[1993 - 94] GHANA LAW REPORT

WARD-BREW v GHANA BAR ASSOCIATION (NO 1) [1993-94] 2 GLR 439—453

HIGH COURT, ACCRA

27 MARCH 1992

ADJABENG JA

Legal profession—Standards of legal education and professional conduct—Enforcement of—Genera

Council (GLC) in control of education and professional conduct of lawyers in Ghana—Institutio
conferment of degree and status of Senior Advocate of Ghana (SAG) by Ghana Bar Association
without consent of GLC—GBA altering prescribed dress code for SAGs appearing in court and res
parking space for their cars at parking lot of courts without consent of GLC—LI 613 empowering every
to take steps to expose unprofessional or dishonest conduct by any lawyer—Action by plaintiff, a lawy
member of defendant-association, for, inter alia, declaration that institution of SAG scheme by defe
association illegal, null and void as being inconsistent with provisions of [p.440] Acts 32 and LI 613—
resisting action on grounds, inter alia, that plaintiff without cause of action and capacity to institute ac
LI 613 empowering every lawyer to take steps to expose unprofessional or dishonest conduct by any m
of or body in profession—Whether plaintiff's action competent—Legal Profession Act, 1960 (Act 32), s
Legal Profession (Professional Conduct and Etiquette) Rules, 1969 (LI 613), regs 2(2) and 9(11).

Legal profession—Standards of legal education and professional conduct—Regulatory institution—G

Legal Council in control of education and professional conduct of lawyers in Ghana—Institutio
conferment of degree and status of Senior Advocate of Ghana (SAG) by defendant-association a
prescribed dress code for SAGs appearing in court without consent of General Legal Council—Defe
association also reserving some area of parking lot at courts for exclusive use of SAGs—Action by p
a lawyer and member of defendant-association illegal, null and void—Action resisted on ground, int
that institution of SAG scheme by defendant-association not barred by any statute and that scheme is
honour leading members of association—Whether defendant-association has authority in circums
to institute SAG scheme—Act 32 , s 1(1)—LI 613, regs 2(2) and 9(11).

Courts—Jurisdiction—Dispute between legal practitioner and Ghana Bar Association—Appropriate for

resolution—General Legal Council (GLC) in control of education and professional conduct of lawy
Ghana—Institution and conferment of degree and status of Senior Advocate of Ghana (SAG) by GBA w
consent of GLC—Recipients of award enjoying certain exclusive perquisites—Action by plaintiff, a
and member of GBA for declaration that SAG scheme illegal—Whether plaintiff should have comm
action before disciplinary committee of GLC.

HEADNOTES
It is provided by the Legal Profession Act, 1960 (Act 32), s 1(1) that:

"1.(1) There shall continue to be a body, to be called the General Legal Council, which shall be con
with the legal profession and, in particular,—

(a) with the organization of legal education, and

(b) with upholding standards of professional conduct."

It is also provided by the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct and Etiquette) Rules, 1969 (LI 613
2(2) and 9(11) as follows:

2.(2) It is the duty of every lawyer at all times to uphold the dignity and high standing of his professio
his dignity and high standing as a ember of it …

9.(11) It is the duty of a lawyer to maintain the honour and integrity of his profession, and to expose w
fear or favour before the proper Tribunal unprofessional or dishonest conduct by any member
profession, and to accept without hesitation a retainer against any member of the profession who is a
to have wronged his client."

