SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME

Kidnapping with homicide - Old rule: (1) Where the accused kidnapped the victim for
the purpose of killing him, and he was in fact killed by his abductor, the crime committed was
the complex crime of kidnapping with murder as the kidnapping of the victim was a necessary
means of committing the murder. (2) Where the victim was kidnapped not for the purpose of
killing him but was subsequently slain as an afterthought, two (2) separate crimes of kidnapping
and murder were committed. Where there is no actual detention (People vs. Masilang, 1986) or
intent to deprive
liberty (People vs. Estacio Jr., G.R. No. 171655, July 22, 2009, En Banc)
killing the person is murder. Demand for ransom will not convert the crime into kidnapping.

Present rule: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention,
regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the
kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed, nor be treated as separate
crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime
(People vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 118570, October 12, 1998, En Banc, People vs. Larranaga, 138874
-75, February 3, 2004, En Banc; People vs. Montanir, GR No. 187534, April 04, 2011, Justice
Peralta)

If kidnapping is a necessary means to commit frustrated murder, special complex crime

of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with frustrated homicide. Homicide as a component
of special complex crime must be at the consummated stage. In this situation, the crime
committed is complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with frustrated murder
(See: People vs. Roxas, GR No. 172604, August 17, 2010, Justice Peralta)

COMPOUND CRIME

The single act of pitching or rolling the hand grenade on the floor of the gymnasium which
resulted in the death of one victim and injuries to other victims constituted a complex crime
under Article 48 of RPC which states that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied
in its maximum period (People vs. Mores, GR No. 189846, June 26, 2013).

X was charged with complex crime with murder and attempted murder. The information
alleges that the accused shot the victim, but it does not allege that he did so several times.
However, the evidence show that accused shot her and her father several times. Can X be
convicted of separate crimes of murder and attempted murder or complex crime? Answer: On
the basis of evidence, X committed separate crimes of murder and attempted murder. Several
shootings rule out the application of the concept of complex crime. However, evidence does not
conform to the Information, which contains no allegation accused shot the victims several times.
In the absence of a clear statement of several shootings in the Information, the accused may be
convicted only of the complex crime of murder with attempted murder. After all, the concept of
complex crimes is intended to favor the accused by imposing a single penalty irrespective of the
number of crimes committed. Information merely states that accused shot the victims. This is a
compound crime since murder and attempted murder was produced by a single act of shooting.
To rule that the accused should be convicted of two separate offenses of murder and attempted
murder pursuant to the evidence presented but contrary to the allegations in the Information is
to violate the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him (People vs. Bernardo, GR No. 198789, June 03, 2013).

DELICTO CONTINUADO

In order that continuous crime may exist, there should be: (1) plurality of acts performed
separately during a period of time; (2) unity of criminal intent and purpose and (3) unity of penal
provision infringed upon or violated (Santiago vs. Garchitorena , GR NO. 109266, December 2,
1993).

a. Single occassion - In People vs. Tumlos, G.R. No. 46428, April 13, 1939, En Banc -
The theft of the thirteen cows owned by six owners involved thirteen (13) acts of taking. However,
the acts of taking took place at the same time and in the same place; consequently, accused
performed but one act. The intention was likewise one, namely, to take for the purpose of
appropriating or selling the thirteen cows which he found grazing in the same place. The fact
that eight of said cows pertained to one owner and five to another does not make him criminally
liable for as many crimes as there are owners, for the reason that in such case neither the
intention nor the criminal act is susceptible of division.

“X” as punong barangay was

angered when he discovered a tap from the main line of the public water tank. On separate
occasions, “X” threatened to kill and crack the skulls of “A”, “B”, and “C”, who suspected to be
responsible for the tapping of water line. There is no continued crime since the three crimes of
grave threat were not committed under a single criminal impulse. “X’s” intent to threaten “A”,
“B”, and “C” with bodily harm arose only when he chanced upon each of his victims. Several
threats can only be considered as continued crime if the offender threatened three individuals at
the same place and at the same time (Paera vs. People, G.R. No. 181626, May 30, 2011). In People
vs. Tumlos, G.R. No. 46428, April 13, 1939, En Banc - The theft of the thirteen cows owned by
six owners involved thirteen (13) acts of taking. However, the acts of taking took place at the
same time and in the same place; consequently, accused performed but one act. The intention
was likewise one, namely, to take for the purpose of appropriating or selling the thirteen cows
which he found grazing in the same place. The fact that eight of said cows pertained to one owner
and five to another does not make him criminally liable for as many crimes as there are owners,
for the reason that in such case neither the intention nor the criminal act is susceptible of
division.

