Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa

CLIMATE & ENERGY PAPER SERIES 2010
MAPPING CLIMATE CHANGE AND

SECURITY IN NORTH AFRICA
JOSHUA BUSBY, KAIBA WHITE, AND TODD G. SMITH
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Mapping Climate Change and Security
in North Africa
Climate & Energy Policy Paper Series
October 2010
Joshua W. Busby1
University of Texas at Austin
Kaiba White1
Todd G. Smith1
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Potential Climate Change-Related Security Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Where Are the Vulnerable Areas in North Africa? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
Narratives of Climate Vulnerability in North Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
Conclusion and Policy Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
1
Joshua W. Busby is an assistant professor in the LBJ School of Public Affairs and a Crook distinguished scholar in the
Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, University of Texas at Austin. Kaiba White is a GIS research
associate at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, University of Texas at Austin. Todd G. Smith is
a Ph.D. Student in the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin.
The authors thank the German Marshall Fund for commissioning this report. This material is based upon work supported
by, or in part by, the U. S. Army Research Laboratory and the U. S. Army Research Office under contract/grant number
W911NF-09-1-0077. The research is part of a larger project on Climate Change and African Political Stability (CCAPS),
http://ccaps.robertstrausscenter.org/ The views of the authors do not necessarily reflect those of the German Marshall Fund
of the United States.
Executive Summary
Climate change is increasingly recognized to — Niger and Sudan — and seek to explain their
have implications that extend beyond impacts significance for the transatlantic policy community,
on people’s quality of life and into the security drawing on broader scholarly and policy literature.
sphere. Scholars and analysts have invoked a host
of purported problems that climate change could The maps reveal vulnerability across the region
contribute to, from armed conflict to migration to climate change and other risks. The Mediter-
flows to complex emergencies that require humani- ranean coastline looks particularly exposed to
tarian intervention. A number of these concerns climate-related hazards, but other areas appear
apply directly to North Africa, which, for the more vulnerable when we add in other dimen-
purposes of this study, is the region including the sions like community and household resilience and
countries along the Mediterranean, south to the governance and political violence. Putting the four
Sahelian countries of Mali and Niger, and extending sources of vulnerability together — climate-related
across to Sudan and the Horn of Africa. North hazard exposure, population density, household
Africa is a strategically important region for Europe and community resilience, and governance and
largely because of its proximity, with the broader political violence — we find that western Ethiopia
transatlantic policy community exercising partic- stands out as the most vulnerable part of the region,
ular concern where Africa’s problems spill over to with pockets of high vulnerability throughout
Europe. south-central Sudan, southern Chad, Niger,
and Somalia. Small pockets of medium vulner-
North or northern Africa is an arid and semi-arid ability exist along the Mediterranean coastline in
region that includes vast expanses of sparsely popu- Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt.
lated or not populated at all territory. It is a region
where the amount of water available per person is Beyond these maps of vulnerability, we explore four
already, in many cases, less than 1,000 cubic meters potential mechanisms where climate and security
per year and where climate change is expected to concerns are potentially connected in North Africa:
make the region much hotter. The brittleness and conflict, migration, terrorism, and humanitarian
weakness of regimes in the region and the wider disasters.
continent, coupled with the low level of human and With respect to conflict, the academic literature on
economic development, enhance Africa’s vulner- climate-related violence is, thus far, inconclusive.
ability to a variety of ills, including climate change, Where conflict is associated with climate change,
terrorism, armed conflict, and piracy. it tends not to be from scarcity of resources per se
The purpose of this study is to reach a better but from volatility and shocks that make it hard for
understanding of how climate change and physical people to plan their economic activities one year
sources of vulnerability to natural hazards might to the next, forcing them into desperate action.
intersect with the region’s various demographic, Studies are increasingly focusing on lower-level
social, and political sources of weakness. Using conflicts like strikes and riots to examine their
Geographic Information Systems (GIS), we map connections with climate change. In North Africa,
the confluence of those sources of vulnerability, however, using a new dataset from the Social
extracting maps of regional vulnerability from a Conflict in Africa Database, we find that lower-
broader research effort on the entire continent level social conflict events are concentrated in the
of Africa. We couple those maps with illustrative areas least vulnerable to climate-related hazards.
narratives from two sites of high vulnerability
Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa iii

As for migration, rough calculations suggest that to high physical vulnerability to climate change is
additional climate-related migrants from Africa likely to be worse because of weak governance and
to Europe between today and 2050 (as a result low household and community resilience to climate
of changing agricultural yields) are likely to be change. These areas include western Ethiopia and
relatively few compared to the number of migrants pockets in southern Sudan, Chad, and Niger. While
likely to migrate in any case because of rising popu- targeted assistance to governments and NGOs for
lation growth. Moreover, if past trends continue, a disaster prevention and risk are essential, equally
much higher proportion of migrants will remain in important may be support for basic government
Africa or go to regions other than Europe. Climate capacity and conflict resolution in those countries,
change may contribute to migration through as they may generate positive spillovers for their
other channels such as water scarcity and extreme ability to address climate-related challenges. Our
weather events, but we should be cautious about findings also lead us to conclude that North African
overstating the challenge of climate-led African countries along the Mediterranean like Morocco
migration to Europe. and Tunisia may be more physically vulnerable
to climate change than others but possess more
There is no compelling argument that identifies capacity at the household and governance levels
climate change as a cause of terrorism. However, to cope with these problems. Support for these
we do see terrorism and climate change potentially countries should include more information-sharing
being twin challenges that weak governments to help them address their physical vulnerabilities
in the region, such as Niger, might have to face largely through mobilization of their own internal
simultaneously, requiring difficult choices in terms resources.
of allocation of scarce resources. Algeria has been
the largest regional site for terrorist attacks, most
of them directed against the national government
with limited implications for European or Western
security.
Finally, with respect to natural disasters, we find

that floods and droughts are the main climate-
related disaster types in the region, with floods
being far more frequent and deadly but droughts
affecting larger numbers of people over greater
areas. Countries in the region with poorer gover-
nance such as Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Niger, Sudan,
and Somalia had far larger numbers of people
affected by disasters than other countries. As our
case studies of Niger and Sudan demonstrate, many
areas severely affected by droughts and floods are
also facing political volatility.
In terms of policy, these conclusions lead us

to recommend that resources and attention be
directed to the areas and countries where modest
iv The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Introduction
Climate change is increasingly recognized to per year.2 Climate change is expected to make the
have implications that extend beyond impacts on region much hotter, suffering temperature increases
people’s quality of life and into the security sphere. higher than the expected average increases world-
Since 2007, policy practitioners and academics have wide.3 It is also a region that has a variety of gover-
issued scores of reports identifying the security nance challenges, with a number of regimes that
risks associated with climate change. Scholars and have largely resisted democratization and economic
analysts have invoked a host of purported prob- modernization. Many of them have long-time
lems that climate change could contribute to, from rulers or family dynasties (Libya, Morocco, Egypt),
armed conflict to migration flows to complex emer- and others are characterized by great political insta-
gencies that require humanitarian intervention. bility (Somalia).
Even as academics continue to debate the specific
relationship between climate change and security A number of these countries have quite fragile
outcomes, the topic has garnered the attention of regimes, with recent experience of coups (Niger)
the UN Security Council, the European Commis- and extensive acts of terrorism (Algeria). Others
sion, and numerous individual governments.1 have experienced spates of violence and conflict,
including Sudan and Ethiopia. The brittleness and
A number of these concerns apply directly to North weakness of regimes in the region and the wider
Africa, a region for the purposes of this study we continent, coupled with the low level of human and
take to include the countries along the Mediter- economic development, enhance Africa’s vulner-
ranean, south to the Sahelian countries of Mali and ability to a variety of ills, including climate change
Niger, and extending across to Sudan and the Horn but also terrorism, armed conflict, and piracy. For
of Africa. North Africa is a strategically important Europe and the United States, two problems —
region for Europe largely because of proximity, with migration and terrorism — are particularly salient
the broader transatlantic policy community exer- and potentially combustible, given the intersec-
cising particular concern where Africa’s problems tion with broader cultural and political currents in
spillover to Europe. Europe about immigrants and Islam and concerns
about ungoverned spaces and the rise of terrorism.
North or northern Africa is an arid and semi-arid
region that includes vast expanses of sparsely popu- Countries in North Africa also have more strategic
lated or not populated at all territory. It is a region significance as providers of important natural
where the amount of water available per person is
already, in many cases, less than 1,000 cubic meters 2
Levy et al. note that populations are vulnerable to water stress
between 500 and 1,700 cubic meters per person. The 1,000 cubic
meter per year threshold is often used to capture chronic water
scarcity. In 2005, about 35 percent of the world population faced
chronic scarcity. In countries like Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia,
about 100 percent of the population already experiences this
problem (Levy et al. 2008).
1
The topic has become virtually a cottage industry, with the
number of papers and speeches too numerous to name. The UN 3
Model projections suggest that North Africa’s average tempera-
hosted a special meeting of the Security Council on the topic ture will increase by 2.16°C (almost 4°F) by mid-century,
in 2007. In the United States, the National Intelligence Council compared to the period 1980-2000. The IPCC Fourth Assess-
conducted a National Intelligence Assessment in 2008. The ment reports that the global average projected temperature
British government has been among the main champions of the change for midcentury is an increase of 1.8°C (for the same time
links between climate and security. Javier Solana, the former EU period and under the A1B scenario) (IPCC 2007). North Africa
High Representative for Foreign Policy, was another champion model projections come from collaborative work we have carried
(Hague 2010; Fingar 2008; Solana 2008; Beckett 2007; UN Secu- out with scientists at the University of Texas’ Jackson School of
rity Council 2007). Geosciences. See footnote 43 for more details.
Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 1