By a resolution passed by its members at one of its annual conferences, the [p.441] defendant-asso
decided to institute and confer on some of its members the degree and status of Senior Advocate of
(SAG). Subsequently, following the institution of the SAG scheme, the defendant-association, inte
altered the black gown prescribed by the General Legal Council for use by lawyers in court by sewing
red lapel which distinguished those honoured as SAGs from other lawyers. Furthermore, special area
reserved for the exclusive parking of the cars of SAGS, at the court parking lot. In consequence, the p
a private legal practitioner, and member of the defendant-association, issued a writ in the High Court fo
alia, a declaration that the SAG scheme as instituted by the defendant-association was illegal, incon
with, and contrary to the Legal Profession Act, 1960 (Act 32) and its subsidiary legislation, the
Profession (Professional Conduct and Etiquette) Rules, 1969, (LI 613). The plaintiff contended th
defendant-association, had no authority to institute such a degree and status; and further that the alte
of the dress prescribed by the General Legal Council for use by lawyers in court, placed SAGs in a s
class, superior to other lawyers including himself, so far as prospective clients were concerned. In sup
his case the plaintiff tendered in evidence a copy of a circular from the General Legal Council da
January 1989 in which the council clearly prescribed a dress code for use by lawyers in court. It was a
case of the plaintiff that he was deprived of the use of the areas reserved for the cars of SAGs at the
parking lot. In its defence, the defendant-association averred that the plaintiff 's action disclos
reasonable cause of action and at the trial it questioned, inter alia, the plaintiff's capacity to institute the
Counsel for, the defendant-association maintained that since the scheme affected the whole of the
profession, the plaintiff had no personal interest in the matter and therefore had no capacity to institu
instant action. In the view of counsel, even if the plaintiff was competent to institute the action, the
body to determine his complaints was the disciplinary committee of the General Legal Council, not the
because the "Tribunal" mentioned in regulation 9(11): of LI 613 was the disciplinary committee of the G
Legal Council. Counsel further submitted that the defendant association had not violated any provis
Act 32 and its subsidiary legislation, LI 613, nor had it usurped any powers of the General Legal Counc
that the SAG scheme was merely to honour some of its leading members. Finally, counsel for the defe
association contended that by its constitution, the association concerned itself with matters affecting th
profession and could consequently pass a resolution instituting the scheme without statutory author
for it. Counsel maintained that there was no statute covering court dress for lawyers and that any c
issued by the General Legal Council in that behalf was merely based on convention.

Held:

(1) Regulations 2(2) and 9(11) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct and Etiquette) Rules, 19
613) imposed a duty on every lawyer at all times to, inter alia, uphold the dignity, honour and integrity
legal profession; and towards that end regulation 9(11) [p.442] imposed a further duty on every law
expose without fear or favour before the proper tribunal, unprofessional conduct by any member
profession. Consequently, any lawyer could institute an action which sought to maintain, ensure or pr
the dignity, honour and integrity of the legal profession, if he felt that these were being threaten
undermined by the act or acts of any member of or body in the profession. Accordingly, the plaintiff h
capacity to institute the instant action. Furthermore, the plaintiff had demonstrated that he had an inte
the matter, and that that interest had been affected by, inter alia, the act of the defendant-associa
altering in the case of the senior advocates of Ghana the dress code prescribed for the use lawyers in
In the circumstance, the plaintiff had clearly established that he had both a cause of action as well
capacity to institutes the instant action. Dyson v Attorney-General [1911] 1 KB 410, CA; Lee v Show
Guild of Great Britain [1952] 1 All ER 1175, CA and Tuffuor v Attorney-General [1980] GLR 637, CA
as SC cited

(2) The General Legal Council was, by virtue of the Legal Profession Act, 1960 (Act 32) and LI 613, th
body charged with the responsibility for the education or professional training, enrolment, discipline a
general control of lawyers in Ghana. Specifically, these statutory responsibilities of the council extend
only to matters pertaining to the making of regulations concerning legal education, such as the awa
diploma to a person who had qualified to become a lawyer; but also to the prescription of rules of profes
conduct and etiquette to be observed by lawyers. Further, on the evidence in the instant case, the G
Legal Council had, pursuant to these statutory powers and by a circular dated 16 January 1989,
prescribed a dress code to be used in court not only by lawyers but also by the judges before whom
appear. In the circumstances, the defendant-association had no legal authority whatsoever for the ins
of the Senior Advocate of Ghana (SAG) scheme without the consent of the General Legal C
Consequently, the defendant-association acted illegally and ultra vires its powers not only by conferr
degree and status of SAG on some of its members but also by, inter alia, altering the dress code
prescribed by the General Legal Council by adding to the black gowns of SAGs a red lapel which w
formerly part of it without the consent of the General Legal Council.

