Sumulong v.

Commission on Elections

Case No. 149

G.R. No. 48634 (October 8, 1941)

FACTS:

On September 15, 1941, Respondent granted the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos the exclusive
right to propose the minority election inspector in the first congressional district of Pampanga,
and to the Popular Front Party of Petitioner, the minority inspector in the second congressional district
of the said province. Eleven days later, Respondent modified its ruling and awarded the minority
inspector to the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos.

ISSUE:

W/N Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion.

HELD:

Where the minimum number of votes required by law was polled by a mere coalition or alliance of
minority parties, the right to minority representation in the board of election inspectors to which such
coalition is entitled, cannot be claimed by any of the component parties which have thereafter
separated. Respondent shall have the discretion to choose the minority inspector.
People vs. Hon. Vicente Echavez, Jr. (G.R. Nos. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980)

25APR

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th Assistant of Provincial

Bohol VICENTE DE LA SERNA. JR., as complainant all private prosecutor, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol Branch
II, ANO DACULLO, GERONIMO OROYAN, MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO CAJES and
MODESTO S SUELLO, respondents.
Ponente: AQUINO
FACTS:
Petitioner Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen persons charging
them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. Before the accused could be
arraigned, respondent Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dismissing the five
informations (out of 16 raffled) on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered
the land through “stealth and strategy”, whereas under the decree the entry should be effected
“with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of
the landowner”, and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the
cultivation of a grazing land. From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under
Republic Act No. 5440.
ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar acts, (also) apply to
agricultural lands.

HELD:
NO. Appeal was devoid of merit.Trial court’s dismissal was affirmed.

RATIO:
[T]he lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its
preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more
particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The
squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not
apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to
urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a
tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain.
Tanada v. Tuvera

GR L-63915, 24 April 1985 (136 SCRA 27)

En Banc, Escolin (p): 1 concur, 2 concur with reservation, 1 took no part, 1 on leave

Facts:

Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern (Section 6, Article IV of the
1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. They maintain that since the subject of the
petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they are
proper parties for the petition. The respondents alleged, however through the Solicitor-General, that
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. They further contend that
publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectiveness of laws where
the laws provide for their own effectivity dates. Thus publication is not indispensable.

Issue:

Whether publication is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of laws

Held:

Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not
provide for its effectivity date — for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenthprovides for the date when it goes into effect. This is correct insofar as
it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Article 2 however, considered in the light of
other statutes applicable to the issue does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of the such
provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim “ignorantia legis non excusat.” It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one. Further, publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. In the present case,
Presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and
effect. The implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official
Gazette is an operative fact, which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

The Supreme Court ordered the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application and that unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.
Tanada v. Tuvera (Resolution)

GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA 446)

En Banc, Cruz (p) : 8 concurring

Facts:

On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication to the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall
have no binding force and effect. Decision was concurred only by 3 judges. Petitioners move for
reconsideration / clarification of the decision on various questions. Solicitor General avers that the
motion is a request for advisory opinion. February Revolution took place, which subsequently required
the new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court).

Issue:

Whether publication is still required in light of the clause “unless otherwise provided”.Held: The clause
“unless it is otherwise provided,” in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean
that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date,
without its previous publication. The legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day
period shall be shortened or extended. Publication requirements applies to (1) all statutes, including
those of local application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated
by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or directly conferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the
purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a
city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the
inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to “fill in the details” of the Central Bank Act
which that body is supposed to enforce. Further, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all
since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.

The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as
soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15
days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2
of the Civil Code.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-48634 October 8, 1941

JUAN SUMULONG, in his capacity as President of the POPULAR

FRONT, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Lorenzo Sumulong and Ruperto V. Suñga for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor-General de la Costa and Acting Assistant Solicitor-General
Gianzon for the respondent.

MORAN, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to review the resolution of the Commission on

Elections granting the Popular Front Party headed by the Pedro Abad Santos the
exclusive right to propose the minority election inspector in the second congressional
district of Pampanga for the forthcoming national elections.