resources. Libya and Algeria are among the leading with physical exposure and incrementally adding
exporters of petroleum, while Niger is one of the population density, household and community
world’s top exporters of uranium. In addition to resilience, and governance and political violence.
these natural resources, the region’s sea lanes — Together, these baskets are combined in an overall
from Egypt and the Suez Canal down to Somalia map of composite vulnerability in the region that
and the Gulf of Aden — are important for global should help policymakers focus their resources and
commerce. attention. From these areas of higher vulnerability,
we selected two sites — Niger and southern Sudan
The purpose of this study is to reach a better — for extended vignettes in Section 3 to explain
understanding of how climate change and physical how the confluence of climate change and other
sources of vulnerability to natural hazards might dimensions of social and political vulnerability may
intersect with the region’s various demographic, conjoin to create security consequences of concern
social, and political sources of weakness. Using for the broader international community.
Geographic Information Systems (GIS), we map
the confluence of those sources of vulnerability,
extracting maps of local vulnerability from a
broader research effort on the entire continent
of Africa. We couple those maps with illustrative
narratives from two sites of high vulnerability
— Niger and Sudan — and seek to explain their
significance for the transatlantic policy commu-
nity, drawing on the broader scholarly and policy
literature.
This is not a work of country experts but a

measured attempt to take stock of regional vulner-
abilities and potential spillovers from climate
change.4 As such, we seek to avoid overstating the
severity of problems. We also identify regions about
which policymakers have expressed concern but
do not appear particularly vulnerable to climate
change, based on our model.
In Section 1 we review the mechanisms by which

climate change could have security implications
in North Africa, by looking at conflict, migration,
terrorism, and extreme weather events. In Section 2
we create a series of sub-national maps of vulner-
ability to climate change in North Africa, beginning
4
For more area studies-informed scholarship on climate and
security in the region, see White forthcoming; Al-Marashi forth-
coming; CENTRA Technology and Seitor Corporation 2009;
National Intelligence Council 2009.
2 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

1 Potential Climate Change-Related
Security Consequences
Since about 2007, academics and practitioners have While most scholarship has focused on sub-
vigorously investigated the security consequences national conflict, advocates have also invoked the
of climate change, in part driven by an effort to specter of “water wars” between states over scarce
generate more broad-based and high-level political water supplies. One of the frequently cited cases of
interest in addressing climate change.5 As the secu- concern is disputes over the waters of the Nile that
rity consequences of climate change have become link Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt, and Uganda. While
more accepted, the debate has matured. What is dams built for irrigation, flood control, or hydro-
now needed is a pragmatic assessment of the nature electric power potentially will lead to disputes over
of the threats, what we know and can know, and water along the length of the Nile, historically there
how best to think about preparing for the future. have been few or no cases of “water wars.” On the
contrary, the common necessity of water often
Most of the work to date has focused on whether serves to force even hostile countries to cooperate.7
climate change will contribute to violent conflict,
but a host of other issues with some potential Climate shocks, such as large declines in precipita-
links to climate change — migration, terrorism, tion from one year to the next, rather than abso-
and climate change related disasters — may have lute scarcity of resources like water and land, are
security consequences worthy of concern. Here, thought to be the most likely way climate change
we take a relatively narrow view of security threats, might contribute to conflict. In this way, desperate
focusing on problems of such grave concern that people, unable to plan their agricultural harvests or
they threaten a country’s existence or way of life or water their animals, could be driven to steal or take
pose deep challenges to the country’s main instru- up arms, potentially leading to violent encounters
ments of self-defense (namely military assets).6 To with others.8 In the northern African context, the
better understand these potential consequences, we conflict in Darfur, Sudan, has controversially been
explore the connections between climate change linked to climate change. Droughts initially brought
and four issues — conflict, migration, terrorism, nomadic herders into conflict with farmers over
and disasters — with special reference to examples grazing rights, which was then exacerbated by poor
from northern Africa. government policy. 9
Conflict In spite of this, most academic studies that have

used quantitative statistical approaches to test for
Much has been made of the potential security a link between climate-related indicators (such as
consequences of climate change. The emphasis drought) and conflict have not found a connec-
among scholars and practitioners has been on tion.10 That said, because these studies look at
the potential for climate change to contribute to historical data, they may ultimately tell us little
conflict, with words like “threat multiplier” and about future climate change and conflict.
“stressor” frequently invoked to acknowledge that
climate change on its own is unlikely to lead to
7
Klare 2007; Victor 2007; Nordås and Gleditsch 2009.
conflict.
8
Hendrix and Glaser 2007; Levy et al. 2005.
5
The examples have become almost too numerous to mention, For a discussion, see de Waal 2007; Homer-Dixon 2007; Busby
9
but important examples include reports from the CNA Corpora- 2009.
tion, CNAS/CSIS, and the Council on Foreign Relations (CNA
Corporation 2007; Campbell et al. 2007; Busby 2007). For summary reviews of the literature, see Theisen, Holter-
10
mann, and Buhaug 2010; Buhaug 2010; Busby 2009; Buhaug,

6
For a more detailed academic discussion, see Busby 2008. Gleditsch, and Theisen 2008.

FIGURE 1
Scholars are starting to look at lower levels of the period 1995-2009 are concentrated in small
conflict like riots and strikes, with some sugges- areas that correspond to major cities throughout
tions that both high and low rainfall might give the region (see Figure 1).
rise to more of these low-level conflicts.11 Another
productive area for future scholarship is to examine We find that social conflicts are clustered in areas
the indirect effects of climate change on conflict by least vulnerable to climate-related physical hazards.
way of economic growth.12 If climate change leads Figure 2 shows the number of social conflict
to low economic growth, which is highly corre- events by area for each of the five quintiles of
lated with the increased incidence of conflict, then underlying exposure to climate-related physical
climate change could have an important indirect hazards like drought and floods. We observe that
effect on conflict.13 the first quintile (the 20 percent of the region with
the least physical exposure to climate hazards)
A preliminary examination of a recently released has the most social conflict events in the period
database, the Social Conflict in Africa Database 1995-2009 (see Figure 2). This does not necessarily
(SCAD), reveals that riots, strikes, demonstrations, mean that climate change has no connection with
and lower-level social conflicts in North Africa in social conflicts like strikes and riots, as people may
take their grievances from their home regions to
11
Hendrix and Salehyan 2010.
national and provincial capitals and major cities.
But, echoing other work that has examined the
12
Levy 2010.
13
Collier 2007.

FIGURE 2 undermine agricultural produc-
tivity, prompting people to move
in search of better land or off-
farm opportunities.15
For Europe, emigration from

North Africa, particularly given
some of the emergent cultural
and political fault-lines, is a
specific concern.16 At the same
time, migrants from sub-Saharan
Africa have also used North
Africa as a trans-migratory
route into Europe, which has led
to unprecedented interdiction
efforts through Frontex, a new
European border control initia-
tive established in 2005.17 Given
the comparatively lower levels
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the Social Conflict in Africa Database and
UNEP/GRIO-Europe of economic development in
sub-Saharan Africa, the prospects
connections between climate change and violence, of larger numbers of migrants
our findings suggest a measure of caution.14 passing through North Africa in a bid to resettle in
Europe has generated significant concern (though
Migration the Sahara Desert may be a fairly effective barrier
Climate change has also been put forward as one of for most migrants).
the many reasons people migrate from their homes,
In this context, advocates have warned of large
from rural to urban areas, within continents and
numbers of “climate refugees,” or people who are
between them in the search of better opportunities.
forced to move because their livelihoods are no
A number of different climate-related mechanisms
longer possible due to prolonged droughts, floods,
have been identified as potential triggers for migra-
storms, and other extreme weather events.18 These
tion, including so-called “distress migration” caused
advocates have also warned of conflict emerging
by swift-onset disasters that make areas temporarily
from migration, as newcomers compete with local
or permanently uninhabitable. Increased water
populations for resources or work. While migration
scarcity for human or animal consumption might
also make migration more attractive. Similarly,
changing temperatures and precipitation might
15
Martin 2010a; Martin 2010b; Collinson 2010. For a set of
additional GMF-sponsored papers on climate change and
migration, see http://www.gmfus.org/cs/publications/publica-
14
The data are divided into five categories or quintiles of tion_view?publication.id=650
roughly equal size, from the least vulnerable to climate-related 16
National Intelligence Council 2010.
hazards (category 1) to the most (category 5). The Social
Conflict in Africa Database was developed by our colleagues 17
See http://www.frontex.europa.eu/
at the University of North Texas, Idean Salehyan and Cullen
Hendrix. 18
Myers 2005; Werz and Manilove 2009.