In People vs. Aaron, G.R. NOS. 136300- 02, September 24, 2002 - The accused inserted
his penis into the victim’s vagina; he then withdrew it and ordered the latter to lie down on the
floor and, for the second time, he inserted again his penis into the victim’s vagina; the accused,
thereafter, stood up and commanded the victim to lie near the headboard of the makeshift bed
and, for the third time, he inserted again his penis into the victim’s vagina and continued making
pumping motions. Accused is convicted of only one count of rape. Accused thrice succeeded in
inserting his penis into the private part of victim. However, the three penetrations occurred
during one continuing act of rape in which the accused obviously motivated by a single criminal
intent. Accused decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault merely
because of his lustful desire to change positions inside the room where the crime was committed.

In People vs. Lucena, GR No. 190632, February 26, 2014 - Accused thrice succeeded in inserting
his penis into the private part of victim. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the other
at an interval of five (5) minutes wherein the accused would rest after satiating his lust upon his
victim and, after he has regained his strength, he would again rape the victim. When the accused
decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault upon victim, he was not
motivated by a single impulse, but rather by several criminal intents. Hence, his conviction for
three (3) counts of rape is indubitable.

In People vs. Crisostomo, GR No. 196435, January 29, 2014 – Accused on the same
occasion inserted a lit cigarette stick into genital orifice of victim (6 years of age) and her anal
orifice, and had sexual intercourse with her. He is guilt for two counts of rape by sexual assault
and rape through sexual intercourse.

b. General plan - In People vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. L-1745, May 23, 1950, it was held
that ransacking several houses located within the vicinity of a sugar mill while two of the bandits
guarded the victims with guns leveled at them is a continued crime of robbery. Several acts of
robbery were made pursuant to general plan to despoil all those in the said place, which is an
indicative of a single criminal design.

Accused intended only to rob one place; and that is the Energex gasoline station. That
they did; and in the process, also took away by force the money and valuables of the employees
working in said gasoline station. Clearly inferred from these circumstances are the series of acts
which were borne from one criminal resolution. A continuing offense is a continuous, unlawful
act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force,
however long a time it may occupy. The perpetrated acts were not entirely distinct and
unconnected from one another. Thus, there is only single offense or crime (People vs. De Leon,
GR No.
179943, June 26, 2009, Justice Peralta).

c. Foreknowledge doctrine - In Gamboa vs. CA, G.R. No. L-41054, November 28, 1975 - Accused
cannot be held to have entertained continuously the same criminal intent in making the first
abstraction on October 2, 1972 for the subsequent abstractions on the following days and months
until December 30, 1972, for the simple reason that he was not possessed of any fore-knowledge of
any deposit by any customer on any day or occasion and which would pass on to his possession and
control. At most, his intent to misappropriate may arise only when he comes in possession of the
deposits on each business day but not in future, since petitioner company operates only on a day-
to-day transaction. As a result, there could be as many acts of misappropriation as there are
times the private respondent abstracted and/or diverted the deposits to his own personal use
and benefit (People vs. Dichupa, G.R. No. L-16943, October 28, 1961).

DOCTRINE OF ABSORPTION - Crime is absorbed if it is a mere incident in the

commission of another crime. In the case of U.S vs. Sevilla (1 Phil. 143), the accused, who struck
the offended parties while simultaneously threatening to kill them if they would not return him
the jewelry they have lost, was held liable for slight physical injuries. The threat was considered
as part of the assault. In People vs. Yebra (109 Phil. 613), it was held that defamatory statement
uttered in the course of committing the crime of threat is not a separate crime. The defamation
was just a part of the crime of threat. The letter containing the libelous remarks is more
threatening than libelous; the intent to threaten is the principal aim and object of the letter.
The libelous remarks are merely preparatory remarks culminating in the final threat.
 What is the effect of the elimination of the overt acts of violence in Article 135 by RA No.
9668? In People vs. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-6025, July 18, 1956 – The Supreme Court justified
the doctrine of absorption in rebellion since murder, robbery, and arson are just a part of the
“engaging in war against the forces of the government", "committing serious violence", and
“destroying property in Article 135. However, RA No. 6968 eliminated the phrases "engaging in
war against the forces of the government", "committing serious violence" and “destroying
property” in Article 135. According to Florenz Regalado, the amendment of Article 135 does not
affect the accepted concept of rebellion and these “overt acts of violence” are deemed “subsumed”
in the provision on rebellion in Article 134. Under this principle of subsumption, engaging in
combat against the forces of the Government, destroying property or committing serious violence is
an essential ingredient of rebellion.

