Green Book 2019

PAKISTAN ARMY

Changing Global Scenario and

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy
Sardar Masood Khan

The Hybrid Challenge:

Whose Problem is it anyway?
Dr Mohammad Iftikhar Zaidi
Professor Caroline Kennedy-Pipe

Re-appraisal of the Principles of

War and their Relationship with
Tenets of Military Strategy
Lieutenant General Raza Muhammad Khan,
HI (M) (Retired)

Tackling Terrorism: Pernicious

Implications of Poor Policing
Dr Muhammad Shoaib Suddle

Lawfare as an Instrument of
Foreign Policy
Barrister Ahmer Bilal Soofi

An Analysis of Pakistan’s
Counter-Insurgency Potentials
against Non-State Actors:
Case Study of ISIS
Ms Sidra Jamil Bajwa

PAKISTAN ARMY
Administration of Swat Handed Back to Civil Authorities General Headquarters
after 11 Years Rawalpindi
 Pakistan Army Green Book
A Research Journal of Pakistan Army, recognised by the
Higher Education Commission of Pakistan

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the Green Book do not imply the official policy of the
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 PAKISTAN ARMY

Note from the Patron-in-Chief

GENERAL QAMAR JAVED BAJWA, NI (M)
Chief of Army Staff

The current stream of geo politics is extremely volatile and the strategic environment
is changing at a pace, not witnessed hither-to-fore. Challenges oscillate along a wide
spectrum ranging from conventional to the Hybrid /Grey Hybrid Zones, warranting well
considered and adroit responses at each level of the strategic paradigm. Notwithstanding
the upward trajectory, Pakistan still has some very peculiar challenges to confront. The
5th Generation Warfare that we are currently subjected to, demands a ‘Whole of the
Nation’ approach with inputs from all Elements of National Power. In the current edition
of Pakistan Army Green Book, some of our leading scholars and strategic practitioners
have touched upon most of the critical issues faced by the country and have proffered
their insightful analysis, opinions and viable recommendations, worth reading.
Pakistan Army Green Book has evolved at fast pace in the last few years and has
improved substantially in the quality of contents and relevance. The credit goes to its
contributing authors, the editorial team and the advisory board. I wish them well in their
future endeavours.

Green Book 2019 i

 PAKISTAN ARMY

PATRON Note from the Editor-in-Chief

Green Book, the flagship publication of Pakistan Army, offers
intellectual discourse on diverse range of subjects of significance
by eminent research scholars, think tanks and practitioners.
The current edition sheds light on Hybrid, Cyber and Lawfare
Challenges besides other contemporary issues. We are highly
indebted to our esteemed authors for their quality contributions.
Please feel free to exchange your ideas and opinion.

Lieutenant General Sher Afgun, HI (M)

TABLE OF CONTENTS
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Changing Global Pakistan and
Scenario and the Shifting
Pakistan’s Foreign Configuration of
Policy Geo-Politics
Sardar Masood Khan Salman Bashir

01 50
The Hybrid
Challenge: Whose
Problem is it
Major General Fida Hussain Malik, HI (M) anyway?
EDITORS Dr Mohammad
Iftikhar Zaidi &
Brigadier Muhammad Farooq Professor

10
Caroline
Colonel Saif Ullah Kennedy-Pipe
Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Bilal Usmani

Re-appraisal of the
Principles of War &
ADVISORY BOARD their Relationship
Lieutenant General Naeem Khalid Lodhi, with Tenets of
Hl (M) (Retired) Military Strategy Impact of CPEC on Pakistan in
Lieutenant General Raza
Brigadier Dr Naeem Haider, SI (M) Muhammad Khan, HI (M) Social, Demographic, Economic
Dr Zafar Iqbal Cheema
(Retired) and Legal Domains
President and Executive Director of
Strategic Vision Institute,
Islamabad, Pakistan
30 Brigadier Kamal Azfar &
Lieutenant Colonel Wasif Mahmood 62
Dr Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema Lawfare as an Strategic
Dean FCS, National Defence University
Islamabad, Pakistan
Instrument of Transformation
Foreign Policy of the Pakistan
Dr Zulfqar Khan
Head of Department, Strategic Studies
Barrister Ahmer Bilal Soofi Economy through
National Defence University,
Islamabad, Pakistan
Special Economic
Zones: A Pragmatic
Dr Rizwana Karim Abbasi Approach
National Defence University,
Islamabad, Pakistan 43 Dr Zafar
Mahmood 78
Dr Zafar Khan
National Defence University,
Islamabad, Pakistan

Dr Mohammad Iftikhar Zaidi

Cranfield University, UK

Professor Caroline Kennedy-Pipe

University of Loughborough, UK

Dr Peter Caddick Adams

Cranfield University, UK
 PAKISTAN ARMY

China: Economic Bulwark Cybersecurity: An

Against Terrorism? Lesson Essential Element of
for others National Security
Imtiaz Gul Brigadier Dr Abdul Rauf,
Brigadier Dr Ashraf Masood (Retired),
Ms Narmeen Shafqat

91 150
An Analysis of Pakistan’s National Response to
Counter-Insurgency Cyber Threats
Potentials against Brigadier Dr Tughral Yamin (Retired)
Non-State Actors:
Case Study of ISIS

101
Ms Sidra Jamil Bajwa

168
Tackling Terrorism: Mineral Wealth of
Pernicious Implications of Pakistan
Poor Policing Dr Samar Mubarakmand, NI, HI, SI
Dr Muhammad Shoaib Suddle

114 177
Growing Strategic
Coercion Against Pakistan:
Challenges & Response
Brigadier Sheikh Ghulam Jilani

129
Climate Change as
a National Security
Imperative for Pakistan
Shafqat Kakakhel
The Last Post: Major General Sana Ullah Khan, T Bt
(Shaheed) - A Soldiers’ General, Loving
138 Father & an Affectionate Husband 190
PAKISTAN ARMY

Green Book 2019 1

 CHANGING GLOBAL SCENARIO AND

PAKISTAN’S
FOREIGN POLICY

Honourable President Azad Jammu & Kashmir Sardar Masood Khan

is an established diplomat and has served on several important
assignments during his esteemed career. He is an ardent campaigner
for the rights of the people of Jammu and Kashmir

Abstract
The regional and international challenges resulted in Pakistan’s alliance and reliance on the US and the
Western World. Consequently, Pakistan joined the US sponsored pacts i.e. SEATO and CENTO in 1954 and
1955 respectively. In 1960s. Pakistan’s relations with China were developed border agreement was signed
between the two countries in 1963 and during Indo-Pak War of 1965 China supported Pakistan on all stages.
In 1970s. Pakistan’s foreign policy saw the new dimensions in wake of separation of East Pakistan and
the Afghan war in 1979. These developments influenced Pakistan greatly and brought Pakistan towards
US and the Western World. On the other hand, cordial and friendly relations were also developed with
the Muslim World, especially the Arabs and China. With present rapidly changing global scenario where
power is diffusing, there is a need to craft Pakistan’s foreign policy intelligently and diligently.

Keywords: Foreign Policy, Multi Polarity, BRI, New World Order, Changing Global Scenario

Green Book 2019 1

 T
PAKISTAN ARMY
he world’s geopolitics is passing through
a period of historical transformation.
The World Order led by the West since
the end of the Cold War is under severe
stress because of a number of factors.
Questions are being raised about
the United States’ overall moral and political
leadership of the globe. America’s exceptionalism
is being challenged by the emerging powers and
by champions of global connectivity who advocate
propagation and adherence to the rule of law at the
international level. The rise of ethnic nationalism
and centrifugal forces in West (Europe) are seen
as indications of a period of uncertainty. Russia is
assertive vis-a-vis the West; and a Cold War between
the US and China, driven by perceived bipolarity, is
unfolding. The Arab Spring has paused but not died
down. The Middle East and many regions of Africa
are being consumed by civil wars and intra-regional
warfare. Latin America seems to be relatively calm.
The Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region,
though prospering economically, are being primed
as a platform for great power contest.
Changing Global Scenario
The United States will continue to remain
a pre-eminent power or, as former Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright said, an ‘indispensable
nation’ in the World Order because it remains a
global leader in innovation, intellect, science and
technology, communications, and industry. But
other nations are emulating and catching up and
narrowing the gap with the US.
From Washington, the world will continue to
get contradictory signals of America First implying
isolation and withdrawal; and assertion of
American leadership in regard to global decision-
making. In the meantime, China’s meteoric rise will
continue and will keep on altering the global and
regional power relations.
Today, the World Order does not have a
singular doctrine. Broadly speaking, theories
about G-2 (the world to be co-managed by the US
and China), multi polarity and G-Zero1 (“a world of
2 Green Book 2019
‘‘
America’s exceptionalism is being
challenged by the emergent powers and
by champions of global connectivity who
advocate propagation and adherence to
‘‘
the rule of law at the international level
every country for themselves”) have been pedalled.
One theory has been expounded by the Chinese
leadership advocating cooperation rather than
confrontation between the existing power, the
US, and the emerging power, China, by avoiding
the so-called Thucydides Trap.2 China asserts the
transnational Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), of
which the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is an
essential part, is designed to connect nations, not
divide them. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
(commonly known as the Quad) comprising the
US, Japan, Australia and India do not agree; they
contend that the BRI process is disruptive. Disruptive
to the existing World Order? The Former US Defence
Secretary James Mattis has questioned the monopoly
of one country – China – over trade routes.
James Norman Mattis - United States’
Former Secretary of Defence
China is, cumulatively, planning to invest
US $ 1 trillion in energy, infrastructure and
industrial projects, under the framework of the
‘‘
Today, the World Order does not
have a singular doctrine. Broadly
speaking, theories about G-2 (the
world to be co-managed by the US and
China), multipolarity, and G-Zero (a
‘‘
world of every country for themselves)
have been pedalled
 PAKISTAN ARMY

MSCI ACWI & FRONTIER MARKETS INDEX

MSCI ACWI INDEX MSCI EMERGING & FRONTIER MARKETS INDEX

MSCI WORLD INDEX MSCI EMERGING MARKETS INDEX MSCI FRONTIER MARKETS INDEX

DEVELOPED MARKETS EMERGING MARKETS FRONTIER MARKETS

Americas Europe & Pacific Americas Europe, Middle Asia Americas Europe & Africa Middle East Asia
Middle East East & Africa CIS

Canada Austria Australia Brazil Czech Republic China Argentina Croatia Kenya Bahrain Bangladesh
United States Belgium Hong Kong Chile Egypt India Estonia Mauritius Jordan Sri Lanka
Denmark Japan Colombia Greece Indonesia Lithuania Morocco Kuwait Vietnam
Finland New Zealand Mexico Hungary Korea Kazakhstan Nigeria Lebanon
France Singapore Peru Poland Malaysia Romania Tunisia Oman
Germany Qatar Pakistan Serbia WAEMU2
Ireland Russia Philippines Slovenia
Israel South Africa Taiwan
Italy Turkey Thailand
Netherlands United Arab
Norway Emirates
Portugal
Spain MSCI STANDALONE MARKET INDEX
Sweden
Switzerland Saudi Arabia Jamaica Bosnia Botswana Palestine
United Panama3 Herzegovina Ghana
Kingdom Trinidad & Bulgaria Zimbabwe
Tobago Ukraine
https://www.msci.com/market-classification

BRI, supported by some 68 countries in three
continents – Asia, Africa and Europe. Despite all
the complementarities between the US and China,
their relationship is now rocked by mutually
damaging tariff wars.
In this emerging confrontation between the
architects of the post-World War II World Order and
its challengers, the next five to ten years are crucial.
There are broadly three possibilities of what may
happen.
First, the West and its allies try to maintain
the status quo by bolstering the dominance of
capitalism and liberal democracies around the
globe through internal reforms, better economic
performance, enhancement in global military
capabilities and overcoming their family feuds.
Second, China, Russia and other major powers
succeed in altering the global strategic, military and
economic order in which the existing and emerging
nations coexist under a new code of conduct and
new terms of reference, thus creating a genuinely
multipolar world. Third, the first two scenarios do
not materialise and the world, like in the first half of
the twentieth century, is engulfed by wars, conflicts
and violence on the regional and global scales. The
third scenario seems most improbable because
global citizens and even national governments will
be averse to world wars and global strife because
of their devastating effects on lifestyles, economic
growth and prospects for human development.
Equipped with nuclear weapons, countries would
know that conflict beyond a certain limit will be
suicidal.
The currency for survival, security and
deterrence, will be hard power, while soft
power would be used to gain influence and
project a positive image among nations. Military
competition, in both strategic and conventional
realms, will sharpen and accelerate. An arms’ race
between China and the US has already started. The
maintenance of continued equilibrium in state
relations will depend on the viability and success
of economic models of the leading nations. In this
new phase, there would be massive redistribution
of wealth within and among nations, with billions
of people climbing up the prosperity ladder; and
there would be demand and acceptance of more
responsive and accountable governance, while
democracy, in various forms, will sweep the globe.
One common threat to the global community,
besides wars and development of weapons of mass
destruction, will be climate change, which will
require a universal approach.
The UN will struggle with regards to hard core
strategic, political and economic issues, because
of real politik and the interests of existing and
emerging powers. However, it would be allowed
to play a leading role on sustainable economic
development and human rights, though with
certain limitations imposed by major powers. As
far as peace and security are concerned, powerful

Green Book 2019 3

 PAKISTAN ARMY

‘‘ Thirty seven countries, including

Pakistan, have been listed amongst
If one looks at the history of the past 150 years,
the world has moved from the Concert of Europe
to the League of Nations to the United Nations to
emerging economies which will compete bipolarity to multi-polarity. The next phase could
‘‘
for wealth and markets and will claim a be one of genuine multilateralism, though still
dominated by big power interests, with the UN
major chunk of global wealth entrusted to play a larger role on global commons,
environment, non-proliferation and human
security.
nations will continue to exert their diplomatic Pakistan’s Foreign Policy
authority and use military instruments in their
spheres of influence and areas of strategic interest. Foreign policy, in practice, is a product of a
Matters of peace and security of lesser importance Whole-of-Government, or to be even more precise,
for global players, such as in Africa, will be left to a Whole of State endeavour. All ministries and
the UN in regard to peacemaking, peacekeeping divisions dealing with financial, economic and
and peace-building. trade matters, defence and security, intelligence,
energy, industry, agriculture, environment and
Economics will play a key role in shaping the
culture must participate in the formulation of
future World Order, generating and redistributing
foreign policy and its execution. For this kind of
wealth, and determining power configurations. In
policy making, elaborate mechanisms should be in
2018, the size of the nominal global GDP is roughly
place in order to respond to emerging and complex
$ 87.6 trillion (or $ 135 trillion by power purchasing
challenges collectively and inclusively. The silo
parity) and is poised to grow rapidly in the years to
mentality spells disaster; while synergy amongst
come. Thirty seven countries, including Pakistan,3
all actors and stakeholders produces better results
have been listed amongst emerging economies
in both pushing the national agenda and course
which will compete for wealth and markets and
correction. Above all, there should be strong
will claim a major chunk of global wealth. The
political leadership by the Prime Minister keeping
performance of these economies will hinge on
in view the global trends and national interests.
development and goods and services’ sectors,
strong domestic economies, demand for products
and services from the developed countries, stable
currency, growth and availability of commodities
and agricultural produce, growing per capita
income, domestic and foreign capital investment,
and mechanisms to lower governments’ debts.
An interface of new technologies and the ongoing
economic revolution will transform our individual
and collective lives, and relations among nations.
Nations, even those inimical to each other, will become
interdependent in many spheres. New technologies,
such as artificial intelligence, robotics, 3D and 4D
printing, biotechnology, lethal autonomous weapons’
systems, and compact, miniaturised batteries, will
redefine the ways in which we will transact, run
enterprises, get education, provide health facilities, The initial contours of Pakistan’s foreign policy
drive, work, make war and peace, and sustain a post- were defined during the Cold War period. Some of
modern civilisation. Those who will lag behind in our statements and strategies still date back to
acquiring these new technologies and incorporating that era. The world has moved on and is moving
them in their education systems and economies will on. Pakistan’s foreign policy makers continue to
be left behind. make the necessary adjustments to the changing
It goes without saying that nations, that have times. While adhering to our national postulates,
internal stability and political continuity, will pragmatism and realism should be injected into the
show more promise and resilience in fighting off system for economic gains and transactions for the
volatilities in the global strategic and economic nation.
environment. High levels of tolerance, respect The US is not happy with Pakistan’s strong
for pluralism and diversity and harmony will partnership with China, especially in the context of
contribute to peace and economic development the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and certain
within and among nations. quarters within may present it as a zero-sum game,

4 Green Book 2019


reminiscent of George W. Bush’ “You’re either with
us, or against us”. But Pakistan and the US have
been longstanding allies. The periodic rupture or
volatility in Pak-US relations need not be hyped
and considered a permanent feature. There are
many ways to repair strained relations.
One must remember that China and the US,
despite their sharp rivalry, maintain channels
and forums open for bilateral strategic and
economic dialogue, because isolationism is not
a possibility in this connected world. Doors must
remain open for Pakistan in the US to benefit from
modern technologies, education, commerce, and
entrepreneurship, while Pakistan further cements
its ties with China. The process of exploring
new avenues of cooperation with Russia is
important for both countries, as well as the region.
Growing ties with Russia will add on regional
security environment and strengthen Pakistan’s
manufacturing and trading sectors; whereas the
primary purpose of engagement with the European
Union, the Gulf Region and East Asia should be
investment and trade.
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s dictum,
“Hide your strength, bide your time”, is also
good advice for Pakistan too; but a prerequisite
for the application of this adage is that Pakistan,
while building its strength, and avoiding strategic
entanglements that dissipate and squander its
energies, also does not allow any encroachment on
its sovereignty.
‘‘ India, in contravention to universally
recognised principles, is adamant that
it would have no such conversation on
Kashmir because it has already declared
‘‘
Jammu and Kashmir its integral part
PAKISTAN ARMY
A full rapprochement with India will not be
possible without a lasting resolution of the Kashmir
dispute in accordance with the principles of self-
determination and wishes of the Kashmiri people.
India, in contravention to universally recognised
principles, is adamant that it would have no such
conversation on Kashmir because it has already
declared Jammu and Kashmir its integral part.
Intermittent cycles of bilateral talks in the past
have yielded no results.
Human Rights’ violations in Indian Occupied Kashmir
Bilateral engagement with India, even though
cosmetic in effect, shrinks space for Kashmir
advocacy in the international community and
to the international human rights’ movement,
because during the talks they believe that India
and Pakistan themselves are sorting out the
issues relating to Kashmir and human rights.
Meanwhile Kashmiris continue to be killed,
maimed, incarceratedW and tortured on a massive
scale by Indian armed forces. Pakistan’s bilateral
dialogue with India on Kashmir and other matters,
cannot be in isolation and cannot obviate Pakistan
and the Kashmiris to credibly raise the issues of
self-determination and human rights in the UN
forums and various parliaments – The European
Parliament, The British Parliament, The US
Congress, for instance, – and global civil society
that influence policy making.
Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi
during his meeting with United Nations Secretary
General Antonio Guterres stressed on the need
for a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute.
(September 2018)
Green Book 2019 5
 PAKISTAN ARMY
Pakistan is on the right track by continuing to
invest in the efforts for peace and reconciliation in
Afghanistan and enlisting regional stakeholders.
It, obviously, cannot do it alone, as it needs the
support of Afghan Government, Taliban, US and
China. Courtney Cooper and Samir Kumar, in a blog
post4on the Council on Foreign Relations website,
talk about the need for, what they call, overcoming
the so-called prisoner’s dilemma. They write: “The
prisoner’s dilemma is a fundamental example in
game theory where rational actors (in this case, the
United States, the Afghan government and polity,
the Taliban, Pakistan, and regional actors) fail to
cooperate even if they would benefit from doing so.
In this example, each actor would benefit from a
peaceful outcome in Afghanistan but may perceive
unacceptable short-term costs associated with that
outcome.”
What is little appreciated is that Pakistan has
borne the brunt of the war in Afghanistan and its
spillover but its initiatives to jumpstart an Afghan
peace process have been repeatedly thwarted
for various reasons. This vicious cycle should be
broken by developing a strategy that would address
the concerns of other players, while protecting
Pakistan’s vital interests.
It is evident that against the backdrop of the
changing global scenarios, as outlined above,
Pakistani foreign policy’s two main priorities are
national security and economic development.
National security entails a stable political
system, national unity and conditions for the
entire population to move ahead. In addition,
Pakistan needs to work for pursuit of peace through
preparedness for war. It is here that the best tools
of foreign policy will be used to enhance national
power.
Technologically, Pakistan has done well in
developing conventional and strategic deterrence.
The diplomatic pincer of foreign policy has
successfully ensured that Pakistan, as a nuclear
weapon state, is part of the international discourse
on nuclear diplomacy. However, in 2008, the
Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), with the active
backing of the US, gave a waiver to India, a non-
NPT nuclear state like Pakistan, from its rules
regulating civilian and nuclear trade, thus creating
‘‘
It is evident that against the backdrop
of the changing global scenarios,
Pakistani foreign policy’s two main
‘‘
priorities are national security and
economic development
6 Green Book 2019
a discriminatory hierarchy. Despite this waiver and
resolute efforts by US’ diplomats, India could not
enter into the NSG as a member.
Ten years later, in 2018, the US announced
another waiver for India in the form of the Strategic
Trade Authorisation Tier-I License Exemption,
which enables India to acquire sensitive
technology, without Congressional oversight or
approval, and paves the way for the establishment
of the US’ high-tech industry in India (followed by
the French and Russian enterprises).
The irony is that such waivers by powerful NSG
members, which do not strictly conform to the NSG
rules, are not in line with international obligations.
While Pakistan must have all rights to
legitimate nuclear trade, there is a large coalition
of NSG members, all NPT states, who want a just,
criteria-based formula for entry of new members
into the NSG.
Since 1947, Pakistani diplomats have been
traditionally focusing on narrowly defined political
issues, though in relatively bigger missions,
economic and commercial counsellors and attachés
are appointed. There is a need to focus on economic
diplomacy with more energy. While the external
economic relations are entrusted to the Economic
Affairs Division and international financial
matters to the Finance Ministry, Ambassadors
and diplomatic missions are expected to achieve
goals on investment and trade. Besides, traders,
investors and entrepreneurs are not fully involved
or integrated into the exercise. Despite these
systemic handicaps, Pakistani mission do adopt a
proactive approach and try to expand investment
opportunities for Pakistan and promote Pakistani
exports. To get best results, continuous review and
empowerment is supported for leading economic
diplomacy and producing tangible results.

‘‘
Pakistan’s youth bulge and broad
demographic trends bode well for fast
GDP growth, but woefully low investment
in human capital remains a weakness
which must be redressed to realise
‘‘
Pakistan’s full economic potential
There is also the fact that in order to promote
exports there should be exportable surpluses
in sufficient quantities; and that requires
development of robust manufacturing, services
and commodities’ sectors. Pakistan needs to be
optimally represented at the global financial,
economic and trade forums and conferences. Sure,
Pakistan should be selective in choosing where to
show up, but it must be present where decisions
are being made which impact Pakistan’s economy
and integrate Pakistan into regional and global
economies.
In the new phase, Pakistan should go global
and think big. Pakistan’s youth bulge and broad
demographic trends bode well for fast GDP growth,
but woefully low investment in human capital
remains a weakness which must be redressed to
realise Pakistan’s full economic potential.
For economic diplomacy to succeed, Pakistan
should diversify its export base, reduce reliance
on textiles and raw materials, and develop high-
end manufacturing, digital industry and services’
sectors.
‘‘ To make Pakistan’s foreign policy effective, a further effective strategy must
be developed to tap the full potential of approximately 9 million strong Diaspora
Communities. Government should conceive modules for win-win partnerships, whereby
resourceful community members make profitable investments in Pakistan and project
Pakistan’s interests in their adopted countries
PAKISTAN ARMY
The CPEC is under fire from friend and foe alike.
This is partly because of a failure in communication.
The CPEC is being painted by vested interests as
part of China’s ‘debt-trap diplomacy’. Pakistan
should confidently and authoritatively convey to
all interested interlocutors all over the world that
the credit extended to it for the mega-project is on
favourable rates and conditions and that Pakistan
would be able to pay it back. Besides, the CPEC is
a catalyst for making Pakistan a regional trade and
investment hub; it is not an end itself.
One should also rightly exude confidence that
Pakistan would remain solvent in the transitional
period and is fast becoming a success story. This,
in turn, will build confidence of foreign investors
to enter into Pakistani market and supply chains.
To make Pakistan’s foreign policy effective,
a further effective strategy must be developed to
tap the full potential of approximately 9 million
strong Diaspora Communities. Government should
conceive modules for win-win partnerships,
whereby resourceful community members make
profitable investments in Pakistan and project
Pakistan’s interests in their adopted countries.
This is the model that has been followed by China,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, and many
other emerging nations. The trend has started in
Pakistan but it is at an incipient level; it needs to be
expanded to a critical scale.
Pakistan’s foreign policy will produce better
results if it is supported by positive and supportive
narratives churned out by the media, think tanks,
and academic institutions. This has been a weak
area so far but with the growing educated middle
class, presence of talented Pakistanis all around
the world, who understand the dynamics of
effective communication, Pakistan should be able
to bridge this gap.
Allocation of resources and institutional
support are a must for energising the Diaspora
community and sharpening communication skill
sets. Mere aspirational hectoring will not lure these
communities.
Water diplomacy is now recognised as a
distinct discipline and is practiced to prevent
and resolve water conflicts. It requires that water
diplomats and negotiators have special skills and
technical expertise while acting as representatives
of upper or lower riparian states, as well as of
‘‘
Green Book 2019 7
 PAKISTAN ARMY
other stakeholders who speak for the interests
of agricultural, industrial, energy, health and
environmental constituencies.
Pakistan’s water diplomacy has been
conducted traditionally in isolation, without
looking at the big picture and without closely
consulting all stakeholders in the state apparatus.
Pakistani Indus Water Commissioners, who have
led talks with their Indian counterparts, though
had good technical knowledge, lacked sufficient
diplomatic or negotiating skills and full inter-
ministerial support.
India very deftly and speedily built dams, such
as the Baglihar and Kishanganga dams, during
periods of high tension between India and Pakistan,
when there was nearly complete breakdown in
communication between the two countries.
Pakistan’s approach towards water diplomacy
must be revisited and revamped to make it more
Notes
1. Jones, Bruce, The New Geopolitics, November 17, 2017, Brookings Institution
website
2. War becomes inevitable when a rising power causes fear in an established
power.
8 Green Book 2019
‘‘
For economic diplomacy to succeed,
Pakistan should diversify its export
base, reduce reliance on textiles and
raw materials, and develop high-end
‘‘
manufacturing, digital industry and
services’ sectors
effective by taking all stakeholders on board. This
is imperative because India, in coming years, is
aggressively working on a series of dams that
include Sawalkote (1856 MW), Kirthai I (390 MW),
Kirthi II (930 MW), Pakal Dul (1000 MW), Kwar
(540 MW), Kiru (624 MW), and Bursar (800 MW),
all in contravention to internal principles and
commitments.
Conclusion
In the rapidly changing global environment,
Pakistan needs a dynamic, proactive and forward-
looking foreign policy. While firefighting will
remain part of day to day conduct of foreign policy,
a long-term vision of our foreign policy, anchored in
Pakistan’s national security paradigm, extending
to year 2050, should be developed and pursued.
This would not be a unilinear tunnel vision but a
flexible framework that would adjust and respond
to future developments and vicissitudes. The core
of this vision should be that, by 2050, Pakistan
will rise holistically to become one of the top
twenty developed and strong nations of the world,
economically and militarily, with levels of human
development reaching those prevalent in West
Europe today.
3. In August 2017, Pakistan was upgraded from a ‘frontier market’ to an ‘emerging
market’ by the MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International) Index.
4. Courtney Cooper and Samir Kumar: from Strength Through Peace and Center
for Preventive Action: Overcoming the Prisoner’s Dilemma to Reach Peace in
Afghanistan, cfr.org
PAKISTAN ARMY

Green Book 2019 9

 PAKISTAN ARMY

THE HYBRID CHALLENGE:

WHOSE PROBLEM IS IT ANYWAY?
Abstract
Hybrid warfare blends conventional and unconventional
means to achieve policy ends. Combining means and
approaches in such ways is not entirely new. Lineage
of such combinations can be traced back to the ancient
world. What we witness today, is a potent mix of old and
new forms of warfare enabled by technologies around
the internet offering nuances and permutations the likes
and gravity of which were simply not possible before. We
will discuss three distinct arenas in which this adaptive
form of warfare creates effects, namely: the conventional
battlefield; the social sphere; and last but not least, the Dr Mohammad Iftikhar Zaidi is a retired
diplomatic, political and economic stage of international Brigadier from Pakistan Army. He is currently
politics. We observe the complexity of defence against this a Senior Lecturer of Leadership and Strategy at
tripartite warfare on the part of any state or alliance and Cranfield University, UK
the inherent challenges and deficiency in systems thinking
to provide a determined counter strategy over all three
arenas over a sustained period. A significant component of
hybrid war is insurgency. We find a particularly dangerous
post-structural evolution in insurgency that we describe as
3rd Generation Insurgency (3GI) that particularly renders
military power ineffective. The breadth and scope of hybrid
threats create issues in response ownership and strategies
that are difficult to articulate unless we fundamentally
alter how threats are perceived and analysed. In short we
need to start thinking outside of familiar systems. We posit
an ‘adaptive’ approach to deal with adaptive threats and
the complex challenges of hybrid war. Caroline Kennedy-Pipe is currently Professor
of International Security and International
Keywords: Hybrid War, Adaptive War, Adaptive Threat, Relations at the University of Loughborough,
Indirect Warfare, Insurgency Paradigm Shift, 3rd Generation UK. She is also a Visiting Fellow at the
Rothermere Institute at the University of Oxford
Insurgency

10 Green Book 2019

 PAKISTAN ARMY

H
ybrid warfare is currently a organisations to act in concert against a threat or,
fashionable term used to describe alternatively, may take the form of disruption and
the state of contemporary war. physical revision of international norms as we saw
Hybrid war is a type of military and in Russian actions over Ukraine and Crimea.
political conduct which is widely Diplomacy and winning a battle of persuasion
understood to blend conventional is no mean feat in an era where truth is elusive and
and unconventional means with features of contested and propaganda eminently powerful. To
regular and irregular war, and supported or led defend against such tripartite warfare/insurgency
by the application of other elements of national is to say the least difficult and requires on the part
powers.1 While that of any state or alliance
combination is not a determined counter-

‘‘
entirely new, we now strategy over all the
witness the potent Hybrid war is a type of military three arenas, enacted
addition of cyber-attacks, and political conduct which is widely over a sustained period.
fake news, electoral In this article we
intervention in the affairs understood to blend conventional and examine the recent
of other states and a unconventional tactics with features of history of hybrid warfare
wide spread utilisation regular and irregular war, and supported arguing that after the
of local groups, some of
which may be terrorist,
‘‘
or led by the application of other elements
end of the Cold War, the
collapse of the bi-polar
to inspire disharmony of national power world permitted shifts
and confusion in the and changes in war
target country or warzone. Insurgency, in its evolved enabling a wide range of actors to take advantage
form, is now a potent mix of old and new means. of ideological voids and political instability. We
Some commentators have traced the lineage of identify some crucial and new elements in the
such hybrid/mixed behaviour back to the ancient character of hybrid wars and the nature of hybrid
world.2
One of the key enablers of this form
of warfare is new technologies developing
around the internet. Foremost among these are
communication strategies, to rapidly promote
a political agenda and incite public disruption.
In short, the ‘people’ are targeted not just in a
conventional sense by warfare, but emotional
and personal messages are directed to individuals
and constantly reinforced; perhaps, even via their
mobile phones. A hybrid war, therefore, has three
distinct arenas: first utilisation or posturing for a
conventional battlefield; second provoking unrest
and dissension among communities through
careful use of information and events, and third;
a variety of actions on the diplomatic, political
and economic stage of international politics. This An analyst looks at codes in the malwares section
third arena is one in which states might engage of a cybersecurity defence laboratory, Russia
with allies to persuade international and regional

Green Book 2019 11

 PAKISTAN ARMY
threats, in particular the evolution of insurgency
towards a form, particularly, suited as strategic line
within a hybrid war strategy. We argue that while
the breadth and scope of hybrid threats ought to
make it a cross government and societal concern,
ownership and response are difficult to articulate
unless we fundamentally alter how threats are
perceived and analysed and unless we think
outside of familiar systems. Finally, we allude, in
our sum-up to ‘adaptive’ approach to deal with the
complex challenge of hybrid war and a particularly
dangerous paradigm creating a new generation of
insurgent movements.
BACKGROUND
History and Evolution
After the end of the Cold War, contradictory
trends in warfare were apparent. For many
scholars during the 1990s, the end of the Soviet
Union had brought about a new ‘world order’ in
which international politics had taken on a more
optimistic shape. Some scholars even expressed
the sentiment that war itself had been unlearnt
and had been consigned to historical memory
alongwith other arcane practises such as duelling
and slavery.3 In some versions of this theory, hard
military power had been replaced by ‘soft’ power.4
However, any idea that war had, or has, gone away
was simply incorrect. Throughout the 1990s, civil
wars and proxy wars as well as terrorist threats
proliferated across the globe. But where Robert
Keohane and Joseph Nye were prescient was in their
prediction over how important ‘soft’ power would
become. It certainly features in hybrid warfare thus
leading us to the rather simplistic but accurate
claim that hybrid war is a mix of hard power
Hybrid war is a mix of hard power and soft power
and soft power. Cultural power too is important
allowing many or indeed all sides to claim to be the
custodians not just of religious sentiment, ethnic
and historical traditions, but keepers of sacred
sites and artefacts.5
At the time much of this complexity was not
recognised. At the turn of the century and perhaps
in the glow of ‘winning’ the Cold War, Western
12 Green Book 2019
military dominance seemed assured. The Bosnian
War had been eventually resolved and NATO prided
itself on the defeat of Serbia and the liberation of
Kosovo. The Kosovo War did not lead to a single
combat fatality on the Western side. This and the
mode of winning the war from the air with so-called
precision bombing, led to the idea of a ‘Virtual
War’6 and the belief that future wars would follow
the same pattern. Indeed, the Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA) seemed to have brought about an age
of accurate targeting and fewer civilian casualties.
Liberal states could, it seemed, wage war at a
distance with few sacrifices for their troops and
little disruption for domestic politics. There were of
course, despite the rhetoric, unintended casualties
on the other side with some caused directly by the
NATO bombing campaign against Serbia. Future
war, it seemed, was to be short, sharp and distant –
at least for Western states.
The events of 9/11 transformed the context
of war. Rather than forgetting war, states such as
the US and the UK proved enthusiastic for military
action against not just those who had perpetrated
the terrorist attacks on the US homeland but
those deemed unsettling to international order
and Western interests. Hence, with the wars in
Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), a traditional
type of warfare returned – that of conventional
‘boots on the ground’.
 PAKISTAN ARMY

Even so, the opening episodes in these wars We saw, too, the emergence of multiple militias
appeared to confirm earlier trends; the initial some of which were controlled and sustained
Afghan campaign reflected in many ways the Kosovo by external actors and the operation of a variety
war, fought initially by the West largely from the air of criminal gangs which fed off the human and
with the added involvement of special operations’
teams to hunt down Al-Qaeda. Iraq involved a
larger military deployment, but airpower remained
crucial in that arena too. Planners expected a short,
decisive campaign with relatively little resistance.
However, the ‘9/11 wars’ did not prove easy.7 Victory
is not complete till the enemy’s will to continue
fighting is sufficiently eroded. In a conventional
war, this usually occurs when the counter-offensive
is defeated. In both these conflicts, however, the
counter-offensive came in a different mode from
that of the offensive and through enemies that had
morphed within civil society. Opposition, therefore,
came in the shape of a complex and multifaceted
insurgency.8
The insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq
transformed these wars into the type of quagmire
where Western troops encountered the brutality of
not just insurgency, but endemic violence, waged
by a variety of sub-state actors, some of which were
proxy forces, some of which were fighting civil wars
and all of which had their own local or regional Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Founder of ISIS
agenda. The eventual chaos in Iraq, after a series of
blunders by invading troops provided the breeding
ground for not just Al-Qaeda to evolve and adapt material resources of the area for political and
but for the beginning of ISIS. economic gain. Refugees and those fleeing the war
zones of the region came to be utilised for political
as well as financial capital.
The so-called ‘weaponisation’ of the migrant
issue in politicised hybrid warfare is a subject
of considerable importance as the homeless
and dispossessed provide vulnerable terrain for
predatory groups and states.
What we also witnessed was the refinement
of an older idea, the IED (Improvised Explosive
Device) and its wide spread use by the insurgents.
IEDs along with suicide bombers operating among
hostile populations pressured coalition forces
to shift their mode of operations both in Iraq, in
Afghanistan and in the subsequent conflict in
Libya.

‘‘ After more than a decade of bloody

wars and increasing casualties on all
sides the US and its allies abandoned
the fight in Iraq and attempted an
exit from Afghanistan. The hope was
to keep ‘boots off the ground’ and
utilise new technologies to counter and
‘‘
kill opponents: Counter-insurgency
without regular soldiering

Green Book 2019 13

 PAKISTAN ARMY

‘‘
After more than a decade of bloody wars and It is perhaps worth noting that
increasing casualties on all sides the US and its
allies abandoned the fight in Iraq and attempted contemporary hybrid warfare of which
an exit from Afghanistan. The hope was to keep drones are a part raises any number
‘boots off the ground’ and utilise new technologies
to counter and kill opponents: Counter-insurgency
of important questions about the
without regular soldiering. This trend was limits of sovereignty and the legality of
exemplified by the widespread use of armed ‘‘
interference/subversion/assassination
drones to eradicate opponents in Afghanistan, in
Pakistan and in Yemen. This use of armed drones of the citizens of other states
by both (the US Military and the CIA) to execute
enemies became characteristic of the first term of
the Obama Administration inspiring considerable
debate about the legality of killing/assassinating terrorists are increasingly mobile, crossing borders
individuals both inside and outside of zones of into complex urban environments and sometimes
conflict.9 staging terrorist atrocities to provoke and unsettle.
APS Peshawar (2014),10 Paris (2015)11 and the
Drone surveillance also caused unmeasured
numerous attacks in London are examples of this
and possibly immeasurable psychological and
agility and adaptability.
physiological stress on the affected population
that heard the mosquito like buzz of armed drones Individuals or groups may take up such acts
above and lived in the fear of the next strike. It is to serve a personal agenda, at the same time,
perhaps worth noting that contemporary hybrid consciously or unconsciously double tap by
warfare of which drones are a part raises any supporting or exploiting the designs of external
number of important questions about the limits powers. A counter hybrid war strategy may thus
of sovereignty and the legality of interference/ engage such groups as an auxiliary line of action.
subversion/assassination of the citizens of other Mercenaries, groups with no obvious political
states. or criminal agenda become an instrument of the
third arena of hybrid warfare, working for a state
The desire on the part of some states, but
or indeed under the control of a non-state actor.
most noticeably the United States not to commit
Malign states engaging such groups keep their
manpower into theatres of war, was reinforced
hands clean without threat of attribution and yet
during the ‘Arab Spring’. The uprisings across
retain the potential for a high degree of control.
the Arab world against brutal rulers such as the
In this sense, as we witnessed during the 1970s,
Qaddafi regime in Libya in 2011 were characterised
terrorist or what we identify as terrorist groups or
in Western circles by a desire to ‘encourage’ the
cells, may be part of a broader agenda, motivated
overthrow of unsavoury regimes that it could
and funded if not always totally controlled by an
no longer work with and to do so without the
external power.
committal of significant troop numbers other than
small special operations’ teams and intelligence
units. In the Libyan action there were, therefore, Terrorist Attack on Army Public School Peshawar, Pakistan,
few casualties for the European powers. The conflict killing 132 innocent students (16 December 2014)
in Syria since 2011 has also been characterised
by an American reluctance to commit ‘ordinary’
troops, but the utilisation of massive strategic and
tactical bombing. This is coupled with an overt
encouragement of rebel and militia groups and the
use of military contractors. The deployment too
of private military personnel is a feature of most
modern conflicts in which Western powers are
involved.
The way of war is now, as it was in Kosovo,
military action at a distance. The continued
and increasing use of armed drones, as well as
the reliance on local forces and private security
contractors, demonstrates a preference for
technology and surrogate forces. One important
consequence of this is that ‘opponents’, whether
they be terrorists or other types of criminals, adapt
their behaviour refusing to stay ‘in theatre’ to be
hunted down and potentially killed. Insurgents/

14 Green Book 2019


New Wars/Hybrid Wars/Insurgency?
Contemporary conflicts continue to display
a disturbing mix of characteristics. They are
seemingly inconclusive and intractable. Most
noticeably there are no official declarations of war
and there is no clear mode of surrender or indeed
of what may constitute a ‘victory’. Mary Kaldor, in
her conceptualisation of New Wars, talks about the
‘grey zone’ between war and peace; conflicts that
are often identity-based a mixture of old and new
(primitive and modern with more guerrilla raids and
massacres than set-piece confrontations between
clearly identifiable armed groups).12 Battle lines
are blurred, with high-levels of collusion between
supposed protagonists.13 Violence is directed at
civilians in the form of massacre, mutilations
and rape, often with the sole purpose of creating
sensation. Conflicts such as those in Sierra Leone,
Liberia, Somalia, Chechnya, Sri Lanka, and Nepal
were characteristic of these so-called new wars,
Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya can be added into this
list.14
PAKISTAN ARMY
The Iraq war was beset by the bewildering
spectre of sectarian strife, death squads,
beheadings, suicide attacks and whole sale human
rights abuses.15 The important point is that whatever
gains had been achieved by the US-led coalition in
terms of elections and new governance structures
were ultimately offset by the political decision to
withdraw foreign troops completely in 2011. This,
coupled with sectarian politics, provided the fertile
ground for the emergence and rise of the Islamic
State group and a generational shift in the nature
and character of insurgent organisations. We will
come back to this later.
‘‘ Contemporary conflicts continue to
display a disturbing mix of characteristics.
They are seemingly inconclusive and
intractable. Most noticeably there are no
official declarations of war and there is no
‘‘
clear mode of surrender or indeed of what
may constitute a ‘victory’
Islamic State was, and is, in many ways a
more agile and resilient reincarnation of Al-Qaeda,
though remnants of the latter still surface, it seems
to have subsumed its precursor organisations. One
of the reasons for this was its operating model
and the other its success. Islamic State rapidly
re-established a grip on parts of Iraq and Syria
as well as footholds in Afghanistan, Yemen, and
beyond. In most instances, this reinforced already
incubating ideological polarisations with more
virtual one is reinforced through the internet,
targeting youthful population perhaps alienated
from their own societies.
The delinking of insurgency and geography by
creating pathways into the global human terrain
obviated the need for physical sanctuary and
created the lone wolf or mini-cells. Control of a
physical refuge with a sympathetic population is
still considered by many an essential requirement
for insurgent organisations but that may change as
insurgents utilise the battle space of cyber-attacks.
Structures are the product of strategy and while
large formal organisation inverse this relationship,
insurgent organisations have generally remain true
to this principle.16
In the UK, the outbreak of terrorist attacks
starting but not ending with the London suicide
bombings of 2005 has been widely linked to the
influence of websites highlighting the Western
abuse of Muslim populations in war zones.
Radicalised men and some women have left the UK
to fight in Iraq or Syria or have perpetuated terrorist
attacks on UK soil. All the post 9/11 battle spaces
have witnessed opponents utilising a wide range
Green Book 2019 15
 PAKISTAN ARMY
of tactics to disrupt superior state forces embroiled
in clearly asymmetric but difficult struggles both at
home as well as in conflicts abroad.
It has also given rise to random and apparently
isolated individual or small team acts (not
sufficiently organised to be called ‘cells’) that do
not seem connected to, or commanded by, other
entities, but rather self-motivated, even when
facilitated and abetted by external entities.17 ‘Self-
starting’ terrorists are also observable as in the case
of the attack on the Finsbury Mosque in London.18
Finsbury Mosque – London
There is another nuance. Adaptive war, as we
may term it, also provides opportunities for covert
organisations of a state to cultivate, motivate and
even create radicalised cells and/or individuals
and use them to undertake sensational acts. Such
individuals or groups never clearly know the
identity of those helping and facilitating them in
their motivation. The hand that ‘wields’ the sword
may never know the motivations and intentions of
the hand that ‘forged’ the blade.
In short what is now labelled hybrid warfare,
and we describe as adaptive war, has been utilised
by a range of groups, proxies and terrorists in
insurgencies and counter-insurgencies over many
years. Most obviously, the label hybrid war was
used to describe the strategy used by Hezbollah
(alleged to be backed by Iran) in the 2006 Lebanon
War. However, it was the Russian actions in
Ukraine and Syria which have inspired much of
the contemporary debate about the meaning of, as
well as the use and effectiveness of so called hybrid
warfare.
‘‘
The hand that ‘wields’ the sword may
‘‘
never know the motivations and intentions
of the hand that ‘forged’ the blade
16 Green Book 2019
By way of an example of the nuances discussed
above, we take a brief look at the Ukraine Conflict
which is considered by many analysts in the West
to be a model Hybrid War.
From a Western perspective, Russia since
the turn of the century, has behaved like a
Revisionist power. This has been provoked
arguably by the expansion of NATO to the East
and the incorporation of states such the Baltic
Republics into the organisation. The ambition of
Ukraine and countries such as Georgia to acquire
membership of Western organisations has been
widely cited as antagonistic by Russian analysts
and spokespersons. So too has the extension of
the influence and association agreements by the
European Union with for example Ukraine. Russia
found itself threatened by an eastward tide of
EU and NATO influence. In this sense, Ukraine
became a critical testing ground for Moscow. The
geostrategic and historic importance of Crimea to
Russia and its Black Sea Fleet arguably left Moscow
with little or no choice but to act in its longer-term
strategic interest. The intervention in Georgia in
2008 made by Russia in part but not only to protect
ethnic Russians, was also about securing territory
and influence. It was this intervention which has
given rise to renewed interest in the character of
hybrid warfare.
Military action in eastern Ukraine and the
Crimea was preceded by disruption of Russian
speaking people in the region, a potent propaganda
campaign utilising historical examples and
grievances and the appearance of the ‘little green
men’ unbadged and technically unrecognised in
the growing conflict. But, as Andrew Monaghan
has pointed out, there was a powerful conventional
element in all of this.19 Some 40,000 Russian
troops were massed on the border. The battles at

Donbas Airport all involved high intensity conflict
including the extensive use of armour, artillery and
multiple launch rocket systems as well as drones
and electronic warfare. Keir Giles from Chatham
House in London has added a critical voice to the
speculation over Russian operations in eastern
Ukraine as somehow constituting simply irregular
warfare.20 As he has pointed out the Russian
incursion into Ukraine was ultimately a large-scale
conventional military cross-border intervention
undertaken in August 2014. Russian troops
and transport although badged by the Russian
authorities as primarily present for the delivery and
organisation of humanitarian aid, proved militarily
decisive.21
Most analysis of the current mode of Russian
hybrid war has centred on an understanding of
the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine as developed
by the Russian Chief of the General Staff – Valery
Gerasimov.22 In 2013, in a now much read essay,
Gerasimov wrote of a blurring of the lines between
states of war and peace. He went on to describe
‘long distance’ and ‘contactless’ actions against the
enemy as the primary means of achieving combat
and operational goals.
That essay has been taken by some Western
scholarly and military communities as evidence of
an innovative, far sighted and novel approach to
war; essentially a new Russian military doctrine. In
turn, this ‘new’ approach is perceived as facilitating
and underpinning an expansive and aggressive
foreign policy agenda. This ‘doctrine’ in addition
to the modernisation of the Russian Armed Forces,
energy ‘blackmail’, the annexation of Crimea,
as well as a ‘successful’ Russian policy in Syria
(neutralising Western action to remove the Syrian
leader Bashar al-Assad) has caused a fair degree of
consternation and controversy. Western policy has
PAKISTAN ARMY
failed to either remove the government, control
territory or stem human rights abuses. The retaking
by Russian backed forces of the ancient city of
Palmyra from ISIS which was both widely reported
and applauded in the Russian press highlighted the
ability of the Kremlin to celebrate and promote the
prowess of Russian military muscle even though
reports of Russian complicity with members of the
Islamic State group were openly circulating.23
Russia and its official media outlets deny
that a ‘hybrid’ doctrine, as described in the West,
is applied by the Russian Armed Forces. Some
sources deny any existence of such a doctrine.
Indeed, in the case of Ukraine the unique nature of
that example, the weakness of the Ukrainian Army,
the presence and embrace of the ‘polite people’ in
the East note not the more sinister ‘little green men’
as described in the West and the overwhelming
support of the Russian people (and Parliament
in March 2014) for the Crimea intervention have
all been stressed. This was a one-off event and it
would be impossible according to some analysts to
replicate any similar action in say the mid-west of
the United States or in Poland.24 Perhaps but can
the same, however, be said for the Baltic States?
There are after all historical/cultural/ethnic claims
by Russia on these states and the Russian speaking
population in for example Estonia are widely
‘targeted’ by Moscow inspired propaganda.
In addition, the propaganda campaign waged
across a variety of arenas has highlighted the claim
that it is Russia which is under imminent threat
from powerful external forces. However, many of
Moscow’s ‘near’ neighbours believe that they are
under attack from Moscow. Hence Finland which
occupies a particularly vulnerable position in
comparison to its large neighbour has taken robust
measures to fend off ‘hybrid’ or mixed activities.
Valery Gerasimov
Green Book 2019 17
 PAKISTAN ARMY

The Finns have been recently flooded with

fake news and the use of troll farms as well as
suffering a variety of over-flights of its air space
by Russian aircraft. Propaganda hostile to the
Finnish Government has taken a variety of forms
but not least have been claim from Moscow that
Russian speakers in Finland are discriminated
against on a routine basis in terms of property
rights. In response, Helsinki has put in place a
public diplomacy programme to train government
officials about disinformation but also increased
its emphasis in schools on media ‘literacy’. It is not
just Finland that is wary of hybrid warfare from the
east but Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Sweden and
Norway.
Russia has also seemingly taken the
opportunity along its shared border with Norway
to ‘mischief make’ in terms of allegedly allowing
refugees fleeing the Middle East to make their way
across the border on bicycles! Hence the idea that
as part of a hybrid war strategy the Russians are
seeking to ‘weaponise’ migrants and generally
exploit the migrant crisis to further divide the
politicians and peoples throughout Europe who
disagree (sometimes violently) about migrant/
refugee policy.
The concentration on Russia as pursuing
hybridity in warfare is contested. A contrary thesis
is presented by Andrew Korybko, who, in his 2015
study of Hybrid Wars, claims that the US, is the
only country currently engaged in Hybrid War. He
argues that the nature of Hybrid War is such that
it is ‘counter-productive for any of the Eurasian
Powers to attempt it in their region’ due to proximity
issues and the unintended consequences/spillover
of what he calls the resulting ‘black holes’ on their
own borders. He predicts that the ‘US will exercise
a full monopoly on Hybrid War for at least the next
decade, if not in perpetuity owing to the unique
international circumstances in which it is waged.’
He has argued that actually ‘Hybrid War is the
new horizon for US regime change strategy.’25 This
mixture of irregular and regular warfare will be the
future strategy for US interventions in pursuit of
its foreign policy interests particularly in an era of
fake news.
Whatever the debates about the essence of
Russian military doctrine and whatever claims
may be about future US warfare now the success
of this adaptive form of warfare is clear. Western
responses to Russian provocations—or for that
matter, Russian responses to US Hybrid warfare,
if we take the Korybko thesis is predicated upon
avoiding direct military conflict. In this sense
the Russian ‘gains’ in Ukraine and Crimea have
extended Moscow’s grip on the region. Despite
sanctions, diplomacy and some military posturing,
(the latter limited to NATO reinforcing its strategic
presence in, both, Norway and in Estonia) Russian
‘gains’ in the tactical and strategic planes remain
intact.
Although the legacy of irregular methods in the
region remains unknown at this point in time. New
power brokers, dissidents and guns for hire may yet
threaten Russia in the longer term.

‘‘ Andrew Korybko, in his 2015 study

of Hybrid Wars, claims that the US, is the
only country currently engaged in Hybrid
War. He predicts that the ‘US will exercise
a full monopoly on Hybrid War for at least
the next decade, if not in perpetuity owing
to the unique international circumstances
in which it is waged.’ He has argued that
actually ‘Hybrid War is the new horizon for
US regime change strategy.’ This mixture
of irregular and regular warfare will be the
future strategy for US interventions in pursuit
‘‘
of its foreign policy interests particularly in
an era of fake news

COUNTER STRATEGIES: TO MANAGE OR
DEFEAT?
Hybrid Strategies
The historical perspective and the Ukraine case
study presented here provided a prism enabling us
to demonstrate and extract some of the nuances
that hybrid war presents. We can now turn to an
inductive conceptual analysis of the nature of the
threat and develop ideas that underpin responses
to state or sub state threats at the strategic plane.
A cleverly articulated hybrid war strategy by
a revisionist and ambitious power(s) produces
confusion, discord and disharmony in the targeted
state or region. There may be confusion as to the
overall objectives (even the existence of any design)
and the means, and the ways, contributing towards
attainment of the design or ends. Even more elusive
and difficult to define are the linkages between
what appear to be disparate actions spread over
a long period. How does communal disruption
in one village link to the appearance of protestors
in another city or the circulation of rumours on
the internet? How can these different events be
put together? Because of uncertainty, dissonant
views, often reinforced by elite political or financial
interests, emerge. The nature of the threat, its
aim and in turn, its ownership, are variously
disputed and what often results is a disjointed and
ambiguous counter strategy.
Threat Perception in the First Arena
Of the three arenas of hybrid war discussed
earlier, the relatively easier to decipher is the first
arena, that is the utilisation of or posturing for a
conventional battlefield. Even the best guarded
strategy or strategic intent may be discerned
from an analysis of hostile power interests, force
and infrastructural development, training and
alliances. In short a military equivalent of what
Henry Mintzberg describes as a ‘pattern in a
stream of actions’.26 (In light of an extensive body
of literature and practice, we will not discuss this
arena further here). The second and the third arenas,
however, require a more critical analysis as it is here
that strategic lines are often blurred. Furthermore,
the experiential lens27 for strategic analysis — the
bedrock of conventional military planning and
systems thinking — is not terribly useful if there
is a mix conventional/insurgent scenario. Unless
the targeted state processes national security as a
broad interrelated and mutually informing system,
it is unlikely that it could make the necessary
connection predicating a comprehensive response.
This creative leap notwithstanding, biases like
‘anchoring’ and ‘availability’ creep in. This is the
classic adage of every problem looking like a nail to
a person with only a hammer.
PAKISTAN ARMY
Threat Spectrum in the Second Arena
Provoking, exploiting, supporting unrest and
dissension among people through careful use of
information and other forms of national power,
as we have demonstrated in above paragraphs,
is nothing new. In fact, Sun Tzu28 talks about
hollowing out one’s enemy from the inside
absorbing the whole without fighting in his famous
treatise on war. War among people or violent social
movements are wicked problems or what Heifitz
describes as adaptive problems.29 Such problems
don’t follow the rules of systems and as such have
never been easy to deal with. And while such
conflicts may be deeply rooted in history, ideology,
religion, culture, or general deprivation, solutions
that are unsympathetic to perspectives and deal in
the present or the near future, treat the problem
not for what it is but what it is constructed to be, a
tame30 or a critical31 problem, in fact a problem that
follows rules.
Prescriptions for fighting insurgencies and
hybrid threats abound. There is an extensive
literature that looks at categorising and classifying
social movements and conflicts. This is important.
Our interpretation of a problem points us
towards its solution, misinterpret the problem and
the solution will invariably not work, or worse,
exacerbate the problem. As was seen in the Iraq
War after 2003 the widespread misunderstanding of
the ‘people’ by invading forces and the politicians
at home meant that inevitably there was a failure to
understand complex local tribal politics.
Western failure meant that other external
actors could fill the voids created by poor security
planning and policing and the misunderstanding
of Sunni-Shia relations plus a fateful ignorance of
the motivations of external actors.
‘‘
A cleverly articulated hybrid war
strategy by a revisionist and ambitious
power(s) produces confusion, discord
and disharmony in the targeted state or
region. There may be confusion as to the
overall objectives (even the existence
of any design) and the means, and the
ways, contributing towards attainment
of the design or ends. Even more elusive
and difficult to define are the linkages
between what appear to be disparate
‘‘
actions spread over a long period
Green Book 2019 19
 PAKISTAN ARMY
The Third Arena
This arena involves a variety of actions on
the diplomatic, political and economic stage of
international politics.
Sun Tzu recognised the power of indirect
warfare. Taking the enemy, without fighting and in
the process conserving vital resources mandates’
avoidance of direct confrontation. Attacking an
enemy in different planes in a sustained manner
while pacing the scale and tempo of the ‘offensive’
within limits of hope and tolerance of the political
elite and threshold of survivability for the masses
creates long term parallel effects.
The dilution of economic, social and human
capital in disparate directions germinates a
defensive mind-set, making the target state further
vulnerable and opens to other forms of attack. This
form of warfare circumvents constraints such as
alliances, military parity and again avoids direct
conflict.32
Hybrid war displays a non-kinetic extension
of Ludendorff’s conception of a total war with
a covert twist. The utilisation of diplomatic,
economic, informational and cultural power
directly and indirectly—through alliances and
political networks, pressure groups and the media
are adopted over a sustained period.
This, we can argue, is a situation which has
relevance to contemporary Pakistan. This third
arena essentially contains the main thrust lines
and is the one where the long-term objectives are
sought by hostile powers to undermine, disrupt
and fragment the opposing state. The aim is to stir
up politics, class, clan, tribe and gender relations,
perhaps even to make parts of the country
20 Green Book 2019
‘‘ Unless the targeted state processes
national security as a broad
interrelated and mutually informing
system, it is unlikely that it could make
the necessary connection predicating a
comprehensive response. This creative
leap notwithstanding, biases like
‘anchoring’ and ‘availability’ creep
in. This is the classic adage of every
‘‘
problem looking like a nail to a person
with only a hammer
ungovernable and easy to penetrate by a host of
actors.
The question now is what is new in all of this
for our understanding of countering hybrid war
and insurgency?
The first novel feature is motivation. Groups
in a micro sense and social movements in the
macro context are motivated by their personal or
parochial interest. A hybrid strategy utilises these
parochial motivations to facilitate the objectives
of such movements and groups through means
that create secondary effects towards serving or
facilitating other lines of operation that tie into
the hostile power’s interests. The social movement
may remain oblivious to the fact that in pursuing
its own narrow interest it is also servicing someone
else’s wider agenda. Ironically, perhaps the wider
agenda may be detrimental in the longer term to
that group or movement.

The second feature is that the ideological
or motivational base is disaggregated from
recruitment. We see a glimpse of this in Islamic
State recruitment, which has a strong global
dimension to it, even for actions in a specific area,
say for example Syria. Who is doing the recruiting,
who one signs up to serve or even if an individual
decides to act alone, the purpose being served is
disaggregated from the source of the motivation,
the thought leaders. This feature in turn provides
two further differentiating qualities that set apart
3rd Generation Insurgency (3GI) from 1st Generation
Insurgency (1GI), these are reach and mobilisation.
The insurgent message finds instant credibility with
receptive segments of population across the globe,
it is not geographically confined and can occur in
the open media. Additionally, the action groups—
the people that do the tactical damage—mobilise
independently of the leadership and the visible
organisations. The action groups are thus difficult
to detect in the conventional system approach to
threat perception and analysis.
The need for sanctuary and a sympathetic
population base with a geographical contiguity, as
we have described earlier, is no longer a necessity;
both are pre-requisites for 1GI and 2GI. Cells of all
sizes hide in the mercy corners of cyber space.
Another significant feature is that all tactical
actions are effects-based not objective-based.
It does not matter who did the act and for what
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‘‘
The point is that in contemporary
war and conflict we do not know for
sure who the insurgents are, who funds
them and whether they are connected
to, or operated by, states or other
actors in the international system. It
is now relatively rare to see a purely
‘‘
nationalist insurgency at work
purpose. The long-term lingering impact is key. The
impact, for example, of the Taliban attack on APS
Peshawar is hard to measure. Different political
groups, as we witnessed constructed the impact
of the event from their own point of view creating
multiple narratives.
Finally, we need to consider distance and
dehumanisation. The utilitarian argument that
the ends justify the means, takes on a whole new
dimension. Those at a distance but indirectly
supporting the group have clean hands. They do
not suffer and may even be disinterested in the
human costs effects of the violence and disruption
they have funded or directed. They are interested
in the ends and not necessarily the means.
Although sometimes the means – implemented by
terrorists, or criminals or states can also be an end
– to unsettle a society.
In this sense the recent attack with a chemical
nerve agent in Salisbury in the UK was striking
in terms of its means and its ends: disturbing
and illegal ‘means’ led to widespread political
disruption surely an end in itself for those who had
directed the attack?
The point is that in contemporary war and
conflict we do not know for sure who the insurgents
are, who funds them and whether they are
connected to, or operated by, states or other actors
in the international system. It is now relatively rare
to see a purely nationalist insurgency at work.
Most groups even those who would badge
themselves as ‘nationalist’ are actually complex
and hybrid organisations working across borders
and utilising technology for spreading ideas and
fund raising.
A Post - Structural Construct of
Insurgencies
Language and terms of reference
notwithstanding, scholarship generally agrees on the
political and nonpolitical classification of insurgent
movements. In both these forms, the underlying
assumptions are, nonetheless, consistent and
form what we might call the first paradigm . These
Green Book 2019 21
 PAKISTAN ARMY

basic assumptions use physical space, sanctuary,
leadership, external support, diffusion in mass
and human capital as the metrics for analysis
and classification underpinned with a geocentric
context. Operationally, each of these types of
insurgencies may employ a variety of means,
methods and tactics for creating effects. Some
scholars have used this modal differentiation as
a metric for classification.33 Bunker identifies five
forms of insurgency as under:
This implies that there is considerable synergy
in approaches to manage political, non-political
and networked insurgencies.
The Information Age has transformed
society and the military; it has also created new
opportunities for the insurgent. Opportunities
that expand the scope of activities, the insurgent’s
battlefield and their idea of battle space. Large
insurgent organisations tend towards intelligent,
adaptive detached minimalistic subsystems.

