Legarda versus Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Petron received Tax Credit Certificates by assignment from 18
private firms registered with the BOI. Petron request for
authorization to use said TCCs to pay for its excise tax
liabilities which was approved by the DOF Undersecretary and
was accepted by the BIR by issuing its own TDM. However,
the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of
the Ombudsman eventually found that the aforementioned
transactions involving the TCCs were irregular, finding
probable cause against several public officers and private
individuals, including petitioners for perpetrating the so-called
“tax credit scam.”
Ruling:
No. In the instant Petition, legal jeopardy has not yet attached
since there is so far no valid dismissal or termination of the
criminal cases against petitioners. To substantiate a claim for
double jeopardy, the following must be demonstrated:(1) first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first
jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or
is a frustration thereof. And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a)
upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c)
after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered;
and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused.
Ivler versus San Pedro
Facts:
Following a vehicular collision, petitioner Jason Ivler
(petitioner) was charged with two separate offenses: (1)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
(Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by
respondent Evangeline L. Ponce; and (2) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case
No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s and damage
to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his
temporary release in both cases. Petitioner pleaded guilty to
the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the
penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner
moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366
for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the
same offense of reckless imprudence.
Ruling:
Yes. Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense. The two charges against petitioner, arising
from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely,
Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The gravity
of the consequence is only taken into account to determine
the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense.
And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result
should affect one person or several persons, the offense
remains one and the same, and cannot be split into different
crimes and prosecutions. Hence, we hold that prosecutions
under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In
imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the
penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and
proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under
Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the
same first level court.
Lejano versus People
Facts:
On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment of
the CA and acquitted the accused in the Vizconde massacre
case, of the charges against them on the ground of lack of
proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Complainant
Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate relative of the victims, asked
the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it "denied
the prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated
the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility;
issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a
manner that resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or
committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and
prosecution witnesses.
Ruling:
No. As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered
because it places the accused under double jeopardy. To
reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in
jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has
already been absolved. There is reason for this provision of
the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State
is ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts
to prosecute the accused for the same offense after he has
been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State
for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually
overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and
the will to fight. In People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan:
At the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the
sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment
for the same offense would arm the government with a potent
instrument of oppression. Of course, on occasions, a motion
for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But the
grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that
absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting
in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any
of such cases, the State may assail the decision by special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
People versus Dahilig
Facts:
Accused and AAA were both employed as house helpers by a
certain Karen Gomez. AAA was only 16 years old at the time
of the commission of the act. Accused denied having raped
AAA. According to him, the sexual congress that transpired
between them was consensual as she was then his
girlfriend. AAA belied denial and with the assistance of their
employer, filed the case and accused arrested. He was
convicted of child abuse instead of rape.
Ruling:
No. The offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the
same act because his right against double jeopardy will be
prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal
liability for a single criminal act. In People v. Aba, it was stated
that if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be
charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d])
of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, the accused can
indeed be charged with either Rape or Child Abuse and be
convicted. Considering, however, that the information
correctly charged the accused with rape in violation of Article
266-A par. 1 in relation to Article 266-B, 1st par. of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and that he was
convicted, the CA should have merely affirmed the conviction.
People versus Mirandilla
Facts:
For Review before the Court is the Decision of the CA
finding accused Felipe Mirandilla guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of special complex crime of kidnapping with rape; four
counts of rape; and, one count of rape through sexual assault.
Mirandilla is asking the Court to acquit him. He contends that
he could not have kidnapped and raped the victim,
AAA, whom he claims to be his live-in partner.
Ruling: No. An appeal in criminal case opens the entire case
for review on any question, including one not raised by the
parties. The reason behind this rule is that when an accused
appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws
the whole case open to the review of the appellate court,
which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and
justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the
appellant. The Court agrees with the CA in finding Mirandilla
guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape,
instead of simple kidnapping. Notably, however, no matter
how many rapes had been committed in the special complex
crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one
kidnapping with rape. This is because these composite acts
are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No.
7659 punishes these acts with only one single penalty.
Judge Mupas versus People
Facts:
Private petitioner Zafra was Supply Officer V of the DSWD
arranged for the withdrawal for replacement, of 200 cartons of
Bear Brand Powdered Milk that were nearing their expiry date.
