1.

Whether the exclusionary practice of menstruating women amounts to discrimination

according to the Constitution of Vindhu?
That the exclusionary practice of menstruating women amounts to discrimination according to
the constitution of Vindhu.

The learned counsel for the appellant humbly submits before this Hon’ble supreme court of
India that the exclusionary practice of menstruating women amounts to discrimination
according to the constitution of Vindhu. It is because such practice is violating the core
principles enshrined in the articles 14, 15, 17 of Indian constitution1. Article 14 of Indian
constitution guarantees the right to equality and as per the same article any law which has an
intelligible differentia ought to have the reasonable nexus with the object that is to be achieved
and in this case the object of the temple authorities is that the deity who is who is worshipped
in the temple will be polluted when the menstruating women enter the temple and thereby it is
blatantly violating not only the constitution of India but also the principles of justice, liberty,
equality which are enshrined in the preamble to constitution of India.

The counsel further submits before this Hon’ble Supreme court of India that it is very clear
from the facts of the case that the classification or differentia which is based on the mensuration
of women is very clear and the object of which is unconstitutional. In the case of Sri
Venkatramana Devaru v. State of Mysore2 it has been stated by the Apex court of India that a
religious denomination cannot completely exclude or prohibit any class or section for all times.

The learned counsel for the appellant further submits before the Hon’ble supreme court of India
that exclusionary practice per se violates the sacrosanct principle of equality of women and
equality before law3. The exclusionary practise is also violating the article 15(1) of Indian
constitution4 as it is directly discriminating the people based on the gender because the
mensuration will be exclusive to only females and the exclusionary criteria is also the same.

It is apt to mention here that this Hon’ble court has also given judgements that the gender
biasness is opposed to the constitutional norms5. This exclusionary practice of preventing the

1
Cite articles of Indian constitution.
2
11 (1958) SCR 895 : 1958 AIR 55
3
Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University and another, (1989) 2 SCC 145
4
Cite article.
5
Anuj Garg and others v. Hotel Association of India and others, (2008) 3 SCC 1 and Charu Khurana and others
v. Union , (2015) 1 SCC 192
of India and others
menstruating women from entering the temple is also causing the stigma on the women
community as a whole and the reason shown by the temple authorities for not allowing the
women into temple is that the women who are menstruating are pollute and so, it is clearly
violating the article 17 of the Indian Constitution6 as it is creating thereby a huge psychological
impact on women and article 17 of the constitution covers the discrimination based on the
social factors and this term social factors is very wide enough to cover menstrual
discrimination against women.

This article 17 of Indian Constitution is made applicable to both the state and the Non-state
actors by a central legislation named Civil Rights Act, 1955 and the judgement which is given
by the High Court which bars the women aged 10-50 from entering the temple is not in
consonance with the provisions of the above said Act.

The exclusionary practice pertaining to women is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution as

it impacts the ovulating and menstruating women to have a normal social day to day rendezvous
with the society including their family members and thus, undermines their dignity by violating
Article 21 of the Constitution7.

The counsel further submits that the exclusionary practice violates the rights of Hindu women
according to the article 25 of Indian constitution which provides the right to women to enter
the Hindu temples which are dedicated to the public and there are many judgements which are
given by the Supreme Court of India by which the Hon’ble court has upheld the entering of the
temples to all the castes as they are Hindus and it is therefore, similar to the present case as
the women who want to assert their rights to enter the temple.

The Article 3(b) of the 1965 Act prohibits the women who are aged about 10-50 from entering
in to the temples and this article is ultra vires and also it is unconstitutional because it is
violating Articles 14, 15, 17, 21 and 25 of the Constitution in so far as it prohibits women from
entering a public temple.

India is also one of the countries which have signed the Convention on Elimination of all forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)8 and by this convention the country should
eradicate and eliminate the taboos relating to the women based on the mensuration which are

6
cite,.
7
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India and others, (2014) 5 SCC 438 and Justice K.S. Puttaswamy
and another v. Union of India and others, (2017) 10 SCC 1
8
cite
governed by the Customs and traditions and also the convention clearly states that the state
must not avoid their obligation by taking a plea that it is custom or tradition.

This exclusionary practice is also violating the Article 21 and the Privacy and the dignity of
the women as it is involuntarily leading to the forceful disclosure of the age and the menstrual
status of the women if they want to enter the temple and also further the respondents cannot
take the plea either on the grounds of health, public order or morality for the term morality used
in Article 25 or 26 is not an individualized or sectionalized sense of morality subject to varying
practices and ideals of every religion but it is the morality informed by the constitutional vision.
In the present case the exclusion of women is an institutional practice and any subjective
reading of the term morality in the context of Article 25 would make the liberty of faith and
worship otiose9.

In the case of Young Lawyers Association V. state of Kerala 10 the facts were that the section
3(b) of the 1965 Act in the sate of Kerala had prohibited the women aged about 10-50 years
from entering in to the temple and they have shown the reason that the mensurating women as
pollute so they cannot enter the sabrimala where lord Ayyappa is worshipped and so, the apex
court has also held that the such exclusionary practise amounts to the discrimination and it is
also unconstitutional and the judgement was not an unanimous one but the majority judgement
was that and this case is very similar to the present case.

The learned counsel for the appellant humbly submits before the Hon’ble supreme Court of
India that by relying upon the above cases and the articles of Indian constitution and the
exclusionary practise of disallowing the menstruating women in to the temple amounts to
discrimination and also it is unconstitutional and so, the Hon’ble supreme court of India may
by its judgement declare that such exclusionary practise is discriminating the women and
therefore, it must be held as unconstitutional.

9
Manoj Narula v. Union of India and National Legal Services Authority, (2014) 9 SCC 1

10
Cite case