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was charged for rebellion under the Revised Penal Code and
obstruction of justice under PD No. 1829. The obstruction of justice case is based on the
allegation that Enrile entertained and accommodated Col. Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan, fugitive
from justice, by giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. The rebellion
case is based on the alleged fact that fugitive Col. Honasan and some 100-rebel soldiers attended
the mass and birthday party held at the residence of Enrile in the evening of December 1, 1989.
It was held that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common
crimes but also to offenses under special laws, which are perpetrated in furtherance of the
political offense. Hence, rebellion absorbs obstruction of justice (Enrile vs. Amin, G.R. No. 93335,
September 13, 1990).

MULTIPLE DEATHS

SINGLE ACT RULE - If there is more than one death resulting from different acts there
is no compound crime of multiple homicides or murder. Article 48 speaks of a “single act”. In
People vs. Toling, G.R. No. L-27097, January 17, 1975 - Twin brothers, who ran amok like
“juramentados” in a passenger train, and killed their eight co-passengers, were held liable for
eight (8) murders and one attempted murder. The conduct of the twins evinced conspiracy and
community of design. The eight killings and the attempted murder were perpetrated by means
of different acts. Hence, they cannot be regarded as constituting a complex crime under Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code, which refers to cases where "a single act constitutes two or more
grave felonies, of, when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.

In People vs. Punzalan G .R. No. 199892, December 1, 2001 - Appellant was animated by
a single purpose, to kill the navy personnel, and committed a single act of stepping on the
accelerator, swerving to the right side of the road ramming through the navy personnel, causing
the death of two persons and, at the same time, constituting an attempt to kill others. The crime
committed is complex crime of multiple murders and attempted murder.

SINGLE IMPULSE RULE – Several acts committed by several offenders with one criminal
impulse resulting in several deaths constitute one crime: the compound crime of multiple homicides
or murders. In People vs. Lawas, L-7618-20, June 30, 1955 - Members of the Home Guard, upon
order of their leader, Lawas, simultaneously and successively fired at several victims. After a
short time, the firing stopped immediately when Lawas ordered his men to “cease fire”. As a
result of the firing, fifty
persons died. It was held that the evidence positively shows that the killing was the result of a
single impulse, which was induced by the order of the leader to fire, and continued with the
intention to comply therewith, as the firing stopped as soon as the leader gave the order to that
effect. There was no intent on the part of the accused either to fire at each and every of the
victims as separately and distinctly from each other. If the act or acts complained of resulted
from a single criminal impulse, it constitutes a single offense - compound crime of multiple
homicides.

COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY RULE - Under the Lawas principle, if accused fired

their guns killing several victims pursuant to a single impulse, they shall be held liable for
continued crime of murder. The Lawas principle should only be applied in a case where (1) there
is no conspiracy (People vs. Hon. Pineda, G.R. No. L-26222, July 21, 1967) and (2) it is impossible
to ascertain the number of deaths caused by each accused (People vs. Tabaco, G.R. No. 100382-
100385, March 19, 1997). In conspiracy, each conspirator is not only liable for deaths
attributable to him but also for deaths caused by others because in conspiracy the act of one is
the act of all. Thus, the Lawas doctrine should not be applied if there is conspiracy since the
number of victims actually killed by each conspirator is not anymore material if there is
conspiracy (People vs. Elarcosa, G.R. No. 186539, June 29, 2010).

In People vs. Nelmida, G.R. No. 184500. September 11, 2012 - Significantly, there was no
conspiracy in Lawas case. However, the Lawas doctrine is more of an exception than the general
rule. With the presence of conspiracy in the case at bench, appellants had assumed joint criminal
responsibility ─ the act of one is the act of all. The ascertainment of who among them actually
hit, killed and/or caused injury to the victims already
becomes immaterial. Collective
responsibility replaced individual responsibility. The Lawas doctrine, premised on the
impossibility of determining who killed whom, cannot be applied.
 In Lawas, this Court was merely forced to apply Article 48 of RPC because of the
impossibility of ascertaining the number of persons killed by each accused. Since conspiracy was
not proven therein, joint criminal responsibility could not be attributed to the accused. Each
accused could not be held liable for separate crimes because of lack of clear evidence showing
the number of persons actually killed by each of them.