FIGURE 3 FIGURE 4
Source: Global Migrant Origin Database 2007
is frequently thought of as a problem, mobility has for survival, may be less likely to engage in conflict
also historically been quite an important adap- simply because their own situation in host coun-
tive tool for people whose life possibilities were tries is so tenuous.21 That said, they may be vulner-
foreclosed in their home countries. Migrants often able to violent reprisals by locals, as Zimbabweans
enrich the communities of the host countries where have been in South Africa.
they ultimately resettle.19
In the European context, whether or not migration
One concern is that while “climate refugees” may will lead to violent conflict in the short run may
be a rhetorical talking point, it will be difficult in be less important than the political ramifications
practice to clearly identify them and distinguish of migrants coming from particular parts of the
their reasons for migrating from other motives. world. Not only are anti-immigrant parties gaining
While scholars have found cross-border migra- more of a political footing in Europe, the potential
tion to be associated with an increased risk of radicalization of diaspora populations from North
conflict,20 a number of scholars believe that if there Africa and other parts of the world has troubled
were such a thing as environmental migration, European policymakers in countries where immi-
dislocated populations, overwhelmingly dependent
upon neighboring countries’ goodwill and relief
19
World Bank 2010.
Gleditsch, Nordås, and Salehyan 2007; Raleigh, Jordan, and
21
20
Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006. Salehyan 2008.

grant populations have been implicated in terrorist group is Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians, who
activity.22 have migrated to their previous colonial power,
France. This accounts for 2.46 million people, or 20
Despite rhetoric from the aforementioned political percent of the total out of northern Africa. Of the
parties and certain media stories, the available remaining migrants, another 2.46 million migrate
data on migration seems to lead to two somewhat to the Middle East. 1.49 million of these are Egyp-
surprising conclusions. First, on the whole, Afri- tians, 282,000 are Sudanese, and 101,000 are Ethio-
cans make up a small proportion of total immi- pians. Saudi Arabia is the most popular destination
grants into Europe. Second, Europe is not the main for Egyptians (slightly over 1 million) and Sudanese
destination for most African migrants. (206,000), while Ethiopians settle in Israel (59,000)
and Saudi Arabia (22,000) (see Figure 5, next page).
The Global Migrant Origin Database publishes a
Of the remaining 26 percent of North African
matrix of migrants from nearly every country in the
migrants, 2.13 million, or 18 percent, are distrib-
world to every other country in the world.23 Strictly
uted throughout the rest of Europe (excluding
speaking, the reported data are stocks of migrants
France) (see Figure 4).
— that is, people living in one country that are
from another — rather than flows of people in any Figure 6 (next page) shows that Africans account
given year. Furthermore, the data for some coun- for 19 percent of migrants in Europe, with 13
tries are extrapolated from other countries with percent — approximately 4.68 million people —
more reliable census information. Despite these from the 14 countries of interest here. Fifty-two
limitations, it is possible to get a general picture percent of these are the aforementioned 2.46
of emigration out of Africa and immigration into million Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians
Europe. The majority of the roughly 16 million living in France. This accounts for 39 percent of
Africans living outside of their home countries have France’s total immigrant population of 6.3 million
migrated to other African countries. Côte d’Ivoire but only 4 percent of its total population of over 62
(14.6 percent), Burkina Faso (7.0 percent), South million. Still, this represents a potentially desta-
Africa (6.4 percent), and Tanzania (5.6 percent) are bilizing portion of French society, as evidenced
the most popular destinations. by rioting in Paris in 2005 and to lesser extents
The 14 countries of North Africa, the Sahel, and since then. Another cultural clash has centered
on the wearing of the face veil by Muslim women,
the Horn had a combined population of 335.5
which the French Senate banned in September
million people in 2007, of which approximately
2010. Although the face veil is generally a practice
12 million were resident outside of their home
of Middle Eastern Muslims the recent legislation
countries. Figures 3 and 4 show how these migrants
may be perceived by the broader Muslim commu-
were distributed by region. The largest portion
nity as an attack on the religion as a whole. Other
of these, 33 percent, migrated to other African
immigrant controversies in France have had little
countries. For example, of the 1.6 million Malians
to do with populations from Africa. A squatter
who emigrated, 487,000 went to Côte d’Ivoire and
camp near Calais that was dismantled in 2009 was
438,000 went to Burkina Faso. The second largest
populated mainly by migrants from Iraq and other
High Representative and the European Commission to the
22 Near East countries. Most recently France has
European Council 2008; Srichandan 2009. generated a political storm by expelling Roma from
See http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigration/
23 Eastern Europe. Notwithstanding these destabi-
global_migrant_origin_database.html

FIGURE 5 in emigration. Extrapolating
these results into the future, the
authors estimated that if climate
change contributes to a 10-50
percent decrease in crop yields
in Mexico (as was the range
of estimates under a variety
of climate models), Mexican
emigration to the United States
would increase by between 1.4
and 6.7 million people by 2080,
controlling for other factors.24
Although lack of data makes it

difficult to estimate the elas-
ticity of migration from North
Africa to Europe in response
to changing crop yields, we can
make some crude calculations. If
we assume that Africa’s elasticity
of migration in response to agri-
Source: Global Migrant Origin Database 2007
24
Feng, Krueger, and Oppenheimer 2010.
FIGURE 6
lizing factors, the drivers of migration from Algeria,
Morocco, and Tunisia likely have little to do with
climate change or other environmental factors and
more to do with France’s long-standing influence in
the region dating back to its original colonization of
Algeria in the mid-19th century.
In the context of climate change in North Africa,

one of the great unknowns is whether the changes
will make parts of the region unlivable or uneco-
nomic (or perceived to be), such that large numbers
of people begin moving. That prospect would have
to be in the next 20 to 30 years, a time horizon close
enough and swift enough to be policy-relevant.
A 2010 study estimated the elasticity of Mexican

migration to changes in crop yields over the period
1995-2005, suggesting that every 10 percent decline
in crop yields would lead to a 2 percent increase Source: Global Migrant Origin Database 2007

cultural yields is similar to Mexico’s, the numbers FIGURE 7
of migrants out of Africa in response to climate
change could potentially be quite large.
However, the Mexico study largely made use of

2001 data.25 Newer data from 2009 by the same
authors cited in the Mexico study suggest that
climate change will have a lesser impact on crop
yields than first thought.26 Using the 2009 data, we
find that the numbers of additional migrants asso-
ciated with declining agricultural yields is likely to
be modest, especially when compared to migration
associated with population growth.27
If we assume similar migration rates as today,

projected population growth alone will lead to an
increase from 4.7 million North African migrants
in Europe in 2007 to 5.6 million in 2020 and 7.0
million in 2050 (see Figure 7). Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from Global
Migrant Origin Database 2010
Looking at all of Africa, the number of African
migrants to Europe — with population growth in 2020 and 340,000 in 2050. Including all African
and current rates of migration — is projected to countries, the number of agricultural yield-related
increase from 6.9 million in 2007 to 8.5 million in migrants to Europe would be 485,000 in 2020 and
2020 and 9 million in 2050. Thus, of the increment 1.92 million in 2050 (see Table 1).28
of additional migrants to Europe, North Africans
(broadly defined) would constitute 55 percent of Still, the percentage of migrants across Africa that
them between 2007 and 2020 and 48 percent of are projected to move due to changing agricultural
them between 2007 and 2050. Of those, Algerians yields constitutes less than 18 percent of the total
and Moroccans would constitute more than 60 in 2020 and 2050. Of the North Africa compo-
percent of the total new North Africans in Europe nent to Europe, the estimate suggests these would
in both 2020 and 2050 (see Appendix A). overwhelmingly come from Ethiopia in 2020, with
some migration from other countries in the region
The number of additional North Africans who (Algeria, Egypt, and Somalia) by 2050. Continent-
migrate to Europe in response to declining agricul- wide, agricultural-led migrants are estimated to
tural yields, given our assumptions, will only bring come disproportionately from Nigeria in 2020 and
the total moderately higher, an additional 30,000 Nigeria, Kenya, and Uganda in 2050 (given our
assumptions and data on the numbers of migrants
25
2001 data is available here http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/
giss_crop_study/CCMquerytools.html
2009 data is available here http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/

26 28
This estimate assumes that the elasticity of migration in
mva/cropclimate/ response to changing crop yields is similar to Mexico’s. The
estimate of crop yields uses one of the various scenarios of future
This assumes no interactive effects between declining agricul-
27
agricultural yields, the A1FI scenario, which assumes continued
tural yields and population growth. globalization and fossil fuel intensive economic growth.