On the appointed date, however, no one from the Property
Division arrived to pick up the milk cases. Instead, three
unidentified persons including the sister of Zafra came to pick
up the milk cases. The committee found substantial evidence
to hold petitioner Zafra guilty of dishonesty and “negligence
of duty and was dismissed. Petitioner Zafra filed a Motion for
Reconsideration praying the grant of her demurrer to
evidence.
Ruling:
Yes. As a general rule, an order granting the
accused’s demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal.
There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant
thereof would not violate the constitutional proscription on
double jeopardy. For instance, this Court ruled that when there
is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court in dismissing a criminal case by granting
the accused’s demurrer to evidence, its judgment is
considered void. In the instant case, having affirmed the CA
finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
when it granted the accused’s demurrer to evidence, we
deem its consequent order of acquittal void.
People versus Hadja Jarma Lalli
Facts:
This is a consolidated criminal case filed against the accused-
appellants for the crimes of Illegal Recruitment (Criminal Case
No. 21930) and Trafficking in Persons (Criminal Case No.
21908). The trial court found that the accused, without a
POEA license, conspired in recruiting Lolita and trafficking her
as a prostitute, resulting in crimes committed by a syndicate.
Ruling:
No. When an act or acts violate two or more different laws and
constitute two different offenses, a prosecution under one will
not bar a prosecution under the other. The constitutional right
against double jeopardy only applies to risk of punishment
twice for the same offense, or for an act punished by a law
and an ordinance. The prohibition on double jeopardy does
not apply to an act or series of acts constituting different
offenses.
Goodland versus Co and Chan
Facts:
Petitioner-appellant Goodland Company allowed the use of its
Makati property, by way of accommodation, as security to the
loan facility of Smartnet with Asia United Bank. Mr. Guy,
Goodland’s Vice President, was allegedly made to sign a Real
Estate Mortgage (REM) document in blank. Goodland found
out that the REM signed in blank by Mr. Guy has been
allegedly filled up or completed and annotated at the back of
the title of the Makati property. Goodland thus wrote a letter
to the NBI requesting for an investigation of the fraud
committed by private respondents. A case was filed for
Falsification of Public Document defined and penalized under
Article 172 in relation to Article 171 (2) of the Revised Penal
Code against private respondents Co and Chan and
Atty.Pelicano. The case is dismissed for failure of the
prosecution to present sufficient and competent evidence to
rebut the presumption of innocence of the accused.
Ruling:
No. It is settled that a judgment of acquittal cannot be
recalled or withdrawn by another order reconsidering the
dismissal of the case, nor can it be modified except to
eliminate something which is civil or administrative in
nature. One exception to the rule is when the prosecution is
denied due process of law. Another exception is when the trial
court commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a
criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to
evidence. If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting
Goodland’s prayer is not tantamount to putting Co and Chan
in double jeopardy. It was with reason, therefore, that the CA
declared that the evidence for Goodland failed miserably in
meeting the quantum of proof required in criminal cases to
overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence. Grave
abuse of discretion may not be attributed to a court simply
because of its alleged misappreciation of evidence.
Section22
Wright versus CA
Petitioner, an Australian Citizen, was sought by Australian
authorities for indictable crimes in his country. Extradition
proceedings were filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, which rendered a decision ordering the deportation of
petitioner. Said decision was sustained by the Court of
Appeals; hence, petitioner came to this Court by way of
review on certiorari, to set aside the order of deportation.
Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty giving
retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex
post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution. He assails the trial court's decision ordering his
extradition, arguing that the evidence adduced in the court
below failed to show that he is wanted for prosecution in his
country. Capsulized, all the principal issues raised by the
petitioner before this Court strike at the validity of the
extradition proceedings instituted by the government against
him.
Ruling:
Yes. The first paragraph of Article 18 refers to the Treaty's
date of effectivity; the second paragraph pertains to its
termination. Absolutely nothing in the said provision relates
to, much less, prohibits retroactive enforcement of the Treaty.
Applying the constitutional principle, the (Court) has held that
the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which
affects the substantial rights of the accused." This being so,
there is no absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that
the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive
application with respect to offenses committed prior to the
Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the
Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the
Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a
piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute.