In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. It is as though each one performed the act
of each one of the conspirators. Each one is criminally responsible for each one of the deaths
and injuries of the several victims. The severalty of the acts prevents the application of Article
48. The applicability of Article 48 depends upon the singularity of the act, thus the definitional
phrase "a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies." To apply the first half
of Article 48, there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not
written into the law.

SINGLE PURPOSE RULE - In People vs. Abella, 93 SCRA 25, the “Lawas principle” was
applied despite the presence of conspiracy. In the said case, sixteen prisoners, who are members
of the OXO gang, were able to break into the cell of Sigue-Sigue gang and killed fourteen (14)
inmates. All accused were convicted for a compound crime. It was held: Where a conspiracy
animates several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done in pursuance of that
purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a complex offense.
Various acts committed under one criminal impulse may constitute a single complex offense.
Basis - The “single purpose rule” was actually adopted in consideration of the plight of the
prisoners. Requisites -There are two requisites to apply the Abella principle: (1) there must be a
conspiracy, which animates several persons to commit crimes under a single criminal purpose;
and (2) the offenders committed crimes in prison against their fellow prisoners (People vs.
Pincalin, et al., G.R. No. L-38755, January 22, 1981).

In People vs. Nelmida, G.R. No. 184500. September 11, 2012 - The application of the
Abella doctrine, has already been clarified in Pincalin, thus: where several killings on the same
occasion were perpetrated, but not involving prisoners, a different rule may be applied, that is to
say, the killings would be treated as separate offenses. If the killings did not involve prisoners or
it was not a case of prisoners killing fellow prisoners, Abella would not apply.

MULTIPLE KIDDNAPPINGS

In People v Tadah, G.R. No. 186226, February 1, 2012 (5 victims)- Since the prosecution
adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused conspired to kidnap the victims for
ransom, and kidnapped and illegally detained them until they were released by the accused after
the latter received the P2,000,000.00 ransom xxx Appellant Yusop Tadah is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of 5 counts of kidnapping.

NOVATION

The novation theory may perhaps apply prior to the filing of the criminal information in
court by the state prosecutors because up to that time the original trust relation may be
converted by the parties into an ordinary creditor-debtor situation, thereby placing the
complainant in estoppel to insist on the original trust. But after the justice authorities have
taken cognizance of the crime and instituted action in court, the offended party may no longer
divest the prosecution of its power to exact the criminal liability, as distinguished from the civil.
The crime being an offense against the state, only the latter can renounce it (Degaños vs. People,
GR No. 162826, October 14, 2013).

It may be observed in this regard that novation is not one of the means recognized by the
Penal Code whereby criminal liability can be extinguished; hence, the role of novation may only
be to either prevent the rise of criminal liability or to cast doubt on the true nature of the original
basic transaction, whether or not it was such that its breach would not give rise to penal
responsibility, as when money loaned is made to appear as a deposit, or other similar disguise
is resorted to (Degaños vs. People, GR No. 162826, October 14, 2013).

Although the novation of a contract of agency to make it one of sale may relieve an
offender from an incipient criminal liability, that did not happen here, for the partial payments
and the proposal to pay the balance the accused made during the barangay proceedings were
not at all incompatible with Degaños’ liability under the agency that had already attached. Rather
than converting the agency to sale, therefore, he even thereby confirmed his liability as the sales
agent of the complainants. The acceptance of partial payments, without further change in the
original relation between the complainant and the accused, cannot produce novation. For the
latter to exist, there must be proof of intent to extinguish the original relationship, and such
intent cannot be inferred from the mere acceptance of payments on account of what is totally
due. Much less can it be said that the acceptance of partial satisfaction can effect the nullification
of a criminal liability that is fully matured, and already in the process of enforcement. Thus, this
Court has ruled that the offended party’s acceptance of a promissory note for all or part of the
amount misapplied does not obliterate the criminal offense (Degaños vs. People, GR No. 162826,
October 14, 2013).
 ESTAFA

ESTAFA THROUGH MISAPPROPRIATION – The elements of estafa under Article 315,

par. 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code are the following: (a) that money, goods or other personal property is received
by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation
or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt;
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) there
is demand by the offended party to the offender (Tabaniag vs.
People, GR No. 165411, June 18, 2009, Justice Peralta; Magtira vs. People, G.R.
No. 170964, March 7, 2012). However, demand is not necessary if there is evidence of
misappropriation.