TABLE 1
Estimates of Future Migration Due to Crop Yields
2020 2050
Percent change Emigration due Percent change Emigration due
in ag. yield to change in in ag. yield to change in
(scenario A1FI) agricultural yield (scenario A1FI) agricultural yield
2020 Total To Europe 2050 Total To Europe
Algeria 0.45 -36 -30 -0.53 52 42
Chad -0.93 28 1 -1.96 108 3
Djibouti 0.30 -1 0 -0.76 2 1
Egypt -0.37 73 7 -1.63 422 39
Eritrea -0.43 6 0 -1.56 34 2
Ethiopia -0.83 180 38 -2.31 801 167
Libya -0.41 6 2 -1.59 31 8
Mali -0.89 31 1 -1.81 113 5
Mauritania -0.76 6 1 -1.43 17 3
Morocco -0.02 1 1 -0.05 4 3
Niger -0.71 33 1 -1.34 155 4
Somalia -1.37 34 9 -3.31 155 42
Sudan -0.09 9 0 -0.91 138 7
Tunisia 0.05 -1 -1 -0.66 17 14
14 country North Africa 369 30 2,051 340
total
Africa-wide average -0.84 2,573 485 -2.14 9,266 1,920
* in thousands of people
Source: Authors’ calculations based on crop-yield projections from Rosenzweig and Iglesias 2009, population projections from
UN Population Fund and elasticity from Feng et al. 2010
and their historically preferred choices for where to the difficulty of estimating what are often informal,
migrate). illicit population movements. More onerous,
uneven enforcement of borders may ultimately
Of course, this is a highly contingent estimation, change the pattern of where future migrants choose
based on an untested assumption that the elasticity as destinations. Moreover, declines in agricultural
of migration from North Africa is at all similar to yield only reflect one dimension of climate change
Mexico and that the Mexico model itself accurately that may contribute to migration. More abrupt
reflects the underlying reality. The migration data weather shocks from floods and storms or declining
we used may also have significant problems, given

water availability may also contribute to additional robust interdiction efforts (which could be prob-
migration. lematic from a human-rights perspective) and
merely displace the challenges of integrating
Nonetheless, this exercise leads to some prelimi- migrants to other countries within Africa and
nary conclusions. Climate change, as reflected by elsewhere.
changing agricultural yields, is likely to contribute
a small proportion of future migrants to Europe Mobility within and between countries has
compared to population growth. Of those, coun- historically been one of the most important coping
tries like Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Nigeria may mechanisms people have taken advantage of in the
be a larger source of migrants to Europe. Based face of environmental challenges. Remittances have
on population growth, North African countries become as, if not more, significant than foreign
like Algeria and Morocco are estimated to send assistance; and the skills migrants learn can be
larger migrant populations to Europe, particularly important when and if the immigrant diaspora
to France, independent of climate change. More- returns home. In the absence of better economic
over, only about a quarter of Africa’s migrants are opportunities and alternative livelihoods, more
estimated to end up in Europe, so the issue of how vigorous efforts to restrict immigration into Europe
to deal with migration within Africa and between and other regions will do little to diminish the
Africa and other countries will likely be a salient demand by people to leave.
concern for a number of other countries.
While a number of scholars have suggested that
In terms of the security implications, the policy migrants prompted to move because of climate
community has to be careful about drawing change may need explicit legal protections, our
alarming conclusions regarding the number of analysis suggests that it may be premature to
climate-induced migrants to Europe from Africa, commit to those policies until more is known about
which could feed into larger xenophobic currents. the potential magnitude of and destination for these
That said, if people move at historical rates and the migrants. In the meantime, the fate of climate-
African population grows as expected, there will be related migrants, however slim their number in
a significant movement of Africans to Europe with the short run, will properly be bound up in wider
or without climate change. A modest additional discussions of the integration of immigrants into
number will likely move with climate change from advanced industrialized countries.
changing agriculture yields, and an untold number
of others may move as a result of other climate- Terrorism
related forces such as displacement after swift-onset Parts of North Africa, particularly Algeria, have
disasters. endured the most acts of terrorism on the conti-
nent. According to the Global Terrorism database,
The number of migrants may matter less than the
of the 3,676 terrorist attacks in Africa between 1995
emerging perception among advanced industrial-
and 2008, nearly a third (1,195 events) took place
ized countries that some immigrants from devel-
in Algeria and more than 10 percent (414 events)
oping countries cannot be successfully integrated
took place in Somalia. Together, the 14 countries in
into the wider society of their new homes. The
North Africa accounted for more than 55 percent
choices for policymakers will be bound up with
of all the terrorist attacks (2,088 events).29 Most
larger questions about how to treat migrants,
whether they are climate-related or not, including 29
See http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/

of these, though, were directed against their own particular) in counterterrorism to secure resources
governments and do not pose an obvious risk to and support to address their own security concerns,
Western governments. However, persistent state some of which may be more related to separatist
weakness in a number of countries in the Sahel- movements and criminal elements rather than
Maghreb has allowed groups like Al Qaeda in the terrorism.33
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), after being pushed out
of Algeria, to organize in countries like Mauritania, Nonetheless, as our narrative on Niger suggests, the
Niger, and Mali. Western tourists and businessmen confluence of vulnerabilities to Tuareg separatists,
have increasingly become targets for hostage- AQIM, and climate change, coupled with Niger’s
taking. For scholars interested in climate change uranium supplies, may make parts of the region
and security in North Africa, the links between more strategically important to the West.
climate change and terrorism is an obvious area for A more productive way to think about these issues
inquiry. is to examine whether or not areas that were histor-
Unfortunately, little scholarship exists on the links ically most vulnerable to terrorist activity are also
between climate change and terrorism. It is unclear among those most vulnerable to climate change. To
how changes in rainfall, extreme weather events, or the extent that these vulnerabilities overlap, govern-
rising temperatures would lead people to take up ments faced with both of these problems and other
arms and attack civilians. The influence of climate governance challenges will face capacity constraints
change could go through rising immiseration and in dealing with them simultaneously.
poverty, but most studies on the causes of terrorism In the next section, we classify all areas within
suggest that poverty is poorly correlated with the Africa into five quintiles, or roughly equal-sized
incidence and onset of conflict.30 classes, based on their physical exposure to climate-
Western counterterrorism programs in the region related hazards. Using geo-coded data of the Global
have been premised on the notion that ungoverned Terrorism Database for the period from 1995 to
spaces could provide organizing territory from 2008,34 we find that in North Africa the sites of the
which later attacks on the West could be planned. most number of terrorist attacks per ten thousand
Given the paucity of roads, airports, communica- square kilometers are concentrated in the areas
tion networks, and infrastructure, it is unclear that both least and most vulnerable to climate change.
the Sahel-Maghreb is the ideal place for terrorist This suggests that the places physically vulnerable
groups to organize.31 A group with more local to climate change may also face concomitant chal-
grievances may have been inadvertently elevated to lenges of dealing with terrorism (see Figure 8).35
a larger regional or global threat on the basis of its It would be premature to suggest that climate
unfortunate choice of name as an Al Qaeda fran- change had any hand in causing these terrorist
chise.32 States in the region have been able to take
advantage of Western interests (and U.S. interest in 33
CENTRA Technology and Seitor Corporation 2009, 35.
30
Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Laitin and Krueger 2008. That The data was geo-coded by Shawn Strange. Additional work
34
said, poor economic conditions might make it easier to recruit geo-coding this data was also done by University of Texas
from the middle classes and contribute to conflict. graduate students Christian Glakas, Marc Olivier, and Sanjeet
Deka.
31
RAND 2007.
Algeria dominates the terrorism statistics, and these patterns
35
32
Kennedy-Boudali 2009. For another assessment of regional hold at the country level as well. Global Terrorism Database,
rivalries within AQIM, see Filiu 2010. START, accessed July 2, 2010.