Insurgency Form Group Examples Theorists’ Form (Year)

(Onset)
Radical Islamist (1979) Iranian Revolutionaries
Hezbollah
Shia Militias (Iraq)
Mujahedeen
Taliban
Al-Qaeda
Islamic State
Liberal Democratic Contras (Precursor)
(1989) African National Congress (ANC)
Free Syrian Army (FSA)
National Council of Resistance Iran (NCRI)
Metz; Reactionary (1995)
Rapoport; Religious Extremism (2001)
Kilcullen; Globalised Islamist (2004)—
Sunni focus
O’Neill; Reactionary-Traditionalist (2005)
Schnabel & Gunartna; Religious (2006;
2015)
Beckett; Superpower Based (2001)—
United States proxy component
O’Neill; Pluralist (2005)

Criminal (Early-2000s) African Warlords Metz; Commercial (1993)

Plutocratic (2008)
Colombian and Mexican Clapham; Warlord (1998)
Cartels Sloan; Apolitical (1999)
Latin American Gangs Thom; Economic (1999)
Ndrangheta (Italy) Cilliers; Resource-Based (2000)
O’Neill; Commercial (2005)
Sullivan; Criminal (2008)
Tarr; Resource Control (2011)
Metz; Non-Political (2012)
Global Elites (.001% to 1%) Metz; Commercial (1993)
Multinational Corporations Bunker; Plutocratic (2011)

Table 1: Contemporary Insurgency Forms34

Metz observes the influence of modern
technology on how insurgent organisations
function and operate and a networked variant to
proto-state and non-political insurgencies.35
Modern insurgencies are driven by a political
particularism, profit or grand politics. The
penultimate objective is usually a combination
of destabilisation, weakening or disintegration
of the targeted state. Seen from the other side of
the prism, we find that effects sought also overlap
and include a mix of paralysis, dislocation,
division and disruption. Insurgent tactics, such as
terrorism, aims at achieving transient effects like
distraction, dispersion or fixation and is directed at
the elements of national power and society.
And while we may have answers to some of
today’s conflicts, the character of insurgency has
transformed and is still transforming. It is this
evolution that places what the US military refer
to as the fifth domain36 of warfare at the focus of
response.
One of the limitations in using structural and
functional elements and indeed paradigms for
classification is that post-structural and innovative
methods can elude observation. We, therefore,
propose a post-structural approach to placing
different forms of insurgencies into categories.
There is comparatively marginal impact on threat
perception and response in legacy type insurgent
movements and their place within an overall

‘‘ The Information Age has transformed society and the military; it has also created
‘‘
new opportunities for the insurgent. Opportunities that expand the scope of activities,
the insurgent’s battlefield and their idea of battle space

22 Green Book 2019

 PAKISTAN ARMY

‘‘
essentially a new contiguous population base—the
Internet enables communications human domain—where recruitment can take place
such as social media coupled with the and where influence is ultimately exerted.
so called ‘dark net’ to provide global Such insurgencies are geographically
contained, require physical sanctuary, a
reach and networking, the exchange of
‘‘
everything from radical ideologies to
sympathetic population for the dual purpose of
recruitment and dissipation. External support
blue prints for IEDs is critical and such insurgencies generally have
focal leadership that acts as the hub of power
and movement. Examples of such insurgent
movements are: Maoists movements, the Taliban
hybrid strategy, however, a paradigm shift leading 2001 to 2003, the Afghan Mujahedeen; Organised
to a newer generation of insurgencies, is apparent Crime cartels in Colombia and warlords in various
and this reclassification of our fundamental post-colonial uprisings in Africa.
assumptions needs consideration. We argue that
within a hybrid war scenario, the insurgencies
reflect the state of relationship between insurgent Maoists Movement – 1GI
and wider society as well as a relationship between
insurgent leadership and insurgent followership.
Communication, a metric that has not featured
as significantly in earlier classifications, is the
key. The internet enables communications such
as social media coupled with the so called ‘dark
net’ to provide global reach and networking, the
exchange of everything from radical ideologies to
blue prints for IEDs. Communication predicates the
degree of localisation or geographic dependency
of the insurgent group or more appropriately
insurgent ideas and influence as organisation
and structure, in the classic sense, is becoming
increasingly irrelevant. As communications and
other influencing factors have evolved, we observe
a further paradigm shifts in our conception of
insurgent movements and groups; while a second
shift is emerging.37

The Classical Paradigm (1st Generation

Insurgency: 1GI)
Without going into lengthy topologies
or taxonomies, we classify first generation
insurgencies (1GI) as a combination of proto-
state and apolitical insurgencies that depend on
space, sanctuary, external support, discernable
leadership, ideology or clear criminal motives, and
Cyber is the FIFTH DOMAIN of conflict
after land, sea, air and space
The First Paradigm Shift (2nd Generation
Insurgency: 2GI)
This form of insurgency is network enabled and
exploits new media in its use of information and
communication. A slight variation of this was the
Arab Spring as these essentially began as leaderless
mass public response. Apart from transient mass
public movements, 2nd Generation Insurgent
movements exhibit many of the limitations and
constraints of 1st Generation movements. Due to
the use of communication and networking, 2GI
network and coordinate their activities across the
globe relying on physical sanctuary and support in
each of the physical spaces. ISIS and its presence
in many parts of the world as highlighted in earlier
paragraphs is an example. Some of the nuances
that challenge the classical paradigm however, are
a global recruitment base, for example European
jihadists joining ISIS in Syria. The main limitation
is the need for physical sanctuary through control

Green Book 2019 23

 PAKISTAN ARMY
‘‘ In some ways, 2GI appears as a
cross over between insurgency and
revolution, but are not revolutions
per se as perpetrators, leadership
and organisation are dislocated and
‘‘
initially lacking in the principle roles
they perform in 1GI
of territory and some level of ability to merge back
into local population in each of the global theatres.
Leadership, particularly within regional contexts
remains the centre of gravity together with the
central idea or unifying factor.
Such insurgencies may be dealt with by
using approaches similar to the 1GI but with due
cognisance of the distributed nature and network
dimension. Such insurgencies do not seem to have a
long incubation phase, as they are often derivatives
of earlier less successful social movements.
They may also have a varied life span, from
protracted to short term. In the short term, variants,
space, recruitment, sanctuary, insurgent leadership
or external support play a less significant role
than in 1GI. In some ways, 2GI appears as a cross
over between insurgency and revolution, but are
not revolutions per se as perpetrators, leadership
and organisation are dislocated and initially
lacking in the principle roles they perform in 1GI.
The Arab Spring provided a brief glimpse of this
transitional form where, essentially ‘bottom up’,
peoples’ movement centred on swarming created
conditions for state collapse. Here ‘leadership’
climbed the bandwagon once the mobilisation
had already begun and subsequently exploited the
opportunities presented.
Islamic State provides a useful example of the
protracted variant. Islamic State and its affiliate
groups differ from other contemporary non-state
groups such as Boko Haram, the Taliban and Al-
Shabab in many ways. From an organisational
perspective, Islamic State demonstrated several
unique structural characteristics in the working of
insurgent organisations. The most significant being
its global recruitment base, ability to instigate
widely dispersed operations if not formally
control or manage these and yet, aligned also to
the classical insurgent model with the control of
physical space and some harmony with disaffected
regions and populations.
Boko Haram – 2GI
The Second Paradigm Shift
(3rd Generation Insurgencies: 3GI)
Cyberspace and modern communication
technologies provide both the means and an
extension of the traditional insurgent activity.
Zaidi in 2012, observed the paradigm shifting
and introduced the concept of 3GI, centred on
post-structural nature of global insurgencies,
the idea, for example, of the lone wolf and mini-
cells self-motivated, self-funded, self-trained,
the minimalist with random and innovative
approaches to creat fear through terror. The idea
sounded so far-fetched and even incredible to the
community of practitioners and academics alike
that without evidence (none existed at the time) it
remained in the realm of fiction. The events of 22
May 2013, when a British Soldier was murdered
in violent attack on the streets of London at the
hands of two self-radicalised individuals changed
all that.38 We now had evidence, was this a one off
or a new trend? Subsequent such events point to
the latter. The post-structural and geographically
unconstrained nature of these insurgencies was
at the time considered indefinable and non-
attributable. While the character of insurgencies
transformed to an extent that the paradigm, our
fundamental, assumptions, of what constituted
an insurgency was challenged. The transition
from hard, structural assumptions to soft ones
such as ideas, beliefs, distributed leadership and
networks of thought as opposed to networks of
practice warranted a new frame of reference. At
the same time, the obvious potential 3GI presented
for mercenaries and criminal networks to tap into,
what we now call hybrid wars, was clear.
The difference between 2GI and 3GI is
fundamental, it is a paradigm shift. There is no
need for sanctuary, leadership does not play any
significant role, there is no ownership of a strategic
level only strategic effects filtering up from
seemingly unrelated tactical actions. In the tactical
or technical levels there is no formal organisation.
While 2GI demonstrates a dislocation of leadership,
insurgent structures, activities and activists,
in other words a leadership remains one of the
centres of gravity, 3GI requires no focal leadership,
formal structure or elaborate organisation. Ideas
and motivations emanating from, what could be a
virtual leader, combined with a mechanism of self-
motivation and training (as provided by the dark
net) form the basic ingredients for effects in the
physical space.
Properly resourced and with precursors
such as real or perceived prejudices, dissent
and division along ethnic, religious, linguistic
or class lines, 3GI could canvas a modern state
comprehensively. The more developed and modern
in infrastructure the state, the more vulnerable it is
 PAKISTAN ARMY

likely to be to 3GI. People, governments, networks,
banking, communications, trade, finance,
industry, resources, all are included in the physical
manifestation of earlier generations.
3GI can effectively tailor methods and effects
to the target’s vulnerabilities as is not confined by
linear thinking; ramming automobiles into a crowd
on the street is an example whether it is in a street
in London, Paris or Kabul. It is also not just about
the ‘radical Islamism’ stereotype as we witnessed
in the Finsbury Park Attack in London.39
world… whether one opts to trail, track, bait or bust
a network, node or an individual, how do the police
or other specialist units’ evidence what would
eventually become legal matters. The tremendous
success of the Pakistan Armed Forces, the Army
in combating terrorists in the frontier regions is
indeed laudable, however while the battle is won,
the war continues. Hybrid war will seek to push
such terrorist movements into the new domain.
In crafting a coherent movement, insurgents no
longer need a sanctuary; cyberspace is their battle-

Metric 2GI 3GI

Leadership Critical Virtual

Organisation Operate and exist in physical space

Sanctuary Physical Cyberspace

Population base Local and Global Global

Recruitment Formalised Local and Global Not required in most instances

External support Yes Irrelevant

Funding Yes, routed through the organisation Depends on resourcefulness of cell/

structures individual. When needed is likely to
channel through anonymous
sympathisers (through internet) or
those who stand to benefit from the
actions politically or materially.

Material Support Significant reliance Limited reliance

Impact Localised (local political or criminal agendas) Localised/global (global dimension

of the motivation is more apparent)

Techniques Guerrilla action Terrorism Open conflict (IS in Terrorism Innovative small group or
Syria) Swarming and mass opinion mobilisations lone-wolf action
(Arab Spring) Cyber Terrorism

Table 3: Comparison of 2GI and 3GI

3GI can at best be managed and mitigated. From
threat perception to response, 3GI places a heavy
reliance of a strong cyber component to detect and
intercept the broad spectrum of actions and modes
of operation the perpetrators can engage in.
ground. For insurgents, this is a world far more
forgiving than the physical one, and promises
rapid impact, and effects at a wider scale.

‘‘
Relational diagraphs connecting threats
is a simple and useful tool for perceiving
interconnected threats that more structured tools
often fail to detect. Either way, our conventional
approach to understanding threats needs to evolve
to understanding threat systems.
Countering 3GI would require greater access to
people use of the electromagnetic spectrum which
throws up legal, moral and ethical arguments. As
insurgents attempt to take the military out of the
game, effectively negating military power disparity,
there is the issue of responding in the physical
The difference between 2GI and
3GI is fundamental; it is a paradigm
shift. There is no need for sanctuary,
leadership does not play any significant
role, there is no ownership of a strategic
level only strategic effects filtering
up from seemingly unrelated tactical
actions. In the tactical or technical
‘‘
levels there is no formal organisation

Green Book 2019 25

 PAKISTAN ARMY
Hybrid War: Whose problem is it any way?
3GI is but one component of a Hybrid War.
We have demonstrated how 3GI attempts to make
military power insignificant. Nonetheless, we have
focused on this idea as it is the one closest to the
military dimension of the response. The security
dimension is much broader. Korybko argues that
hybrid war permits individuals to become swarms
that can then be used in creative ways to overwhelm
authority and lead to what he calls a ‘soft coup’. It is
the tactical manifestation of the weaponisation of
ideas and unleashing chaos. The only prerequisite,
he suggests, is ‘‘an effective information outreach
campaigns and the construction of social networks
over a period of time”.40 A monster composed of ‘a
hive mind of anti-government activists’ is created.
‘War’ moves forward, not at the high intensity
that technology permits it to but at pace far below
it. Operational tempos are slowed down, the
connection between actions and effect obscured
and extended over time. The insurgents and
indeed the hybrid war antagonist, own time, while
the protagonists are locked in their own ‘efficient’
decision loops. The antagonist moves outside these
decision loops, and all this while, the pieces of the
puzzle come together waiting for the last push.
Hybrid war is everyone’s problem. It is a whole
of government and whole of society problem. While
it can’t be effectively fought — because the enemy
remains elusive — it can be effectively managed
because we can know what we are managing and
can strive to get it right, it becomes, therefore, a
‘tame’ and not a ‘wicked’ problem.
Threat perception is of course particularly
difficult. The operational tempo in a hybrid
strategy does the opposite of what we strive for
in high tempo operations. Instead of trying to get
inside the target state’s OODA loop, the object is to
operate well outside it; what Sun Tzu described as
operating above the seven heavens and below the
seven earths.41
Conclusion
Change often needs something dramatic to
break existing inertia. In this sense the current
debate over Russia and its supposed embrace of
a hybrid war strategy has been helpful in terms
of thinking about the ‘enemy’. It has also opened
debate about insurgency as a tool of great states as
well as the province of new and shadowy sub state
actors. This is important as despite a remarkable
affinity to absorb technology, militaries the
world over demonstrate an aversion to shedding
intellectual and structural baggage which has
become embedded in the bureaucracy and the
mind-set of officials. Doctrine thrives on the hope
that a compliant enemy will repeat history. In
reality, reading emerging threats can be a bit like
26 Green Book 2019
‘‘
Hybrid war is everyone’s problem.
It is a whole of government and whole
of society problem. While it can’t be
effectively fought — because the enemy
remains elusive — it can be effectively
managed because we can know what
we are managing and can strive to get
‘‘
it right, it becomes therefore a ‘tame’
and not a ‘wicked’ problem
crystal ball gazing. In a hybrid war scenario, even
insight into an enemy’s capabilities and intents;
combat power; contours of its military strategy and
even enablers and catalysts across other lines of
operation may yield little or nothing of value for
actual policy and the development of an effective
counter-strategy.
Much has happened since the military
community last talked about the changing face of
combat and conflict in the 21st Century. Many of the
technological and structural developments in war
led to some success even if in the overall analysis the
West effectively ‘lost’ the war in Iraq. Intelligence
successes in Afghanistan and Iraq, particularly and
most significantly in detection and Counter IED, is
something the military and associated industry can
be proud of. These technical achievements, while
preventing repeat of these tactics, are not helpful
in predicting the next lone-wolf armed with an
idea and a knife, or a driver gearing up to ram into
a crowd. Hybrid war, and its connection with 3GI
produces a different world of challenges.
The human domain, the military and
technology have large gaps to cover before we can
begin to upset and disrupt the advantages a state
pursuing a hybrid war against another or the third
generation insurgents enjoy. Future technologies
must approach semantic, the synaptic and the
physical layers of the info-sphere from a human
perspective and this approach will need to be
adaptive to understand behaviour, sentiment and
dissonance.
While crafting their movements, insurgents no
longer need a sanctuary. Cyberspace is their safe-
house. It is a world far more forgiving than the
physical one and promises rapid impact and effects
on a global scale. Insurgency within a hybrid war
(whether state or sub state) also includes the use of
‘coercive covert power’, the use of mercenaries, acts
of sabotage, false flag operations, and rogue groups
in ways that remain ambiguous to an ideological
or religious cause. To this end more in depth
understanding is required of the morphology of all
sorts of crime, particularly understanding criminal

and terrorist activities and their communication
(including the role of cyber, cellular and other
means); and indeed an interpretation of threats
risks from criminal organisations and violent social
movements.
Conflicting paradigms, Kuhn would argue,
do not coexist, however, the First and Second
Paradigm shifts we find do just that and may play
side by side. Perhaps, we need a different term of
reference for 3GIs to de-conflict this departure from
an academic perspective, but that is a discussion
for another time.
To manage Hybrid war at the national level,
a greater cohesion between people, government
and the military will be needed. At the military
level, it translates into a merger of human and
the technical domains to synergise the physical-
moral and conceptual elements of combat power.
Understanding of interconnections between
methods used by various organised criminal groups;
their motivations; their structures and networks;
transferable techniques; public perceptions and
workings of transnational organised crime is vital
for making sense of how a hybrid war strategy may
‘‘ It is the ‘people’ who will be targeted to undermine a society and a community. To
counter future threats ‘joined up’ thinking will be required across government, media
and the armed forces as well as our own people
Acknowledgment
We would like to acknowledge the help of Professor Chris Bellamy of the Oxford Changing Character of
War Programme with this piece.
Notes
1. National power is defined as the combination of Diplomatic, Informational,
Military and Economic (DIME) Power of a state. Used originally in the US
military, the term is now more widely used around the world. UK’s Royal
College of Defence Studies has also embraced this typology and it is this
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tap into the fabric of a nation and how it may then
hollow out the state one layer at a time.
A new breed of analysts and planners is
needed. There is a requirement for scholars and
students to think and perceive outside of the
systems approach, who are comfortable with
ambiguity and extremes of information. Above
all, political and military leaderships need to be
less prescriptive and embrace complexity and the
art of dealing with adaptive problems; something
militaries are not traditionally good at. As the
Russian incursion into Ukraine proved and as we
have learnt more about Islamic State for example,
societies can be subverted in an imaginary sphere
of false news, questionable narratives of historical
suffering as well as through the some time false
promises of more prosperous futures and better
governance. It is the ‘people’ who will be targeted
to undermine a society and a community. To
counter future threats ‘joined up’ thinking will be
required across government, media and the armed
forces as well as our own people.
Hybrid war — it is everybody’s problem!
‘‘
definition to which we refer. However, we include ‘Culture’ as a separate and
influential component National Power which in the UK and US constructs is
not treated separately. See RCDS (2017) Getting Strategy Right Enough. London:
RCDS.
2. Murray Williamson & Peter R, Mansoov (Eds.) (2011) Hybrid Warfare Fighting
Green Book 2019 27
 PAKISTAN ARMY
Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
3. John Mueller (1995) Quiet Cataclysm Reflections on the Recent Transformation
of World Politics. London: Harper Collins.
4. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S Nye (1998) ‘Power and Interdependence in the
Information Age.’Foreign Affairs. September/October, 77.5.
5. Ron B. Hassner (2009) War on Sacred Grounds. New York: Cornell University
Press.
6. Michael Ignatieff (2001) Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond. New York: Picador.
7. Jason Burke (2011) The 9/11 Wars. London: Allen Lane.
8. Mohammad Iftikhar Zaidi (2009) The Conduct of War and the Notion of Victory.
Shrivenham: Cranfield University.
9. Lloyd Gardner, Killing Machine The American Presidency in the Age of Drone
Warfare, New York: The New Press, 2013.
10. BBC (2014) As it Happened: Pakistan School Attack. BBC News Online: https://
www.bbc.com/news/live/world-asia-30491113. Accessed on September 3,
2018.
11. CNN (2015) 2015 Paris Terror Attacks Fast Facts. CNN News Online. https://
edition.cnn.com/2015/12/08/europe/2015-paris-terror-attacks-fast-facts/index.
html. Accessed on September 3, 2018.
12. Mary Kaldor (2012) New Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era (2nd Ed.).
Cambride: Polity.
13. David Keen (2012) Useful Enemies When Waging Wars is more Important than
Winning Them. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
14. David Kilcullen (2009) The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the
Midst of a Big One. New York: Oxford University Press
15. Thomas Ricks (2006) Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. London:
Allen Lane
16. Alfred D. Chandler Jr. (1962). Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of
the American Industrial Enterprise. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
17. The idea of a generational shift in how insurgencies operated and what
their future direction was tending towards was developed by Dr M. I. Zaidi
classifying three generations of insurgent organisations. The events of 22
May 2013, where a British soldier was murdered by two individuals working
in concert but acting independent of external control or funding, reinforced
the idea and provided a brutal example of a third generation insurgency
practice. See also Mohammad Iftikhar Zaidi (2014): Insurgencies: The Third
Generation: A conference paper presented at the AOC Crows conference.
Edinburgh. Online: https://www.eweurope.com/Content/14th-15th-May-Main-
Conference-Programme/6_12/
18. CNN (2017) London mosque attack suspect named, according to media outlets.
CNN Online. https://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/18/europe/urgent---london-vehicle-
28 Green Book 2019
collision/index.html. Accessed on September 3, 2018.
19. Andrew Monaghan (2015) “Putin’s Way of War. The ‘War’ in Russia’s Hybrid
Warfare.” Parameters, 45 940 Winter, 2015-2016.
20. Ibid
21. Keir Giles (2016) Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and
Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power. Chatham House, Research Paper.
Russia and Eurasia Programme.
22. Roger McDermott (2015) ‘Does Russia’s “Hybrid War; Really Exist.” Eurasia
Daily Monitor. Volume 12 Issue 103. June.
23. Ari Heistein and Shapir Michlin (2016) “Russia’s Hybrid-Warfare Victory in
Syria.”The National Interest. May 19.
24. Roger McDermott, Op. Cit.
25. Andrew Korybko (2015) Hybrid Wars: The Indirect Adaptive Approach to Regime
Change. Moscow: Unknown. Kindle Edition. Pp.1574-1586.
26. Henry Mintzberg (2007) Tracking Strategies: Towards a General Theory. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
27. Johnson et. al. (2017) Exploring Strategy: Text and Cases, (11th Ed.). London:
Pearson.
28. Sun Tzu (2000) The Art of War (A Modern Chinese Interpretation). Tao
Hanzhang and Youan Shibing (Trs.) New York: Sterling Publishing Company.
29. Ronald A. Heifetz, Alexander Grashow and Marty Linsky (2009) The Practice of
Adaptive Leadership: Tools and Tactics for Changing your Organisation and the
World. Boston: Harvard Business School.
30. Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber (1973) Dilemmas in a general theory of
planning. Policy Sciences. Volume 4, Issue 2, June: pp 155–169.
31. Keith Grint (2010) “Wicked Problems and Clumsy Solutions: The Role of
Leadership” in Stephen Brookes, Keith Grint (Eds.)The New Public Leadership
Challenge. Basingstoke:Palgrave Macmillan: pp. 169-186.
32. Andrew Korybko, Op. Cit.
33. See Metz, 2007 Op. Cit.; Galula, 2006 Op. Cit.; Kilcullen, 2010 Op. Cit.; Bunker,
2016, Op. Cit and Zaidi, 2014 Op. Cit.
34. See R. J. Bunker, 2016. Op. Cit. p. 39.
35. Steven Metz (2012) “The Internet, New Media, and the Evolution of
Insurgency.” Parameters. Carlisle: SSI Autumn.
36. Department of Defence (2011) Cyberspace is a New Warfare Domain. Online.
https://www.securityweek.com/department-defense-cyberspace-new-
warfare-domain
37. Zaidi (2014), Op Cit.
38. Frank Gardner (2013). “Two guilty of Lee Rigby murder: Analysis”. BBC News.
Internet. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-25450555. Accessed on September 1,
2018.
39. Vikram Dodd and Kevin Rawlinson (2018) “Finsbury Park attack: man
‘brainwashed by anti-Muslim propaganda’ convicted” The Guardian Online.
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/feb/01/finsbury-park-van-attacker-
darren-osborne-found-guilty-murder-makram-ali. Accessed on September 1,
2018.
40. Andrew Korybko, Op. Cit.
41. Sun Tzu (2000) Op. Cit.
PAKISTAN ARMY

Green Book 2019 29

 RE-APPRAISAL OF
THE PRINCIPLES
OF WAR
AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH TENETS OF
MILITARY STRATEGY

‘‘willEach period in the history of nations

have its own theory of war, as every
age could have its own kind of war and
‘‘
its own limiting conditions
Lieutenant General Raza Muhammad
Khan, HI (M) (Retired), former Corps
Clausewitz
Commander and former President of the
National Defence University, Islamabad

Abstract
The arguments proffered in this rendition seek to provide additional food for thought on doctrinal-
development. It questions the relevance, scope and adequacy of the existing principles of war and
expounds their relationship with common aphorisms of military strategy. The exposition aims at
grasping and comparing the dynamics and philosophies of past and contemporary wars, and suggests
a reinterpretation and expansion of the current thinking on the matter. It recommends the adoption of
four new precepts and rearranging the existing principles to win, or-terminate modern conflicts on a
favourable note.

Keywords: Principles of War, Doctrine, Conflict, Military Strategy, Victory

30 Green Book 2019

T
he principles of war are as old as the
history of warfare itself and many of
these were formally listed and first
applied during the Napoleonic era. The
prevailing principles of war, adopted by
most countries, with some variations,
comprise about a dozen fundamental axioms that
represent the best efforts of past military thinkers,
to identify those aspects of warfare that could be
universally true and perpetually relevant to ensure
victory or to avert defeat in a war.
These are: selection and maintenance of aim
or objective, offensive, mass or concentration,
economy of force, mobility or manoeuvre, unity of
command/effort, security, surprise and simplicity.
The British and Canadian defence doctrines also
include maintenance of morale as a principle
of war. The Russian principles of war include
readiness, information warfare, joint and combined
operations and moral and political factors.
There has been some divergence of opinion
about these principles even among great captains
of war.
Napoleon felt that ‘the principles of war are the
same as that of siege. Fire must be concentrated
on one point and as soon as the breach is made,
the equilibrium is broken and the rest is nothing’.1
Jomini propounded four broad principles in his
famous ‘Precise’, i.e. directing the mass of force
against the communication lines of the enemy’s
main effort, superiority at the point of decision at
the strategic level, a similar action at the tactical
level and speed.2
Clausewitz, the philosopher of war, listed
many important principles for the conduct of
war.3 He theorised the three general principles of
war i.e., ascendancy of the moral to the physical,
calmness/firmness and audacity. Clausewitz
himself modestly, but, perhaps rightly observed
that the principles had been drawn up by him in a
haste and therefore, they may not be able to stand
severe criticism. Marshal Foch enunciated four
principles of war, e.g., economy of force, freedom
‘‘ The prevailing principles of war,
adopted by most countries, with some
variations, comprise about a dozen
fundamental axioms that represent the
best efforts of past military thinkers,
to identify those aspects of warfare
that could be universally true and
‘‘
perpetually relevant to ensure victory
or to avert defeat in a war
PAKISTAN ARMY
of action, free disposal of forces and security. He
also propounded two principles of strategy, ‘the
intellectual element and the philosophy of reason,
the spiritual element and the exaltation of the
will’. His emphasis on the offensive as the ‘law of
war’ is also well known4. Liddell Hart crystallised
his entire thought process on winning of wars in
six positive and two negative maxims (indirect
approach being the dominant maxim), however he
also preferred to parallel these with the principles
of strategy. Andre Beaufre is of the view that
since modern wars are no more a mere military
phenomenon, there is an overlap in it in the sphere
of internal policy, external affairs, economics and
military operations.5 He goes on to recommend
that mastery of strategy in these fields should be
acquired to assist policy for the purpose of winning
wars. Bernard Brodie has opposed any conception
that suggests a ‘computerised tabulation or
keyboard where pressing the right button produces
the right answer’ but agrees that ‘the consideration
of a catalogue of numbered principles (usually
fewer than a dozen) with the barest definition
of the meaning of each may be necessary to
communicate to second-order minds (or minds too
busy with the execution of plans to worry about the
specific validity of the ideas behind them), some
conception of what the business is all about’.6
From the brief discussion above, it appears
that while some military thinkers have mixed
the application of the principles of war with that
of strategy, others have chosen to keep the two
separate. Not much is apparently wrong with
either of these approaches, as belligerents seem to
have tested them practically, during the conduct
of warfare. It therefore appears that it may be a
rather difficult undertaking to make an attempt
to re-appraise these principles or methodologies.
Challenging them could be even more exacting. It
is perhaps for this reason that apparently no recent
attempts seems to have been made, either to review
their efficacy or to redefine/revisit them, despite
epochal changes in the nature of wars and conflicts,
since these principles were first propounded. This
could result in applying outmoded lessons to future
wars and costly miscalculations.
There is also variation, as well as ambiguity
in the exposition of the principles of war, which
evokes the need for their reassessment, questioning
their adequacy and relevance.
To do so, the following four cardinal questions
may need to be answered as part of the re-appraisal
effort in this discourse. First; whether the current
principles of war are relevant in the present and
future, domestic, regional and global environment?
Second; what is the scope of these principles and do
they provide guidance at all levels at which wars and
conflicts ruminate? Third; if the various types and
Green Book 2019 31
 PAKISTAN ARMY
forms of war, such as cold, conventional (limited
and total), nuclear, guerrilla asymmetrical wars
and low intensity conflicts, including insurgency
and counter insurgency, to name a few, can also
be governed by the present set of principles? And
Fourth; to inquire into the sphere of influence of
strategic doctrine on the existing principles and
ascertain if there is any interrelation.
Environmental Tests of the Principles of
War
The environment includes the totality of
the significant external and internal conditions
that prevail within a given time period. The
most important transformation in the regional
environment includes the overt nuclearisation of the
Sub-Continent and the events in Afghanistan after
9/11, with its fall out in Pakistan.
There is also a consensus on the grave dangers
of a conflict between nuclear armed neighbours, yet
limited, nuclear as well as conventional wars are still
being considered as options to resolve contentious
issues related to territorial and other disputes. Limited
conventional wars could escalate to the use of the
ultimate weapon; with consequences too disastrous
to be managed by any one, yet attitudes on addressing
the causes of conflict remain unchanged. As I write,
almost one third of the Pakistani troops are involved
in counter insurgency/counter terrorism and ‘in aid
of civil power’ duties. These commitments have their
own rules and dynamics that may be different from
the traditional principles of war.
Additional visible trends are the phenomenal
developments in information technology, major
role of the media and increasing globalisation of the
economies. As a consequence, greater reliance on a
collective response for the use of coercive diplomatic
measures and the application of force, at the regional
and global levels could ensue. International support
is dependent on the mutuality of common interests
and challenges/threats. The Indo-Russian ties, the
32
‘‘ There is also variation, as well as
ambiguity in the exposition of the
principles of war, which evokes the need
for their reassessment, questioning
‘‘
their adequacy and relevance
Indo-US nuclear deal, the Indo-Israeli defence
cooperation, the CPEC and Pakistan-China security
understanding and US actions in Afghanistan are
some examples. Due to the current recession in
the economies of many countries, predominantly
Pakistan; the FATF, IMF, the World Bank, and other
donors could also exert a much greater (though
selective) influence on state policies, than it did in
the past.
Pakistan is one of the largest contributors to UN
peace keeping and enforcement operations. Its armed
forces are therefore expected to participate in a variety
of military operations other than war (MOOTW). As
these factors will shape all future security imperatives
of nations, there will be a requirement to take greater
cognisance of their presence.
The existing principles of war do not entirely
seem to cater for adjustments necessitated by these
compulsions or the fact that victory in modern wars
is dependent on the will of the masses and the
harmonisation of the socio-political, administrative
and military strategies.
Scope and Level of Application
The current principles of war may have stood
the test of recent wars at the operational and tactical
levels, yet, there are higher levels at which lower
level postulates could be meaningless.
Consider the deliberations at the National
Security Council, the National Command Authority,
the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, the Defence

‘‘ Consider the deliberations at the National Security Council, the National Command
Authority, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, the Defence Council, the Ministry of
‘‘
Defence or the Joint Services levels where major decisions related to war and peace,
including the military system are made
Council, the Ministry of Defence or the Joint Services
levels where major decisions related to war and
peace, including the military system are made.
The first three echelons of the higher defence
organisation will provide only broad guide lines and
precepts for the planning and conduct of the conflict
or war. Such forums may reject war as a concept
to solve the crises at hand and will rarely consider
principles like offensive action, concentration, or
mobility etc. They will be reflecting on bigger issues
outlined in the national security policy/strategy, the
defence policy and the military strategy, like public
opinion, international support and the general state
of preparedness for war, or the lack of it. The senior
military leadership will always be expected to advise
the political leadership on such issues, yet these
factors are not included in the existing principles of
war.
It may be argued that the domain of the general
is distinct from that of the statesman, and therefore
the two could have a different set of guide-lines for
war fighting. While this may be true, conclusions
from the environment outlined earlier, suggests
that there has to be an overlap between the two.
Besides, an exclusive catalogue of principles, meant
only for use by political leaders is hard to find. In
fact, it is the lack of such guidance that makes the
PAKISTAN ARMY
search for a common list, so important and urgent.
This very cursory reference to the components of
any higher defence organisation and its mandate,
points towards other principles that may be needed
at the uppermost levels in all wars and conflicts,
present or future.
Response to the Nature of Wars
Wars may range, from very high intensity armed
conflicts at one end of a spectrum to irregular warfare
and low intensity operations at the other, which
include insurgency and counter insurgency. If wars
had to be guided by a set of rules or principles, they
must ideally hold good for the successful execution
of all these forms of war.
Then there are limited wars, all out wars, nuclear
wars and the wars against terrorists. The principles
of war must satisfy and take into account all these
forms and shades of wars, failing which, they need
to be updated. These principles also evoke other
expectations like provision of a generic formula for
victory, major guide lines for the conduct and rules
of engagement of each type of mission, and an
assurance of victory that will be permanent in nature.
However, the current principles of war are silent on
such prospects and appear more applicable to specific
National Security Committee Meeting
 PAKISTAN ARMY

‘‘ The current principles of war may Possible New Principles of War

have stood the test of recent wars at the Internal Consensus and Public Opinion
operational and tactical levels, yet, there The significance of Clausewitz’ trinity of ‘the
are higher levels at which lower level
‘‘ people, the government and the military’, in all the
affairs of warfare is well known. He was of the view
postulates could be meaningless that any theory that did not consider this trinity
was useless.
In future wars, the people are not likely to allow
conventional operations, campaigns and battles, governments to take decisions on war and peace,
rather than the entire range of warfare alluded earlier. over their heads. Similarly, the armed forces alone
For instance, the principle of ‘mass/concentration’
may not be relevant to nuclear, chemical or
biological warfare milieu. The necessity for wars Clauswitzian
to be perceived as legitimate and just, for their Trinity of War
successful prosecution and counsel for asymmetric
wars also appears outside the scope of the existing
principles.
Considering the revolutions in military affairs,
brought mainly by technological developments,
there certainly is place for some fundamental and
key axioms in the theory and practice of war that
can deal with information operations and the
‘soft’ or cyber wars. The existing principles do
not specifically address low intensity conflicts or
insurgency and counter insurgency operations,
wherein primacy of the political factors, intelligence
based operations and ensuring legitimacy are the
or a superior technology may not prove useful in
key factors. This inadequacy is glaringly evident
winning wars unless the people are ready, willing
when considered in the light of the violent events
and motivated to participate in their own defence.
in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere in the
world. It is also paradoxical that such factors that are We know that modern democratic institutions
vital for the conditions of the peace, subsequent to are mainly built on the will of the people and war
the initial victories in conflicts and wars have rarely is, therefore, the concern of all citizens. Domestic
been collectively discussed under some imposing consensus among the elected leaders, the
appellation, such as the principles of war. It may intelligentsia and even the media should, therefore,
be noted that a theory, precept or a notion of war be the corner stone of all war policies/plans.
can be labelled as a principle on the condition that History bears testimony to the fact that a conflict
it provides guidelines for the successful execution between the will of the people and the policies of
of all present as well as future wars/conflicts. The the government or even the military could prove
current list of principles of war appears restricted extremely detrimental to the achievement of the war
to provision of guidance, mainly for the latter and objectives.
is therefore imperfect. Besides, they may not be Sometimes it may not be possible to find military
able to stand the acid test of sufficiency/adequacy solutions to problems that may be essentially
at the highest levels of policy and strategy. political, ideological or economic in nature. In such
Besides, the resilience and power potential cases, the military’s main job would be to create
of a country is remarkably influenced by many conditions that are suitable for arriving at domestic
constant factors, before, during and often after the consensus and public support in the target countries/
end of major combat actions as well. Four such
factors are: internal consensus and public opinion

‘‘
(supportive or against), international support and
environment, the state of preparedness for war and History bears testimony to the
the impact of information operations on the entire fact that a conflict between the will
spectrum of warfare.
The following discussion in this rendition
of the people and the policies of the
shall examine these and a few other dynamics as government or even the military could
possible new principles of wars/conflicts, in the prove extremely detrimental to the
‘‘
light of generally accepted norms and selected
historical evidence. achievement of the war objectives

34 Green Book 2019


areas on these issues. The support of the population
lies at the core of counter insurgency operations;
however, the US failure to achieve this support in
Afghanistan is largely responsible for their present
predicament in that country. Sometimes public
opinion may sway back and forth, against or in
support of wars, and conflicts in accordance with
the way in which military operations progress. Such
a state of affairs may arise if the people have not
been prepared by the leadership, for the impending
events, in advance. This preparation will not be
possible unless its significance is acknowledged.
Even a quick look at recent military history
verifies that in case of a protracted war or post war
insurgency/counter insurgency or a war that leads
to large human casualties, the people must have
a very strong conviction in the cause for which
the nation has gone to war. The absence of this
condition will invariably lead to an erosion of the
public support to military operations, which in turn
could lead to an erosion of military morale and may
even compel the national government to terminate
the war – sometimes under undesirable conditions.
Strong proof of such phenomena could be found
in the Vietnam War, the Soviet and US invasions of
Afghanistan. It is also well known, that the success
of our armed forces military operations against
terrorists, since the last many years, were greatly
facilitated by a favourable public opinion.
Sometimes, ‘the people will carry on a war
regardless of the outcome if that war is favoured
by them, but if it is detested, the people will refuse
to take part in them, which may in turn force the
government to make peace for fear of its own safety’.7
The support of the population of countries
which are invaded can only be won if the invaders
are perceived as liberators, just and friendly and/
or the general conditions after the war/conflict are
better than what they were before the conflict. The
post occupation measures like the Marshall Plan
etc. put in place in Germany
and Japan by the Allied
Powers after World War –
II, provide a good example
of this. Thus, the need to
elevate this factor to its
rightful place as a principle
of war.
Preparedness for War
Any consideration about
the type of response to
aggression or the likelihood
of the same could include
multiple choices. Inordinate
delays in the choice of
response options could have
catastrophic consequences.
PAKISTAN ARMY
‘‘
The people will carry on a war
regardless of the outcome if that war is
favoured by them, but if it is detested,
the people will refuse to take part in
them, which may in turn force the
‘‘
government to make peace for fear of
its own safety
Within these options, the politico-military strategy
must also consider the type of force best suited
for the campaign. The preferences could range
among others, from the use of minimum force,
covert actions, and single armed service, like the
Special Forces, air force, navy, army or a suitable
combination of these means. Such decisions would
be based on an in depth analysis of the capabilities,
limitations and consequences of the use of each
type of force, with its own peculiarities and rules
of employment. Most of these decisions will
essentially be politico-military in nature, requiring
a thorough understanding of the theories of warfare
by the senior most politicians and military leaders.
This will need time for preparation. But as military
strategy always flows out of policy, the bigger onus
of responsibility will be on the political masters,
who have to be prepared and trained, during peace
time, to take such decisions, through formal and
informal military education and war games.
Preparation for war also includes acquisition
of weapons, equipment, munitions, fuel etc. from
within the country and abroad. This will require a
long period, spread over many months, sometimes
years. Readiness will include what Sun Tzu termed
‘knowing yourself and the enemy’. It will also
embrace training for new missions necessitated by
changes in the environment, or in the adversary’s
 PAKISTAN ARMY
‘‘
In future wars, the people are not
likely to allow governments to take
decisions on war and peace, over their
heads. Similarly, the armed forces
alone or a superior technology may not
prove useful in winning wars unless the
people are ready, willing and motivated
‘‘
to participate in their own defence
doctrines. Mobilisation of forces and training of
reservists and second line forces will also need
careful consideration. This was indeed a major
lesson learnt by the Pakistan armed forces during
the Indo-Pak tensions and deployments of forces, at
the borders in the years 2001/2002 and 2008, as we
realised that the various government departments
will need time to reorient and train for their war
time functions.
The civil defence organisation and the disaster
management authorities will have to be readied,
equipped and deployed during the pre-hostilities
period. Particular attention will have to be given
to the psychological preparation of the people for
war. All training must be extensive to save blood
and designed around future and not the past wars.
If a conflict or war is imposed in a state of
un-preparedness, the politico military objectives
will have to be modified and tailored accordingly.
Protection of vulnerable areas/points, strategic
assets and dispersion of nuclear weapons and their
means of delivery is also a part of preparedness for
war.
Preparedness is now the first principle of the
Russian and many of the CIS countries, armed
forces. Finally, and most importantly, increased
readiness levels of conventional and nuclear forces
helps deterrence, which happens to be the primary
mission of all armed forces.
“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you
need not fear the result of a hundred battles”
Sun Tzu
36 Green Book 2019
The readiness list can be very long indeed,
however the single most important area that can
enhance or curtail liberty of all-action in war, will
be state of information operations.
As the transformation of the world continues
with developments in the means of communications
and information technology, future wars and
conflicts are likely to be influenced more by these
phenomena than anything else. This is discussed
in the ensuing text.
Information Dominance
Sun Tzu advised us over 2500 years ago that if
we kept ourselves informed about our adversaries
as well as ourselves, we could hope to win
hundreds of battles. He also stated that ‘all warfare
is based on deception (and surprise)’. Surprise
and deception will depend predominantly on
information manipulation.
Machiavelli believed that a good general could
be differentiated from an ordinary one on account
of the former’s foreknowledge about the enemy.
Napoleon equated an agent at the right place
to 20,000 soldiers. One of the major reasons given
by Wellington for his victory at waterloo was
prior information about Napoleon’s forces. Jomini
paralleled knowing with conquering. Clausewitz
devoted a full chapter to information in war
in his monumental work, ‘On War’. He stated
in the opening sentences of Chapter 6 that ‘…
information is the foundation of all our ideas and
actions, in war’. All the three ‘general principles
of war’, suggested by Clausewitz, that include
ascendancy of the moral to the physical, calmness
and even audacity could be influenced positively
or negatively by information operations. These
thoughts per se could have influenced the German
Army to adopt this principle of war.
The Information Age in which we are living
today has fundamentally altered the nature of
warfare. It has almost eliminated the ‘fog’ of war,
enabled most senior commanders to fight the war
through remote controls, reduced the need for
ground reconnaissance and made the necessity for
upwards flow of information less critical. It has the
potential to save resources, time and much sweat.
Information operations can be used to influence
the attitudes, behaviour and even the deep-seated
‘‘ The readiness list can be very
long indeed, however the single most
important area that can enhance or
curtail liberty of all-action in war, will
‘‘
be state of information operations
 PAKISTAN ARMY

beliefs of the people if applied for a sufficiently and civilian applications of artificial intelligence is
long duration. In the last two decades, the main fundamentally transforming the nature of warfare.
thrust of worldwide research and development has Like telecasts and radio broad casts, the Internet
been directed at information technology. Pakistan does not recognise national or international
is doing its utmost to catch up with the tremendous boundaries and terms like hybrid, non-lethal or
benefits of the information revolution. As Pakistan’s soft wars, utilising the powers of this media are
‘net-work’ dependency grows; its survival can already in vogue. However, the lack-some say even
be threatened by anyone who can disrupt this absence of state control over the internet is giving
network. This is equally applicable to the civil as rise to serious concerns among government circles.
well as the military sectors. With E – Commerce, The dangers of ‘web spoofing’, and other forms
free flow of capital is possible. This could affect of attacks by hackers are quite well known and
national security, if financial institutions, multi-
some counter measures to these have only recently
national companies or even individuals decide to
surfaced. ‘Trojan horses’, ‘logic bombs’, ‘trap doors’,
suddenly shift out funds or investments.
‘worms’, ‘chipping’ and ‘Nano machines’ are some
of the new weapons of this type of war. Modern
satellites, aircraft and remotely piloted vehicles can
pin point minute details with great accuracy, by day
and night and in all weather conditions. Everything
else being equal, the side that has information
domination is more likely to win the contest.
In view of the forgoing, there is a need, to
give information dominance and intelligence the
place they deserve–that of a principle of war. But
information dominance, as well as preparedness
for war may be dependent on international support
for many developing countries, including Pakistan.
This is discussed next.
International Support
As in the past, the outcome of wars/conflicts
in the next century will also be contingent upon
the world opinion and the support of the comity
of nations. For this, a timely successful ‘exterior
With the proliferation of TV channels and manoeuvre’ that aims at an adroit manipulation
broad band internet, the attitudes and convictions of the foreign affairs to shape the international
of the masses, so vital to the success of all forms environment would play a vital role. Some
of military operations, are increasingly being consequences of ignoring this compulsion were:
influenced by the media. Information warfare, despite his operational genius, demonstrated in
that shall include propaganda to sap the morale of the battles of Austerlitz and Jena etc., Napoleon
the rivals and measures was decisively defeated

‘‘
to keep the spirits of at Waterloo by the last
own population and the Machiavelli believed that a good Coalition of Nations that
armed forces high, will be
possible through media general could be differentiated from an formed against him.
reports and coverage
during the tension
‘‘ This Coalition abhorred
ordinary one on account of the former’s Napoleon’s foreign
period and the conflict. foreknowledge about the enemy policy manifested by the
‘Continental System’.
The electronic media, that includes commercial
Perhaps Napoleon needed some principles other
broadcasts/telecasts, the print media and the
internet shall continue to play the most dominant than those existing at the time for him to follow, in
role and anyone who controls such assets may order to win the war and not only battles.
be able to shape and control present and future The German Blitzkrieg in Poland in 1939 and
events, whether these are at home or abroad. France in 1940 were indeed very fascinating and
With computing powers more than doubling impressive; however, Hitler failed to keep one of
every eighteen months or so, and developments in the great powers i.e. the USA, Britain or Russia
fibre optics technology allowing transmissions of neutral, during the conflict, which led to his defeat
an entire encyclopaedia in a few seconds, military in World War II.

Green Book 2019 37

 PAKISTAN ARMY
The erstwhile Soviet Union was humiliated in
Afghanistan due to lack of international support
for their actions in that country. Post World War
II history of warfare also indicates that purely
bilateral wars may not be easily winnable in view of
the heavy inter-dependence of countries on others
for the sinews of war and the inter-connectivity of
the economies of states. The outcomes of the Soviet
Invasion of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the US invasion of Iraq
and Afghanistan prove that wars for permanent
conquests of territories or even for change of
regimes, without convincing justification and
legitimacy, accepted by a majority of nations, are a
very costly and difficult undertaking. Even the most
powerful nations in the world have often preferred
to fight as part of a bigger coalition, though the US
did not learn its lesson from Vietnam when it tried
to fight a war mostly by itself in that country and
did the same in Iraq to end the Saddam regime. The
war in the Gulf to end the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,
the war in Kosovo and the war in Afghanistan are
recent, well known, examples of a unified action
that enjoyed almost a unanimous international
support. The triumphs in many of these instances
were obviously due to the international agreement
on the disputes in question. A collective response
formulated through a successful exterior
manoeuvre was prevalent in the past and is still a
logical course, but strangely, it does not figure out
as a principle for the conduct of wars.
‘‘ The German Blitzkrieg in Poland in 1939 and France in 1940 were indeed very
fascinating and impressive; however, Hitler failed to keep one of the great powers i.e.
‘‘
the USA, Britain or Russia neutral, during the conflict, which led to his defeat in World
War II
38 Green Book 2019
The role of diplomacy for forming coalitions
after the events of 9/11 and its impact on the
subsequent military operations in Afghanistan
needs no reiteration. These issues would assume
greater significance in all future wars and conflicts,
of whatever intensity. Saddam Hussain of Iraq
and his people paid a very heavy price for acting
against the international will when it invaded
Kuwait, but paradoxically, the United States, the
leader of the early Coalition against Iraq did not
learn this lesson. As a consequence, it faced serious
problems in Iraq; chief among which was the cost
of sustaining the war effort, which is in trillions of
US dollars by some estimates.8
Lessons Learnt for the Future
Diplomacy must assert and at times even
over assert its legitimate role as the first means
for achieving the political aims and interests of
nations.
At the same time, aggressors would be
disciplined through punitive measures by the
international community, sometimes applied
against them by the UN, while at other times; it may
be without the UN endorsement. Sometimes even
super power interests may not take precedence
over global concerns and international outlook.
From this, it could also be inferred that while the
ultimate outcomes of the serious disputes in Asia
and the Middle East cannot be determined at this
time, the opinion of the comity of nations may
eventually prevail in these conflicts as well.
This factor is indeed more pertinent for smaller
powers, which may wish to further their interests
against equal or bigger, more powerful states.
However, in future, international support to war
related acts by smaller countries may not be easily
forthcoming, unless there is commonality of threat
or shared interest of other states.
Finally, most wars and even military operations
other than war, fought after World War II, under a
UN or some other multinational umbrella have
generally been successful. The present arrangement
in Afghanistan (ISAF legitimised through the UN)
is a good example, but this dispensation is not
as successful as it ought to be. The main reasons
are that the UN is not in the lead role and there is
lack of enough public support to the continuous
presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan.

‘‘
Diplomacy must assert and at times
even over assert its legitimate role as the
‘‘
first means for achieving the political
aims and interests of nations
This alone proves that foreign decisions cannot
be imposed unless the domestic public opinion has
been prepared for them simultaneously and all
other fundamentals have been considered before,
during, and after the war.
Relationship of Principles of War and
Tenets of Strategy
As strategy deals with the best ‘ways’ to
employ the ‘means’ at our disposal to meet the
‘ends’ in war, the principles of strategy and those
of war have similar aims i.e. winning of wars, and
thus, combining the two for the purpose may be in
order. Strategy also comprises two components i.e.,
the employment and development of forces. Put
together, the principles of war and strategic doctrine
should cater for a comprehensive response, at most
levels. However, it must be clearly understood that
military and operational strategies are unlikely to
succeed if the principles of war are circumscribed,
or violated.
Clausewitz enunciated five general principles
of strategy; concentration of force at the decisive
point, economy of force, speed, public opinion and
pursuit. In addition, he outlined a separate set of
principles for offensive and defensive operations
at the tactical level. His view about putting public
opinion as a principle of strategy and not war
may have been true in his time, when monarchs
generally ruled and public support to government
decisions was not as significant, however,
nowadays, it needs to be a tenet for both.
In strategic terms, consideration of the well-
known notions of ‘time, space and relative strength
(TSR) matrix’, maintenance of a state of ‘balance’ at
all times, selection of the attrition or the manoeuvre
or a combination of the two warfare theories to
achieve the war objectives would depend on the
state of relative preparedness of the two sides and
an analysis of the adversary’s centre of gravity
(COG). Whether it is war or Military Operations
Other Than War (MOOTW), the first and perhaps
the most vital factor for planning would be the
identification and the tackling of the adversary’s
COG.
In fact, no war planning can proceed as desired
or succeed without the correct determination of
the opposing COG at many levels, yet this vital
aspect fails to find a mention in the current list
of the principles of war. It could be argued, that
PAKISTAN ARMY
the first principle i.e. ‘Objective’ may well include
a determination of the COG, however, such a
contention is not purported in the glossary of
the terms found in commonly known military
publications or literature. In any case, ‘Objective’
would mean the political or military purpose or
aim of the war and thus, it would remain distinct
from the term COG. Tackling the adversaries COG
at the least expected time and place has been
strongly advocated by Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart,
Strategic
Strategic centre of gravity
Operational
Tactical
Operational centre of gravity
Tactical centre of gravity
and is an accepted norm in our strategic thinking;
however, the Principles of War are silent on the
matter. Thus, there a need to undertake this
exercises concurrently, as an essential step, after
consideration of the first, existing principle of war
i.e. ‘Selection of Aim’. While some references to
these postulates could be found in the explanation
of the principles of ‘mobility’ and ‘concentration
of force’ but it is difficult to find instances where
these principles and the said notions were viewed
together for planning/waging of wars.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The preceding discussion may have provided
some answers to the fundamental questions raised
at the beginning of this part. These are: First; that
a reappraisal of the existing principles is needed
with a view to bringing them in harmony with
the dictates of the environment and the mission.
Second; that their relevance to all forms of warfare
is doubtful. Third; that their scope is rather narrow
and limited to address national security issues
at higher levels and finally that there is a need to
expand the principles of war and synchronise them
‘‘
As strategy deals with the best ‘ways’
to employ the ‘means’ at our disposal to
meet the ‘ends’ in war, the principles of
strategy and those of war have similar
aims i.e. winning of wars, and thus,
‘‘
combining the two for the purpose may
be in order
Green Book 2019 39
 PAKISTAN ARMY
with our defence doctrine for optimum effects. It is
sometimes argued that the principle of primacy of
the political factors,9 may not serve a useful purpose,
as military commanders may not be in a position
to influence political decisions. This observation is
negated by the recent events at the politico-military
level in the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan. In fact,
there is a need to formulate a separate guide for
policy makers on counter insurgency in the 21st
Century as this form of conflict is thought to be
eighty per cent political and only twenty per cent
military in its nature. However, the true purpose of
such direction can only be met in the context of a
balance of the political and military factors at the
top10 that will provide better environment for the
application of lower level postulates.
International understanding and domestic
consensus are likely to ensure primacy of political
issues and legitimacy and information dominance
would cover the vital intelligence needs of such
operations. The new/supplementary principles
40 Green Book 2019
of war take a broader, all-encompassing view of
war. They provide guidance at the level at which
decisions concerning war and peace are made.
Global and regional powers as well as smaller
nations, may have varying perspectives on wars
and different pedestals from which they view them,
nevertheless, in the present day interdependent,
inter connected/networked world (a phenomenon
that is likely to increase many fold in the near
future) they must look for such principles of war
that are applicable at the global, regional and local
levels (or grand strategic, strategic and operational
tiers). Equal relevance at all these levels would
obviously be preferable but not essential. The
principles of ‘International Support’, gained
through a successful exterior manoeuvre, ‘Internal
Consensus and favourable Public Opinion’, and
‘Information Dominance’, are directly pertinent
at the first two levels and indirectly at the last
level. All of these principles are applicable to
most MOOTW, including UN peace keeping and
enforcing operations. They, therefore, merit
consideration and adoption after due adjustment
for local conditions and requirements.
The first two, new principles, may apparently
look irrelevant below the national level, but
this may be a faulty supposition as any errors,
omissions, shortcomings or successes at that level
will profoundly influence the conduct and outcome
of wars, campaigns and battles at the other levels.
In other words, we must take cognisance of one
major lesson learnt repeatedly from history; that
‘‘ In fact, no war planning can proceed
as desired or succeed without the
‘‘
correct determination of the opposing
COG at many levels
a viable strategy at the top level can sustain many
lower level flaws, however, the opposite is rarely
true. These two new principles will call for a
much closer interaction and accommodation on
the issue between the political and senior military
leadership.
The new principles will be equally (if not
more) relevant in considerations related to nuclear,
biological and chemical warfare where the end state
is always difficult to envision. In such conflicts,
well contemplated and candid professional advice,
rendered by well informed and experienced senior/
strategic military leadership, at the highest level,
to the national leadership about the ominous
consequences of such wars will be vital. All strategic
leaders must therefore prudently ponder over these
new principles, well before entering a conflict of this
nature.
The current principles totally ignore the primary
mission of the armed forces, i.e. to deter war/conflict.
Preparedness, by nuclear and conventional forces
shall reinforce deterrence and, therefore, it warrants
recognition as a principle of war.
If war is a ‘continuation of policy by other
means’ as stated by Clausewitz, it must be based on
the most authentic, precise and timely information.
If war is a ‘clash of two opposing wills’ as enunciated
by Liddell Hart, these wills can be impinged upon
as much by information operations as by kinetic
military operations. The Principle of Information
Dominance must come up to this expectation.
If it does not, the future may see more wars like
the one in Iraq, initiated due to faulty intelligence.
The new principle of ‘Information Dominance’
is mainly driven by technological considerations
and it therefore tends to induce over reliance on
technological solutions. This may be an aberration
and needs to be guarded against, since war fighting
will remain both an art as well as a scientific
phenomenon.
The new precepts could preferably be termed
as the general principles of war and for MOOTW
at the politico military level, while the current
ones could be designated as ‘principles of military
campaigns, battles and operations’, for exclusive
military consideration, usage and application at
the tactical/lower levels.
Alternatively, the new principles could be
added to the existing ones, beginning with the
former and thereby adopting a total of thirteen
(four new plus nine old) principles. Such a list
may appear a bit long but the expansion will pass
most of the validity tests mentioned in this paper.
Notwithstanding the numbers or form of listing,
the new principles should be applicable at the
strategic and higher levels (state, regional, global)
and the existing principles must logically flow out
from these for all lower tiers.
For the sake of doctrinal harmony, all
notions and main tenets of strategy could flow
from the existing principles (such as ‘mobility’,
‘concentration’ and ‘selection and maintenance
of aim’) and need to be read in conjunction with
the new principles, suggested in this paper. The
existing principles of war should also be re-defined
to accommodate the major tenets of strategy.
However, the identification and tackling of the
adversaries COG is worth particular consideration
at higher levels and this factor could even merit the
status of a separate principle of war at some levels.
This exercise should be a combined attempt of the
civilian controllers and the military authorities.
While the new list of principles is made to mean
provision of general guidance, mainly for the
‘‘
The current principles totally ignore
the primary mission of the armed forces,
i.e. to deter war/conflict. Preparedness,
by nuclear and conventional forces
shall reinforce deterrence and,
‘‘
therefore, it warrants recognition as a
principle of war
Green Book 2019 41
 PAKISTAN ARMY
planning and conduct of most wars and conflicts,
some additional/separate principles will always be
needed for nuclear, chemical or biological or other
specialised forms of wars and conflicts like COIN etc.
Notes
1. Quoted by Liddell Hart; ‘Decisive Wars of History’, (London: G. Bell & Sons,
1929, First Edition) p.91.
2. Quoted by Felix Gilbert; ‘Makers of Modern Strategy’, (USA: Princeton
University Press, 1973) p.85 and Michael Howard in ‘Clausewitz’, (New York:
Oxford University Press. 1983) P.24.
3. Summarised from ‘On War’, edited by Michael Howard (New Jersey, Princeton
University Press, 1976)
4. Quoted by Etienne Mantour, in the ‘Makers of Modern Strategy’, (USA:Princeton
University Press, 1973). P. 219
5. Quoted by Michael Carver from ‘Introduction to Strategy’, by
AndreBeaufre,(London: Faber and Faber, 1965) in the ‘Makers of Modern
Strategy, Part Five, P788.
Notwithstanding the numbers or form of
listing, the first and most important existing
principle of war, i.e., selection of aim must flow
out of the new principles. The new principles must
find an emphatic mention in the defence doctrines,
and the joint staff, as well as the individual service
training publications.
The arguments proffered in this work do not
claim to challenge existing doctrine or related
fundamental issues on the subject. However, they
do seek to provide additional food for thought
on the matter by outlining some new embryonic
ideas for doctrinal improvement. It is hoped
that the inputs (some general and some specific)
contained in this exposition shall assist those who
are inclined to reinterpret or expand the existing
principles to win wars or at least to end them on a
favourable note, at an affordable cost.
6. Brodie Bernard, ‘War and Politics’, (New York; Mac Millan, 1973). P.446
7. Gleaned from the ‘Principles of Strategy: Illustrated mainly from American
Campaigns’, Bigelow, John, Captain (New York: Green Wood Press, 1968).P224-
233
8. www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/article titled, ‘The Three Trillion Dollar War’ by
Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes
9. For a detailed description of the US Counter Insurgency Doctrine (COIN), refer
to; FM3-24, Chapter 1, p.28 & 29.
10. The US COIN doctrine has been realistically analysed by Alexander Alderson,
in the ‘Parameters’, published by US Army War College, Winter 2007-08.ps 42
-44.
11. This article includes revised passages from the author’s Book: Peace and War:
Their Precepts and Principles, (Ferozesons . Pvt Ltd 2013, Lahore).
LAWFARE
AS AN
INSTRUMENT
OF FOREIGN Barrister Ahmer Bilal Soofi is
former Federal Law Minister,

POLICY
Advocate Supreme Court of
Pakistan and President
Research Society of
International Law, Pakistan

Abstract
Lawfare is on a roll not only in the region but also at a global level and it is becoming manifest in new
evolving alliances between China & Russia on the one hand and the US & Israel on the other. The article
takes cognisance of this development from a legal lens, apart from reviewing Pakistan specific lawfare
moves. It puts spotlight on more recent indications of lawfare moves, particularly the one alluded to by
Indian foreign minister in her UNGA speech. It also refers to the legal push back by Iran, a state otherwise
a subject of serious lawfare sanction regime and the dividends that it could extract from a global judicial
forum against the most powerful state in the international system. Lawfare is now a reality and a unique
dimension of 4th Generation Warfare. It must, therefore, be factored into the security calculus of Pakistan
by the policy makers in the government so that the proper resources are allocated to effectively counter
the lawfare moves by our rival states.

