Psychological Bulletin

1973, Vol. 80, No. 4, 286-303

PERSONAL CONTROL OVER AVERSIVE STIMULI

AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO STRESS 1
JAMES R. AVERILL 2
University of Massachusetts

It is almost axiomatic to assume that personal control over an impending

harm will help to reduce stress reactions. However, a critical review of
experimental research indicates that this assumption is not always warranted.
Specifically, three main types of personal control may be distinguished: (a)
behavioral (direct action on the environment), (6) cognitive (the interpreta-
tion of events), and (c) decisional (having a choice among alternative courses
of action). Each type of control is related to stress in a complex fashion,
sometimes increasing it, sometimes reducing it, and sometimes having no
influence at all. As a broad generalization, it may be said that the relationship
of personal control to stress is primarily a function of the meaning of the
control response for the individual. Stated differently, the stress-inducing or
stress-reducing properties of personal control depend upon such factors as
the nature of the response and the context in which it is embedded and not
just upon its effectiveness in preventing or mitigating the impact of a poten-
tially harmful stimulus.

From many different quarters today, there
is the demand for more personal control:
Students complain that they have no control
over the political process, persons in poverty
complain that they have no control over
economic resources, and old people complain
that they have little control over anything,
not even how they die. Although the first
reaction to these complaints is that they con-
tain considerable merit, it is not clear exactly
what is meant by "personal control" and
whether it is such an unmixed blessing as
might at first be supposed.
Among psychologists, too, there is a ten-
dency to assume that personal control has a
beneficient or stress-reducing effect. For ex-
ample, Sells (1970) has argued that stress
occurs when two conditions are met: (a) An
individual is called upon to respond under
circumstances in which he has no adequate
response available, and (b) the consequences
of not responding are important to the indi-
vidual. These conditions, Sells (1970) has
claimed, provide "a new principle to distin-
guish stress from other phenomena of human
1
Parts of an earlier version of this paper were
presented at the American Psychological Association,
Honolulu, September 1972.
2
Requests for reprints should be sent to James R.
Averill, Department of Psychology, University of
Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts 01002.
286
behavior [p. 139]." In other words, the lack
of control (i.e., the nonavailability of an
adequate response) is a necessary if not
sufficient condition for stress. Handler and
Watson (1966) have argued for a similar
type of relationship: "Any situation which
interrupts, or threatens the interruption of
organized response sequences, and which does
not offer alternate responses to the organism,
will be anxiety-producing [p. 280]." Accord-
ing to Mandler's view, personal control
makes it possible for the individual to in-
corporate a potentially threatening event into
a cognitive plan, thus reducing anxiety. To
take a final example, in a recent defense of
individual freedom and autonomy (as op-
posed to Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dig-
nity), Lefcourt (1973) has reviewed a num-
ber of studies which indicate that control
over an aversive stimulus helps reduce stress
reactions. He concluded:
The perception of control would seem to be a
common predictor of the response to aversive
events regardless of species. . . . the sense of con-
trol, the illusion that one can exercise personal
choice, has a definite and a positive role in sustaining
life [p. 424].
As indicated by the above quotations, dif-
ferent types of control may be (but generally
are not) distinguished: The first type is
behavioral control, the availability of a re-
 PERSONAL CONTROL OF AVERSIVE
sponse which may directly influence or mod-
ify the objective characteristics of a threat-
ening event; the second type is cognitive
control, the way in which an event is inter-
preted, appraised, or incorporated into a
cognitive "plan"; and the third type is deci-
sional control, the opportunity to choose
among various courses of action. The purpose
of the present paper is to review the experi-
mental research relating each of these types
of control to the experience of stress. (For
recent reviews of control expectancies as a
personality dimension, see Joe, 1971; Lef-
court, 1972.)
BEHAVIORAL CONTROL AND STRESS
In many everyday situations, a person has
no alternative but to endure a potentially
noxious stimulus. He may, however, be able
to control such things as who administers the
stimulus (e.g., himself or another) and how
and when the stimulus will be encountered.
In other cases, the stimulus may be pre-
vented entirely, terminated prematurely, or
otherwise modified by some form of direct
action (e.g., avoidance, escape, attack, and
so forth). This suggests a twofold subdivi-
sion of behavioral control, namely, regulated
administration and stimulus modification.
Each is considered in turn beginning with
the regulated administration of a noxious
stimulus.
Regulated Administration
An experiment by Haggard (1943) was
perhaps the first study to deal with regulated
administration as a mode of control. In the
first phase of Haggard's study, subjects were
presented with a list of words, one of which
was always followed by an electric shock. For
half of the subjects, the shock was adminis-
tered by the experimenter; for the other
half, a signal light came on at the appropriate
time and subjects administered the shock to
themselves. Following this conditioning pro-
cedure, subjects were assigned to one of three
analogue therapy conditions: rest, experi-
mental extinction, and catharsis-information.
During a third and final phase of the study,
the same procedure was followed as in the
first conditioning phase but without the elec-
tric shock.
STIMULI 287
During the first (conditioning) phase of
the experiment, the self-administered shocks
resulted in smaller changes in skin conduc-
tance than did the experimenter-administered
shocks. This might be taken as an indication
that subjects who had control over the de-
livery of shock were less stressed. However,
the lessened autonomic reactivity of these
subjects cannot be attributed to behavioral
control per se. Since the self-administered
shocks were preceded by a warning signal,
whereas shocks in the experimenter-admin-
istered condition were not, the two conditions
differed in uncertainty or ambiguity as well
as behavioral control. Other studies to be
reviewed below indicate that uncertainty it-
self can have a significant effect on stress.