Per curiam, Counsel for the defendant-association sought to suggest that the scheme is that of honou
leading members. But to me the Senior Advocate of Ghana scheme is more than mere honouring of l
members of the defendant-association. The scheme affects the other very important section of the
profession, namely the courts. Unless the honour conferred is recognised by the Chief Justice and the C
it would, in my view, remain a hollow one.

(3) A complaint before the disciplinary committee of the General [p.443] Legal Council will,
circumstances of the instant case, have to be against the recipients of the SAG award themselves.
evident, however, that a complaint before the disciplinary committee would be clearly unfair to the ind
lawyers who innocently received the honour conferred on them. Hence, it was more reasonable to cha
the basis of the award by an action in court against the institution which made the award, name
defendant-association.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232; [1964] 2 All ER 929; [1964] 3 WLR 573, CA.

(2) Domfe v Adu [1984-86] 1 GLR 653, CA.

(3) Ghana Rubber Products Ltd v Criterion Co Ltd [1984-86] 2 GLR 56, CA.

(4) Amponsah v Appiagyei; Amoah v Anthony; Boakye v Effah; Boateng v Boahen (Consolidated) [19
GLR 96.

(5) Clark v Epsom Rural District Council [1929] 2 Ch 287; 98 LJCh 88; 140 LT 246.

(6) Tuffuor v Attorney-General [1980] GLR 637, CA sitting as SC.

(7) Lee v Showmen's Guild of Great Britain [1952] 2 QB 329; [1952] 1 All ER 1175; [1952] 1 TLR 111

(8) Dyson v Attorney-General [1911] 1 KB 410; 80 LJKB 531; 27 TLR 143, CA.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by the plaintiff, a lawyer and member of the Ghana Bar Association (GBA), against the GBA
institution of the degree and status of Senior Advocate of Ghana (SAG) to honour selected members
GBA without the consent of the General Legal Council, the body with statutory responsibility for the edu
and professional conduct of lawyers in Ghana. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the

COUNSEL

The plaintiff in person.

Nana Akufo-Addo for the defendant-association.

JUDGMENT OF ADJABENG JA.

On 17 May 1991 the plaintiff issued a writ of summons against the Ghana Bar Association as th
defendant, and the General Legal Council, as the second defendant. The second defendant-c
however, successfully applied later for the name of the council to be struck out as a defendant in the
The General Legal Council is therefore no longer a defendant in this action even though before the
out, they [p.444] had filed a statement of defence. The only defendant presently in this action therefore
Ghana Bar Association.

In the indorsement on his writ of summons, the plaintiff claims nine reliefs, the first six of which are
form of declarations, while the remaining three are in the form of orders. The plaintiff's main comp
seems to me, can be found in his first relief. In this, the plaintiff claims:

"A declaration that the Senior Advocate of Ghana (SAG) scheme as presently constituted by th
defendant, the Ghana Bar Association, is improper, illegal, unlawful and void as it is inconsistent w
spirit and letter of the Legal Profession Act, 1960 (Act 32) as amended, as well as the subsidiary legi
made under it such as the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct and Etiquette) Rules, 1969 (LI 61

The events that provoked this action are the creation and conferment by the defendant-association on
of its members of what it termed the degree and status of Senior Advocate of Ghana (SAG). The said d
and status were purported, to have been created by a resolution passed by members of the defe
association at one of its annual conferences. It is the contention of the plaintiff, who is a private
practitioner and a member of the defendant-association, that this award, which is new in the legal prof
in this country, has no legal basis as it is not sanctioned by or provided for in the Legal Profession Act
(Act, 32) or in any subsidiary legislation made thereunder, such as the Legal Profession (Profes
Conduct and Etiquette) Rules, 1969 (LI 613). It is also the contention of the plaintiff that the defe
association has no authority, to institute such a degree and status, and that if there should be a need fo
an award in this country, then it is the General Legal Council, the legal body charged with the respon
of seeing to the education or training, enrolment, control and discipline of lawyers in the country which
be appropriate body to institute it, and not the defendant-association.

