigations in aid of legislation?

H: No

R: A line should be drawn between the powers of Congress as the repository of the legislative power under the
Constitution, and those that may be exercised by the legislative bodies of local government unit, e.g. the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Dumaguete which, as mere creatures of law, possess delegated legislative power. While the Constitution
does not expressly vest Congress with the power to punish non-members for legislative contempt, the power has
nevertheless been invoked by the legislative body as a means of preserving its authority and dignity in the same way that
courts wield an inherent power to “enforce their authority, preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity, and ensure the
effectiveness of the administration of justice.” In Arnault v. Nazareno, and Arnault v. Balagtas, the Supreme Court ruled
that the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy and is implied or incidental to the
exercise of legislative power.
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 The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that branch of the
government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its authority and punishes
contempts thereof. The contempt power of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis and local legislative bodies cannot
correctly claim to possess it for the same reasons that the national legislature does. The power attaches not to the
discharge of legislative functions per se but to the character of the legislature as one of the three independent and
coordinate branches of government.
The same thing cannot be said of local legislative bodies which are creations of law. To begin with, there is no
express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) granting
local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent a
constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of
asubpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious behavior would be for said power to be deemed
implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of
a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the
performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers
without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

“When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch
supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must have intended each department’s authority to
be full and complete, independently of the other’s authority or power. And how could the authority and
power become complete if for every act of refusal every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it,
the legislative body must resort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is
impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the affronts committed against its authority or dignity”

In addition, the type of investigation which may be conducted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod does not include within
its ambit an inquiry into any suspected violation by an electric cooperative of the conditions of its electric franchise. The
power to inquire into the efficiency of the service supplied by electric cooperatives is within the franchising powers of the
NEA. In the exercise of this power, the NEA may conduct hearings and investigations, issue subpoenas and invoke the
aid of the courts in case of disobedience to its subpoenas (Sec. 47 & Sec. 54, P.D. 269). Clearly, then, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Dumaguete cannot look into any suspected failure of NORECO II to comply with the standards of electric
service prescribed by law and in its franchise. The proper recourse is to file a complaint with the NEA against NORECO II
if there be sufficient basis therefor.

45. Senate v. Ermita

46. Philcomsat Holdings v. Senate

47. Neri v. Senate

SECTION 24
48. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

Doctrine: Because revenue bills are required to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the Senate cannot
enact revenue measures of its own without such bills. However, after a revenue bill is passed and sent over to it by the
House, the Senate may certainly pass its own version on the same subject matter. This follows from the co-equality of the
two chambers of Congress. As petitioner Tolentino states in a high school text, a committee to which a bill is referred may
do any of the following:
(1) To endorse the bill without changes;
(2) To make changes in the bill omitting or adding sections or altering its language;
(3) To make and endorse an entirely new bill as a substitute, in which case it will be known as a committee bill; or
(4) To make no report at all.

SECTION 25

A. RIDERS

49. Garcia v. Mata

Doctrine: The subject of R.A. 1600, as expressed in its title, is restricted to “appropriating funds for the operation of the
government.” Any provision contained in the body of the act that is fairly included in this restricted subject or any matter
properly connected therewith is valid and operative. But, if a provision in the body of the act is not fairly included in this
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restricted subject, like the provision relating to the policy matters of calling to active duty and reversion to inactive duty of
reserve officers of the AFP, such provision is inoperative and of no effect.

B. TRANSFER OF FUNDS

50. Demetria v. Alba

Doctrine: The questioned provision empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department,
bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or
office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to: 1) whether or not
the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, and 2) whether or not the
transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made, as limitations prescribed in the
Constitution, their absence in the questioned provision renders the latter unconstitutional.

51. Philconsa v. Enriquez

Doctrine: Provided that the Senate President and the Speaker of the House, as the case may be, approve proposed
realignments of savings in the allotments for operating expenses of individual members of Congress (by applying the
limits specified by the Constitution), the initial determination and proposal by individual members of Congress of the
necessity of the realignment is constitutional.

52. Araullo v. Aquino

SECTION 26

A. SUBJECT AND TITLE OF BILLS

53. Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject,
and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general
object.” The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to
cripple or impede the power of legislation. It should be given a practical rather than technical construction. The questioned
provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the
DECREE, which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title.

54. Phil. Judges Association v. Prado

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: Where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the
statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, that should be briefly expressed in its title under the Constitution.
Thus, should a new Act repeal or alter by implication other Acts, such repeal or alteration need not be expressed in the
title of the new Act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable. The provision in
the Statute repealed franking privileges that were previously granted. The statute need not include such repeal in its title
in order for it to comply with the one-subject-one-title rule under the Constitution.

55. Tobias v. Abalos

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate
and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, “An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong” necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated
under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. Moreover, the “one title-one
subject” rule should be liberally construed so as not to cripple or impede legislation.