Moreover, Haggard found that subjects who
administered shock to themselves also tended
to be more aware of the experimental con-
tingencies (i.e., which word was followed by
shock) than were subjects to whom the
shocks were administered by the experi-
menter. When aware subjects were contrasted
to unaware subjects, the difference in re-
sponse patterns was similar to that between
subjects in the self-administered and experi-
menter-administered shock conditions, re-
spectively. Haggard took this to mean that
administering shock to the self "facilitated
structuration of the cognitive field" and that
cognitive structuring, rather than behavioral
control, was responsible for the differences
between self-administered and experimenter-
administered shock groups.
Haggard also found that subjects who
received experimenter-administered shocks
showed more rapid extinction during therapy
than did subjects who administered shock to
themselves. Thus, by the third phase of the
study (a repetition of the original conditions
but without shock), no differences existed
between experimenter-administered and self-
administered shock groups in terms of psycho-
physiological reactions to the stimulus word.
This would indicate that the stress-reducing
effects of behavioral control, if indeed any
existed in this experiment, were rather
ephemeral and short lived.
Pervin (1963) attempted to disentangle the
influence of behavioral control from that due
288 JAMES R. AVERILL
to the reduction of uncertainty. In a 3 X 2
factorial design, he varied 3 levels of uncer-
tainty (signal, no signal, and inconsistent
signal) and 2 levels of control (self-admin-
istered shock and experimenter-administered
shock). Each subject experienced all six con-
ditions in a series of paired comparisons.
There was a significant tendency for subjects
to prefer self-administered shock, but differ-
ences in anxiety and pain ratings between
self- and experimenter-administered condi-
tions were small and statistically nonsignifi-
cant. Still, there was a trend toward less
stress when subjects had control. This trend,
however, was most evident during the early
trials and in the unsignaled and inconsist-
ently signaled conditions, that is, when uncer-
tainty was the greatest. This might suggest,
as did the results of the Haggard study de-
scribed above, that the factor of behavioral
control is less important in determining stress
reactions than the reduction of uncertainty
which generally accompanies such control. In
line with this, Pervin found a clear indication
that subjects preferred signaled shock to
either unsignaled or inconsistently signaled
shock and that they found the former less
anxiety producing and less painful than the
latter. In other words, the reduction of uncer-
tainty was a much more potent variable than
behavioral control.
Studies investigating the preference for
immediate versus delayed threat (e.g., Badia,
McBane, Suter, & Lewis, 1966; Cook &
Barnes, 1964; D'Amato & Gumenik, 1960;
Hare, 1966; Maltzman & Wolff, 1970) are
also relevant to the issue of behavioral con-
trol. In most experiments using this paradigm
(see Maltzman & Wolff, 1970, for an excep-
tion), subjects have been required to make
some response which resulted in either im-
mediate or delayed threat. Since in the im-
mediate threat condition the noxious stimu-
lus follows directly upon the subject's re-
sponse, the stimulus can be considered as
self-administered. In the delayed condition,
on the other hand, the noxious stimulus is
delivered by the experimenter after some
time interval.
The results of these experiments have been
rather consistent: Most subjects prefer an
immediate to a delayed noxious stimulus and
find the former less stressful. The interpreta-
tion of these results is ambiguous, however,
for variables other than behavioral control
are involved. For example, delayed threat
involves an element of temporal uncertainty
which immediate threat does not. Delayed
threat also entails a waiting period, which
itself may be an independent source of anxi-
ety (Folkins, 1970; Franzini, 1970). Thus,
the generally found preference of subjects for
immediate as opposed to delayed threats
could be due to (a) a desire for behavioral
control, (b) a preference for greater cer-
tainty, and/or (c) a wish to avoid an anxiety-
inducing waiting period. Among these alter-
natives, behavioral control seems to be the
least important. In the first place, one study
which did not involve control as a variable
(Maltzman & Wolff, 1970) still found the
immediate threat condition to be the least
stressful. In the second place, Badia et al.
(1966) found that the number of subjects
preferring a delayed threat could be increased
substantially (to about 50% of the sample)
if the immediate threat was made less pre-
dictable (by varying its probability) and the
delayed threat was made more predictable
(by preceding it with a warning signal). This
result is consistent with the findings of Hag-
gard and Pervin which suggest that the self-
administration of noxious stimuli is stress
reducing primarily when it is accompanied by
a reduction of uncertainty.
Using an experimental design similar in
many respects to the immediate-versus-de-
layed-shock paradigm described above, Ball
and Vogler (1971) allowed subjects to ad-
minister shocks to themselves (upon the
presentation of a signal) or to have shocks
administered at random time intervals by the
experimenter. After experiencing both condi-
tions in a series of forced trials, subjects were
allowed to choose between them on subse-
quent trials. Out of 39 subjects 25 showed a
preference for self-administered shock, and of
these 21 said they did so in order to avoid
uncertainty. Eleven subjects indicated
a preference for experimenter-administered
shocks, and 3 showed no particular pref-
erence. The reasons subjects gave for pre-
ferring experimenter-administered shocks
were highly varied and idiosyncratic and
 PERSONAL CONTROL OF AVERSIVE
included such things as (a) negativism, doing
the opposite of what might be expected; (b)
religious conviction, not struggling against
pain; and (c) excitement, guessing when a
shock might come.
Staub, Tursky, and Schwartz (1971) have
reported several studies involving regulated
administration which also implicate uncer-
tainty as an important mediating variable.