Alternatively, the plaintiff contends that such an award can only be instituted by a body established
solely for the purpose. The plaintiff thinks that that is what has been done in both Nigeria and England
the analogous awards of Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN), and queen's counsel respectively are con
by bodies other than the bar associations of those countries, especially established for the purpose.

As would be expected, the defendant-association disagrees with the plaintiff. In paragraph (27) and
the statement of defence filed on [p.445] its behalf, the following averments have been made:

"(27) Paragraph (55) is denied and the first defendant says further that the institution of the SAG sche
it is proper and within the powers of the general council of the bar.

(28) In general answer to the statement of claim, the first defendant says it discloses no reasonable ca
action, it is a hopeless piece of litigation and prior to or at the hearing of the suit will set down fo
argument the capacity of the plaintiff to bring the action

True to its word, the defendant-association filed additional summons for directions in which it set o
following issues for trial:

"(1) Whether or not the plaintiff has capacity to institute this action.
(2) Whether or not the Senior Advocate of Ghana (SAG) scheme instituted by the first defendant is
and ultra vires its powers."

At the hearing of the summons for directions, counsel for the defendant-association applied for these
to be set down for determination by legal argument as it was thought that the determination of these
would substantially dispose of the whole case. The application was granted and later, arguments
received from both sides. This judgment is therefore the outcome of the legal arguments canvassed o
sides.

The first issue dealt with is the issue of capacity and whether or not the plaintiff has a cause of actio
first submission made by counsel for the defendant-association, Mr. Nana Akufo-Addo, is that the p
has no cause of action against the defendant-association and so he is incompetent to maintain this
Counsel referred to a definition of "cause of action" given by Diplock LJ in the English case of Le
Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232, CA and submitted that the plaintiff has, failed to show by his pleadings that
a personal interest in the matter, that is that he had any personal interest in the operation of the
Advocate of Ghana (SAG) scheme. For example, he argued, the plaintiff did not show that he had a
for but was refused the honour. Counsel also submitted that since by paragraph (55) of his statement o
the plaintiff conceded that the SAG scheme could only be brought into being by an amendment of the e
legislation, no one could be accused of violating the existing legislation; and that there was no contr
between the plaintiff and the defendant-association to warrant the making [p.446] of the declarations
sought by the plaintiff. Another submission counsel made was that the question of the Senior Advo
Ghana scheme involves the entire profession, and that the plaintiff has no personal interest in the decla
he seeks. That it is the whole profession which can institute a relator or class action if they so desire. C
concluded his submissions on this issue by reiterating the point that no cause of action was vested
plaintiff. He cited in support Domfe v Adu [1984-86] 2 GLR 653, CA; Ghana Rubber Products Ltd. v Cr
Co Ltd [1984-86] 2 GLR 56, CA; Amponsah v Appiagyei; Amoah v Anthony; Boakye v Effah; Boa
Boahen (Consolidated) [1982-83] GLR 96 and Clark v Epsom Rural District Council [1929] 1 Ch 287 a

In respect of the second issue, namely whether or not the Senior Advocate of Ghana (SAG) scheme ins
by the defendant-association is illegal and ultra vires its powers, counsel for the association contend
the association, by instituting this scheme, has not violated any provision of Act 32, nor has it violate
other law. It has not also usurped any powers of the General Legal Council. According to couns
association has instituted the scheme in order to honour its leading members and that in the area of hon
lawyer, there is no statutory provision therefor and so no act done by it in that area can be said to
from the powers of the General Legal Council, or be the concern of any other body. That the Ghan
Association by its constitution concerns itself with matters affecting the legal profession in Ghana, an
in furtherance of its aims, the association can by a resolution passed by a majority of its members
annual conference decide to act in a certain way. That it was by such a resolution that the SAG schem
instituted; and that it needed no statutory authorisation so to do. Counsel for the defendant-asso
contends that it is because it has not violated any provision of Act 32, or indeed of any law, or done an
that detracts from the powers of the Ghana Legal Council that neither the council nor any prominent m
of the legal profession, for example, the Chief Justice, or the Attorney-General, has complained abo
institution of the scheme. Indeed, counsel is of the view that the General Legal Council has not pro
the scheme; that the council has accepted it. As regards the prescribed court dress for lawyers, coun
the defendant-association contends that there is no statute covering the same and that the circulars
by the Chief Justice thereon are based on convention.