"It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for
prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime
was already committed or consummated at the time the
treaty was ratified."
People versus Lacson
Facts:
The respondent seeks the reconsideration of the Resolution of
this Court which granted the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration. The respondent thereafter prays to allow
Associate Justices appointive by GMA to voluntary inhibit
themselves or, absent their consent, rule that such inhibition
is in order and to recuse them from further deliberating,
discussing or, in any manner, participating in the resolution of
the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplement to Motion
for Reconsideration. The respondent points out that the
members of the Court were appointed by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo
Ruling:
The time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable
compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the
societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and
speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice
to the State and the accused. It took into account the
substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due
process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable
period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases
with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended
parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected
unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or
insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice.
No. The Court is not mandated to apply Section 8 retroactively
simply because it is favorable to the accused. It must be
noted that the new rule was approved by the Court not only to
reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy
disposition of the case. The time-bar under the new rule was
fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the
administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of
the State and the accused; not for the accused only. The two-
year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the
State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and
reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-
bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. For to do
so would cause an "injustice of hardship" to the State and
adversely affect the administration of justice in general and of
criminal laws in particular. In this case, when the Court
approved Section 8, it intended the new rule to be applied
prospectively and not retroactively, for if the intention of the
Court were otherwise, it would defeat the very purpose for
which it was intended, namely, to give the State a period of
two years from notice of the provisional dismissal of criminal
cases with the express consent of the accused. It would be a
denial of the State’s right to due process and a travesty of
justice for the Court to apply the new rule retroactively in the
present case as the respondent insists, considering that the
criminal cases were provisionally dismissed. A retroactive
application of the time-bar will result in absurd, unjust and
oppressive consequences to the State and to the victims of
crimes and their heirs. If the time-bar fixed in Section 8 were
to be applied retroactively, this would mean that the State
would be barred from reviving the case for failure to comply
with the said time-bar, which was yet to be approved by the
Court three years after the provisional dismissal of the
criminal case.
Chavez versus COMELEC
Facts:
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which contained the
assailed provision on Section 32. Petitioner filed his certificate
of candidacy for the position of Senator and was directed to
comply with the said provision by the COMELEC's Law
Department by ordering petitioner to remove or cause the
removal of the billboards, or to cover them from public view
pending the approval of his request. Feeling aggrieved,
petitioner Chavez asks this Court that the COMELEC be
enjoined from enforcing the assailed provision. He urges this
Court to declare the assailed provision unconstitutional as the
same is allegedly in the nature of an ex-post facto law.
Ruling:
No. Section 32, although not penal in nature, defines an
offense and prescribes a penalty for said offense. Laws of this
nature must operate prospectively, except when they are
favorable to the accused. The offense, as expressly prescribed
in the assailed provision, is the non-removal of the described
propaganda materials three (3) days after the effectivity of
COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. If the candidate for public
office fails to remove such propaganda materials after the
given period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code for premature campaigning. Indeed,
nowhere is it indicated in the assailed provision that it shall
operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law
in this case.
Republic versus Eugenio
Facts:
Following the promulgation of Agan, a series of investigations
concerning the award of the NAIA 3 contracts to PIATCO were
undertaken by the Ombudsman and the Compliance and
Investigation Staff (CIS) of petitioner Anti-Money Laundering
Council (AMLC). Alvarez had been charged by the
Ombudsman with violation of Section 3(j) of R.A. No. 3019.
The search revealed that Alvarez maintained eight (8) bank
accounts with six (6) different banks.