Briefly, in the first of two experiments, sub-
jects were presented with a series of gradually
increasing electric shocks. One half of the
subjects were allowed to administer the
shocks to themselves; each of these had a
yoked partner who received shocks in the
same temporal sequence but administered by
the experimenter. (In the self-administered
shock condition the shock also was preceded
by a warning signal, whereas in the yoked-
control condition it was not. However, sub-
jects tended to administer shocks to them-
selves in such rapid succession that timing
was predictable for both groups. The major
difference between groups, the authors there-
fore argue, is the variable of control.) Under
these conditions, behavioral control had no
discernible effect on the levels of shock
judged as discomforting, painful, and intol-
erable.
In a follow-up experiment, Staub et al.
(1971) made subjects wait for varying time
intervals before they could administer shocks
to themselves; they also allowed subjects to
determine the intensity of the next shock in
the sequence. In this way, subjects who had
control also knew how intense the next shock
would be and when it would occur; their
yoked partners had no such information. Un-
der these conditions of increased uncertainty,
self-administration did have an ameliorative
effect on the perceived intensity of shock.
The experiments reviewed thus far have
employed relatively simple stimuli as sources
of stress (e.g., electric shock or loud noise).
An experiment by Stotland and Blumenthal
(1964) employed a more complex threat,
namely, an intelligence test. Subjects in one
group were informed that they could take the
component parts of the test in any order
they desired, whereas a second group was told
that they had to take the test in a prescribed
order. Subjects who believed they had control
STIMULI 289
over the order of administration showed less
of an increase in palmar sweating than did
subjects who had no control. These results
also would seem to indicate that regulated
administration can mitigate the experience of
stress provided the situation is complex
enough to involve a degree of uncertainty.
Some observations in retrospect and pros-
pect. A brief digression is in order at this
point not only to summarize the results of the
discussion thus far but also to adumbrate
briefly some observations which are of im-
portance for subsequent discussion.
1. The studies just reviewed provide little
evidence that by itself, the regulated admin-
istration of a noxious stimulus has an ameli-
orative effect on stress reactions. In fact, the
data suggest that regulated administration is
stress reducing primarily (and perhaps only)
when other factors are involved, such as the
reduction of uncertainty regarding the nature
and/or timing of the threatening event. The
potential importance of the reduction of un-
certainty as a mediating variable is further
illustrated by the findings of Howell (1971)
that subjects tend to become overconfident
about outcomes which depend on their own
performance. That is, from a subjective point
of view, the reduction of uncertainty may be
integrally linked to behavioral control. How-
ever, the relationship between the reduction
of uncertainty and stress reactions is itself
quite inconsistent, as will be seen below when
research dealing with cognitive control is
reviewed.
2. Studies on regulated administration in-
dicate that most persons prefer to have con-
trol over a potentially noxious stimulus even
when that control has no instrumental value
in altering the objective nature of the threat.
This preference generally has been inter-
preted to mean that conditions of control are
less stressful; that is, persons generally do
not prefer the more stressful of several con-
ditions. Such an interpretation, however, is
open to question in many instances. In the
studies just reviewed, for example, direct
measures of stress (e.g., self-reports and
psychophysiological reactions) provide little
evidence that regulated administration per se
has an ameliorative effect on stress, regardless
of how much a person might prefer it.
290 JAMES R. AVERILL
Actually, a certain independence of pref-
erence ratings from stress reactions makes
good biological and psychological sense. An
animal (especially an unspecialized primate
of the type ancestral to man) who did not
seek information about, or attempt to exert
control over, potentially harmful events
probably did not survive to contribute to the
evolution of the species. This would lead to a
biological predisposition for personal control,
even though under certain conditions the
exercise of that control might be stress induc-
ing rather than stress reducing. Of course,
similar reasoning could be applied to onto-
genetic as well as phylogenetic development.
The growing child is taught to assume re-
sponsibility and exercise control, even though
he may at times find this rather frightening.
Once socialized, the preference for control
may be manifested regardless of whether or
not such control -is actually effective in re-
ducing stress in any particular instance. In
other words, the desire for personal control
may be a deep-seated motivational variable,
whether phylogenetically or ontogenetically
based.
3. The above argument regarding the adap-
tive significance of control also makes neces-
sary a distinction between short-term and
long-term stress reactions. Over the long run,
personal control may be stress reducing or
adaptive even though in the short run it may
be stress inducing. But what is long-term
adaptation? On the phylogenetic level, long-
term adaptation refers to the survival of the
species, regardless of the fate of any single
individual. It is easy to see how the exercise
of personal control could, under appropriate
circumstances, be stress inducing and still
adaptive in this sense. On a personal level,
long-term adaptation could refer either to a
net reduction in stress over an extended pe-
riod of time, or it could refer to the "psychic
cost" of maintaining equilibrium with the
environment. With regard to the latter, Glass
and Singer (1972) have demonstrated that
even when lack of control does not lead to
greater stress reactions, and does not retard
short-term habituation, it still may impair
performance on tasks administered after the
noxious stimuli have terminated. The types
of control studied by Glass and Singer belong
to categories we have not yet discussed (e.g.,
stimulus modification). It therefore is not
clear whether regulated administration would
also reduce the psychic cost incurred during
adaptation to noxious stimuli, but this is a
possibility. In any case, even though regu-
lated administration by itself (i.e., in the
absence of uncertainty) may have little or no
effect on short-term stress reactions, it re-
mains possible that it does facilitate long-
term adaptation to stress.