The plaintiff, who appeared in person, disagrees with the above arguments. As regards capacity, the p
is of the view that regulations [p.447] 2(2), and 9(11) of LI 613 gives every lawyer or member of the
profession the right to take the relevant steps to protect the profession whenever he sees anything
wrong with the profession. It is not necessary therefore, he argues, that a member should suffer direc
injury before he can take the appropriate steps to check any abuses or excesses in the professio
plaintiff thinks, therefore, that he has the capacity to take the present action, especially as nothing in
Act 32, or LI 613 prevents him from taking the action.

The plaintiff also thinks that he has a cause of action in the matter as the matters complained of conc
interest. For example, he argues that the reserving of some areas at the courts to be used exclusiv
Senior Advocates of Ghana as car parks has deprived him, as a practising lawyer at the courts, of the
these areas. In other words, he cannot park his car there. And he thinks that this deprivation is illegal
Senior Advocate of Ghana scheme is illegal and unauthorised. He contends, therefore, that he has th
and duty to take action to stop this illegal and unauthorised scheme which has brought about this depri
The plaintiff argues that only the proper authority can lawfully deprive him of his right to park his car
place at the courts and the defendant is not a proper authority so far as this matter is concerned.

Another way in which the plaintiff thinks his interest as a lawyer has been affected by the Senior Advo
Ghana scheme is the alteration of the prescribed court dress for lawyers by sewing onto the black go
recipients of such honour, red lapels. This distinguishes them from other lawyers. This, according
plaintiff, places them in a special class and holds them out as lawyers who are superior to the other la
including himself, some of whom may even be senior to them at the bar, and places them in a more favo
position so far as prospective clients are concerned. The alteration of the black gowns by sewing onto
the red lapels, argues the plaintiff, not only seriously violates the General Legal Council's circular on
dress, but the wearing of such gowns would also be considered as violating regulation 2(1) and (3) of
which forbids advertising, touting and publicity by lawyers. The plaintiff tendered in evidence a copy
General Legal Council's circular No SCR/92/Vol 8 dated 16 January 1989, marked exhibit A. In sup
his contention that he has capacity to institute the action and also that he has an interest in the matt
plaintiff cited Tuffuor v Attorney-General [1980] GLR 637, CA sitting as SC and Lee v Showmen's G
Great Britain [1952] 1 All ER 1175, CA.

On the issue as to whether the Senior Advocate of Ghana scheme [p.448] instituted by the defe
association is illegal and ultra vires its powers, the plaintiff has seriously argued that the association
authority to institute the scheme and so the scheme is illegal.

There is no doubt that the one body in this country which is charged with responsibility for the educa
professional training, enrolment, discipline, and the general control of lawyers is the General Legal C
A study of Act 32 and the subsidiary legislation made thereunder, LI 613, will leave one in no doubt th
body responsible for the professional affairs of lawyers in the country is the General Legal Council. S
1(1) of Act 32 provides that:
"1.(1) There shall continue to be a body, to be called the General Legal Council, which shall be conc
with the legal profession and, in particular,—

(a) with the organization of legal education, and

(b) with upholding standards or professional conduct."

For the purpose of carrying out these onerous tasks, the General Legal Council has been given po
make rules by legislative instrument: see section 13, 14, 16, 23 and 53 of Act 32. One of the instrume
council made in pursuance of the powers given them is LI 613 which prescribed the rules of profes
conduct and etiquette to be observed by lawyers. It must be noted that the council has also been given
in section 14 of Act 32 to make regulations concerning all matters connected with legal education inc
"the issue of diplomas to persons who have passed examinations conducted by the General Legal Co
Hence, there is statutory authority for the award of a diploma to a person who has qualified to bec
lawyer. In the universities also, the degrees, diplomas and certificates awarded are all backed by sta
authority.