Keywords: Lawfare, Sino-Russian Joint Declaration 2016, Kulbushan Jhadav, Comprehensive Convention
on International Terrorism (CCIT), Kashmir, RMI vs Pakistan

Green Book 2019 43

 A
mundane and limited conception aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks or in imposing
of international law perceives it as sanctions on states including, recently on China,
merely a set of rules that constrain Russia, Iran and North Korea, the US has resorted
state autonomy and sovereignty to the tools and frameworks of international law to
through mandatory compliance. In my achieve its foreign policy aims.
study and practice of international law It developed, for instance, a white paper
stretching close to three decades, I have, however, justifying use of force and drone attacks against
come to appreciate a more encompassing view of Taliban moving targets in various states. The same
international law. On this view, which also finds was developed by a team of lawyers led by Mr Harold
favour among leading scholars including Harvard Ko, a distinguished professor of International
Law School’s David Kennedy, states actively make law and, later, legal advisor to state department.
tactical and strategic uses of international law as a At that point, I happened to be the Federal Law
vital instrument of national power to advance and Minister in a caretaker set up and commissioned a
safeguard their foreign policy goals and objectives. team of young lawyers to prepare a rebuttal of the
In both my writings and various public said white paper and the same was passed on to
speaking engagements in the last few years or so, I Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence.
have diligently advocated for Pakistan to adopt this With respect to Iran, the US has exercised
‘lawfare’ paradigm in the formulation of its foreign its sovereign right of consent under international
policy.1 The need for such law to enter into
an approach has never and withdraw from

‘‘
been more urgent given international agreements.
the adoption of this The American military has coined Thus, when the Obama
paradigm by our rival a word: ‘lawfare’ – law as a weapon, law administration’s preferred
states to successfully as a tactical ally, law as a strategic asset, foreign policy position
undermine the pursuit of was conciliation over
our national interests in an instrument of war. The US (Military) continuing confrontation
the international arena. observes that law can often accomplish with Iran, the US used
Lawfare is a phrase what might once have been done with international treaty
which has found traction framework in spearheading
in international political bombs and missiles; seize and secure the efforts to conclude
discourse and which has territory, send messages about resolve
‘‘ the Joint Comprehensive
since been interpreted Plan of Action (JCPOA)
to refer to a variety of
and political seriousness, even break the Agreement with Iran in
different elements. will of a political opponent 2015 whereby Iran would
The phrase has, however, redesign, convert, and
been also formulated as a David Kennedy reduce its nuclear facilities
doctrine by Professor David Kennedy, who summed and accept the Additional Protocol of the IAEA in
up lawfare as: “The American military has coined a order to lift all nuclear-related economic sanctions,
word: ‘lawfare’ – law as a weapon, law as a tactical freeing up tens of billions of dollars in oil revenue
ally, law as a strategic asset, an instrument of war. The and frozen assets.
US (Military) observes that law can often accomplish The Trump administration, adopting a more
what might once have been done with bombs and hard-nosed foreign policy towards Iran, reversed
missiles; seize and secure territory, send messages the initiative of the previous administration by
about resolve and political seriousness, even break withdrawing the US from the JCPOA in 2018 and re-
the will of a political opponent”. Notably, with its imposing broad sanctions on Iran.
array of distinguished
international law
experts in both the
government and the
academia, the United
States has carefully
developed its capacity to
use international law in
this manner.
Whether justifying
its broad conception of
the right to use force
in self-defence in the

44 Green Book 2019

 The two successive occupants of the White
House have, therefore, strategically utilised
international as well as US domestic law in opposing
ways in the pursuit of their respective foreign policy
goals vis-à-vis Iran.
In response to these US lawfare moves, Iran
has employed its own counter-lawfare-moves. The
conclusion of the JCPOA itself was a successful
counter-move by Iran to negate the complex web of
UNSC sanctions crippling its economy. With respect
to the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and the re-
imposition of sanctions upon it, Iran has made
a counter-lawfare move by taking the US to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ). In the ongoing
Iran v. United States’ (Nuclear sanctions) case,
the ICJ has found jurisdiction in the matter and
has already granted limited relief to Iran through
preliminary measures, exempting certain goods
from US sanctions on humanitarian grounds.
The US has countered this by employing its
own lawfare move by terminating its 1955 Treaty of
Amity with Iran, which allowed the ICJ to exercise
jurisdiction in the instant case.
The US-Iran example offers an important
lesson for policymakers around the world – that
the United States is not alone in employing the
doctrine of lawfare in its foreign relations. Besides
Iran; Israel, the Gulf states, India, Russia and
China have all adopted the lawfare paradigm and
accordingly invested heavily in developing their
international law capacity. Israel, through writings
of its international law experts and the decisions of
its judiciary, has for over two decades been at the
forefront in progressively developing international
law on targeted killings in a manner that optimises
its foreign policy agenda in the Middle East. Israel’s
lawfare moves amply demonstrate that states that
prioritise and engage with international law and its
institutions stand to reap dividends in the conduct
of their foreign relations.
Perhaps taking their cues from Iran and Israel,
the Gulf States are also increasingly resorting to
international law to advance their political agendas
in the international arena.
Thus, in the wake of the diplomatic spat
between the Gulf States in 2017, Qatar has taken
the UAE to the ICJ. The Court has already granted
partial relief to Qatar in the form of provisional
measures declaring certain acts of the UAE against
Qatar as discriminatory in contravention of the
International Convention Eliminating Racial
Discrimination.
Russia and China, two of the five permanent
members of the UNSC, besides emphasising
the indispensability of international law for the
conduct of foreign relations, reaffirmed their
commitment to it in 2016 in a Joint Declaration on
the Promotion and Principles of International Law.
‘‘
The US-Iran example offers an
important lesson for policymakers
around the world – that the United States
is not alone in employing the doctrine of
lawfare in its foreign relations. Besides
Iran; Israel, the Gulf states, India, Russia
and China have all adopted the lawfare
paradigm and accordingly invested
‘‘
heavily in developing their international
law capacity
45
 The Declaration also, significantly, spells is of utmost importance that the provisions of
out Chinese and Russian counter-lawfare moves this universal treaty are applied consistently,
against US imposition of sanctions as well as with in such a manner that does not impair rights
respect to the interpretation of the United Nations and legitimate interests of States’ Parties and
Convention on Law of the Sea. does not compromise the integrity of the legal
Its pertinent paragraphs read as: regime established by the Convention.
── The Russian Federation and the People’s
Republic of China reiterate their full commitment
to the principles of international law as they are
reflected in the United Nations Charter, the 1970
Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
among States in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations. They are also guided by the
principles enshrined in the Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence.
── The principles of international law are
the cornerstone for just and equitable
international relations featuring win-win
cooperation, creating a community of shared Sino-Russian­­Joint Declaration on the Promotion and
future for mankind, and establishing common Principles of International Law (2016)
space of equal and indivisible security and
economic cooperation. This is a very vital development as two
permanent members of UNSC have formulated
── The Russian Federation and the People’s
Republic of China share the view that the fresh emphasis on international law principles of
principle of sovereign equality is crucial for non-intervention and few others. Further, both the
the stability of international relations. States states have jointly and formally snubbed unilateral
enjoy their rights on the basis of independence sanctions by US as being against the spirit of UN.
and on an equal footing, and assume their This is a bold move. In other words, both China and
obligations and responsibilities on the basis Russia are alienating US on its moves that dent rule
of mutual respect. States have the right to of international law. Pakistan will have to choose
participate in the making of, interpreting going with rule of international law approach that
and applying international law on an equal China and Russia has formulated through the joint
footing, and have the obligation to comply declaration.
with international law in good faith and in a I believe Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign
coherent and consistent manner. Affairs should examine the full contents of the
said declaration and consider aligning itself with
── The Russian Federation and the People’s
various specific positions that both countries have
Republic of China share the view that good
taken on several aspects of international law.
faith implementation of generally recognised
principles and rules of international law Most troublingly from the perspective of
excludes the practice of double standards Pakistan, India has been persistently executing
or imposition by some States of their will on well-planned lawfare moves in the international
other States, and consider that imposition of arena calculated and tailored to undermine
unilateral coercive measures not based on Pakistan’s policy positions and its global prestige
international law, also known as «unilateral and standing.
sanctions», is an example of such practice. Indian FM Sushma Swaraj’s insistence upon
The adoption of unilateral coercive measures the global adoption of a Comprehensive Convention
by States in addition to measures adopted on International Terrorism (CCIT) in her recent
by the United Nations Security Council can
defeat the objects and purposes of measures
imposed by the Security Council, and
undermine their integrity and effectiveness.
── The Russian Federation and the People’s
Republic of China emphasise the important
role of the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea in maintaining the rule
of law relating to activities in the Oceans. It

46 Green Book 2019

Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj’s insistence on CCIT at
UNGA - A pre-meditated lawfare move against Pakistan

India has been lobbying successfully with the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Headquarters to
get Pakistan grey-listed
remarks at the UNGA is a text book example of
a pre-meditated lawfare move against
Pakistan. Pakistan’s FATF grey-listing, the
Kulbhushan Jadhav case at the ICJ, India’s
objections over Diamer Bhasha Dam, and its
hardening stance over the Indus Waters
Treaty (IWT) and the Mumbai attacks are
further instances of such moves.
However, Kulbhushan’s disclosures are
startling evidence of interference by a third
state and we need to position his disclosures in
various global forums as they always
appreciate much better dossier containing
material that is obtained pursuant to a
legal process as opposed to material
obtained from intelligence sources.
Therefore, the copies of his statements
given under provisions of Criminal Procedure
Code of Pakistan are more valuable and much
better received than general narration of facts or
episode from intelligence sources. Pakistan may
want to not only provide statements but also the
provisions of laws under which they were
obtained. I have also already written
extensively on Indian lawfare moves and
potential Pakistani counter-lawfare moves with
respect to the IWT.2
Perhaps the most insidious lawfare moves
by India have been with respect to attempts to
de-legitimise the Kashmiri indigenous struggle
for self-determination as terrorist activity
sponsored by Pakistan.
In this context, India has quite deliberately
tried to shape as well as exploit the
evolving international law on terrorism in the
aftermath of 9 /11 terrorist attacks in a
manner that aligns it in the maximum possible
manner with its policy positions on Kashmir. To
this end, India has managed to get Pakistani
based entities and individuals it deems inimical
to its interests in Kashmir listed on CTC terrorism
lists under UNSC Resolution 1373.
PAKISTAN ARMY
It has twice lobbied successfully with
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
Headquarters to get Pakistan grey-listed on
account of apparent deficiencies in its anti-
money laundering – combating the
financing of terrorism (CFT/AML) legal and
administrative framework.
More recently, it has been vigorously
pushing for the global adoption of the
Comprehensive Convention on International
Terrorism (CCIT), which if adopted, would
eviscerate the fine distinctions under
international law between legitimate
freedom movements based on self-
determination and terrorist activity. India’s
FM Sushma Swaraj’s remarks at the UNGA this
year sums up this lawfare move against Pakistan:
“Each year, for the last five years, India
has been arguing from this podium that
lists are not enough to check terrorists and
their sponsors. We need to bring them to
accountability through international law.
In 1996, India proposed a draft document
on CCIT at the UN. To date, that draft has
remained a draft, because we cannot agree
on a common language. On the one hand
we want to fight terrorism; on the other, we
cannot define it. This is why terrorists with a
price on their head are celebrated, financed,
and armed as liberation heroes by Pakistan.
I, therefore, appeal to this body to come to an
agreement on CCIT as one of the necessary
measures in a long-running war.”3
Indian FM’s only new legal argument
is about reminding the world to proceed with
the draft convention on international terrorism.
This is interesting and it seems that she wants
to kick alive the debate that freedom fighters do
not have the right to use force or alternatively
bring forth the point that everyone taking up
arms against the state is a terrorist. Pakistan
needs to prepare itself in advance to handle this
upcoming argument as it has also battled against
non-state actors using arms against the state.
Pakistan may wish to tie up the additional
‘‘
Perhaps the most insidious lawfare
moves by India have been with
respect to attempts to delegitimise
the Kashmiri indigenous struggle for
‘‘
self-determination as terrorist activity
sponsored by Pakistan
Green Book 2019 47
 PAKISTAN ARMY
argument that when a freedom struggle is
recognised by UN and is long standing linking to a
territorial dispute, it is not comparable with use
of force by violent non-state actors. From a legal
perspective, Indian FM’s showcasing this argument
in UNGA should kind of tip Pakistani policy makers
in advance as to which way Indian Government plans
to take the lawfare game.
India, through lawfare moves tying Giligit-
Baltistan to the broader territorial dispute over
Kashmir, has also been attempting to undermine
Pakistan’s ability to construct Diamer-Bhasha Dam
by curtailing its financing o ptions. I nternational
lenders, like the Asian Development Bank and the
World Bank, have now conditioned any financing of
the dam upon no-objection certificates from India.4
Cumulatively, all this not only highlights the
necessity for Pakistan to adopt its own counter-lawfare
moves in these cases, but is also a clarion call to the
State to proactively and broadly utilise international
law to advance its own national interests and foreign
policy agenda.
From Pakistan’s point of view, lawfare means
the use of international law to develop pressure
points on strategic issues in order to make political
gains. Lawfare should be the State’s preferred
option over Kashmir, more so because all aspects of
the Kashmir issue are essentially legal propositions.
It is a territorial dispute involving the interpretation
of UN law and bilateral treaties, the Indian and
Pakistani constitutions, and holds many other legal
elements such as the implications of the exercise
of continuing sovereignty by Pakistan over Azad
Jammu and Kashmir, not to mention the Modi
government’s attempts to invalidate or whittle down
Article 370 of the Indian constitution.
Pakistan, by writing to the UN Secretary
General, should also push for the establishment
of an inquiry commission over Kashmir as
recommended by the first e ver 4 9-page r eport
issued by the UN Human Rights Office, de tailing
gruesome human rights abuses by Indian forces in
Indian Occupied Kashmir. With respect to the status
of Giligit-Baltistan, Pakistan must forcefully assert
its legal linkage with the remaining territories of
Pakistan at all international fora.
Equally important, Pakistan should share
evidence of Indian sponsored terrorism in Pakistan
with the global community. Its counter-lawfare
strategy should highlight repeated Indian non-
cooperation on Mumbai trials as well as over Uri and
Indian top
court grants
bail to Colonel
linked to
Malegaon,
Samjhauta
Express
attacks
48 Green Book 2019
Pathankot probes, besides raising miscarriages of
justice in the Samjhauta Express trials held in India.
With respect to trials of Mumbai suspects in
Pakistan, India has failed to provide any admissible
evidence required under Pakistani law for
conviction of these suspects. Despite Indian non-
cooperation in a trans-national crime, Pakistan has
been making good faith efforts at great expense to its
exchequer for close to a decade to bring these trials
to a conclusion. It, however, cannot be expected to
side-step its domestic legal procedures to forcibly
convict Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi and other suspects
in Mumbai attacks.
Pakistan’s lawfare response to India’s so-
called surgical strikes should entail exposing this
pretense and its threats as a flagrant violation of
settled principles of international law on non-
interference and against aggressive use of force
enshrined in the UN Charter.
Pakistan should cogently put India on notice
that any such strikes or their threats thereof will
clearly constitute unlawful use of force against
Pakistan granting it the legal right under Article
51 of the UN Charter to respond with force against
India in self-defence.
With regards to getting off the FATF grey-
list, Pakistan should present a comprehensive
and well thought out plan to the FATF secretariat
encompassing legal and administrative reforms
necessary to comply with the FATF guidelines.
Former Director General Military
Operations, Ranbir Singh aggressively
claiming “Surgical Strike” across the
Line of Control in Kashmir
The state should make efforts to replicate its
previous successful efforts to get off similar watch
lists, most notably in moving up the US Human
Trafficking Index in 2018 and in getting removed
from the US Intellectual Property Watch List in 2016.
A rare instance of Pakistan’s successful counter-
lawfare move is the ‘Republic of Marshall Island’
(RMI) vs Pakistan case at the ICJ, which is also a
significant reminder that if the state can manage to
harness its indigenous international law expertise
and potential, it can achieve victories at the highest
forums in international law. In a landmark ruling in

2016, the ICJ, the United Nation’s top court, knocked
out the RMI case against Pakistan on ‘Obligations
concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the
Nuclear Arms’ Race and to Nuclear Disarmament,’
accepting Pakistan’s legal arguments that it lacked
the jurisdiction to proceed in the case any further
on the merits. The ruling represents a historic first
victory for Pakistan at the ICJ and formally brought
the RMI lawsuit against Pakistan to a conclusion
after two and a half years.
In a text book lawfare move, the RMI had
originally filed applications before the ICJ in April
2014 against all nine nuclear-weapons’ states
including Pakistan but only lawsuits against
Pakistan, India and the United Kingdom proceeded
to the jurisdiction stage as a consequence of their
qualified advance consent to the Court’s jurisdiction.
In response to the RMI’s written pleadings on
jurisdiction and admissibility issues, Pakistan’s
legal team submitted a robust counter-response
arguing that the case should not proceed to the
merits because Pakistan’s nuclear programme is a
matter of its national defence and security which
falls exclusively within its domestic jurisdiction and
is, therefore, not to be called into question by any
court including the ICJ.
Moreover, it was conveyed to the Court that
the RMI lacks the requisite standing to institute the
current proceedings since there is no dispute, let
alone a legal dispute, that exists between the RMI
and Pakistan. This is manifested by the fact that
the RMI has never suffered any damage caused
by Pakistan either directly or indirectly, and by
the lack of any formal or informal communication
initiated by the RMI with Pakistan until it filed its
application in the ICJ Registry on 24 April 2014.
Pakistan’s written pleadings further stressed that
the injury claimed by the RMI cannot be redressed by
compelling the specific performance in the absence
Notes
1. See Ahmer Bilal Soofi, Lawfare versus Warfare, DAWN, October. 25, 2014.
2. Ahmer Bilal Soofi, The Three-Basket Approach to IWT, DAWN, Janauary. 31,
2017.
3. SushmaSwaraj, Full Text of Speech at the UNGA (2018), available at: https://
‘‘
Since lawfare demands active
participation in international fora,
Pakistan must make all efforts to win
memberships at various UN bodies,
Commissions and Committees and
get its nationals appointed as judges
and arbitrators at international courts
and tribunals including the ICJ, the
International Tribunal on Law of the
Sea (ITLOS), and the Permanent Court
‘‘
of Arbitration (PCA)
of other nuclear-weapons’ states by only Pakistan,
which is neither “an interested party” nor a party
“directly concerned” with obligations enshrined in
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
While accepting Pakistan’s legal arguments, the
Court in its judgment especially noted the lack of a
legal dispute in the case and crucially affirmed that
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are not illegal under
international law.
Moving Forward
Pakistan ought to integrate lawfare in the
conduct of its foreign policy in an institutionalised
manner. This crucially means that in addition to
capacity building measures and lawfare formulations
suggested in this article, the state should proactively
engage with international institutions to enable
itself to participate in the progressive development
of international law which safeguards its national
interests. Given the fast-paced and dynamic nature
of international law, issues that significantly threaten
our security and economic interests such as evolving
international laws on autonomous weapons and
cyber warfare and the negotiations on WTO rules,
urgently need careful scrutiny by international law
experts.
Lastly, since lawfare demands active
participation in international fora, Pakistan must
make all efforts to win memberships at various UN
bodies, Commissions and Committees and get its
nationals appointed as judges and arbitrators at
international courts and tribunals including the ICJ,
the International Tribunal on Law of the Sea (ITLOS),
and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/full-text-of-sushma-swarajs-statement-at-
un-general-assembly/articleshow/66009354.cms (last accessed on October. 7,
2018).
4. (https://www.dawn.com/news/742060)(https://tribune.com.pk/story/514063/
diamer-bhasha-dam-world-bank-not-adb-presses-for-seeking-indian-noc/)
Green Book 2019 49
 PAKISTAN AND
THE SHIFTING
CONFIGURATION OF
GEO-POLITICS

Salman Bashir is a former Foreign

Secretary of Pakistan, Ambassador to
Denmark, Lithuania, China, Mongolia
and High Commissioner of Pakistan to
India

Abstract
Asia is now the centre stage of geo-politics; relations between major powers are slipping towards uncertainty,
competition and rivalry. Melt down of the global order. Societal changes across the globe impelled by
demography, generational shift, globalisation and technology. Strategies at China containment − smack
of a new cold war. Globalisation is irreversible. It is impelling deepening of global interdependence and
warrant international cooperation. Geo-politics cannot upend geo-economics. The concept of Indo-
Pacific as endorsed by the US brings India and Indian Ocean into emerging power equations. President
Trumps’ Afghanistan and South Asia strategy is a variant of a broader US’ Indo-Pacific policy. US’ policy
incoherence and contradictions are causing confusion and raise serious questions about US’ will and
ability to shore up global order. Trump’s world view is shaped by his business background and quest
for America’s national renewal. US will remain the primus inter pares and continue to wield influence
across the globe. Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is good for the world; an inclusive concept of
voluntary partnerships for development and win-win cooperation. Interests of US and China converge
over a broad spectrum. China has no interest in challenging the US’ preeminence. Rational way forward
for US and China is to cooperate and concert efforts for attaining shared goals. India is being consumed
by its misplaced ambitions and is misreading the global power dynamics. Pakistan’s geo-strategic
vulnerabilities are being overcome and converted into strength by CPEC. Pakistan is well situated to
delineate a CPEC Plus Vision for building concentric circles of stability, peace and development in our
region-Afghanistan and beyond. Real interests bind Pakistan and the US, in the Afghanistan context. There
are good reasons for reworking Pakistan − US partnership. New government in Pakistan has brought hope
for socio-economic transformation. Working the domestic agenda and stabilising external environment to
suit national interests must be a priority. Good relations with neighbours and all major powers is a must.
Need to eschew any unnecessary external liabilities. Centenary independence vision 2047 − a developed
Pakistan should inform and guide national endeavours.

Keywords: Geo-Strategy, Geo-Politics, Globalisation, Indo-Pacific, Asia-Pacific, CPEC

50 Green Book 2019

T
PAKISTAN ARMY

he centre of gravity of global politics has

shifted from west to east. Asia-Pacific is
the new locus of global strategic power
play. The rise of China, rejuvenation
of Russia and India’s growth potential
have compelled a re-think in the US
global strategy − China and Russia are now declared
strategic competitors/rivals and India a partner
of choice in the ‘China containment’ strategy. A
triangular power equation–US, China and India- is
shaping the geopolitics of the region.
Situated in the heart of Eurasia, Pakistan’s
destiny will be impacted by contemporary trends
and in turn Pakistan is destined to play a critical
role in determining future outcomes. Given its
history of close partnership with both, the US
and China, Pakistan is well positioned to make a
positive contribution to global peace, security and Unpredictable US foreign policy
development.
Global society has
Global Disarray

‘‘
undergone a profound
The melt down of The center of gravity of global transformation − impelled by
world order − signifies globalisation, demographic
an inflexion point in politics has shifted from west to and generational shifts
contemporary history − east. Asia-Pacific is the new locus and the unprecedented
made stark by the advent pace of technological
of global strategic power play. advancements. Systems
of President Trump on
the global scene. Anxiety The rise of China, rejuvenation of of politics, economics and
and uncertainty abound. Russia and India’s growth potential governance no longer match
US shaped the twentieth new requirements.
century world. However, it
have compelled a re-think in the Old tools of strategic
is now becoming difficult US global strategy-China and analysis and standard
to discern US’ policy Russia are now declared strategic prescriptions no longer
direction. Widespread apply. In a perceptive essay
competitors/rivals and India a title the ‘Big Shift’, Walter
lament on the fading away
of the liberal order and
‘‘
partner of choice in the ‘China Russell Mead examines how
loss of the moral compass, American democracy fails
containment’ strategy its way forward to success.
to save, if not reinforce the
foundations of the international system, premised He notes that ‘the Information Revolution is
on the principles and purposes of the United disrupting the country’s social and economic order
Nations Charter, is a cause of anxiety. as profoundly as the Industrial Revolution did.

A triangular power equation – US, China and

India- is shaping the geopolitics of the region

Green Book 2019 51

 ‘‘
Western sea board of Eurasia shaped
the history of the world. Ascendency
of the West, over several centuries,
exemplified by the Euro-Atlantic alliance
since the Second World War was a sine
qua non for global security as well as
the ideals and values that underpin our
‘‘
civilisation. Its roots were in ancient
Greece, Rome and Christianity
The ideologies and policies that fit American
society a generation ago are becoming steadily
less applicable to the problems it faces today…
intellectual and policy elites, for the most part, are
too wedded to paradigms that no longer work, but
the populists, who seek to replace them, don’t have
real answers, either. It is, in many ways, a stressful
and anxious time to be alive. And that anxiety
has prompted a pervasive sense of despair about
American democracy − a fear that it has reached a
point of dysfunction and decay from which it will
never recover’.1 This quote gives a sense of what
is being felt in the US and more generally in the
world.
Established systems do not work any longer.
The concepts and intellectual constructs have
become outdated and out paced by the speed of
societal change. But where is the new thinking or
even new understanding of the phenomenon of
‘change’.
Mead further states ‘The challenge is immense.
The foundations of societies are quaking at home,
even as the international order threatens to
splinter….The old answers in the old text books don’t
seem to work anymore, the new answers haven’t
been discovered yet, and those who will someday
write new answers are still in primary school. To
reflect on the upheavals that accompanied the
52 Green Book 2019
Industrial Revolution − the most destructive wars
and the most unspeakable tyrannies in the history
of our species − is to realise just how much peril
we face…Yet humans are problem solving animals.
We thrive on challenges…The good news and bad
news are perhaps the same: the American people,
in common with others around the world, have
the opportunity to reach unimaginable levels
of affluence and freedom? But to realise, that
opportunity, they must overcome some of the
hardest challenges humanity has ever known.
The treasure in the mountains is priceless, but the
dragon who guards it is fierce’.2
Western sea board of Eurasia shaped the
history of the world. Ascendency of the West, over
several centuries, exemplified by the Euro-Atlantic
alliance since the Second World War was a sine qua
non for global security as well as the ideals and
values that underpin our civilisation. Its roots were
in ancient Greece, Rome and Christianity. Waves
of globalisation generated by the intellectual,
technological and economic prowess of the
West impacted and transformed societies and
institutions everywhere.
Asia has benefitted from these processes that
encompassed not only economy and trade but also
organising principles of society and institutions-
political pluralism, democracy, human rights, free
trade and capitalism.
The triumph of liberalism over communism
in the 1990s was a watershed in human history.
As President Obama in delivering the Nelson
Mandela lecture in Johannesburg noted, ‘at the
end of the twentieth century, while some Western
commentators were declaring the end of history
and the inevitable triumph of liberal democracy
and the virtues of global supply chain, so many
missed signs of a brewing backlash…Look around.
Strong man politics are ascendant, suddenly,
whereby elections and some pretense of democracy
are maintained − the form of it − but those in power
seek to undermine every institution or norm that
gives democracy meaning….
 PAKISTAN ARMY

In the West, you’ve got – right parties that a new age, where standard geo-political constructs
often times are based not just on platforms of have become unworkable? Is Globalisation
protectionism and closed borders but also on reversible?
barely hidden racial nationalism. Many developing Multilateral cooperation is a function
countries now are looking at China’s model of of ‘interdependence’. Unilateralism, narrow
authoritarian control, combined with mercantilist nationalism and what President Obama has
capitalism, as preferable to the messiness of repeatedly decried – ‘neo-tribalism’ have become
democracy. pervasive. Rise of xenophobia, intolerance, racism,
Social media – once seen as a mechanism and all the other signs and symptoms of populism
to promote knowledge and understanding and made legit by the ballot are indicative of the chaos
solidarity − has proved to be just as effective resulting from processes of societal transformation,
promoting hatred and paranoia and propaganda in nearly all parts of the world.
and conspiracy theories’.3 Democracy has tended to serve the rich
In an article in the New Yorker titled “Francis and powerful. The digital age has empowered
Fukuyama Postpones the End of History”, Louis individuals and made them more aware of the
Men and writes, ‘Fukuyama’s argument (back in context and contrasts of their own existence.
1989) was that, with the ‘Asymmetry’ in terms of
imminent collapse of the politics and economics is

‘‘
Soviet Union, the last creating a lethal brew of
ideological alternative Social media – once seen as a social despondency if not
to liberalism had been mechanism to promote knowledge and revolt. Is this increasingly
eliminated. Fascism the new normal?
had been killed in the understanding and solidarity – has The fading away of
Second World War, and proved to be just as effective promoting the liberal era, may well
now Communism was
imploding. In states,
‘‘
hatred and paranoia and propaganda prove to be a passing
phase. The US will
like China, that called and conspiracy theories remain the predominant
themselves Communist, power, it will undergo a
political and economic reforms were heading in the process of national renewal and continue to speed
direction of a liberal order. Twenty nine years later, ahead not only in military might but on the wings
it seems …that history has a few more tricks up its of technology, transforming our planet into a more
sleeve. It turns out that liberal democracy and free tightly knitted and thus highly interdependent
trade may actually be rather fragile achievements. community.
There is something out there that doesn’t like
liberalism, and is making trouble for the survival Unburdening of America
of institutions. Fukuyama thinks he knows what President Donald Trump has in a short span
that something is, and his answer is summed up of just two years rocked, if not demolished, the
in the title of his new book, “Identity: The Demand foundations of the international system. In official
for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment”. and think tank community in Washington DC
The demand for recognition, Fukuyama says, there are nuances and contradictions on the US
is the “master concept” that explains all the perspective on the world. However, the President
contemporary dissatisfactions with the global
liberal order… Present trends don’t continue. They
produce backlashes and reshufflings of the social
deck. The identities that people embrace today are
the identities their children will want to escape
from tomorrow. History is somersaults all the way
to the end’.4
Globalisation has brought about a fundamental
restructuring of the global economy-manufacturing
and services sectors have moved east to Asia.
Financial sectors were hit by the 2008 recession.
Asia’s rise was a consequence of a number of
factors – demography, technology and nature of
governance.
Are these transformations on a civilisational
scale? Is ‘confrontation’ the perennial theme in the
rise and fall of nations? Are we now at the cusp of

Green Book 2019 53

 PAKISTAN ARMY

has taken the lead in reframing US’ world view and development — and the norms and values
and consequently the view of the world about the associated therewith in terms of the free world or
United States. liberal order. It can perhaps be better construed
Defining instances of the Trumpian world view
were the G-7 Summit in Quebec on 8-9 June 2018,
Brussels NATO Summit on 11-12 July 2018, President
Trumps visit to the UK on 13 July 2018, the Helsinki
Summit with President Putin on 16 July 2018 and
the meeting with Kim Jong Un of North Korea, in
Singapore on 12 June 2018.
These encounters revealed an abandoning of
standard constructs about alliances and interests-
a series of deliberate knocks to signal change in
US’ thinking about the world, which is, of course,
hugely consequential.
Commenting on Trump’s behaviour at the G-7,
CNN Editor — at large — stated, “in space of less
than 48 hours, the President of the United States
attacked the leader of Canada as ‘very dishonest
and weak’ and praised the leader of North Korea for
working toward a deal on the Korean peninsula…. President Donald Trump slammed Canadian Prime
The extent to which Trump has clashed with long- Minister Justin Trudeau as ‘very dishonest and
time allies (Britain, Canada, France, Germany, weak’, what the White House called a ‘great meeting’
Australia and on and on and on) is remarkable. As between the two leaders during G-7 Summit 2018
is his willingness to publicly explode the usually as creative destruction — to usher a new wave
staid-managed international gatherings like the for re-establishing US’ primacy by carrying to the
G7. His allies have — and will cheer his name ultimate extreme the notion of US ‘exceptionalism’.
calling and his long-distance tendency toward In this sense, US is no longer a status quo power.
confrontation…The US has been the steadying
The perception of unburdening of the US has
force in international affairs for decades…If the
had profound repercussions everywhere and,
US no longer plays that role — or shrinks from it
especially, in the Asia-Pacific region. The US’ allies
in any meaningful way — the balance of the world
in the Pacific such as Japan and South Korea as well
is shaken and changed. And those changes are
as among the ASEAN Ten have read the tea leafs.
unpredictable — and not necessarily beneficial to
These countries, given their economic interests
the United States. Power and vacuums and power
with China and uncertainty now associated with
and shifts are filled rapidly in politics and foreign
the US security guarantees, are now re-positioning
affairs”5
themselves.
Under the banner of ‘America First’, Trump
A good indicator is the net flow of investments
seeks national self-renewal. This is akin to the
and trade between Japan and China and South
Chinese Communist Party slogan of ‘national
Korea and China. India has some $85 bn of trade
rejuvenation’. But the means and methodologies
with China. The financial math does not match up
are strikingly different. It would be a folly to read
with geopolitical posturing. Money trails are fairly
Trump’s policy as merely erratic or naive. This
good indicators of real interests.
is a deliberate effort at ‘unburdening’ the US
from responsibilities it had assumed as the sole On the other hand, China has tried hard to play
super power in guarding world peace, security by the old rule book, demonstrated its adherence
to the established global order. It is evident that
the global order suited China’s national interests.

‘‘
In official and think tank community
in Washington DC there are nuances and
contradictions on the US’ perspective on
the world. However, the President has
taken the lead in reframing US’ world
‘‘
view and consequently the view of the
world about the United States
In this sense, China is a status quo power. It is
not interested in challenging US’ primacy but in
pursuing its own economic growth trajectory.
In face of US’ retreat, China has been assuming
a greater share of responsibility with respect to
maintaining global order and stepping in where
US is unable or unwilling to support existing
international structures — such as the UN and
Bretton Woods system. The world sees China’s role
as benevolent and beneficent, as it is increasingly

54 Green Book 2019


the only one that is in a position to roll out funds
and technology for development on the basis of
mutually beneficial partnerships.
US and Indo-Pacific: Ramping up China
Containment
The US’ Indo-Pacific strategy has a strong
military dimension. It builds on President Obama’s
‘pivot’ to Asia by reinforcing its Pacific Command
by encompassing the Indian Ocean. The concept of
Quad — Japan, India, Australia and the US — was
revived in 2017. Politically, the Pacific ring is being
aligned more closely with US- China containment
approach. However, economic strands, are missing.
By walking away from the Trans Pacific Partnership
(TPP), the US has left its partners wondering about
the direction and substance of US policy.
Donald Trump Just after pulling the US out of TPP
Firing of the first few rounds of tariffs by the
US in a trade war with China has compounded
economic uncertainty with profound consequences
for global economy. The US’ ‘go it alone’ attitude is
somewhat disconcerting for its allies, both across
the Atlantic and Pacific. Chinese access to high
technology is also being restricted. The ostensible
purpose is to balance trade and retard China’s
economic growth and technological progress.
In an article in the Asia Times titled ‘Sun Tzu
and the art of fighting a trade war,’ Pepe Escobar
writes about the US triggered trade war with China
and states, ‘It will be nasty and Trump would
be foolish to underestimate Xi and the resolve
of China…the Beijing leadership identifies…
in the Chinese culture terminology, as the three
threats…A threat to their foreign policy concept
PAKISTAN ARMY
‘‘
In face of US’ retreat, China has
been assuming a greater share
of responsibility with respect to
maintaining global order and stepping
in where US is unable or unwilling to
support existing international structures
‘‘
– such as the UN and Bretton Woods
System
for the coming decades, such as the Belt and Road
Initiative…Trump attack on “Made in China 2025”…
(it) does not alter the fact that the world’s second
largest economy is relentlessly climbing up the
manufacturing ladder. Eventually it will overtake
the US in technological innovation…China’s
military “adventurism’ allows the Pentagon to
come up with a Space Force. China is also barred
from investing in US industries related to national
security…And China is increasingly depicted
as a “malign” — the buzzword of choice that
makes Trump, in this case, fully aligned with the
industrial-military-security-think tank complex.’6
India’s Strategic Dilemmas
India had tried to cozy up to the US for its own
reasons. In its quest for global respectability and
power it desperately wanted US’ support to become
a full member of the Nuclear Suppliers Club and a
Permanent member of the Security Council. More
important was India’s desire to get the US on its
side in its perennial hostility towards Pakistan.
It had hoped for US support in isolating Pakistan
and to de-legitimise the freedom movement of the
Kashmiri people for the exercise of their right to
self-determination, in accordance with UN Security
Council resolutions.
US promised India high technology and
sophisticated weapon systems. US also sensed
that India was a large market and thus relevant
to US’ economic interests. It has declared India
as a major defence partner and signed logistics
and basing agreements. The US’ decision to place
India in tier one for receiving high technology
defence equipment, exempting it from licensing
requirements, is another shot in the arm of the
China containment strategy.
From the US’ perspective, what matters is the
Indian Ocean. The maritime component of global
strategic play in which US and Indian navies could
cooperate in ensuring freedom of navigation and if
required choking of sea links for strategic supplies
bound for China. Succinctly, Pan-Eurasian-ism vs
Atlantic-ism seems to be the essential dynamics of
geo-politics today.
Green Book 2019 55
 PAKISTAN ARMY
India consistently signalled its readiness
to play the role of a junior proxy for the US on
the grand Asian-Pacific chess board. But lately
Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj and Defence
Minister Nirmala Sitharaman held crucial talks with Former
US Secretary of Defence James N. Mattis and US Secretary
of State Mike Pompeo – New Delhi (6 September 2018)
Indian policy establishment is faced with strategic
dilemmas. China has demonstrated immense
‘strategic patience’ and appears to be succeeding
in impelling a rethink in New Delhi. Prime Minister
Narendra Modi has been to China twice (Wuhan
and Qingdao in April and June 2018) and met
President Xi Jinping also at the BRICS summit in
Johannesburg in July 2018. The Communiqué of
the India-China Informal Summit at Wuhan inter
alia states that “the simultaneous emergence of
India and China as two large economies and major
powers with strategic and decisional autonomy has
implications of regional and global significance.
They shared the view that peaceful, stable and
balanced relations between India and China will
be positive factor for stability amidst current global
uncertainties.”7 India realises that it needs to take
the cover of ‘strategic autonomy’ to play (and
benefit from all sides) as a balancer. There are clear
indicators of its warming up to China. This rethink
is also occasioned by uncertainties about the US
and its global role.
Rise of China
On the Eurasian island, new centres of economic
development are conferring vigour and vitality to the
global economy. The truly inspiring development
has been the magnificent transformation of China
into the second largest economy of the world. We are
witnessing the renaissance of the Chinese civilisation.
It is not only in terms of economic statistics but in
thought, philosophy, arts and crafts. China has a
unique reading of global history and this imbues
it with long-term perspectives. For the people
of Pakistan China’s rise is a source of immense
inspiration and satisfaction.
56 Green Book 2019
‘‘
From the US’ perspective, what
matters is the Indian Ocean. The
maritime component of global strategic
play in which US and Indian navies
could cooperate in ensuring freedom of
navigation and if required choking of
sea links for strategic supplies bound
for China. Succinctly, Pan -Eurasianism
vs Atlanticism seems to be the essential ‘‘
dynamics of geo-politics today
The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),
seeks to connect Eurasia and Africa into a cohesive
economic whole. It is premised on inclusivity,
voluntary participation, mutual benefit and win-
win cooperation. While rejuvenation of the Chinese
nation is the Chinese dream, the greater dream is
creating a community of shared destiny. China has
created the mechanisms and the infrastructure for
realising these worthy goals.
This visionary initiative of President Xi Jinping
holds the promise of bringing about a historic
transformation in the global economic and political
landscape. As a concept and in its working, this
represents an original and most consequential
Chinese Dream
The Chinese dream, after all, is the dream of the people.
We must realise it by closely depending on the people.
We must incessantly bring bene its to the people.
Realising the great
renewal of the
Chinese nation is
the greatest
dream for the Chinese
nation in modern history.
---- quotes from Chinese President Xi Jinping

contribution of China to the future of mankind.
The BRI seeks to convert the Eurasian land mass
into a single economy by interconnecting it with
a network of roads, railroads, pipelines, ports,
airports, and telecommunications links, and, based
on these, to create a series of development corridors
containing large zones of productive economic
activity and, ultimately, prosperity. Supplementing
this essentially continental development is a
maritime component (the “Road”), aimed at
investing and fostering collaboration in Southeast
Asia, Oceania, and North Africa, through several
contiguous bodies of water – the South China Sea,
the South Pacific Ocean, and the Indian Ocean. The
Polar access Route is also being worked. Chinese
position on all international issues was enunciated
on the basis of principles.
China did not ask for a re-writing of the rules
and/or principles of international relations.
It wanted everyone to ‘own’ and ‘live by’ the
accepted norms and principles. China’s voice at
international forums has been a ‘moral’ voice.
China has scrupulously eschewed power politics,
hegemony and has stood for the rights of the under
privileged and poor in the Third World.
With the accretion in China’s economic
might, we have seen the practice of the principles
of sovereign equality, non-interference, mutual
interest and mutual benefit getting even more
pronounced in China’s dealing with its neighbours
and partners in the world.
China is today the number one economy of
the world in terms of purchasing power parity and
its GDP in nominal terms is projected to overtake
that of the US in the next few years. China has
been taking practical steps to build peace and
shared prosperity. It leads the way, especially in
cooperative enterprises such as SCO and in multiple
regional and inter-regional processes such as Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM).
China’s economic strength is being utilised to
set up financial institutions to promote economic
growth in the Asian region and beyond. The
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB),
the Silk Road Fund, the SCO Development Fund,
‘‘
This visionary initiative of President
Xi Jinping holds the promise of bringing
about a historic transformation in
the global economic and political
landscape. As a concept and in its
working, this represents an original ‘‘
and most consequential contribution of
China to the future of mankind
PAKISTAN ARMY
BRICS and other enterprises are directed towards
consolidating and promoting development across
continents.
Pakistan and China
Pakistan takes great pride in its friendship with
China. This is a time tested all weather partnership
and friendship. The China Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project of the BRI, is only
one dimension of the concrete manifestation of this
mutually beneficial friendship.
Pakistan is developing high grade infra-structure
with Chinese assistance – Gwadar Port, roads,
bridges, rail tracks and special economic zones.
Agricultural, energy and industrial cooperation have
been prioritised. China-Pakistan cooperation is for
development and not directed against any country.
In fact, the entire region and the world can benefit
from CPEC.
China’s outreach to the world, especially to
its neighbours, is consequential. China has ample
number of times stated that the world is big enough to
accommodate the aspirations of all. The reach out to
India is an example of Chinese sagacity and strategic
patience. China sees its southern neighbours as
important for its own stability, peace and prosperity.
It has always advocated peaceful resolution of
Pakistan-India disputes. It proceeds from a position
of principle, something that is increasingly rare in
contemporary times.
Pakistan would view an improvement in China-
India relations as a positive development. India’s
opposition to the BRI is unfortunate. The BRI is a
concrete manifestation of globalisation. It is not about
the East wind prevailing over the West. Corridors
and connectivity are two ways. Hence by definition
neutral by way of geo-political significance.
Pakistan’s stands to benefit from the BRI
and CPEC. The long-term vision that would make
perfect sense for Pakistan is that CPEC extends
further in all directions.
Green Book 2019 57
 PAKISTAN ARMY
CPEC Plus vision would see the incorporation
of Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and the Gulf States
on the one hand and Central Asia to Russia on
the other. CPEC, as a BRI adjunct would extend to
Africa. It could also leap east towards India, if India
could reconcile to Pakistan’s existence as ‘equals’
and agree to resolve peacefully all disputes.
Drawing in extra regional powers to contain or
countenance the rise of China by re-inventing the
age of bloc politics will not only be counterproductive
but also prove to be unworkable. Concepts of the
Quad or alliance of ‘maritime democracies’ based
on geo-political considerations, are notions that
will only stall, albeit temporarily, the Eurasian
dynamics of win-win cooperation for stability,
predicated on shared prosperity.
IMPORTANT CONCLUSIONS
No Zero Sums: US – China/ Pakistan – India
It is a mistake to consider China-US relations
as a zero-sum game. Despite the US Security and
Defence Strategies and the Nuclear Posture Review,
the fact of huge interdependence between US and
China cannot be ignored. Russia’s rejuvenation as
politically consequential entity on the Eurasian
continent and its cooperative endeavours with
China to stabilise Eurasia constitutes an important
factor in the emerging global scenario.
From North Korea to Afghanistan, all pressing
issues require China-US-Russia cooperation. In
Pakistan’s immediate vicinity such cooperation
would contribute to stabilising the situation in
Afghanistan. The ongoing processes, for peace
and national reconciliation in Afghanistan, could
pick up momentum if a collaborative approach
is devised to prioritise economic and social
development of Afghanistan.
The challenge for Afghanistan and Pakistan is
to convert their respective strategic vulnerabilities
into strength. This has started to happen with
the ongoing progress in CPEC related projects
in Pakistan. It will be fortified by economic
development and peace in Afghanistan.
Unfortunately, Pakistan-India have remained
in a tense stand-off. Both are nuclear weapon
states. Regrettably, India has closed avenues for de-
escalation by blocking mechanisms of engagement
and dialogue. The peaceful resolution of the Jammu
and Kashmir dispute is the key to unblocking the
potential of win-win cooperation between Pakistan
and India.
‘‘ Concepts of the QUAD or alliance of ‘maritime democracies’ based on geo-political
considerations, are notions that will only stall, albeit temporarily, the Eurasian dynamics
of win-win cooperation for stability, predicated on shared prosperity
58 Green Book 2019
Both India and Pakistan need to overcome their
mental blocks about each other. Pakistan’s Asian
calculus does not factor India. Similarly, for Indian
policy makers, Pakistan does not exist in their
global strategic calculus. Both Pakistan and India
have confined themselves to merely ‘managing’
their relations in a narrow band. It is tedious,
exacting and demanding. Shorn of imagination
or creativity, it is for diplomats, a well-rehearsed
exercise that has been played out numerous times
bilaterally and at the UN.
Both India and Pakistan need to realise that
considering each other as distant-abroad is not a
viable option. The deliberate disruption of SAARC
process has eviscerated the hopes for emergence
of a South Asian stream in the story of Asia’s
rise. Classic geo-political power play and worn-
out themes and notions seeking extra-regional
intervention, to fill-in the balance of power gaps,
are indications of this sad reality.
India’s declared policy is to ‘isolate’ Pakistan.
It not only opposes but is actively trying to subvert
CPEC. India did not participate in the BRI Summit
in Beijing and remains staunchly opposed to the
BRI. The China containment theme underlying
India-US Alliance and Defence Partnership could
introduce a new cold war in South Asia. This will
prove to be hugely detrimental to the interests of
this region. A frigid winter will descend and lives of
billion plus people will be jeopardised.
Such short-sighted approaches will not
succeed and prove to be self-defeating. One,
Pakistan will not allow CPEC to be disrupted at any
cost. Two, by opposing BRI, India loses a precious
opportunity for its own development. Three, BRI
is already a reality. Eurasia has been connected
by road and rail links. The East Asian and Pacific
states are supportive. Four, India may cut itself
from the Eurasian development mainstream. Five,
the notion of contest for the dominance of the
Indian Ocean Region is far-fetched, archaic and
mainly academic.
Despite the disputed border, China has
continued to urge India to join its endeavours for
economic development, across continents and
sought cooperative relations. India’s admission in
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a
testimony to China’s maturity and sagacity.
Pakistan has been able to maintain a relatively
stable power equation with India at the strategic
and conventional planes. The conflict simmers,
‘‘

however, at the sub-conventional levels. The Indian
campaign to foment insurgency and terrorism in
Balochistan is a deeply disturbing example of the
new dimensions of the bitter stand-off.
All this is wholly unnecessary. Pakistan is not
in competition with India but would not succumb
to intimidation or hegemony. Pakistan would like
to develop normal relations with India, on equal
terms. A meaningful resumption of dialogue and
settlement of Jammu and Kashmir dispute would
liberate the South Asia from the stranglehold of
enmity that has sapped its strength and vitality.
Pakistani Foreign Minister Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi meets US Secretary of State
CPEC Plus Vision
CPEC will become the anchor for extending
concentric circles of stability, peace and
developments in our greater region. The Vision
CPEC-Plus can become the defining nomenclature
for bringing the benefits of win-win partnerships
and to realise the dividends of China’s economic
development and the promise of an Asian century
to our region.
CPEC Plus together with revived regional
cooperation in South Asia could have significant
positive effects for the economic and social
development of the region as a whole.
PAKISTAN ARMY
‘‘
The China containment theme
underlying India-US alliance and
Defence partnership could introduce a
new cold war in South Asia. This will
prove to be hugely detrimental to the
interests of this region. A frigid winter
‘‘
will descend and lives of billion plus
people will be jeopardised
Mike Pompeo – State Department, Washington (2 October 2018)
Pakistan and the US: Convergences
Pakistan and the US have a long history of
cooperation. Unfortunately, the relations are
strained for now, primarily over the Afghanistan
issue. Pakistanis have a lingering sense of betrayal
and feel that US is trying to scapegoat Pakistan for
the failure of its mission in Afghanistan. On the other
hand, some sections in the US policy community
are venting their frustration over alleged Pakistani
cover to the Afghan Taliban namely the Haqqanis.
There is an ever-widening communication gap.
Inter-agency processes in DC and Islamabad
remain dead locked on determining the best way
Green Book 2019 59
 PAKISTAN ARMY
forward, both with respect to Afghanistan and the
US-Pakistan relations.
The US Administration’s Afghanistan and
South Asia strategy announced in August 2017 was
construed as a variant of its Indo-Pacific Policy.
President Trump’s own instincts were to withdraw
US troops from Afghanistan but he was persuaded
by the generals to persist with what was a costly
and militarily, an unwinnable venture. The South
Asia Strategy seeks to ratchet up pressure on
Pakistan, recognises India’s role in Afghanistan,
inter alia provides for an increase of US troop levels
in Afghanistan, and refers to a ‘conditions-based’
approach to Afghanistan.
Viewed from Islamabad, adding India and
China factors would have resulted in making
Afghanistan a ‘forever’ victim of the new games
on the Asian chessboard. However, the US policy
position on Afghanistan has seen a notable
evolution. Angling for a political settlement, the
US Administration has signalled readiness for
direct talks with the Afghan Taliban, including on
the question of US troop presence thus meeting
key Taliban conditions for a negotiated end to over
seventeen years of war.
It is now evident that the war is unwinnable
and a military outcome is not possible. It would
be to President Trump’s credit that he agrees to
strike a deal with the Taliban for durable peace and
stability in Afghanistan.
Indeed, a political settlement would bring
lasting credit to President Trump politically and
personally. It will be welcomed by the Afghans and
the region. After a long time, there is a convergence
of interests of the US, Pakistan and the Taliban
on core issues regarding Afghanistan, which is
more importantly super imposed by the will and
aspirations of the Afghan people for peace.
Pakistan shares US concerns that Afghanistan
must never again become a safe haven for
international terrorists. The presence of ISIS is as
much a concern for the US as for Pakistan and the
Afghan National Unity Government. The Afghan
Taliban are strongly opposed to ISIS and thus a
four-way convergence of interests would make it
possible to join efforts for neutralising terrorism in
this part of the world.
Pakistan has been making extraordinary
efforts to repair relations with Afghanistan. The
Chief of Army Staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa
has undertaken several visits to Kabul.
The Afghan-Pakistan Action Plan is derived
from broad agreement on the way forward.
Specific steps have been taken to set up Ground
Coordination Centres and post liaison officers on
both sides to coordinate efforts against terrorists
and unauthorised crossings.
60 Green Book 2019
‘‘
An important aspect of changing
US policy options on Afghanistan is
the correct decision to see this issue
separately and not link it to the Indo-
Pacific Strategy. This would make
it possible for other neighbours of
Afghanistan, such as China to be more
actively involved in providing support
‘‘
for building the economic foundations
for sustained peace
An important aspect of changing US’ policy
options on Afghanistan is the correct decision to
see this issue separately and not link it to the Indo-
Pacific Strategy. This would make it possible for
other neighbours of Afghanistan, such as China to
be more actively involved in providing support for
building the economic foundations for sustained
peace.
The Afghan Taliban should respond positively
to the political signals from Washington, Kabul and
Islamabad and opt for moving forward from direct
contacts to formal talks with the US. The Taliban
need to transform themselves into a political
entity. Their resilience, if not battlefield gains need
to be converted into political capital. But what is
more important is to keep in view the imperative
need for making Afghanistan a united, sovereign,
independent and peaceful state, respecting
the rights and aspirations of all its citizens and
contributing to regional peace and development.
Pakistan and the US need to work closely for the
success of peace in Afghanistan. Other regional
states would also stand to benefit. Pakistan views
US presence in Afghanistan as a factor of stability.
Moreover, we are keen to see US succeed in
Afghanistan. This is a major point that is somehow
lost on the DC establishment. It entirely possible
for Pakistan and the US to find ways to bring
about an Afghanistan end state, that is entirely
in consonance with the aspirations of the Afghan
people and serves interests of all three-namely US,
Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s new administration led by Prime
Minister Imran Khan has signalled building of
mutually beneficial relations with the US. Pakistan
wishes to prioritise its economic development and
thus is interested in improving relations with all
of its neighbours. With Afghanistan, Imran Khan
has spoken about tranquil and open borders and
high priority to peace, which is indispensable for
peace in Pakistan. With India, he has signalled a
determined effort to improve relations including
 PAKISTAN ARMY

normalising trade. A peaceful and progressive
South Asia, well integrated economically would
open huge prospects for development and offer
economic opportunities for the world.
The corporate sector from across the globe
could be incentivised to participate in multi-
national CPEC projects and work the Central-South
Asia resources and growth opportunities for profit.
Incidentally, this happens to be the view of China as
well. Renewed efforts for bringing about conceptual
clarity and congruity between the US and Pakistan
and other important stakeholders in Asia-Pacific
could open new horizons for sustainable peace and
development.
A high degree of optimism is sweeping across
Pakistan with the people hopeful and confident
that the new government will correct course
domestically and in foreign affairs to suit national
interests.
Working the domestic agenda must remain
a priority. A stable and conducive external
environment is absolutely essential for this
purpose. Good relations with all major powers,
neighbours and eschewing unnecessary external
liabilities will enable Pakistan to go forward
economically and socially. The governance needs
to be fixed and institutions rebuilt.
It is heartening to see the real issues now coming
to the fore of State’s priorities. A futuristic vision
of Pakistan becoming a moderately developed
country by 2047, the centenary of independence
must inform and guide national endeavours.

‘‘ Pakistan’s new administration led by Prime Minister Imran Khan has signalled
building of mutually beneficial relations with the US. Pakistan wishes to prioritise
its economic development and thus is interested in improving relations with all of its
neighbours. With Afghanistan, Imran Khan has spoken about tranquil and open borders
and high priority to peace, which is indispensable for peace in Pakistan. With India, he
‘‘
has signalled a determined effort to improve relations including normalising trade
Notes 5. CNN POLITICS, ‘The absolute chaos of Donald Trump’s G7 meeting, Analysis
1. Mead, Walter Russells, The Big Shift, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2018 issue. by Chris Cillizza, CNN Editor-at large, 11 June 2018
2. ibid 6. Asia Times, Sun Tzu and the art of fighting trade war, Pepe Escobar, August 23,
3. The New Yorker. The Nelson Mandela Lecture, Barack Obama, July 18 2018. 2018.
4. The New Yorker, Francis Fukuyama Postpones The End of History, Menand 7. Ministry of External Affairs New Delhi, India-China Informal Summit at
Louis, September 3, 2018. Wuhan, April 28, 2018
 PAKISTAN ARMY

IMPACT OF CPEC ON
PAKISTAN
IN
SOCIAL, DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC
& LEGAL DOMAINS

Brigadier Kamal Azfar is serving in Lieutenant Colonel Wasif Mahmood

Pakistan Army is serving in Pakistan Army

Abstract
This paper discusses the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) long-term infrastructural project as
a major part of the One Belt One Road (OBOR) the major global initiative by the Chinese government,
scheduled to complete by 2030. CPEC is a joint project that Beijing and Islamabad agreed to finance
through Chinese investments utilising investment loans largely by Chinese financial institutions;
nevertheless, Pakistan will also be responsible for investing approximately 15 billion dollars on its
own in the process. While the project has been welcomed by Greater Eurasia (including Russia, Iran,
and Central Asia) besides the United Kingdom and Western European Countries, albeit vehement
opposition by India. Paper carries out realistic appraisal of CPEC with respect to its anticipated social,
demographic, economic and legal implications for Pakistan with a view to proffer viable strategy for
optimising the benefits from this project. It highlights the opportunities, challenges and the impact
that this mega project will likely have to the existing socioeconomic infrastructure, job opportunities,
poverty level index, and regional peace and security.

Keywords: CPEC, BRI, Game Changer, Challenges and Opportunities, Infrastructure Development,
Labour Force, Socio-economic, Regional Peace and Security

62 Green Book 2019

 PAKISTAN ARMY

CONCLUSIONS FROM CPEC RELATED

ENVIRONMENT

C
hina-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),
being the flagship project of Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI), has been rightly
termed as a potential game changer for
Pakistan due to its potential of being the
harbinger of economic, demographic,
political and social progress for the country. As per
the vision of Chief of Army Staff, “CPEC is the grand
manifestation of the deep-rooted ties between China
and Pakistan. Much larger than its bilateral benefits,
CPEC is indeed a corridor of peace & prosperity, not
only for the people of Pakistan and China but also
for the region and beyond. It will bind all these
nations together and bring about an economic
transformation through enhanced connectivity’’.1
CPEC needs to be taken as an environment;
not only as a port, some roads and projects etc. It is
going to be an amalgamation of internal, regional
and trans-regional connectivity and merger. CPEC
will, therefore, affect Pakistan in every domain
which may have long lasting social, demographic
and economic implications. On the other hand, the
legal aspects of CPEC also need to be considered to
protect Pakistan’s interests in the future.
Global Environment
America First policy has forced many countries
to recalibrate their approach towards USA and its
unpredictable foreign policy choices. Latest US
policy revision for Afghanistan and South Asia adds
confusion and uncertainty to an already complex and
delicate situation.
USA views CPEC as Chinese geo-political riposte
to hedge against her Pivot to Asia policy. US does not
favour CPEC because it offers a back door to China
right at the mouth of the Persian Gulf and can facilitate
her trade of petrochemicals and other commodities
through Pakistan using ports in the Persian Gulf and
Africa.
President Putin has already expressed interest in
CPEC as a regional connectivity option and has been
successful in obtaining Chinese investment in Russian
Federation. Russia may further its cooperation with
China by getting on board CPEC project besides other
bilateral trade and commerce initiatives with China,
which in turn can result in better security for the
region.2

‘‘ CPEC is the grand manifestation of the deep-rooted ties between China and
Pakistan. Much larger than its bilateral benefits, CPEC is indeed a corridor of peace &
‘‘
prosperity, not only for the people of Pakistan and China but also for the region and
beyond
General Qamar Javed Bajwa, COAS Pakistan Army

Green Book 2019 63

 PAKISTAN ARMY

China. Furthermore, continued diplomatic pressure

from USA is also likely to indirectly force Iran to
enhance her relations with Russia and China.
Internal Security situation in South and Central
Balochistan is not optimal. For CPEC to succeed,
these regions would have to be made fully secure
and peaceful for transportation of cargo along
national highways passing through these areas.
A host of narratives among segments of society
against both China and Pakistan viz CPEC are
noticeable ranging from “What has CPEC given us
but more poverty, misery and loss of our lands?”,
“People of Gwadar are going to be replaced by
Russia has shown interest in CPEC

Japan is firmly behind Indian initiative to open

up a route to CARs through Iran and Afghanistan.
This is indicative of lack of Japanese interest in
CPEC owing to historic animosity with China.
Resultantly, Japan is likely to maintain somewhat
neutral outlook viz a CPEC projects.
USA views China’s growing economic and
military power with concern and wants to affect
its containment. However, China has adopted
a prudent approach in handling America’s India sees CPEC as a security threat
provocative questioning of One China policy and
other contentious issues. China is expected to act outsiders due to CPEC”. Unless addressed properly
strictly in accordance with its perceived national in all domains, such propaganda/narratives can
interest’s sans direct confrontation with the US to pose problems for CPEC going forward.
the extent possible. There is broad national consensus across the
political spectrum on friendly relations with China
Regional and Domestic Environment
and importance of CPEC as the main engine of
India views the development of Gwadar Port by growth for Pakistani economy in the near future.
China as a security threat. In order to stall CPEC’s
progress, she is helping Iran develop Chabahar Port CPEC Projects Perceived to Affect Social
as a strategic counter weight to Gwadar, improving and Demographic Domains
its diplomatic and trade relations with Pakistan’s
── Population. A population of 194 million can
traditionally friendly countries in Middle East.
provide very rich human resource for CPEC
After some hiatus, bilateral relations b/w projects. If this resource is properly equipped
Pakistan and Iran portend a positive tone. Iran and utilised, it likely to multiply dividends of
also has strengthened bilateral trade relations with CPEC manifold.

── Labour Force and Employment. In Pakistan,
32.3% of the population constitutes labour force
having significant bearing on the productive
capacity (Crude Activity Rate). All these CPEC
projects (especially energy and infrastructure
ones) will provide huge employment
opportunities for the people, especially for
unskilled labour.
── Education. Having official literacy rate of
58%, total 245,387 educational institutes of
all types (primary schools to universities)
and student teacher ratio of 29.45 to 1 (42357.5
thousand students and 1437.8 thousand
teachers),3 warrants colossal efforts in this
domain. While analysing CPEC projects, it is
evident that this domain has been seriously
neglected which is substantiated from the fact
that out of 58 x planned projects, there are
only two projects in the field of education.
── Health
00 With entire world including China moving
towards green energy, establishment of 8 x
coal-based electricity generation plants in
different areas of Pakistan raises concerns.
00 Projects which are likely to have an impact
on health of the people are very limited.
This is due to the fact that only recognised
CPEC project pertaining to health is up
gradation of GDA Hospital in Gwadar.
── Water Supply and Sanitation. Apart from
9 x SEZs, which may contribute towards
improving water supply and sanitation in
those particular areas, only one project has
been planned (5 MGD Desalination Plant)
PAKISTAN ARMY
which is only sufficient for the residents of
Gwadar. No worthwhile project is expected in
this domain in the country.
Economic Perspective
── Pakistan’s State of the Economy. Pakistan’s
economy is broadly divided into three main
sectors i.e. agriculture, industry and services.
In order to ascertain performance of various
components of the economy over the past
five years, an incisive sectoral analysis of
Pakistan’s economy has been carried out.
Each of these is being discussed in ensuing
paras.
── Rate of Inflation.4 Inflation rate remained
4.09% during last year while the volume
of Pakistan’s economy surpassed US $300
billion.
── Fiscal Deficit. Fiscal deficit has also registered
a decrease. From last year, when it was 4.6 %,
fiscal deficit has been brought down to 4.2 %.
── Agriculture Sector. Agriculture sector
recorded a growth of 3.46 % in FY 2017 as
compared to 0.27 % the previous year.
2012-13 8.2 %
2013-14 5.5%
2014-15 5.3%
2015-16 4.6%
2016-17 4.2%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP
── Industrial Sector. Industrial sector recorded
a growth of 5.02 % as compared to 5.8 % the
previous year.
── Services’ Sector. Services’ sector witnessed
a growth of 5.98% as compared to 5.55 % the
previous year. Share of services’ sector has
reached to 59.59 % of GDP in FY 2017/18.
Green Book 2019 65
 PAKISTAN
CPEC will curb brain ARMY
drain and generate employment opportunity for youth

── Per Capita Income. It is historically one of
the most commonly used indicator to assess
the economic development of a country. Per
Capita Income in dollar terms increased from
US $ 1,531 in FY 2016/17 to US $ 1,629 in FY
2017/18. Main contributing factors for this
are higher real GDP growth, lower growth in
population and stability of Pakistani Rupee.
Figure displays the progressive improvement
in per capita income for Pakistan during last
ten years.

Pakistan - Per Capita Income ($)

1700 1629
1600 1514 1531
1500
1389
1400 1320 1334
(US $)

1274
1300
1200
1053 1072
1100 1026
1000
900
800
2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17

Source: PBS

66 Green Book 2019

 PAKISTAN ARMY

ANALYSIS
Social and Demographic Domains
Positive Implications
── Employment Generation. One of the most
obvious domains in which CPEC is likely to
benefit Pakistan is job creation. According to
official data, 30,000 jobs have already been
created for Pakistani engineers and labourers
in the Early Harvest projects which are to
be completed in 2018.5 International Labour
Organisation (ILO) estimated that CPEC will
create around 400,000 jobs while Applied
Economics Research Centre (AERC) estimated
that CPEC is expected to create over 700,000
direct jobs between 2015 and 2030.6
── Better Infrastructure. One of the key areas
around which the success of CPEC will be
measured is infrastructure. In this context,
many roads have been built or are being
constructed. Besides catering for expected
increase of traffic on our roads in future, this
will also enhance connectivity especially in
the shape of farm-to-market roads.
── Inculcation of Chinese Work Ethos. Working job opportunities and improve the lifestyle of
on CPEC projects under Chinese managers its people; thus preventing brain drain from
and with Chinese counterparts is definitely the country. With basic necessities being
going to improve the work ethos of Pakistani available in their own motherland, there
work force making them more committed to would remain little incentive for people to go
their job and adopting a more professional abroad looking for jobs.
approach in their working. Working on
CPEC projects is also likely to give excellent Negative Implications
exposure to Pakistani professionals regarding ── Human Resource. Human resource of more
international business environment and than 200 million, if not channelled properly,
practices. might become a menace for the initiative,
── Alleviation of Poverty. CPEC projects are ushering silent detractors initially and active
likely to generate a large number of jobs in dissatisfaction/unrest in later stages. It is
the local market, thus helping reduce poverty essential that the population feels that effects
levels in Pakistan to some degree. According of CPEC are trickling down to common and
to  Pakistan Vision 2025, Pakistan aims to deprived citizen of Pakistan.
reduce its current poverty level by half. With
current poverty rate at 39%,7 this means that ── Education. While analysing CPEC projects, it
by 2025, the rate might drop to around 19%. is evident that this domain has been seriously
neglected. Pakistan China Friendship School
── Curbing Brain Drain. CPEC can help the in Gwadar may provide improved education
Government create better education facilities, to a few children of Gwadar but it will not
make any real contribution towards providing

‘‘
International Labour Organisation
(ILO) estimated that CPEC will create
around 400,000 jobs while Applied
Economics Research Centre (AERC)
estimated that CPEC is expected to
‘‘
create over 700,000 direct jobs between
2015 and 2030
education to 2.5 million out of school children
existing in Pakistan.
── Health
00 With entire world including China moving
towards green energy, establishment of 8 x
coal based electricity generation plants in
different parts of Pakistan raises concerns.
Environmental hazards of these plants viz
their benefits need to be weighed.