4. Even the conclusion that regulated ad-
ministration has little or no effect on short-
term stress reactions is subject to qualifica-
tion due to confounding of various types of
control in single experiments. For example,
in nearly all the studies reviewed thus far
(Badia et al., 1966; Ball & Vogler, 1971;
D'Amato & Gumenik, 1960; Hare, 1966;
Pervin, 1963; Staub et al., 1971) the inten-
sity of the noxious stimulus (electric shock
in these instances) was determined individu-
ally for each subject. That is, the level of
shock was set at that point where a subject
found it unpleasant or indicated that he
would not accept anything stronger. This is
an instance of a second type of behavioral
control to be discussed shortly, namely, stim-
ulus modification. When given the oppor-
tunity, subjects can prevent more intense
shocks during an experiment by indicating
at the outset a low tolerance level. Such
stimulus modification need not involve con-
scious dissimulation. Nevertheless, it is a
potentially confounding factor even when all
subjects in an experiment (e.g., in both self-
administered and experimenter-administered
shock groups) are able to set their own levels.
Thus, Bowers (1968) found that if subjects
were first allowed to select a level of shock
and were informed subsequently that the
delivery of shock would be dependent on
their performance during the experiment,
there were no differences in pain and anxiety
ratings as a function of control versus no-
control instructions. On the other hand, if
subjects were told they would have such con-
trol before they selected shock levels, those
given the control instructions were willing to
tolerate significantly higher intensities of
shock. In other words, allowing a subject to
select his own level of shock prior to (or in
 PERSONAL CONTROL OF AVERSIVE
conjunction with) the experimental manipula-
tions may serve to mask other, more subtle
effects.
Let us turn now to a detailed considera-
tion of studies in which the subject explicitly
is given the opportunity to modify the objec-
tive characteristics of the impending harm.
Stimulus Modification
Most studies of behavioral control have
allowed the subject to modify (or at least to
believe that he could modify) the objective
nature of the threatening event. For exam-
ple, subjects have been allowed (a) to pre-
vent entirely or at least avoid some instances
of a noxious stimulus, say, by having punish-
ment contingent upon the performance of
some task (e.g., Averill & Rosenn, 1972;
Bowers, 1968; Glass & Singer, 1972; Hous-
ton, 1972); (b) to interpose rest periods or
take time out from a series of noxious stim-
uli (Hokanson, DeGood, Forrest, & Brittain,
1971); (c) to terminate prematurely (es-
cape) a noxious stimulus (Bandler, Madaras,
& Bern, 1968; Champion, 1950; Elliot,
1969; Geer, Davison, & Gatchel, 1970;
Geer & Maisel, 1972); or (d) to limit the
intensity of a noxious stimulus (as when
subjects select the level of shock they will
tolerate in an experiment—cf. previous dis-
cussion).
Obviously, in delineating stimulus modifi-
cation as a subvariety of behavioral control
we are dealing with a complex category. The
situation is complicated even further by the
fact that most studies investigating this type
of control have actually involved more than
one manipulation. An experiment by Hokan-
son et al. (1971) may serve to illustrate this
point. The study was designed to test, among
other things, the hypothesis that the availa-
bility of an avoidance response reduces physi-
ological indicants (blood pressure) of stress.
The avoidance response available to one
group of subjects, but not to a yoked com-
parison, was the possibility of introducing
one-minute rest periods during a one-half-
hour work schedule. In fact, however, there
were two other types of personal control in-
volved in this experiment. First, subjects
were allowed to determine for themselves the
level of shock they would endure during the
STIMULI 291
experiment, and second, the work schedule
from which subjects could take time out was
itself an avoidance task.
The Hokanson et al. experiment revealed
that subjects who could interpose rest periods
had smaller increases in blood pressure than
did their yoked partners who received the
same number and sequence of time-outs. Ho-
kanson et al. (1971) therefore concluded that
"the availability of an avoidance response
reduces autonomic signs of arousal [p. 66]."
This conclusion may serve as a starting point
for the present analysis, for it is a representa-
tive summary of the research on stimulus
modification cited in the introduction to this
section. That is, when subjects are given the
opportunity to modify the nature of an aver-
sive stimulus, decreased stress reactions gen-
erally have been observed in comparison with
conditions in which no control is possible. In
spite of the seeming ubiquity of this finding,
its generality is open to question. Without
going into details, it may be stated that for
any particular experiment in which lower
stress reactions have been observed on the
part of the subjects who have had control,
the results typically are open to alternative
interpretations. In the Hokanson et al. study,
for example, it is reasonable to assume that
subjects who had control took their rest
periods at psychologically propitious mo-
ments, that is, when they were especially
fatigued, tense, etc. Subjects in the yoked
condition, on the other hand, had time-outs
imposed upon them regardless of their mo-
mentary state. For the latter group, then, one
would expect the rest periods to be less ef-
fective in alleviating stress.
The above criticism might seem relatively
minor. After all, the same alternative expla-
nation cannot be applied to all experiments
which have observed reduced stress reactions
as a function of control. It might therefore
be argued that the more parsimonious expla-
nation for the totality of experimental results
is in terms of personal control. Two further
points must be noted, however. First, some
investigators have observed little or no reduc-
tion in stress among subjects who have had
control (e.g., Houston, 1972). Second, even
in studies in which the majority of subjects
who have had control showed reduced stress
 292 JAMES R. AVERILL
reactions, a sizable minority (typically be-
tween 10% and 20% of the total sample)
have shown the opposite pattern of response
(e.g., Averill & Rosenn, 1972). That is, for
some subjects under certain circumstances,
the availability of a control response appears
to be stress inducing rather than stress re-
ducing. The relevant question, then, is not
whether having personal control reduces
stress reactions but under what conditions it
has this effect and under what conditions it
has the opposite (stress-inducing) effect. At
present, studies on the human level do not
allow an answer to this question, partly be-
cause they have tended to be so complex. On
the animal level, however, a start has been
made in elucidating the conditions under
which the availability of a control response
will lead to increased as opposed to decreased
stress reactions.