It must also be observed that it is by virtue of the powers given to the General Legal Council to see
professional conduct and etiquette of lawyers that the council by exhibit A, its circular dated 16 January
referred to earlier, prescribed the dress to be used for court not only by lawyers, but also by the judges
whom they appear. I quote in full the circular:

[p.449]

"SCR/92/Vol 8/

GENERAL LEGAL COUNCIL

P O BOX 179

ACCRA

16 January 1989.

DRESS FOR COURT SITTINGS AND APPEARANCE

I have instruction from his Lordship, the Chief Justice who is also the Chairman of the General Legal C
to inform you that the following is the dress for sittings and appearances in court:

1. BENCH

(a) Full robbing (ie dark suit, gown, wig and bibs) is compulsory for all superior court and circuit judge

(b) Professional magistrates may fully robe.

2. BAR

(a) Full robbing (ie wearing of dark suit, gown, wig and bibs) is compulsory in the superior and circuit

3 The General Legal Council further wishes the members of the Bar to know that any lawyer who ap
before a judge without robbing as stated in paragraph 2 above shall not be heard.

4 All judges are, therefore, requested not to give audience to any lawyer who appears before them w
robbing fully."

It is undisputed that when the defendant-association instituted the SAG scheme, they altered the black
prescribed as indicated above by sewing onto the gown of each of those who have been honoured w
title "SAG" a distinctive feature, namely a red lapel. This distinguishes them from other lawyers. The p
contends that the defendant- association has no right to institute the scheme and to alter the dress pres
by the General Legal Council.

I have no hesitation in saying that it is wrong to tamper with the dress legally prescribed by the Genera
Council by adding to it something which was formerly not there without the permission of the council. A
courtesy demanded that the consent of the council should have been sought before such alteratio
made. Nothing suggests that any attempt was made by the defendant-association to seek a consent.
such a conduct not give cause for concern to at least some members in the profession? Yet it seem
nobody in the General [p.450] Legal Council has noticed that the court dress they had described was
altered without their consent. The argument by the defendant's counsel that the circular was bas
convention and not on statute does not impress me. I think that the General Legal Council has power
32 to prescribe the court dress as I have explained earlier. But even if the circular was based on conv
is it proper that it should be violated? Does that augur well for discipline and orderly legal profession
has the plaintiff any right to complain about these lapses?

I think he has the right to complain and to bring this action. Regulation 2(2) of LI 613 provides that "It
duty of every lawyer at all times to uphold the dignity and high standing of his profession and his own
and high standing as a member of it." Regulation 9(11) of the said LI 613 also specifically provides th

"(11) It is the duty of a lawyer to maintain the honour and integrity of his profession, and to expose w
fear or favour before the proper Tribunal unprofessional or dishonest conduct by any member
profession, and to accept without hesitation a retainer against any member of the profession who is a
to have wronged his client."

I think that it is clear from these regulations that any lawyer can bring an action which seeks to ma
ensure, or preserve the dignity, honour and integrity of the legal profession if he feels that these are
threatened or undermined by the act or acts of any member of or body in the profession. The argum
the defendant's counsel that the tribunal mentioned in regulation 9(11) of LI 613 is the disciplinary com
of the General Legal Council, and so the plaintiff's complaint should have been referred to that com
and not brought before this court is an admission that the plaintiff has the capacity to take action but t
proper forum should be the disciplinary committee. It seems to me that the facts of this case are such
would not be proper to take the matter to the disciplinary committee. A complaint made before the disci
committee would have to be against the recipients of the SAG title as a complaint at the forum is u
against an individual lawyer. It seems to me that it would not be fair to the individual lawyers who inno
received this honour conferred on them. I think that the most reasonable thing to do is to challenge the
of that award and so it is the institution which made the award that must be tackled. I am of the view the
that the plaintiff took the right step.