Green Book 2019 67

 PAKISTAN ARMY
00 Medical facilities being set up at Gwadar
will only provide basic medical facilities to
a small segment of the population.
── Water Supply and Sanitation. With a boom
in CPEC projects and related migrations,
urbanisation is likely to increase.
Industrialisation and coal based power plants
will pollute existing water reservoirs.
── M
ass Migration. As a result of mass migration,
following issues are likely to surface: such as Bank of China have established
00 Sense of deprivation among locals if they
are unable to compete with settlers for jobs.
00 Threat to livelihood means of locals due
to industrialisation/developmental work,
fishermen of Gwadar are a case in point.
Economic Domain
Positive Implications
── Trade Prospects and Potential Industries
00 About US $16 billion of trade with China
occurs mainly through the sea (97%) and
only 1% through land. Improving the
infrastructure (rail and road network)
will help increase trade by reducing
transportation and transaction costs.
00 China is taking keen interest to invest in
agribusiness to add value to Pakistan’s
agriculture raw products. Same can
be exploited for improving Pakistan’s
agriculture-based exports to China
(constituting 15% of Pakistan’s total
exports).
00 With Chinese investors’ interest in local
businesses, Pakistan’s textile industry
‘‘ China is taking keen interest to invest in agribusiness to add value to Pakistan’s
agriculture raw products. Same can be exploited for improving Pakistan’s agriculture-
based exports to China (constituting 15% of Pakistan’s total exports)
68 Green Book 2019
can look to attract investment and ensure
value addition to increase its exports.
00 In view of the planned alignment of CPEC
routes, marble and mineral processing,
food processing/packaging and leather
products trade have great potential in
improving the trade balance with China.
── Financial Inclusion
00 New international commercial banks
their branches in Pakistan. It brings new
and modern financial products which can
augment our existing financial system.
00 There are new opportunities to provide
consultancy and brokerage services for
Chinese and Pakistani investors.
── Employment Opportunities. According
to the International Labour Organisation,
CPEC would bring more than 400,000 jobs
to the country while the Applied Economic
Research Centre has estimated that the mega
initiative would provide around 700,000
direct jobs between 2015 and 2030.8 Planning
Commission’s data shows even more
promising results, with CPEC generating
around 800,000 jobs in the next 15 years.
── Urban Development
00 Rapid urbanisation under CPEC is
creating agglomeration economy with
opportunities in the sectors of real estate,
urban infrastructure, construction and
municipal service delivery.
00 CPEC is likely to attract investments from
Pakistani private sector in ‘Low-Carbon
Urban Transportation’ and other ‘Clean
Technologies for Cities’ through Green
Climate Fund (GCF) and other global
funding opportunities.
00 CPEC, an economic corridor can become
an ‘Environmental Corridor’ if the
mechanism for development of ‘Regional
Renewable Energy Trade’ between
China & Pakistan is formulated and
implemented. Benefiting from Chinese
experience, Pakistan can move on the
path of “Green Development”.
── Poverty Reduction. CPEC is likely to lift
millions of Pakistanis out of poverty. CPEC
‘‘

‘‘ Gwadar port city is expected to soon
become one of the most sought after
‘‘
real estate investment destinations in
Asia
embraces the construction of textile garment,
industrial park projects, construction of
dams, installation of nuclear reactors and
creating networks of road and railway lines
which will generate numerous employment
opportunities.
── Gwadar as a Trading Hub. With 120 berths
in future, Gwadar Port will be able to deal
with trade traffic of about 45-65 million tons
(in 15 years) up to 300 million tons (in 50
years).9 Besides strengthening trade ties with
landlocked countries, it is estimated that
up to 4 % of global trade will pass through
Gwadar by 2020. About 70% increase is
expected in maritime trade through Gwadar.
Revenue from the port, once fully operational,
is estimated to be US $40 billion annually.
── Real Estate Business. Gwadar port city
is expected to soon become one of the
most sought after real estate investment
destinations in Asia. An annual population
growth rate of 2.8% (Source: FBS, 2016)
otherwise entails that more housing projects
would be needed in future.
── Tourism. CPEC is likely to boost ecological
tourism in Gilgit-Baltistan and coastal tourism
in the Coastal Belt of Pakistan. This is going to
benefit not only the local people but will also
be a good source of revenue generation for the
country.
PAKISTAN REMITTANCES
5530
5125
4966
4722
4699
4434
4387
Jan 2015 Jul 2015 Jan 2016
PAKISTAN ARMY
Negative Implications
── Over Dependence on CPEC. At present,
Pakistan’s economic progress has been
linked in its entirety to CPEC allied projects.
This policy of putting all eggs in one basket
can prove to be counter-productive. With
our economic stakes linked with CPEC only,
its failure on any account will prove to be
catastrophic.
── Debt Trap
00 CPEC is based on a US $62 billion outlay
whose major component is either loan or
investments by Chinese companies.
00 In 2017, Pakistan had nearly US $72
billion  foreign debt. Current Account
Deficit in first 5 months (Jul-Nov 2017) of
current fiscal year has risen to 89%.10
00 With CPEC, if it is assumed that the
interest will be in the range of 7%, payable
in 25 to 40 years, this would mean China
will have to be paid back approximately
US $ 7-8 billion as Equated Monthly
Instalments (EMI) for next 43 years
from 2018  onwards. Pakistan will find it
difficult to pay back even the interest, let
alone the principal amount.
── Increased Trade Deficit. Pakistan’s trade deficit
has widened in recent years because exports
are much lower than imports. Pakistan had
trade deficit of US $32.4 billion during last
fiscal year11 out of which US $11 billion is with
China alone. However, we continue to exempt
duty from more and more items for the Chinese
which is likely to hurt the local industrialist
for the benefit of Chinese individuals.
── Reduction in Remittances. Foreign
remittances have also seen a downward trend
5600
5400
5246
5200
5000
USD Million
4765 4791
4740 4800
4600
4600
4400
4200
Jul 2016 Jan 2017 Jul 2017
SOURCE: TRADINGECONOMICS.COM I STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN
Green Book 2019 69
 PAKISTAN ARMY
in third quarter of 2017 whereby they have
decreased to US $4791 million as compared
to US $5246 million in the second quarter of
2017.12
── Overwhelming of Pakistani Industries cheaper than Pakistani goods. This is
00 Pakistan cannot compete with products of
other countries because of  high taxation,
exorbitant electricity rates with erratic
supply, inconsistency of policies etc., for
industrial sector.
00 Pakistan is providing free trade and low
tariffs on products imported from China,
thus making them cheaper than Pakistani
goods. This is counterproductive to our
industries and their export potential.
00 Asymmetric trade balance exists between
Pakistan and China. While Pakistan has
very less export items for Chinese markets,
our markets are flooded by cheap Chinese
goods. These may harm Pakistani Small
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in the long
term.
── Reliance on Own Workforce by China.
China is having huge under-utilised capacity
of industrial production and workforce.
Majority of workers, goods and material being
employed on CPEC projects is of Chinese
origin. Apparently, Pakistani work force, if
utilised, may only be employed on odd jobs
while the lion’s share would go to Chinese
work force.
‘‘ Pakistan is providing free trade
and low tariffs on products imported
from China, thus making them
‘‘
counterproductive to our industries
and their export potential
── Energy Mix. In overall outlay of CPEC energy
projects, the main thrust at present is on coal
generation. We need to keep an eye on ratio of
coal’s share in the overall energy generation
mix. At the current pace, by 2025, coal’s
share could be as high as 55-60%, a figure
highly undesirable both from environmental
perspective as well as financial burden.
── Environmental Hazards from Coal Power
Plants. Through CPEC,  China is installing
coal-based power plants in Pakistan which
have adverse effects on human health and are
in contradiction to environmental safe guards
and regulations. This is alarming since China
is closing down its own coal power plants due
to environment degradation issues.
── Absence of HRD. Pakistan lacks skilled
and well trained work force. This human
resource (including engineers, technicians
and administrators etc.) will be required
at enhanced scale once CPEC projects get
operational at their optimum levels. Nandipur

Combined Cycle Thermal Power Plant is one
of the example where after a lot of operational
failures, Pakistan handed over its operations
to Chinese Company. No concrete planning is
underway for capacity building of local HRD
to meet projected requirements.
── Lack of Development along Corridors.
There are no worthwhile cities and rest areas
along CPEC routes from Gwadar towards
Khunjerab for supporting passengers and
cargo traffic along these roads.
── Development of Maritime Sector.
Exploration of offshore natural resources
promises tremendous economic potential.
Although some CPEC projects aim at promoting
coastal tourism and the fishermen community
but the fact is that the activities of Pakistani
fishermen are hampered by illegal trawling
inside Balochistan waters, lack of support from
the government and poor economic condition
of fishermen community. Government needs
to do much more for this community all along
the Coastal Areas of Pakistan.
── Weak Diplomatic Corps. We have not
been much successful in establishing our
diplomatic foot print in emerging markets.
Moreover, due to absence of meritocracy,
country’s interests are not being served in an
apt manner.
── Absence of Freight Forwarding Facilities.
On operationalisation of Gwadar Port, huge
volume of cargo is likely to be transported
from here to China and other destinations.
It would require companies holding sizeable
freight carrying trucks. However, presently
there are no government/private owned
transport companies in Gwadar having
capability for provision of said facilities to
meet the requirements.
Legal Aspects
── Principle Variations. Chinese government
has approached CPEC by opting to invest
in commercially viable ventures. The
fundamental variations from standard
practices are as follows:
00 China will invest through its state owned
companies in the projects collaborating
‘‘ In present day world, geo-economics is overtaking geo-politics which has
necessitated reorientation in Chinese approach. However, CPEC being flagship project
‘‘
is likely to face stiff resistance due to evolving global power politics and security
challenges
PAKISTAN ARMY
with Pakistan. The whole exercise is
aimed at enhancing competitiveness
amongst Chinese companies with
possibility of better dividends.
00 In present day world, geo-economics
is overtaking geo-politics which has
necessitated reorientation in Chinese
approach. However, CPEC being flagship
project is likely to face stiff resistance
due to evolving global power politics and
security challenges.
── Implementation of Local Laws. Being a
signatory of WTO, Pakistan has to clearly
elucidate in laws that privately owned Chinese
companies as well as Government firms
shall be given same preferential treatment.13
Similarly, exceptions and preferential access
available to Chinese products throughout
Pakistan will have to be provided to other
WTO signatory competitors. It is likely
to invoke complications over struggling
economic structure being borne by Pakistan.
── Policy Framework Bindings. CPEC projects
are spread over three decades. Given the
history of bilateral relations with China as
well as perceived interdependence after
CPEC, this cooperation is likely to continue.
Therefore, our internal as well as external
policies shall remain contingent upon this
collaboration. While such nature of relations
act as a surety, there is also an element of
predictability attached to it which shall limit
our coalition options.14
── Labour Standards. SEZs act was promulgated
in 2012, which facilitates public private
partnership as well as private developers
in developing economic zones. However, a
global study15concludes that these zones
generally neglect welfare of labourers.
Therefore this aspect has to be focused.
── Focus of Agreements
00 CPEC will enhance China’s global
outreach. Therefore Chinese priority will
be more on infrastructural development
rather than trade with Pakistan.
00 Manner in which different contracts have
been handed over to Chinese companies
has come under debate/scrutiny. Non
Green Book 2019 71
 PAKISTAN ARMY
Prime Minister Imran Khan in delegation level talks with
President Xi Jinping – Beijing, China (2nd November 2018)
adherence to standard practices and
abstinence of market competition can be
challenged in courts, detrimental to CPEC
perception.
── Investment Agreements. Pakistan and
China have comprehensive investment
agreements in form of BIT & FTA. BIT focuses
more on “equitable treatment” for investors,
FTA is comparatively more comprehensive in
addressing the voids in BIT by focussing on
“fair and equitable” treatment.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Social and Demographic Domains
National Level
── Education
00 More good quality schools under CPEC
project be started in different parts of
Pakistan to provide quality education to
the under-privileged.
00 Chinese language be taught as an elective
subject at intermediate and graduation
level. This will contribute in reducing
the gap between Chinese and Pakistani
societies to some extent.
── Health
00 Primary, secondary and tertiary medical
care facilities be made part of CPEC. Special
focus be given to Southern Balochistan,
Western half of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and
Northern areas of Pakistan.
00 Joint research institutes for medical
sciences be established in major cities of
Pakistan with collaboration of Pakistani
and Chinese authorities.
72 Green Book 2019
00 Exchange programmes for doctors and
para-medics be organised in order to
accrue benefit from Chinese expertise in
this domain.
── Migration
00 Ministry of Planning and Development to
plan new cities/towns in relation to CPEC
projects with a view to curb urbanisation
of already over-crowded major cities.
00 Mass awareness campaigns be initiated
in order to promote inter-cultural and
inter-ethnic harmony.
── Designated Areas for Chinese. In order to
prevent any untoward incident which may
create bad blood, areas may be designated
where Chinese people can live separately
from the local population. Present system of
Chinese accommodation at Gwadar port may
be taken up as an example in this regard.
── Changes in Structure of Population.
Preparations be made for imminent arrival
of large number of Chinese and focus on pro-
active measures such as:
00 Transparent process of visa issuance to
Chinese nationals.
00 Coordination of NADRA with Chinese
‘‘
Primary, secondary and tertiary
medical care facilities be made part
of CPEC. Special focus be given to
Southern Balochistan, Western half
‘‘
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Northern
areas of Pakistan

Hukou System16 to gain information about
Chinese nationals coming to Pakistan.
00 Making policies of giving visa to individuals
after obtaining a Non-Criminal Record
Certificate from Chinese authorities.
── Relocation of Population. Shifting of
population be carried out under a national
strategy so that people from backward regions
of Pakistan are relocated along CPEC routes to
help evolve new cities/towns.
── Concession for Locals. With advancement
of CPEC, price hike in certain areas will affect
land prices. Locals will then be unable to
purchase land being monetarily inferior to
international companies. A scheme must be
devised to set prices after concession only
for the locals so that they are not wiped
out altogether from business opportunities
offered by CPEC.
── Pakistanis on Key Positions on Projects. A
certain ratio of key positions be reserved for
Pakistanis in all CPEC projects (40% – 50%).
This ratio may be less in the initial 3-5 years
and it may be demanded that after utilising
this period for training of Pakistani people,
this ratio be increased.
── Human Resource. A number of measures
be taken for correct utilisation of Pakistan’s
Human Resource by offering incentives to
educated Pakistani diaspora working abroad
with the aim to bring them back to Pakistan
and become part of CPEC projects. This will
also reduce the brain drain faced by Pakistan.
── Water Supply and Sanitation. Water
supply and sanitation projects be planned
under CPEC umbrella to improve these
facets in cities/newly developed areas/
SEZs. Furthermore projects like water supply
schemes, desalination plants, water filtration
PAKISTAN ARMY
plants and storage tanks be planned along
all CPEC routes inside Balochistan where the
entire region faces acute shortage of water.
Army Level
── Education
00 Army should focus on development of
education sector  in Balochistan and
Sindh, especially in areas along CPEC
routes by establishing Army Public
Schools and Cadet Colleges to provide
good quality education facilities to locals
of these areas.
00 Contribute towards establishing of
excellent quality education institutions
in Academia-Industry-Research (AIR)
Clusters with NUST in the lead, at SEZ
locations planned at Dera Ismail Khan,
Zhob, Quetta, Kalat, Khuzdar, Turbat and
Gwadar.
00 Establish National Defence University
campus at Gwadar by clearing
bureaucratic hurdles in Balochistan.
── Health
00 Identify dysfunctional hospitals and adopt
them on the lines of GDA Hospital, Gwadar
under proper legislation by respective
provincial governments. Same may be run
by Army Doctors on supervisory role while
undertaking capacity building of local
doctors.
00 Monitoring of health facilities in Sindh and
Balochistan provinces in collaboration
with provincial health departments after
necessary legislation at federal/provincial
levels.
00 Organise free medical camps in remote
areas’ especially in Sindh and Balochistan to
provide health care services to marginalised
communities.
── Jobs
00 Locals (unskilled/ semi-skilled/ skilled
work force) be inducted in military
institutions such as FWO, MES etc.,
besides induction in Army.
‘‘ A scheme must be devised to set
prices after concession only for the
locals so that they are not wiped out
‘‘
altogether from business opportunities
offered by CPEC
Green Book 2019 73
 PAKISTAN ARMY
00 Vocational Training Centres be established
in far flung areas for skill development to
get employment in CPEC projects.
Economic Domain
National Level
── Debt Management. Apart from the oft
repeated recommendations of credible
experts regarding debt management of the
country, proper evaluation of CPEC related
contracts for mapping out a debt payment
strategy be done immediately to avoid default
on their payments.
── CPEC Central Command Authority. A CPEC
Central Command Authority be established
for supervising and undertaking all CPEC
related policy decisions and projects. Timely
completion of Early Harvest Projects to be
ensured so as to operationalise CPEC within
the envisioned timeframe. Transparency to be
brought in development of SEZs as clusters
of Industry, Academia and Human Resource
Development to spurt industrial revolution in
the country in a wholesome manner.
── Industrialise the Country. Achieve
industrial growth at 7-8% in short to medium
term & 9-10% in long term by providing
uninterrupted power supply to optimise
existing potential of industrial output.
Facilitation package (tax concessions, skill
development, import concessions etc.) at
‘‘ Apart from the oft repeated recommendations of credible experts regarding
debt management of the country, proper evaluation of CPEC related contracts for
‘‘
mapping out a debt payment strategy be done immediately to avoid default on their
payments
74 Green Book 2019
Gwadar Industrial Zone and SEZs along the
routes of CPEC be implemented to promote
local industries.
── Ship Breaking and Shipbuilding Industry.
Owing to strategic importance of ship building
industry, Pakistan must develop its ship
breaking and building industries on firm
footings. South Korean shipping industry
reforms be consulted as a guideline for better
results.
── HRD. Invest in HRD at all tiers. Inculcate
and promote research culture in universities,
especially the ones related to economic sectors
of interest for Pakistan. Simultaneously,
related fields also may not be neglected
such as Contract Management, Contractual
Law, and International Law etc. Malaysian
economy is a good example of how a country
can successfully reshape its HRD model for
achieving outstanding progress.
── Business Friendly Environment. Government
must unleash a new plan to resurrect a struggling
industrial environment especially in Gwadar.
Implement sweeping changes for making
Pakistan’s economy attractive for investment.
Spur job creation for the locals of Gwadar
and Balochistan. Some suggested steps are as
follows:-
00 Reduce tariffs to regional parity and
provision of uninterrupted energy to
industry.
00 Promotion of financial credit facility to SMEs.

00 Establishment of SEZs for specialised
industry clusters for enabling SMEs to
complement resources and expertise.
00 Graduated devaluation of currency.
── Integrated Energy Development Model.
CPEC energy funds be re-allocated with revised
priorities favouring hydel, renewables and
nuclear options. This should be supplemented
with an “Integrated Energy Development
Model” which can help achieve savings of
15-20% in our total energy consumption.
Moreover, private investments in hydel and
other renewable sources be encouraged.
── Development along CPEC Corridors. ƒƒ
Construction of rest and administration areas
should be carried out along the CPEC corridors
as this will not only have a positive effect
on economy but also make the locals stake
holders partners in benefits of CPEC.
── Transparency and Meritocracy. System
of transparent bidding for CPEC projects
and strict enforcement of meritocracy in all
employment opportunities in CPEC projects be
ensured. Quarterly and yearly audits of CPEC
projects’ financial transactions be ensured
through reputable international audit firms.
Details of all financial undertakings be floated
for public consumption.
── Contingency Planning for National
Economy. Effective measures be taken to
improve all sectors of our economy. CPEC can
be means to an end but not the end itself.
── Capacity Building in Targeted Sectors. After
carrying out a detailed analysis of countries
PAKISTAN ARMY
having potential for Pakistani exports,
Pakistan must aim at enhancing its capacity
in targeted industrial sectors such as cotton
products, leather products and electrical
industry.
── Development Strategy. Proposed
development strategy is premised on
transition from agrarian economy to
industrialised economy having export
oriented outlook. Salient aspects of proposed
development strategy for Pakistan are
appended below:
00 Initiation Phase
Ascertain target countries where
Pakistan can focus on increasing
trade volume. For this purpose,
import pattern of these countries to be
studied and same may be compared
with own production potential in
areas of interest.
ƒƒ
D evelop CPEC communication
infrastructure (both road and
railways) and allied facilities at the
earliest.
ƒƒ Establish SEZs along the CPEC
routes as per the local area products.
Businessmen/Consortiums setting up
their businesses in these SEZs be given
economic incentives in the shape of
tax exemptions etc.
ƒƒ Carry out analysis of import patterns
of target countries to ascertain areas
of focus for development of above
mentioned SEZs.
Green Book 2019 75
 PAKISTAN ARMY
00 Implementation Phase
ƒƒ In addition to other facilitation
mechanisms, the government would
have to facilitate targeted industries/
businessmen at least initially to enhance
the competitive value of own exports to
the targeted countries.
ƒƒ Effective marketing of own products
through diplomatic missions/
commercial councillors and diplomats
to cement trade ties with the targeted
countries.
Army Level
── Establishment of AIR Clusters. Army must
support trio of top notch educationists,
businessmen and research fellows in
establishment of world class AIR clusters
along CPEC routes.
── Assistance to Ministries for Kick Starting
Exports. Maximum support be rendered
to Ministries of Finance and Commerce in
increasing our trade footprint on African
continent. For this purpose, our contingents
deployed in United Nations missions be
dovetailed for making inroads into trade
Notes
1. “COAS Address at Gwadar” Pakistan Army website, accessed on 20
February, 2018, https://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/awpreview/pDetails.
aspx?pType=PressRelease&pID=646
2. Saddam Hussain, “The possibility of a Russia-Pakistan Economic Corridor”
Opinion Editorial Daily Times, 29 April,2018,http://www.cpecinfo.com/news/
the-possibility-of-a-russia-pakistan-economic-corridor/NTIxMA
3. Pakistan Economic Survey 2017/18, Ministry of Finance website, http://www.
finance.gov.pk/survey_1718.html, accessed on 22 February 18
4. “Pakistan Economic Survey 2016-2017 Ministry of Pakistan website, accessed
on February 22, 2018, http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey_1617.html.
5. The Nation, dated 06-06-2017 by Fawad Yousafzaihttp://www.cpecinfo.com/
news/cpec-early-harvest-projects-create-over-30000-jobs-for locals/MzE3Nw
& “Over 30,000 jobs created under CPEC early harvest projects” Pakistan
Obsever, accessed on July 21, 2018, https://pakobserver.net/30000-jobs-
created-cpec-early-harvest-projects/
6. CPEC creates over 30,000 jobs” Associated Press of Pakistan Corporation,
accessed on February 28, 2018,http://www.app.com.pk/cpec-projects-create-
over-30000-jobs-officials/.
7. “Pakistan 2025 One Nation - One Vision” Planning Commission of Pakistan
website, accessed on February 28,20 8,http://pc.gov.pk/web/vision.
circles and importers of targeted countries
with the aim to increase our trade volume
with these countries.
── Tasking of Defence Attaches. Defence
Attaches be tasked to also assist in pursuing
economic diplomacy by concerned staff at
our embassies in Africa and other countries
(including their accredited countries).
Military diplomacy to pave the way for
proper diplomatic relations transitioning to
economic diplomacy.
── Security of CPEC Routes. Army to continue
ensuring security at mining prospects and
along farm-to-market roads besides the main
CPEC routes to allow raw materials to reach
AIR cluster factories.
Conclusion
CPEC can indeed prove a game and fate changer
for Pakistan. Pakistan can acquire numerous
advantages from CPEC in social, demographic and
economic domains, for which a holistic approach
and sound strategy are required. With honest
pursuit of national interests using CPEC as the main
vehicle for growth, Pakistan stands to emerge quite
successful in the comity of nations in the future.
8. CPEC creates over 30,000 jobs” Associated Press of Pakistan Corporation,
accessed on February 28, 2018,http://www.app.com.pk/cpec-projects-create-
over-30000-jobs-officials/.
9. Interview with Mr Zhang Bao Zhong, Chairman China Overseas Port Holding
Company (CoPHC) at Gwadar on June 12, 2018
10. Salman Siddique, “Current Account Deficit Widens 28.74 % to $1.61 Bn”
Express Tribune, (February 21, 2018).
11. Shahbaz Rana, “Trade deficit widens to $17.97 Billion”, Express Tribune
(February 23, 2018).
12. “Pakistan Remittances” Trading Economics, accessed on March 24,https://
tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/ remittances.
13. Malik, Ahmad Rashid, “The Sino Pakistan trade and investment relations”,
Margalla Papers, 2013.
14. Jaspal, Dr Zafar. “Challenges to CPEC”, The Pakistan Observer, http://
pakobserver.net / challenges-to-cpec/ (last visited 31 Marc 2018).
15. Report, “SEZs: Performance, Lessons Learned, and Implications for Zone
Development”, World Bank Group, April 2008.
16. Priyanka Junejo, “China’s Hukou System”, The Diplomat (July 14, 2017).
PAKISTAN ARMY

Green Book 2019 77

 PAKISTAN ARMY

STRATEGIC TRANSFORMATION OF THE

PAKISTAN ECONOMY
THROUGH
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES:
A PRAGMATIC APPROACH

Dr. Zafar Mahmood is a Professor of

Economics & HOD Research, School
of Social Sciences and Humanities,
National University of Sciences and
Technology (NUST), Islamabad

Abstract
For the past many years, Pakistan’s economic growth performance has remained sluggish and uneven.
It is mainly due to unrealised growth potential, including under-utilisation of the installed capacity.
This is happening despite the fact that Pakistan holds some essential natural endowments and strategic
advantages viz-a-viz economic fundamentals that can enable it to harness the unrealised potential. The
China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project has become an antecedent for fast-tracked industrial
growth phase. Next phase of CPEC will establish Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Pakistan. SEZs will
open a new window of opportunity for both countries to cooperatively integrate and grow fast. While
embarking on to establish SEZs, Pakistan undeniably will face a number of challenges that it will have to
manage. SEZs once established will provide much needed impetus to stimulate economic activities. They
will also provide a life-time opportunity for Pakistani companies to work together with Chinese companies
for the transformation of export-oriented manufacturing industries. To make this a reality, in this article,
I propose a pragmatic approach whereby, from the beginning, SEZs should be linked with the Domestic
Zone including industrial clusters in Pakistan for a win-win outcome via extensive capacity building and
the resulting technology and productivity spillovers. These links, with a proactive role of the Pakistani
Diasporas, would facilitate transfer of technologies and knowledge, adaptation of modern management
practices, and creation of new business for cluster-based firms and ancillary service providers. The paper
provides detailed strategic policy directions and policy actions to draw maximum inclusive-benefits on
sustainable basis from the establishment of SEZs.

Keywords: Special Economic Zone, Industrial Transformation, Industrial Clusters, Strategic Policy
Directions

78 Green Book 2019

 PAKISTAN ARMY

Map of 9 SEZs

P
akistan’s economic growth performance 60% of population), which has the potential to
over the past 10 years, like the “lost drive the economy onto a higher economic growth
decade of the 1990s”, has remained low path, thus creating a demographic dividend.2
and uneven. This weak performance Pakistan has an additional advantage of large
was mainly due to unrealised growth Diasporas residing abroad. Some of them can
potential, including under-utilisation return if conducive work and living environments
of the installed capacity. The Pakistan economy are created in the country. Diasporas carry a further
is globally ranked at 115th (2017) in terms of advantage of working with foreign workers and
competitiveness, 113th (2016) in innovation, 118th multinational companies. They can play a decisive
(2016) in human capital and 147th (2018) in ease role in providing expertise, know how and even
of doing business.1 Such dismal rankings have investments for the new phase of industrialisation
a very direct adverse impact on investment and in the country.
divulge of precarious economic performance. This
situation also indicates that Pakistan considerably Pakistani Youth Bulge – Greater potential for economic growth
lags behind its economic growth potential, which
calls for transformation of the economy, not mere
restructuring, to put back the economy on a path of
better social-economic well-being and prosperity.
These goal paths are achievable as Pakistan holds
some essential natural endowments, strategic
advantages and economic fundamentals that
can enable it to harness the unrealised growth
potential. Realisation of the potential will make
it possible for Pakistan to secure a bigger share
in global production and exports. It may be noted
from the latest available statistics that Pakistan’s
share in the world GDP was 0.37% (2015), while the
share in world’s total exports was 0.13% (2017) that
has declined from 0.18% in 1991.
Notwithstanding the above described
situation, Pakistan has a favourable demographic
profile with a large proportion of bright youth (i.e.,

Green Book 2019 79

 PAKISTAN ARMY

‘‘
has struggled to force its outdated and loss-making
Pakistan has a favourable plants to restructure or shut down.
demographic profile with a large Chinese industries having excess capacity
proportion of bright youth (i.e., 60% simply want to escape weak demand and soaring
environmental costs in China by moving abroad
of population), which has the potential through the courtesy of the “One Belt One Road”
to drive the economy onto a higher initiative that intends to shift such production
‘‘
economic growth path, thus creating a abroad.
demographic dividend

Pakistan’s driving force to attract investment

in SEZs also include growing urbanisation, rising
middle class, and increasing consumer spending. The
economy is currently powered by such dynamisms
and foreign investors are weighing to seize this
opportunity.
At this juncture as Pakistan is preparing to
take some strategic economic decisions, the China
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project has
become an antecedent for fast-tracked industrial
growth. Completion of infrastructure projects have
laid down a solid foundation and created positive
externality3 (multiplier effects) for the next phase
of CPEC. The next phase is the establishment of
Special Economic Zones (SEZs). To benefit from
SEZs, Pakistan aims at establishing resilient and
potentially productive industries to initiate a
new era of industrialisation and trade, including
high-end textiles, sports goods, surgical goods, Pakistan should be careful in opening its SEZs
telecom parts, engineering and knowledge- for Chinese investment. While safeguarding its
based industries, fish and marine products, food interests, Pakistan should welcome only the above
packaging, and modern storage facilities for fruits reported industries, they should not unnecessarily
and vegetables, jointly or side-by-side with Chinese impose cost on the economy or distort domestic
companies to be based in SEZs. markets. Planners should attract those industries
SEZs will open new vistas of opportunity for that should deliver both static and dynamic
both countries to cooperatively integrate and grow benefits.
fast. Thus, SEZs are likely to become new growth Given the successful record of China in
poles. establishing many SEZs, Pakistan finds a new
Chinese investors, on their part, are looking conviction to establish SEZs jointly with China.
for profit-making opportunities around the globe. Pakistan is ready to benefit from the Chinese
They have shown keen interest in investing in experience in ensuring the success of its
SEZs being exclusively developed for them in prospective SEZs.
Pakistan. This is happening at a time when rapid SEZs would provide an opportunity to attract
industrial expansion has over burdened China Chinese investment and locate Pakistan in the
with ‘price-sapping supply gluts’ in many of its global supply and value chains to boost economic
industries. Despite several policy initiatives, China development.
SEZs can help make economic development

‘‘
SEZs would provide an opportunity
to attract Chinese investment and
locate Pakistan in the global supply
‘‘
and value chains to boost economic
development
process more inclusive across Pakistan. Pakistan
should capitalise on its existing cheap labour,
diasporas, land and other endowments to attract
investors.
Needless to state that while capitalising on the
opportunities arising from SEZs, Pakistan will have
to, effectively, manage many challenges including:
consistency in economic policies and avoidance of

80 Green Book 2019


sudden policy reversals, transparency in decision-
making, expansion of financial markets to provide
adequate finance to industries, availability of
qualified personnel through execution of vocational
training and skill development programmes, and
favourable business environment, including strong
property rights protection and fair and speedy
dispute resolution.4
SEZs, once established will provide much
needed impetus to stimulate economic activities.
They will also provide a life-time opportunity to
Pakistani companies to work together with Chinese
companies for the development of export-oriented
manufacturing industries, while managing the
above stated challenges with the assistance of
reformed public sector institutions. To make this
happen, I propose an integrated-multi-sectoral
approach via extensive capacity building. This
should stimulate inclusive and sustainable
growth, generate decent and productive jobs,
develop industrial and business infrastructures,
and develop global and domestic supply and value
chains.5 To harness these benefits6 this approach
suggests to connect SEZs with existing industrial
clusters while introducing comprehensive strategic
reforms.7 These links would facilitate transfer of
new technologies and knowledge, adaptation of
modern management practices, and creation of
new businesses for cluster based firms and other
ancillary firms.
Within the above perspective, this paper
discusses the potential role and effectiveness of
SEZs on the basis of international experience, A
critical evaluation of existing SEZs in Pakistan
and proposed CPEC-related SEZs, Potential threats
to CPEC-SEZs, Approach to connect clusters and
SEZs, Strategic policy directions and policy actions
to draw benefits from SEZs.
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Potential Role and Effectiveness of SEZs
SEZs are established around the globe to
catalyse economic development and structural
transformation, as they create special environment
conducive to business, where governments
otherwise face great difficulties doing so. The basic
rationale to establish SEZs is that by removing
critical ‘binding constraints’8 to economic growth
in a controlled environment, their policies create
incentives for firms and investors that might not
otherwise be attracted.9 Governments also use
SEZs as a way to attract investments in sectors with
no obvious comparative advantage, or as a way of
increasing value-added in export activities.10
Conceptually, SEZs are characterised and
designed as:
── Geographically demarcated areas.
── Single management/administration.
── Special fiscal incentives and regulatory
regime.
── Incubators for the application of new policies
and economy-wide approaches.
── Separate customs’ area and its streamlined
procedures.
── Modern and reliable infrastructures.11
SEZs are generally self-contained in the
procurement of raw materials (from local and
international markets), power generation,
mitigating pollution, sewage treatment and
support services. They have practically everything
from transportation to cultural and educational
facilities. So, they are perceived to provide
significant insulation from the uncertain domestic
zone (DZ, Note: domestic zone is comprised of rest
of the country) environment.12
Special Economic Zone
Green Book 2019 81
 PAKISTAN ARMY
Laws and regulations of SEZs are different from
those generally applicable laws and regulations in
the DZ.
SEZs are generally duty free enclaves for
both trade and manufacturing. Several fiscal
and regulatory incentives are offered to investors
within zones by national, provincial and local
governments. Nonetheless, international
experience suggests that decisions to invest in
SEZs are rarely based on financial incentives alone;
indeed such incentives are not the key to SEZs
success that may attract weaker firms. Success
factors for them include; efficient and cost effective
infrastructures, and good governance (or absence
of over-intrusive governance) that distinguish them
from DZ.
Success of SEZ inspires DZ, encouraging
more effective provision of public services and
infrastructures, and forcing policy makers to
introduce economic reforms to achieve what was
not achieved before.13
Key successful international experiences,
especially of China, suggest gradualism with
an experimental approach, a strong political
commitment, preferential policies and broad
institutional autonomy, foreign investment and
investment from diaspora, strong business value
chains and social networks, continuous technology
learning and upgrading, and active and pragmatic
facilitation by the government. SEZs if ill-prepared
will not be able to attract investors and will not
benefit from their efforts.
Countries that fail to liberalise trade, and do
not adopt export-oriented strategies are less likely
to experience positive impacts of SEZs on exports.14
Of course, SEZs have played varied roles in terms
of export diversification. Substantial exports from
SEZs have been observed in some sectors that were
already outward-oriented, thus making export
performance difficult to attribute directly to the
presence of SEZs.
Thus successful SEZs spurto:
─ ─ Establish complementarity between
economies.
── Diversify the economy to produce new and
value-added goods.
── Attract local and foreign investment especially
towards under-privileged regions, reducing
regional disparities.
── Generate complementarity with local
industries, especially small and medium
enterprises (SMEs).
── Develop skills of local labour force.
── Transfer technology and disseminate
knowledge to domestic industries.
── Promote ancillary industrial activities.
── Develop local entrepreneurship.
── Enter into basic and intermediate
82 Green Book 2019
manufacturing by leaping up value chains and
prompting positive externalities.
── Create competition and hence efficiency.
── Alleviate unemployment.
── Promote exports and industrialisation.
── Ensure ease of administration and
management.
── Allocate resources for socio-economic uplift
in adjoining areas for their acceptability by
the locals.
── Diversify economic and political risks.
Despite gainful role played by SEZs worldwide,
in some countries they have been criticised for
being less legal and socially protective for workers,
misusage of allotted land for real estate speculation
and tax evasion.
International experience suggests that the
main reason as to why SEZs fail is that initial
investors (harvesters) locate themselves in SEZs to
escape from taxation and resist in improving their
competitiveness.
They move out when the time-constrained
subsidies and other incentives expire. For less
dynamic firms, SEZs are simply a source of rent-
seeking. Other reasons for SEZs’ failure include:
weak governance, regulatory issues, bilateral
disputes, lack of a dispute resolution mechanism,
etc. To avoid such problems and to ensure effective
management, countries assign decentralised
decision-making roles to private-public partnership
arrangements of SEZs with inclusiveness of local
communities and institutions.15 Moreover, the
situation is improved by creating coalition of local
workers, local governments and SEZ-investors who
have invested in SEZ infrastructure.
Existing SEZs in Pakistan - A Critical
Overview
Virtually, every district headquarters of
Pakistan has an Industrial Estate or Area. Industrial
Estates have requisite infrastructures and offer
many different incentives. Punjab has 26 industrial
estates, whilst Sindh, Balochistan and KP, have 30,
7 and 12 industrial states, respectively.16
In addition to Industrial Estates, eight Special
Economic Zones (SEZs) and Export Processing
Zones (EPZs) in Pakistan include: Export Processing
‘‘
International experience suggests
that the main reason as to why SEZs
fail is that initial investors (harvesters)
locate themselves in SEZs to escape
‘‘
from taxation and resist in improving
their competitiveness

Zone (Karachi), Export Processing Zone (Risalpur),
Export Processing Zone (Sialkot), Export Processing
Zone (Gujranwala), Special Economic Zone
(Khairpur), Economic Zone (Rashakai Mardan),
Gadoon Economic Zone (Gadoon-Amazai), and
Hathar Economic Zone (Hathar-Haripur).
There are also some Industrial Parks: Rachna
Industrial Park (Lahore), Marble City (Lahore),
and Textile City (Port Qasim). Some of the newly
established industrial estates are: Value Addition
City (Sheikhupura-Faisalabad Expressway),
Industrial City (Faisalabad), and Quaid-e-Azam
Apparel Park (Lahore).
Some of these industrial zones are successful
while others are unsuccessful, because they are
established in remote areas lacking necessary
skilled work force or basic amenities for workers,
despite abundance of raw materials in the region.
Generally, these estates are far away from existing
industrial clusters consequently they could not
benefit from economies-of-scale external to
firms.17 Small private investment that took place
in many Industrial Estates resulted into higher
per unit service and utility costs, which made
them unfeasible. The Estates were not linked to
domestic or global supply or value chains as they
were far away from traditional supply routes,
mainly highways and ports. Moreover, due to local
influence allotted land was used for other purposes.
Pakistan has also developed many clusters,
mainly through private initiatives that have
promoted industrial development. They are
developed on the basis of their strength in skilled
workforce, raw materials availability, supporting
institutions and deep historical links with domestic
and global supply and value chains. These clusters
include: sports and surgical clusters in Sialkot,
PAKISTAN ARMY
‘‘
Pakistan has also developed many
clusters, mainly through private
‘‘
initiatives that have promoted
industrial development
textiles cluster in Faisalabad, fan cluster in Gujrat,
and engineering cluster in Gujranwala, to name the
major ones.
CPEC – SEZs
Both China and Pakistan have proposed the
following nine SEZs to be established in Pakistan:
── Rashakai Economic Zone (Nowshera).
── China Special Economic Zone (Dhabeji).
── Bostan Industrial Zone (Quetta).
── Punjab-China Economic Zone (Faisalabad).
── ICT Model Industrial Zone (Islamabad).
── Development of Industrial Park on Pakistan
Steel Mills Land (Port Qasim).
── Bhimber Industrial Zone.
── Mohmand Marble City.
── Moqpondass SEZ (Gilgit-Baltistan).
Of these, three prioritized SEZs set to take off
soon are: Faisalabad, Rashakai and Dhabeji.
The whole political sphere in Pakistan has a
consensus to fast establish SEZs. The All Parties
Conference held on 15th January 2016, provided a
much needed reassurance to both Chinese and
Pakistani governments and their private investors.
Despite some reservations, stakeholders in two
 PAKISTAN ARMY

countries now perceive CPEC as a project that would be limited if SEZs employ few local workers,
transform Pakistan into a hub of manufacturing especially if workers will be concentrated in
and trade activities in the region. low-skill jobs.
── SEZs can create distortion within the economy
Possible Threats to SEZs as they will receive incentives different from
The main threats that are likely to be faced by DZ and domestic industrial clusters.
the Pakistani industries located in SEZs and DZ ── Threat of sabotage from bureaucracy, who may
may include:-18 not wish to work in free market environment
and do not want to lose their clout.
── If the state land is not available to establish
── Footloose industries would draw benefits
SEZs, then a forceful land dispossession from fiscal incentives and may leave the
would be a source of ‘land conflicts’. country, so sustainability of SEZs would be
Resistance from land owners and local people the biggest threat.
could be hostile for SEZs and may jeopardise
its very existence.
── Adjacent local communities feeling socially
A Pragmatic Approach to Establish
threatened or not economically benefiting Complementary SEZ - Cluster
can create security threat for SEZs. So far, To draw maximum benefits from the
no specific threat has emerged against CPEC establishment of SEZs, I propose here a pragmatic
projects except occasional rhetoric. approach whereby Pakistan should carefully
── Threat to local industry could be significant design and plan to attract large-scale Chinese firms
from low-skill, labour-intensive and low- mainly producing intermediate inputs and large-
technology SEZ-based Chinese firms and medium-sized firms producing final goods.
producing similar products. These firms should be integrated with domestic
── Sustainability of firms located in the
export-led growth DZ, including domestic

‘‘
strategy for SEZs industrial clusters. This
will be threatened Some Chinese investors may choose integration should be
by global trade to operate outside SEZs in an attempt created on the basis
frictions that are of complementarity
looming, with to avoid governmental control, and high between Chinese and
increasing global rents and utility costs in underpopulated domestic firms.
protectionism and
fears of global
‘‘
SEZs. This may create a conflict of In preceding
paragraphs, the role of
trade wars. interest SEZs was discussed in
── SEZs’ success is detail. Here, I begin by
linked with institutional reforms and efficient discussing the role of industrial clusters in creating
institutions. Absence of reforms and reformed their possible complementarity with SEZs. An
institutions will be a recipe for SEZs failure. industrial cluster is a geographical concentration of
── Pakistanis interested in getting access to intertwined firms in a specific industry (e.g., sports
Chinese technology, while Chinese investors goods) with their links to input supplier firms,
will try to protect their intellectual properties financial, technological and other institutions all
in Pakistani market. Any resistance to transfer based in the cluster. Firms in a cluster are inter
of technology and knowledge by Chinese connected through their positive externalities
firms may create a conflict situation. and complementarities and are usually located
── SEZs will be threatened, if they could not near to each other. Cluster is thus a mechanism
achieve the desired impacts of moving up to for enabling firms to combine their efforts and
higher value-added activities, and generating resources for achieving competitiveness.
significant technology and productivity
spillovers for local industries. This character establishes the platform for
── Local participation in SEZs may be restricted sustainability and expansion of clusters in the
due to reluctance of Chinese firms to seek joint long run. There are three main reasons19 as to
ventures (Chinese firms strictly protect their why a cluster of firms may be more efficient than
proprietary knowledge and trade secrets). firms established in isolation across the country:
── Some Chinese investors may choose to specialised input suppliers based in a cluster know
operate outside SEZs in an attempt to avoid the exact needs of cluster-based manufacturing
governmental control, and high rents and firms, labour pooling of cluster firms reduces job
utility costs in underpopulated SEZs. This may search and training costs, and knowledge spillovers
create a conflict of interest. through informal intermingling of workers from
── Skill transfer through labour turnover might different firms. Clusters thus provide distinctive

84 Green Book 2019


opportunities for firms to take advantage of a wide
range of links, which then stimulate learning and
innovation processes across firms.
Formation of clusters, however, takes time
and needs an ecosystem based on market forces.20
Most clusters are essentially established through
“bottom-up” private initiatives. However, these
initiatives do not exclude government’s role of
facilitation to create a cluster, especially through
improving the business environment and making
appropriate policy interventions. SEZs, on the
other hand, are established through a “top-down”
approach mainly by the government policies.
Prospects for the SEZs to build backward
and forward linkages with domestic competitive
industrial clusters and ancillary suppliers are
potentially strong. This is possible if the SEZ firms
would source intermediate inputs from cluster-
based firms or sub-contract/outsource some of
their production to them. Thus, direct and indirect
linkages need to be developed between SEZ firms
and existing industrial cluster firms with concerted
efforts.
Supply of domestic inputs intended for SEZs is
a key to its integration with DZ including clusters
(see, Chart 1). If no input from clusters is used in the
production by the SEZ firms, then SEZ would merely
be an isolated enclave. The build-up of linkages
between the SEZ and DZ can motivate domestic
producers of intermediate inputs to produce higher
quality inputs so that SEZ firms demand these inputs
domestically and do not outsource to their foreign
networks. Likewise, producers of intermediate
inputs based in SEZ can supply their output to DZ
and cluster-based final goods producing firms, who
will thus be affected positively by such linkages. In
general, the exchange of goods between SEZ and
DZ will pressurise firms to increase productivity via
upgrading their technology or alternatively they
will crowd out each other.
These linkages will not only create business
for local firms but will also enable Chinese
firms to firmly place themselves in SEZs for a
long time. Zone management should encourage
Chinese investors to establish joint ventures with
local partners in SEZs and create backward and
forward linkages with cluster and DZ firms. These
linkages are possible only if strong domestic
supply chains (DSCs) and domestic value chains
(DVCs) are created and jointly used and operated
by SEZ and cluster firms. Such chains can be
promoted by developing efficient and cost effective
infrastructures and logistics.
Satellite clusters would also start emerging
out of existing saturated clusters and SEZs,
independently or jointly (see Chart 1). Market
forces initially produce satellite clusters, but later
on government support and facilitation, including
setting up of various institutions, would enable
PAKISTAN ARMY
them to expand. Of course, emergence of satellite
clusters out of SEZs would depend on the success
of the later. Such clusters would initially use low
and labour-intensive technology. Some of them
would gradually upgrade and move up the value
chain.
For creating complementarities between
SEZ and cluster firms, Pakistan needs to plan
systematically from the outset. If SEZs are
established to work in isolation, then Pakistan
will not benefit much from their existence. Only by
creating complementarity/synergy between SEZs
and existing industrial clusters, all the participants
will benefit for a longer time.
SEZs will initially be developed by the
private sector developers with assistance from
the government, which will ensure all required
infrastructures, services, utilities and institutional
support (see, Chart 1). SEZ firms will mainly
produce ‘intermediate inputs’ and ‘final goods’.
SEZs produced intermediate inputs will be supplied
to SEZ firms producing final goods and existing
local clusters, while remaining intermediate goods
will be sold in foreign markets. SEZs will export
their final goods to domestic and foreign markets.
In their complementary role, existing clusters will
supply intermediate inputs and ancillary services
to SEZs. SEZ in the long-run will also create satellite
cluster independently or jointly with existing
cluster in their vicinity.
Initially, SEZs firms will use established
local distribution/marketing networks available
in local clusters or DZ, and later, they can have
their own distribution network. Clusters normally
have small to medium-sized enterprises; they
cannot directly enter into foreign export markets.
They can join hands with SEZ large firms to enter
into foreign export markets and thus can benefit
from established foreign distribution networks of
Chinese firms based in SEZs.
Local clusters can be an important source of
supply of skills to SEZs (i.e., labour pooling). With
movement of workers between SEZ and cluster
firms, spillover of technical knowledge will also
take place.
Institutional role would be to facilitate and
encourage both clusters and SEZs to complement
each other. They would also create a match between
cluster and SEZs firms from the beginning. Some
‘‘
Cluster is thus a mechanism for
enabling firms to combine their
‘‘
efforts and resources for achieving
competitiveness
Green Book 2019 85
 PAKISTAN ARMY

Chart 1: A Pragmatic Approach to Link SEZs and Clusters

Special Economics Zone (SEZs) Domestic Zone (DZ)
Supplying of Skills, Ancillary Goods and Services
Spillover of skills & technology, dissemination of knowledge
Zone Management
SEZ Developers

Final Inputs
Producers Industrial Cluster
(Large &
Facilitation Firms: Large, Medium,
Medium Small
Firms) Government Institutions Producers of: Final Goods,
Special Fiscal Incentives Skill Development Support Intermediate Inputs
Provision of Land Provision of Technology Ancillary & Supplier Firms
Technical Assistance
Finance Facility
Labour Pooling
Infrastructures

Intermediate Rules and Regulations Knowledge Dissemination

Utilities,

Inputs Infrastructure
Labour Laws Distribution Networks
Producers Environment Regulations
(Large Firms) Link with GSC & GVC
Environment Regulations Competition Law

Supplying of Intermediate Inputs Other firms outside cluster working

Adaptation of Modern Management Practices at isolated places in DZ

SEZ Satellite Joint Satellite Cluster DZ Satellite

Cluster Cluster
Domestic Foreign
Markets: Markets:
DVC, DSC GVC, GSC

of SEZ and cluster-based firms will eventually be targets for businesses, markets and growth, ensure
competing for their shares in domestic and foreign availability of efficient infrastructures, technology
markets. As a practice, competition should be innovation capability, and environmental
encouraged on the principles of globally accepted sustainability21.
business norms, rules and regulations. The success of SEZs would require that
The crux of this approach is to create a pragmatism prevail. A very capable private
complementarity/synergy between SEZ and cluster administration, political will and determination are
firms from the beginning for the sustainability of needed to introduce SEZ cluster – based industrial
SEZs; attract large scale Chinese firms producing transformation, of course, with a cautious and
intermediate inputs and final goods, not just having gradual approach, so that the reform process does
not fall captive to vested interest groups.
assembly lines based on imported intermediate
inputs from their parent companies in China. Policy actions that need to be introduced while
establishing SEZs should include:
It will be difficult to safeguard Pakistan’s
interest once Chinese investment starts pouring ── Location Decision. Decision-makers have
to take location decisions as per the local
into SEZs, but not impossible. In this regard, I
dynamics and characteristics. Chinese private
put forward some strategic policy directions and
investors are least interested in investing
strategic policy actions in the next section. in a region without complete necessary
infrastructures, the supply of skilled workers
Strategic Policy Directions and Policy and developed markets for other inputs and
Actions raw materials. Thus, while making a decision,
SEZ strategies should be fully integrated into the objective of developing an export-oriented
economic development strategies and national SEZ and the development of backward
industrial policies. The SEZs should be so designed regions may be contradicting, they should be
that they complement and support national dealt separately. Initially locate SEZs near to
comparative advantages and be validated through established industrial clusters.
strategic planning. While developing SEZs, policy ── Planning of SEZs. Do not develop too many
makers must consider their commercial viability, fix SEZs at a time, otherwise competition among

86 Green Book 2019


zones to attract Chinese companies would
increase the bargaining power of Chinese
investors, which in turn would impose
higher costs on the country. This is because
as each region starts offering more and more
preferential incentives—longer tax holidays,
lower land and utility charges, and subsidised
inputs, the only gainer of this competition
would be investors, who would get the most
favourable conditions. Therefore, there is a
need to formulate a long-term coordinated
development plan in consultation with all
provinces.
── It is important that SEZs have direct links
to major international trading routes at a
low cost, because only in this way SEZs will
be motivated to produce goods for export
markets. Customs authorities should be
involved from the beginning because they
will be directly dealing in trade activities with
SEZs’ investors. For a successful development
of SEZs, it is crucial to have a well-planned
initial stage, which includes all major
development steps in the short run. If this first
stage takes too long, it will create distrust for
potential Chinese and Pakistani investors.
── Investment Restrain. Industries in which
Chinese engagement would be allowed, need
to be carefully chosen, as discussed earlier.
Such industries should be chosen that have
a strong backward and forward linkages with
DZ, especially with industrial clusters. At the
same time, domestic companies with enough
abilities and strength to establish production
in the SEZs should get the same preferential
treatment as Chinese companies.
── Infrastructures. SEZs should attract Chinese
investment mainly in export sectors. It is,
therefore, important that the produced goods
or raw materials and intermediate inputs
can be transported to the production site
at a low cost. Thus ensure availability of all
the infrastructures, utilities and services for
a modern production processes at global
competitive rates.
── Investment Decisiveness. Policymakers
should not overestimate the possible impact
of fiscal concessions on the investment
decision of Chinese investors. Other factors,
‘‘ The success of SEZs would require that pragmatism prevail. A very capable private
administration, political will and determination are needed to introduce SEZ cluster –
based industrial transformation, of course, with a cautious and gradual approach, so
that the reform process does not fall captive to vested interest groups
PAKISTAN ARMY
like the growth potential, the quality of the
infrastructure and political stability are
considered to be much more important by the
investors. Thus fiscal incentives, including
tax holidays, are not decisive, but incentives
like duty-free imports of raw materials,
other privileges (such as preferential fees
for land or facility use, rapid customs
clearance, depreciation allowance on capital,
repatriation of profits and invested capital,
and permission to sell a certain proportion
of output in the domestic market) often
influence the investment decision. Fiscal
incentives should be given just to compensate
investors for higher risks of their investment in
new environment; they must not be the only
reason for investment decision, otherwise the
investors will think about moving out of SEZ
as soon as the incentives are abolished.
── Industrial Innovation. As production costs
or the costs of doing business increase,
SEZs need to be more innovative to move up
the global value chains (GVC). For SEZs to
enhance productivity and sustain long-term
competitiveness, they must keep pace with
technological and industrial innovation. To
realise this, they need to expand well-focused
and applied research and development
(R&D) activities, strengthening academia-
industry linkages, support targeted business
incubators, and attract talent22.
── Develop Relevant Skills. Chinese investors
are likely to mostly demand low skilled
workers for simple assembly and processing,
whereas Pakistan is interested in transfer of
modern technology. Chinese investors should
be convinced to reciprocate Pakistan’s fiscal
incentives for their transfer of technology.
But this would require sufficient availability
of high-skilled workers, which might
be a decisive prerequisite for transfer of
technology. The lack of skilled workers
will be a big disadvantage for a successful
technology transfer. Therefore, one of the
highest priorities should be to provide
customised and specialised education and
training that generate, upgrade and deepen
knowledge and skills. Without exception,
training must be constantly updated to keep
pace with changing business and industrial
‘‘
Green Book 2019 87
Diasporas can bring investment for the new phase of
industrialization in the country
PAKISTAN ARMY
development needs. Certain incentives can
be accorded to encourage Chinese firms to
provide training to their local workers.
── Attract Diasporas. Who can spearhead SEZs
activities from the Pakistani side and can be
champions and drivers of SEZs. Therefore,
encourage them by giving full confidence that
their investments and transfer of skills and
knowledge will be absolutely secured and
highly valued by the nation.
── Legal Framework. A predictable and
transparent legal and regulatory framework
would be needed to ensure the clarity of roles
and responsibilities of various stakeholders,
and to provide protection and certainty to
SEZ developers and investors. Such a legal
framework would ensure that SEZs attract the
right investments that will set high business,
social and environmental standards. The
legal framework will also buffer SEZs from
unpredictable political risks or interference.
The legal framework is also important for
strict enforcement of protection of property
rights including intellectual property.
Absolutely discourage rent-seeking activities,
don’t allow investors to exploit policies or
circumvent the very objective of establishing
SEZs. In addition, long-term government
commitment would provide supplementary
support for SEZs’ success by ensuring policy
continuity and uninterrupted provision of
public services.
── Strategic Connectivity. Connectivity among
individuals, firms, provinces and countries is a
key factor in achieving competitiveness. To be
a catalyst for structural transformation, SEZs
‘‘ Fiscal incentives should be given just to compensate investors for higher risks of
their investment in new environment; they must not be the only reason for investment
‘‘
decision, otherwise the investors will think about moving out of SEZ as soon as the
incentives are abolished
88 Green Book 2019
need to be linked with key infrastructures (like
airports, seaports, railways and highways),
logistics and customs’ services.
── Create Linkages. The success of SEZs is
entwined with DZ. SEZs need to be built on
local comparative advantages and should
have local suppliers as part of their supply
and value chains. SEZs established without
strong linkage to DZ and local cluster firms
will not be very successful. Government and
SEZ management should encourage zone
firms to link with local cluster firms through
supply and value chains or sub-contracting/
outsourcing relations to create technology
and productivity spillover effects23.
── Administration. An effective and flexible
administration, based on a transparent
and consistent legal framework, can be
a catalyst to reduce the costs of doing
business substantially. This can be made
possible through the introduction of a single
administration agency, which deals with SEZ
investors. But for this agency to be efficient
and effective, it must be empowered to
negotiate directly with different governmental
bodies.
── Establish Representative Office. Establish
a representative office of SEZs in China,
to disseminate important information to
potential Chinese investors, about facilities
and incentives to be available in SEZs. This
office should also provide information on
domestic zone and cluster firms, who can
possibly provide ancillary services and
intermediate inputs to Chinese firms or can
join hands for joint ventures. Also establish

‘‘ Chinese firms and Pakistani clusters as well as Diasporas can play important roles
in the success of SEZs by attracting investment, technologies, and management skills;
‘‘
generating learning and technology spillovers; and ultimately helping to build modern
industrial capacity
a labour service company that can assist
Chinese investors to find qualified workers,
and can provide information on wages and
local labour contract requirements.
── Reliable Supplies. Chinese producers in
SEZs may not demand intermediate inputs
from local suppliers because of low quality or
if the timely supply is not guaranteed. In this
case, it is important to incentivise domestic
producers to upgrade their production
technology, improve their management
quality and make their supply more reliable.
In addition, the logistic infrastructures have
to be improved so that intermediate inputs to
and from DZ and cluster firms can be shipped
just-in-time.
In sum, SEZs must be built on the basis of local
comparative advantage.
A long-term vision is important because
industrial transformation via SEZs can take
many years. In this regard, it is important for
policymakers to undertake joint actions to
promote synergies and coordination among
different stake holders. Successful SEZs need
a holistic and systematic approach proposed
earlier, which carries all the important aspects of
building conducive industrial and business eco-
system. More specifically, SEZs need a strategic
location with sound infrastructures and strong
commercial viability, strong institutional support,
effective one-stop-shop services, and a robust legal
framework. Government should restrict its own
direct involvement in SEZ management and should
transfer maximum responsibility to private agents.
Chinese firms and Pakistani clusters as well as
Diasporas can play important roles in the success
of SEZs by attracting investment, technologies,
PAKISTAN ARMY
and management skills; generating learning and
technology spillovers; and ultimately helping to
build modern industrial capacity.
Efficient infrastructures and ease of doing
business coupled with incentives can provide
a great opportunity for Chinese companies, DZ
companies and Diasporas to invest in SEZs.
Conclusions
Following conclusions need to be kept in front
while establishing SEZs to maximise static and
dynamic socio-economic benefits for the country:
── Make SEZs development as a core of national
development strategy and treat them as
platforms for transfer of technology and
knowledge beyond their impact on economic
growth and productive job creation.
── Encourage local investment in SEZs, this
will allay the concerns of locals that Chinese
investors are accorded with various incentives
at high opportunity cost to DZ.
── Local participation by firms and workers in
SEZs is critical to realise productivity and
technology spillovers; therefore, incentivise
local firms to invest in SEZs and facilitate
workers to avail job opportunities in SEZs.
── The industry selection for SEZs should be
determined by consulting local and Chinese
stakeholders. This is important for the
alignment of activities with domestic needs in
terms of industrial development and that any
resulting technology spillover is more readily
absorbed by domestic clusters and DZ firms.
── Systemic constraints to SEZ development will
take longer time to overcome, but they must
not be neglected. Government must prepare
local firms ready to absorb technology. This
Green Book 2019 89
First Science Technology Park established in
NUST (Islamabad) with Chinese Collaboration
 PAKISTAN ARMY
calls for substantial investment in local R&D
institutions and the provision of incentives
for firms to train their workers, and adopt best
management practices.
── Remove administrative and regulatory
constraints to local supplier firms. Provide a
platform to SEZ and DZ firms to work together
to create strong and sustainable mutual/joint
partnerships.
── Set up training arrangements with assistance
from Chinese vocational institutions.
Establish industrial technology parks, as is
being established in National University of
Science & Technology (NUST) with Chinese
assistance, to meet technology needs of SEZs
and DZ firms.
── Given the complex and heterogeneous
environments in which SEZs would operate,
a clear legal framework is needed to guide
their operations. Such a framework should
include clear roles and responsibilities for the
government and private sector.
Notes
1. In addition, the big three international rating agencies, Moody’s, Standard &
Poor’s, and Fitch in 2018 graded Pakistan’s economy with “B3 (negative)”, “B”
and “B (negative)”, respectively, i.e., the economy is highly speculative. This
suggests that if right measures are not timely introduced then the economy
may plunge into bankruptcy.
2. Demographic dividend is the economic growth potential that may result
from changes in the age structure of population, especially when the share
of the working-age population is larger than the non-working-age share of the
population, so number of dependents are less than number of workers in the
labour force. Because of this change in age distribution, fewer resources would
be required to meet the needs of the dependent age groups and thus resources
are freed up for their employability in productive activities, this is called the
“demographic dividend.”
3. A Chinese proverb says, ‘if you want to be rich build a road’. It basically points
to positive externality of building road infrastructure. So roads and power
infrastructures provide sound base for industrialisation.
4. See, Mahmood, Zafar (2018a) Opportunities and challenges of special
economic zones under CPEC for Pakistan. S3H Monograph Series 01:2018,
School of Social Sciences and Humanities, National University of Sciences and
Technology, Islamabad.
5. Supply chain is a tool of business transformation, which establishes a network
between suppliers (of raw materials), manufacturers (semi- or manufactured
products), wholesalers, distributors, retailers, and the end consumer—a link
from the point of origin to its final destination, i.e., consumption. Value chain
is referred to a range of activities that adds value at every single stage in
designing, producing, and delivering a quality product to the user.
6. In general, if implemented successfully, SEZs accord two types of economic
benefits: ‘static’ or ‘direct’ and ‘dynamic’ or ‘indirect’. Static benefits include
direct employment creation, export growth and export diversification, revenue
generation, and foreign exchange earnings. Whereas, dynamic benefits
include indirect employment creation, skills upgrading, technology transfer
and innovation, economic diversification, demonstration effect arising from
application of ‘best practices’, regional development, and productivity
enhancement of local firms. These benefits elucidate SEZs’ acceptance in
general in the country and by local communities in particular (See, Zeng,
Douglas Zhihua (2010) Building engines for growth and competitiveness
in China: experience with special economic zones & industrial clusters.
Washington, D.C.: The World Bank).
7. Comprehensive reforms could not be introduced earlier because of strong
resistance from various local interest groups.
8. These constraints broadly range from regulatory regimes and infrastructure to
land acquisition and trade logistics.
9. Thus, SEZs should only be used to address market failures (distortions) or
‘‘
A long-term vision is important
because industrial transformation via
‘‘
SEZs can take many years
Establishment of SEZs and their linkage with
domestic cluster and DZ firms is not likely to be an easy
one and may not please everyone. Therefore, Pakistan
needs to ensure that all (Chinese and Pakistani)
stakeholders are on board and they patiently play
their constructive respective roles for the success
of SEZs. Needless to say, there will be heavy cost to
establish SEZs and other requisite infrastructures that
will be borne by Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan must
ensure reciprocal compensation from SEZ firms in
terms of visible and significant transfer of technology
and knowledge to DZ and cluster firms, creation of
jobs for local workforce, sizeable exports to foreign
markets, and investment in complementary activities
by establishing joint ventures. These should be at
the core of the SEZ strategy to transform the Pakistan
economy.
binding constraints that cannot be addressed through other policy options.
If the constraints can be addressed through countrywide reforms, then SEZs
might not be necessary (see, Rodrik, Dani (2004) “Rethinking growth policies
in the developing world.” Draft of the Luca d’Agliano Lecture in Development
Economics, delivered on October 8, 2004, in Torino, Italy).
10. See, Cirera, Xavier and Raith W. D. Lakshman (2014) The impact of export
processing zones on employment, wages and labour conditions in developing
countries: systematic review. Journal of Development Effectiveness, 9:3, 344-
360.
11. See, Zeng, Douglas Zhihua (2016) Special economic zones: lessons from the
global experience. PEDL Synthesis Paper Series, No. 1.
12. See, Mahmood, Zafar (2017) A win-win proposal to establish China-Pakistan
special economic zones. Hilal, October 2017.
13. See, Zeng (2016) Ibid.
14. See, Johansson, Helena and Lars Nilsson (1997) Export process zone as
catalysts. World Development, 25:12, 2115-28.
15. These institutions may include producers’ associations, chambers of
commerce and industry, trade unions, local governments and local banks.
Their participation is essential for the success of SEZs.
16. See, Mahmood (2018a) Ibid.
17. External economies-of-scale imply that as the size of an industry grows larger,
the average costs of doing business within the industry falls. This may occur
due to increased specialisation or training of workers, faster innovation or
shared supplier relationships.
18. Also see, Mahmood, Zafar (2018b) Potential threats and challenges to the
special economic zones under CPEC. Chapter 14, in Zafar Iqbal Cheema (ed.)
“China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Potentials and Prospects”, Strategic
Vision Institute, Islamabad.
19. See, Krugman, Paul, Maurice Obstfeld and Marc Meltiz (2017) International
economics: theory and policy. New York: Pearson 11th Edition.
20. See, Krugman, Paul and Anthony Venables (1996) Integration, specialisation,
and adjustment. European Economic Review, 40:3, 959-968.
21. See, Farole, Thomas (2011) “Special economic zones in Africa: comparing
performance and learning from global experience.” Washington, D.C.: The
World Bank.
22. See, Zhang, Ming (2008) What can cities do to enhance competitiveness?
Local policies and actions for innovation. En breve. Washington, D.C.: The
World Bank. Retrieved on July 13, 2018 from: http://documents.worldbank.
org/curated/en/2008/07/10133626/can-cities-enhance-competitiveness-
localpolicies-actions-innovation.
23. See, Zeng, Douglas Zhihua (2015) “Global experiences with special economic
zones: focus on China and Africa.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
7240. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
 CHINA:
ECONOMIC BULWARK
AGAINST TERRORISM?
LESSON FOR OTHERS
Imtiaz Gul is the Executive
Director of Centre for Research
and Security Studies (CRSS),
Islamabad

Abstract
China in the last decade or so has emerged as a big economic connector on the back of the Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI), proposed by President Xi Jinping. Soon after becoming the most powerful person
in contemporary China in 2012, Xi embarked on the most ambitious plan any country has ever conceived.
The BRI, But he was also conscious of the pitfalls in this regional and global connectivity undertaking.
One of these pitfalls is the war against terrorism in Afghanistan and its consequences for the rest of the
world. Particularly after the bulk drawdown of the US-NATO troops from the war-battered country in
December 2014, it became clear that regional powers shall have to fill the ensuing vacuum and create
firewalls against the growing menace of trans-border terrorism. China’s appointment of a special envoy
for counter-terrorism and special out-reach to both Afghanistan and Pakistan underscored the concerns
arising out of the spiralling terrorist violence in Afghanistan. Beijing was also conscious of the fact that
success of the BRI, of which the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the flagship project, hinged
on getting a handle on terrorism-induced violence. And this, the Chinese concluded, depended on a
regional security architecture involving regional stakeholders such as Russia, India and Pakistan. That
is why China has been pushing the idea of a regional security architecture since 2014 to successfully fight
terrorism and terrorist proxies. This paper argues that since 2014 or so China, cognizant of the growing
Indo-US influence in the region, has been attempting to bring these countries plus Afghanistan together
for a regional Afghan peace and counter-terrorism policy, which it believes is crucial for the success of
all BRI-related initiatives aimed at connecting China with the world – north and south of it. By pursuing
this dream of trade connectivity, China has assumed an unusual role in the global war against terrorism,
without deploying high-handed tactics against smaller countries, a perception that accompanies the
US counter-terrorism policies. This unique focus on the need for a regional anti-terror strategy comes
in handy for Pakistan too; following 17 years of turmoil following its partnership in the global war on
terror, Pakistan has suffered enormous losses – both human and material. China happens to be the only
country to empathise with the complex situation that Pakistan faces and herein lies a chance for it to
align its counter-terror policies with China and other regional powers such as Russia for better and lasting
solutions to problems induced by the trans-border terrorist networks.