attacks. Though Osama Bin FIGURE 8
Laden has made the occasional
reference to climate change as a
source of grievance, we have yet
to see a plausible explanation that
connects terrorism to climate
change. Our data do not address
that question, which would
require additional statistical
tests to see if climate change and
terrorism are correlated, control-
ling for other factors.
Extreme Weather Events and

Complex Emergencies
Sources: Calculations by the authors based on data from the Global Terrorism Data-
Climate change is expected to base and UNEP/GRIO-Europe
increase the severity and possibly
the frequency of extreme weather the early 1990s created a humanitarian emergency
events, contributing to more serious floods, that prompted the United States to send in more
droughts, and soaring temperatures. With people than 20,000 troops as part of Operation Restore
increasingly living in places of high physical expo- Hope. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Western
sure, along coasts and in flood plains, the number militaries became increasingly familiar with such
of people affected and the amount of damage from missions in places like Central America (after
climate-related weather phenomenon has been Hurricane Mitch in 1998) and Haiti (after the 2004
steadily rising. mudslides).
Disaster-related emergencies frequently exceed the The 2010 floods in Pakistan affected more than 20
capacity of local fire, water, and rescue services, million people and destroyed much of the coun-
requiring the mobilization of military assets for try’s infrastructure, including some of the resupply
humanitarian relief. Rich, western countries have routes the U.S. military was using to get goods
not been immune from these incidents. The U.S. to its troops in Afghanistan. While scientists do
military was mobilized in the wake of 2005’s not attribute specific weather events to climate
Hurricane Katrina. Greece’s military was required change, the floods are consistent with the kinds of
to stamp out a series of debilitating fires in 2007, as weather-related anomalies expected to increase as
was Australia’s in 2009. a result of climate change. Even as Western donors,
including militaries, mobilized to help the millions
The effects of climate-related hazards are even more of Pakistanis left homeless and in need in the wake
devastating on developing countries with poor of the floods, Niger was experiencing its own flood
governance and limited capacity, which frequently emergency halfway across the world.
require assistance from the international commu-
nity. For example, because of government incompe- A country that has to divert its military to deal
tence, a not-too-severe drought in Somalia during with weather-related emergencies at home or

abroad will face the opportunity costs of not having of a state of emergency; or a call for international
them available to guard against other external or assistance.39
internal challenges. For example, in the wake of the
2010 floods, the U.S. sent dozens of helicopters to In the EM-DAT database, floods and droughts are
Pakistan from its increasingly difficult war effort in the main climate-related disaster types with floods
Afghanistan.36 far more frequent and deadly but droughts affecting
larger numbers of people. When floods occur they
Where governments fail to respond to humani- tend to destroy homes. As the next section on
tarian needs, the effects of disasters can potentially vulnerability details, countries in the region with
create security problems of their own. While in the poorer governance, such as Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
short run, the devastation following swift-onset Niger, Sudan, and Somalia, had far larger numbers
disasters may make it difficult for people to orga- of people affected by disasters than other countries.
nize insurgent activity, desperate people may riot or Though some of these are highly populous coun-
loot in the search for food and water, particularly tries (Ethiopia, Sudan), a number of these countries
if there are known depots in the area. Over time, had small populations (see Table 2).
insurgents groups may be emboldened to rebel and
be better able to recruit from populations disaf- While some of the countries that have experienced
fected from governments that failed to help them devastating disasters in North Africa might not be
in their time of need, particularly if insurgent or as strategically important to the United States and
terrorist groups were more capable of providing Europe, large-scale disasters can generate intense
emergency social services than the government.37 media attention and demands for humanitarian
intervention and relief operations. For Western
We can observe the role of poor governance by militaries, this can translate into rapid redeploy-
examining the disaster mortality and damage ment away from fighting wars and other traditional
statistics using the EM-DAT International Disaster security responsibilities to assist in disaster relief,
database compiled by the Université Catholique an important opportunity cost if those scarce
de Louvain in Belgium.38 In the next section, we resources are already stretched thin. In Africa, the
present maps of climate hazards based on physical continued after-effects of the international inter-
thresholds (wind speed, amount of precipitation, vention in Somalia in the early 1990s, coupled with
etc.). The EM-DAT database only counts an event strategic priorities in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
as a disaster if the consequences meet one of the may make Western intervention in the short-run
following conditions: ten or more people killed; unlikely. However, in the event of natural disasters
100 or more people reported affected; a declaration in the region, African Union troops might need
logistical support from the West to support human-
itarian relief. Over time, the legacy of Somalia may
fade, engendering greater will to support deploy-
For a more extended discussion of the security implications of
36 ment for humanitarian purposes, particularly if the
disasters, see Busby 2008; Busby 2009. magnitude of droughts, floods, or storms creates
37
Some studies have found connections between certain kinds massive need.
of natural disasters and the increased likelihood of conflict,
those concerns may be confined to earthquakes and may not
be applicable to climate-related extreme weather events. See
39
This dataset is in part a reflection of reporting so the patterns
Brancati 2007; Nel and Righarts 2008. may not fully reflect all the disasters or may be biased to coun-
tries that have more media attention. Moreover, the data on
38
See http://www.emdat.be/database fatalities, people affected, and homelessness may be inaccurate.

TABLE 2
1995-2008 Climate-Related Disasters in North Africa
Country Number of Number of Number of Number of Max. Max. Total Max.

Disasters Floods Droughts Storms Killed Affected Homeless
Algeria 32 25 1 3 921 (f) 45,423 (f) 3,000 (f)
Chad 12 9 2 1 100 (f) 800,000 (d) 45,000 (f)
Djibouti 7 5 1 1 51 (f) 340,000 (d) 1,500 (d)
Egypt 10 5 0 2 32 (hw) 3,000 (f) 3,000 (f)
Eritrea 4 2 2 0 0 2.3 million 0
(d)
Ethiopia 42 34 6 0 498 (f) 12.6 million 79,000
(d) (floods)
Libya 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Mali 16 13 3 0 15 (f) 1 million (d) 41,586 (f)
Mauritania 14 11 2 1 25 (f) 1 million (d) 20,000 (f)
Morocco 19 15 1 2 730 (f) 275,000 (d) 0
Niger 13 9 3 1 7 (floods) 3.58 million 46,472 (f)
(d)
Somalia 26 4 22 0 2,311 (f) 3.3 million 230,000 (f)
(d)
Sudan 25 2 21 1 150 (f) 2 million (d) 200,000 (f)
Tunisia 4 0 4 0 16 (f) 27,000 (f) 0
f=flood, d=drought, hw=heat wave
Source: OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database

2 Where Are the Vulnerable Areas in
North Africa?
Areas that have a number of problems simultane- entrepreneurial skills to avoid those hazards or
ously are more likely to be vulnerable to large-scale minimize their effects.
emergencies that 1) necessitate outside humani-
tarian relief, 2) compete for attention with other • Governance and Political Violence. Weather
problems countries face like terrorism, 3) force emergencies frequently exceed the capacities
people to move temporarily or permanently from of local communities’ emergency services,
their homes, and 4) contribute to tensions that may requiring national-level mobilization to save
escalate to violence and conflict. Our aim is to go people from rising waters or from being
beyond saying a particular country is vulnerable trapped under rubble and to provide food,
to climate change to identify which parts of that water, and shelter for people left homeless
country are vulnerable, and why. or otherwise affected by extreme weather
events. As the world witnessed in Pakistan
The consequences of climate change are likely to in July 2010, countries with poor or unstable
emerge based on the confluence of vulnerabilities.40 governance are less able or even willing to
We consider four broad processes important in provide such services. Autarkic countries like
an area’s overall total vulnerability to the security- Myanmar cannot or will not count on external
related consequences of climate change including: aid to help them in such circumstances. Venal
and incompetent governments can transform
• Climate-Related Hazard Exposure. At a even small physical effects, like the modest
minimum, places have to be physically exposed drought in Somalia in the early 1990s, into
to climate-related hazards. major humanitarian disasters. Places with a
history of violence may be more difficult to
• Population Density. Policymakers generally
deliver services to and may have additional
care about places where people live. All else
localized governance challenges.
being equal, more densely populated areas that
are highly exposed to climate-related hazards Our operating assumption is that the most vulner-
will command more attention from decision- able places are likely to be those where high phys-
makers. ical exposure to climate-related hazards conjoins
• Household and Community Resilience. The with high population density, low levels of house-
hold and community health and education, and
first line of defense for many people will be
poor governance and widespread political violence.
what resources they have at the household and
community level to protect themselves from Each of these four baskets — physical exposure,
physical hazards and respond in the event population density, household and community
of climate-related emergencies like floods, resilience, and governance and political violence —
droughts, or storms. Communities where many is represented by indicators. In all but the popula-
people are sick and have inadequate access to tion basket, multiple indicators have been selected
health care and basic amenities are likely to be to represent the basket. We selected these particular
less resilient than those that are healthier and indicators based on review of the existing literature
have greater access to services. Where people and with some statistical tests to eliminate indica-
are poorly educated, they may have fewer tors that were highly correlated. We also selected
these indicators with an eye towards identifying
This section builds on our previous research in Busby et al.
40
2010.