Ruling:
Yes. Lilia Cheng argues that the proscription against ex post
facto laws goes as far as to prohibit any inquiry into deposits
or investments included in bank accounts opened prior to the
effectivity of the AMLA even if the suspect transactions were
entered into when the law had already taken effect. The Court
recognizes that if this argument were to be affirmed, it would
create a horrible loophole in the AMLA that would in turn
supply the means to fearlessly engage in money laundering in
the Philippines. nowhere in the legislative record cited by Lilia
Cheng does it appear that there was an unequivocal intent to
exempt from the bank inquiry order all bank accounts opened
prior to the passage of the AMLA. There is a cited exchange
between Representatives Zamora and Lopez where the latter
confirmed that “deposits are supposed to be exempted from
scrutiny or monitoring if they are already in place as of the
time the law is enacted.” That statement does indicate that
transactions already in place when the AMLA was passed are
indeed exempt from scrutiny through a bank inquiry order, but
it cannot yield any interpretation that records of transactions
undertaken after the enactment of the AMLA are similarly
exempt. Due to the absence of cited authority from the
legislative record that unqualifiedly supports respondent Lilia
Cheng’s thesis, there is no cause for us to sustain her
interpretation of the AMLA, fatal as it is to the anima of that
law. The passage of the AMLA stripped another layer off the
rule on absolute confidentiality that provided a measure of
lawful protection to the account holder. For that reason, the
application of the bank inquiry order as a means of inquiring
into records of transactions entered into prior to the passage
of the AMLA would be constitutionally infirm, offensive as it is
to the ex post facto clause.
U.S. versus Juvenile Male
Facts:
Respondent Juvenile Male was 13 years old when he began
sexually abusing a 10-year-old boy. Respondent was charged
in the District of Montana with delinquency under the Federal
Juvenile Delinquency Act. Respondent pleaded "true" to
charges that he knowingly engaged in sexual acts with a child
under 12. While respondent remained in juvenile detention,
Congress enacted SORNA which states that a sex offender
must "register, and keep the registration current, in each
jurisdiction" where the offender resides, is employed, or
attends school. This registration requirement extends to
certain juveniles adjudicated as delinquent for serious sex
offenses and mandates that it be applied retroactively to sex
offenders convicted before the statute's enactment. The
District Court determined that respondent had failed to
comply with the requirements of his prerelease program. The
court revoked respondent's juvenile supervision, imposed an
additional 6-month term of detention, and ordered that the
detention be followed by supervision until respondent's 21st
birthday.
Ruling:
Yes. The court's opinion discussed only the merits and
concluded that applying SORNA to juvenile delinquents who
committed their offenses "before SORNA's passage violates
the Ex Post Facto Clause.
BOCEA versus Teves
Facts: Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335
to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection
of the BIR and the BOC. BOCEA opined that the revenue target
was impossible to meet due to the Government’s own policies
on reduced tariff rates and tax breaks to big businesses, the
occurrence of natural calamities and because of other
economic factors. BOCEA claimed that some BOC employees
were coerced and forced to sign the Performance Contract.
The majority of them, however, did not sign.
Ruling:
No. The Court holds that R.A. No. 9335 is not a bill of
attainder. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment on individuals or members of a particular group
without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a
specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals,
the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the
lack of judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the
elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict
punishment without a judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 merely lays
down the grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC official
or employee and provides for the consequences thereof. The
democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional
rights of the concerned employee are amply protected.

2002 Bar
No IX. A Tamaraw FX driven by Asiong Cascasero, who was
drunk, sideswiped a pedestrian along EDSA in Makati City,
resulting in physical injuries to the latter. The public
prosecutor filed two separate informations against Cascasero,
the first for reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries
under the Revised Penal Code, and the second for violation of
an ordinance of Makati City prohibiting and penalizing driving
under the influence of liquor. Cascasero was arraigned, tried
and convicted for reckless imprudence resulting in physical
injuries under the Revised Penal Code. With regard to the
second case (i.e., violation of the city ordinance), upon being
arraigned, he filed a motion to quash the information invoking
his right against double jeopardy. He contended that, under
Art. III, Section 21 of the Constitution, if an act is punished by
a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act
He argued that the two criminal charges against him
stemmed from the same act of driving allegedly under the
influence of liquor which caused the accident. Was there
double jeopardy? Explain your answer (5%)
FIRST ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, there is double jeopardy. Under the second sentence of
Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution, if an act is punished
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act. In this case, the same act is involved in the two
cases. The reckless imprudence which resulted in physical
injuries arose from the same act of driving under the influence
of liquor. In Yap v. Lutero, G.R. No. L-12669, April 30, 1959, the
Supreme Court held that an accused who was acquitted of
driving recklessly in violation of an ordinance could not be
prosecuted for damage to property through reckless
imprudence because the two charges were based on the
same act. In People v, Relova, 148 SCRA 292 (1987), it was
held that when there is identity in the act punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
bar prosecution under the other.