In a well-known experiment by Brady,
Porter, Conrad, and Mason (19S8), it was
found that the member of a yoked pair of
monkeys who could prevent the delivery of
shock (working on a Sidman avoidance
schedule) was also the member who devel-
oped ulcers and died. In a recent series of
experiments, Weiss (1968, 1971a, 197lb,
1971c) has presented evidence that the rea-
son for the "executive" monkey's stress was
not the ineffectiveness of the control response
but rather a lack of feedback regarding its
success. Using rats as subjects, Weiss has
found that ulceration increases proportion-
ately with the number of coping responses
emitted by an animal but inversely with the
amount of positive feedback regarding the
success of the response. The most stressful
conditions are those in which many responses
are demanded but the responses result in
negative or inconsistent feedback (the tradi-
tional conflict situation); also stressful, how-
ever, is the situation—like that of the execu-
tive monkey—in which the animal must wait
to learn the outcome of his response or rely
on difficult temporal discriminations. On the
other hand, if an animal receives immediate
and positive feedback, then the availability of
a coping response alleviates stress in com-
parison to animals who receive the same
amount of noxious stimulation but who have
no control.
The point which needs to be emphasized in
the above analysis by Weiss is that stress is
not only a function of feedback but also of
the number of coping responses. Holding feed-
back constant, the animal who responds more,
even if the responses are effective, also ex-
hibits more stress. In extreme cases of am-
biguous feedback, one might predict that the
animal who does not respond at all, and
hence receives the noxious stimulus, should
experience less stress than the animal who
responds frequently and receives little punish-
ment. (This assumes, of course, that the
punishing stimulus does not itself lead to
physiological damage.) It remains to be
tested whether or not this prediction is ac-
curate, and whether the conditions elucidated
by Weiss for animals also hold for humans,
with their greater capacity for cognitive
modes of control. Nevertheless, the results of
Weiss represent one of the few concrete dem-
onstrations of the conditions under which
the availability of a control response may
lead to increased rather than decreased stress.
COGNITIVE CONTROL AND STRESS
While behavioral control involves direct
action on the environment, cognitive control
refers to the way a potentially harmful event
is interpreted. It might seem that we are
stretching the concept of control too far by
subsuming under it the interpretation of
events. But consider the oft-demonstrated
finding that the perception of pain is a func-
tion, in part, of the meaning or significance
of the aversive stimulus (Melzack & Casey,
1970). If pain can be mitigated on the basis
of a person's interpretation of events, then
certainly such an interpretation deserves to
be called, in some sense at least, a mode of
control. Nevertheless, the notion of cognitive
control does present some conceptual diffi-
culties. For example, the research reviewed
thus far indicates that personal control may
have potentially stress-inducing as well as
stress-reducing properties. Is there any sense
in which an interpretation of an event can
lead to increased stress and still legitimately
be called a mode of control? There is no
doubt that certain interpretations (e.g., that
one has cancer) may increase stress reactions.
But if cognitive control is equated with any
 PERSONAL CONTROL OF AVERSIVE
interpretation, then the concept of control is
stretched beyond useful limits. What is
needed is some definition of cognitive con-
trol which is independent of immediate stress
reactions but still more restrictive than just
any type of stimulus evaluation. The distinc-
tion previously made between immediate and
long-term stress reactions (cf. summary ob-
servations on regulated administration) is
helpful in this regard. Cognitive control may
be defined as the processing of potentially
threatening information in such a manner as
to reduce the net long-term stress and/or
the psychic cost of adaptation. This defini-
tion allows for the possibility that cognitive
control, just as behavioral control, may lead
in the short run to increased rather than de-
creased stress.
Depending upon whether the interpretation
of an event is essentially reality oriented or
whether meaning is imposed upon the stimu-
lus, two types of cognitive control may be
distinguished: information gain and ap-
praisal. In certain respects, this distinction is
similar to that between regulated administra-
tion and stimulus modification as subvarieties
of behavioral control. That is, in the case of
information gain, the evaluation of threat is
relatively objective; in the case of appraisal,
on the other hand, the threat is modified to
conform to the needs and desires of the indi-
vidual.
Information Gain
The role of information in reducing stress
—what Furedy and Doob (1970) have called
"informational control"—recently has become
a topic of considerable interest and contro-
versy. In examining this issue it is helpful to
start with the simplest case, namely, the
effect of having a warning signal prior to an
aversive stimulus. Discussion is limited to
situations in which the warning signal does
not allow the individual to exert any behav-
ioral control over the threatening event.
A number of studies have found that a
warning signal tends to increase the stressful-
ness of a situation. Brady, Thornton, and
Fisher (1962), for example, observed greater
weight loss and mortality in rats subjected to
a regimen of signaled versus unsignaled
shock. Similar findings have been reported
STIMULI 293
by Friedman and Ader (1965) in mice and
by Liddell (1950) in sheep and goats. On
the other hand, Seligman (1968) and Weiss
(1970) have found that rats exhibit less
stress when electric shock is preceded by a
warning signal than when it is not.
The reasons for the above discrepant find-
ings are not clear. Weiss (1970) has noted
that in the studies by Brady et al. (1962)
and by Friedman and Ader (1965), electric
shock was delivered through a floor grid to a
freely moving animal. This might have al-
lowed the animal to exert some behavioral
control over the shock, for example, by rear-
ing on its hind paws, jumping, etc. Such
control would be relatively inefficient, how-
ever, interrupting or perhaps mitigating the
shock only for brief periods. Inefficient con-
trol might increase the stressfulness of a
situation by providing negative feedback to
the subject (cf. the previous discussion of
stimulus modification). However, experiments
by Liddell (1950) indicate that this probably
is not the entire explanation. Liddell deliv-
ered shock on a fixed time schedule (e.g.,
every two or seven minutes). Although the
animals (goats and sheep) learned quite ac-
curately when to expect the shock, this tem-
poral conditioning was accompanied by little
stress. However, if each shock was preceded
by a 10-second warning signal, the animals
showed signs of severe disturbance. Accord-
ing to Liddell (1950), "the added pinprick
of vigilance supplied by a ten second signal
preceding the shock appears to be the deter-
mining factor in precipitating the chronic
abnormalities of behavior which we call ex-
perimental neurosis [p. 195]." In other
words, it was not the negative feedback re-
garding an inefficient response which pro-
duced stress (both the signaled and unsig-
naled animals knew through temporal condi-
tioning when to expect the shock); rather,
the stress appeared to result from stimulus
overload.