FIGURE 9
Composite Vulnerability Baskets and Indicators
sub-national data sources for a continent where These quintile classifications are relative to the rest
data availability is problematic. of Africa, not the rest of the world. So, while all of
Africa might be vulnerable to climate change, some
Within each basket, indicators are assigned weights areas are more vulnerable than others (see Figure 9
and aggregated. We then classify the vulnerability for a representation).
categories into quintiles with the least vulnerable
20 percent represented by yellow colors and the From the four baskets, we developed a composite
most vulnerable 20 percent represented by red. map combining all four baskets of vulnerability. In

TABLE 3
Climate-Related Hazard Exposure Data
Variable (weight) Unit Source Years

Cyclone surge frequency Events per 1,000 years UNEP/GRID-Europe 1975 - 2007
(.167)
Cyclone wind frequency Events per 1,000 years UNEP/GRID-Europe 1975 - 2007
(.167)
Flood frequency (.167) Events per 100 years UNEP/GRID-Europe
Drought events (.167) Number of events UNEP/GRID-Europe 1980 - 2001
Wildfire density (.167) Per year per 11.1 sq km UNEP/GRID-Europe 1997 - 2008
pixel
Low elevation coastal zone Coastal areas below 10 m USGS EROS
(.167) elevation

this composite map, each of the baskets is weighted population, household/community, and gover-
equally. nance/violence baskets shows the value of a more
holistic approach to vulnerability.
We started the process by mapping physical expo-
sure to climate-related hazards on its own and then We use historic exposure to climate-related disas-
created an additional map of population density, ters to represent physical exposure. Models of
then another of community/household resilience, future climate vulnerability for Africa notoriously
and then finally, a fourth map of governance and show widespread disagreement among scientists
political violence. At each stage, we also created a about what is likely to happen. For that reason, we
map adding each new dimension to the previous begin with past exposure to climate-related physical
one (such as climate exposure + population hazards (see Table 3 for a list of data sources). We
density). We then mapped the difference between include some early findings from our collaborative
the simpler map and then more complex one, work with climate modelers that aims to do a better
which allows us to identify the places that show up job mirroring past weather patterns in Africa and
as more or less vulnerable with the addition of each that produces data on timescales and indicators that
basket. are more useful for policy audiences.
As our composite model of vulnerability demon- Findings

strates, places that are physically exposed to climate
Our map of climate hazard exposure shows the
hazards and are densely populated may be resilient
Mediterranean coast of Morocco, Algeria, and
to climate change because individuals and commu-
Tunisia to be especially vulnerable as well as
nities are better prepared to protect themselves and
pockets of coastal Egypt, large swathes of western
their governments are willing and able to help them
Ethiopia, and portions of southern Sudan (see
when in need. In many countries in North Africa
Figure 10).
this is not true. The incremental addition of our

FIGURE 10
However, whether or not physical exposure to region is sparsely populated throughout the extent
climate hazards actually translates into large-scale of the Sahara desert (see Figure 11).
potential loss of life, damages, or security conse-
quences like those explored in this paper ultimately When we add the population basket to create a
depends on other factors. Obviously, there will be composite vulnerability index of physical exposure
more potential loss of life if large numbers of people and population density (not shown), we find that
live in an area that is physically vulnerable. Because coastal Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia are more
this work focuses on the direct impact to human vulnerable while the interior, just south of the coast,
populations, we exclude unpopulated areas from of all three countries is less vulnerable. Egypt along
our analysis. the Nile appears much more vulnerable when we
add in population, as do densely populated areas
Our maps of population density show the popula- around Khartoum, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), and
tion of North Africa concentrated along the Medi- Maradi (Niger). Portions of southern Sudan are less
terranean coastline and along the Nile in Egypt, vulnerable given low population density.
with dense concentrations of people in western
Ethiopia, a large concentration radiating around We next created a map of household and commu-
Khartoum, Sudan, and some moderate population nity resilience and added it to climate-related
density in the southern portion of Sahelian coun- hazard exposure and population density (see Table
tries like Niger and Chad. The central part of the 4 for data sources). The northern part of Sahelian
countries of Niger, Chad, and Mali appears the
most vulnerable alongside Ethiopia and Somalia.

FIGURE 11
TABLE 4
Africa-Wide Household and Community Resilience Data
Variable (weight) Indicator (weight) Source Years of Data Availability

Education (.25) Literacy rate, adult total (percent of WDI 2000 - 2007; no data for The Gambia,
people ages 15 and above) (.125) Guinea-Bissau, or Somalia
School enrollment, primary (percent WDI 2004 - 2008; 1998 for Angola; 1999 for
gross) (.125) Somalia; 2001 for Guinea-Bissau
Health (.25) Infant mortality ratio (per 100,000 live CIESIN 1991-2003
births)
Life expectancy at birth (years) both WHO 2006
sexes (.125)
Daily Necessities Percent of children under age of 5 CIESIN 1991-2003
(.25) underweight (.125)
Percent of population with sustain- WHO 2006; 2000 for Cape Verde and
able access to improved drinking water Seychelles
sources (.125)
Access to Healthcare Per capita total expenditure on health WHO 2006; 2001 for Somalia
(.25) (PPP int. $) (.125)
Nursing and midwifery personnel WHO 2002 - 2006; no data for Somalia
density (per 10,000 population) (.125)

FIGURE 12
Adding this dimension to our overall composite subnational political violence, these form the core
index brings down Morocco and Tunisia’s vulnera- elements of our basket for governance and political
bility while significantly increasing the vulnerability violence (see Table 5 for data sources).
(by two quintiles) of southern Niger and Chad, as
well as eastern Ethiopia and much of Somalia
FIGURE 13
(see Figure 12).
Finally, when we look at governance and

political violence, we find that the Mediter-
ranean countries have substantially better
governance than a number of countries in
the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, elevating
the vulnerability of the latter and lowering
the vulnerability of the former.
Figure 13, a chart of North African gover-

nance ratings, draws on national-level data
of indicators of voice and accountability
and government effectiveness, an index of
global integration, and measures of political
instability (see Figure 13). Along with the

TABLE 5
Governance and Political Violence Data

Variable Indicator (weight) Source Year(s)
Government Responsive- Voice & Accountability (.2) World Governance Indicators 2008
ness
Government Response Government Effectiveness (.2) World Governance Indicators 2008
Capacity
Openness to External Globalization Index (.2) KOF Index of Globalization 2009
Assistance
Government Stability Polity Variance (.1) Polity IV Project 2000 - 2009
Number of Stable Years (.1) Polity IV Project 1855 - 2009
Presence of Violence Politically Motivated Atroci- Kansas Event Data System (KEDS) 1995 - 2008
ties
When we incorporate subnational data on atroci- highly vulnerable across all maps, whereas coastal
ties, parts of Sudan and Somalia stand out, while Morocco and Tunisia are highly physically vulner-
the relatively good governance in Morocco, Tunisia, able to climate hazards but have lower overall
and Mali drives down their overall vulnerability composite vulnerability because of higher local
(see Figure 14). resilience at the household and community level as
well as better governance.
Putting these four baskets together, we find that
western Ethiopia stands out as the most vulnerable Some questions emerge from these maps of vulner-
part of the region, with pockets of high vulnerability. What do they have to tell us about future
ability throughout south-central Sudan, southern vulnerability to climate change? Do we have confi-
Chad, Niger, and Somalia. Small pockets of dence that the attributes of historic vulnerability
medium vulnerability exist along the Mediterra- will be similar in the future? Trying to project
nean coastline in Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt (see the physical dimensions of future climate change
Figure 15). is difficult enough, so we limit our efforts there.
While provisional, our preliminary findings from
When we look at the difference between the map collaboration with climate modelers at the Univer-
that includes only physical exposure to climate- sity of Texas suggest some continuity with historic
related hazards and population density (human patterns.41 For example, when we look at projected
exposure to climate-related hazards) and the final changes between the 1980-2000 period and the
composite map, we find that a number of areas 2040-2060 period, we find that eastern and western
appear to have relatively low human exposure to
climate-related hazards but are far more vulner- 41
Our collaborators are Kerry Cook and Ned Vizy from the
able when we add in other dimensions (see Figure Jackson School of Geosciences. The model uses the Weather
Research and Forecasting (WRF) model from the National
16). These include southern Niger and Chad as Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) and the National
well as Somalia. Western Ethiopia appears to be Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The model is based
on the A1B emissions scenario.