Misappropriation as an element of the offense of estafa connotes an act of using, or

disposing of, another’s property as if it were one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use
different from that agreed upon. Failure to account upon demand for funds or property held in
trust without offering any satisfactory explanation for the inability to account is circumstantial
evidence of misappropriation. Demand for the return of the thing delivered in trust and the failure
of the accused to account are similarly circumstantial evidence that the courts can appreciate
(Magtira vs. People, G.R. No. 170964, March 7, 2012).

The essence of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) is the appropriation or conversion of
money or property received to the prejudice of the owner. The words "convert" and
"misappropriate" connote an act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's
own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for
one's own use includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt
to dispose of the property of another without right (Tabaniag vs. People, GR No. 165411, June
18, 2009, Justice Peralta).

X received from A jewelry with obligation to return the same if unsold or deliver the
proceeds of sale. In the acknowledgement receipt, X is prohibited from selling jewelry the jewelry
on credits or giving it for safekeeping. X transferred the jewelry to Y, a subagent. Y failed to return
the jewelry. Is X liable for estafa through conversion?

Answer: No. It must be pointed out that the law on agency in our jurisdiction allows the
appointment by an agent of a substitute or sub-agent in the absence of an express agreement to
the contrary between the agent and the principal. In the case at bar, the appointment of sub-
agent was not expressly prohibited by A. Neither does it appear that X was verbally forbidden by
A from passing on the jewelry to another person. Thus, it cannot be said that X's act of entrusting
the jewelry to Y is characterized by abuse of confidence because such an act was not proscribed
and is, in fact, legally sanctioned.

Since properties were given by X to Y to achieve the very same end for which they were
delivered to her in the first place, there is no conversion since the same were not devoted to a
purpose or use different from that agreed upon. Similarly, it cannot be said that X delivered them
to Y "without right." Aside from the fact that no condition or limitation was imposed on the mode
or manner by which X was to effect the sale, it is also consistent with usual practice for the seller
to necessarily part with the valuables in order to find a buyer and allow inspection of the items
for sale (Tabaniag vs. People, GR No. 165411, June 18, 2009, Justice Peralta).

Can X be held liable for estafa through negligence? Answer: No. In estafa, the profit or
gain must be obtained by the accused personally, through his own acts, and his mere negligence
in permitting another to take advantage or benefit from the entrusted chattel cannot constitute
estafa (Tabaniag vs. People, GR No. 165411, June 18, 2009, Justice Peralta).

Can X be held liable for estafa on the basis of conspiracy? Answer: No. If an agent acted in
conspiracy with subagent in carrying out the actual misappropriation, then the former would
be answerable for the acts of his co -conspirators. However, the mere fact that X failed to
return the pieces of jewelry upon demand is not proof of conspiracy, nor is it proof of
misappropriation or conversion (Tabaniag vs. People, GR No. 165411, June 18, 2009, Justice
Peralta).

ESTFA THROUGH ISSUANCE OF BOUNCING CHECK - The essential

elements of estafa through bouncing check:
(1) the accused shall defraud another by issuing or postdating check in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time the check is issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check;
(3) check was issued or postdated prior to or simultaneously with the parting of money or
property by the payee; and (4) damage to the payee thereof.

It is the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check that is punishable, not the
non -payment of a debt. Prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the drawer
of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three days from
receipt of the notice of dishonor. To be guilty of estafa the accused must have used the check in
order to defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere
issuance of the worthless check. Accused could not be held guilty of estafa simply because he
had issued the check used to defraud complainant. The proof of guilt must still clearly show that
it had been accused as the drawer who had defrauded complainant by means of the check.
Complainant admitted that it was another person who received the rice from him and who
delivered the bearer check to him (People vs. Reyes, GR No. 157943, September 04, 2013).
In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of postdating or issuing a
check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. This means
that the offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party by reason of
the issuance of the check, whether dated or postdated. In other words, the Prosecution must
show that the person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted with his money or
property were it not for the issuance of the check by the offender (People vs. Reyes, GR No.
157943, September 04, 2013).

ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE AND DECEIT - The offense of estafa, in

general, is committed either by (a) abuse of confidence or (b) means of deceit. The acts
constituting estafa committed with abuse of confidence are enumerated in item (1) of Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; item (2) of Article 315 enumerates estafa committed by
means of deceit. Deceit is not an essential requisite of estafa by abuse of confidence; the breach
of confidence takes the place of fraud or deceit, which is a usual element in the other estafas
(Brokmann vs. People, G.R.
No. 199150, February 6, 2012).

ESTAFA AND OTHER DECEIT - What is the difference between estafa through false
representation and other deceit? The common elements of these two crimes are: (1) false
pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud; and (2) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice.
It is essential that such false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause
or the only motive for the private complainant to part with her property. In estafa under Article
315, the false representation is committed by using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to
possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions; or by means of other similar deceits. Following the principle of ejusdem generis,
other deceit as a means to commit estafa must be similar to pretending to possess power,
imaginary transaction etc. If the deceit is not similar to pretending to possess power or imaginary
transaction, the crime committed is other deceit under Article 318. In Guinhawa vs. People, G.R.
No. 162822 August 25, 2005 () - Fraudulent representation of the seller that the van to be sold
is brand new constitutes other deceit under Article 318. On the other hand, in People vs.
Rubaton, C.A., 65 O.G. 5048, issue of May 19, 1069, false representation that accused has a
palay by reason of which the victim parted his money in consideration of the palay constitutes
estafa under Article 315. Unlike in the Guinhawa case, the transaction in Rubaton case is
imaginary.

Authority to sell - Primelink entered into joint venture agreement with the owner of a certain
land to develop a club. Accused represent to complainant on October 10, 1996 Primelink will
finished the Club by July 1998. Because of this representation complainant purchased a Club
share. However, the Club was not completed because the owner of the property mortgaged it in
violation of their agreement. The projected was aborted. Accused is not liable for estafa for such
representation. False pretense of power to develop the Club resulting in damage to buyer is
estafa. However, the law requires that the false pretense be used “prior to or simultaneous with
the execution of the fraud, and that is October 10, 1996. In this case, there is no showing that
Primelink possessed no power (capability) to develop the Club and that accused knew that the
Club was a bogus project. Primelink is a legitimate developer. In fact, it has already released
money for the initial funding of the project. The project was only aborted because of the problem
with the owner of the land, which occurred after October 10, 1996. However, the false pretense
made by accused that Primelink was authorized to sell membership shares is estafa. False
pretense of qualification (to sell securities) is within the contemplation of the provision on estafa
(Lopez vs. People, GR NO. 199294, July 31, 2013)

SUBSEQUENT FRAUD - Is the fraudulent act committed by the accused subsequent to

the time the victim parted his money constitutes estafa? In the prosecution for this kind of estafa,
it is indispensable that the false pretense or fraudulent act is committed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, it being essential that such false statement or
representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which induces the offended party to
part with his money. In the absence of such requisite, any subsequent act of the accused,
however fraudulent and suspicious it might appear, cannot serve as basis for prosecution for
estafa (Ambito, vs. People, G. R. No. 127327, Feb. 13, 2009).

REPRESENTATION OF FUTURE PROFIT - When will a representation of a

future profits or income be considered as an actionable fraud or estafa? Where one states that
the future profits or income of an enterprise shall be a certain sum, but he actually knows that
there will be none, or that they will be substantially less than he represents, the statements
constitute an actionable fraud where the hearer believes him and relies on the statement to his
injury. In the present case, it is abundantly clear that the profits which Elvira and her
co-conspirators promised to Elizabeth would not be realized (Joson vs. People, G. R. No. 178836,
July 23, 2008).

OTHER DECEIT- Other deceit under Article 316 (a) of RPC is committed by any person
who, knowing that the real property is encumbered, shall dispose of the same, although such
encumbrance be not recorded. The law was taken from Article 455 of the Spanish Penal Code.
However, the words "como libre" in the Spanish Penal Code, which means "free from
encumbrance" do not appear in the English text of RPC, nonetheless, the same are deemed
incorporated in the RPC. The gravamen of the crime is the disposition of legally encumbered
real property by the offender under the express representation that there is no encumbrance
thereon. Hence, for one to be criminally liable for estafa under the law, the accused must make
an express representation in the deed of conveyance that the property sold or disposed of is free
from any encumbrance (Naya vs. Abing, G.R. No. 146770, February 27, 2003,).