Keywords: Regional Peace, Chinese BRI, Counter Terrorism Strategies, Indo-US Nexus, Pakistan and
Peace Process

Green Book 2019 91

Q
PAKISTAN ARMY
uietly, but resolutely, China has been
choreographing its Afghanistan and
counter-terror policy in consultation
with regional stakeholders, Pakistan
and Russia in particular. With this
quiet diplomacy, it has emerged as
the economically strong bulwark against terrorism,
a power that is underpinning regional counter-
terrorism efforts through its economic clout.
Apparently, the impending US-NATO
drawdown in December 2014 served as the trigger
for Beijing’s activism on the Afghan front.
“For the past 13 years the US and NATO have
been playing a major role in Afghanistan and we
made a contribution and gave them support – but
now with the US leaving, Afghanistan is facing a
critical period……we are ready to do more, we want
to play a bigger role.”
This excerpt from China’s special representative
for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador Sun
Yuxi’s rare interview with the BBC back in 2014 was
quite instructive.1
Ambassador Sun went on to offer to even host
an intra-Afghan dialogue.
“We would welcome the Taliban in any neutral
venue such as in China …we will make negotiations
happen but the process must be Afghan-owned
and Afghan-led – the agenda must be proposed by
President Ashraf Ghani,’’ he underscored.
The appointment of Sun Yuxi, 63, who has
known Afghanistan since 1981 as a young diplomat,
was itself a clear manifestation of Beijing’s strong
desire to get involved in Afghanistan.
Nearly two years later in January 2016, Beijing
played host to the Afghan foreign minister,
‘‘
For the past 13 years the US and
NATO have been playing a major role in
Afghanistan and we made a contribution
and gave them support - but now with
the US leaving, Afghanistan is facing
a critical period……we are ready to do
‘‘
more, we want to play a bigger role
Ambassador Sun Yuxi
Salahuddin Rabbani, with the obvious objective
of paving way for bringing Afghanistan’s warring
factions to the negotiating table.
Engagement with Afghanistan and
Taliban
Days after the Taliban trip to Beijing, Deng
Xijun, the Chinese special envoy for Afghanistan,
flew into Kabul to convey to President Ashraf Ghani
that his country had “encouraged the Taliban
during our contacts with them to join the peace
process,” Ghani’s office confirmed after Xijun’s
meeting with Ghani.2
“China has always conveyed to the Taliban
that it recognises the Afghan government and the
president and that talks are the only option for
them,” the statement quoted Xijun as saying.3
Interestingly, preceding the Taliban trip to
Beijing was a close consultation among Chinese,
Russian and Pakistani officials in December
2016 at Moscow,4 where all welcomed the lifting
of international sanctions on some Taliban

Ambassador Sun
Yuxi China’s Special
Representative for
Afghanistan and
Pakistan
leaders. Their Qatar office was quick to appreciate
the outcome of the Moscow meeting as an
acknowledgment by major stakeholders “that the
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is a political and
military force.”
By inviting the Afghan foreign minister,
followed by the Taliban delegation and active
participation in the Moscow meeting, the Chinese
leadership underscored its quest for regional peace
– whatever way possible – which it considers
critical for its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Chinese scholars and former diplomats point
out that with the economic rise of their country,
their leaders feel the pressure that comes with the
global economic status.
“The big backdrop is that the United States will
have withdrawn most of its troops from Afghanistan
with the antiterrorism mission unfinished, which is
leaving the country a mess,” said Du Youkang, who
worked in Islamabad, Pakistan, as a diplomat and
is now the director of the South Asia Studies Centre
at Fudan University in Shanghai.
“Bombings have never stopped, even in the
capital. Afghanistan shares a border with China, so
in this case China must get involved to promote the
talks and to secure the stability in the region.” 5
Securing Belt and Road Initiative?
Another reason for China’s engagement
has been the BRI’s flagship project – the China
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Both Beijing
and Islamabad know that Afghanistan remains a
critical trans-border transportation hub to connect
with Central Asia.
The Uighur Islamist insurgency in its western
Xinjiang region, the largest in size and rich with
mineral wealth, is another factor that may be
fuelling Beijing’s desire to proactively get involved
in Afghanistan but the larger focus remains on
PAKISTAN ARMY
defeating terrorist groups and restoring peace in
Afghanistan, considered a sanctuary for several
pan-Islamist terror groups such as Al-Qaeda, Daesh
as well as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement
(ETIM), which specifically relates to the Uighur
Sunni Muslims of Xinjiang.
China also considers peace and stability
as central to curbing drugs that are grown and
processed in ungoverned spaces of Afghanistan.
Some of it travels through to its markets via
Xinjiang too.
‘‘ Bombings have never stopped, even
in the capital. Afghanistan shares
a border with China, so in this case
China must get involved to promote the
‘‘
talks and to secure the stability in the
region
Du Youkang, Director of the South Asia Studies
Centre at Fudan University in Shanghai
Narcotics indeed is part of the deadly mix that
keeps Afghanistan on tenterhooks and creates the
space for all kinds of non-state actors including
drugs’ smugglers, criminals, and terrorists. A
former US commander in Afghanistan, General
John Allen, who commanded 150,000 US and NATO
forces from July 2011 to February 2013, too, pointed
to these elements as a source of continued strife in
Afghanistan.
General Allen gave his assessment at the
Brookings Institution in May 2018.
“In my mind, there was a triangular threat to
Afghanistan’s future but also, in a military context,
you had the ideological insurgency, which we would
Green Book 2019 93
 PAKISTAN ARMY

‘‘ Narcotics indeed is part of the deadly mix that keeps Afghanistan on tenterhooks
and creates the space for all kinds of non-state actors including drugs’ smugglers,
criminals, and terrorists. A former US commander in Afghanistan, General John Allen,
who commanded 150,000 US and NATO forces from July 2011 to February 2013, too,
‘‘
pointed to these elements as a source of continued strife in Afghanistan

Another trilateral forum comprising China, US

euphemistically called the Taliban, you had the drug
enterprise which fuelled an awful lot of insurgent and
criminal behaviour and then you had the criminal
patronage network. I don’t believe we were properly
organised frankly to deal with that.”6
Convergence with Regional Actors
This is where positions of China, Russia,
Pakistan, Iran and Turkey converge, allowing
China to be the visible force behind a coordinated
regional counter-terrorism policy.
China, Afghanistan and Pakistan political and
counter-terrorism cooperation dialogues – both at
official as well as the civil society level. It is also
part of a regional group ‘Six Plus One’, comprising
US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran and
Afghanistan.
and Afghanistan is pursuing the same objectives
but – ostensibly for political reasons - Chinese
officials would not publicise it as much as they do
with other tracks.
No surprise that between February and July
2017 alone, defence officials from Israel, Turkey,
Pakistan and the UAE visited Beijing to discuss
security cooperation with China. Beijing also sent
the PLA Navy (PLAN) to visit the region on several
occasions. Navy ships called on ports in several
Middle Eastern countries, including Iran, Oman,
Kuwait, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar and
the UAE. Some of these port-calls were the first
such visits in years.7
The CHINA GLOBAL SECURITY TRACKER also
spoke of the Chinese Navy’s permanent presence in
the waters of the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea
since 2008, as a result of its continued participation
in counter-piracy operations. Meanwhile, China’s
first overseas military base in Djibouti also became
operational in 2017.
The same year in March, China launched the
second joint counter-terrorism and humanitarian
rescue drill – Dragon Gold 2018 – with Cambodia
at a training field in the Maras Prov Mountains. It
involved some 280 soldiers of the Royal Cambodian
Armed Forces (RCAF) and 216 soldiers of the
Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).8
This reflected the seriousness with which
Beijing pursued its focus on counter-terrorism,
taking countries of its entire neighbourhood on
board for the trans-border phenomenon.
 PAKISTAN ARMY

China had long been averse to getting involved Counter-Terror Diplomacy Expands
in the Afghan or any other conflicts, not wanting
No coincidence, therefore, that the China
to be seen as taking sides. But Afghan officials,
Association for Friendship, a helping arm of the
beginning under the administration of President
Ministry for Public Security for outreach, organised
Hamid Karzai, have been insistent, pressing
the first unofficial counter-terrorism symposium in
Chinese leaders at every opportunity to use their
Beijing involving Pakistan and Afghanistan and
influence on Islamabad to curb the Taliban.9
the hosts.10
China was also part of a similar track known
as the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) but
it came to a literal grinding halt after a US drone Chen Zhimin, President of China Association for Friendship
strike killed Taliban leader Mulla Akhtar Mansoor
in May 2016.
Li Shaoxian, a Chinese scholar and vice-
president of the Chinese Association of Middle
East Studies, said he believed it was important
for China to establish direct contact with Taliban
representatives.
“ I went to the country in 2000, and I have to
say that the Taliban simply will not be wiped out,
because they are deeply rooted in the rank-and-
file of the society and are a representative of the
Pashtuns,” Mr. Li said, referring to the majority ethnic
group in Afghanistan. “So now Beijing, Washington
and Kabul have all accepted the fact that, well, we
Chen Zhimin, the President of the Association,
need to include them in the peace and reconciliation
opened the dialogue and declared that the cross-
process’’.
border mobility of terrorist networks and their
In broader sense, the Chinese push for a technical capabilities represented a major threat to
multi-lateral engagement on peace in Afghanistan all regional stakeholders.
dovetails its strong, but less articulated, focus on
At the same time Zhimin, who enjoys the rank
trans-national terrorist outfits, which it describes
of a minister, underscored the need for improving
as a “common security threat’’.
connectivity among all regional powers. Real
connectivity would deny terrorists the chance
to network and help break the nexus between
terrorists and criminal networks, Zhimin said. At
the same time the President acknowledged that
both Afghanistan and Pakistan had been suffering
because of being at the forefront of the anti-terror
war. ‘‘We are with you, thank you for fighting ETIM
and thank you for standing up to other terrorist and
criminal networks’’, he said.
Only two weeks earlier, senior Chinese officials
went into an unprecedented huddle with their
Russian, Iranian and Pakistani counterparts at
Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital to share thoughts
on developments around them, with a particular
focus on the buildup of Islamic State in turmoil-hit
Afghanistan.11

‘‘ I went to the country in 2000, and I have to say that the Taliban simply will not
be wiped out, because they are deeply rooted in the rank-and-file of the society and
are a representative of the Pashtuns. So now Beijing, Washington and Kabul have all
‘‘
accepted the fact that, well, we need to include them in the peace and reconciliation
process
Li Shaoxian, Vice-President of the Chinese Association of Middle East Studies

Green Book 2019 95

 PAKISTAN ARMY

Daesh-IS: The Common Denominator Nebenzya said, reiterating the Russian view, which
Iran, which shares a long border with Afghanistan,
A spokesperson for Moscow’s Foreign
Intelligence Service also confirmed that the also shares.
emergence of IS in Afghanistan prompted the
deliberations in Islamabad, and that director of the
Russian spy agency, Sergei Naryshkin represented
his country in a meeting that shocked many in
western capitals.
“The conference reached understanding of
the importance of coordinated steps to prevent
the trickling of IS terrorists from Syria and Iraq to
Afghanistan, where from they would pose risks for
neighbouring countries,” Sergei Ivanov told state-
run TASS media outlet.12
This meeting also signalled a synergy of views
on the mysterious phenomenon of Islamic State
of Khorassan, or Daesh, in Afghanistan. Although
China never took a public position on the Russian
Washington, though, dismissed the charges as
allegations that the IS is a US-sponsored entity,
rumours, and an attempt to justify Moscow’s links
particularly in northern Afghan provinces next
to the Taliban insurgency.
to the border with Central Asian countries, yet its
presence at the quadrilateral meeting in Islamabad IS calls its Afghan branch Khorasan Province,
was viewed by many in the West as an endorsement or ISKP, and it routinely carries out deadly suicide
bombings in the war-hit country and occasionally
of Moscow’s view on Daesh.
plots such attacks in neighbouring Pakistan.
Vasily Nebenzya,
Russian Envoy to
the United Nations

Russian envoy to the UN, Vasily Nebenzya,

while addressing a Security Council meeting on
Afghanistan in June 2018 had asserted that IS is
creating training camps in Afghanistan for its
fighters, including those who come from Central
Asian States.
“This is a group, which has up to 10,000 fighters
in its ranks, and it is already active in at least nine
out of 34 provinces … and is constantly consolidating
its positions in the north of the country, turning it into Pakistan – Victim of suicide attacks
a springboard for its expansion into Central Asia,”

‘‘ Russian Envoy to the UN, Vasily Nebenzya, while addressing a Security Council
meeting on Afghanistan in June 2018 had asserted that IS is creating training camps in
‘‘
Afghanistan for its fighters, including those who come from Central Asian States

96 Green Book 2019


‘‘
Although Pakistan failed to escape
being grey-listed by the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) in June 2018,
China stood by Pakistan in urging
the international community to view
the country’s anti-terrorism efforts
in an objective and impartial way, an
‘‘
attempt to shoulder some of Pakistan’s
political burden
Pakistani officials also believe the terrorist
group has established strong bases in “ungoverned
spaces” in Afghanistan and plans cross-border
terrorist attacks from there.
They also cite US military assessments that the
Afghan government controls less than 60 per cent
of the territory, particularly referring to estimates
by John Sopko, the US Special Inspector General
for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) .
Islamabad, Moscow, Beijing and Tehran
maintain contacts with the Taliban, saying they
are meant to persuade the insurgency to seek a
negotiated settlement to the Afghan war.
But the diplomatic ties with insurgents have
upset both Kabul and Washington because they
see them as an attempt to legitimise the Taliban’s
violent campaign.
Sino-Pak Synergy on Counter-Terrorism
Although Pakistan failed to escape being grey-
listed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)13
in June 2018, China stood by Pakistan in urging
the international community to view the country’s
PAKISTAN ARMY
anti-terrorism efforts in an objective and impartial
way, an attempt to shoulder some of Pakistan’s
political burden.
“The government and people of Pakistan
have contributed and sacrificed a lot in their fight
against terrorism and made great efforts in ground
operations as well as combating terrorism in the
financial sector,” Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lu
Kang said at a routine press conference.14
Lu’s comments came after some countries
persuaded members of the FATF last week to
place Pakistan on the “grey list” of nations with
inadequate efforts to control terror financing.
‘‘China, as an all-weather strategic cooperation
partner of Pakistan, will continue to strengthen
communication and coordination with Pakistan in
anti-terrorism cooperation’’, Lu said.
“ ….we stressed many times that Pakistan has
made important sacrifices and contributions to the
global anti-terrorism cause and the countries should
strengthen anti-terrorism cooperation on the basis
of mutual respect instead of finger pointing at each
other. This is not conducive to the global efforts,”
China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lu Kang
said during his regular press briefing here.15
The spokesperson underscored that the
Chinese side opposed linking of terrorism with
any certain country and disagreed to place the
responsibility of counter-terrorism on a certain
country. “First, and the foremost, I would like to
say that terrorism is common enemy of the world
cracking down on the terrorism needs joint efforts
from the international community”, he said.
“The government and people of Pakistan have
contributed and sacrificed a lot in their fight
against terrorism’’
China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Lu Kang
Green Book 2019 97
 PAKISTAN ARMY
Using Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO) for inter-state
synergy on terrorism
At the same time, Beijing also kept trying to
bring India and Pakistan closer at multi-lateral
fora such as the maiden joint counter-terrorism
exercises under the SCO held in Russia in August
2018.
“We sincerely hope that they can enhance
their dialogue and cooperation both bilaterally and
within multilateral mechanisms like the SCO, work
together to improve their ties and jointly maintain
regional peace and stability,” the spokesperson
added,16 Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
Hua Chunying said at a news briefing, adding that
both India and Pakistan are important countries in
South Asia and that ‘‘stability in their ties was the
key to peace and development in the region and the
world.”
The counter-terrorism drill by SCO countries
– involving at least 3,000 soldiers from China,
Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, India
98 Green Book 2019
and Pakistan - was the largest under the SCO
charter with the participation of India and Pakistan
for the first time.
The drill plays a positive role in deepening
defence and security cooperation among member
countries, enhancing capacity in tackling new
threats and challenges and safeguarding regional
peace and stability, China’s Ministry of National
Defence spokesperson Ren Guoqiang said.
The previous SCO counter-terrorism drills had
mainly been limited to Central Asia. But because of
the entry of India and Pakistan, the SCO’s counter-
terrorism mission had expanded to South Asia.
The effective counter-terrorism cooperation
among SCO countries has greatly undermined
terrorist groups in Central Asia in recent years
and it’s expected that this cooperation will also
boost stability in South Asia, a region facing a
more complicated counter-terrorism situation
with a variety of active terrorist groups,” Li Wei, a
counter-terrorism expert at the China Institute of
Contemporary International Relations in Beijing,
said.
Sun Zhuangzhi, a professor at the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences called the “Peace
Mission 2018” a “rare opportunity for Pakistan
and India,” which have long been involved in the
military conflict, to enhance military exchanges
and trust. This could improve regional stability.17
 Peace Mission 2018 – SCO Countries Joint Counter-Terrorism Exercise, Russia (August 2018)
Conclusion
With the rise in its economic might, China has
also emerged as the biggest proponent of peace and
the advocate of a regional approach in countering
the complex web of global terrorism. Beijing’s
focus on this particular issue has also dovetailed
with Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy as well its long-
drawn and hard battle against terrorist forces. We
have been fighting monsters who were receiving
support from both in and outside the country, said
General Qamar Javed Bajwa, Pakistan Army Chief
in an off-the-record talk with three dozen leading
journalists and writers.18
It indeed took the Pakistani state security
apparatus to get a handle on the various
proponents of terror – most of them external
proxies – between August 2008, when the
Operation Sherdil (Lion’s Heart) was launched
in Bajaur tribal region, to Swat Operation
(May 2009) to the South Waziristan Operation
(October 2009) to Operation Zarb-e-Azb , North
Waziristan (June 2014).
China was among the few friendly countries
that demonstrated visible understanding of the
complexity of the situation and the calibrated
Pakistani response to it. Leaders and officials in
Beijing also seem to learn from the way Pakistani
forces – through a multi-pronged but sequenced
strategy – attacked, disrupted and neutralised
most of the terrorist outfits.
One can, therefore, assume that success of
China in counter-terrorism translates into gains for
Pakistan as well. This has also helped in creating
a regional ownership for a war that knows no
boundaries but can still be restricted and effectively
countered if major stakeholders, including China
and Russia, can synergise their thoughts and
actions.
This represents a great opportunity for
Pakistan to align its counter-terror policies with
China and other regional powers such as Russia for
better and lasting solutions to problems induced
by the trans-border terrorist networks. At the same
time, the country needs to draw on experiences of
China in particular in not only counter-terrorism
but also in maintaining trade relations even with
countries with which it is locked in political and
territorial disputes.
‘‘
We have been fighting monsters who
‘‘
were receiving support from both in
and outside the country
General Qamar Javed Bajwa
COAS Pakistan Army
Green Book 2019 99
 PAKISTAN ARMY
Notes
1. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30273431, 2014
2. https://crssblog.com/2017/03/14/future-prospects-of-taliban-china-afghan-
peace-negotiations-tahir-khan/
3. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1348055/afghan-talibans-political-negotiators-
visit-china/
4. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-taliban-russia-pakistan-c-
idUSKBN14G19I
5. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/25/world/asia/china-considers-larger-
role-in-afghanistan-peace-process.html
6. https://dailytimes.com.pk/246503/us-officials-question-their-states-af-pak-
narrative/+http://southasianmonitor.com/2018/06/12/us-officials-question-
their-states-af-pak-narrative-2/
7. https://www.merics.org/en/china-monitor/content/3211
8. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/17/c_137046090.htm
9. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/25/world/asia/china-considers-larger-
role-in-afghanistan-peace-process.html
10. The tripodal dialogue, held July 2018, involved high-ranking Ministry of
Foreign Affairs officials and intelligentia from Afghanistan, Pakistani private
sector security and terrorism experts (including the author) and Chinese
officials as well as academia. The first official counter-terror (CT) trilateral
dialogue had taken place in December 2017 at Beijing.
100 Green Book 2019
11. https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-hosts-unusual-meeting-of-regional-
spymasters/4478723.html
12. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1756610/1-pakistan-hosts-spy-chiefs-russia-
china-iran/
13. FATF is a 37-nation inter-governmental body established in 1989 to combat
money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity
of the international financial system.
14. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1091020.shtml, 2018/2/27
15. https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/01/08/china-appreciates-pakistans-
sacrifices-in-anti-terror-cause/
16. http://www.cpecinfo.com/news/stable-pakistan-india-relationship-
important-anti-terror-drills-a-way-forward-for-the-two-countries-chinese-
foreign-ministry/NTc3OQ==
17. https://dailytimes.com.pk/289143/china-hails-participation-of-india-
pakistan-in-sco-anti-terror- + drill/http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1539127.shtml
18. The author was part of the meeting that took place on March 9, 2018.
 PAKISTAN ARMY

AN ANALYSIS OF
PAKISTAN’S
COUNTER-INSURGENCY
POTENTIALS AGAINST
NON-STATE ACTORS:
Ms Sidra Jamil Bajwa is an adjunct
lecturer at International Islamic
University, Islamabad

CASE STUDY OF ISIS

“Our Resistance War is a long and hard struggle and we
have mainly to rely on our own forces”1
Mao Tse Tung

Abstract
With the Karachi bus attack of 2015 , Pakistan has become centre of attention for international media and
scholarship viz-a-viz footprints of Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS). Anti-Pakistan elements did not
hesitate to label the country as the birth place of ISIS without any concrete evidence. A successful claim
of footprint requires its presence, scope and membership of ISIS in Pakistan. This paper discusses the
David Galula’s prerequisites of successful insurgency and examines that to what extent Pakistan meets
the prerequisites of a successful insurgency, required for any non-state actors including ISIS to hold
footprints in the country. The current research is based on secondary sources including books, scholarly
articles and newspapers. The review of literature reflects that the countries having footprints of ISIS are
either politically or socially instable, and ISIS formed hybrid composition with local groups to advance
its ventures. The present research reveals that Pakistan’s counter-insurgency potentials are adequate to
prevent the country against any non-state actor including ISIS. Pakistan does not meet the prerequisites
of Galula’s successful insurgency, therefore, it is almost impossible for ISIS or any other non-state actor to
have footprints in Pakistan.

Keywords: Counter-Insurgency Potentials, Non-State Actors, ISIS, Pakistan

Green Book 2019 101

D
PAKISTAN ARMY
issimilar to delinquency and poverty,
terrorism on international canvas is a
new phenomenon.2 Modern terrorism
has well established roots around
the globe, though it has history of
only one hundred and twenty-five
years, categorised into four waves.3 The first global
or truly international terror incident occurred in
Russia in 1880s, which gave birth to “Anarchist
Wave of Terrorism” that spread across the Western
Europe, Balkan and Asian regions.4 Anarchist wave
is considered as the first wave of terrorism, followed
by “Anti-Colonial Wave,” which started in 1920s
and continued for around forty years. Afterwards,
“New Left Wave” emerged, which longed till the
end of twentieth century, leaving some active cells
till date in Nepal, Spain, United Kingdom, Peru and
Columbia5. The fourth and existing wave of modern
terrorism is called “Religious Wave,” which started
in 1979 and will end till 2025.6 With the start of
religious wave, number of revolutionary campaigns,
insurgencies and civil wars emerged globally such
as Buddhist-Hindu rivalry in Sri Lanka, Khalistan
Movement in India, Christian Identity Movement
in United States, struggle for Akhand Bharat
(undivided India) in India and Muslim atrocities
by Jews in Palestine. Islam is at heart of this wave
because international media exaggerates the terror
attacks by Muslim at maximum.7
A large number of so-called Islamic militant
organisations appeared to implement their
version of Islam on international canvas. The most
significant, lethal and intense terror activities are
conducted by so-called Islamic groups globally.8
From Al-Qaeda to Taliban, and now Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (ISIS), non-states actors conducted
brutal terrorist attacks on the name of religion.
ISIS was formed in 2003 with the aim of
establishing its own caliphate—an Islamic empire
governed by a Caliph, who they consider the
actual successor of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).
ISIS is trying to achieve its presence, scope and
membership that can be labelled as “Global” in real
sense. Terrorist activities of ISIS are not confined to
Middle-East only, but the organisation has carried
out brutal attacks in Europe, North Africa, Asia,
America and Africa. Since June 2014, with the
declaration of its caliphate till Sep 2018, ISIS has
conducted two hundred twenty five in numerous
countries other than Iraq and Syria.9 These terrorist
attacks have killed more than 7,734 people and
wounded thousands more.10
For the first time, ISIS took the responsibility
of carrying out terrorist attack in Pakistan in May
2015, which killed forty-six people on the bus in
Karachi.11 With claim of ISIS, taking responsibility
for Karachi bus attack engendered a new debate on
footprints of ISIS in Pakistan.
Academics and civil-military bigwigs kept
on nulling and voiding the casting shadows of
ISIS in Pakistan, but international media not
only exaggerated the issue negatively but tried to
relate and link Pakistan in every best possible way.
Some people labelled Pakistan as “Birth Place of
ISIS” without any hesitation and hiccup.12 Arrest
of three hundred militants and video released by
the students of Jamia Hafsa (religious seminary)
supporting and inviting ISIS was used to second
the left-hand propaganda against Pakistan.13-14
‘‘
For the first time, ISIS took the
responsibility of carrying out terrorist
attack in Pakistan in May 2015, which
killed forty six people on the bus in
Karachi. With claim of ISIS, taking
responsibility for Karachi bus attack
engendered a new debate on foot
‘‘
prints of ISIS in Pakistan
 PAKISTAN ARMY

‘‘
A quarrelsome argumentation at academic
level is going on between those who second and Revolution, insurgency and civil war
who deny the footprints of ISIS in Pakistan. To is the pursuit of policy of a group, inside
untangle the myths of presence and prospects of a sovereign, by all means and resources.
ISIS in the country, it is important to consider the
very nature and characteristics of revolutions,
‘‘
These phenomena are always internal
insurgencies and civil wars. (intra-state) not external
According to Clausewitz, “revolution,
insurgency and civil war is the pursuit of policy Clausewitz
of a group, inside a sovereign, by all means and
resources. These phenomena are always internal
(intra-state) not external”.15 ISIS: Evolution, Demise and Re-Emergence
The statement of Clausewitz defined that ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Al—Sham)18 is
insurgency and civil war are primarily emerged known by various acronyms—IS, ISIL and Daesh.19
from inside the country that may gain external ISIS has its pedigrees in Al-Qaeda which was
support at latter stages.16 founded by Jordanian national Abu Musab Al-
Zarqawi. Al-Zarqawi was sentenced for fifteen years
by Jordan on the acts of terrorism during Soviet-
Afghan war. In prison, Al-Zarqawi met his old
companion from Afghan Jihad, Abu- Muhammad
Al-Maqdisi — a Jihadi theorist. Fundamentalist
theology and jurisprudence of Al-Maqdisi left great
impact on Al-Zarqawi’s personality.20
Al-Maqdisi articulated the doctrine called
al-Wala’ w-al-Bara’, meaning “Loyalty and
Disavowal”. This concept expects the Muslim
to distance themselves from everything that
contradicts from ‘Sharia’, for example, democracy.21
Al-Zarqawi was pardoned in 1999 and went
to Afghanistan.22 In 2002, Al-Zarqawi escaped
David Galula (1919–1967) — A French military officer to Kurdish dominated Iraq held by Al-Qaeda
and scholar who was influential in developing the associated faction called Ansar Al-Islam.23 In 2004,
theory and practice of counter insurgency warfare he gave bay’a (oath of loyalty and allegiance) to
Usama Bin Ladin, and renamed his organisation
Qai’datal Jihad fi Bilad Al-Rafidayn (Al-Qaeda in the
From the statement of Clausewitz, it is evident
Land of the Two Rivers, or more commonly known
that in modern nation state system, an international
in the West as Al-Qaeda in Iraq, AQI), which was
sovereign can be invaded by another sovereign,
initially called Al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (monotheism
but foreign insurgents cannot penetrate into a state
and jihad).24 In 2006, Mujahidin Shura Council
without local support. Insurgency is always carried
(MSC) was formed to unify the foreign jihadi
out by local groups. Hence, it is impossible for ISIS
groups fighting in Iraq, and to maintain the AQI’s
to prosper in the context of presence, membership
identity.25
and scope in Pakistan, without having alliance
with local insurgents, particularly the Tehreek-e-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP) operational in Federally
Administered Tribal Area (FATA). David Galula’s
theory of ‘Successful Insurgency’ states that a
successful insurgency has some characteristics;
it needs a cause, suitable geography, weakness of
counter-insurgency force, and external support.17
In addition to alliance with local groups, the above-
mentioned parameters of successful insurgency
given by David Galula are crucial for ISIS to carry
out insurgency in Pakistan
The later parts of the paper will discuss the
current status of ISIS, and its future in Pakistan by
analysing the situation of the country through the
prism of David Galula’s successful insurgency.

Green Book 2019 103

 PAKISTAN ARMY
On June 7, 2006, Al-Zarqawi was killed,26 and
the two successors of Al-Zarqawi; Abu Hamza al
Muhajir27 and Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi28 continued
the cause under the flag of MSC and proved
themselves more violent and brutal than their
predecessor.
In October 2006, MSC established Islamic
Emirate in Iraq (IEI) that later transformed into
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).29 Their territory was
consisted of the Western and Northern Province
of Iraq. Although emirate remained unsuccessful
due to clash of ideology of foreign Jihadists with
IEI and increasing demands of local Iraqi fighters
for political and economic patronage, yet the
organisation somehow survived.30 The rebranding
of IEI into Islamic State of Iraq , facilitated United
States (US) to assimilate tribal militias against jihadi
groups. With the effective tactics of the US, active
support of Islamic State of Iraq by local population
started to decline.31 Following are the reasons for
the Islamic State of Iraq’s decline in Iraq:
── Tribal leaders realised that political process
is a better option to follow than to support
and facilitate Islamic State of Iraq against the
coalition;
── Goals and objectives of Islamic State of Iraq
were not only contradictory to the tribal, but
odd and too violent in nature;
── US cashed the prevailing frustration among
the tribal militias (the Sahwa, or awakening
council), by reaching them and facilitating
financially and logistically to fight against
Islamic State of Iraq.
Discontinuation of popular support by tribal
militias proved a great setback for Islamic State
of Iraq . Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza
Al-Muhajir were killed in joint raid of Iraqi and
US forces in 2010.32 In addition to it, thirty-four
top leaders of the IS were killed or imprisoned in
the same year.33 According to Michael Knights, “in
second half of 2010, Islamic State of Iraq was dead
on its feet”.34
After the death of Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi, Abu-
Bakar Al-Baghdadi stood out as an Emir of Islamic
State of Iraq in 2010. Abu-Bakar took charge at
‘‘
The rebranding of IEI into Islamic
State of Iraq , facilitated US to
assimilate tribal militias against jihadi
groups. With the effective tactics of
the US, active support of Islamic State
‘‘
of Iraq by local population started to
decline
104 Green Book 2019
Local Iraqi volunteers gathered to stop Islamic State of Iraq
the time when organisation was about to dissolve.
New Emir eschewed the efforts to regain its control
on the territory and preferred to rejuvenate its
classic-styled terrorist attire; assembled on an
underground organisation.35
With the withdrawal of US from Iraq, once
again Islamic State of Iraq got chance to re-emerge,
and conducted more lethal attacks.
When Syrian conflict broke out, Abu-Bakar
initiated his long-term plan of creating Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
Abu-Bakar sent his commander Al-Golani to
Syria, who successfully formed a group called
Jabhat Al-Nusra (JN).36 In 2012, when Abu-Bakar
was hard at work in Iraq, Golani was struggling
in Syria. In July 2012, Abu-Bakar launched a
campaign called “Breaking the Walls” which
increased violence in Iraq at maximum. The
campaign longed for one year from July 2012 to July
2013. Through this campaign, eight prisons were
attacked, among them Abu Ghraib prison attack
is the most significant; above five hundred high-
profile so-called jihadists managed to escape, who
were imprisoned during confrontation against US
and New Iraqi regime.37
According to a preeminent analyst, Jessica
Lewis, the “Breaking Walls” campaign reflected
that Islamic State of Iraq had rebuilt itself a
professional military force that is capable of
planning, training, financing, and executing
synchronised and complex attacks in Iraq.38 On
April 8, 2013, through an audio message Abu Bakar
broadcasted the unification of Islamic State of Iraq
and Jabhat Al-Nusra, and titled joint alliance as
“The Islamic State in Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS)”.39
After some days, Al-Golani, the head of Jabhat Al-
Nusra in Syria, through an audio message, cast
off the news of union of Islamic State of Iraq and
Jabhat Al-Nusra, and gave his allegiance to Al-
Zawahiri and Al-Qaeda Core (AQC).40 A letter, dated
May 23, which was leaked in June 2013 to Al-Jazeera
revealed Al-Zawahiri’s statement that Jabhat Al-
Nusra is the only affiliate of Al-Qaeda (AQ) in the
region.41 In response, Abu Bakar reaffirmed the
name of his organisation (ISIS), and continuation
of activities in Iraq and Syria. With this statement
ISIS officially separated from Al-Qaeda.42 Since
 PAKISTAN ARMY

then, Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi, a self-proclaimed
caliph of Ummah (Muslim world) claims authority
over entire Muslim world, and is trying to enhance
presence, membership and scope of ISIS at global
level.
Footprints of ISIS are observable across the
globe. The major victims of ISIS include Libya,
Sinai region, Algerian province, West African
Recruits of ISIS are captured across the globe
including US, Canada and Europe. Some seized
ISIS recruits do not endorse the footprints of ISIS
in these countries. Footprint means presence,
membership and scope of an organisation in a
particular country.
It is unjustified to link footprints of ISIS with a
country until it meets the David’s prerequisites of a
successful insurgency.

ISIS and Pakistan

The very first incident linked to ISIS in
Pakistan was the attack on a bus on May 13, 2015.
Forty-five people were killed and thirteen injured
in the attack. Jundullah, a pledged ally of ISIS in
Pakistan, claimed the responsibility of the attack.43
The attack commenced a new debate on
presence of ISIS in Pakistan, which was fuelled by
anti-Pakistan actors at maximum. International
media has done all-out effort to defame Pakistan.

region, Northeast Nigeria, Northern Cameroon,

Niger, Chad, Yemen, Chechnya, Palestine and
Afghanistan etc.
Keeping in view the above-mentioned facts,
evolutionary history of ISIS can be categorised into
three phases. In first phase, the ideology and vision
of ISIS was established, followed by strengthening
its membership and presence in Iraq. In second
phase, ISIS remained unsuccessful in gaining
popular support and formation of Islamic Emirate
in Iraq. Lack of popular support weakened the
ISIS and it went underground. In third phase,
three factors helped ISIS to make a successful
rise in Middle East: a shift in ISIS’ leadership;
withdrawal of American forces from Iraq; and
outbreak of Syrian conflict. Presence of vacuum,
cause, leadership, suitable geography, popular Hither, some newspapers and TV channels
support, finances, and lack of counter-insurgency did not hesitate to call Pakistan as birth place of
force helped ISIS not only in rejuvenation within ISIS. Afterwards, one after another, every terrorist
the Middle Eastern region but opened prospects of activity in Pakistan has been linked with ISIS
its global reach. including Lahore bombing in March 2016, and
hospital attack in Quetta in August 2016. However,
The careful observation on the scope of ISIS in
a report published by Pakistan Institute for Conflict
the world exposed that footprints of ISIS are only
and Security Studies (PICSS) nullified the traced
evident in the regions that are either politically or
links of above mentioned events with ISIS.
socially instable.

‘‘ The careful observation on the scope of ISIS in the world exposed that footprints
‘‘
of ISIS are only evident in the regions that are either politically or socially instable

Green Book 2019 105

 PAKISTAN ARMY
‘‘ Recruits of ISIS are captured across
the globe including US, Canada and
Europe. Some seized ISIS recruits do
not endorse the foot prints of ISIS
in these countries. Foot print means
presence, membership and scope of an
‘‘
organisation in a particular country
According to the report, the analysis of patterns
of attacks claims that the attack on Police Academy
in Quetta was the first attack carried out by ISIS in
Pakistan.44 Report also tells that style and pattern
of attack was typical “Fidayeen Style”.
There was a time when this style of attack was
a trademark of one group but now many groups
in the region have adopted this style of storming
into a facility, holding out and fighting till death.
Therefore, one cannot ascertain exactly that which
group was behind the attack. But, after the incident
of twin towers (9/11), the group formed coalition
with non-state actors like Al-Qaeda and TTP
against the Pakistani State, parallel to targeting
Shia community.
Later the spokesman of Laskar-e-Jhangvi Al-
Alami endorsed the statement of IGFC and said,
“the attack was the joint venture of LeJ Al-Alami and
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’’.45
The second attack which is carried out by the
ISIS; confirmed by sources and claimed by ISIS is
the attack on Shah Noorani Sufi Shrine in Khuzdar
District of Balochistan, in which more than fifty-
two people have lost their lives and a hundred
were injured.46 Till date, the above mentioned two
attacks are done by ISIS with collaboration of local
non-state actors operating in Pakistani territory.
Just like other parts of the world, ISIS attacks in
Pakistan confirmed that the so-called Islamic State
cannot come directly to invade, but it always needs
local non-state actors to exploit fault lines to pursue
its goals. The coming below discussion reveals
that does ISIS actually fulfils the prerequisites for
conducting successful insurgency in Pakistan as it
is portrayed by international media or it is just a
false propaganda to defame Pakistan.
Assessment of Pakistan’s Counter-Insurgency
Potentials
The above sections of the study revealed that
ISIS cannot operate in Pakistan without acquiring
the membership of local insurgent groups.
Insurgency is a vanilla term that is usually
confused with militancy and terrorism. Militancy
is the use of force by external elements (non-state
106 Green Book 2019
actors) against the state and civilians.47 Whereas
insurgency is the use of force by local groups
against the state and masses.48
Terrorism, on the other hand, is the amalgam
of militancy and insurgency. ISIS falls under the
category of terrorist organisation that cannot
operate in any region without the assistance of
local insurgents.49 Therefore, it is crucial to assess
Pakistan’s counter-insurgency potentials to accept
or reject the footprints of ISIS in the country.
Following are the details of prerequisites:
Lack of Cause: A Wanting Prerequisite for
Insurgency
For an insurgent and a non-state actor, it is
very important to have an attractive cause to attain
popular support. Cause is a primary prerequisite
to pry the population away from the state, and to
control and mobilise them against the state.
Al-Zawahiri clearly said that Al-Qaeda is not
the ally of ISIS.50 The present deadly battle between
Afghan Taliban and ISIS in Afghanistan seconds
his statement.51
Pakistan has a clear non-discriminatory policy
against insurgents and non-state actors.52 Pakistani
nation is united against extremism and terrorism,
and local groups have no attractive cause to acquire
popular support in Pakistan.53
Strengths of Pakistan as Counter-Insurgency
Force
Origin of an insurgency takes place just like
the process of seed germination. It needs proper
environment and protection to spread the scope of
its roots.
An insurgency seeks protection and avenues of
its growth in the weaknesses of counterinsurgency
force. Therefore, it is very important to analyse
Pakistan as a politic body resistant to any
insurgency in general, and ISIS in particular. Below
are the strengths and weaknesses of Pakistan as a
counter-insurgency force that will help to develop
a better understanding on the scope and future of
ISIS in the country:
── Ability to Address the Problems. It is
practically impossible for a sovereign to
acquire hundred percent immunity from
the problems. Inability of a government
to address insurgency effectively helps
insurgents to carryout insurgency, but
Pakistan has a history to manage the
problems efficiently and effectively. Pakistan
has launched several military operations
since 9/11 and remained successful. Pakistan
has maintained sustainable peace and
stability in Swat region through military
operation called “Rah-e-Rast”.54 Currently

‘‘ Insurgency is a vanilla term that is usually confused with militancy and insurgency.
Militancy is the use of force by external elements (non state actors) against the state
‘‘
and civilians. Whereas insurgency is the use of force by local groups against the state
and masses
Pakistani counter insurgency forces are
carrying out military operation called Radd-
ul-Fasaad in Waziristan, which is also
bringing about positive results.55 According
to data of South Asia Terrorism Portal, the
fatalities of civilians from terrorist violence
are declining in number every year. Civilian
fatalities have been dropped to 40 percent in
2014, and 65 percent in 2015, and 74 percent in
2016.56 Moreover, the militancy in Pakistan is
only confined to certain areas located at Pak-
Afghan border due to porous border, whereas
rest of the country is living in peace.
── National Consensus. It is the primary
factor on which solidarity of a nation is
based. In Pakistan, whole nation is standing
united against the insurgents or non-state
actors prevailing in the country. National
consensus in Pakistan is developed as the
result of phenomenal security gains. All the
national institutions along with central and
provincial governments have contributed
at their maximum to eradicate terrorism
and extremism across the Country. Pakistan
has formulated a comprehensive National
Action Plan (NAP) against terrorism and
launched operations across the country under
NAP. Pakistan is praised by international
community on its success achieved against
insurgents.57-58 Pakistan has targeted all non-
state actors without any discrimination.
General Raheel Shareef said, “the operation
was against militants of all hues and colours.
It is without any discrimination, whether it is
Haqqani network, TTP or any other group”.59
Recently, Pakistan Army has launched
Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad across the country
to eliminate anti-Pakistan activities.60 Every
citizen of Pakistani state is all ready to offer
any sacrifice to mitigate anti-state activities
and terrorism from the country. Not only that,
but neighbouring China is also standing hand
in gloves with Pakistan against terrorism and
offered its full support for this global cause.61
── Resoluteness of the Counter-Insurgency
(Government) Leadership. Firmness of
counter-insurgency leadership is third
important factor to prevent insurgency.
Insurgency does not develop overnight, it is a
slow process, and hence sometimes counter-
PAKISTAN ARMY
insurgency force does not pay heed to the
development and evolution of insurgency,
which eventually becomes troublesome for
the counter-insurgency force to counter later.
The successful insurgencies developed across
the globe such as in Sudan, Rwanda and Sri
Lanka were the result of negligence of state
for a long time. Pakistan, however, has shown
resoluteness in countering insurgency and
launched successful military operations.
In operation Al-Mizan (2002-2006) 70,000-
80,000 troops were engaged, and operation
suspended with a ceasefire agreement
between Pakistan Army and tribal men.62 With
the breach of agreement, Pakistan launched
Operation Rah-e-Haq (November 2007) that
resulted into deaths of 615 militants.63 In
Operation Sher-e-Dil (September 2008) more
than one thousand militants were killed in
first three months. Similarly, in Operation
Zarb-e-Azb (2013), 3400 terrorists were
killed, 837 hideouts were demolished and
21,193 terrorists were arrested.64 Moreover,
with the launch of National Action Plan
(2015), National Counter-Terrorism Authority
(NACTA) confirmed that 1,808 terrorists are
arrested whereas 5,611 killed.65
── Counter-Insurgency Leaders’ Knowledge of
Counter-Insurgency Warfare. Resoluteness
alone is not enough; a counter-insurgency
force must know the effective strategy and
tactics required to fight an insurgency.
Pakistan is a nuclear power and holds sixth
most equipped and trained armies (including
land, air and naval force) in the World, and
largest among the Muslim world. Pakistan
not only possesses the capability to defend
her territory from external and internal
threats, but is also engaged in United Nations
(UN) Peacekeeping Missions; being one of the
World’s largest troop contributor in UN. Up till
now Pakistani forces have intervened globally
in various intra-state and inter- state conflicts
under the banner of UN. In a nutshell,
Pakistan’s civil and military leaders have the
concrete knowledge, strategy and tactics of
Counter Insurgency Warfare.
── The Machine for the Control of the
Population. The fifth most important
prerequisite of counter-insurgency is to
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PAKISTAN ARMY
‘‘
have concrete state machinery which
includes political structure, administrative
bureaucracy, the police, and the armed forces:
The Political Structure. Political structure
decides the fate of any nation. Flaws within
the political structures are responsible for the
catastrophes at national level. Unnecessary
oppression, dictatorship or political unrest
gives the reason for the development of an
insurgency. Pakistan is a modern democratic
country in which people choose their political
bigwigs as per their will. Democracy gives
minimum chances to any insurgency to raise
head.
○○ In addition to that Pakistan’s political
structure is divided into one centre and
four provinces due to which government’s
civil bureaucratic system is successfully
serving at every nook of the country.
○○ The Administrative Bureaucracy.
Administrative bureaucracy is considered
as the engine of progress, growth and agent
of transformation. Bureaucrats along
with public institutions are expected to
provide leadership and deliver order and
stability. Pakistan inherited the system
of administrative bureaucracy from Joint
Indian Royal Services. The system, till
date is considered as the most effective
and efficient to deliver at grass root
level. Pakistan’s administrative system
is divided into factions from sub-district
to district, then from district to division,
and further to provincial till federal
level. In presence of this kind of effective,
Pakistan not only possesses the
capability to defend her territory from
external and internal threats, but is also
engaged in UN Peacekeeping Missions;
‘‘
being one of the World’s largest troop
contributor in UN
efficient, transparent and accountable
administrative structure, it is impossible
for insurgents to carry out any non-state
activity within Pakistan.
○○ The Police. Police is considered as the
eye and arm of any political entity for
pertaining internal law and order. Any
insurgency that flares up, faces police
as the first counter-insurgent institution.
The efficiency of police as an institution
depends on number of factors: numerical
strength; capability of their personnel;
their loyalty for the state and the
government; and concrete and continuous
support from other state institutions.66
Pakistan’s police department is capable
enough to deal with any challenge.
Police is working in parallel to other law
enforcement agencies to maintain law
and order in Pakistan.67
○○ The Armed Forces. Besides strengths
required for armed forces to fight all kind
of wars, numerical strength, composition
of armed forces, devotion of troops for

the cause, and the time lapse before
intervention are most relevant to fight an
insurgency.68
 Numerical Strength. Numerical
strength of counter-insurgent army
must be in relation to the population
size of the country. Insurgency
means two-dimensional combat
to control the population;
therefore sufficient numbers of
army troops are required not only
to fight insurgency but to control
population. Pakistan has sixth
largest army of the world with
560,000 active personnel.69
 Composition of Army. Unlike
the conventional warfare, less
sophisticated counter-insurgent
force is better to fight insurgency.
For instance, in France’ NATO
divisions in Algeria, modern
equipment and specialised units
had to be hurriedly transformed into
ordinary infantry. In an insurgency,
Naval force requires sufficient force
to maintain blockade effectively
and air force needs are slow assault
fighters, short take-off transport
planes, and helicopters.70 Pakistan
army has in-depth knowledge of
country’s geography and climate.
Military composition of Pakistan:
land, air and naval forces are
capable enough to operate in any
situation including natural and
man-made disasters.
 Devotion of Individuals towards
the National Cause (Counter-
Insurgency). Devotion of every
single individual of armed forces
towards the state is crucial to
fight an insurgency successfully
and effectively. In every military
operation, a large number of young
Pakistan army officers volunteered
their services that truly reflects
their dedication and devotion to
the national cause.71
‘‘ Any insurgency that flares up, faces police as the first counter-insurgent institution.
The efficiency of police as an institution depends on number of factors: numerical
strength; capability of their personnel; their loyalty for the state and the government;
and concrete and continuous support from other state institutions
PAKISTAN ARMY
○○ The Delay in Intervention: It takes
a sufficient period for insurgents to
transform peace into a war. Usually
political governments hesitate to let army
intervene, which favours the insurgents
to gain strength.
○○ Pakistani parliament, however, tried to
address the problem immediately with
the help of civil and military institutions
as mentioned above.
── Outside Support. Following are the forms of
outside support:
○○ Moral Support. It is an important factor
through which cause of an insurgent or a
non-state actor goes along the wind of the
history. Propaganda is the key instrument
to gain popular support and sway public
opinion or reinforce the public sympathy,
but fortunately entire international
community is condemning the attacks
launched by ISIS, and the organisation is
being badly discouraged throughout the
global canvas in general, and Pakistan in
particular.
○○ Political Support. Direct political
support of insurgents or indirect influence
through international forums builds
pressure on counter-insurgent force.
Unlike the other organisations operating
in the region, ISIS failed to impress the
populations of South Asia by its political
ideology. Every South Asian country
sees it as an enemy: the organisation
has sectarian rivalry with Shiite majority
Iran; its ideology contradicts to Taliban.
Therefore, ISIS left with empty hands in
South Asia.
Policy Recommendations
Although Pakistan has all the key elements to
deal with anti-state actors yet following additions
to counter-insurgency strategy can further help
strengthening the Pakistan’s counter-insurgency
potentials:
── Border Monitoring. Federally Administrated
Tribal Areas (FATA) are located on border of
politically instable Afghanistan. Porous Pak-
Afghan border facilitates non-state actors to
‘‘
Green Book 2019 109
 PAKISTAN ARMY
── Selection of Areas of Efforts. Use of force
── Deployment of Static Units. Disengagement
transport across the border. Erection of Pak-
Afghan border has already been started but
fence must be planned for complete border
and expedited to bar the entry and exit of non-
state actors.
── Contact with Population. Counter-insurgency
── Strengthening the Political Machine.
Political machinery must further be
strengthened in areas that have faced problem
of insurgency such as South Punjab and
‘‘
FATA. Civil services departments: Pakistan
Administrative Services (PAS) and Police
Service of Pakistan (PSP) must play an active
and efficient role in these areas to address the
problems from grass root level.
── The First Area as a Test Area. Pakistan
may have a well-prepared, trained and
indoctrinated counter-insurgency force, but
mistakes are bound to happen. Pakistan
must learn from its experiences of counter-
insurgency and counter-terrorism warfare
and try to identify the gaps left in earlier
operations and must not repeat the same
mistakes in future. For example, Swat is a
110 Green Book 2019
success story in the history of Pakistan’s
counter-terrorism warfare, and the lessons
learned from that success episode must be
utilised in FATA region too.
is not the ultimate solution, other areas that
are social and economic in nature must also
be kept in focus and addressed to attain
sustainable peace and security in the country.
It is observed that poverty, lack of education,
and food and health insecurity, are the factors
contributing in uplifting an insurgency. Basic
needs of the population must be addressed to
restore their confidence on government.
of police and army from field, sometimes help
the non-state actors to re-unite, therefore static
units from Pakistan army and police must be
deployed to ensure the non-violence and to
carry out surveillance of the rehabilitation
activities.
authority must stay in contact with the terrorism
affected population. Pakistani government must
Propaganda is the key instrument
to gain popular support and sway
public opinion or reinforce the
public sympathy, but fortunately
entire international community is
condemning the attacks launched by
ISIS, and the organisation is being
badly discouraged throughout the
‘‘
global canvas in general, and Pakistan
in particular

isolate the population from vestige non-state
actors and their sympathisers by enforcing
authority. Left over political cells of non-state
actors should be eliminated by intelligence
led-operations.
── Coordination of Efforts. Government
institutions, religious clergy and civil society
must work hand in hand to restore positive
peace in the society. Collective efforts can
transform the terrorism affected areas in a
constructive way.
── Political Participation. Political
participation of those who surrendered or are
ready to negotiate with counter-insurgency
authority must be ensured. They are given
the chance to be elected through elections
so that their demands can be addressed in a
legitimate way.
── Testing of the Local Leaders. The ultimate
outcomes of the government’s efforts
regarding affected population hinge on the
efficiency and effectiveness of the locally
elected representatives. Elected men are
worthless if they remain unsuccessful in
meeting the targets set by the government for
the affected region. Local leadership must be
tested by giving them concrete task such as
running the local government, undertaking
local projects etc. Their public support will
consolidate; if they succeed in living up to the
‘‘ As few attacks conducted by ISIS in Europe do no endorse footprints of ISIS in the
region, similar is the case with Pakistan. Outsourcing four to five attacks through non-
state actors operating locally (which have already entered in the phase of demise)
‘‘
by ISIS in no way certify the footprints—presence, scope and membership of the
organisation in the country
PAKISTAN ARMY
Border Fencing Pak-Afghan Border
expectations of the government, otherwise
new people will be given chance to serve the
local population.
Conclusion
In the light of above discussed prerequisites of
successful counter insurgency, it is evident that it is
almost impossible for any non-state actor to carry
out insurgency in a country like Pakistan which has
all the potentials of counter-insurgency warfare.
In Pakistan, non-state actors are only present in
some areas located on western border which is due
to politically instable landscape of Afghanistan.
Porous border sharing with neighbouring
Afghanistan and easy escape of insurgents to
other side of the border during military operations
hinders Pakistan’s counter-insurgency force to
eliminate them. Other than western border region,
whole country is living in peace. The comparison
of what faced by Europe and Pakistan due to ISIS
in last two years reflects that Pakistan has gone
through less loss than Eurozone. As few attacks
conducted by ISIS in Europe do no endorse
footprints of ISIS in the region, similar is the case
with Pakistan. Outsourcing four to five attacks
through non-state actors operating locally (which
have already entered in the phase of demise) by
ISIS in no way certify the footprints—presence,
scope and membership of the organisation in the
country. In sum, Pakistan nulls and voids all the
prerequisites mentioned by David Galula for a
successful insurgency.
Green Book 2019 111
 PAKISTAN ARMY
Notes
1. Tung, Mao Tse. “Quotations from Mao Tse Tung - Chapter 8.”Introduction to
the Metaphysics of Morals by Immanuel Kant. Accessed on August 04, 2018.
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/red-book/ch08.htm.
2. David C. Rapoport. Terrorism: Critical Concepts in Political Science. London,
England: Routledge, 2006, P4.
3. Ibid, P4.
4. Ibid, P5.
5. Ibid, P5.
6. Ibid, P4.
7. Chalabi, Mona. “Terror attacks by Muslims receive 357% more press attention,
study finds,” In The Guardian, July 20, 2018. Accessed on July 27, 2018.https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jul/20/muslim-terror-attacks-press-
coverage-study.
8. Rapoport, David C. “Comparing Militant Fundamentalist Movements and
Groups.” In Fundamentalism and State, 429-61. Chicago, United States:
University of Chicago Press, 1993.
9. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Islamist_terrorist_attacks
10. Ibid.
11. Silva, Christina. “ISIS threat in Pakistan: Islamic State violence continues
with death of intelligence officer,” In International Business Times, October 24,
2016. Accessed on July 18, 2018.http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-threat-pakistan-
islamic-state-violence-continues-death-intelligence-officer-2430508.
12. “Pakistan birthplace of ISIS: Tarek Fatah.” In Times of India. May 10, 2015.
Accessed on July 28, 2018.http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/ahmedabad/
Pakistan-birthplace-of-ISIS-Tarek Fatah/articleshow/47218188.cms.
13. “Four ISIS men arrested in Lahore raid,” The Nation, September 17, 2016.
Accessed on July 18, 2018.http://nation.com.pk/national/17-Sep-2016/four-isis-
men-arrested-in-lahore-raid.
14. Azeem, Munawar. “Police to act against Jamia Hafsa over Daish video,” In
Dawn, January 09, 2015.Accessed on July 18, 2018.http://www.dawn.com/
news/1155803.
15. Galula, David. Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. New York,
United States: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964, P3.
16. Ibid, 3.
17. Ibid, 13-32.
18. Ash-Sham (al-Sham) is a historic term for Greater Syria, which in modern terms
means the Levant. The organisation is known by many names as will become
apparent in the report, ISIL is short for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,
and is the acronym that the U.S. administration prefers to use. ISIS is short for
the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham; Daish, which is the Arabic acronym
for ad-Dawlah al-Islāmīyahfīl-ʻIraqwa ash-Shām; or IS, the Islamic State as
the organisation now prefers to be known. This report will henceforth use the
acronym ISIS because it reflects the organisation’s current areas of engagement.
19. Ibid.
20. Kazimi, Nibras. “A Virulent Ideology in Mutation: Zarqawi Upstages Maqdisi.”
Current Trends in Islamic Ideology 02 (September 15, 2005): 59-73. September
15, 2005. Accessed on July 18, 2018. https://www.hudson.org/content/
researchattachments/attachment/1453/current_trends_islamist_ideology_v2.pdf.
21. Brachman, Jarret M., Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice. London, England:
Routledge, 2009, P 22.
22. Rabasa, Angel. Beyond al-Qaeda.Part 1.The Global Jihadist Movement. Santa
Monica CA, United States: RAND Corporation, 2006, P 136.
23. O’Neill, Brendan. “Zarqawi: Western Fearmongering Made Flesh.” Spiked.
June 13, 2006. Accessed on July 18, 2018.http://www.spiked-online.com/
newsite/article/389#.W3P4cs4zbIU.
24. Faraj, Caroline. “Al-Zarqawi Group Claims Allegiance to Bin Laden.”CNN
International. October 18, 2004. Accessed on July 18, 2018. http://edition.cnn.
com/2004/WORLD/meast/10/17/al.zarqawi.statement/.
25. Rabasa, P 141.
26. Burns, John F. “U.S. Strike Hits Insurgent at Safehouse.” New York Times. June
08, 2006. Accessed on July 18, 2018.https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/08/
world/middleeast/08cnd-iraq.html.
27. Holmquist, Erika. ISIS and Hezbollah: Conduits of Instability. Sweden: FOI,
Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2015, P 15.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Felter, Joseph and Brian Fishman. “Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First
Look at the Sinjar Records.”Combating Terrorism Centre, January 02, 2007.
Accessed on July 18, 2018.https://ctc.usma.edu/al-qaidas-foreign-fighters-in-
iraq-a-first-look-at-the-sinjar-records/.
31. Hafez, Muhammed M. “Al-Qa`ida Losing Ground in Iraq.” CTC Sentinel 1, no.
1 (December 2007). Accessed on July 18, 2018.https://ctc.usma.edu/al-qaida-
losing-ground-in-iraq/.
32. Arango, Tim. “Top Qaeda Leaders in Iraq Reported Killed in Raid.” The New
York Times, April 19, 2010.Accessed on June 03, 2018. https://www.nytimes.
com/2010/04/20/world/middleeast/ 20baghdad.html.
33. Shanker, Thom. “Qaeda Leaders in Iraq Neutralised, US Says.” The New
York Times, June 4, 2010. Accessed on July 18, 2018. https://www.nytimes.
com/2010/06/05/world/middleeast/05military.html.
34. Knights, Michael. “The Resurgence of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.”The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, December 12, 2013. Accessed on July 18, 2018.
35. Fishman, Brian. “Redefining the Islamic State: The Fall and Rise of Al-Qaeda
in Iraq.” New America Foundation, July 18, 2011. Accessed on July 18, 2018.
https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/4343-redefining-the-islamic-state/
Fishman_Al_Qaeda_In_Iraq.023ac20877a64488b2b791cd7e313955.pdf.
112 Green Book 2019
36. Abouzeid, Rania. “The Jihad Next Door.”Politico Magazine, June 23, 2014.
Accessed on July 18, 2018.https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/
al-qaeda-iraq-syria-108214.
37. “Iraq: Hundreds Escape from Abu Ghraib Jail.” The Guardian, July 22, 2013.
Accessed on July 18, 2018.https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/22/
iraq-prison-attacks-kill-dozens.
38. Lewis, Jessica. “Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent: Part II.” The Institute for the
Study of War, September 2013, P, 7. Accessed on July 18, 2018.http://www.
understandingwar.org/report/al-qaeda-iraq-resurgent-part-ii.
39. Joscelyn, Thomas. “ Al Qaeda in Iraq, Al Nusrah Front Emerge as Rebranded
Single Entity.” The Long War Journal, April 9, 2013. Accessed on: April 10, 2018.
40. Holmquist, P 18.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ali, Imtiaz. “43 killed in attack on bus carrying Ismailis in Karachi,” Dawn, May
14, 2015. Accessed on January 28, 2017.http://www.dawn.com/news/1181698.
44. Khan, Abdullah. “First ISIS Attack In Pakistan – Can We Learn Some Lessons?”
Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies, October 29, 2016. Accessed
on July 18, 2018.athttps://www.picss.net/archives/5849.
45. Ibid.
46. Shah, Syed Ali, Imtiaz Ali, and Ismail Sasoli. “At Least 52 Killed, 102 Injured in
Blast at Khuzdar Shrine.” Dawn, November 13, 2016. Accessed on July 18, 2018.
athttp://www.dawn.com/news/1295928.
47. Azam, Maryam, and UmbreenJavaid.”The Sources of Militancy in Pakistan.”
Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan 54, no. 02 (December 2017): 189-98.
48. Oxford English Dictionary second edition 1989.
49. Sinclair, Samuel Justin, and Antonius Daniel.The Psychology of Terrorism
Fears. USA: Oxford University Press, 2012, P 14.
50. Holmquist, P 18.
51. Brennan, David. “ISIS Vs. Taliban: Dozens Killed as Battle for Afghanistan
continues.” news week, July 17, 2017. Accessed on July 18, 2018.https://
www.newsweek.com/isis-vs-taliban-dozens-killed-battle-afghanistan-
continues-1028441
52. “Nation United against Terrorism: DG ISPR.” The News, January 20, 2015.
Accessed on July 18, 2018. https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/619-nation-
united-against-terrorism-dg-ispr.
53. “Nation united against terrorism, extremism: Pervaiz.” The News, March 17,
2016. Accessed on July 18, 2018.https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/105913-
Nation-united-against-terrorism-extremism-Pervaiz.
54. Sheikh, Ismail. “Timeline: Major offensives launched by army against
militants.” The Express Tribune, June 15, 2014. Accessed on July 18, 2018.
https://tribune.com.pk/story/722391/timeline-major-offensives-launched-by-
army-against-militants/.
55. Ghazanfar, Saima. “Operation Zarb-e-Azb: Two years of success.” The
Nation, September 06, 2016. Accessed on July 18, 2018.http://nation.com.pk/
national/06-Sep-2016/operation-zarb-e-azb-two-years-of-success.
56. Ibid.
57. “Pakistan is winning the war against terrorism under NAP: US Country
Report.” Times of Islamabad, August 07, 2016. Accessed on July 18, 2018.
https://timesofislamabad.com/pakistan-is-winning-the-war-against-
terrorism-under-nap-us-country-report/2016/08/07/.
58. “COAS visit: Chinese military appreciates Pakistan’s consensus against
terrorism.” The Express Tribune, January 25, 2015. Accessed on July 18, 2018.
https://tribune.com.pk/story/827292/coas-visit-chinese-military-appreciates-
pakistans-consensus-against-terrorism/.
59. “Army targeting all militants without discrimination: General Raheel.” The
Express Tribune, November 20,2014.Accessed on July 18, 2018.https://tribune.
com.pk/story/794198/army-to-ensure-terrorists-are-unable-to-reestablish-
their-base-in-pakistan-coas-tells-us-senators/
60. “Army launches ‘Operation RaddulFasaad’ across Pakistan.” The Nation,
February 22, 2017. Accessed on July 18, 2018.http://nation.com.pk/national/22-
Feb-2017/army-launches-operation-radd-ul-fassad-across-pakistan.
61. Sharjeel, Hussain. “War on terror continues.” The Nation, March 03, 2017.
Accessed on July 18, 2018.http://nation.com.pk/columns/03-Mar-2017/war-on-
terror-continues.
62. Nabi, Adiya. “List of Military Operations in Pakistan.” News Agency, December
28, 2016. Accessed on July 18, 2018.https://www.liverostrum.com/pakistan-
army-operations/1025510.html.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. “Pakistan is winning the war against terrorism under NAP: US Country
Report.” Times of Islamabad, August 07, 2016. https://timesofislamabad.
com/pakistan-is-winning-the-war-against-terrorism-under-nap-us-country-
report/2016/08/07/.
66. Galula, P 23.
67. “Police, agencies carry out 1,423 search operations in Punjab.” The News,
April 06, 2016. Accessed on July 18, 2018.https://www.thenews.com.pk/
latest/110739-Police-agencies-carry-out-1423-search-operations-in-Punjab.
68. Galula, P 23.
69. The Military Balance 2017, by The International Institute of Strategic Studies.
London, England: Routledge, 2017.
70. Galula, P 24.
71. Interviews with army officers.
PAKISTAN ARMY

Green Book 2019 113

 PAKISTAN ARMY
Tackling Terrorism:
Pernicious Implications of
Poor Policing
Dr Muhammad Shoaib Suddle, is a renowned
former Senior Police Officer, who currently as
Senior Fellow at Global Think Tank Network,
and Strategic Advisor to Centre for Research
on Security Studies, plays a leading role
in security, justice and governance policy
organisations
114 Green Book 2019
Abstract
The problem of terrorism has raised a lot
of questions about how this complex and
sophisticated threat should be responded to.
Should terrorism be dealt with by specialised
counter-terrorism agencies or local police or both?
What are pernicious implications of poor policing
vis-à-vis tackling terrorism? Has poor policing
made handling of complex problem of terrorism
even worse? The police is the largest component
of the network of security forces, serving not only
as first responders but also as intelligence officers
and bridge-builders to communities suspected of
contributing disproportionately to terrorism. How
counter-terrorism ‘high policing’ impacts local
policing? How critical is intelligence in countering
terrorism? Should local police be involved in
covert terrorism prevention or counter-terrorism
intelligence gathering? Is Pakistan’s inherited
policing model relevant to present-day challenges,
particularly terrorism? If not, what is the relevance
of democratic policing principles to counter-
terrorism? What reforms are needed to reform the
anachronistic police system, particularly in the
context of counter-terrorism? This paper attempts
to address these questions.
Keywords: Police, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism,
Intelligence, High Policing, Low Policing, Police
Reform, Security Forces, Police Act 1861, Police
Order 2002, Capacity-building, National Police
Bureau, Internal Security
P
PAKISTAN ARMY

akistan inherited, in 1947, a more-than- The Historical Context of Policing

eighty-year-old police system from the
British. The overriding consideration
before those who designed the police
organisation in 1861 was to create an
instrument in the hands of the – colonial
– government for keeping the natives on a tight
leash. Police was not meant to be an operationally
neutral public service agency geared to enforce law
fairly and justly.
Established in the backdrop of ‘Mutiny’ of
1857, principal objectives of this design included
keeping the people fully under control through a
“rough and ready” system of maintenance of law
and order, a euphemism for what Justice Cornelius
called the rule of danda (stick); seamless collection
of land revenue; and safeguarding and promoting
Great Britain’s trading interests.
It is crucial to understand the basic difference
between a colonial police force and a police service
meant for a free country. Whereas the former was
geared at raising semi-militarised, semi-literate,
underpaid bodies of men for maintaining order
by overawing an often turbulent and hostile
population, the latter aimed at creating law
enforcement professionals tasked to prevent and
detect crime in plural, multi-ethnic and rights’
conscious communities, through just and impartial
enforcement of laws. The former knew how to rule,
the latter to serve. 

As the overriding objective of police

organisation designed in 1861 was to maintain the
stability of the Raj, the purpose was admirably
achieved through emulating the Irish Constabulary
model – by placing police under direction and
control of the executive authority through the
office of the European District Officer who acted as
the agent of the colonial government.

‘‘ The overriding consideration before those who designed the police organisation
in 1861 was to create an instrument in the hands of the – colonial – government for
‘‘
keeping the natives on a tight leash. Police was not meant to be an operationally
neutral public service agency geared to enforce law fairly and justly

Green Book 2019 115

 PAKISTAN ARMY

misbehaviour is a bitter fact of every-day life, borne

out of experience of successive generations at the
hands of a force widely believed to be working
beyond the bounds of civilised code of behaviour.
It is the behaviour that defies change and is
impervious even to the most scathing criticism by
leaders of civil society. Could the ordinary citizen
do anything when things went wrong, grievances
arose, or complaints about police fell on deaf
ears? Not much, because, badly enough, whatever
remedial arrangements existed were woefully
inadequate, lacked public confidence and were
far from user-friendly. It is citizens’ widely-held
belief that police could get away with anything
and everything. There existed no independent
mechanism of policing the police notwithstanding
that an increasingly expanding range of coercive
powers at their command required stricter
accountability controls. Public confidence in the
police has never been lower. We know why? We
even know how to fix this problem.

Faced with a deepening crisis both internally

within its own organisation and externally in its
relations with the public, the 1861 policing system
started running around under the strain of social
change brought about in 1947 by the freedom from
colonial rule. Though a clear intent to reform police
surfaced in independent Pakistan right at the start
when Governor General Muhammad Ali Jinnah,
in August 1947, issued a directive for establishing
a modern police force for the city of Karachi, the
reform bill (XXV of 1948), passed on 7th February
1948, couldn’t get assent of the Governor General,
thanks to politics of police reform.
In the backdrop of deteriorating health of the
Father of the Nation, Legal Advisor to the Governor
General, returned the bill unsigned for making
certain ‘minor corrections’. There were over twenty
police reform commissions/committees, both
national and foreign, in the past seventy years, but
their recommendations remained largely ignored.
No surprises that Pakistan’s policing crisis has
continued to exacerbate over time.