56. Philippine Constitution Association v. Gimenez

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: Provisions that provide retirement benefits for non-GSIS members, are not germane to the
subject matter of Commonwealth Act No. 186, which established the GSIS, and should have been provided in a separate
bill. The “one-subject-one-title” rule in the Constitution is mandatory.
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 57. Insular Lumber Company v. Court of Tax Appeals

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: The republic act in question in this case deals with only one subject and proclaims just one
policy, namely, the necessity for increasing the Highway Special Fund through the imposition of an increased specific tax
on manufactured oils. The proviso in Section 5 of the law is in effect a partial exemption from the imposed increased tax.
Said proviso, which has reference to specific tax on oil and fuel, is not a deviation from the general subject of the law.

SECTION 27
A. ITEM VETO

58. Commissioner of Court of Tax Appeals

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: An “item” in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire section imposing a particular kind of
tax, but rather to the subjects of the tax and the tax rate. In the portion of a revenue bill which actually imposes a tax, a
section identifies the tax and enumerates the persons liable therefor with the corresponding tax rate. To construe the word
“item” as referring to the whole section would tie the President’s hand in choosing either to approve the whole section at
the expense of also approving a provision therein which he deems unacceptable or veto the entire section at the expense
of foregoing the collection of the kind of tax altogether. The evil which was sought to be prevented in giving the President
the power to disapprove items in a revenue bill would be perpetrated rendering that power inutile. The presidential veto
referred merely to the inclusion of hotels, motels and rest houses in the 20% caterer’s tax bracket but not to the whole
section. The inclusion of hotels, motels and rest houses in the 20% caterer’s tax bracket are “items.”

59. Gonzales v. Macaraig

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: The vetoed provisions did not relate specifically to appropriations in the subject general
appropriations bill, instead they referred to all appropriations recommended by the President which had been disapproved
or reduced by Congress. The vetoed Sections were more of an expression of Congressional policy in respect of
augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary appropriation. Consequently, they were inappropriate provisions that
should be treated as items for the purpose of the President’s veto power.

60. Philconsa v. Enriquez

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an
appropriations bill must “relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein” and “be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates,” it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which
extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered “an inappropriate provision” which can be vetoed
separately from an item. Also to be included in the category of “inappropriate provisions” are unconstitutional provisions
and provisions which are intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kinds of laws have no place in an
appropriations bill. These are matters of general legislation more appropriately dealt with in separate enactments. Thus,
this “inappropriate provision” doctrine was applied to each veto made by the President of provisions in the General
Appropriations Act of 1994.

See summary of vetoed provisions

61. Bengzon v. Drilon

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: What were vetoed were methods or systems placed by Congress to insure that permanent
and continuing obligations to certain officials would be paid when they fell due. An examination of the entire sections and
the underlined portions of the law that were vetoed will readily show that portions of the item have been chopped up into
vetoed and non-vetoed parts. Less than all of an item has been vetoed. The power to disapprove any item or items in an
appropriation bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same
item. Moreover, the vetoed portions are not items. They are provisions. They give power to the Chief Justice to transfer
funds from one item to another in order to insure that permanent and continuing obligations to certain officials would be
paid when they fell due. There is no specific appropriation of money involved. In effect, the subjects of the President’s
veto were R.A. No. 1797 and the Supreme Court Resolution related to the pensions of the retired Justices of the SC and
CA. No President may veto the provisions of a law enacted thirty-five (35) years before his or her term of office. Neither
may the President set aside or reverse a final and executory judgment of this Court through the exercise of the veto
power.

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SECTION 28
A. UNIFORM AND EQUITABLE

62. Tan v. del Rosario

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: The legislative intent to shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach in the
income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain a global treatment on corporations does not violate the
constitutional requirement that taxation shall be uniform and equitable. Such provision merely requires that all subjects or
objects of taxation, similarly situated, are treated alike both in privileges and liabilities. Uniformity does not forefend
classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is
germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future
conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class.

63. Commissioner v. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Inc.

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: A tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the
subject of it is found. Uniformity means that all property belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike. The Legislature
has the inherent power not only to select the subjects of taxation but to grant exemptions. Tax exemptions do not violate
the equal protection clause.

B. EXCLUSIVE EDUCATIONAL USE

64. Abra Valley College, Inc v. Aquino

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: “All lands, buildings and improvements” used exclusively for “[…] educational purposes
[…]” are exempt from real property tax. Included in the exemption are those incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of such purpose. However, should a portion or portions of such land, building, or improvements be used
for a different purpose that is not incidental to or necessary to the accomplishment of said purposes, such portion or
portions shall be taxable.

65. Commissioner v. Court of Appeals

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: What is exempted from real estate taxes is not the institution itself, but the lands, building
and improvements actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes. The
Constitutional provision pertains only to property taxes. The Supreme Court reiterated that the YMCA, as a charitable
institution, is exempt from the payment of property tax, but not income tax on the rentals from its property. The bare
allegation alone that it is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution is insufficient to justify its exemption from the
payment of income tax.

66. Lung Center v. Q.C.

SECTION 29

A. EXPENDITURE OF PUBLIC FUNDS

67. Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works
68. Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank
69. Guingona, Jr. v. Carague
70. Petitioner-Organizations v. Executive Secretary

B. SPECIAL FUND
71. Osmeña v. Orbos

SECTION 30
72. Fabian v. Desierto

SECTION 32

A. INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM

73. Garcia v. COMELEC

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