In the elections of 1938, the Popular Front Party, supporting the candidacies of
Francisco Lazatin and Joaquin Alejandrino for the first and second legislative districts of
Pampanga, polled more than ten per centum of the total votes cast in said legislative
districts. It appears, however, that said Popular Front Party was then a mere coalition of
several minority groups among which are the Popular Front faction of Juan Sumulong
and that of Pedro Abad Santos. These two factions now stand out as separate and
independent minority parties supporting different sets of candidacies for the forthcoming
national elections. On September 15, 1941, the Commission on Elections granted to the
Popular Front Party of Abad Santos the right to propose the minority inspector in the
second congressional district of said province. On September 26, 1941, on motion for
reconsideration by Francisco M. Ramos, candidate of the Popular Front of Abad Santos
and that the Popular Front Party of Sumulong has but a nominal existence in the
province," modified its ruling of the 15th of September by awarding the minority
inspector to the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos. This resolution is the subject of
review in this petition for certiorari.

It is now a well-settled rule that where the minimum number of votes required by
law (Commonwealth Act No. 657, sec. 5) was polled by a mere coalition or alliance of
minority parties, the right to minority representation in the board of elections inspectors
to which such coalition is entitled, cannot be claimed by any of the component parties
which have thereafter separated. (Sumulong vs. Commission on Elections, 40 Off. Gaz.
[9th Sup.], No. 13, pp. 226, 230-231; Vinzons vs. Commission on Elections et al., G.R.
No. 48596, October 1, 1941.) And where such situation obtains, the Commission shall
have the discretion to choose the minority inspector. (Commonwealth Act No. 657, sec.
5; Vinzons vs. Commission on Elections et al., supra; Rimando vs. Commission on
Elections et al., G.R. No. 48603, October 1, 1941.) The modification by the Commission
of its ruling of September 15th awarding the minority inspector to the Popular Front
Party headed by Abad Santos is a legal exercise of the discretion vested in it by law. lâw phi 1.nêt

The resolution of the Commission is affirmed, with costs against petitioner.

Diaz, Laurel, and Horrilleno, MM., concur.

Separate Opinions

OZAETA, J., dissenting:

I maintain here my dissent in the analogous cases of Vinzons and Rimando, G.R.
Nos. 48596 and 48603, respectively.

The Commission on Elections having found that neither the Sumulong nor the
Abad Santos faction of the Popular Front was entitled under the law to the minority
inspector, it should have followed what the law to the minority inspector, it should have
followed what the law provides in such a case, namely, to choose such inspector at its
discretion (sec. 5, Commonwealth Act No. 657), and the person so chosen should be
nonpartisan (sec. 6,id.). When the Commission allowed the Abad Santos faction of the
Popular Front to choose the inspector for it, it abdicated the power and authority vested
in it by law in favor of said faction, and at the same time unconsciously laid itself bare to
criticism of partiality from the Sumulong faction.

It must be borne in mind that the coming election is not for Representatives only
but also for President, Vice-President , and Senators-at-large. With more reason,
therefore, should the Commission on Elections have appointed a person of its own
choice for the second inspector in order better to safeguard the interests of all the
contending parties.

There is another reason why in my opinion the award by the Commission on

Elections of the second inspector to the Abad Santos faction is particularly unfortunate.
It is a notorious fact that the party headed by Mr. Pedro Abad Santos is the Communist
Party of the Philippines. Before said party joined the Pagkakaisa ng Bayan, which was
organized by Mr. Juan Sumulong, in December, 1936, it was known as the Socialist
Party of Pampanga. After said party headed by Mr. Abad Santos has separated from
the Pagkakaisa ng Bayan or Popular Front, and has reverted to its former independent
existence, the Commission on Elections now permits it not only to parade as Popular
Front — and not as Communist Party — but also to have the second inspector to which
it admittedly is not entitled. I cannot bring myself to sanction that result.