‘‘
The Problem
Serious inadequacies of police range from
incompetence, inefficiency, arbitrary and
insensitive handling of public complaints to
institutionalised abuse of power and perceived
widespread resort to corruption. No wonder that
citizens lend little or no co-operation to the police.
They perceive police not as an instrument of rule
of law but as a highly politicised service operating
principally to look after the interests of the
powerful.  Unacceptably high level of mistrust in
the police did not come about lightly or suddenly.
For most citizens confronting routine police
A clear intent to reform police
surfaced in independent Pakistan right
at the start when Governor General
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, in August 1947,
issued a directive for establishing a
modern police force for the city of
Karachi, the reform bill (XXV of 1948),
passed on 7th February 1948, couldn’t
get assent of the Governor General,
‘‘
thanks to politics of police reform

116 Green Book 2019


Discussing in detail different factors that
contribute toward poor policing in Pakistan,
Abbas (2012)1 argues that first and foremost of
these factors is outdated Police Act of 1861, which
is still applicable in two Provinces: Sindh and
Balochistan. Other factors such as corruption,
political interference, structural problems, Thana
Culture, poor training and lack of advanced
technology play key role in police not being able to
counter-terrorism.
Poor policing over time also became a serious
threat to social order. Although the country spent
tens of billions every year on police, civil armed
forces and security agencies, yet the citizen
continued to suffer from a creeping sense of
insecurity. It was almost as if the anachronistic
police system was designed not to work. The
way forward to long debated package of police
reforms lay in radically changing the way the
police operated; in developing a sub-culture of
professional policing, trained and equipped to
uphold the rule of law; in shifting from oppressive
policing practices to humane service delivery; and
in reinventing the police which had miserably
failed to win much-needed partnership with
citizens and communities. It was time for police
to enter into a customer service contract with the
people of Pakistan, a guarantee of more effective,
efficient, responsive, accountable policing. It was
time to implement ideas that worked and get rid
of those that didn’t. As the ground conditions that
made the 1861 arrangement expedient had long
ceased to exist, it was clear that police needed a
fundamental transformation – from its colonial
mould to an organisation structured on standard,
democratic policing principles meant for ensuring
rule of law.
Toward Comprehensive Police Reform
The opportune moment to reinvent police
apparently came when the Ministry of Interior, in
November 1999, decided to set up Focal Group on
Police Reforms and tasked it to suggest fundamental
restructuring of police. The Focal Group submitted
its recommendations in February 2000. In the
meanwhile, the National Reconstruction Bureau
(NRB), as part of their good governance and
devolution of powers programme, decided to
accord high priority to long overdue police reforms.
The NRB’s Think Tank on Police Reforms comprised
a Justice of the Peace from Britain and three senior
police officers who knew the police best – who
knew what worked, what didn’t; and how things
ought to be changed.
The NRB, after extensively deliberating aspects
of police reforms, concluded that police could only
perform well if founded on valid organisational
principles. In the case of police, these principles
PAKISTAN ARMY
‘‘
As the ground conditions that
made the 1861 arrangement expedient
had long ceased to exist, it was clear
that police needed a fundamental
transformation – from its colonial
mould to an organisation structured
on standard, democratic policing
‘‘
principles meant for ensuring rule of
law
were ruthlessly violated over the years. This
resulted in the creation of a corrupt, inefficient and
highly politicised police force. Consequently, the
task of maintaining law and order suffered serious
setback.
Increasingly the police were rendered to act
as agents of the political executive rather than
as instruments of a democratic polity. Selective
application of law against opponents, whether due
to political interference or at the behest of persons
of influence, became the norm rather than an
exception. Personal and clan vendettas were waged
and won through manipulation of instruments of
the state. Whatever safeguards existed against the
floodgates of pressure, inducement or threat from
criminals or ethnic, sectarian or other powerful
elements virtually became non-existent. The net
result of this all was that people perceived the
police as agents of the powerful, not as members
of an organisation publicly maintained to enforce
law.
The Police Act 1861 was finally replaced by
Police Order 2002 promulgated on 14th August
2002. The latter sought to provide the police
with operational autonomy and freedom from
illegitimate political interference. It envisaged
effective accountability of the police, both
internally and externally through independent
Police Complaints Authorities. The Police Order
2002 obligated the police “to function according to
the Constitution, law and democratic aspirations
of the people”. It redefined the police duties, police
powers, as also the control mechanisms over police.
It aimed at bringing about a radical transformation
in the ‘old police culture’ and turning the police
into a vehicle for establishing and promoting rule
of law.
Implemented in its true spirit, the Police Order
2002 could have led to policing best practices,
effectively meeting the 21st century law and order
challenges. However, that didn’t happen. The Police
Order 2002 was massively amended in 2006, solely
due to political considerations. Not only did the
Green Book 2019 117
 PAKISTAN ARMY
‘‘ Implemented in its true spirit, the Police Order 2002 could have led to policing best
practices, effectively meeting the 21st century law and order challenges. However, that
‘‘
didn’t happen. The Police Order 2002 was massively amended in 2006, solely due to
political considerations
amendments dilute the operational independence
of the police, they also rendered the long sought
for police de-politicisation mechanisms ineffective,
defeating the very purpose of the whole reform
effort. In yet another retrograde step, the Provinces
of Sindh and Balochistan, in 2011, reverted to the
old Police Act 1861. In 2017, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
also replaced the Police Order 2002 with the Police
Act 2017, leaving Punjab as the only Province that
has, till date, retained the Police Order 2002, with
amendments.
Police Access Service (PAS) – Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Impact of ‘High Policing’ Practices on
Police-Public Relationship
According to Brodeur (1983),2 ‘high policing’
is primarily concerned with protecting the state
and nation as a whole and is carried out by the
security services to pre-empt, infiltrate and subvert
insurgent groups deemed a threat to the state
and larger public interest. This is in contrast to
traditional ‘low policing’ where the police remained
concerned more with bringing the offenders to
justice after the commission of crime.
As noted, the colonial underpinning of our
police has historically meant that the public is less
willing to engage with the police. In jurisdictions
where police are seen as an instrument of rule
of law, not an oppressive tool at the hands of the
118 Green Book 2019
executive, the nature and extent of police-public
interaction is fundamentally different. Impolite
and unfair policing only exacerbates negative
perceptions to voluntary cooperation by the
public. Improved police-public relations require
positive community perceptions of everyday police
practices.
Mastrofski (1999)3 has identified six basic
ingredients for the police in order to elicit more
effective support and cooperation from the public:
── Attentiveness– Police should attend to their
public’s problems and ‘be around’.
── Reliability– There needs to be a degree of
predictability about what the police do.
── Responsiveness– The police should provide
a client-centred service that is reassuring to
the public.
── Competence– The public respects police who
can get the job done and where this cannot be
done, public respect police who clearly and
honestly explain why.
── Manners– Far more significant than what the
police accomplish is how they treat people on
an interpersonal basis.
── Fairness– Police should treat all people fairly.
While basic guidelines on sensitive and
fair policing are integral to all forms of police
work, their significance increases with regard to
counter-terrorism operations. If individual police
officers are appropriately trained to undertake
their activities humanely and courteously, the
risk of undermining police legitimacy in counter-
terrorism practices is significantly reduced. Clancy
et al. (2001)4 suggests that the police’s ‘poor
demeanour’ is most frequent source of the public
being ‘really annoyed’ with the police. According
to Tyler (2004),5 police should afford people input
into wider policing decisions; be objectively
neutral and transparent; be polite and treat people
with dignity and respect for their human rights;
and be sincere, explaining their decisions and
conduct in a benevolent manner. Skogan (2006)6
likewise found that fair and courteous treatment
in police-initiated contacts, giving people reasons
for what police do and explaining them their
rights, contributes to satisfaction with ‘police
encounters’. Lowe and Innes (2008)7 suggest that
as front-line, ‘public-facing’ police officers get

to know the everyday ‘rhythms and routines’ of
social life in their local communities, they tend to
get into an advantageous position when it came to
noticing subtle changes in their environments that
outsiders may be unaware of.
A prerequisite for community engagement to
succeed is that counter-terrorism teams involved
in ‘high policing’ operations not only engage
cooperatively and wholeheartedly with the local
police but also improve their intelligence-sharing
propensities and mechanisms. Evidence suggests
that intelligence continues to be held within ‘high
policing’ teams and is not effectively shared with
local levels (Audit Commission and HMIC, 2008).8
Also, whilst deployment of trained intelligence
officers in specific localities known to house actual
or potential terrorists is vital for more targeted
intelligence, a significant problem arising from
spreading an intelligence-collection net too wide is
that much irrelevant material is pulled in, impairing
its usefulness. Another negative consequence is
that security services start suffering ‘information
overload’.
It is clear that in order to build legitimacy
the police needs to invest significant resources in
improving the quality of community engagement.
Not only should police develop clear guidelines,
emphasising that individual officers interact
with the public fairly, honestly, and reliably, but
performance indicators of police should include
meaningful accounts of specific community
concerns addressed.
Indeed, these guidelines can go a long way
toward developing local solutions to preventing
crimes, and thereby building improved community
relations that contribute to the long-term
prevention of terrorism.
Pernicious Implications of Poor Policing
A four-member British delegation headed by
Sir Richard Barrat,9 Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector
of Constabulary, visited Pakistan from 21 to 26
January 1990, emphasising that Pakistan’s existing
‘‘
The colonial underpinning of our
police has historically meant that
the public is less willing to engage
with the police. In jurisdictions where
police is seen as an instrument of rule
of law, not an oppressive tool at the
hands of the executive, the nature and
‘‘
extent of police-public interaction is
fundamentally different
PAKISTAN ARMY
police establishment was a continuation of the
police appointed during the British days, the
delegation observed:
“The central problem surrounding police …
in Pakistan is that the present system was created
many years ago under colonial rule and has not been
refined or evaluated to keep pace with the changing
face of the country in the last decade of the twentieth
century … Police … throughout Pakistan has clung to
the role envisaged by the Police Act of 1861, in which
the main functions were the maintenance of law and
order and preservation of the status quo by methods
of suppression and control.”
A UN Mission led by Vincent M. Del Buono,
UN’s Interregional Advisor for Crime Prevention
and Criminal Justice, visited Pakistan from 26
March to 10 April 1995. Making a number of
categorical recommendations, the UN Mission10
observed:
“The present crisis comes as no surprise. Since
1960, there have been eleven separate committees
or commissions established by governments in
Pakistan and four international missions requested
by the Government of Pakistan which have
recommended major reforms of policing in Pakistan.
These have, for the most part, been ignored and
the remedies suggested have been unimplemented.
Had the proposed reforms been undertaken, much
of the present crisis could have been avoided.  The
present police system, which has been allowed to
deteriorate so badly by successive governments
and been so abused for political patronage, has not
yet completely broken down due to the dedication,
integrity, initiative and professionalism of a large
number of individual officers and constables. In
spite of their best efforts, policing will collapse not
Green Book 2019 119
 PAKISTAN ARMY

only in Karachi but also in other parts of the country
unless law enforcement institutions are strength
ened immediately.”  Police, over 260, got martyred at the hands of
A Japanese experts team11 led by Mr. Sekine,
Director General National Police Agency, visited
Pakistan in April 1996 on the invitation of
Government of Pakistan. After discussing police
reforms of 1947-54 in Japan, the team observed that
it was crucial that police reforms in Pakistan be
focused on building a relationship of trust between
the people and the police, and that the police in
Pakistan should adopt a public service concept.
In their February 1999 Report on Sustainable
Peace in Karachi, the Colombian12 experts
succinctly cautioned:
“If a professionally competent, politically
neutral and democratically controlled Karachi
Metropolitan Police Force is not formed, there will,
probably, be no police reform or reconstruction of the
public sector, both of which are essential elements
for sustainable peace.”  financial incentives played a key role in success
As policing continued to deteriorate over
time, the last decade of 20th century particularly
witnessed an almost complete collapse of law and
order in Karachi. Urban terrorism during the 1990s
claimed tens of hundreds of innocent victims and
brought Karachi the infamous title of ‘the City of
Death’.
The economy also lost hundreds of billions of
Rupees. A very large number of officers of Karachi
terrorists in 1995 alone. In the exclusively police-
led counter-terrorism operation,13 Karachi Police
played a heroic role in effectively taming the
dinosaur of terrorism exceptionally in a little over
six months. Sadly, the Government’s failure to
consolidate and sustain the rare law and order gains
yet again resulted, in 1998, in serious deterioration
of the security situation, costing the nation dearly
in terms of quality of life, economy, and Pakistan’s
image abroad.
Abbas (2009)14 has argued that despite
frequently occurring law and order problems and
internal strife, the Pakistani state did not give due
attention to build capacity of the police. Referring
to 1995-96 successful counter-terrorism operation
in Karachi, he concluded that police leadership
factor, political support, extra resources and
of the operation. According to him, lacklustre
implementation of Police Order 2002, poorly-
resourced National Police Bureau, and absence of
specialised training to selected police officers all
have negative implications for effective policing.
Analysing capability of Pakistan’s security
apparatus to meet emerging internal security
challenges, Fair (2011)15 has thus observed: “Not
only has Pakistan demurred from making critical
investments in police forces, but the state has
also failed miserably to provide a modern policing
framework.” According to her, the state of Pakistan
has not fully realised the importance of the
institution of police and failed to reform and rebuild
it according to the requirements of changing time.
Modern policing places more emphasis on
problem-oriented and intelligence-led approaches.
Information technology is critical to building
police capacity to store, search, interpret and
analyse data. Through processing data in a myriad
of ways, analytical software supports enhanced
crime prevention and investigation capabilities,
providing police new insights in understanding the
‘crime problem’.
Alongside enhanced use of modern technology,
police officers, working in ‘high risk’ localities,
need to be aware of the potential contribution they

‘‘ It is clear that in order to build legitimacy the police needs to invest significant
resources in improving the quality of community engagement. Not only should police
develop clear guidelines, emphasising that individual officers interact with the public
‘‘
fairly, honestly, and reliably, but performance indicators of police should include
meaningful accounts of specific community concerns addressed

120 Green Book 2019


‘‘ Initially established for crime control and maintenance of public order, today’s
police have to deal with multifarious, complex and growing tasks, including terrorism,
transnational organised crime, white-collar crime and cybercrime
can make to countering terrorism through their
everyday policing activities. However, this being
a relatively new area of research, the available
evidence showing positive linkage between routine
policing activities and counter-terrorism needs to
be explored further. Also, as one cannot always
generalise from studies conducted in foreign
jurisdictions, the Higher Education Commission
and our universities and institutions of higher
learning should increasingly encourage and
promote local criminological research, with focus
on contemporary internal security challenges.
Police Role in Counter-Terrorism
Counter-terrorism incorporates practices,  tactics
techniques and strategy that government, law
enforcement, military, paramilitary and intelligence
agencies  use to combat or prevent  terrorism.
Counter-terrorism strategies include countering
financing of terrorism. If  terrorism  is part of
a broader  insurgency, counter-terrorism may
employ  counterinsurgency  measures. Initially
established for crime control and maintenance
of public order, today’s police have to deal with
multifarious, complex and growing tasks, including
terrorism, transnational organised crime, white-
collar crime, cybercrime.
According to Wilkinson (2001),16 there are three
models of counter-terrorism response: (1) political
reconciliation bringing the terrorist groups out of
terrorism by pursuing negotiations and diplomacy,
(2) the use of law enforcement and criminal justice
PAKISTAN ARMY
‘‘
system, and (3) the use of military force. These
models are not mutually exclusive, and elements
from each of them may be combined into a set of
policy guidelines according to the circumstances.
Though the incidents of 9/11 brought the issue
of international terrorism and use of military force
into a new debate, there is no consensus in favour
of the high-handed military response as a pre-
emptive measure. “The rules of international law
could not simply be interpreted by a single country
like the US to its own motives. If the interpretation
is unilateral by the strong according to its will and
weak is to accept it, then we are back in the dark
ages.” contends Maogoto (2005).17 Underscoring
the need to realign the existing rules on the use
of kinetic force to match the altered international
security environment, he suggests clearly defined
limits to the use of military force.
After studying seventeen successful
counterinsurgencies, Sepp (2005)18 has concluded
that the role of police is central to any successful
counterinsurgency campaign. The best practices
discerned include:
── Police in the lead with the military providing
backup support; and
── Strengthening the police with relevant
capabilities to help address the security needs
of the at-risk population.
There are some disadvantages though to using
local police in covert counter-terrorism. These
disadvantages include burdening scarce resources
available with the local police and diverting local
 PAKISTAN ARMY
police from their normal routine duties. However,
on balance, local police can actually contribute
more to counter-terrorism by performing their
normal duties with increased focus and efficiency,
particularly through improved interaction with
the local communities and enhanced intelligence-
gathering capabilities.
Analysing police role in counterinsurgency
campaigns in Malaya and Cyprus, Corum (2006)19
concluded that nearly all major twentieth century
counterinsurgency campaigns relied heavily on
indigenous police as well as military forces.
Building up the case that partnership among
national security organisations, intelligence
agencies and local police is necessary to prevent
future terrorist attacks, Clarke and Newman (2007)20
observe that police play an important and central
role in this partnership because they are in a better
position to learn about emergence of local terrorist
threats, their knowledge of possible targets and
being in a position to offer first response to terrorist
attacks. In their view, an extension of community
policing can be helpful not only in the collection of
intelligence but also prevention of situational and
ordinary crime.
After analysing 648 terrorist groups that
existed worldwide between 1968-2006, Jones and
Libicki (2008)21 of RAND Corporation concluded
that most groups ended because they either joined
the political process or came in mainstream politics
or they were neutralised by police and intelligence
agencies through eliminating key leaders. The
authors contend that policing was the most
effective counter-terrorism strategy against those
terrorist groups which did not join the mainstream
politics and continued their terrorist activities.
Based on their research, they ended up suggesting
to the US’ policymakers that they should stop using
the phrase “war on terrorism” because there was
no battlefield solution to ending terrorism.
Bayley and Weisburd (2009)22 suggest several
ways in which local police can contribute to
counter-terrorism, including by:
── Observing and interacting with local people
during routine policing activities;
── Analysing crime patterns indicating propensity
to commit terrorist activity or making pre-
terrorism preparation;
── Developing partnerships with local businesses
and civil society organisations;
── Validating intelligence produced by specialised
counter-terrorism agencies;
── Contributing in covert surveillance, penetration
and target hardening; and
── Using local knowledge to recruit informers.
122 Green Book 2019
Explaining the role of local police in counter-
intelligence programmes during the Cold War
period and in counter-terrorism after the terrorist
attacks of 9/11, Waxman (2009)23 argues that local
police is better equipped in terms of resources,
capabilities and opportunities to counter terrorist
activities. Dividing the challenges posed by
international and local terrorism to the police in
three categories: (1) organisational challenges, (2)
political accountability challenges, and (3) mission
challenges, he contends that these challenges stem
from decentralised, heterogeneous and fragmented
policing systems.
According to a survey conducted by Bayley
and Weisburd (2009),24 all police services, whether
centralised or decentralised, engage in domestic
counter-terrorism, and there are no examples of
specialised counter-terrorism agencies separated
from the police at sub-national level. Likewise,
according to Abbas (2011):25 “Police capacity is critical
for taming terrorism and controlling insurgency-
infested areas. A growing body of empirical research
has established that law enforcement, not military
force, is the most effective tool for this task.”
The recent phase of–post-9/11–terrorism
though largely tamed has quite bedevilled our
counter-terrorism communities. The changing
forms and manifestations of terrorism continue
to pose a serious challenge to capacities and
capabilities of security forces around the world.
Most countries have created specialised national
police agencies for effectively tackling terrorism.
Although Pakistan established NACTA in 2009, still
it is not the only agency looking after countering
the terrorism because of the current inadequacies.
Whilst each Provincial Police and Islamabad
Police has its own Special Branch primarily to
gather, process, and analyse local intelligence,
the Intelligence Bureau (IB) in recent years has
assumed a growing counterintelligence role at
national level. In addition, there are Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) and Military Intelligence (MI)
that have a major counter-terrorism role. However,
meaningful and prompt sharing of intelligence,
held by different agencies, civil and military,
remains a huge challenge.
Bayley and Perito (2012)26 have identified three
elements of strategy commonly adopted by the
police in countering terrorism:
── Target hardening.
‘‘
Partnership among national security
organisations, intelligence agencies
‘‘
and local police is necessary to prevent
future terrorist attacks
 PAKISTAN ARMY

attacks and undertaking covert operations to

prevent such attacks is a police responsibility.

Counter-Terrorism Challenges and

Reliability of Policing Services
For decades, international terrorist organisations
have spread their networks across the globe. More
recently, the internet and social media have provided
new tools not only to identify and communicate with
terrorist sympathisers but also to radicalise them to
carry out terrorist attacks at targets of their choosing.
Indeed, information technology poses huge
counter-terrorism challenges for contemporary
policing, including:
── Arresting, investigating, and prosecuting ── Using limited police resources more efficiently
terrorists. to fight crimes such as terrorism.
── Pre-emptive disruption. ── Providing a local, national as well as an
international response to terrorism.
Target hardening refers to provision of effective
security to the potential terrorist targets, including ── Building capacity for solving terrorism-related
important persons and places. crimes having national and international
implications.
Special police units, private security agencies,
security and surveillance equipment like CCTV ── Solving terrorism-related cases with limited
cameras, walk through gates, metal detectors and intelligence or sometimes intelligence that is
jammers play an important role in target hardening. not available locally.
Apart from technical equipment, trained sniffer ── Improving neighbourhood policing for counter-
dogs are also being used for crime detection and in terrorism.
sweep and search operations.
── Continuous professional development of
Even though counter-terrorism is a
police officers so that they can see the bigger
multidisciplinary and multiagency endeavour,
picture of fighting terrorism.
the role of police in arresting, investigating, and
prosecuting terrorists is pivotal and critical. ── Monitoring internet and social media for
Political scientists, sociologists and criminologists hate speech, recruitment of terrorists and
generally take the phenomenon of terrorism as a identifying terrorist networks.
crime and not as a military combat. A minority view
though is that crime and terrorism are different
phenomena and a successful crime control strategy
may not always be relevant to counter-terrorism.
Pre-emptive disruption, third element in
terrorism control strategy, means a measure taken
in advance to forestall a terrorist act. It entails
neutralising terrorists’ plans and capabilities with
a view to preventing them from achieving their
goals. Whilst target hardening and investigating
and prosecuting criminals are mandated
responsibilities of police, pre-emptive disruption
is rarely conducted in open. Even interaction with
general public is seldom made during execution
of terrorist-related plans notwithstanding that
gathering intelligence about potential terrorist

‘‘ Police capacity is critical for taming terrorism and controlling insurgency-infested

‘‘
areas. A growing body of empirical research has established that law enforcement,
not military force, is the most effective tool for this task

Green Book 2019 123

 ── Adopting latest information technologies.
── Safe city projects in major cities and their
monitoring through drone and CCTV cameras.
── Centralised sharing of intelligence.
── Well-trained specialist investigators, with access
to modern technological tools and supported by
latest forensics.
── Promoting partnership between intelligence
agencies and police.
── Intelligence based police operations.
The World Economic Forum’s 2017 Travel and
Tourism Competitiveness Report ranks Pakistan
at 133/136 in the safety and security pillar, beating
only El Salvador, Yemen and Colombia. Indicators
specific to safety and security pillar include:
(1) business costs of crime and violence, (2)
reliability of police services, (3) business costs of
terrorism, (4) index of terrorism incidence, and (5)
homicide rates per 100,000 population. Ranking
these five indicators at 123/136, 116/136,132/136,
126/136 and 99/136 respectively, the Report shows
Pakistan Police in obvious bad light. Discerning
debilitating aspects of a police force ranked at the
bottom in South Asia, the long-debated causal
factors like outdated laws, under-resourcing, poor
professionalism, police politicisation and lack of
advanced technological tools to effectively execute
police mission readily come to mind.
‘‘ Even though counter-terrorism is a multidisciplinary and multiagency endeavour,
the role of police in arresting, investigating, and prosecuting terrorists is pivotal
and critical. Political scientists, sociologists and criminologists generally take the
phenomenon of terrorism as a crime and not as a military combat
124 Green Book 2019
Though terrorism stands substantially controlled
over the past couple of years, the need to reinvent
Pakistan Police as a matter of urgent national priority
cannot be overstated.
Way Forward
Under the Constitution, it is the duty of the
Federation to protect every Province against
external aggression and internal disturbances
[Article 148(3)]. Paradoxically, whilst the
Constitution obligates the Armed Forces to defend
Pakistan against external aggression, and, when
called upon, to act in aid of civil power [Article
245 (1)], there is no dedicated civil force available
to the Federation to protect Pakistan against
internal disturbances. Even when extent or nature
of internal disturbances is beyond a Provincial
Government to handle, how the Federation is to
discharge its constitutional duty to protect the
Province, is not unambiguous. In the Provinces’
view, law and order is their exclusive responsibility.
No wonder that National Action Plan (NAP),
enforced in the backdrop of 16 December 2014
brutal terrorist attack on Army Public School,
Peshawar, involving massacre of over 150 people,
132 of them children, failed to get a clear go ahead
from the Provinces for establishing a dedicated
counter-terrorism force. Though of late terrorism
has been largely contained, the establishment of
a dedicated counter-terrorism force by the Federal
Government remains a constitutional imperative.
‘‘
 PAKISTAN ARMY

Not only is counter-terrorism dependent on partnerships between various stakeholders. In

effective intelligence but the principal weapon 2008, the Office of National Security Advisor was
to win the fight against terror is actionable established in the Prime Minister’s Secretariat.
intelligence. As democratic policing principles More recently, on 18 March 2014, the Prime Minister
that emphasise increased police legitimacy and directed that a National Intelligence Directorate
improved community relations when implemented
proactively tend to have positive impact on police
Changing Police Station Culture
ability to gather vital intelligence, there is urgent
need to recognise that Pakistan’s contemporary
policing scene – still stuck with the 19th century
‘third degree’ model – requires urgent reinvention.
As full adherence to basic rights of law-
violating minority cannot be achieved except at the
expense of rights of the law-abiding majority, there
is a need to debate the public policy imperative of
tampering the basic rights of wayward individuals.
However, police should strive to keep the extent of
infringement of rights of the wayward minority to
a bare minimum. This is possible if ‘high policing’
organisations, in particular, possess specific human
interaction skills and their operating practices are
kept continually evaluated and updated.
Intelligence being lifeblood of police and
counter-terrorism work, it makes sense that police
and relevant agencies take full advantage of latest
information technology tools for increased and
efficient monitoring of country’s telecommunication
network, subject to effective checks and without
undermining law-abiding citizens’ rights to privacy
and free expression. What is required is a state-of-
the-art National Monitoring System (NMS) that is
capable of real time monitoring of all phone and
(NID) be immediately established under National
Internet traffic, bypassing service providers. In
Counter-Terrorism Authority to pool together
the meantime, phone and Internet monitoring by
national and provincial intelligence resources.
service providers needs to be made accessible by
However, obstacles to real time intelligence sharing
all law enforcement and security agencies.
still remain.
A lot of real time criminal intelligence is
There are serious infrastructural and capacity-
potentially available at the Police Station level.
building issues inflicting the police forces across
Due to adversarial police-public relationship, the
Pakistan. Though of late there is growing awareness
lines of intelligence flow from the community to the
and interest in relation to the use of information
local police are virtually choked. That is why it is so
and forensic technologies by law enforcement
critical to reinvent the Police Station.
agencies, there is a need for a sharper focus. The
Besides, there being no institutional National Police Bureau played a pivotal role as
mechanism for efficient intelligence sharing, the national focal point for addressing infrastructural
intelligence available with different agencies is not and capacity-building issues on a sustainable and
put to effective use. What we require is build stronger standardised basis when it steered four flagship
police modernisation projects relating to common
services at an estimated cost of Rs 7,952 million

‘‘
during 2004-2008.27 The projects included:
As full adherence to basic rights
of law-violating minority cannot be
achieved except at the expense of
rights of the law-abiding majority,
there is a need to debate the public
policy imperative of tampering the
‘‘
basic rights of wayward individuals
── Automated Fingerprint Identification System
(Rs 1,107 million).
── Police Record and Office Management
Information System (Rs 1,405 million).
── Nationwide Integrated Trunk Radio System
(Rs 1,952 million).
── National Forensic Science Agency (Rs 3,488

Green Book 2019 125

 PAKISTAN ARMY

million). The entire effort was to provide email, or data from damaged devices. In Khyber
new tools to upgrade police investigative Pakhtunkhwa, apart from improved facilities for
capacity. Sadly, no new projects were added specialised training, Mobile Forensic Laboratories
during past ten years. Even on-going projects have been established at Peshawar, Abbottabad,
suffered neglect for want of funds. and D. I. Khan. IT-based policing tools such as Geo
Tagging, Identity Verification System, Digitalisation
The National Police Bureau has a statutory of FIRs, Vehicle Verification System, Tenants
responsibility to perform its mandated functions like Information System, Police Assistance Lines, and
advising the Federal and Provincial Governments on Police Access Service are other welcome additions.
matters concerning police planning; development Balochistan received two mega infrastructural
and standardisation of police administration projects under a 2004 Federal Grant of more than
and equipment; police education and training;
police communications; criminal identification
facilities; developing standard operating
procedures based on internationally accepted good
practices particularly in relation to recruitment,
appointment, promotions, transfers, tenure and
discipline; and arranging research in such areas
as terrorism, sectarian and ethnic violence, drug
trafficking, organised crime, crime having inter-
Provincial and inter-National dimensions.
What National Police Bureau needs is better
quality human resource and a medium to long-
term development strategy to bring it at par with
international bodies like the College of Policing
in England and Wales. Setting standards in
professional development, including codes of
practice and regulations, the National Police
Bureau must ensure consistency in training, skills
and qualifications across the police forces in
Pakistan.
The Provinces in recent years have also
started to invest, relatively, generously in capacity-
building and modernisation of their police forces,
particularly their Counter-Terrorism Departments Rs.10 billion. However, the Provincial Government
(CTDs). Punjab has particularly taken lead by took a retrograde step in rolling back Conversion
establishing a state-of-the-art forensic lab and a of “A” Area into “B” Area Project in 2008. However,
modern command and control centre in Lahore. without fundamentally changing the long-existing
Sindh has established a much-needed forensic Thana Culture, the induction of latest technology
training school that imparts training in crime alone is unlikely to make a significant difference.
scene management, physical evidence analysis,
For efficient and effective service delivery, police
basic detection, and fingerprint proficiency. Its
will have to turn more-than-century-old policing
Digital Computer Forensic Lab assists in anti-
practices upside down. The crisis is more profound
terror investigations by recovering lost and deleted
when there is inadequate provision of quality pre-
electronic files, deleted browsing history, deleted
and in-service training, when career progression
is not based on performance, when postings and
transfers are politicised, when policemen live off

‘‘
A lot of real time criminal intelligence
is potentially available at the Police
Station level. Due to adversarial
police-public relationship, the lines of
intelligence flow from the community
to the local police are virtually choked.
‘‘
That is why it is so critical to reinvent
the Police Station
the land, and when accountability mechanisms are
either blunted or virtually non-existent. Policing
is no longer a vocation. Ways and means based on
international good practices will have to be devised
to turn policemen into competent professionals.
Their education and training courses must cater
to leadership development needs, as also to
stimulation of critical and innovative thinking.
There is little evidence that BPS 18-20 police
officers undergoing mandatory general-purpose
courses – Mid Career Management Course, Senior

126 Green Book 2019


‘‘ Major structural reforms, including
a standard police law that criminalises
extraneous interference in police
administration and guarantees
provisioning of adequate resources, are
necessary to create and sustain well-
‘‘
performing, effective and accountable
police forces
Management Course, and National Management
Course – become better police professionals.
The way forward is a fundamental restructuring
involving a short spell of 2-4 weeks of common
instruction at the National Institutes of Management
or National School of Public Policy (NSPP)/National
Defence University, as the case may be, followed
by 2-5 months of intensive specialised training
at the National Police Academy. Also, different
categories of police professionals may be issued
ISO type certifications. These certifications may be
suspended for misconduct, poor performance or for
failure to fulfil minimum continuous professional
development requirements.
Finally, politicised police recruitments,
postings and promotions are the bane of our
police system. If policemen are not recruited on
merit, they neither take trainings seriously nor
readily accept postings which are not of their
liking. Using extraneous influence, they will
successfully manage their postings, transfers
and promotions. The seniors will find it hard to
hold them accountable even for manifest acts of
misconduct. Indeed, their insatiable propensity to
subvert normal departmental processes all through
their careers is a source of severe impairment for
the organisations they serve in. Major structural
reforms, including a standard police law that
criminalises extraneous interference in police
administration and guarantees provisioning of
adequate resources, are necessary to create and
sustain well-performing, effective and accountable
police forces.
Conclusion
Terrorism is a form of crime that has bedevilled
Pakistan for many years. Political terrorism in
Balochistan lasted for couple of years, before it
ended in 1977. Terrorist outfit, Al-Zulfiqar, remained
active for more than a decade, starting 1979. Ethno-
political urban terrorism in Sindh peaked in 1990s.
Sectarian terrorism has remained with us for
several decades. However, the terrorism that Al-
Qaeda and their affiliates started and sponsored in
the aftermath of 9/11 has proved to be the deadliest.
PAKISTAN ARMY
Though military and paramilitary forces in
Pakistan are playing a key role in the fight against
terrorism, counter-terrorism is primarily a police
function. If well-trained, well-equipped, and well-
resourced, the police is generally better suited to
counter-terrorism. Police intelligence network
going down to local Police Station is potentially
a more effective counter-terrorism tool. Police
and security agencies have made tremendous
sacrifices while countering terrorism, and have
won many a battle. They can do better. Major
reasons, why police is not able to do better, include
outdated laws, politicisation, poor professional
development, inadequate resources, police-public
estrangement, police highhandedness, corruption
and ineffective accountability. Police need to build
stronger partnerships with the community to
improve their intelligence-gathering capabilities.
Structured under the Police Act of 1861,
Pakistan’s public-frightening police forces are
neither adequately equipped nor sufficiently
trained to effectively deal with mundane criminal
activity, let alone serious crimes like terrorism.
For effective counter-terrorism, we need a
police system which is politically neutral, non-
authoritarian, accountable and responsive to the
community, professionally efficient, and last but
not least, which is an instrument of the rule of
law.
There are several systemic issues confronting
the police forces in Pakistan. These include
serious quantitative and qualitative constraints,
extraneously-influenced policing operations,
police performance measures not based on
internationally-accepted key performance
indicators but personal liking/disliking of those
who mattered. Inadequate police budgets, poor
working conditions, insufficient support of
forensic and information technologies, and lack of
real time intelligence sharing between police and
security agencies. The abysmally poor budgetary
allocation inevitably means that not enough money
is available for improving rank and file salaries,
housing, transport facilities and health care. As
around 88% of the police force consists of lower
rank constables and head constables, absence
of shift system and poor promotion prospects
adversely affect their morale and productivity. It
is time the police leadership came up with viable
solutions, based on international good practices,
for administering larger police forces efficiently
and effectively. It is time to seriously consider
delegating maximum powers to the field officers
and the Inspector General Police dealing mainly
with policy matters.
Like most countries that have specialised
counter-terrorism agencies, Pakistan needs to have
a dedicated centralised counter-terrorism force to
Green Book 2019 127
deal with terrorism having inter-Provincial and
transnational dimensions. Forming partnerships
with local communities and businesses, police
can use local knowledge to assess the validity
Notes
1. Abbas, H. (2009) ‘Role of Pakistan Police In Counterinsurgency’Brookings.
2. Brodeur, J. (1983) ‘High Policing and Low Policing: Remarks about the
Policing of Political Activities’, Social Problems, 30(5): 507-520.
3. Mastrofski, S. (1999) ‘Policing For People’, Ideas in American Policing,
Police Foundation: Washington.
4. Clancy, A., Hough, M., Aust, R. and Kershaw, C. (2001) Crime, Policing and
Justice: The Experience of Ethnic Minorities.Findings from the 2000 British
Crime Survey. Home Office: London.
5. Tyler, T. (2004) ‘Enhancing Police Legitimacy’, the Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 593(1): 84-99.
6. Skogan, W. (2006) ‘Asymmetry in the Impact of Encounters with the Police’
Policing and Society 16(2): 99-126.
7. Lowe, T. and Innes, M. (2008) ‘Countering Terror: Violent Radicalisation and
Situational Intelligence’, Prison Service Journal, September 2008, No. 179.
8. Audit Commission and HMIC (2008) Preventing Violent Extremism:
Learning and Development Exercise. Department of Communities and Local
Government: London.
9. Barrat, Sir Richard, Aspects of Policing in Pakistan, 1990.
10. Report of the UN Mission to Pakistan: Organised Crime, 1995 (Islamabad:
UNDCP)
11. Report of the Japanese Police Delegation on the Police System in Pakistan,
1996
12. Report of the Colombian Mission, 1999 (Karachi: CPLC)
13. The author was Chief of Police Karachi during this operation.
14. Abbas, H. (2009) ‘Role of Pakistan Police In Counterinsurgency’ Brookings.
15. Fair, C (2012) ‘Security Sector Governance in Pakistan: Progress, But Many
Challenges Persist’, CIGI
16. Wilkinson, P. (2001) Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State
of intelligence produced by specialised counter-
terrorism agencies. On balance, general-duty
police can contribute more to counter-terrorism
than specialised counter-terrorism agencies.
Response. Frank Cass: Abingdon.
17. Maogoto, J. N. (2005). Battling Terrorism: Legal Perspective on the Use of
Force and the War on Terror.Aldershot, Hampshire, UK, Ashgate Publishing
Limited.
18. Sepp, K. I. (2005), ‘Best Practices in Counterinsurgency’, Military Review.
19. Corum, J. S. (2006).Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A tale
of two insurgencies.Strategic Studies Institute.
20. Clarke, R. V. and Newman, G. R. (2007) ‘Police and the Prevention of
Terrorism’ in Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice’ (Oxford University
Press).
21. Jones, S. G. and Libicki, M. C. (2008) ‘How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons
for Countering Al-Qaeda’, RAND Corporation.
22. Bayley, D. H. and Weisburd. D. L. (2009), ‘Cops and Spooks: The Role of
Police in Counter-terrorism’ into Protect and to serve: Policing in an age of
terrorism.
23. Waxman, M. C. (2009), ‘Police and National Security: American Local Law
Enforcement and Counter-Terrorism after 9/11’, Journal of National Security
Law & Policy, Vol 3:337
24. Bayley, D. H. and Weisburd. D. L. (2009), ‘Cops and Spooks: The Role of
Police in Counter-terrorism’ in To Protect and to serve: Policing in an age of
terrorism.
25. Abbas, H. (2011), ‘Reforming Pakistan’s Police and Law Enforcement
Infrastructure’, Special Report 266, United States Institute of Peace,
Washington DC.
26. Bayley, D. H. and Perito, R. M. (2012).The Police in War: Fighting Insurgency,
Terrorism and Violent Crime. New Delhi: Viva Books.
27. The author was Director General, National Police Bureau, during 2004-
2008.W
 PAKISTAN ARMY

GROWING STRATEGIC COERCION

AGAINST

PAKISTAN: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSE

‘‘is The most complete and decisive victory
to compel one’s enemy to give up its
‘‘
purpose, while suffering no harm to
oneself
Belisarius1

Brigadier Sheikh Ghulam Jilani is serving in

Pakistan Army

Abstract
Of late international/regional powers are vehemently trying to mount a full scale hybrid warfare against
Pakistan. Threat spectrum of Pakistan has thus diversified quicker than anticipated. If this intimidation
remains unabated; Plummeting Economic Conditions, Internal Challenges and External Pressure may
push Pakistan towards a corner with limited response options. Such a situation may not be favourable for
Pakistan, region and the world. Paper takes stock of the existing drivers, players, dominant challenges
of strategic game and likely spectrum of conflict. A reappraisal of certain dynamic measures to avert this
worst case scenario ensuring uplift of Pakistan is also touched upon.

Keywords: Power Centres, Coercion, Hybrid Warfare, Strategic Goals, CPEC, Nuclear, Diplomacy, Internal
Security, Spectrum of Conflict, Threat Manifestation

Green Book 2019 129

 PAKISTAN ARMY
W
orld Order is continuously
morphing due to the power play
of existing and emerging power
centres. International political
fabric is knit around competing
interests of nation-states. We
are living in an era of complex interdependence,
wherein cooperation and coercive approaches
continue to be applied concurrently. Actions
like, economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation,
information operations and limited use of force are
being undertaken by states to meet the political
objectives.
“Pakistan is the pivot of the world, placed on the
frontier on which the future position of the world
revolves”
Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah
130 Green Book 2019
Pakistan is the geo-strategic and geo-economic
pivot of Asia and it is interesting that same was also
prophesised by Quaid in 1948.2 However, due to its
strategic location and hegemonic India, coupled
with competing global interests, it has remained
a target of coercion. Importance of Indian Ocean
and place of Pakistan aka Gwadar is much evident
as it’s being manifested now and was visualised
much before.3 Role of other variables (CPEC, Brexit,
Trump-ism, JCPOA, and Economy) and perpetual
hostility against Pakistan with manifestation as
Hybrid War4 is also growing, gnawing, hedging
and compelling. Pakistan is a declared nuclear
state whose isolation/strangulation may have
serious regional/global implications. It’s a known
fact that any misadventure against Pakistan would
only materialise if Pakistan’s behaviour seriously
impinges on US strategic goals – physically or
in cognitive domain. US and its conglomerates
would progressively employ all options for a
coercive compliance – for instance to act against
the Afghan Taliban and pro-Kashmiri groups and
as a rider clause to accept unilateral restraints on
Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programmes. US’
obsessive fixation on attacking the so called safe
havens of the TTP which might actually be a mere
smoke screen to target nodal points of the OBOR/
CPEC. Moreover using Daesh as proxy by US is a
high probability so that it weakens Afghan Taliban
internally and foments terrorism inside Pakistan
simultaneously. The materialisation of any serious
threat against Pakistan will entail shaping of
environment involving regional and extra regional
forces.
Global Players
Iran. Since long, Iran has been a subject of
stringent economic isolationist policies of US.
Divergence in EU and US on Iran, issue is weakening
US while Iran a militarily strong nation, is grappling
with the situation under a strong leadership
and nation- hood. Russian relations with Iran
are strategically very important. Economic and
financial isolation of Iran by coercing the country’s
financial institutions and banks economically
engaged with, it has been an important part of
the coercion strategy. But Iran still finds countries
like Russia and China who trade with. As Stefano
Salustri says, Iran’s nuclear programme problem
remains unresolved and the pressure put on Iran,
by the US, Israel and the other countries, is rebuffed
‘‘ Pakistan is a declared nuclear state
whose isolation/strangulation may have
‘‘
serious regional/global implications

by Russia and China. Hence effective isolation will
always be difficult, especially in the changing
world economic environment. Yet the US is willing
to take pains at plugging all possible financial
loopholes and convincing her global partners to
support her tireless efforts patiently. Redundancy
of global transactions and willingness of countries
to circumvent the US-led economic sanctions for
their peculiar state interests emerge as important
barriers to strategic coercion. Leaning of Iran
towards Pakistan is obvious and can be of a great
assistance in the grand strategic game.5
Turkey. Despite having strong historical relations
with US and economic ties with Israel, Turkey is also
being targeted explicitly by US on accounts of its role
in the global politics, especially Syria and Palestine
issues. KSA-Turkey entanglement on Khashoggi
murder is also affecting the regional canvass. Pak-Turk
relations are historically very good and can assist in a
big way in any misadventure.
China. It is the only nation which is challenging
US in the region mostly due to economic strength and
matching military capability. Chinese BRI initiative
is causing ripples across the globe and US led world
order is being challenged due to its inclusivity. The
US-India axis is genuinely scared of the OBOR/CPEC
initiatives as China threatens to overtake the US as
the pre-eminent economic power of the world and
simultaneously leave India far behind in its wake
at the regional level. This will adversely affect US
Pak-China joint training exercise
PAKISTAN ARMY
‘‘
Economic and financial isolation of
Iran by coercing the country’s financial
institutions and banks economically
‘‘
engaged with, it has been an important
part of the coercion strategy
spheres of influence in critical spaces around the
globe and ruin India’s regional ambitions. It would
also make Pakistan economically self-reliant and
increasingly defiant of Indian belligerence and
domination and US coercion. This is unacceptable
to both, thus they feel compelled to challenge
China’s ingress into the region. China Russia
cooperation is also causing concerns to US,6 while
Pakistan is being targeted by US and India for its
high profile role in BRI through CPEC.7
Russia. Russian resurgence and growing
influence in the Eurasian bloc is alarming for US.
Increased cooperation with Iran, Syria and Turkey
is directly against the US interests and same is
voiced by US as well. SCO is exerting now beyond
security as well with increase in its members and
activities. Russia immediately filled the political
and military void which has been created as a
result of increased US coercion against Pakistan.
Such concerns have now resulted in the US freezing
military assistance, which included anti-terrorism
training. Moscow’s increased assistance has
included training in counter-terrorism, and Russia
has been conducting joint military exercises with
Pakistan despite years of discord between the two
countries. Pakistan’s recent coziness with Russia
is being viewed frantically by US while it is much
needed in present times.
Green Book 2019 131
 PAKISTAN ARMY
India. With a strong economy, diversified
diplomacy and relevance to US, Israel, Afghanistan
and other nations it is hedging Chinese influence.
US-India multidimensional assault on Pakistan is
taking a concrete shape now. The Indian sponsored
terrorist and militant prongs were exemplified
by the arrest of Kulbhushan Jadhav, the Indian
master spy, from Balochistan. Modi Administration
through RAW sponsors a media prong which
recently organised a “Free Balochistan” campaign
in Geneva.8 This unexpected upsurge of moral
indignation, timed superbly with the projected visits
of US functionaries to Pakistan is clearly intended
to put it (and China) under increasing pressure and
acquiring a more domineering negotiating posture.
Prime issue of Kashmir remains unsettled and
it dominates all other initiatives by either side –
intentions not-withstanding.
Kulbhushan Jadhav – Indian Spy arrested from Balochistan
Afghanistan. US’ failures in the longest war
are so far causing pressures domestically and
internationally as well. NATO policies (mostly US-
led) have yet to deliver. The US is literally isolated in
the region; only tenuously established in northern
Afghanistan, with an estranged Pakistan in the
East and peripheral India distant and unwilling to
take part militarily. Failure of US-Taliban talks and
tagging Pak as part of problem is not auguring well.
Recent victories of Taliban have also put the Afghan
government and US/NATO forces in a quandary.
Afghan government itself suffers from induced
hatred for Pakistan due to US/Indian factor and
‘‘
China-Russia cooperation is also
causing concerns to US, while Pakistan
is being targeted by US and India for its
‘‘
high profile role in BRI through CPEC
132 Green Book 2019
any positive act remains hostage to this feeling.
However, Taliban have a different orientation
towards Pakistan.
Possibility of Emergence of a New
Strategic Bloc
Given the above parameters, there is a
likelihood of emergence of a new regional bloc
involving Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and back up
support of China and Russia. If materialised may
change the geo-strategic great game; likely to make
India irrelevant in the strategic equation, partially
reduce the influence of US in the region and also
induce attraction for littoral states of Maldives,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Japan
and Korea. CARs and other existing energy
corridors (Persian Gulf, Black Sea and Caspian
Sea) may be denied to US-led strategic blocs. This
also coincides with the BRI concept of strategic
linkages.
Miscellaneous Contributory Factors
── Nuclear Issue vis-a-vis Terrorism. Of
late, despite fail-safe mechanism emplace,
nuclear issue is being linked with terrorism
through propagating the narrative of “nuclear
weapons falling in the hands of terrorists.9
On the contrary, India is being facilitated
for membership of Nuclear Supply Group
(NSG) thus coercion against Pakistan on
nuclear issue is adjudged as selective and
discriminative.10
── Kashmir Issue. Since 2001, India has un-
successfully tried to link Kashmiri freedom
struggle with terrorism. Off late, the trend
of blaming Pakistan without any credible
evidence and threat of use of force has
 PAKISTAN ARMY

increased as witnessed during the events

of Mumbai attack in 2008, Pathankot, Uri
incidents and fake surgical strikes in 2016.
It also continues to commit unabated gross
human rights’ violations not only to subdue
the indigenous freedom struggle but to coerce
Pakistan to abandon its political, diplomatic
and moral support of legitimate Kashmir
cause.
── Pakistan’s new regime and developing
trajectory is not acceptable to India as it goes
against their strategic interests.
── Pakistan’s growing alliances with China,
Russia and Iran are emerging as a counter
weight in the region. With China growing each
Prime Minister Imran Khan performed the groundbreaking of the
day and entering of more nations in CPEC, it is long-awaited corridor connecting Gurdwara Darbar Sahib in Kartarpur
gnawing the space and hedging out all other to India’s Gurdaspur district (28 Novmeber 2018)
players who are opposing CPEC/BRI/OBOR
── Failure of US in Afghanistan. its economic mainstay on IMF/IFIs as well as
military assistance11 from US is vulnerable to
Possible Threat Manifestation strategic coercion – economic sanctions as
experienced in the past. The external loans12
── US & Allies (IFIs) to exploit Pakistan’s and balance of payment issues can afford an
economic vulnerabilities – economic opportunity to inimical forces to dissuade
coercion and strangulation. Pakistan due to Pakistan; policy change/regression on certain
issues. However, due to emerging multi-
polarity and emerging power blocs, the effects

‘‘
To contain Chinese influence in IOR,
US is stepping up quadrilateral efforts
to check assertive and aggressive
Chinese behaviour through joint
regional infrastructure scheme aided
‘‘
by India, Japan and Australia
may not be that severe, lest other global
players, allies and IFIs completely comply
with the inimical forces.
── Chinese initiative of OBOR/BRI is attracting
international propaganda, especially from US
lobby. CPEC while centre piece to complete
idea is also in the eye of the storm. Indian
lobby, US think tanks and other experts are

Pakistan’s Total External Debt

USD Million

Green Book 2019 133

 PAKISTAN ARMY

‘‘
The China-Russia-Iran-Pakistan-
Turkey (CRIPT) alignment as a
competing pole to the US-India axis
must crystallise post haste. This
alliance is supported by geography,
convergences and the dictates of the ‘‘
prevailing geo-political environment
causing aspersions on the intentions of China
quoting Humbantota models.13
── US maritime presence in IOR shall continue
to not impose check on BRI, but will also play
significant role in economic strangulation.
The strategic environment in the Indian
Ocean is changing fast. In the last few years,
the growing strategic rivalry between major
powers like China and India is expanding.
To contain Chinese influence in IOR, US is
stepping up quadrilateral efforts to check
assertive and aggressive Chinese behaviour
through joint regional infrastructure scheme
aided by India, Japan and Australia.14 China’s
moves and Indo-US responses are brewing a
new cold war in IOR.
── Enhanced efforts to counter Pakistan’s
nuclear and strategic capabilities, including
cyber attacks.15
── Selective application of ‘Lawfare’ and ‘R2P’16
in the garb of human rights violations, and
subdue Pakistan’s sovereignty.
── Project Pakistan as safe haven for Taliban and
virulent Information Operations campaign to
isolate Pakistan.
Response Strategy
Longer-term perspectives, rational mindsets,
due diligence and honest common sense are
required for policies to develop credibility,
direction and momentum. Stage 3 is the worst case
and has to be avoided by mitigating the effects
of Stage 2 with an aim to get out of even Stage 1.
New regional bloc is a great game changer and
strategically very rewarding. Its pursuance may
be a sagacious and prudent step with necessary
preparations. Measures required to mitigate the
effects of coercion in various domains include:
── Diplomatic
○○ Pakistan’s approach towards regionalism
should be the hallmark of foreign policy.
Regional crisis management involving
China; rebuilding trust with Kabul;
and mutual trust with US and cordial
relations should be maintained with
Russia, Turkey, Iran and KSA.
○○ Pakistan must endeavour to save its
relationship with the US without prejudice
to its national interests. Simultaneously, it
must pre-empt this expected US coercion
by engaging China, Russia, Iran, Turkey,
KSA, GCC and major world capitals on the
threats posed to it and the region.
○ ○ The China-Russia-Iran-Pakistan-Turkey
(CRIPT) alignment as a competing pole to
the US-India axis must crystallise post haste.
This alliance is supported by geography,

Spectrum of Conflict for Pakistan

Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3

Enhanced PEDWC
Politico-Economic-
Stages Coercion (CPEC disrupted, Economic
Diplomatic Coercion
Blocade)

Strangulation, Isolation Various reasons carved for

Ongoing as of by slapping sanctions pressurising Pakistan to become a
Status
today on Pakistan using any pliant state (using both kinetic and
reasons non-kinetic means)

Not acceptable Pakistan to break the Pakistan decides to retaliate all out
Response
to Pakistan vicious cycle by diplomacy with help of its allies

134 Green Book 2019


convergences and the dictates of the
prevailing geo-political environment.
○○ It must also seek alternate sources of trade,
economic sustenance and cooperation.
Pakistan must forge national solidarity and
unity and prepare its multidimensional
responses vis-a-vis the US presence in
Afghanistan. Under no circumstances
should it agree to fight the Afghan war on
terror in Pakistan, again.
○○ Information operations are vital for
perception management17 and to dispel
false narratives. In this domain following
needs to be done:
ƒƒ Under the umbrella of NACTA,
specialised platform may be established
to develop narratives18 to counter
information onslaught against Pakistan.
ƒƒ Establish Pakistan centre in leading
think tanks to promote positive
perception across the globe.
ƒƒ Encourage academia to participate in
international seminars and conferences,
with a positive message from Pakistan.
○○ Foreign policy must have its objectives,
priorities and red lines. Special emphasis
be given to the foreign missions in Iran,
KSA, India, USA, and Russia.
○○ Pakistan to remain relevant in Afghan
peace equation through effective military
diplomacy and security agreements.
Moreover any Indian security role in
Afghanistan be opposed.
PAKISTAN ARMY
── Military
○○ Pakistan should continue to focus on
technological advancements to offset the
conventional asymmetry.
○○ Build on existing military-to-military
relations and forge new partnerships
encompassing all areas of cooperation.
○○ Pakistan must continue to maintain its policy
of credible minimum nuclear deterrence.
○○ Enhanced military diplomacy with
regional countries.
○○ Exercise vigilance internally and in all
relevant institutions to prevent and counter
attempts by the hostile actors to develop
such ‘rationales’ to constrain Pakistan’s
strategic programmes.
○○ Terrorism and other sub-nationalist
tendencies which can be exploited for
conversion into proxies must be kept under
watch.
○○ Pakistan should extend sincere desire for
conflict avoidance and strategic restraint in
South Asia.
── Internal Security. Domestically taking
necessary measures to eliminate residual
threat across the board by logically concluding
operation Radd-Ul-Fasaad with enhanced focus
and political will.
── Economic
○○ While CPEC offers a lifetime opportunity
to Pakistan for its economic rise to thwart
challenges, stakes of other countries in the
project is recommended to be developed.
○○ Best practices for economic development
must be institutionalised by taking correct
decisions.
○○ Diversification in economic development.
○○ Domestic measures – anti corruption.
In order to reduce dependency on IFIs,
attention may be given to a progressive
and self-sustained economic growth.
── Political. Ensuring good governance and
building national consensus through an
inclusive approach engaging all stake holders
through dialogue and promotion of a strong
national narrative.
─ ─ Legal Framework and Lawfare. Despite
an increased Indian diplomatic clout which
India maintains and as a consequence is
able to garner more support internationally,
Pakistan must continue to highlight
contentious issues. Pakistan should also
develop its expertise in understanding of
international legal framework and using
Green Book 2019 135
 PAKISTAN ARMY

lawfare as a means to achieve to desired ends.

In this regard, it is suggested to establish
an International Legal Framework Division
under the foreign office to identify legal
avenues which can be explored and utilised
to counter Indian designs.

Conclusion
Strategic challenges confronting Pakistan could
be addressed through governance at home; geo- INDIAN OCCUPIED
KASHMIR

strategic and geo-economic cooperation with China (Disputed Territory)

& Russia; substantive relations with US based on

mutual concerns. A non-confrontational, dialogue-
based and problem solving working relationship
with India despite outstanding differences and
developing mutual confidence with Afghanistan.
Such an integrated approach could progressively
limit India’s ability to use Afghanistan against
Pakistan; improve Pakistan’s image and reduce
US suspicion and Indian hostility. This under a
strong and sincere leadership needs policy realism
and imagination; a well-resourced and influential
foreign service; and an intellectually active foreign
policy community. These priorities will need to be
embedded in a national transformation process.
Notes
1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belisarius
2. Interview of Quaid by Margaret Bourke White, published as cover story of LIFE
magazine January 1948, https://www.youlinmagazine.com/story/vision-of-
the-founding-father-quaid-i-azam-muhammad-ali-jinnah
3. Book, Monsoon. Penned by , Robert D Kaplan: The Indian Ocean and the
Future of American Power
4. Article, India’s Hybrid Warfare and Pakistan’s Response, published on 25 May
2018 at https://nation.com.pk
5. Article, Pakistan – Iran vow to improve military ties by Baqir Sajjad Syed,
published on July 17, 2018, at https://www.dawn.com/news/1420539
6. Article, Why Russia and China Are Strengthening Security Ties by Alexander
Gabuav, published on September 24, 2018 at https://carnegie.ru/2018/09/24/
why-russia-and-china-are-strengthening-security-ties-pub-77333
7. Article, The China Pakistan Economic Corridor, Beyond the Rule of Capital?
by Aasim Sajjad Akhtar published on June 01,2018
8. Article, US’ Coercion and Pakistan by Imran Malik, Published in The Nation
published on October 11, 2017 at https://nation.com.pk/11-Oct-2017/us-
coercion-pakistan
9. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/us-worried-
pakistans-nuclear-weapons-could-land-up-in-terrorists-hands-official/
articleshow/60220358.cms
10. Article, At 2+2 talks, India seeks US help in a new bid to enter NSG published
on October 15, 2018 in Hindustan Times, at https://www.hindustantimes.com/
india-news/india-seeks-us-push-for-entry-into-nsg
11. Article, US Sanctions on Pakistan and their failure as a Strategic Deterrent by
Shublangi Pandey, published on August 1, 2018 at https://www.orfonline.org/
research/42912
12. Pakistan Economic Survey; Pakistan Foreign Debt and Liabilities Surged 14
per cent in FY18, Touch $ 95.097 billion https://profit.pakistantoday.com.
pk/2018/08/16/pakistan-foreign-debt-and-liabilities-surged-14-percent-in-
fy18-touch-95-097-
13. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303946910_HAMBANTOTA_
SRI_LANKA_CHALLENGES_IN_USING_A_%27NEW_CITY%27_PLANNING_
APPROACH_TO_REGIONAL_GROWTH_IN_DEVELOPING_COUNTRIES
14. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-beltandroad-quad/australia-u-
s-india-and-japan-in-talks-to-establish-belt-and-road-alternative-report-
idUSKCN1G20WGAustralia, U.S., India and Japan in talks to establish Belt and
Road alternative: report February 19 2018.
15. Article, US Cyber Warfare against Pakistan, by Riaz Haq, published in Pakistan
Defence on October 19, 2018 at https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/us-cyber-
warfare-against-pakistan.135552/.
16. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Soverignity
on Responsibility to Protect; published in December 2001 at https://www.
lawfareblog.com/tagged/responsibility-protect-r2p.
17. Article, Shaping the Information Space by Douglas Dearth published in
Volume 1, Issue 3 of Journal of Information Warfare
18. https://nacta.gov.pk/national-narrative/

136 Green Book 2019

Exercise Peace Mission 2018, Heads of Armed Forces of SCO countries

PAKISTAN ARMY

Green Book 2019 137

 PAKISTAN ARMY

CLIMATE CHANGE
AS A NATIONAL
SECURITY
IMPERATIVE
FOR
PAKISTAN
Shafqat Kakakhel is a former UN
Assistant Secretary General, Deputy High
Commissioner in New Delhi and High
Commissioner in Nairobi. Presently he is
Chairperson of Sustainable Development
Policy Institute (SDPI) – Islamabad

138 Green Book 2019

 PAKISTAN ARMY

Abstract
Climate Change is widely recognised as the defining challenge of our times and an existential threat to the
planet and its inhabitants. The global consensus on climate change, including its causes and consequences,
has been shaped and sustained by robust scientific research. The UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) adopted at the UN Conference on Environment and Development held in the Brazilian
city of Rio in June 1992 represents the quintessential statement of global consensus on climate change.1
UNFCCC has facilitated annual climate change conferences aimed at translating the objectives of the
UNFCC into concrete measures. The security implications of climate change have received increasing
attention following debates on the subject by the UN General Assembly and Security Council in 2007-8.2
The security-related impacts of climate change include declining fresh water leading to reduced food
production; sluggish socio-economic development; heightened health hazards; internal displacement
and migration, and intra-regional conflicts over distribution of natural resources jeopardising national
unity. All these are relevant for Pakistan’s national security and, therefore, deserve due recognition and
response.