FALSIFICATION
Commercial document - Commercial documents are, in general, documents or
instruments which are “used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or
credit transactions.” Promissory notes facilitate credit transactions while a check is a means of
payment used in business in lieu of money
for convenience in business transactions. A cashier’s check necessarily facilitates bank
transactions for it allows the person whose name and signature appear thereon to encash the
check and withdraw the amount indicated therein (Tanenggee vs. People, GR No. 179448, June
26, 2013).

Is intent to cause damage an element of falsification of public or official document? No.

In falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea
of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of a public document,
what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein
solemnly proclaimed (Regidor, Jr., vs. People, G. R. Nos. 166086-92 Feb. 13, 2009).

What is the crime committed if private document is falsified as a necessary means to

commit or conceal estafa or malversation?

Under the doctrine of common element, an element used to complete one crime cannot
be legally re-used to complete the requisites of a subsequent crime (Regalado). The common
element of estafa or malversation and falsification is damage to the victim. Thus, falsification of
private document and estafa cannot co-exist. The use of damage as an element in falsification
precludes the re-use thereof to complete the elements of estafa, and vice versa.
 Falsification - If the offender committed falsification of private document as a means to
commit estafa, he is liable for falsification only. Falsification absorbs estafa. (See: U.S. vs Chan
Tiao, G.R. No. 12609, October 30, 1917).

Estafa or malversation– If a person falsified a private document to conceal malversation or estafa,

the crime is malversation or estafa only. Falsification of private document is not committed
because: (a) the use of damage as an element in estafa precludes the re -use thereof to complete
the elements of falsification; and (b) the damage to third person is not caused by the falsity in
the document but by the commission of estafa(See: People vs. Beng, 40 O.G. 1913). Note: If
falsification of private document was used as a means to commit estafa, the former was
committed ahead of the latter; hence, falsification absorbs the element of damage of estafa. If
falsification of private document was used as a means to conceal estafa, the latter was committed
ahead of the former; hence, estafa absorbs the element of damage of falsification.

What is the crime committed if public, official, or commercial document is falsified as a

necessary means to commit or conceal estafa or malversation?

Complex crime - Since damage to third person is not an element of falsification of public,
official or commercial document, it consummates the very moment the offender falsifies the
document. If the offender uses the falsified document to defraud a third person or the
government, estafa or malversation is also committed. Estafa or malversation consummates the
moment the third person or government suffers damages. Since falsification is committed as a
necessary means to commit estafa or malversation, complex crime under Article 48 is committed.
(See: Ambito, vs. People, G. R. No. 127327, Feb. 13, 2009; People vs. Barbas, G.R. No. 41265,
July 27, 1934).

Separate crimes - If falsification of public, official or commercial document is used as a

means to conceal estafa or malversation, two distinct crimes of estafa (or malversation) and
falsification are committed. There is nocomplex crime since falsification is not a necessary means
to commit estafa or malversation since the latter was already consummated when the former
was committed (See: People vs. Monteverde, G.R. No. 139610, August 12, 2002).

When the offender commits on a public, official or commercial document any of the acts
of falsification as a necessary means to commit another crime like estafa, theft or malversation,
the two crimes form a complex crime. The falsification of a public, official, or commercial
document may be a means of committing estafa, because before the falsified document is actually
utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or
intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or
commercial document. In other words, the crime of falsification has already existed. Actually
utilizing that falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But
the damage is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document.
Therefore, the falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only a necessary
means to commit estafa. Taken in its entirety, the proven facts show that petitioner could not
have withdrawn the money without falsifying the questioned
documents. The falsification was, therefore, a necessary means to commit estafa, and
falsification was already consummated even before the falsified documents were used to defraud
the bank. The crime committed is complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial
document (Tanenggee vs. People, GR No. 179448, June 26, 2013).

In Patula vs. People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012 - According to the theory and proof
of the Prosecution, petitioner misappropriated or converted the sums paid by her customers, and
later falsified the duplicates of the receipts before turning such duplicates to her employer to
show that the customers had paid less than the amounts actually reflected on the original
receipts. Obviously, she committed the falsification in order to conceal her
misappropriation or conversion. Considering that the falsification was not an offense separate
and distinct from the estafa charged against her, the Prosecution could legitimately prove her
acts of falsification as its means of establishing her misappropriation or conversion as an
essential ingredient of the crime duly alleged in the information. In that manner, her right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her was not infringed or denied to
her.