FIGURE 14
Ethiopia, as well as parts of central Sudan, Chad,

and Morocco will likely experience sharp increases
in the number of heat wave days, though Algeria
may experience fewer days of such hot weather (see
Figure 17).42
When we look at the change in the number of

drought days, we find that some of the Mediter-
ranean coastline, particularly in Tunisia and Libya
will experience an increased number of drought
days, while Algeria may experience a decrease.43
Southern Mali, central Sudan, and the north coast
of Somalia will also experience more drought, while
southern Ethiopia and central Somalia may experi-
ence fewer dry days (see Figure 18).
Heat waves are defined as three or more days with maximum

42
daily temperatures of at least 105 degrees Fahrenheit.
Droughts here are defined as 21 consecutive days with less

43
than 1mm of rainfall in any given day.

FIGURE 15
FIGURE 16

FIGURE 17
FIGURE 18

3 Narratives of Climate Vulnerability
in North Africa
By way of several illustrative vignettes, we can border between the Sahara Desert and the eastern
understand how governance problems and political part of the Aïr mountains. In this area, the French
instability can transform exposure to climate- firm Areva is constructing a major uranium mine.
related hazards into disasters and create negative The Imouraren mine is planned to come online in
spillover effects for the international community. 2013 or 2014 and produce 5,000 tons of uranium a
year, making Niger the second largest producer in
Niger the world.
In fall 2010, Niger experienced the worst floods However, political instability in Niger from multiple
in 80 years along the Niger River, near the capital fronts may make that difficult.47 Even as Niger’s
of Niamey. Nearly 8 million people in Niger alone interim military government was grappling with
were thought to be facing severe food shortages and the floods, seven foreigners, including five French
200,000 people had been displaced. Parts of Chad nationals, were kidnapped in the uranium-mining
and northern Mali were also affected by unusual region in September 2010 by groups affiliated
rainfall patterns across the region. The effects of with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),
the floods were thought to be more severe than leading the French government to encourage the
previous ones because they occurred in the wake of 1,700 nationals in the country to leave the mining
crippling droughts.44 region.48 With the status of the kidnapped staff
Niger was also beset by a number of other prob- unknown at the time of writing, it is unclear what
lems. In February 2010, the military seized power effect this episode will have on Niger’s long-term
in a coup, displacing the country’s leader who had ability to export uranium.
been in power for more than a decade and had Aside from the recent challenge posed by AQIM,
sought to amend the constitution in order to retain Niger and other Sahelian countries also have
power.45 The military government promised a periodic challenges from Tuareg nomads who
swift restoration of democracy and was relatively live in the uranium-mining region and in neigh-
responsive to the country’s flooding and droughts. boring countries. The Tuareg, who have long been
Nonetheless, Niger’s governance problems limit the marginalized from the seats of government in the
country’s capacity to respond to other problems region, began a rebellion in 2007 that continued
(Niger ranked 35th out of 53 African countries through 2009, motivated in part by a desire for a
in our governance index, and in the 2009 UNDP greater share of mineral wealth. Calm only returned
Human Development Index, Niger ranked last in after a 2009 ceasefire, which was one of many
the world).46 that have occurred in the last couple of decades.
Niger’s strategic importance has been elevated due While Tuareg mobilization dates back to the early
to its reserves of uranium. Niger provides about 20th century, there have been more recent cycles
8 percent of the global market for uranium (with of rebellion from the 1990s on, punctuated by
the French particularly reliant on it) at the mines periodic ceasefires in 1995, 1998, and 2006.49 The
in Arlit and Akouta in northern Niger along the Tuareg have a sometimes contentious relationship
with AQIM. For example, the Tuareg were thought
Johnson 2010; Thomson 2010; Norweigan Council for Africa
44
2010. 47
Lewis and Massalatchi 2010.
45
Smith 2010. 48
Reuters 2010b, 2010a.
46
See http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ 49
Hershkowitz 2005; AlertNet 2007; UPI 2009.

FIGURE 19
to have provided intelligence to French authori- observers, nonetheless has taken on new signifi-
ties, which prompted a summer 2010 raid that cance with the potential effect on the uranium-
killed senior AQIM leaders. In response, AQIM mining sector. The latest attacks prompted a
kidnapped a Tuareg customs officer in Mali.50 renewed effort at regional security.
AQIM’s ability to operate in regions populated by
the Tuareg may have depended upon complicity by It is unclear what these problems collectively mean
the Tuareg, but the increasingly violent activity by for Niger’s future security. The floods occurred
AQIM, which brought in unprecedented inter- in the south of the country near Niamey, along
national scrutiny, may have alienated the Tuareg the length of the Niger River. The Tuareg and the
and lead to a rupture between them.51 The AQIM uranium mines are located further north in areas
threat, though perhaps inflated by international where the government’s reach is weaker. In the
thinly populated regions, AQIM has found sanc-
tuary. The uranium is typically transported in
50
Intelligence Quarterly 2010; Daily Middle East Reporter 2010.
liquidated form by truck along a road (the so-called
51
Kennedy-Boudali 2009.

“Uranium Highway”) from Arlit to Tahoua to have had reason to fight over resources in a world
Birnin Konni to Dosso and out of Niger at Gaya/ of more reliable rain? Possibly, but the particular
Malanville to the coast at Cotonou, Benin (see story would have been different.
Figure 19). While the uranium highway crosses the
Niger River at Gaya, satellite photos of the floods Looking ahead, the political story in Sudan appears
did not include the bridge at Gaya.52 Other reports to dominate. The south is scheduled to have a vote
suggested that large numbers of animals died for secession in January 2011. With the country’s
from hypothermia and flooding in the area east oil reserves located in the south, the expected vote
of Tahoua and south of Agadez (see Figure 19 for in favor of southern secession may lead to renewed
a map of the Niger River Basin and its composite violence throughout Sudan. For a country that
climate vulnerability).53 lost 2 million people to 20 years of civil war in the
1980s and 1990s, the prospect of another civil war
The confluence of problems in Niger — political is a great and grave possibility. In 2009, political
instability, disasters, al Qaeda activity, and insur- violence claimed more than 2,000 lives in the
gencies — may not have long-run implications for area near the North-South border and displaced
the country’s security, regional stability, terrorism, more than 300,000 people.54 As the south votes on
or global uranium supplies. Then again, the situ- secession, the contested area of Abyei is set to have
ation is in flux. The narrative here is meant to its own referendum on whether to join the South
suggest that weak governments in the region, beset or remain with the North. Other areas, the Nuba
by other problems, will have trouble dealing with Mountains in South Kordofan and the Blue Nile,
climate emergencies and that extreme weather also may be sites of future contestation; though
events will, in turn, make it difficult for capacity- technically part of the north, large numbers of
constrained and unstable regimes to be able to people from these regions fought with the south
address other challenges. during Sudan’s previous civil war.55
Sudan In this context, the role of environmental factors

might seem overshadowed by politics, but like
The Darfur region of western Sudan has already Niger, policymakers should consider the role
been identified by UN Secretary General Ban that extreme and variable weather could play in
Ki-moon as the world’s first climate war, harkening different parts of the country, particularly when
back to the droughts and the land and grazing coupled with Sudan’s history of political violence
disputes between nomads and farmers that and instability. As our maps of Sudan’s vulnerability
predated the Sudanese government’s support for suggest, the country has pockets of relatively high
the Janjaweed militias in the early 2000s. Whether physical exposure particularly in the south, near
or not droughts or variable rains had an important the city of Juba, the expected southern capital. In
role in the on-going conflict in western Sudan the event of a weather emergency, southern Sudan
remains hotly contested. Debating the relative might not have the capacity to address the needs of
role played by environmental causes in Darfur its populace. Moreover, should fighting re-emerge
compared to other political factors may ultimately in Sudan, a conflict-riddled southern Sudan
be unproductive. Would the farmers and herders might find it difficult to get relief supplies into the
52
DLR 2010. 54
Gettelman 2009.
53
FEWSNET 2010. 55
Schwartz 2009; International Crisis Group 2010.