Keywords: Climate Change, Global Consensus on Climate Change, UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Kyoto Protocol, Paris Agreement (2015), Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change, Adverse

C
Effects of Climate Change, the Climate Change —National Security Nexus

limate change impacts can only be
addressed through deliberate and
concerted efforts at national level
and regional and global cooperation
underpinned by science and motivated
by global solidarity. Whilst some
impacts of climate change will be irreversible,
mitigation of the drivers of global warming and
adaptation to its negative consequences will enable
the international community to reduce the damage
caused by climate change.
Climate change is a threat resulting from
human actions, in particular the huge increase in
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG), especially
carbon dioxide (CO2) caused by the burning of fossil
fuels such as coal and oil for producing energy
to drive large scale industrial and agricultural
production and controlling severe cold weather.
security as well as determined and coordinated
actions to protect Pakistan’s socio-economic
development from the ravages of climate change
impacts. It also calls for strengthening the resilience
of our people and the natural ecosystems to counter
the risks posed by climate change. It also refers to
the positive contribution of Pakistan defence forces
to climate change mitigation and adaptation.
Global Consensus on the Drivers and
Consequences of Climate Change
The United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), adopted at the UN
Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED, also known as the Rio Summit) held in Rio

‘‘
The likely security implications of climate
change have been discussed by the UN General Climate change is a threat resulting
Assembly and the Security Council. The climate from human actions, in particular the
change- security nexus in relation to Pakistan’s huge increase in emissions of greenhouse
national security has also been examined by official
and independent Think Tanks and experts.3 gases (GHG), especially carbon dioxide
This paper probes the likely implications of the (CO2) caused by the burning of fossil
negative effects of climate change on Pakistan’s fuels such as coal and oil for producing
national security according to both the traditional
energy to drive large scale industrial and
and contemporary definitions of national security.
It calls for recognition of climate change as a key
‘‘
agricultural production and controlling
national and human security imperative in a new, severe cold weather
comprehensive definition of Pakistan’s national

Green Book 2019 139

 PAKISTAN ARMY

(Brazil) in June 1992, states the global consensus on
the causes and consequences of climate change and
how the international community could address it.4
The negotiations leading up to the agreement on
the Climate Convention were preceded by a number
of high level conferences convened by UN agencies
and the first report of the Inter-Governmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC), established by the UN
in 1988 to assess the global climate change and
suggest response measures, issued in 1990.5
The UNFCCC recognised that human- induced
climate change had taken place mainly due to the
huge increase in the emissions of heat-trapping
greenhouse gases (GHG), especially CO2, by the
industrialised countries caused by the burning of
fossil fuels such as coal, oil and gas for producing
energy for large scale production of goods as well
as overcoming severe cold.
hurricanes, heat waves, and droughts; rapid
melting of snow and ice stored by high altitude
glaciers, as well as in the Arctic. Accelerated
melting of ice and snow would trigger higher sea
levels and in the long run cause diminished supply
of fresh water.
The UNFCCC recognised that the adverse
effects of climate change would hit the developing
countries the hardest and proclaimed the obligation
of developed countries to provide finance,
technology, and capacity building assistance to
the developing countries so as to enable them to
cope with the negative consequences of climate
change and continue to achieve socio-economic
development.
The Convention established a conference of
parties (known as COPs) to be held annually in order
to legislate measures for enhanced international

It also recognised the impacts of climate change cooperation for stabilising the global climate
such as higher surface and ocean temperatures; through the implementation of the international
rising sea level; increase in the number, frequency commitments stipulated in the Convention. In 1997,
and intensity of extreme weather events like floods, the conference of parties held in the Japanese city of

‘‘ The UNFCCC recognised that the adverse effects of climate change would hit the
developing countries the hardest and proclaimed the obligation of developed countries
to provide finance, technology, and capacity building assistance to the developing
‘‘
countries so as to enable them to cope with the negative consequences of climate
change and continue to achieve socio-economic development

140 Green Book 2019

 PAKISTAN ARMY

Kyoto adopted a protocol called the Kyoto Protocol

whereby 38 industrialised countries agreed to slash
their GHG emissions by 5% below the 1990 levels
up to 2012.6 (The US failed to ratify the Protocol).
Inter-governmental negotiations held at the COPs
since 2009 aimed at a new post- 2012 Agreement
made negligible progress owing to the apparent
unwillingness of the developed countries to commit
themselves to deeper cuts in their GHG emissions
as well as to fulfil their commitment to provide
financial, technology, and capacity building
assistance to developing countries. Industrialised
countries called for GHG reduction by rapidly
developing countries such as China. Their negative
disposition stiffened despite warnings by the IPCC
based on the findings of scores of climate change
centres in the developed countries that the pace of
global warming had accelerated due to unabated
increase in GHG emissions leading to a spike in
climate-related extreme events in different parts of
the world, especially in the developing countries ── The Warsaw International Mechanism on
and warranted strong global responses.7 Following Loss and Damage. to support developing
protracted and deeply polarised negotiations, countries in coping with the damage and loss
the UNFCCC COP held in Paris in December 2015 resulting from climate change impacts.
adopted a non-legally binding agreement called
the Paris Agreement (PA) which reiterated the ── Technology Mechanism. for promoting
consensus achieved in 1992 and substantiated by transfer of climate friendly technology to
scientific research that climate change represented developing countries.
“an urgent and potentially irreversible threat to ── Network of organisations. for promoting
human societies and the planet” and pledged to capacity building related to climate change
“uphold and promote regional and international mitigation and adaptation in developing
cooperation in addressing climate change.” The countries. The various arrangements
PA proclaimed the global goal of limiting surface
stipulated in the PA were to be operationalised
and ocean temperature increase to less than
through decisions of the COP no later than
two degrees Celsius (2°C) through reduction on
voluntary basis by all countries in their GHG 2018.9
emissions. The reduction measures are to be listed Whilst representing a success of multilateral
and updated periodically in a document called diplomacy, the PA has been decried by scientists
“Intended Nationally Determined Commitments” as an inadequate response to climate change. The
(INDCs).8 The PA established several mechanisms removal of distinction between developed and
for supporting developing countries, namely: developing countries that were a corner stone
── Green Climate Fund. to which developed of the UNFCCC and the voluntary nature of GHG
countries shall provide US$ 100 billion reduction pledges have also been criticised.
annually up to 2025 (prior to a new ceiling to The progress in finalising the operationalisation of
be set before 2025). the key provisions of the PA has been excruciatingly
slow. It would not be less than a miracle if COP 24
in Poland in December 2018 is able to accomplish

‘‘
President Trump’s decision on US
withdrawal from the PA and his relentless
efforts to reverse the initiatives of the
previous US Administrations to promote
development of renewable energy and
curb GHG emissions by various sectors
‘‘
within the US have caused a setback to
global climate friendly actions
the unfinished agenda of operationalising the PA.
President Trump’s decision on US withdrawal
from the PA and his relentless efforts to reverse
the initiatives of the previous US Administrations
to promote development of renewable energy and
curb GHG emissions by various sectors within the
US have caused a setback to global climate friendly
actions.10
China has increased its development and
deployment of clean energy, phased out coal
fired plants and taken other carbon reduction

Green Book 2019 141

 PAKISTAN ARMY
measures. It has also pledged to promote enhanced
international cooperation to reduce GHG emissions.
Overall, there is a discernible decline in
support for international cooperation for climate
change among the OECD countries thanks to the
recrudescence of narrowly defined nationalism in
several European countries.
The spirit of global solidarity forged in Rio and
renewed in Paris faces serious challenges leaving
developing countries to fend for themselves.
There are encouraging signs of enhanced
cooperation on climate change in various regions.
However, in South Asia the initiatives launched
under the umbrella of the South Asia Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) have not made
any significant headway, especially in view of the
present Indian Government’s apparent lack of
enthusiasm for SAARC.11
Global Discourse on Climate Change-Security
Nexus
The security dimension of climate change was
recognised as far back as June 1988 by a major
international climate change conference convened
by the Canadian Government in Toronto on ‘The
Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global
Security’.
The conference had warned that changes
in world climate “represent a major threat to
international security”, adding that “the potentially
severe economic and social dislocation for present
and future generations would worsen international
tensions and increase the risk of conflicts among
and within nations”.12 However, the emphasis on
the security implications of climate change was not
echoed in the global discussions and negotiations
on climate change. This was perhaps because
influential countries did not wish to re-define
the mandates of the UN Security Council and
other inter-governmental processes concerning
international peace and security.
In 2007 the Security Council deliberated the
security implications of climate change at which
representatives of developing countries highlighted
the threats to their security and in the case of island
states to their very survival. The Security Council
called on all UN agencies “to intensify their efforts
in considering and addressing climate change,
including its security implications”. It requested
‘‘
The spirit of global solidarity forged
in Rio and renewed in Paris faces
serious challenges leaving developing
‘‘
countries to fend for themselves
142 Green Book 2019
‘‘
Throughout the 21st century climate
change impacts are projected to slow
down economic growth, make poverty
alleviation more difficult, further erode
‘‘
food security and prolong existing and
create new poverty traps
the UN Secretary General (UN SG) to submit a
report on “the possible security implications of
climate change’’ “at the next 64th session of the UN
General Assembly” (in 2008).
The UN SG’s report on ‘Climate Change and
its Possible Security Implications’ noted that
climate change could heighten human insecurity
by threatening food security and human health by
causing increased exposure to extreme events such
as floods, droughts, storms, hurricanes etc. Second,
it could slow down and reverse the gains of socio-
economic development, thereby undermining the
ability of states to maintain internal peace and
stability. Third, climate change could increase the
risk of domestic conflict by triggering population
displacement, involuntary migration, domestic
conflict or violence related to competition for
natural resources including water and land in
Africa and South Asia. Fourth, climate change could
cause loss of territory and statelessness, especially
in the case of small island developing states as a
result of sea-level rise and inundation. Finally,
climate change could potentially cause conflicts
between countries sharing trans-boundary water or
other resources, e.g., in South Asia and Africa. The
report specifically referred to the India-Pakistan
Indus Waters Treaty and the need for “efforts…at
all levels to ensure its continued effectiveness”.13
The UN SG’s report recognised that climate
change could act as a “threat multiplier” that would
exacerbate existing threats posed by persistent
poverty, weak state institutions for resource
management and conflict resolution, fault-lines
and historic mistrust between communities and
nations as well as inadequate access to information
and resources. However, the report also listed a
number of “threat minimisers” which could reduce
climate-related insecurity such as climate change
mitigation and adaptation, economic development,
democratic governance, strong local and national
institutions , international cooperation, preventive
diplomacy and mediation, timely availability of
information, and increased support for research
and analysis to improve understanding of climate
change—security inter-linkages. The report called
for “a comprehensive, fair, and effective global
agreement” that could help stabilise our climate,
 With 80% of our staple grains dependent on irrigated farming, any reduction in water
supply will cause a drop in food production and threaten our fragile food security
protect development gains, assist vulnerable
nations adapt to climate change and build a more
secure, sustainable and equitable society”. The
General Assembly expressed support for the SG‘s
recommendations.14
Significantly, the latest, fifth assessment report
of the IPCC(2013-14) included a sub-section on
the impacts of climate change on human security
such as increased displacement of people due to
lack of resources and extreme weather events in
poor countries which could increase the risk of
violent conflicts. The report also referred to the
“trans boundary impacts of climate change such
as changes in sea ice, shared water resources.”
and warned that “throughout the 21st century
climate change impacts are projected to slow down
economic growth, make poverty alleviation more
difficult, further erode food security and prolong
existing and create new poverty traps”.15
At the national level, the US and a few
other countries have identified climate change
as a national security imperative. The respected
Global Military Advisory Council on Climate
Change comprising senior retired military officers
(including Ex-Defence Secretary General Tariq
Waseem Ghazi) of several countries has issued
a number of reports underlining the security
dimensions of climate change.16
The Impacts of Climate Change on
Pakistan and their Security Implications
Pakistan’s vulnerability to climate change is
dictated by a host of geo-physical and man-made
factors. The former include the country’s location in
a pre-dominantly warm, sub-tropical zone with low
average rates of precipitation (60% of the country
receives less than 250 mm rain annually; only 24%
get between 250-500 mm of rain); Pakistan’s arid
land and soil conditions and seasonal variations in
supply of water, the country’s critical dependence
on surface water supplied by the Indus River
System and the twice annual monsoons .
The main sources of Pakistan’s surface water
are the melting of snow and ice melt in the high
altitude Himalaya-Karakoram-Hindukush (HKH)
regions and the monsoons. Both are highly
vulnerable to climate change. Like all high-altitude
glaciers those in HKH have experienced rapid
recession.
The indispensability of irrigation for Pakistan’s
agriculture sector is a crucial determinant of its
vulnerability given the likely decline (up to 25%
according to some estimates) in surface water due
to recession of glaciers and variable precipitation
from the monsoons’ winds. With 80% of our
staple grains dependent on irrigated farming, any
reduction in water supply will cause a drop in food
production and threaten our fragile food security.t
Agriculture and Livestock sector contributes a
fifth to our GDP; provide 40% of all jobs; supports
livelihoods of the majority of our population in the
rural areas; and nearly 80% of raw material for our
largely agro-based exports. This is a serious source
of vulnerability.
Population explosion illustrated by a six-fold
increase in population (from 32 million in 1947 to
around 200 million at present) constitutes a major
factor of vulnerability.
Pakistan’s 1000 km long coastline exposes our
coastal cities and communities to all the socio-
economic and humanitarian consequences of
higher sea levels destroying human settlements
and livelihoods and contaminating surface and
ground water sources.
Unabated de-forestation in Pakistan
accentuates our vulnerability given the vital role
of forests in restraining flooding and providing
livelihoods. The non-physical causes of Pakistan’s
climate-related vulnerability include: low rates
of economic development leading to growing
unemployment and poverty; inefficient and
unaccountable governance; mismanagement of
fiscal and other resources; endemic corruption;
huge losses made by large state-owned and state-
run enterprises; terrorism linked to Pakistan’s
Green Book 2019 143
 PAKISTAN ARMY

involvement on conflicts in the region and religious The Human and National Security Impacts
extremism; decaying physical infrastructure and of Climate Change
decadent human resources; and unsatisfactory
relations with neighbours warranting growing Pakistan’s national security narrative has,
expenditure on defence exacerbate Pakistan’s by and large, emphasised the military dimension
acute vulnerability to the disruptive and destructive given our seven decades long adversarial relations
effects of global warming and climate change. with India and our turbulent relations with
Pakistan’s macro-level fault lines which are Afghanistan. However, as articulated by our
likely to be amplified by climate change impacts political leaders and armed forces’ chiefs as well
such as rising sea level, recession of HKH glaciers, as national security experts and Think Tanks, our
erratic monsoons, decline in availability and national security doctrine must include recognition
deterioration of the quality of fresh water and of socio-economic development, human resources,
the consequent decrease in already stagnant national health, the state’s capacity to deliver
agricultural productivity, increase in the frequency justice, basic social amenities and timely relief to
and severity of floods , droughts, hurricanes, heat people affected by floods, droughts, heat waves and
waves and storms coupled with poor governance other extreme weather events as key determinants
will further slowdown socio-economic development and paramount objectives of our national security.
and make poverty eradication virtually impossible. It is widely recognised that the adverse socio-
The sectors especially sensitive to the adverse economic consequences of climate change would
effects of climate change include: agriculture and make adequate military budgets in-feasible.
livestock; energy production affected by non- Frequent extreme events such as floods and
availability of water droughts would directly
needed for hydroelectric threaten vital military

‘‘
plants; health care; and strategic assets and
disaster prevention and A likely decline in the flows of the installations such as
management capacity at Indus River due to climate change military cantonments;
national and provincial hydropower and nuclear
levels; arid and semi- impacts is likely to accentuate tensions power generation
arid regions. These in Indo-Pak relations. Similarly, a capacities; railways,
adverse impacts will also roads and other
exacerbate political and
decrease in the inflows of the Kabul transport infrastructure.
social conflicts, including River originating in Afghanistan could These will necessitate
inter-regional and intra-
‘‘
cause additional strains in our accident- increasing involvement
regional differences.17 of our military forces
prone ties with Afghanistan in providing relief
Nearly 80% of the
waters of the Indus assistance and
River Basin originate outside Pakistan, in Tibet rehabilitation of vital infrastructure which would
plateau, in India, and in Afghanistan which mean thinning down their presence in sensitive
makes continued access to trans-boundary rivers border regions and other locations.
a national security imperative. A likely decline in Our defence forces can make invaluable
the flows of the Indus River due to climate change contribution to efforts to alleviate the hardships
impacts is likely to accentuate tensions in Indo-Pak caused by extreme weather events linked to
relations. Similarly, a decrease in the inflows of the climate change, such as the 2010 country wide
Kabul River originating in Afghanistan could cause floods and more recently the planting of ten million
additional strains in our accident-prone ties with saplings by armed forces’ personnel on the specific
Afghanistan.18 orders of the Army Chief as a corollary of the new
government’s tree plantation campaign.
The armed forces can also contribute to the
mitigation of’ and adaptation to climate change
in Pakistan through large scale afforestation,
protection of water resources, especially the large
lakes in Sindh and Punjab, from pollution caused by
dumping of industrial, agricultural and municipal
waste; climate friendly procurement, production
and consumption practices by all defence
enterprises; mobilisation of retired personnel
for strengthening the resilience of communities
threatened by climate disasters etc.

144 Green Book 2019

 Chief of the Army Staff General Qamar Javed
Bajwa initiated a nationwide plantation drive
with the objective of planting 10 million trees

Pakistan‘s Response to Climate Change The most significant climate change-related

related Challenges development is the enactment by our parliament
in 2017 of a Climate Change Act. The Act provides
The first significant initiative undertaken for a potentially robust institutional architecture
by Pakistan to address the challenges posed by for addressing climate-related risks. It envisions
climate change was the establishment, in October the establishment of a National Climate Change
2008, of a multi-stakeholder Task Force on Climate Council (NCCC), headed by the Prime Minister
Change (TFCC) under the umbrella of the Planning or a Minister nominated by him and comprising
Commission. The TFCC produced a comprehensive the Chief Ministers of provinces and key federal
report in 2010 succinctly listing the negative effects ministers.
of climate change on our key economic sectors, our
The NCCC is mandated to approve national
communities, and animal and plant species and
climate-related policies and coordinate their
suggested a number of policy measures to alleviate
them. In 2014, a National Climate Change Policy
(NCCP) was developed enumerating over a hundred
policy measures related to energy, water resources,
food production, health, disaster prevention and
management and coastal regions and the Indus
Delta. The NCCP was largely anchored in the
report of the TFCC. The Ministry of Climate Change
formulated a National Sustainable Development
Strategy (NSDS) in 2012 but failed to promote its
wide acceptance by the Federal and Provincial
Governments.

Green Book 2019 145

 PAKISTAN ARMY

‘‘ Pakistan has made considerable efforts to increase hydropower generation

‘‘
capacity; develop renewable energy resources such as solar and wind; and promote
efficiency

implementation. The Act also provides for the
formation of a National Climate Change Authority
(NCCA) to approve climate change programmes and
projects, particularly those submitted for funding by
the UN Green Climate Fund and other multilateral
finance windows, including the International
Finance Institutions (IFIs).The Act also calls for
the establishment of a National Climate Change
Fund for activities unlikely to receive funding
from external sources.19 The previous Government
had also decided to strengthen the Global Change
Impact Study Centre (GCISC) as the country’s
major climate-related Research and Development
(R&D) Centre. The success of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa
provincial Government’s Billion Tree Campaign is
globally acclaimed.
Apart from the initiatives specifically described
as being climate change-related, Pakistan has
made considerable efforts to increase hydropower
generation capacity; develop renewable energy
resources such as solar and wind; and promote
efficiency in use of economic side energy.
Pakistan’s environmental community has
supported all these initiatives whilst criticising
a number of large coal-based power projects,
including those under the China Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC) which has increased our historically
low coal-base power generation capacity. Since 2010,
Pakistan has established an elaborate institutional
infrastructure comprising disaster risk reduction
and management authorities at the federal and
provincial levels and formulated comprehensive
disaster-related strategies and plans of action. The
speed of implementation of the disaster-related
policies has been impeded by resource constraints.
The adoption of Pakistan’s first ever National
Water Policy (NWP) based on the paradigm of
Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM)
formulated by the Federal Government and
endorsed by all the Provincial Governments in
April 2018 constitutes a historic political and
institutional development. It is a timely initiative
given that almost all the impacts of climate change
would affect the supply and quality of water.
The NWP calls for a substantial increase in
federal and provincial public sector investment in
projects related to fresh water resources which had
stagnated at low levels over the past several decades.
It also calls for strengthening the institutional
capacities of the state to conserve and develop
our water resources in order to forestall a looming
crisis of existential nature.20 A review of Pakistan’s
climate change policy landscape calls out a number
of deficits and fault lines. These include lack of
harmony among different sectors and sectoral
policies; lack of coordination and coherence between
the federal and provincial governments; inadequate
financial and human resources causing delay in the

Pakistan could face

mass droughts by
2025 as water level
near ‘absolute
scarcity’
Rachel Roberts
The Independent 15 September 2017

Pakistan could face drought in the near future, experts have warned in a fresh report: Unicef
 PAKISTAN ARMY

operationalisation of the mechanisms enshrined in

the landmark National Climate Bill; and the inability
of the Federal Ministry of Climate Change to promote
country-wide policies on climate change owing
to chronic fiscal and human resource limitations.
Pakistan has neither been able to translate its NCCP
into operational strategies and plans of action nor
forged cooperative ties with China and other friendly
countries able and evidently willing to support
its climate change initiatives. The unprecedented
emphasis laid by the newly elected Government on
environmental protection has rekindled hopes for
greater attention by the state and non-state stake
holders to climate change adaptation and mitigation.

The Way Ahead

In August 2013 the Government reconstituted
the erstwhile Defence Committee of the Cabinet as
the Cabinet Committee On National Security (CCNS)
with a mandate to “frame a national security policy”
that would focus on national security agenda with
the aim to formulate a National Security Policy
which will become the guiding framework for its
subsidiary policies-defence Policy, foreign policy,
internal security and other policies affecting
national security. Subsequently a National Security
Adviser was appointed and a National Security
Secretariat was established. However, this far no
comprehensive national security policy has been
evolved.
It is recommended that the Government
consider the development of a detailed national
security policy (NSP) to guide security-related
initiatives. The NSP should, inter alia, recognise
climate change as a key factor of national security
in view of the profound implications of this multi-
dimensional challenge on our critical economic
sectors and our quest for sustainable development
and poverty eradication.
Such recognition will lend impetus to the
coordinated implementation of the NCCP and help
in reducing the adverse effects of climate change. Our
defence forces should consider the formulation of a
framework policy on their contributions to climate
change mitigation and adaptation as a significant
input to the formulation and implementation of
Pakistan’s NSP. Government should make renewed
efforts to promote cooperation with India, China,
and Afghanistan on trans-boundary rivers and
other climate related issues. Common challenges
Prime Minister Imran Khan inaugurating
Tree Plantation Campaign
posed by climate change in South Asia, which could
be addressed through greater regional cooperation
include: rising temperatures; extreme weather
events; glacier melting; sea level rise; infectious
diseases; and black carbon. The achievement of
this objective would necessitate strengthening of
the capacities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
institutions entrusted to address climate change-
related actions.
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy must integrate
climate change imperatives in its core mandates
and functions with a view to enhancing
Pakistan’s contribution to the global climate
change conferences and secure support from
the international community for mitigation and
adaptation efforts.
Pakistan should make efforts to resuscitate the
plans of actions approved by SAARC summit and
ministerial meetings for enhanced cooperation
in addressing climate change-related challenges,
including food, energy, and health security as well
as preventing and managing extreme events likely
to be multiplied by climate change.
Conclusion
The multiple adverse impacts of climate change
and their undeniable implications on Pakistan’s
human and national security cannot be countered
by a “business as usual attitude” by the state and

‘‘ The NSP should, inter alia, recognise climate change as a key factor of national
security in view of the profound implications of this multi dimensional challenge on
‘‘
our critical economic sectors and our quest for sustainable development and poverty
eradication

Green Book 2019 147

 PAKISTAN ARMY
non-state stake holders. Nor is this a sectoral issue
to be handled by an inadequately resourced federal
and equally crippled provincial climate change
ministries and departments. What is urgently
needed is a “whole of government approach” toward
Notes
1. United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change, unfccc.int,1992https://
unfccc.int/ resource/docs/ convkp/conveng.pdf
2. United Nations Security Council holds first-ever debate on impact of climate
change on peace, security, hearing over 50 speakers. 17 April 2007. https://
www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc9000.doc.htm> United Nations General Assembly.
General Debate of the 64th Session. September 2009. https://www.un.org/ga/64/
generaldebate/
3. Kakakhel, Shafqat. Climate Change Impacts and Security Implications for
Pakistan.Islamabad. Institute of Strategic Studies. 2016
4. United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change, unfccc.int, 1992
https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf
5. Climate Change the IPCC Scientific Assessment. www.ipcc.ch. 1990.https://www.
ipcc.ch/ipccreports/far/wg_I/ipcc_far_wg_I_full_report.pdf
6. Kyoto Protocol To The United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change.
unfccc.int. 1997. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/kpeng.pdf
7. Climate Change 2014 Synthesis report. www.ipcc.ch. 2014. https://www.ipcc.ch/
pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf
8. Paris Agreement.unfccc.int. 2015.https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_
nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf
9. Ibid
10. Hai-BinZhanga, Han-ChengDaib, Hua-XiaLaic, and Wen-TaoWang. US.
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement: Reasons, impacts, and China’s response.
Volume 8, Issue 4, December 2017, Pages 220-225.
148 Green Book 2019
climate change informed by scientifically credible
knowledge and regularly updated data guiding
efforts at local, provincial, and national levels
augmented by robust regional and international
cooperation.
11. Majaw, Baniateilang. Climate Change and South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation: a Regional Response. Volume 4, No 2, 2012 ISSN: 1309-8063
12. Bodansky, Daniel. The History of the Global Climate Change Regime. 1988. http://
graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/admininst/shared/doc-
professors/luterbacher%20chapter%202%20102.pdf
13. United Nations General Assembly. Climate Change and its possible security
implications. http://www.un.org. 2009. http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/resources/
res_pdfs/ga-64/SGReport_on_Climate_Change_and_security.pdf
14. United Nations General Assembly resolutions on debate on Climate Change and
its possible security implications Session A/64/350
15. Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. http://www.ipcc.ch. 2013-2014.
http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/
16. Ghazi ,TariqWaseem.,Muniruzzaman A.N.M.,and Singh A.K.Climate Change and
peace in South Asia Cooperating for peace. GMACCC Papers. 2016
17. Task Force on Climate Change.Planning Commission of Pakistan. 2010. http://
www.mocc.gov.pk/moclc/userfiles1/file/MOC/Publications%20on%20Env%20
and%20CC/Reports/TFCC%20Final%20Report%2019%20Feb%202010.pdf
18. Kakakhel, Shafqat. Afghanistan-Pakistan Treaty on the Kabul River Basin?
thethirdpole.net. 2017. https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/2017/03/02/afghanistan-
pakistan-treaty-on-the-kabul-river-basin/
19. Pakistan Climate Change Act 2017. Islamabad. http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/
documents/1491459994_555.pdf
20. National Water Policy 2018.Government of Pakistan.http://www.ffc.gov.pk/
download/AFR/National%20Water%20Policy%20-April%202018%20FINAL.pdf
PAKISTAN ARMY

Green Book 2019 149

 PAKISTAN ARMY

CYBERSECURITY:
AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF
NATIONAL SECURITY

150 Green Book 2019


Brigadier Dr Abdul Rauf is serving in
Pakistan Army
Brigadier Dr Ashraf Masood, (Retired)
is an Adjunct Faculty member at the
Department of Information Security,
Military College of Signals (MCS-NUST),
Rawalpindi
Ms Narmeen Shafqat is Lecturer at the
Department of Information Security,
Military College of Signals (MCS-NUST),
Rawalpindi
PAKISTAN ARMY
Abstract
The increasing reliance on Information and Communication
Technology (ICT) for routine tasks has intensified the sophistication
and frequency of cyber-attacks manifolds. Apart from data leakage,
financial losses and disruption of normal functioning of the digital
infrastructure, cyber-attacks can also pose a pernicious threat to the
national security, stability, economic vitality and public health. It is
for this reason that cyberspace is believed to be the fifth dimension of
military war, after air, water, land and space.1 Many countries across
the world have also accepted cyber-attacks as a top national security
threat and therefore the development of defensive and offensive
cyber capabilities is fostered to cope up with this growing cyber peril.
Pakistan, unfortunately, is busy in fighting an aggressive war against
terrorism along with dilemmas of poverty, illiteracy, corruption etc
Owing to this, cybersecurity has not been considered as an integral
element of the National Security Policy of Pakistan. However, few
initiatives have been taken at national and organisational level to
curb cyber menace and build cybersecurity capacity in Pakistan. In
an endeavour to improve the security of the national cyberspace,
this document highlights the existing and emerging threats posed
to Pakistan’s cyberspace. The comparative analysis of contemporary
National Cybersecurity Strategies of leading countries has also
been carried out, based on which recommendations are provided to
improve national cyberspace security. This will ultimately guarantee
national security from evolving cyber-attacks.
Keywords: Cybersecurity, Pakistan’s Cyberspace, Threat Landscape,
National Security, Cyber-attacks
Green Book 2019 151
 T
PAKISTAN ARMY

he concept of National Security was

originally confined to the military
security or protection of country’s
sovereignty against external military
agents. However, with time, it has evolved
to include some non-military aspects like
human security, energy security, economic stability,
cybersecurity, environmental security, freedom from
political coercion etc
Like Information and Communication
Technology (ICT) has revolutionised all sectors
(including finance, telecom, academia, energy,
transport, government etc), nation-states have
also employed ICT for the development of smart
weapons, intelligence monitoring, data mining,
emergency operations etc2 to enhance national
security and public safety. However, this increasing
reliance on Internet and ICT and the simultaneous
increase in frequency of cyber-attacks, have now
made cybersecurity one of the most crucial aspect
of national security.
In layman's terms, cybersecurity is referred to
as the protection of IT systems from damage, the
resident information from unauthorised access or
modification and the network and e-services from
being disrupted by the cyber-offenders.
Thus, any deliberate exploitation of ICT
systems, applications, e-services or network to
gain unauthorised access, expose or alter data,
disrupt online services etc, fall under the category
of cyber-attack.
Countries should therefore assume their
responsibility for securing the fraction of the digital
domain that they operate in, also referred to as the
national cyberspace.

Effects of Cyber Attacks on National Security

The Global Attack Timeline shown here depicts
that the frequency of cyber-attacks has drastically
increased over the recent years with attacks
becoming deadly than ever. Today, cyber-attacks
occur after every 39 seconds; sometimes causing
breach of integrity, confidentiality and availability
of data, and other times incurring heavy financial
loss.

‘‘ Increasing reliance on Internet and

ICT and the simultaneous increase in
frequency of cyber-attacks, have now
made cybersecurity one of the most ‘‘
crucial aspect of national security

152 Green Book 2019

 PAKISTAN ARMY

‘‘ In layman's terms, Cybersecurity Cyber-attacks have even caused explosions in

a furnace at German Steel Mill and a pipeline in
is referred to as the protection of IT
Iranian Petro-chemical company in 2014 and 2016
systems from damage, the resident respectively.
information from unauthorised access
or modification and the network and
‘‘
e-services from being disrupted by the
cyber-offenders

According to Symantec’s Internet Security

Threat Report, as more and more devices get
connected, the average cost of a data breach will go
beyond $150 million by year 2020.3
Few notorious cyber-attacks of the past have
also raised extreme concerns about national
security as well. The unprecedented wave of
powerful attacks that hit national websites and IT
systems of Estonia in 2007, exposed sensitive data
and rendered many IT systems useless. Few years
later, the Iranian Nuclear Facility was struck by
“Stuxnet” attack. This attack utilised a specially
crafted worm to infiltrate numerous computers in
the facility and destroyed one-fifth of the nuclear
centrifuges. The Stuxnet attack, if not stopped
timely, could have wreaked havoc in Iran.4

Stuxnet destroyed one-fifth of Iran's

Nuclear Centrifuges
Explosion in Gas Pipeline of Marun Oil and Gas
Production Company, Iran in July 2016 is believed
to have been caused by cyber-attack.7

These explosions caused by cyber-attacks are

a threat to human lives as well. It is believed that
the loss incurred by organised cyber-attacks can
even exceed the loss caused by a natural calamity
Also, a Saudi Energy Company “Aramco” was
or physical terrorism.8
hit by the “Disttrack Wiper” Malware in 2016.
It damaged around 30,000 computers and also
caused two weeks of system unavailability in the “Sophisticated and virtually untraceable
company.5 With the passage of time, cyber-attacks political ‘hacktivists’ may now possess the
grew more and more powerful. ability to disrupt or destroy government
Furnace at a German Steel Mill blown up by operations, banking transactions, city power
cyber-attack. 6 grids, and even military weapon system’’.

Stephan Herzog, Security Expert

In the worst scenario, cyber-attacks can also
trigger inadvertent cyber wars between nations
or groups. Hence, national security necessitates
effective security of the national cyberspace.

Green Book 2019 153

 PAKISTAN ARMY

Amid cyber-attacks, countries across the world Edward Snowden, NSA Whistleblower
have made cybersecurity an important constituent
Despite escalating cyber risks to the national
of their National Security Strategies. More than 50
cyberspace, Pakistan has not paid heed to this
countries, including USA, UK, Singapore, Estonia
critical issue of cybersecurity. According to the
etc, have even formulated detailed National Cyber
Guardian’s report, Edward Snowden claimed that
Security Strategies (NCSS) and have allocated
Pakistan is the second most spied over country by
massive budgets for national cybersecurity
NSA.10
initiatives.
In a report published by Microsoft in year 2015,11
Pakistan was reported to be the most malicious
country of the world. Despite these revelations,
Pakistan still has no National Cybersecurity
Paralysis of IT Panic / Cyber Strategy, Cyber Regulatory Framework or dedicated
Systems Terrorism government organisation responsible for securing
the national cyberspace. With regard to the
government’s commitment and dedication to
cybersecurity, the Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI)
ranks Pakistan at 67th position, as opposed to India
Effects of
Inadvertent Collapse of at 23rd position.12 If cybersecurity is taken for granted
Cyber Attacks
Cyber Wars Critical for long, Pakistan may suffer deleterious security
on National
Security e-services breaches, incidents involving cyber vandalism,
massive financial losses and in the worst case,
physical damage to IT infrastructure or casualties
as well.
Loss of Critical Massive
Information Financial Emerging Cyber Threats to Pakistan
Losses
The cheap access to Internet and increased
utilisation of smart-phones in Pakistan have increased
the usage of Internet in daily affairs, e-banking,
Edward Snowden, a popular whistleblower e-commerce, academia etc, in the past couple of
revealed in year 2013 that National Security Agency years. According to Pakistan Telecommunication
(NSA, USA) is carrying out extensive surveillance Authority (PTA), Pakistan has around 47.5 million
of information infrastructure world wide.9 This internet users (nearly 22% internet penetration rate).
revelation triggered the establishment of cyber-
capability and development of secure indigenous
IT products in many countries.
Edward Snowden, NSA
Whistleblower

Out of these Internet users (also called as

netizens), 35 million people actively use social
networking websites and applications like
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp etc13 This
has made the diameter of potential cyber threat
scenario more sophisticated and complex than
ever before.

‘‘ More than 50 countries, including USA, UK, Singapore, Estonia etc, have even
‘‘
formulated detailed National Cybersecurity Strategies (NCSS) and have allocated
massive budgets for National Cybersecurity Initiatives

154 Green Book 2019

 PAKISTAN ARMY

‘‘ Owing to the lack of cyber- has become a lucrative target for cyber-adversaries.
Researchers consider Pakistan’s thriving IT sector
awareness amongst the masses and and the recently introduced 3G/4G networks as the
technical malpractices, Pakistan has major future hotbeds for cyber-attacks in Pakistan.
become a lucrative target for cyber-
adversaries. Researchers consider Digital Snapshot - Pakistan (2018)
Pakistan’s thriving IT sector and the
recently introduced 3G/4G networks
‘‘
as the major future hotbeds for cyber-
attacks in Pakistan

Internet Stats of Pakistan, 201814

In the early twentieth century, the cyber risks
posed to the national cyberspace of Pakistan were
only confined to website defacements and small-
scale hacking and intruding attempts carried out
via malware infections. However, as the cyber-
attacks acquired momentum, the attack trend
shifted to spamming (junk emails), phishing
(lure victim to disclose sensitive information) and
botnets (army of compromised devices) in 2005.
Eventually the trend moved to Advanced
Persistent Threats (APTs i.e. powerful stealth
attacks) in 2010. Later in 2015, the attacks on
cryptographic keys and digital certificates were
increased. Currently, cyber espionage attacks
carried out by foreign intelligence agencies are on
the rise.15
Owing to the lack of cyber-awareness amongst
the masses and technical malpractices, Pakistan
Population Internet Users Social Media Users
210 Million 47.5 Million 32 Million
Other cyber-attacks targeting Pakistan are
likely to evolve from following domains in the near
future:
── The increased usage of social technology/
networking apps will increase possibilities of
abuse, misuse, data theft and identity theft.
── The existence of cryptocurrency miners
(compromising victim PC to use it for running
crypto-mining script) and social bots (bots
controlling social networking accounts) are
likely to emerge as well.
── The usage of mobile computing platforms for
carrying out regular financial transactions

CYBER THREAT EVOLUTION IN PAKISTAN

ATTACKS ON
Social Technology
Mobile Computing
2010 Critical Infrastructure
Worms, Backdoor, Cloud Computing
Website Attacks IoT Networks
Trust Infrastructures
2000 Big Data
Worms, Backdoor,
Website Attacks

2015
Attacks on crypto
keys & certi cates
2005
Botnets, Spams,
Phishing, Session
Hijacking
< 2000
Viruses, Password
Crackers
 PAKISTAN ARMY

and weak Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) ransomwares and Artificial Intelligence
policies at work-environment will increase (AI) powered attack tools to compromise IT
cross-platform attacks using botnets, drive-by systems in Pakistan.
exploits, malware, phishing etc. ── The growing global trend of ransomwares like
── Critical Information Infrastructures of WannaCry, Not Petya etc will be a matter of
Internet Service Providers (ISPs), Internet great concern for Pakistan as well.
Exchange Points etc will be the focused target
of cyber-attacks in near future, since the Cyber Threat Landscape of Pakistan
effect on cyber-attacks here can be incredibly
Cyber Threat Landscape of any country is
disruptive.
referred to as the cyber-attack vectors (attack
── The growing trend of Cloud Computing methods) and the cyber threat agents (adversaries)
and Internet of Things (IoT) in Pakistan that harm the national cyberspace.16
is giving rise to a wave of attacks as well. Since the cyber activities go unchecked in
Cloud computing involves a shared pool of Pakistan, the rate of cyber-crimes has dramatically
computing resources for data storage etc, and increased in the recent years. This necessitates
hence cyber-attack on one party may affect thorough understanding of the threat landscape of
other as well. The idea of Internet of Things Pakistan in order to recommend effective measures
(IoT) is to connect everyday computing to defend the national cyberspace.
devices e.g. TV, washing machine, lights etc
with the Internet which ultimately increases
the attack surface as well.
Cyber Attack Vectors
The cyber-perpetrators targeting Pakistan’s
── Trust Infrastructures (i.e. ICT systems
providing authentication services to establish cyberspace generally make use of malware
secure communication) are also on risk. infections, especially Trojans and worms. These
Thus, drive-by exploits, spear phishing, malwares help the attacker acquire unauthorised
APTs, ineffective security controls etc, will be access to victim’s computer, gather sensitive
a matter of high concern in future. information or disrupt normal operations of the IT
systems.
── The growing trend of big data has also opened As already stated, the Microsoft’s Security
wide doors for crimes like data theft and Intelligence Report (Vol-19, 2015) highlights
manipulation.
Pakistan as the most compromised country in the
── Researchers believe that hackers will make world with malware encounter rate (ER) of 45.1%,
increased use of sandbox-evading malwares, as opposed to world’s rate of 14.8%.17

Trends for the five locations with the highest encounter rates in 2015 (100,000 reporting computers minimum)

70%
Pakistan
Indonesia
Encounter rate (percent of all reporting computers)

60% Palestinian
Authority
Bangladesh
50% Nepal

40%

30%

20% Worldwide

10%

0%
1Q15 2Q15 3Q15 4Q15

Pakistan with highest Malware ER (Microsoft Intelligence Report v. 19)18

156 Green Book 2019

 PAKISTAN ARMY

‘‘
Unfortunately, the malware encounter rate of
Pakistan has continued to stay in the list of top five Anti-Pakistan hackers frequently
compromised countries of the world and it does deface websites of government
not seem to reduce, until all netizens adopt secure organisations, military etc, with
cyber practices.
racist, blasphemous, vulgar, politically
subversive, or slanderous content,
50
Pakistan
‘‘
followed by actions like data theft,
40 data manipulation
30
ER
20 Today, cyber-criminals have made Electronic
Forgery of mark sheets, certificates, currency
World rate notes, revenue stamps, etc a lucrative business.
10
The increasing trend of Intellectual Property
Crimes related to software piracy, infringement of
0
2014 2015 2016 2017
CYBER ATTACKS ON PAKISTAN
Year
BEFORE 2013
Pakistan with highest Malware ER NBP E-Theft: Loss Rs 14 M
(Results gathered from Microsoft Intelligence Report v. 19 to v22)19 Burj Bank (2012): DB leaked
FBISE (2007): Result Leaked
1 day before
NTC Server compromised
(2010): 40 Government sites
Apart from malware infections, cyber-stalking hacked
is also a pervasive cyber nuisance in Pakistan. 2013
Around 80% of the cyber complaints reported to HEC:48k users DB leaked
HBL: Employee DB leaked
National Response Centre for Cyber Crime (NR3C) PKNIC: 23k accounts leaked
PIA: E- Tickets of $7M stolen
last year pertained to cyber-stalking of female NADRA E.Sahulat: DB leaked
community on Facebook/Twitter.20 This is often
2014 - 15
followed by incidents of cyber harassment or cyber- Warid: Customer DB leaked
bullying, where private pictures or conversations OpPakistani: 10 Government
are leaked, and the victim is blackmailed. Mostly, sites hacked, 23k bank records
leaked
Spam and Phishing Emails carrying malicious 2016
attachment or drive-by-download un-wittingly CTB Locker Ransomware:
download malwares on victim’s system and help locked a Government site,
loss of Rs 0.5 M
the attacker comprise it easily.
2017 - 18
Moreover, anti-Pakistan hackers frequently HBL ATM Hacking: loss 10M,
deface websites of government organisations, 579 customers affected
WannaCry Ransomware:
military etc, with racist, blasphemous, vulgar, State Life Insurance, Shaukat
politically subversive, or slanderous content, Khanum Hospital etc affected
followed by actions like data theft, data Careem Data Leak: Details of
0.5 M Pakistanis exposed
manipulation, etc Unfortunately, the websites
of PTA, Ministry of Railways, Supreme Court, Notorious Cyber-Attacks
Establishment Division etc have been hacked more (less website defacements)
than once, but are still insecure. The forthcoming
cyber-attacks timeline depicts that there have been copyrights, trademarks violations, etc, have also
some security breaches in the history of Pakistan, incurred huge financial losses to victims. Lastly,
that have exposed sensitive details of thousands of tides of Cyber Warfare and Cyber Terrorism also
netizens and incurred financial losses as well. present a horrid threat to the national cyberspace
To add further, Dissemination of Offensive of Pakistan.
Material like sexually explicit content, racist
propaganda etc on social media is also causing Cyber Threat Agents
nuisance in Pakistan’s cyberspace. The Illegal
Usage of cyberspace by terrorists and Interception Threat Agent embodies all entities that can
of VoIP Gateways for international calling are also cause, spread, or support a cyber-threat/crime.
currently a menace. Amongst these, the Indian state-sponsored hackers

Green Book 2019 157

 PAKISTAN ARMY
Homepage of NR3C, FIA21
are the most active adversary, Various Cyber
Hacktivists (hackers with political agenda) also
frequently deface government websites as protest
against electricity load-shedding, high internet
charges etc. Similarly, cyber espionage attempts
conducted by Foreign Intelligence Agencies in
search of information on sensitive domestic data,
nuclear programmes, trade secrets etc, are also
very alarming.
Since cyber crime legislation, “Prevention of
Electronic Crime Act 2016”, is not strictly enforced
in the country, therefore cyber-offenders are free
to commit cybercrimes. The insiders/employees
often misuse their privileges and exfiltrate sensitive
information from companies’ computers. Similarly,
competitors are in a continuous struggle to get
competitive advantage over their rivals through
offensive tactics e.g. hacking, electronic vandalism,
social engineering intelligence etc. Moreover,
Scammers, APT Agents, script kiddies, crackers
and Cyber Jihadis (particularly Al-Qaeda) are also
harming the national cyberspace by regularly
launching cyber-attacks.
Since the use of IT is not widespread in
Pakistan, therefore the rate of cybercrimes is
significantly lower than in the first-world countries.
However, the absence of cyber accountability and
prevalence of cyber malpractices are likely to
increase the cybercrimes beyond bounds in near
158 Green Book 2019
future. The government should, therefore, adopt a
pragmatic approach for reducing the cyber-attack
surface; else national security will be at risk as well.
Cybersecurity Initiatives taken in Pakistan
Since cybersecurity is not a matter of utmost
importance for Pakistan, no National Cybersecurity
Coordinating Body has ever been created.
NR3C working under Federal Investigation
Agency (FIA) is addressing cyber-crimes in
the country. Also, the National Telecom and
Information Technology Security Board (NTISB), a
wing of Cabinet Division has been made responsible
for advising government on cybersecurity Issues
and carrying out security assessment of IT products
to be used in government organisations.
Cyber Laws
In the absence of any dedicated Cybersecurity
Strategy, the Government of Pakistan has
extended the applicability of various computer and
internet related laws to govern and regulate the
national Cyberspace.22 The Section 54 of Pakistan
Telecommunications (Re-organisation) Act 1996
and Surveillance 101/ Fair Trial Act 2013 allow state
and military to conduct online surveillance in “the
interest of national security”. The National IT Policy
and Action Plan issued in 2000 partially dealt with

child online safety, provided minimum encryption
standards, encouraged digital signatures and
setting up of a local mail exchange.
Moreover, the e-commerce and e-banking
industry of Pakistan abide by the Electronic
Transaction Ordinance (ETO-2002) and Payment
Systems and Electronic Fund Transfer Act 2007.
The electronic and broadcast media are regulated
in Pakistan through the Pakistan Electronic
Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA Ordinance
2002, 2007). Furthermore, Laws for Child Online
Protection are enacted through Section 293 of
Pakistan Penal Code, while online cases of slander,
libel and blasphemy are dealt with The Defamation
Ordinance (2002, 2004) and Sections 295 and 298 of
Pakistan Penal Code.
Cybercrime Legislation
In the past, cyber-criminals were penalised
through legislations like Electronic Crimes Act 2004
and Prevention of Electronic Crimes Ordinance
(PECO 2007 and 2009). Today cyber-crimes are dealt
under Prevention of Electronic Crime Act (PECA,
2016).
PECA provides penalties for almost all major
electronic crimes, cyber terrorism and cases of
child pornography. However, it has not been
strictly enforced as yet, owing to the unavailability
of pertinent investigation infrastructure and lack of
training of judges on various cyber laws.
E-Regulations
Apart from these IT laws, the government
has also issued several e-regulations23 like Net
Café Regulation, Retention of Internet logs (for
record), Monitoring of Voice over Internet Protocol
(VoIP 2009, 2013), Protection from Spam and
obnoxious communication (2009), SMS Filtering
(2011), Internet & E-Mail Policy for Government
Departments (2009, 2011) etc Also, an Inter-
Ministerial Committee was formed in 2006 to
Cyber Secure Pakistan (CSP) Awareness Seminar (February 2018)
PAKISTAN ARMY
regularly evaluate online content. Since then,
blasphemous sites, pornographic material and
anti-state links are regularly blocked.24
Incident Management Capabilities
To deter national cyber-attacks, Computer
Emergency Response Team (CERT) like Pak CERT
(2001), Pisa CERT (2009), and NUST CERT (2013)
were established at national, private and academic
levels. However, none of them is operational now.
Currently, cyber-crimes are reported to NR3C
through online portal and cyber hotline. The
respective forensic investigations are carried out
by the Punjab Forensic Science Agency and Digital
Forensics Science Laboratory.25
National Cybersecurity Awareness Initiatives
Government organisations, including State
Bank of Pakistan (SBP), Securities and Exchange
Commission of Pakistan (SECP), PTA, NTISB etc,
have issued Cybersecurity Guidelines for creating
cyber-awareness amongst their employees and
regularly trains them in the field of Information
Security (IS) as well. Public and private sectors
organisations (particularly NR3C and PISA)
and Civil Protection Agencies, have organised
Awareness Seminars and campaigns to raise
cyber-awareness amongst the masses.26 Academic
institutes also play their part by organising
cybersecurity conferences on annual or bi-annual
basis.
Cybersecurity Manpower Development
Currently, no cybersecurity education is
provided in schools and colleges of Pakistan. At
undergraduate level, few institutions like NUST
and COMSATS are already offering specialised IS
subjects (e.g. Digital Forensics, Network Security
etc) as part of few BE degrees (e.g. Software
Engineering, Computer Science etc). However,
Air University and UET Taxila will be the first to
Green Book 2019 159
 PAKISTAN ARMY
introduce Cybersecurity Degree Programmes at
undergraduate level this year.
MS/PhD programmes in cybersecurity are
currently offered in several academic institutes in
twin cities like NUST, Riphah University, COMSATS,
CASE, Air University etc NR3C has also started
Cybersecurity Scouts Initiative to train students
in order to combat cyber-crimes at the grass-root
level.27
To build cyber capacity, NIMIS, MCS-
NUST, Riphah University, NR3C and Institute
of Cybersecurity (ICS) conducts Cybersecurity
Training Programmes for students and
professionals on regular basis. Cybersecurity
Research Centres particularly Pakistan Research
Center for Cyber Security (PRCCS), Centre for
Network-Centric Technologies (CENTech) etc have
been established to promote development and
usage of secure indigenous IT products in Pakistan.
Fortunately, CENTech has been successful in
certifying Pakistan’s first ever crypto module
“Tahir Pak Crypto Library” (TPCL) from Federal
Information Processing Standards (FIPS).28
Recently, National Centre for Cyber Security
(NCCS) has been established in Pakistan to
conduct Research and Development (R&D) on IoT
security, Block chain, Quantum Technology, Deep
Packet Inspection (DPI), development of secure
indigenous IT products, protection of critical
infrastructure, etc.
160 Green Book 2019
IS Service and Certification Providers
Few public and private sector organisations
of Pakistan including Ebryx, Trillium, Tranchulas,
Security Experts, i2C, MTBC, TransICT etc are
already providing IS services (cyber risk mitigation,
vulnerability assessment, forensic analysis,
security audit etc) and consultancy to few national
as well as international organisations.29
National and International Collaborations for
Cybersecurity
Pakistan has no government-approved venture
or framework for the exchange of cybersecurity
assets (people, processes, tools) with the national
or international community. However, there exists
a collaborative project, PISA R3C that promotes
public-private partnerships (PPP) to enhance
national cyber skillset and resources. With regard
to International Cooperation, Pakistan has
collaboration with ITU-IMPACT, Digital Crimes
Consortium of USA, ICANN, G8 High Tech Crime
Network (HTCN) etc and Global CERTs like APSIRC-
WG and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
(OIC-CERT).30 For a country like Pakistan, having
netizens amounting up to 47.5 million and potent
cyber enemies, there is a dire need to secure
the cyberspace to ensure that communication,
e-commerce and other electronic services run
smoothly and efficiently.
 PAKISTAN ARMY

Timeline of Leading National Cyber Security Strategies

3
USA
Version of NCSS

2
USA Canada, Estonia Germany UK
France,
Finland

1
USA Canada, France, Austria, UAE Singapore
Estonia, Germany, India,
Finland New Zealand Japan,
UK Saudi Arabia

0
2001... 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Year
The measures taken so far show a positive trend
for introducing cybersecurity in the country but
are inadequate compared to the drastic increase
in state-sponsored cyber-attacks happening these
days.
Cybersecurity Strategies in Contemporary
Countries
Today, more than fifty countries have
formulated National Cyber Security Strategies
(NCSS)31 and regard cyber-attacks as a top-tier
national security threat. In the recent Cybersecurity
Ranking Document issued by ITU,32 NCSS of
Canada, Estonia, France, Finland, Germany,
New Zealand, Singapore, UK and USA have been
particularly acknowledged. Owing to continuously
changing threat spectrum, countries, especially UK,
USA, Estonia etc, have even published subsequent
versions of their NCCS.
Objectives stated in NCSS
NCSS defines action plan of a country for
addressing the national cybersecurity challenges.
Most NCSS share common goals33 such as the
creation of secure/resilient cyberspace, security of
critical cyber assets, formulation of cybersecurity
legislative framework, raising cyber-awareness,
develop indigenous IT products, establish CERTs,
promote public-private/international partnerships
etc However, despite similar objectives, the
country’s varying cyber threat landscape, level of
cyber-consciousness, socio-political conditions,
etc34 have brought significant variations in the
preventive, defensive and offensive approaches
adopted by each country.35
Diverse Understanding of Key Terms
Owing to the absence of globally harmonised
definitions, countries have self-defined key terms
like cybersecurity, cyberspace, cybercrimes etc
For instance, scanning/probing is considered an
offence in Germany, but not in USA.36
The definition of cyberspace also varies across
the countries. For instance, Australia, Spain,
Germany, Canada, New Zealand etc perceive
cyberspace as a network of all ICT devices connected
with Internet only.37 However, USA, UK, France,
Turkey etc also include all other virtual/physical
ICT devices in their definition of cyberspace. These

‘‘ The definition of cyberspace also varies across the countries. For instance,
Australia, Spain, Germany, Canada, New Zealand etc perceive cyberspace as a
network of all ICT devices connected with internet only. However, USA, UK, France,
‘‘
Turkey etc also include all other virtual/ physical ICT devices in their definition of
cyberspace

Green Book 2019 161

 PAKISTAN ARMY
varying perceptions of cybersecurity make it hard to
adopt a holistic approach for addressing cyber issues
worldwide.38
Lead Responsible Authority for Cybersecurity
Majority of the countries including Canada,
India, Malaysia, Turkey, Austria, Spain, Germany
etc have given the responsibility of cybersecurity
to one of their existing ministries (IT, Interior, Law
or Defence). However, Estonia and France, have
created new coordinating bodies, which centrally
deal with cyber-threats and attacks.39
Security Incident Management
103 countries all over the world provide
incident management capabilities at national level
through CERTs. However, the goals and efficacy of
these CERTs vary considerably, owing to varying
expertise of incident handlers, inadequate funds,
and the cyber threat landscape of the country.40
Cybersecurity Capacity Building
To increase cyber-workforce, all NCSS promote
research and education in cybersecurity and
emphasise on the need for security certifications/
trainings for IT professionals.
Cyber-Awareness Campaign conducted in USA
Every October42
To create cyber-consciousness amongst the
masses, UK, Malaysia and Australia run national
programmes like “Get Safe Online”, “Cyber Safe”,
“Stay Safe Online” respectively.
US and Austria have gone one step ahead
by annually observing “Cybersecurity Month”.41
Netherlands and Turkey in their NCSS have also
emphasised on making cybersecurity part of all
academic curriculums.
162 Green Book 2019
‘‘
To create cyber-consciousness
amongst the masses, UK, Malaysia and
Australia run national programmes
like “Get Safe Online”, “Cyber Safe”, ‘‘
“Stay Safe Online” respectively
R&D on Cybersecurity
To prevent the inherent vulnerabilities of IT
products being exploited by adversaries, almost all
countries have established national R&D centres to
develop secure indigenous IT products and sponsor
pertinent industrial/academic projects.
Cybersecurity Cooperation
The NCSSs of Canada, Australia, UK, Saudi
Arab and Netherlands have specifically emphasised
upon effective incessant interstate collaboration
with telecom vendors/operators and private
sector organisations who own most of the internet
infrastructure. On similar lines, the NCSS of Australia,
Germany, UK and USA have also mentioned action-
plans to improve global cooperation.43
NCSS Evaluation Framework
Most countries have mentioned review
frameworks in NCSS to frequently evaluate the
progress of NCSS after certain years and revise it
accordingly. Other NCSSs have provided review
mechanisms as a separate act. In reality, very few
countries have practically endeavoured to achieve
the stated objectives and have, therefore, updated
the first version of NCSS.
Analysis and Discussion
Amid exponentially increasing cyber-attacks,
cybersecurity has become the highest national
priority worldwide. Countries today understand
cyber-attacks can cause data leakage, massive
financial loss, business interruption, physical
damage etc and can thus affect national security as
well. However, Pakistan has always shown apathy
over this grave issue of cybersecurity. The past
Governments being oblivious to the deleterious
impacts of security breaches too believed that since
Pakistan is lagging in the race of technology, the
existing security controls are adequate to secure
the national cyberspace.
Today, cyber unconsciousness amongst the
internet users and the uncertain cyber regulatory
environment have made Pakistan’s cyberspace an
ideal arena for various cyber offences.
Cyber malpractices particularly usage of
obsolete Windows XP and Win7 by 20% computer

users,44 downloading movies/cracked software
from Torrent, usage of proxies to circumvent
blocked content, keeping easy passwords,
allowing browser to remember credentials,
ignoring Software Privacy Policies, not updating
software/ tools frequently etc, have made Pakistan
the most compromised country of the world.
Microsoft Intelligence Report v22 reveals that 84%
of the computer users in Pakistan do not even use
antivirus solutions,45 the Chinese companies such
as Huawei, Lenovo and ZTE Corporations that
have been blacklisted by western governments
for the inherent vulnerabilities in their products/
infrastructure are surprisingly in use by most of
the telecom companies of Pakistan. Had there
been any severe security breach accompanied by
heavy financial loss to the state in the past or any
major incident compromising national security, the
government would not have taken cybersecurity for
granted.
Are Current IT Laws and E-Regulations
adequate to address Issues of Cybersecurity
and National Security?
As already discussed, the government has
extended the applicability of IT laws to address
major cybersecurity Issues. However, these laws
only deal with the confidentiality, availability
and integrity of the data and ignore aspects of
authentication and non-repudiation, and the
emerging cyber risks. Moreover, despite the fact
that our cyber threat landscape is unique to us.
Law-makers need to understand that ineffective or
irrelevant laws will not secure the cyberspace and
all efforts to strengthen the national security will
still be in vain.
Private and Civil agencies have often
endeavoured to provide a draft of NCSS to
government, however, these have been turned
down on political grounds, despite negligible
shortcomings. Weak enforcement mechanisms
owing to shortage of acceptance of Presidential
Ordinance (i.e. six weeks from the date of its
promulgation) is another reason why  no cyber
draft has ever reached the implementation phase.
Even if a law is promulgated (e.g. PECA 2016), it is
not strictly enforced, nor updated after a certain
period of time. It is because of this uncertain cyber
regulatory environment in the country that many
international companies, especially E-bay, PayPal,
Amazon etc, are not willing to provide e-commerce
services in Pakistan. The unsupervised internet
‘‘ Today, cyber unconsciousness amongst the internet users and the uncertain cyber
‘‘
regulatory environment have made Pakistan’s cyberspace an ideal arena for various
cyber offences
PAKISTAN ARMY
access to terrorists and anti-state agents and their
continuous struggle to harm the national security
necessitates an urgency to deploy a powerful
content filtering system at the Internet and telecom
exchanges.
However, owing to the nagging fear that
politicians will use nationalism and religion as
a blanket for justifying the personal vendetta
through internet surveillance and censorship,
the idea of deploying content filtering system has
always been met with massive uproar from media,
vehement online campaigns by civil societies and
ubiquitous condemnation in the form of street
agitation.
The terrorists are hence still free to
communicate in the national cyberspace of
Pakistan which is an absolute horrid threat to both;
cyberspace security as well as national security.
The basic solution to all the problems is the
implementation of a well-defined cybersecurity
governance, legislative and regulatory framework,
as discussed in detail under “Recommendations”
section.
Impact of National Cybersecurity Capacity
Building Measures undertaken in Past
As elaborated before, few public and private
sector organisations, especially PISA, NR3C, etc,
have often endeavoured to hold Cybersecurity
Workshops, awareness seminars and training
sessions in major cities of Pakistan. However,
being technical in nature, their efforts could not
make much impact for the regular computer users.
Also, cybersecurity guidelines issued by certain
organisations for their employees and customers
was a good step for promoting cybersecurity
culture, but owing to the weak enforcement
mechanisms, the guidelines have always been
bluntly ignored.
Moreover, the lack of expertise, budget and
accountability have exacerbated the capabilities
of the existing law enforcement agencies to handle
cybercrimes. FIA, for instance, does not have the
required human resource and capacity to deal with
cybercrimes executed by hackers through freely
available proxies, such as TOR.46 The ‘PakCERT’
and “PISACERT” established with the aim of
bolstering incident management capabilities, are
also not operational owing to lack of budget and
expertise.
Green Book 2019 163
 PAKISTAN ARMY
Cyber education is not provided up to
undergraduate level in Pakistan. The MS/PhD
programmes being offered in Pakistan are confined
to twin cities i.e. Islamabad and Rawalpindi only. In
order to build its own cyber-army, there is a dire need
to make cyber education ubiquitous nationwide.
With a strong cyber-workforce, Pakistan can
definitely defend its national cyberspace and
ultimately enhance national security too.
Recommendations
A country lacking cyberspace security offers
an attractive target for cyber-perpetrators, and
hence pose threat to its national security as well.
Like other countries, Government of Pakistan
should, therefore, consider cybersecurity as its top-
tier national priority. Accordingly, cybersecurity
should be treated as the shared responsibility of
everyone within the cyberspace and significant
national budget should be allocated for developing
and implementing cybersecurity capabilities at the
national level. Till the time an effective cybercrime
legislation is prepared, existing legislation i.e.
PECA 2016 should be strictly enforced in the country
in order to create effective cyber deterrence.
Next, the Government should form an interim
team comprising of one member from each; Ministry
of Information Technology (MoIT), Ministry of
Interior (MoI), Ministry of Defence (MoD), Ministry
of Education and Research, Ministry of Law &
Justice, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Foreign
Affairs accompanied by few cybersecurity experts.
The team will be responsible for formulating
a comprehensive “Cybersecurity Governance
Framework” in a period of 1 month. This framework
shall clearly define role, responsibilities, authority
and accountability for each stakeholder that
needs to be included in the national supervisory
body for cybersecurity (discussed in next para).
In this regard, fair commitment of all national
stakeholders including telecom providers,
government, financial institutions, military, civil
society, judiciary, religious leaders etc should be
encouraged.
164 Green Book 2019
Once the framework is ready, a National Cyber
Security Council (NCSC), a supervisory body to
address national cybersecurity issues, and oversee
planning, implementation and evaluation of
cybersecurity initiatives shall be established. For
effective operation, NCSC can be divided into five
major divisions. The National Cybersecurity Policy
Division and Cyber Crime Division can formulate
cyber laws (especially NCSS) and apprehend cyber-
criminals while the technical counterparts i.e.
National Cybersecurity Capacity Building Division
and the Cyber Incident Management Division
shall endeavour to increase cyber-workforce of
Pakistan and improve cyber-attack detection
and responsiveness respectively. Lastly, National
Cybersecurity Advisory Body comprising of
separate technical, operational, policy and industry
groups, shall put forward their consolidated
recommendations on the performance of the other
four divisions of NCSC.
r icy C
C yb
ybe Pol Di rim er
C ity on vis e
i
c ur ivis ion
Se D
National
Cybersecurity
Cyber Council Cyber
Capacity
Security
Advisory
(NCSC) Building
Division
Body
Cyber Incident
Management Division
Proposed NCSC Organogram
In order to ensure digital continuity and
protection from cyber-attacks, Pakistan needs
to implement an appropriate “Cybersecurity
Technology Framework” as well. Accordingly,
critical organisations shall discourage BYOD policy,
restrict removable media, ban downloading and
usage of cracked software etc
Furthermore, to cope up with cyber delinquency
and thwart cyber-attacks rampant in the national
cyberspace, the creation and enhancement
of cyber incident recognition, preparedness,
response and recovery capabilities at national and
organisational levels in the form of a 24/7 national
and sector-specific CERTs should be encouraged.
A cybersecurity hotline can be created where
netizens can report confronted cyber irregularities
immediately.