Now let us consider instances in which
signaled shock has led to less stress than
unsignaled shock. Seligman (1968) and
Weiss (1970) presented evidence that this is
due to the fact that the subject learns not
only that a warning signal predicts shock but
also that the absence of the signal predicts
294 JAMES R. AVER2LL
safety. Thus, by providing a warning signal,
one also provides a safety signal (cues asso-
ciated with the absence of the warning sig-
nal). During the safety signal, the animal can
"relax," knowing that shock will not be de-
livered. When there is no warning signal, on
the other hand, the animal must constantly
remain vigilant and, hence, the stressfulness
of the entire regimen is increased. According
to this line of reasoning, then, it is not the
warning signal per se which is stress reducing
but rather the meaning it imparts to other
cues not associated with threat.
Experiments using animal subjects thus
lead to the following tentative conclusions
regarding the stressfulness of signaled versus
unsignaled shock. First, signaled shock may
be accompanied by greater stress reactions
than unsignaled shock under conditions which
lead to negative feedback (due, for example,
to ineffective avoidance responses) and/or
when the limits of the organism to assimilate
new information are exceeded. Second, sig-
naled shock may be accompanied by fewer
stress reactions under conditions in which
viable avoidance responses are possible3 and/
or in which the contingencies between the
warning and the shock are such that the sub-
ject can relax during the intershock interval.
The latter point is worth emphasizing be-
cause it means that whatever stress-reducing
properties a warning signal might have are
not intrinsic to the signal itself but rather
are a function of the entire context in which
the warning is embedded.
A few laboratory studies have investigated
the effects of warning signals with human
subjects (Averill & Rosenn, 1972; Glass &
Singer, 1972; Lovibond, 1968). Although not
without exception, these experiments, like
their animal counterparts, generally have
found that a warning signal by itself has
little effect on the experience of stress. It
should be pointed out, however, that a warn-
ing signal probably is not the most effica-
cious way of providing information regarding
the onset of a threatening stimulus. For ex-
3
This statement is obviously subject to the quali-
fications introduced in the previous sections regard-
ing potentially stress-inducing effects of behavioral
control.
ample, if a threatening event follows too
closely upon a warning signal, waiting for
the warning could be as demanding as wait-
ing for the threatening event itself. Perhaps
a more efficacious way to provide information
regarding the onset of a noxious stimulus is
to have the latter occur at the end of a speci-
fied time interval. Thus, Glass and Singer
(1972) observed that periodic bursts of noise
produce fewer undesirable consequences on
performance following termination of the
stimuli than do randomly presented bursts
(cf. also the previously cited studies of Lid-
dell on temporal conditioning in animals).
On the other hand, Monat, Averill, and Laz-
arus (1972) found that knowing the time of
occurrence of a noxious stimulus (indicated
by a clock) led to greater anticipatory stress
reactions than did a condition of temporal
uncertainty, perhaps because the latter al-
lowed subjects to engage in avoidancelike
cognitive activities as time progressed.
Jones, Bentler, and Petry (1966) found
that subjects appear to be more motivated to
obtain information about the time of occur-
rence of a noxious stimulus than about its
intensity, which would seem to highlight the
importance of temporal information. As indi-
cated before, however, it is hazardous to
draw inferences from preference ratings to
stress reactions. In the just cited experiment
by Monat et al. (1972), for example, subjects
expressed a preference for temporal certainty
(knowing when a shock would occur) than
for temporal uncertainty, although anticipa-
tory reactions tended to be less when the
time of occurrence was unknown.
Epstein (1973) has reviewed recently a
number of studies conducted in his laboratory
which deal with the effects of different kinds
of information on reactions to noxious stim-
uli (loud sounds and electric shocks). He
found that information regarding the time of
occurrence, likelihood, and nature of the
stimulus could either reduce or enhance reac-
tivity to the impact of the stimulus. He con-
cluded :
The finding of greatest generality was that an ac-
curate expectancy tended to facilitate habituation.
. . . It follows that, depending upon the threat
value of a stimulus, it is at times necessary to pay
the price of a momentary unpleasurable increase in
 PERSONAL CONTROL OF A.VERSIVE
arousal if one is to later be able to respond at a
reduced level of arousal [p. 105].
Lanzetta and Driscoll (1966) examined the
preference for information as a function of
whether the anticipated event was an electric
shock (versus no shock), a monetary reward
(versus no reward), or shock versus reward.
They found that subjects generally preferred
to have information as opposed to no informa-
tion regarding an anticipated event, but
there were no significant differences in the
number of subjects seeking information among
the shock-no-shock, reward-no-reward, and
shock-reward conditions. Moreover, informa-
tion regarding the nature of the impending
event had little influence on reactivity to its
occurrence.
At still a more complex level of informa-
tion, Staub and Kellett (1972) examined the
relative value of two types of knowledge con-
cerning an impending threat (electric shock).