Apart from the statutory provisions referred to above, I think that the [p.451] plaintiff has demonstrate
he has an interest in the matter and that this interest has been affected as has been stated earlie
satisfied therefore that the plaintiff has the capacity to institute this action and he has shown that he
cause of action: see Tuffuor v Attorney-General (supra) at 639, Dyson v Attorney-General [1911] 1 K
CA and Lee v Showmen's Guild of Great Britain (supra).

The next question to be decided is whether or not the SAG scheme instituted by the defendant-asso
is illegal and ultra vires its powers. As I have observed earlier, certificates or diplomas awarded by the G
Legal Council to persons who have passed the prescribed examinations to qualify them to be enro
lawyers are backed by Act 32; and the degrees, diplomas, and certificates awarded by our universiti
similarly backed by statute. But by what statutory authority has the Ghana Bar Association, the defe
herein, purported to institute the degree and status of Senior Advocate of Ghana (SAG)? I am yet to be
that authority.

In Nigeria, as observed earlier, the analogous scheme of Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN) was ins
under the Legal Practitioners Act, 1975 (Cap 207). Section 5(1), (2) and (3) of this Act provides as fol

"5.(1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, the Legal Practitioners' Privileges Committee estab
under subsection (3) of this section may by instrument confer on a legal practitioner the rank of
Advocate of Nigeria.

(2) A person shall not be conferred with the rank of Senior Advocate of Nigeria unless he has been qu
to practice as a legal practitioner in Nigeria for not less than ten years and has achieved distinction
legal profession in such manner as the committee may from time to time determine.

(3) There shall be a committee to be called the Legal Practitioners' Privileges Committee which shall c
of the following—

(a) the Chief Justice who shall be chairman;

(b) the Attorney-General of the Federation;

(c) one Justice of the Supreme Court;

(d) the President of the Court of Appeal;

(e) five of the Chief Judges of the States;

(f) the Chief Judge of the Federal High Court; and

(g) five legal practitioners who are Senior Advocates of Nigeria."

[p.452]

It is clear from the above in Nigeria the senior advocates scheme has been established by an
Parliament and the committee responsible for the conferment is composed of the Chief Justice, eigh
judges, the Attorney-General and five legal practitioners who are Senior Advocates of Nigeria. There, i
a monopoly by the bar association. I have found no legal justification why in Ghana the bar goes it alo

Counsel for the defendant-association sought to suggest that the scheme is that of honouring its l
members. But me to the Senior Advocate of Ghana (SAG) scheme is more than mere honouring of l
members of the defendant-association. The scheme affects the other very important section of the
profession, namely the courts. Unless the honour conferred is recognised by the Chief Justice and the
it would, in my view, remain a hollow one. The defendant-association assumed that the General Legal C
and the courts have recognised the honour it has been conferring on some of its members. I wonde
still labouring under that false impression. As a result of this action, the General Legal Council has co
boldly to say that it does not recognise the scheme and has not been privy to its institution. Indee
council's chairman is said to have asked that no car parks should any longer be reserved for
Advocates of Ghana.

I have not been persuaded that the defendant-association has the legal authority for the institution
Senior Advocate of Ghana (SAG) scheme. I find no legal basis for it. In my view, the Ghana Bar Asso
alone cannot successfully institute such a scheme as it has no legal right to impose such a scheme
General Legal Council and on the courts. I think therefore that what it has done is illegal. I agree w
plaintiff that the appropriate body qualified to institute such a scheme is the General Legal Council, if it
it is necessary. It has been given power to ensure the smooth running of the legal profession and to
the control and discipline of the lawyers. It has been given power to make rules or regulations to en
carry out its function. It is, therefore the General Legal Council which can initiate the necessary legisla
the institution, should it decide to institute the scheme.

It is my decision, therefore, that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment on his reliefs (a) and (b) except
relief (b) all the words therein indicating that the General Legal Council is the second defendant sho
deleted. Accordingly, I make the declarations sought in those reliefs. [p.453] I dismiss the other relie
find no basis for granting them.

DECISION

Judgment for the plaintiff.

JNNO