Moreover, to access and enhance IT operator’s
readiness and responsiveness to cyber incidents,
national cybersecurity exercise programmes shall
also be annually conducted. If a Threat Information
Sharing Centre is also established, it would
facilitate the exchange of sensitive and classified
cyber threat information between government and
stakeholders.
C should be thoroughly assessed for inherent
rly org (nat ERT
Ea ning an ion
isa al/
r
wa ystem tio
na
S l)
Investigation
National Cyber
Forensic
Cyber
Digital
Drills
Incident
Management
In Th
tel re ical e
lig at Crit ructur
en as t on
ce Infr rotecti
P capabilities of IT professionals.
Proposed National Cyber Incident
Management Model
Moreover, to lessen the rate of growing cyber-
crimes in the country, content filtering software
for internet traffic and SMS shall be deployed at
Internet Exchanges. However, to ensure that the
conversations are only lawfully intercepted and
privacy rights of the citizens are not invaded,
the surveillance committee (i.e. government and
intelligence agencies) shall be made accountable
to a court body. To further stop terrorist moves in
the cyberspace, all websites providing facility of
Internet SMS shall be banned. With the Internet
SMS service, anyone can send message to any
victim without revealing his identity. The activities
of cyber cafes shall also be strictly checked and
only registered Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)
shall be allowed.
Similarly, to prevent foreign surveillance and
malicious eavesdropping and to confine domestic
information within the national cyberspace, it is
recommended to perform security assessment of
all IT products, search engines, social networking
websites/applications etc All privacy invading
applications shall be replaced with secure
indigenous alternatives at priority until indigenous
solutions are developed. Moreover, all national
information systems, software and services reliant
on obsolete OS or web browser should be updated
at priority. The IT products of telecom vendors such
PAKISTAN ARMY
‘‘
A cybersecurity hotline can be
created where netizens can report
confronted
‘‘
cyber irregularities
immediately
as Huawei, Lenovo and ZTE Corporation, that have
been blacklisted by the western governments,
vulnerabilities.
Like military forces are trained to improve the
physical security of the country, a strong cyber-
army or cyber-workforce should also be created by:
── Intensifying cyber-consciousness among
the public, law enforcement agencies and
judiciary regarding incident reporting
and basic cyberspace security checks and
practices. Like US, UK and Malaysia, the
government should also organise a national
cyber-security week or day.
── Organising cybersecurity trainings to enhance
and perpetuate the technical and operational
── Promoting national cybersecurity degree
programmes to meet the scarcity of cyber
experts. Also, organise hacking competitions,
summer camps, internship programmes in
cybersecurity to entice more students towards
this domain.
── Incorporating cybersecurity course in the
curriculum of all grades from primary to
doctoral programmes, tailored according to
their needs.
── Stimulating active R&D on cybersecurity and
facilitating the development, implementation,
and commercialisation of secure indigenous
IT products in order to attain national self-
sufficiency in cybersecurity.
── Developing credible cybersecurity certification
and accreditation programmes for evaluating
the competence of technical workforce and
national IT infrastructure.47
── Establishing cohesion at national level by
encouraging exchange of cybersecurity
expertise, threat intelligence etc. Similarly,
avenues for developing bilateral and
multilateral relations with regional partners
(China, Iran, Turkey etc) and emerging cyber
powers (USA, UK, Germany, France, Estonia
etc) shall be explored. Cooperation should
also be extended to Organisation of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC), Organisation for Security
and Council in Europe (OSCE), Cooperative
Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE),
Green Book 2019 165
 PAKISTAN ARMY
South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC).
── Cases involving foreign cyber-offenders shall
be strictly dealt with in order to strengthen
national security e.g. taking aggressive
diplomatic and economic measures against
those countries, curtailing visas of its citizens,
penalising the cybercriminals etc.
Moreover, since Indian hackers deface our
websites on daily basis, it is recommended to form
a committee that performs security assessment of
websites of all major organisations regularly. The
inadvertent cyber wars with India can be prevented
in the future by developing Confidence Building
Measures (CBMs) and cyber rules of game.48
Training Awareness
Partnerships Education
Certification Accreditation
Standard-
ization Research
Cybersecurity Capacity Building
Lastly, there is a need to incorporate the
principle of agility by subjecting the NCSS to regular
reviews after every two to three years. The input
from industry shall be solicited in order to keep pace
with the technological advances and increasing
cyber risk sophistication. While formulating
NCSS for Pakistan, these recommendations can
be considered to guarantee cyberspace security as
well as national security.
Conclusion
In the recent years, cyber-safety has become
one of the top-level national concern worldwide.
However, our government seems oblivious to, and
undeterred by, the grave issue of cybersecurity
and its debilitating effects on the national
security. Before the cyber-attacks overwhelm
our national security, the government needs to
166 Green Book 2019
consider cybersecurity as an essential constituent
of its National Security Policy, formulate a sound
National Cybersecurity Strategy and take other
defensive measures outlined in the document to
make the national cyberspace secure, robust and
profitable for the Pakistani citizens, government
and business to conduct daily activities smoothly.
Notes
1. Kovács, László. “National Cybersecurity as The Cornerstone of National
Security”. Land Forces Academy Review 23, no. 2 (2018): 113-120. doi:10.2478/
2.
raft-2018-0013.
Demchak, Chris. “Introduction to MCA Issue, “Cyber, Economics, And
National Security””. Military Cyber Affairs 3, no. 1 (2018). doi:10.5038/2378-
0789.3.1.1042.
3. Milkovich, Devon. “12 Alarming Cybersecurity Facts And Stats | Cybint”.Cybint
Solutions - A BARBRI Company, 2018. https://www.cybintsolutions.com/
cyber-security-facts-stats/.
4. Singh, Ajeet, and Anurag Jain."Study of Cyber Attacks on Cyber-Physical
System".SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3170288
5. Bisson, David. “Shamoon 2: Nothing Whets Disttrack’s Appetite Like Destroyed
Data”. The State of Security, 2016. https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/
security-data-protection/cyber-security/shamoon-2-nothing-whets-disttracks-
appetite-like-destroyed-data/.
6. RT. “Cyberattack on German Steel Mill Inflicts Serious Damage”, 2014. https://
www.rt.com/news/216379-germany-steel-plant-hack/.
7. Paganini, Pierluigi. “Iran Investigates Possible Cyber Attacks Behind A String
Oil Industry Incidents”. Security Affairs, 2016. https://securityaffairs.co/
8.
wordpress/50415/security/iran-cyber-attacks-fires.html.
Global Risks 8Th Edition. World Economic Forum, 2013. http://www3.weforum.
org/docs/WEF_GlobalRisks_Report_2013.pdf.
9. Greenwald, Glenn, and EwenMacAskill. “Boundless Informant: The NSA’s
Secret Tool To Track Global Surveillance Data”. The Guardian, 2013. https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-global-
datamining?CMP=twt_gu#_.
10. Ibid
11. Microsoft Intelligence Report V19. Microsoft, 2015. http://download.microsoft.
com/download/4/4/C/44CDEF0E-7924-4787-A56A-16261691ACE3/Microsoft_
Security_Intelligence_Report_Volume_19_English.pdf.
12. Global Cybersecurity Index. International Telecommunication Union, 2017.
https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Pages/GCI.aspx
13. PTA Annual Report. Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA), 2017.
https://www.pta.gov.pk/en/annual-reports.
14. Ibid
15. Shafqat, Narmeen. “Pakistan’s Cyberspace: Critical Analysis and
Countermeasures”. MS Thesis, National University of Sciences and Technology
(MCS-NUST), Pakistan, 2016.
16. ENISA Threat Landscape Report 2017.European Union Agency for Network
and Information Security (ENISA), 2018. https://www.enisa.europa.eu/
publications/enisa-threat-landscape-report-2017.
17. Microsoft Intelligence Report V19. Microsoft, 2015. http://download.microsoft.
com/download/4/4/C/44CDEF0E-7924-4787-A56A-16261691ACE3/Microsoft_
Security_Intelligence_Report_Volume_19_English.pdf.
18. Ibid
19. Microsoft Intelligence Reports (V19 To V23). Microsoft, 2018. https://www.
microsoft.com/en-us/security/intelligence-report.
20. Shahid, Jamal.”Cyberstalking: New Challenges”, 2014. http://www.dawn.
com/news/1078417
21. “National Response Centre for Cyber Crime (NR3C – FIA)”, 2018. http://www.
nr3c.gov.pk/index.html.
22. Shafqat, Narmeen. “Pakistan’s Cyberspace: Critical Analysis and
Countermeasures”. MS Thesis, National University of Sciences and Technology
(MCS-NUST), Pakistan, 2016.
23. Ibid
24. Haque, Jehanzaib. Pakistan Internet Landscape.Bytes for All, 2018. https://
content.bytesforall.pk/sites/default/files/MappingReportFinal%20-%20
Published.pdf.
25. Shafqat, Narmeen. “Pakistan’s Cyberspace: Critical Analysis and
Countermeasures”. MS Thesis, National University of Sciences and Technology
(MCS-NUST), Pakistan, 2016.
26. Ibid
27. Ibid
28. “Certificate Detail - Cryptographic Module Validation Program | CSRC”.
Csrc.Nist.Gov, 2018. https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-
validation-program/Certificate/1962.
29. Shafqat, Narmeen. “Pakistan’s Cyberspace: Critical Analysis and
Countermeasures”. MS Thesis, National University of Sciences and Technology
(MCS-NUST), Pakistan, 2016.
30. Ibid
31. “Cybersecurity Strategy Documents”.CCDCOE, 2018. https://ccdcoe.org/
strategies-policies.html.
32. Global Cybersecurity Index.International Telecommunication Union, 2017.
https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Pages/GCI.aspx

33. Luiijf, Eric, Kim Besseling, MaartjeSpoelstra, and Patrick de Graaf.”Ten
National Cybersecurity Strategies: A Comparison: Critical Information
Infrastructure Security”. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS) Volume
6983: Springer, 2013. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261987241_
Ten_National_Cyber_Security_Strategies_a_Comparison_Critical_
Information_Infrastructure_Security.
34. Lehto, M. “The Ways Means and Ends in Cybersecurity Strategies”.
Proceedings of the 12th European Conference on Information Warfare and
Security.:ProQuest, 2013.
35. Shafqat, Narmeen, and Ashraf Masood.”Comparative Analysis of Various
National Cybersecurity Strategies”.International Journal of Computer Science
and Information Security 14 (2016). https://sites.google.com/site/ijcsis/vol-14-
no-1-jan-2016.
36. National Cybersecurity Framework Manual. NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence
Centre of Excellence., 2012. https://ccdcoe.org/multimedia/national-cyber-
security-framework-manual.html.
37. Alliance, BSA. “Asia Pacific Cybersecurity Dashboard”. 2015 BSA APAC
Cybersecurity Dashboard, 2015. http://cybersecurity.bsa.org/2015/apac/index.
html.
38. Shafqat, Narmeen, and Ashraf Masood.”Comparative Analysis of Various
National Cybersecurity Strategies”.International Journal of Computer Science
and Information Security 14 (2016). https://sites.google.com/site/ijcsis/vol-14-
no-1-jan-2016.
39. Štitilis, Darius, PauliusPakutinskas, and Inga Malinauskaitė. “EU and NATO
Cybersecurity Strategies and National Cybersecurity Strategies: A Comparative
PAKISTAN ARMY
Analysis”. Security Journal 30, no. 4 (2016): 1151-1168. doi:10.1057/s41284-016-
0083-9.
40. Shafqat, Narmeen, and Ashraf Masood.”Comparative Analysis of Various
National Cybersecurity Strategies”.International Journal of Computer Science
and Information Security 14 (2016). https://sites.google.com/site/ijcsis/vol-14-
no-1-jan-2016.
41. Min, Kyoung-Sik, Seung-Woan Chai, and Mijeong Han.”An International
Comparative Study on Cybersecurity Strategy”. International Journal of
Security and Its Applications9, no. 2 (2015): 13-20. doi:10.14257/ijsia.2015.9.2.02
42. “National Cybersecurity Awareness Month”. Department of Homeland
Security, 2018. https://www.dhs.gov/national-cyber-security-awareness-
month.
43. “Cyberwellness Profiles”.Itu.Int, 2018. http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/
Cybersecurity/Pages/Country_Profiles.aspx.
44 Shafqat, Narmeen. “Pakistan’s Cyberspace: Critical Analysis and
Countermeasures”. MS Thesis, National University of Sciences and Technology
(MCS-NUST), Pakistan, 2016.
45. “One in Four Computers in Pakistan Are Attacked by Malware: Microsoft”.
Propakistani.Pk, 2017. https://propakistani.pk/2017/09/19/one-four-
computers-pakistan-attacked-malware-microsoft/.
46. Shafqat, Narmeen. “Pakistan’s Cyberspace: Critical Analysis and
Countermeasures”. MS Thesis, National University of Sciences and Technology
(MCS-NUST), Pakistan, 2016.
47. Kiertzner, Henrik. “Cybersecurity For Critical National Infrastructure”.
Engineering & Technology Reference, 2016. doi:10.1049/etr.2016.0004
48. Yamin, Tughral. Cyberspace CbmsBetween Pakistan And India, 2014.
Green Book 2019 167
 CYBER
PAKISTAN ARMY

NATIONAL RESPONSE TO

THREATS
Dr Tughral Yamin is a retired
Brigadier from Pakistan Army. He is
currently Associate Dean at Centre for
International Peace and Stability (CIPS),
National University of Sciences and
Technology (NUST), Islamabad

Abstract
Warfare in the twenty first century has metamorphosed at a frightening pace. Instead of physically
fighting the enemy, most war fighting now takes place in the virtual domain. With the increasing reliance
on computers and computer networks, the scope and scale of cyber threats has grown exponentially.
Cyberspace has become the fifth dimension of warfare. It is unregulated territory, where the customary
rules of engagement are not practiced. Threats not only emerge from traditional sources but also from a
host of non-traditional quarters. States actively carry out offensive operations as well indulge in pervasive
surveillance, sparing neither friend nor foe. Terrorists are using cyberspace for recruitment, funding and
propaganda. Criminals surreptitiously siphon off millions of dollars from Online e-commerce activity. The
kids in the basement and freelance hacktivists hack out of fun or because of self-righteous patriotic fervour.
This paper highlights the broad spectrum of cyber threats and the voids discernible in the cybersecurity
at the policy planning level. It proposes a suitable response at the national level to the emerging cyber
challenges. It recommends inter alia a policy covering all aspects of the threat. It underlines the importance
of having a coordinating body at the national level to oversee and organise cybersecurity activities. It calls
for devoting sufficient funds for national cybersecurity preparations. It also emphasises the need for cyber
awareness and creating structures to deal with cyber threats. In the age of the digital revolution, leaders
and advisors need to learn the art and science of crafting effective cyber policies and legislations. This
is not only necessary to prevent the breakdown of critical infrastructure, disruption of communication
services and damage to command and control systems but also to protect private businesses and industry
from losing hours of productivity. The cyber planners also need to integrate unified cyber strategies in all
matters related to domestic and foreign policies.

Keywords: Cyber Threats, Cybersecurity, Cyber Policy, Cyber Budget

168 Green Book 2019

T
here has been a paradigm shift in the
nature of warfare in the twenty-first
century. Instead of fighting physically,
all means are employed to defeat the
adversary virtually. It is no longer
necessary to destroy tanks, aircraft and
battleships through kinetic means. Instead the
command and control systems managing these war
fighting systems are targeted to cause chaos and
mayhem in the enemy ranks.
Digital warriors sitting behind computer
screens, and not the soldier in the trenches, now
man the front-lines. They work assiduously to
find chinks in the armour of enemy’s computer
networks controlling the instruments of war to
bring them down during the crucial phases of
decision-making and execution. Cyber-attacks are,
however, no longer restricted for periods of active
hostilities.
Hostile agencies use the social media to
degrade national morale and defeat the enemy even
before the first bullet is fired through aggressive
and sinister use of social media.
The dialectic of opposing wills is now a
contest that includes the application of Artificial
Intelligence (AI). Cyberspace is unregulated
territory and spy agencies, business rivals,
terrorists and criminals consider it perfectly
legitimate means to syphon off information stored
in computer database to obtain an edge over their
adversaries and competitors. Suffice is to say that
the loss of data can be extremely harmful and
traumatic for governments, public and private
concerns.
In fact there is so much upheaval in the digital
world that it is hard to keep track of incidents of
cyber breaches happening on a daily basis. Digital
data continues to fall into the wrong hands and is
used for the most malicious reasons.
The proliferation of social media has made it
easier to harvest information provided willingly
by unwary users. The US elections 2016 were
‘‘
It is no longer necessary to destroy
tanks, aircraft and battleships through
kinetic means. Instead the command
and control systems managing these
war fighting systems are targeted to
‘‘
cause chaos and mayhem in the enemy
ranks
Green Book 2019 169
 PAKISTAN ARMY
It is hard to keep track of incidents of cyber
breaches happening on a daily basis
supposedly influenced because of the data gleaned
by Cambridge Analytica, a digital mining firm
from an application that they uploaded on the
Facebook to find clues to the likes and dislikes
of potential voters.1 The campaign team of the
unlikely candidate Donald Trump could turn the
tables on Hillary Clinton because they knew what
kind of sales pitch they were required to adopt.
The Facebook has also been used to spread fake
news. This has shaped public opinion among its
users. Unsubstantiated messaging on Whatsapp
messaging service has caused the lynching of
innocent people in India. The company was
forced to publish full page advertisements to
warn the public of spreading unsubstantiated
information through their application. In July
2018, the European Union was fined €4.345 Billion
for securing dominance for its search engine on
android phones. Google had managed to add
Google maps on all android phones. European
competitors considered this a violation of the rule
for fair competition. In Pakistan the data of Careem
ride share services was hacked causing a huge
embarrassment for the company.
‘‘
There is a visible dearth of national
debate on Cybersecurity. Whatever
is reported in the print and electronic
‘‘
media lacks direction and focus
Domestic politics was rocked, when Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif was ousted from office
after toxic load of data was made public by
the International Consortium of Investigative
Journalists (ICIJ) that it hacked from the database
of a Panama based legal firm the Monseck
Fonseca. This information among other things
provided incontrovertible evidence about Sharif’s
family business investments in dubious off shore
companies.2
The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) that
emerged as the largest political party in the
national elections 2018 on an anti-corruption
agenda effectively used its social media to
170 Green Book 2019
discredit Sharif, his family members and cronies
on the basis of the data made available due to the
so-called Panama Leaks.3 Before the elections,
officials of the National Database and Registration
Authority (NADRA) had to explain to suspicious
political parties that voter data publicly made
available was not meant to skewer the results but
to facilitate the voting public.4 Immediately after
the elections, another controversy broke out when
the losing parties voiced allegations of poll rigging
because of the failure of technology. The collapse
of the Result Transmission System (RTS) fuelled
speculations that it was done to doctor ballot count
and manipulate the final results.5
Unfortunately data security in Pakistan is not
the top of the national agenda despite the fact that
databases are being blatantly breached. There is a
visible dearth of national debate on cybersecurity.
Whatever is reported in the print and electronic
media lacks direction and focus.
The most visible activity on the Pakistani cyber
landscape has been the legislation on cyber crime.
The Cyber Crime Bill or the Prevention of Electronic
Crimes Act (PECA) was approved in 2016 by both
houses of the parliament after incorporating several
amendments raised by digital rights activists. The
very vocal activist lobby had waged a relentless
campaign to oppose those parts of the Bill that they
thought infringed upon the rights of the netizens.
The animated discussion over the PECA actually
diverted the attention of all concerned from the real
issue at hand i.e. cybersecurity.
It is indeed disconcerting to note the complete
apathy and disregard for this important facet of
national security. Clearly, people at the helm of
affair fail to grasp the importance of cybersecurity.
Not only is there a complete absence of policy in this
regard but also management and organisational
structures are either non-existent or at a very
nascent stage. There is, therefore, a pressing need
to establish a well-defined cybersecurity on sound
footings at all levels within the country and this
means thinking beyond the puny Information
and Computer Technology (ICT) Departments that
private and public firms have.

An interview with the federal minister of IT
in the summer of 2015 confirmed my worst fears.
The minister candidly admitted that the issue
of cybersecurity “had not blipped on the official
radar.” She wasn’t sure who was responsible for it
i.e. her ministry or the Ministry of Interior (MoI) or
the Ministry of Defence (MoD) or the intelligence
agencies.6 She was right; cyberspace is the
collective responsibility of a number of ministries
and departments and needs joint ownership. This
is in fact true for all national security issues.
National Security
National security covers a wide spectrum of
issues, such as its territorial integrity, political
sovereignty, economic autarky, self-sufficiency in
food and energy, environment protection and in
the modern age and era of cybersecurity.
It is, therefore, quite obvious that national
security is given very high importance by any
government. The policy formulation is always done
at the highest level involving the top most decision
and policy makers. This invariably includes the
chief executive of the country (the president or
the prime minister) and his cabinet. They receive
inputs from all the institutions of the state i.e.
the armed forces, intelligence agencies and the
concerned ministries to formulate policy.
Traditionally, before being finalised, all
national security issues are discussed at the
level of the National Security Committee (NSC)/
National Command Authority (NCA), the relevant
parliamentary committees and the parliament
itself. The NCA is convened, when it involves
nuclear decision-making. It is the constitutional
duty of any government to ensure that the interests
of the state and its citizens are protected from all
kinds of external aggression and internal turmoil,
while ensuring the civil rights and liberties of
its citizens. To ensure that the writ of the state
extends all over its sovereign territories, it uses all
instruments of the state such as the armed forces
and law enforcement agencies and the judiciary to
implement the national security mandate. A citizen
owing allegiance to a state is required to support
the government in this sacred duty.
‘‘
In Pakistan NSC brings together
the civilian and military leadership so
that they are on one page insofar as
national security is concerned. Besides
the NSC’s office, there are cabinet and
parliamentary committees that look ‘‘
into national security matters
PAKISTAN ARMY
‘‘
National security covers a wide
spectrum of issues, such as its territorial
integrity, political sovereignty,
economic autarky, self-sufficiency
in food and energy, environment
‘‘
protection and in the modern age and
era of Cybersecurity
The national power potential is directly
proportional to its political power, diplomatic
influence, economic capacity and military might.
A number of governments including Pakistan
arrogate the responsibility of coordinating national
security matters to the NSC.
In Pakistan NSC brings together the civilian
and military leadership so that they are on one
page insofar as national security is concerned.
Besides the NSC’s office, there are cabinet and
parliamentary committees that look into national
security matters.
National security policy is underpinned
by four pillars i.e. a strong national leadership
that can provide strategic vision and across the
board coordination on security matters; a policy
framework with clear cut and precise mission
statement; the Terms of Reference (TORs) for
the execution the policy and adequate material
and human resources for its implementation. To
produce a worthwhile policy, the national security
managers operate under clear and unambiguous
sets of rules and regulations to cover the
overarching national security agenda.
Cybersecurity
One of the primary issues of cybersecurity
involves protection of personal, professional and
official data. In simple words cybersecurity means
protecting computers and computer networks
from harmful intrusions. Expanding on this basic
definition, the entire gamut of cybersecurity
includes protecting, detecting and responding to
attacks directed against computers and servers
storing private and official records; personal
computers and cell phones; entertainment gadgets
like digital cable, mp3s; intelligent systems
controlling the means of travel like car engines and
aeroplane navigation systems; online electronic
shopping stores and credit cards etc.
In order to survive in the digital world, country
must enable digital frontiers. Clearly this means
leadership, policies and guidelines, and resources
both in term of trained manpower and funds.
Green Book 2019 171
 PAKISTAN ARMY
As digitisation becomes common place,
governments are increasingly worried about the
protection of electronically controlled national
critical infrastructure. This includes inter alia the
national electricity grid, water works, railways and
airlines controlled through Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA). It also covers the
protection of national critical infrastructure.
Cyber-attacks can result in long downtimes
that can disrupt the decision-making process
in a critical point of time. There are also minor
irritations like the defacement of official and
private websites that needs time and resources to
repair. Major disruptions can be caused crashing of
servers or loss of huge amounts of data.
Cyber-attacks can not only cause psychological
trauma but also physical damage and financial
losses and acute loss of faith in a system. It can
cause panic among the people, collapse of a system
and paralysis at the highest echelons of decision-
making.
As mentioned earlier in this article, cyberspace
is not the sole preserve of state actors. It is open
territory for non-state actors, criminals, freelancers
and the kid in the basement to operate with
impunity. This makes it all the more difficult to
forensically trace the trail of a cyber-attack and
attribute it to a particular person or entity.
Many times the actual source of attack is an
insider within the organisation. A disgruntled
employee for example may be trying to settle a
score.
It is difficult to mount a cyber counter-attack
because of problems related to attribution, absence
of set rules of engagement and the proportionality
of the response. International norms and rules on
the subject are hazy but countries and organisations
have crafted laws to persecute those interfering
with their digital systems. The issue of information
security has been on the UN agenda since 1998;
however, to date there has been no international
treaty to make cybersecurity an international norm.
Most modern day national governments attach
great importance to their national cybersecurity.
Substantial funds have been allocated and trained
manpower has been made available for these tasks.
172 Green Book 2019
Policy guidelines have been issued to streamline
cybersecurity management.
Cybersecurity Models
Most countries of the world have designated
organisations to deal with national cybersecurity
needs. The leadership is usually assigned to
powerful and influential people with direct access
to the country’s chief executive. Adequate sums
of money are allocated for cybersecurity and clear
cut policy guidelines given to give a framework to
cybersecurity managers.
The US cybersecurity model is perhaps the
most well-known. The national cybersecurity policy
comes from the President himself, through executive
orders and policy guidelines.7 To assist the President
is the National Cybersecurity Coordinator.8 This
person is the cybersecurity ‘czar’ and has direct
access to the President.
Currently three agencies in the US are
responsible for cybersecurity i.e. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), the National Security
Agency (NSA) and US Army Cyber Command or
Cybercom.9
The DHS more or less resembles the MoI in
Pakistan. This agency was created after the 9/11
attacks with the express mandate to protect the
national critical infrastructure. This remotely
monitors, controls and operates systems with
coded signals over communication channels
and are extremely vulnerable to cyber-attacks.
‘‘
Cyber-attacks can not only cause
psychological trauma but also physical
damage and financial losses and acute
loss of faith in a system. It can cause
panic among the people, collapse of
‘‘
a system and paralysis at the highest
echelons of decision-making
 PAKISTAN ARMY

A designated Cyber Emergency Response Team

(CERT) under the DHS provides a united response
to cyber emergencies.
The NSA and Cybercom carry out cyber
surveillance and offensive cyber operations
respectively. Both these organisations are being
run by the military. The NSA and the Central
Security Service (CSS) leads the US Government in
cryptology that includes both Signals’ Intelligence
(SIGINT) and Information Assurance (IA) to provide
it a decisive edge in Computer Network Operations
(CNO). The NSA won international notoriety after In India the special secretary in charge of
the Snowden leaks in 2013. A substantial amount cybersecurity in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)
of money is allocated for cybersecurity in the US. is the Cybersecurity Chief. India has national
According to official US sources: cybersecurity policy since 2013.14 It has more
The FY 2019 President’s Budget includes $15 than 5000 cyber warriors to conduct offensive
Billion of budget authority for cybersecurity-related and defensive operations and adequate funds to
activities, a $583.4 million (4.1 per cent) increase conduct such activity. CERT-In is a designated body
above the FY 2018 Estimate. Due to the sensitive to respond to computer emergencies.15 Government
of India has a number of cybersecurity agreements
nature of some activities, this amount does not
represent the entire cyber budget.10
Like most countries, cyber warfare is the
responsibility of the military in China. Reportedly,
the Strategic Support Force (SSF) has been
designated by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
to lead the country in matters related to cyber
warfare, space security and electronic surveillance.
The Pentagon alleges that Unit 61398 of the PLA has
been engaging in gathering corporate intelligence.11
In Australia, the lead agency in cybersecurity

with countries such as the US, Israel, Russia,

is the Australian Cybersecurity Centre (ACSC).12
CERT Australia looks after national computer
emergencies in Australia. In the UK computer
emergencies are handled by CERT-UK. The Office
of Cybersecurity & Information Assurance (OCSIA)
in the UK supports the ministers and the NSC to
manage cybersecurity.13
Malaysia, Singapore and Japan. India has a regular
cybersecurity dialogue with the US.
In a joint declaration released after a
cyber-dialogue, it was announced to increase
cybersecurity cooperation. India is also expanding
relations with Israel in the area of cyber cooperation.
In January 2018, the Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu visited India. A number
of areas including cybersecurity were identified
for cooperation.16 In February 2018, the second
round of Indo-Russia Consultation on Security
regarding use of Information and Communication
Technologies (ICT) was held in New Delhi. This was
a follow up by the Indo-Russia Bilateral Agreement
on Cooperation in ensuring security in the use of
ICT signed on the sidelines of 8th BRICS Summit
held in October 2016.17

‘‘ In India the special secretary in charge of Cybersecurity in the Prime Minister’s Office
(PMO) is the Cybersecurity Chief. India has national Cybersecurity policy since 2013. It
‘‘
has more than 5000 cyber warriors to conduct offensive and defensive operations and
adequate funds to conduct such activity

Green Book 2019 173

 PAKISTAN ARMY
Cybersecurity in Pakistan
It is not India alone that wages a strong cyber
offensive against Pakistan, many other countries
are using cyber means to syphon off critical data.
US is one of those countries that actively and
regularly spies upon Pakistan. According to cyber
whistleblower Edward Snowden Pakistan is one of
the most cyber spied upon country in the world.18
Snowden had also claimed that the UK has
acquired vast amounts of communications data
from inside Pakistan by secretly hacking into
routers manufactured by the US based company
Cisco.19 It is unfortunate that the issue of cyber-
spying has not been raised with either the US or the
British governments; notwithstanding the fact that
London and Washington remain the favourite ports
of call for most of our politicians.
National security covers both internal and
external threats. In Pakistan, these threats are
discussed under heading of the National Defence
Policy and the National Internal Security Policy
(NISP). The defence matters are dealt with by
the MoD and by extension usually remains the
exclusive preserve of the armed forces. The NISP is
issued by the MoI. All civil and military intelligence
agencies are involved in identifying the internal
and external threats. NISP 2014 does mentioned
cybersecurity without going into the specifics and
recognises its importance within the framework of
counter terrorism. The NISP is supplemented by
the National Action Plan (NAP) 2015 with a twenty
‘‘Pakistan is one of the most cyber spied
upon country in the world’’
Edward Snowden
174 Green Book 2019
‘‘
There is no mechanism of interstate
understanding or sharing of best
‘‘
practices on regional basis
point agenda to eliminate terrorism. NISP 2018 lays
down road map for Internal Security (IS) for the
next five years.20
There are clearly identifiable hurdles
in establishing a meaningful cybersecurity
architecture in Pakistan e.g. there is no central
authority to coordinate cybersecurity matters and
advise the prime minister about emerging cyber
threats. There is a palpable lack of awareness within
the policymaking circles about this important
issue. Apart from the Cyber-crime Bill there is no
clear cut policy on the subject of cybersecurity. The
cybersecurity stakeholders are not clearly defined
and their turfs not properly marked out. There is no
PK-CERT and no funds allocated for cybersecurity
purposes. The Federal Investigation Agency (FIA)
has a National Cyber Response Centre for Cyber
Crime (NR3C).21 Its mandate is limited to tracking
down cyber-crime and it lacks the wherewithal
to act as first responder in case of a computer
emergency. Pakistan is represented at the UN Group
of Governmental Experts on Information Security,22
but the national points of view expressed on these
forums are not shared with the public.
There is no mechanism of interstate
understanding or sharing of best practices on
regional basis. The Bangladesh central bank lost
81 million dollars in a cyber-heist in 2016. The State
Bank of Pakistan did not issue any instructions to
avoid a similar occurrence in our country. It is not
known, if any advice was sought from Bangladeshi
counterparts on the subject or from SWIFT, the
international banking forum through whose portals
the request on Bangladesh’s foreign exchange
reserves was made. In fact there is no coordination
or collaboration in the South Asian region or the
member countries of the South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). This is in stark
contrast to the active collaboration among the
countries of the Association of East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) on cybersecurity collaboration.
Recommendations
A number of steps can be taken to improve
Pakistan’s cybersecurity situation. Some of these,
in no particular order are listed below:
── Human Resource Development. Pakistan
has a very huge and talented human
resource. Some of the best IT graduates are
being produced in universities like National
University of Sciences & Technology (NUST)
and National University of Computers &

Emerging Sciences (FAST-NU). The only thing
lacking is direction, policy and adequate
funds. This condition can be improved by
having good cyber managers and planners.
This should include not only people with
technical education but also those who
have policy planning skills and knowledge
of international relations and law. Most
people at the top echelons of the security
establishment lack the knowledge and
vision to properly organise cybersecurity.
Crash courses in cyber awareness to senior
government officials and parliamentarians
can improve the lackadaisical cybersecurity
milieu in Pakistan. Courses already being
taught in cybersecurity management in
the universities can be modified to suit the
emerging requirement. Cybersecurity should
also be included in the curriculum of the
security workshop arranged by National
Defence University (NDU) Islamabad.
── Policy Level. A number of things can be
done at the policy level. First and foremost,
there is an urgent need for well-defined
national cybersecurity architecture. The
powers of coordinating all issues related to
cybersecurity should be vested in the office of
a cybersecurity coordinator working directly
under the prime minister. The cybersecurity
PAKISTAN ARMY
chief should be provided secretarial services
by the NSC. The NSC could be one forum,
where all cybersecurity measures may be
discussed. Second, a cyber-taskforce (CTF)
should be created and placed under the NSC.
The mandate of the CTF should include issuing
policy guidelines on cybersecurity. Third, the
creation of PK-CERT is a long outstanding
demand. The national CERT should be
established and asked to practice cyber
emergency drills on regular basis. Fourth,
cyber funds should be allocated in the national
budget and their proper utilisation ensured
by the national cybersecurity coordinator.
Fifth, cybersecurity cooperation with other
countries, particularly those belonging to
regional forums such as SAARC and the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)
is advisable. Since there is little traction for
Pakistan in SAARC due to the open hostility of
India, it would be advisable to concentrate on
SCO. The Organisation of Islamic Conference
(OIC) can be another forum but this too has
become moribund due to internal differences
in the Muslim world.
── Ownership. Currently there is a complete
lack of ownership at political level about the
subject of cybersecurity. It would certainly be
a good idea if the new political government
Green Book 2019 175
 PAKISTAN ARMY
considers this issue seriously and develops
structures and allocates resources in this
regard. cybersecurity cooperation should
be made an agenda item for discussion with
friendly countries like Turkey, Iran and Saudi
Arabia.
Conclusion
From the above discussion it is quite clear that
cybersecurity is a neglected issue in the national
security discourse. In this time and age it should be
taken very seriously. In fact a national emergency
should be declared to highlight the importance of
this neglected sector. Unless there is awareness at
Notes
1. Cambridge Analytica uses data to change audience behaviour and has
commercial and political divisions to serve their client’s needs. Details about
the services being offered by them are available at their website: https://
cambridgeanalytica.org/ (Accessed on August 9, 2018).
2. The ICIJ take credit for the imprisonment of Nawaz Sharif on corruption
charges in their website https://www.icij.org/(Accessed on August 9, 2018).
3. Danish Hussain, PTI launches aggressive social media campaign against PML
N, Express Tribune, November 29, 2016, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1247545/
jhooton-ki-dastan-documentary-expose-launched-social-media/ (Accessed
on August 9, 2018).
4. Syed IrfanRaza, “No Breach of Voters’ Data Security, NADRA,”Dawn, June 20,
2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1414889 (Accessed on August 9, 2018).
5. “Result Transmission System failure causes delay in election results: ECP,”
Associated Press of Pakistan (APP), July 26, 2018, https://www.app.com.pk/
result-transmission-system-failure-causes-delay-in-election-results-ecp/
(Accessed on August 9, 2018).
6. Interview with the Minister of IT, Summer 2015.
7. Hogan Lovells, “US Cyber security Policies – A year-to-date roundup,”https://
iapp.org/news/a/u-s-cybersecurity-policy-developments-a-year-to-date-
roundup/ (Accessed on August 9, 2018).
8. For details go to the website Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues: https://
www.state.gov/s/cyberissues/.
9. For details regarding NSA and Cybercom read Gen Michael Hayden, Playing
to the Edge; American Intelligence in the Age of Terror (New York: Penguin
Random House, 2017).
10. Cyber security Funding, The Whitehouse, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/ap_21 _cyber_security-fy2019.pdf (Accessed on
August 8, 2018).
11. MeghaRajgopalan, “Chinese Military Force to Take Lead on Cyber Space
Defense,” Reuters, January, 29, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
china-military/chinese-military-force-to-take-lead-on-cyber-space-defence-
idUSKCN0V714B (Accessed on August 8, 2018)
176 Green Book 2019
the highest level about the potential threat that
looms in front of us, nothing substantial would
be done. Therefore, it is of utmost necessity that
a campaign should be launched at the highest
level to sensitise our leadership about it. The
political chief executive, his cabinet and indeed
the complete parliament should be briefed about
the challenges ahead. The responses should be
mounted jointly involving the military and the
civil government and members of the industry and
businessmen. It should be a whole of government
approach and cover all non-official sectors as well.
A joint national plan for cybersecurity is the need
of the hour.
12. Details available at the official website https://www.acsc.gov.au/.
13. “Cybersecurity in the UK,” Houses of the Parliament, Parliamentary Office
of Science & Technology, https://www.parliament.uk/documents/post/
postpn389_cyber-security-in-the-UK.pdf (Accessed on August 8, 2018).
14. India’s national Cyber Security Policy is available at the website of the Ministry
of Electronics and Information Technology (Meity): meity.gov.in/.
15. Information available at official website www.cert-in.org.in/.
16. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhry, “India, Israel sign nine pacts on cyber security,
other sectors,” The Economic Times, January 16, 2018, https://economictimes.
indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-israel-ink-nine-pacts-on-
cyber-security-other-sectors/articleshow/62507272.cms (Accessed on August
8, 2018).
17. “India, Russia to deepen practical cooperation in ICTs,” The Business
Standard, February 20, 2018, https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-
stories/india-russia-to-deepen-practical-cooperation-in-icts-118022001480_1.
html (Accessed on August 8, 2018).
18. Isaac Chotiner, “Why the Latest Snowden Leaks about Pakistan Are Scary,”
The New Republic, September 3, 2013, https://newrepublic.com/article/114573/
snowden-leaks-united-states-and-pakistan (Accessed on August 9, 2018).
19. “UK hacked routers in Pakistan to identify terrorists, claims Edward Snowden,”
The Indian Express, October 7, 2015, https://indianexpress.com/article/world/
world-news/uk-hacked-routers-in-pakistan-to-identify-terrorists-edward-
snowden-nsa-twitter/(Accessed on August 9, 2018)
20. The details regarding Pakistan’s National Internal Security Policy (2014-18)
are available at https://nacta.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/National-
Internal-Security-Policy-2014.pdf (Accessed on August 9, 2018).
21. National Response Centre for Cyber Crime (NR3C), http://www.nr3c.gov.pk/
(Accessed on August 9, 2018).
22. Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the
context of international security, UNODA, https://www.un.org/disarmament/
topics/informationsecurity/ (Accessed on August 9, 2018).
 PAKISTAN ARMY

MINERAL
WEALTH OF
PAKISTAN
Dr Samar Mubarakmand, NI, HI, SI,
is a globally renowned & acknowledged
Nuclear Scientist. He is Chairman (Board of
Governors) Underground Coal Gasification
Project, Block-V & Chairman (Board of
Directors) Punjab Mineral Company

Abstract
Pakistan is extra-ordinarily gifted by nature with a very valuable and wide diversity of mineral wealth.
copper, gold, silver and iron are among the principal valuable deposits of metallic minerals. In quantity
and quality, the gemstones of Pakistan are famous in the world and fetch very good prices in international
exhibitions in the world. Among minor metals the country can also boast of significant quantities of
gallium, tungsten, beryllium, cobalt, zirconium and chromium. The recent discovery of cobalt in Gilgit
Baltistan is especially good news for the country as this metal is finding wide spread applications in the
manufacture of high current density batteries for electric cars. Nature has endowed Pakistan with Rare
Earths such as cerium, yttrium and lanthanum etc. which have important applications in Optics, Nuclear
detectors, Electronic industry as well as in Medicine. Among non-metallic minerals, Pakistan can boast
of very large deposits of coal, marble, granite, onyx and a large variety of beautiful stones for use in civil
construction. The Shale oil and Shale gas deposits lie under ¾ of the surface area of Pakistan which
ranks at 9th place among the top ten Shale oil and gas countries in the world. There is a need to realise the
potential of this mineral wealth, mine it, refine it and channelise it into the economy of Pakistan.

Keywords: Metallic Minerals, Minor Metallic Minerals, Non Metallic Minerals, Shale Oil/Shale Gas
Extraction, Gemstones, Rare Earths, Coal

Green Book 2019 177

 M
PAKISTAN ARMY
ineral wealth of countries are
gifts of nature. Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates, Qatar,
Malaysia and several more
countries had histories of poverty
and backwardness prior to the
discovery of oil, gas and other minerals. These
countries have now become forerunners of affluent
economies and boast of very high per capita incomes
and national growth.
Types of Minerals
Broadly minerals are classified into metallic
and non-metallic types. Metallic minerals include
mineable deposits of iron, copper, gold, nickel,
tungsten, cobalt, aluminium, zinc, platinum etc.
and strategic metals such as molybdenum, lithium,
thorium, radium, uranium etc. An under the surface
presence of different metals as pure elements or in
the form of metal salts / compounds may occur. But
the scattering of minerals in the soil is sometimes
an indicator of mineable deposits in the form of
thick seams. Borehole drilling, extraction of ore
samples from different depths and their chemical
analysis can determine quality and quantity of
a minable metal from below the surface of earth.
To classify such metallic deposits under the earth
as economical or un-economical, various factors
come under consideration. The international price
tag on a metal will determine the investment in
its mining and refining effort. Gold, platinum or
radioactive metals or rare earths are of such high
value that deep mining with challenges of water
influx may be worth overcoming during open pit
or tunnel mining. In case of cheaper metals like
iron, aluminium etc. too much cost in mining
would make the ultimate price of the mined metal
uncompetitive in the world market and the entire
effort would not be worthwhile. Cheaper metallic
deposits of reasonable thickness and lighter
over burdens can be mined economically.
Non-metallic minerals commonly found
in Pakistan include lime stone, clay, fire
clay, ceramic, gemstones, granite, graphite,
gypsum, dolomite, marble, quartz,
sulphur, zirconium, onyx etc.
178 Green Book 2019
Lime stone, gypsum and clay are extensively
used in cement manufacture. Fire clay bricks have
applications in lining high temperature furnaces
and ceramic mixed with gypsum and clay is used
in the manufacture of earthenware and crockery.
Granite and marble decorate our civil construction.
Dolomite of high quality exists in Pakistan and is
of great value in the chemical industry as well as
in glass manufacture. Graphite is a very pure form
of carbon. It is used in manufacture of cells and
graphite electrodes. Gemstones found in Pakistan
are especially famous for their high quality.
A few years ago, some un-scrupulous elements
of society would dig out raw gemstones and sell
them of to foreign countries at a few rupees per
kilogram. The Federal Government took cognisance
of this colossal waste of national wealth. Several
batches of precious stone cutters and polishers
were trained.
Three gemstone cutting facilities were
established in the country where raw stones are cut
and polished. Annual exhibitions are held in the
country where international and national buyers
get an opportunity to purchase the entire product
of Pakistan.
Natural Occurrence of Metallic Minerals
Usually occurrence of metallic minerals is
seen to exist in worldwide belts which run through
continents. For Pakistan, we are very fortunate to
have the existence of Tethyan copper belt passing
through the country. The belt originates in China
close to Tibet. It moves parallel to Himalayas on the
Chinese side and enters Pakistan from the north.
This belt has a north to south trajectory passing
through Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Balochistan
and then swings west into Afghanistan and ends
up in Turkey.
A close look at the Tethyan copper belt
shows large copper deposit at Reko Diq and
Saindak in Pakistan, another large deposit
of copper in Sarcheshmeh, Sari Gunay
in Iran and minor and major deposits
along the belt ending in Turkey.
gold and silver exist with
copper in Saindak, Reko
Diq and Sari
 PAKISTAN ARMY

Reesk Tethyan Copper Belt

Rosia Montana

Majdanpek

Bor

Chelopech

Copler Reko Diq

Olympias Kisladag
Sari Gunay
Skauris
Sari Chesmeh
500 kms
Saindak

Gunay. A small shallow deposit of copper/cobalt of pure copper and 217 tons of pure gold at
has been reported by FATA Development Authority Saindak.1 The contract for mining and production
in Shinkai North Waziristan. of blister copper / gold / silver was awarded to the
Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) in 2001
Saindak Copper Mines for an annual production of 15000 tons of copper
The Saindak copper mines are located in metal, 1.5 tons of gold and 2.8 tons of silver. There
the west of Balochistan on the Tethyan copper are three mineral deposits in Saindak. To date, the
belt and about 40 km from the famous Reko Diq largest of the three deposits has been completely
deposit. Initially, Saindak copper was discovered mined and work is going on the second deposit
by Geological Survey of Pakistan in 1973 with a since 2015.
preliminary estimation of 400 million tons of ore Reko Diq Copper Deposits
containing 0.4% copper
and 0.30-0.48 g/ton of The Geological Survey of Pakistan discovered
gold. Later on Tethyan copper, gold and silver deposits at Reko Diq in
copper company in its 1978-79. There are about 36 individual mineable
feasibility report on deposits in 400 Sq. Km area of Reko Diq.
Reko Diq mentioned a The largest deposit of copper, gold and silver
total asset of 1.8 lies in the western porphyry (H-13, H-14 and H-15)
million tons totalling 22 million tons of copper metal and 39
million ounces of gold. Another significant deposit
of 2.42 million tons of pure copper metal exists in
Tanjeel (H-4). In all, the aggregate endowment
of ore in the greater Chaghai
belt amounts to 7 billion

‘‘ The international price tag on a metal will determine the investment in its mining
and refining effort. Gold, platinum or radio active metals or rare earths are of such
‘‘
high value that deep mining with challenges of water influx may be worth overcoming
during open pit or tunnel mining

Green Book 2019 179

 PAKISTAN ARMY
tons, yielding 27 million tons of copper and 52
million ounces of gold with a present day value of
$ 228 billion on the London Metal Exchange (LME).
At Reko Diq, the average grade of ore is 0.8%
copper and 0.285 grams of gold per ton of ore. The
total ore estimated, at Reko Diq only, is 5.9 billion
tons which would yield 24.5 million tons of copper
metal and 42 million ounces of pure gold.2
Shinkai Copper
Based on several years of geophysical surface
investigations and exploratory drilling, a reserve of
35 million tons of copper ore was established with
an average grade of 0.8% copper in ore at depths of
up to 150 metres. Other associated metals including
lead, zinc, silver, cobalt, iron and sulphur were
considered as additional by-products.3
180 Green Book 2019
The major deposits of copper and other metallic
minerals in North Waziristan are located at Shinkai.
The exploration was carried out through 3300 feet
of core drilling, core analysis and geophysical
survey. The relevant area of the deposit has 700
metres of radial extent and 400 metres of width
going down to a depth of 150 metres.
The total assets of copper, silver, cobalt, and
gold are valued at $ 4.987 billion at current value
of LME.
‘‘
Tethyan copper company in
its feasibility report on Reko Diq
mentioned a total asset of 1.8 million
‘‘
tons of pure copper and 217 tons of
pure gold at Saindak
 PAKISTAN ARMY

Iron Ore in Pakistan
Iron ore deposits occur in several locations in
Pakistan. The significant deposits are at Naukundi,
Chiniot, Haripur and the largest deposit is at
Kalabagh.4 It was established through UN-PAK
Mineral Survey Project Report (1962-1963), that an
estimated 52 million tons of iron ore is at Chughlan
near Kalabagh, 35 million tons at Kuch-Kartoop
(north of Kalabagh), 213 million tons East and West
of Chichali pass and 50 million tons at Makerwal.
All these deposits called the Kalabagh iron ore
deposits total 350 million tons. The thickness of
iron ore ranges from 8-25 ft.
Recently, IMC-Montan Consulting GmbH
(Germany) has developed economically viable
process for sponge iron and steel using Kalabagh
iron ore and indigenous Pakistani coal.
Historically in the sixties at the time of the
discovery of iron ore the process for its conversion
into steel could not be established at economical
‘‘
The total assets of copper, silver,
cobalt, and gold are valued at $ 4.987
‘‘
billion at current value of London Metal
Exchange
level due to the technologies available at that time.
The recent study by IMC-Montan has deployed
the latest reduction technologies to convert the
Kalabagh ore to high grade steel at an economical
cost using indigenous coal.5
Geological Survey of Pakistan during
surface studies for metallic minerals comprising
gravitational method, polarisation studies and
geomagnetic survey had strongly indicated
presence of high grade iron ore in Chiniot and its
vicinity of Rajoa.

Kalabagh

Chiniot
e
ng
Ra
an
lam
Su
h
Ko

Green Book 2019 181

 PAKISTAN ARMY

‘‘ Pakistan has deposits of 4.5 million

metric tons of chromite in Zhob,
‘‘
Chrome Mining
Pakistan has deposits of 4.5 million metric
tons of chromite in Zhob, Shangla, Muslimbagh,
Shangla, Muslimbagh, Khanozai, Nisai Khanozai, Nisai and Gowal. A few more deposits
and Gowal occur just under the surface in several locations of
South Balochistan. Open pit mining is resorted to
for ore excavation.6
About four years ago, the Punjab Mineral Annual production of chromite and small
Company (PMC) was tasked by the Punjab quantities of magnesite ore mined from different
Government to carry out detailed exploration over sites amounts to 1.5 million metric tons.
an area of 28 Sq. Km to ascertain the content of iron
ore and other minerals present in the Chiniot zone. Bauxite (Aluminium) Reserves
Exploratory targeted drilling was carried out after
surface studies pin pointed locations of occurrence Pakistan has 74 million tons of bauxite
of high concentrations of metallic minerals reserves which are classified as low to medium
underground. Thousands of core samples extracted grade. Bauxite occurs in Muzaffarabad, Ziarat,
from different depths were chemically analysed in Kalat and Khushab. The annual production from
international laboratories. The work was carried out different bauxite mines aggregates to about 10,000
by a Chinese company and supervised by a leading tons annually.7
German consultant. The net result confirmed the
presence of high grade iron ore of 150 million tons
valued at $ US 4.5 billion --sufficient to feed a one
million ton steel mill for 30 – 40 years. The total
cost of this initial effort of phase-I exploration is
about Rs. 3.2 billion.
Towards the end of this exploration effort in
phase-I, strong indications of copper, gold, zinc
and graphite were observed. In the second phase,
surface studies were extended to an area of 2000 Sq.
Km from Kirana in the North West to Chak Jhumra
in the South East of Chiniot. Apparently, according
to the German experts these minerals were thrown
up by a volcanic activity in the vicinity of Chiniot
town millions of years ago. A second phase (phase-
II) of exploration work is now underway and so far
the results for the occurrence of more iron ore and
Bauxite Ore
copper are very encouraging.

Lead and Zinc

The Geological Survey of Pakistan has
discovered several deposits of lead and zinc ore in
Lasbela-Khuzdar region of Balochistan Province.
They are associated with carbonate rocks of Winder
Group and Shirinab formation. UNDP and JICA
funded projects have helped Geological Survey of
Pakistan (GSP) to estimate lead and zinc deposits
at Duddar of 6.86 million tons of proven reserves
and 3.43 million tons of inferred reserves. These
reserves contain 11.34% of zinc and 2.01% lead.

‘‘ Annual production of chromite

and small quantities of magnesite ore
‘‘
Gowal Open Pit Chrome Mine mined from different sites amounts to
1.5 million metric tons

182 Green Book 2019


Present estimate of available ore in the country
is over 23 million tons. Mining of lead and zinc
commenced during 2010-2011 with a total annual
production of 12,692 metric tons.8
Lead is widely used in the production of lead
acid batteries. Some of its minor uses includes
protectors against radiation, sound proofing and as
an additive in car fuel to prevent engine knocking.
Zinc is used in galvanising steel to protect it
from rusting. Zinc compounds are used in plastics,
rubber and cosmetic industry.
Manganese
Manganese is a silver grey metal with a pinkish
tinge. It is found in many localities in Lasbela,
Kharan, Chaghai and Zhob districts in Balochistan. It
is also found in Warsak Killi area in KP. Presently total
estimates of ore available in the country are 600,000
metric tons with an annual production of 2,712 metric
tons.
Manganese
Manganese has important applications in the
production of high quality steel. It adds strength
to the alloy by the removal of oxygen and sulphur
impurities from raw iron. It also forms alloys with
‘‘ Manganese is found in many localities in Lasbela, Kharan, Chaghai and Zhob
districts in Balochistan. It is also found in Warsak Killi area in KP. Presently total
‘‘
estimates of ore available in the country are 600,000 metric tons with an annual
production of 2,712 metric tons
PAKISTAN ARMY
‘‘
Pakistan has vast reserves of cobalt
at Shinkai in North Waziristan where 35
‘‘
million tons of ore contains 1100 grams
per ton of cobalt in the ore
aluminium and copper for the production of battery
cathodes, soft ferrites used in computer memories.
It is also used as a micro nutrient in fertilisers.
Using in trace quantities with enzymes it acts as a
detoxification agent. It aids the body in absorbing
vitamin B-1 and makes bones strong and flexible.
A common compound, potassium permanganate,
is commonly used to remove bacteria from fruit,
water and other eatables.
Cobalt
One of the most valuable metals in current
industrial use is cobalt with a price tag of $ US
55,500 per ton. The recent steep demand of cobalt
is due to its application in high performance
rechargeable batteries. Cobalt delivers very high
energy density for power, performance and charge
life in lithium-ion batteries. Cobalt combines
with lithium, or with nickel and aluminium or
with nickel and manganese in the manufacture
of different types of rechargeable batteries. These
batteries can deliver high currents for longer times
in smaller sizes and weights. Cobalt has special
applications in aerospace industry also. In earlier
models of electric cars recharging was required
every 100 KMs of driving. With the production of
advanced cobalt lithium batteries electric cars can
now run for 400 KMs before recharging. With this
latest breakthrough 2017 is called “The Year of
Cobalt”.
Pakistan has vast reserves of cobalt at Shinkai
in North Waziristan where 35 million tons of ore
contains 1100 grams per ton of cobalt in the ore.
In addition, there is occurrence of copper, gold
and silver. The Mineral Development Corporation
of Pakistan during the Regional Chemical Survey
has discovered this precious metal at 255 potential
target points. Cobalt has occurred in quantities of
1458 grams per ton in association with copper, gold
and silver. There is occurrence of other precious and
Green Book 2019 183
 PAKISTAN ARMY
base metals above the threshold value of 70 and 25
gm/ton. The top most cobalt anomaly has occurred
in 4 sq. Km of Pakora Valley of Gilgit Baltistan. The
chemical analysis of a representative sample from
this location has been chemically analysed yielding
Cobalt = 1457.7, Gold = 34.4, Copper = 4164.8, Lead
= 3540 and Zinc = 1197 grams per ton.9
Incidentally, it may be mentioned that at Reko
Diq the ore contains 7,000 grams of copper and
0.285 grams of gold per ton.
Gallium
The rare metal gallium occurs with a typical
concentration of 50 parts per million (ppm) in
bauxite ore. During the extraction process gallium
can be extracted with 15% efficiency during the
processing of bauxite for separation of alumina.
Pure gallium is a soft silvery blue metal with a
melting point of 29.76oC. Gallium arsenide has very
Gallium Crystal
important applications in electronics. It is used in
microwave, high speed switching circuits, infrared
circuits, production of light emitting diodes and
diode lasers.10
Xenotime (Yttrium)
184 Green Book 2019
‘‘
Yttrium is a soft metal with a silver
metallic appearance. It has applications
in the production of Light Emitted
Diodes (LEDs), Red Phosphors (crystals
which produce red light on the impact of
electrons), Television screens, Cathode
‘‘
ray tubes, and high powered Yag Lasers
and Super conductors
Rare Earths
── Yttrium is a rare earth which occurs as a
phosphate in xenotime.11 Occurrence of
xenotime is reported in Warsak Mountains
40 Km from Peshawar. Yttrium is a soft
metal with a silver metallic appearance. It
has applications in the production of Light
Emitted Diodes (LEDs), Red Phosphors
(crystals which produce red light on the
impact of electrons), Television screens,
Cathode ray tubes, and high powered Yag
Lasers and Super conductors.12
── Cerium and Lanthanum occur in the form
of carbonate fluoride mineral in bastnaesite
which is found in KP province in the Warsak
Mountains. Their content in the compound
are almost equal. Cerium is a heavy metal.
When mixed with aluminium and a small
quantity of magnesium or silicon an extremely
high strength alloy is produced which can be
used at high temperatures. It has important
applications in space technology. Cerium is
also used as a compound ceria for polishing
glass and producing high quality optical
surfaces with applications in optical and
laser industry. Lanthanum is the costliest of
the rare earths occurring in the Warsak range
and has a price tag of $ 64 per gram. It is used
in nuclear radiation detectors as a scintillator.
It has applications in production of electron
cathodes and has important applications as
phosphate binder in cases of renal failure.13
Bastnaesite
 PAKISTAN ARMY

── Topaz & Aquamarine from Pakistan. Dasu

and Shigar valleys in the Skardu district boast
of top quality Topaz and Aquamarines. The
quality of these gemstones is based upon
their size, clarity and transparency. They are
being mined since 1988 and after the creation
of Gemstone Corporation of Pakistan, the
Lanthanum cutting and polishing of all our gemstones
are in the hands of much specialised trained
technicians equipped with the latest cutting
Non Metallic Minerals and polishing machines.
Pakistan is situated in a zone of the sub-
continent which has the Himalayas, the
Karakorams, the Hindu Kush and the Koh-Suleman
ranges. There is a great wealth of non-metallic
minerals/rocks available in these mountain ranges.
Pakistan is famous for its large resource of marble,
granite, quartz, rock salt, onyx, limestone and coral
rock. These materials are extensively used all over
the world to provide beautiful floors and facings for
modern buildings.
Lime stone, gypsum and clay form the basic
ingredients for the production of cement in the
country. Pakistan exports large quantity of cement Topaz Aquamarine
and earns valuable foreign exchange through its
trade.
── Rubys and Sapphires are found in Dir.
Gemstones They occur in corundum clusters. One such
corundum specimen containing Rubys is
A very wide variety of precious gemstones
shown below in the natural form. The value
occur in north of the country. Some of the most
popular gemstones in the world market are as and beauty which our craftsmen add to such
follows: rough stones can be seen in the polished
── Purple-Lavender Hued Topaz. This is found
at Katlang in the Mardan district of KP. These
stones are extremely rare and very valuable.
They fetch a high value on the world market.

Purple Lavender Hued Topaz Uncut Ruby

‘‘ Pakistan is situated in a zone of the sub-continent which has the Himalayas, the
Karakorams, the Hindu Kush and the Koh-Suleman ranges. There is a great wealth of
non-metallic minerals/rocks available in these mountain ranges. Pakistan is famous
‘‘
for its large resource of marble, granite, quartz, rock salt, onyx, limestone and coral
rock

Green Book 2019 185

 PAKISTAN ARMY
gemstones offered at the international
exhibitions by the Gemstone Corporation of
Pakistan.
Dir Ruby Swat Emerald
Coal
There are four types of coal. Grading them
in quality at the top is Anthracite followed by
Bituminous, Sub-bituminous and Lignite coal. The
heat value of Anthracite is 12910 Btu/lb. while the
heat value of Lignite coal is 6900 Btu/lb.
Pakistan has extensive coal reserves which are
in excess of 185 billion tons. The main coal deposits
are in Sindh at Thar, Sonda, Jharruk, Lakhra and
Thatha aggregating a total of 184.623 billion tons.
The coal deposits of Thar are based on Lignite.
A Log of Coal Hydrogeology at Thar
(Courtesy UCG Project Block-V)
186 Green Book 2019
This coal ranks as the lowest among all coal types.
It is light brown in colour with a texture like
compressed carbon powder. The water content in
the coal is between 35-45%. Fortunately, it is low in
sulphur with an average of 0.8%. Being powdery in
nature, Thar lignite is porous and most suitable for
underground gasification. Extensive exploratory
studies have been carried out on the hydrogeology
and physical as well as chemical properties of this
principal reserve of coal of Pakistan.
The coal log demonstrates a layer of 80 metres
of sand at the top followed by two water layers. The
first layer of water (aquifer) is 80 metres below the
surface and has a thickness of 4 metres. It is formed
with penetration of rain water through the sand
which stops at an impenetrable layer of clay. The
Total Dissolved Salts (TDS) in aquifer-1 are about
2000 parts per million and the people of Thar use
this water for drinking and irrigation purposes. The
second aquifer is at a depth of about 130 metres
below the surface and is fed from the waters of the
Rann of Kutch. The thickness of this water layer is
about 10 metres and its TDS value is between 7000
– 8000. It is highly brackish and totally unfit for
human consumption or irrigation.
The coal seams just below the second aquifer
have thicknesses of less than 2.5 metres. They are
interspersed and discontinuous. The principal
coal seam which contains 80% of the coal occurs
at a depth of between 165 to 175 metres below the
surface.
The occurrence of water aquifers pose the main
impediment in open pit mining. One can imagine
easily that in a mine of depth of 170 metres, the
Lignite coal will be immersed under deep water.
Any attempt at pumping out the water would be
very costly. A total of 27,538 cubic metres per day
of water will have to be pumped out continuously
from the mine of 4 Sq. Km.14 The damage to the
environment of Thar can be imagined from the fact
that salt water lakes would be created by water
being pumped out from the coal mines.
The best quality coal in Pakistan is available
at the Chamalang mines in Balochistan which
contain high quality Anthracite coal. The salt range
has coal mines at several places with outcrops
in Bannu and Jhelum districts. This coal is sub-
bituminous in nature with a mixture of lignite in
it. The total coal in the salt range is estimated at
0.235 billion tons and in Balochistan the coal from
all deposits comes to 0.217 billion tons.15
Shale Oil and Shale Gas
An extensive study completed with USAID in
2015 covering 33% of the area of sedimentary rock
in Pakistan has yielded a presence of 3778 trillion
cubic feet of Shale Gas and 2323 billion stock tank

barrels of Shale oil. A total of 124 wells were drilled
into the sedimentary rock and core samples of
shale stone were analysed in the USA. The presence
of Pakistan’s Shale oil and Shale gas reserves have
been authenticated as a result of the above detailed
study.16 Pakistan now stands as ninth country in the
world having massive Shale reserves which exist at
depths between 4,000 to 15,000 feet.17
China has operating plants for the extraction
of Shale oil and gas from shale stone. The Author
visited one such facility in the city of Longkou in
Shandong province. To exploit our own reserves
on commercial basis it would be very pertinent
to approach China to launch a big project under
CPEC for the production of Shale oil and Shale
gas. Shale reserves can be tapped at locations in
close proximity to existing natural gas purification
facilities or oil refineries. This would eliminate
the expenses on laying long distance pipelines
Notes
1. TCC Reko Diq Feasibility Report Executive Summary page-5.
2. TCC Reko Diq Feasibility Report Executive Summary page-4.
3. FATA Development Corporation Report on Shinkai Copper December, 1992
4. Mining in Pakistan. Iron Ore. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mining_in_
Pakistan
5. Kalabagh Iron Ore http://punjabmineralcompany.pk/wp-content/
PAKISTAN ARMY
to connect Shale oil and gas wells to purification
and refining facilities. This is where the future of
Pakistan’s economic prosperity lies.
Conclusion
The large variety and very high value of
mineral resources of Pakistan have been discussed.
This mineral wealth has been lying under the soil
of our country for millions of years. It has stayed
untapped and unexploited so far. Now that we have
the technology and a very valuable and trained
human resource it would be in the best interest of
our country to exploit this natural wealth for the
benefit of our people. At this time in our history,
the will of the Government is now needed to pick
up the gold, the copper, the silver, rare earths,
valuable minor metals, precious gemstones and
above all the sea of oil and trillions of cubic feet of
natural gas which lie under our feet. Ninety five per
cent of Pakistan’s wealth exists below its soil.
uploads/2017/12/kalabagh.pdf
6. Gowal Open Pit Chrome Mine https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan_
Chrome_Mines_Ltd#Reserves
7. Government of Pakistan Statistics Division Federal Bureau of Statistics
Islamabad. http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/industry_mining_and_
energy/publications/cmq200506/Mining%20Report%20Final.pdf
8. Lead and Zinc (A Compilation Report on Mineral Ores of Pakistan by H. Jawad
Green Book 2019 187
 PAKISTAN ARMY
Sohail Geologist) https://www.slideshare.net/HJawadSohail/a-compilation-
report-on-the-mineral-ores-of-pakistan
9. A Global Outlook of Cobalt Beyond 2017 and its prospective exploration targets
in Pakistan published on May 20, 2017 (Muhammad Yaqub Shah) https://
www.linkedin.com/pulse/global-outlook-cobalt-beyond-2017-its-prospective-
exploration-shah
10. Gallium https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gallium
11. Xenotime https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xenotime
12. Yttrium (Xenotime) from Zagi Mountains https://www.mindat.org/loc-51430.
html
Thar Coal Block-II Project
188 Green Book 2019
13. Lanthanum https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lanthanum
14. China Northeast Coal Geological Bureau (CNGB) (Block-V Tharparker Report)
15. Coal Reserves of Pakistan https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan_Coal_
Mines_and_Resources
16. Pakistan & Gulf Economist http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/2018/01/22/
tapping-shale-oil-gas-potential-pakistan/
17. Shale Oil and Gas (Lifeline for Pakistan) Sustainable Development Policy
Institute (Engr. Arshad Abbasi) SDPI Report 2014 (Page 36 – Table-1)
PAKISTAN ARMY

Green Book 2019 189

 THE LAST POST
A SOLDIERS’ GENERAL,
LOVING FATHER & AN
AFFECTIONATE HUSBAND
(Based on an interview with Begum Major General Sana Ullah Khan,TBt, Shaheed)

“And do not think of those killed

in Allah’s path as dead: indeed
they are alive and receive their
sustenance from their Lord’’
(Al-Qur’aan, 3:169)

All officers of Pakistan Army take great pride in leading troops from the front.
Resultantly, the casualty ratio between the leaders and the led in Pakistan Army is
one of the highest in the world. In the same context, a new chapter was added in the
archives of audacious achievements of Pakistan Army, when Major General Sana Ullah
Khan, General Officer Commanding (GOC) 17 Division, embraced Shahadat at Pak-
Afghan border in District Upper Dir in 2013.

Born on 10th September 1960 in a respectable of the prestigious Baloch Regiments. Living upto
family from Daudkhel, Mianwali, the people of the expectations of his friends and family, he
which are known for their valour and respect rose steadily in the Army
for human values. He was brought up to become through his competence
an upright and an honest human like his father, and hard work, reaching the
Deputy Superintendent prestigious rank of Major
Police Ikhlas Khan, a General in the Army, He
legendary Police officer assumed command
from his area. After his as GOC of 17 Infantry
basic education, he Division deployed
in Swat on 17th
January 2013 — the
joined Pakistan appointment he held
Army in December till his Shahadat.
1983 and was
commissioned in one

190 Green Book 2019


Major General Sana Ullah Khan Niazi (Shaheed)
with father Khan Ikhlas Khan Niazi & General Zia
at Passing Out Parade - 1982
Remembering Major General Sana as a
husband and father of two daughters, Begum Sana
recollects, “Sana was my best friend and a very
affectionate, cooperative and caring husband I
could ever have wished for as a life partner. He was
the most kind hearted, generous and loving father
to his daughters. The memories we had together are
etched in my mind and heart forever. His children
will grow up knowing all this about him. He was
like a friend to his daughters, helping them in their
studies and constantly guiding them about various
facets of life. Everyone including myself, my kids,
his friends and colleagues enjoyed his charismatic
presence and felt at ease in his company”.
He was a man of strong character and made up
of very sound moral fibre having unflinching belief
in Allah Almighty. He always remained calm and
composed in the time of crisis. In the words of his
spouse, “He always believed in destiny and Allah’s
Will. Even in any kind of difficult times, he used
to say that Allah will protect, help and guide us,
nothing to fear’’.
On the professional front, he always stressed
upon setting a personal example and ensured high
morale of troops by his presence in the front lines.
He always used to say, “My soldiers are waiting
for me in front lines; I have to be there with them,
PAKISTAN ARMY
so that they never feel that they are alone.” It was
due to this insistence he very regularly used to visit
forward posts. His affection and concern for his
troops had earned him an eternal name; A Soldiers’
General.
On 14th September 2013, he departed from his
Headquarters on operational visit to border posts
in Chitral and Upper Dir. Before leaving for visit he
called his wife and told her that he was going to
spend a night in the company of his brave soldiers
on the front line. She was a bit worried on that day,
feeling restlessness and shared her thoughts with
him. He replied, “Don’t worry, we are fighting in
the way of Allah and for our beloved motherland,
nothing can harm us. Just take care of yourself and
kids and I will be back soon. Allah be with you”.
Begum Sana tried to calm herself by constantly
telling herself,’’ it is not the first time, he was going
on front lines, I, being a wife of soldier, should be
used to this.’’ But after all, she, being a devoted
wife, was worried and something unknown was
making her impatient.
‘‘
He was like a friend to his
daughters, helping them in their
studies and constantly guiding
‘‘
them about various facets of life
Green Book 2019 191
 PAKISTAN ARMY

On 15th September, after night stay at the border Major General Sana’s distinct attributes
post, while moving to the Battalion Headquarters of personality not only earned him love and
of 33 Baloch, an Improvised Explosive Device trust of his family, but also great respect of his
(IED) exploded under his vehicle resulting in his subordinates, colleagues and seniors. He truly was
Shahadat. a remarkable man, whose sacrifice will remain a
Begum Sana recalls that day, “Suddenly, I source of inspiration to all ranks of Pakistan Army.
received a call from 17 Division that Sana Ullah
has embraced Shahadat. I told my Batman not to Long Live Pakistan Army
inform kids regarding the incident. At the time of Long Live Pakistan
his Shahadat my daughters were in school but in
few moments the news of his Shahadat was on
every channel. By the time, my daughters entered
the house, they knew, their father had embraced
Shahadat. Tears started flowing like stream of
water from our eyes. I thought the life has come to
an end, but nothing can be done against nature’s
rules as Allah says that every soul shall have taste
of death”.
“Like always, he fulfilled his promise of
coming back, but this time his body was in a coffin
box wrapped up in a green flag. There were tears
in everyone’s eyes. On that day I actually realised,
how much his soldiers and officers loved him”. The
time spent with him is the most memorable time of
my life, which I can never forget. I can still see the
glimpse of his personality in my daughters. Like
all girls, my both daughters were very close to his
heart”.

‘‘ Like always, he fulfilled his promise of coming back, but this time his body was
in a coffin box wrapped up in a green flag. There were tears in everyone’s eyes. On
‘‘
that day I actually realised, how much his soldiers and officers loved him

192 Green Book 2019

Progress PAKISTAN ARMY

CPEC

Prosperity

Connectivity Green Book 2019 193

 PAKISTAN ARMY

194 Green Book 2019

Gwadar – Gateway toARMY
PAKISTAN CPEC

Green Book 2019 195

 PAKISTAN ARMY

Then

Misguided Youth Temporarily Displaced Persons

Militants Blow up New Government

School – Dir

Bomb Blast at Koto Girls High School – Lower Dir Destroyed Shrine – South Waziristan

Blast in Khwaja Jan Market – Miranshah

Check post, shops destroyed –Kurram Reign of Terror

196 Green Book Agency
2019 blast
 Mainstreaming of Tribal Areas
(Now Part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province)

Now

International Exhibition Tribal women create history by casting vote in

T20 Cricket Match – North Waziristan General Elections – 2018

Market Complex – Miranshah

Learning New Skills We will Rise and Shine

Successful WHAM Campaign

Pak – UAE Friendship Road

Cadet College Wana South and North Waziristan
 Educating, Inspiring, Developing

PAKISTAN ARMY
General Headquarters
Rawalpindi