Subjects were given information about (a)
the objective characteristics of the shock
(e.g., the nature of the delivery apparatus
and its safety features, transfer of electricity,
and the like) and/or (b) about the types of
sensations subjects would experience when
the shock was delivered. Subjects who re-
ceived both types of information were willing
to accept more intense shocks before evalu-
ating them as painful than were subjects who
received either type of information by itself.
The latter subjects, in fact, did not differ in
pain tolerance from those who received no
information at all. The no-information sub-
jects, however, did express more worry or
anxiety than those who had either or both
kinds of knowledge about the threat and its
consequences. From the responses to question-
naire items, Staub and Kellett have argued
that the two kinds of information enhanced
each others' perceived trustworthiness, or
usefulness, or both. While the apparatus in-
formation helped reduce worry about the
danger of shock, only the sensation informa-
tion could be validated by the subject's own
experience. The reduction of objective worry
and the validation by experience may be
necessary before information can represent
an effective control device, at least in terms
of pain tolerance.
STIMULI 295
All of the research reviewed thus far has
dealt with relatively simple stimuli such as
electric shock or bursts of loud noise. The
results indicate that subjects generally prefer
to have information about an impending
harm but that there is no consistent relation-
ship between such information and initial
reactivity. There is some indication, however,
that predictability, even when it leads to
increased reactivity initially, may facilitate
long-term adaptation. Evidence reviewed be-
low on the appraisal of complex emotional
stimuli would seem to support this conclusion.
Appraisal
When a situation is complex or ambiguous,
a person does not simply obtain information,
he also actively imposes meaning on events.
The imposition of meaning on a potentially
threatening event often has been considered a
form of defense (cf. psychoanalytic theory).
However, since no psychopathology is implied
in the present discussion, the term "appraisal"
is preferable to "defense mechanism" as a
generic name for this subvariety of cognitive
control. As it relates to personal control, the
concept of appraisal resembles Kelly's (19SS)
notion of personal constructs. Kelly viewed
man as an incipient scientist whose ultimate
aim is to predict and control events. Such
prediction and control is achieved by abstract-
ing from events certain features and weaving
these abstractions into a system of constructs
which lends meaning to the separate events.
The body of literature related to the ap-
praisal of threat is so extensive that no at-
tempt is made to review it here (see, e.g.,
Lazarus, 1966). Rather, we simply illustrate
with a few instances how appraisals, like
other modes of control, may under appro-
priate circumstances increase as well as de-
crease stress reactions. Sensitizinglike de-
fense mechanisms are perhaps the prime
example of appraisals which are stress in-
ducing in the short run but which may facili-
tate long-term adaptation (e.g., Davidson &
Bobey, 1970). The person who uses this type
of control focuses attention on threatening
events, searches for cues regarding potential
harm, and in general emphasizes the affective
quality of experience.
296 JAMES R. AVER1LL
Closely related to sensitization as a mode
of defense is the "work of worry" described
by Janis (1958). According to Janis, worry
is a form of inner preparation that increases
the level of tolerance for subsequent noxious
stimuli but at some cost in terms of immedi-
ate stress reactions (see also Breznitz, 1971).
Janis found that surgical patients who experi-
enced too much or too little fear prior to an
operation evidenced less rapid recovery than
did patients who showed moderate anticipa-
tory stress reactions. Presumably, the cogni-
tive strategies employed by the latter allowed
better preparation for the surgical trauma
which followed.
Egbert, Battit, Welch, and Bartlett (1964),
following up the ideas of Janis, prepared a
group of patients for the stress of surgery
by providing them with information regarding
the impending operation and their possible
reactions and experiences during recovery.
Patients who received such instruction re-
quired less medication and were sent home
earlier than were patients who received no
preparation. However, the instruction given
to patients by Egbert et al. was fairly inten-
sive and included advice with regard to
behavioral as well as cognitive control.
The influence of information per se on
the stress of surgery has been the subject of
several dissertations conducted under the
direction of Michael Goldstein.4 In these
studies, patients were first divided into three
groups depending upon whether they exhib-
ited a preference for sensitizing or avoidant
(deniallike) defenses or whether they showed
no specific preference ("nonspecific defend-
ers"). In an initial study, Andrew (1970)
found that information regarding surgery fa-
cilitated recovery of those patients classified
as nonspecific defenders but may have been
counterproductive for patients who preferred
deniallike defenses. Contrary to expectations,
sensitizers were not affected by the receipt of
information, perhaps because they already
had prepared themselves sufficiently for the
operation. In a second dissertation, DeLong
* M. J. Goldstein. Individual differences in re-
sponse to stress. Paper presented at a symposium on
Stress: Its impact on thought and emotion, Univer-
sity of-California, San Francisco, June 1972.
(1970) gave some patients very specific in-
formation describing the nature of their ill-
ness, the reasons for surgery, what to expect
preoperatively and postoperatively, and the
like. Other patients received more general
information regarding hospital facilities, rules
and regulations, etc. DeLong found that sensi-
tizers recovered more quickly than avoiders
when given specific information but less
quickly when given general information. Type
of information did not seem to influence the
recovery of nonspecific defenders or avoiders;
the former recovered well under both condi-
tions, while the latter recovered poorly. How-
ever, complaints of discomfort were more
numerous among avoiders who received spe-
cific information (in comparison to sensitizers
who received the same information), while
complaints were less among avoiders who re-
ceived only general information. Although
these data from the Andrew and DeLong
studies are not entirely consistent, they do
indicate that the type of information a person
receives about an impending danger may
interact in a generally predictable fashion
with his characteristic style of defense.