FIGURE 20

country, particularly in the event of a weather-
related emergency. The roads around the southern
capital suffered intense damage during the civil
war and were heavily land-mined. Only in late
2010 was a route to Uganda taking shape to ease
travel, though it passes through Gulu, an area with
a history of instability from Uganda’s own insurgent
group, the Lord’s Resistance Army.56
In January 2009, nearly 40,000 people were

displaced when unusual rains affected the south-
eastern state of Jonglei and heavy rains caused the
Nile to overflow its banks.57 In January 2010, the
World Food Programme estimated that drought
and conflict together meant that the number of
people who needed food assistance increased from
1 million in January 2009 to 4.3 million a year later.
In August 2010, floods displaced more than 50,000
around the southern town of Aweil, just two years
after its previous flooding.58
While relief supplies could be brought in by air,

southern Sudan is an immense region, so the
absence of good infrastructure to distribute aid
could pose a serious problem. A Sudan embroiled
in a North-South civil war might also be inatten-
tive to droughts or food insecurity in other parts of
the country like Darfur, which is also both riven by
conflict and historically prone to drought. Perhaps
Sudan is not seen as a strategically important
country to the West, but renewed civil war, coupled
with perennial floods and droughts made worse by
climate change, could put large numbers of people
at risk of mass death, rivaling or exceeding the
atrocities observed in Darfur in recent years (see
Figure 20 for a map of composite climate vulner-
ability in Sudan).
56
Thome 2010.
57
Bianchi 2009; AFP 2010.
58
World Food Programme 2010; IRIN 2010.

4 Conclusion and Policy Implications
As our discussion of the potential security conse- concerns are real, but much more work needs to be
quences of climate change noted, advocates for done before the grandiose claims of climate security
more aggressive action on climate change have enthusiasts are substantiated. As for large-scale
seized on the security connection to draw atten- humanitarian disasters, events in Africa and world-
tion to their cause. In an effort to demonstrate wide suggest that people are vulnerable to extreme
the importance of their concerns, there is a risk of weather events and that militaries are increasingly
speaking beyond the available evidence to sell the finding humanitarian rescue and relief to be part of
threat, what Dean Acheson described in the Cold their normal operations. While crisis early-warning
War as being “clearer than truth.” systems for both conflict and famine are important
ways the policy community has sought to prevent
The policy world has run ahead of the scholarly the worst consequences from coming to pass,
community in terms of taking the security conse- building government capacity to make countries
quences of climate change like conflict and migra- and communities more resilient to climate shocks
tion at face value. As we have found, there is some remain important priorities.
potential to overstate the severity of these threats or
a risk of mischaracterizing their nature. At the same time, the policy community needs
to continually engage academics on the state of
By labeling climate change as a security threat, their findings and commit to policies that will be
resources are directed towards some dimensions beneficial to countries, even if the worst security
of the problem and potentially not others. At the consequences of climate change do not come to
same time, security problems potentially elicit the pass. These include early warning systems, disaster
interest of the military. Their influence and exper- preparedness, weather station monitoring, refores-
tise are valuable, but preventing the worst security tation, better building codes, and drought-resistant
consequences of climate change is largely going agriculture.
to be the responsibility of civilian agencies and
foreign assistance programs. Even if climate change As our maps of composite vulnerability suggest, the
is understood to be a security problem, it would places ultimately most vulnerable to the security
be unfortunate if the security dimension primarily concerns we discussed may not be those countries
came to be seen as the military’s problem. most physically exposed to climate-related hazards.
Though western Ethiopia appears across all baskets
In advancing policies to address the problem, we as especially vulnerable, we observe that North
are better served by evidence-driven assessments. African countries along the Mediterranean tend to
This study of the North African region has investi- be physically exposed to climate hazards but that
gated a range of security consequences — conflict, this vulnerability is offset by better education and
migration, terrorism, and disaster relief — to health indicators and superior governance at the
determine what role climate change might play national level (as compared to the rest of the conti-
in relation to them. For most of the concerns, our nent). By contrast, countries across the Sahel and
main conclusion is that the available evidence is Horn, save for Mali, tend to exhibit extremely poor
inconclusive, that the threats specified by many governance and possess low indicators for health
advocates in the climate security debate are not yet and education, making them much more vulner-
supported by academic work on conflict, migration, able to weather hazards than they would otherwise
and terrorism. Our preliminary efforts to describe be, potentially transforming moderate droughts
their meaning in North Africa suggest that the and floods into major humanitarian emergencies.

On one hand, this suggests that foreign assistance With these observations in mind, we recommend
resources be directed to areas that need it the most: the following policy approaches:
southern Chad, Niger, Somalia, Sudan, and persis-
tently vulnerable western Ethiopia. On the other 1. Focus resources and attention on the areas
hand, these are precisely the governments least and countries most vulnerable to climate
likely to spend the money well. So, while the need change from a holistic perspective including
is great, building state capacity for any purpose, let western Ethiopia and pockets in southern
alone to protect the country from climate change, Sudan, Chad, and Niger.
will be a great challenge. • Build basic government capacity in those
Countries like Morocco and Tunisia, despite facing areas as more capacity to deliver services
higher physical exposure to climate change, are could spill over to climate-related areas.
likely to be better equipped to handle the problem. • Support NGO and local government
This observation leads to a conundrum for donors. efforts to protect people through targeted
The countries with the most capacity to protect investments in early warning systems,
themselves from the effects of climate change may disaster preparedness, drought-resistant
be best able to spend donor money appropriately.59 agriculture, and weather monitoring.
Trying to equip Somalia with the resources to
handle extreme weather events in the absence of a 2. Build cooperative relationships with North
functioning government would be a challenge, if African governments on the Mediterranean
not an impossibility. that are physically vulnerable to climate change
but have more capacity to address the problem.
One approach would be to focus on the specific
areas where physical exposure is most severe at the • Focus on information-sharing and
sub-national level and try to support community mobilization of the government’s own
and household resilience through targeted invest- resources to protect against climate-related
ments in NGOs and possibly local governments in hazards.
western Ethiopia.
• Develop better information resources
However, given that state capacity is the main on migration and agriculture to assess
limiting factor, continual investments in NGOs are the responsiveness of North Africans to
not an attractive long-run solution. Even amidst changing agricultural yields.
broader government disarray, it may be possible to
focus on small areas of technocratic competence While the precise connections and security
such as military-to-military training exercises on consequences remain uncertain, our vulnerability
disaster preparedness or better weather monitoring. assessments can help policymakers to prioritize
At the same time, support for conflict resolution resources. Preventive action and measures to
and basic state-building activities in countries may address the most vulnerable areas and countries
spillover to other domains, allowing people to should be more cost-effective than responding to
address other concerns like climate change. weather emergencies after the fact. At the same
time, such investments should mostly involve
development assistance rather than hard power,
This mirrors similar findings from the foreign assistance
59
though some investments in training local mili-
community on aid effectiveness (Kaufmann 2009, 2010a, 2010b).

taries in disaster response will be a priority. Beyond
general support to improve the overall effectiveness
of weak governments throughout the region, more
targeted funds for adaptation (for drought-resistant
agriculture, early warning systems, improved flood
control, and investments in meteorological stations)
will be particularly important. Here, our vulner-
ability maps provide a rough first cut at where those
efforts ought to be directed.

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CLIMATE & ENERGY PAPER SERIES 2010

MAPPING CLIMATE CHANGE AND

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

This publication can be downloaded for free at http://www.gmfus.org/publications/index.cfm. Limited print

GMF Paper Series

Transatlantic Climate Bridge Initiative

Climate & Energy Policy Paper Series

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa iii

Finally, with respect to natural disasters, we find

In terms of policy, these conclusions lead us

iv The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 1

This is not a work of country experts but a

In Section 1 we review the mechanisms by which

2 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Conflict In spite of this, most academic studies that have

mann, and Buhaug 2010; Buhaug 2010; Busby 2009; Buhaug,

Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 3

4 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

For Europe, emigration from

Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 5

Source: Global Migrant Origin Database 2007

6 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 7

Although lack of data makes it

In the context of climate change in North Africa,

A 2010 study estimated the elasticity of Mexican

8 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

However, the Mexico study largely made use of

If we assume similar migration rates as today,

2009 data is available here http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/

Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 9

Estimates of Future Migration Due to Crop Yields

10 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 11

12 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Extreme Weather Events and

Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 13

14 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

1995-2008 Climate-Related Disasters in North Africa

Country Number of Number of Number of Number of Max. Max. Total Max.

Source: OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database

Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 15

16 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Composite Vulnerability Baskets and Indicators

Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 17

Climate-Related Hazard Exposure Data

Variable (weight) Unit Source Years

As our composite model of vulnerability demon- Findings

18 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 19

Africa-Wide Household and Community Resilience Data

Variable (weight) Indicator (weight) Source Years of Data Availability

20 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Finally, when we look at governance and

Figure 13, a chart of North African gover-

Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa 21

Governance and Political Violence Data

22 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Ethiopia, as well as parts of central Sudan, Chad,

When we look at the change in the number of

Heat waves are defined as three or more days with maximum

daily temperatures of at least 105 degrees Fahrenheit.