In her study, DeLong also assessed the
anxiety of patients on the day they were
informed that surgery was to be performed
and again 24 hours before the actual opera-
tion. These data help clarify some of the
ambiguities in the relationship between de-
fensive style and the use of information. Non-
specific defenders showed large increases in
anxiety when surgery was first scheduled, but
their anxiety diminished considerably by the
day before the operation. Sensitizers, on the
other hand, showed only a moderate increase
in anxiety upon learning of surgery and main-
tained this level during the preoperative
period. Finally, patients who were classified
as avoiders showed an actual decrease in anx-
iety when surgery was first scheduled, but
this was followed by a rise to preoperative
levels. In short, the three groups of patients
were showing different gradients of anxiety
(one descending, one remaining constant, and
one ascending) at the time they received in-
formation regarding surgery. The use of the
information as a source of control appears to
have been a function of these gradients (being
 PERSONAL CONTROL OF AVERS1VE STIMULI 297

unnecessary in the case of the first, facilita- In concluding this discussion of appraisal
tive in the second, and counterproductive in as a mode of control, it is perhaps worth
the third). pointing out the obvious, namely, that any
In attempting to clarify further the mecha- interpretation of events is an ongoing process.
nisms involved in the interaction between in- What is appraised in one manner now may
formation and defensive style, Goldstein and be reappraised in another manner subse-
his colleagues reasoned that different defen- quently. One such form of reappraisal which
sive styles represent different cognitive sets deserves brief mention is that involved in
concerning the likelihood of danger. Paul dissonance reduction. (This is what Zimbardo,
(1969) attempted to manipulate such sets on 1969a, has referred to as "cognitive control.")
a temporary basis by showing subjects either Most of the research on cognitive dissonance
a stressful or a benign film when they first has emphasized the reduction of stress. How-
reported to the laboratory. After the estab- ever, even dissonance reduction does not go
lishment of either a sensitizing (stress film) against the general conclusion that personal
or denial (benign film) set, subjects were in- control may sometimes lead to increased
formed that they would see a second film of rather than decreased stress reactions. An
a threatening nature. Paul found that sub- experiment by Bandler et al. (1968) illus-
jects with the sensitizing set exhibited greater trates this. Bandler et al. administered
stress reactions when they were shown the electric shock under conditions in which
threatening film shortly after being informed the subjects were instructed either to es-
but lower stress reactions if a day elapsed cape or to endure the stimulus. Results in-
between the warning and the showing of the dicated that subjects tend to rate as more
film. Subjects with a denial set, on the other painful shocks which they escape as opposed
hand, exhibited lower stress reactions when to shocks which they endure. The authors
they saw the second film after a short delay interpreted these results to mean that a per-
but greater reactions following a day's delay. son's perception of pain is determined, in
These results were confirmed by Cooley part, by his original response to the painful
(1971), who also demonstrated that the high stimulus: If he tries to escape the stimulus,
stress after a day's delay on the part of it must be more painful than if he tries to
subjects with a denial set was due to the endure it. In a follow-up experiment, Corah
specific "tranquilizing" effect of the benign and Boffa "(1970) obtained similar results but
film. Initial exposure to this film (as opposed only if subjects believed they had a choice
to no particular set induction) seems to have in escaping or enduring the shock.
caused subjects to ignore the warning of Interaction among various types of control.
future threat. The experiment by Corah and Boffa (1970)
From the above laboratory and surgery is worth considering in some detail because
studies, it appears that if a person is going it illustrates the manner in which the vari-
to utilize effectively information regarding an ous types of control we have distinguished
impending harm, there must be an initial set (behavioral, cognitive, and decisional) may
for the appraisal of threat based either on interact to enhance or inhibit stress reactions.
specific situational cues or on a person's Corah and Boffa arranged situations in which
characteristic cognitive style.5 subjects believed that they could either
terminate or not terminate a loud noise. (The
5
The fact that long-term adaptation may be same subjects experienced both conditions in
facilitated by initial appraisals of threat is perhaps a repeated measures design.) Termination of
one reason for the success of implosive psycho-
therapy (Stampfl & Levis, 1967). In contrast to the noise is, of course, an example of stimu-
most behavior therapies which try to hold anxiety lus modification, the second type of behav-
at a minimum during desensitization, implosive ioral control outlined previously. In addition,
therapy attempts to reinstate in as much detail as
possible the threatening cues, even though this may one half of the subjects were given instruc-
lead to considerable short-term stress on the part tions emphasizing that it was up to them
of the patient. whether or not they terminated the noise in
 298 JAMES R. AVERILL
the escape condition and whether they en-
dured it in the no-escape condition. Such
choice is an example of decisional control,
which will be discussed in more detail below.
The other half of the subjects were not
given any choice but were simply instructed
to escape or not escape in the respective
conditions.
Let us consider first the stress reactions
of subjects in the no-choice group. Compari-
sons of the escape with the no-escape trials
yielded significant differences in terms of both
self-report and autonomic (skin conductance)
indexes of stress. When subjects had behav-
ioral control (could escape), they experienced
less stress than when they had no control
(could not escape). Now let us consider only
the no-escape condition and contrast the re-
sponses of subjects who had a choice with
the responses of those who had no choice.
Again, the results were quite clear. Both sub-
jective reports and autonomic arousal indi-
cated that subjects who had some degree of
choice experienced less stress than those who
did not.
Taken together, the above results indicate
that both types of control—behavioral and
decisional—were stress reducing when consid-
ered independently. What happened when
subjects had both modes of control, that is,
in the condition where escape was possible
and subjects felt free to respond or not? In
terms of subjective reports of discomfort, at
least, this condition was judged as stressful
as its opposite—the no-choice, no-escape
condition. Moreover, it was significantly more
stressful than either the behavioral or deci-
sional control conditions separately. (The
autonomic indexes of stress provided more
equivocal results. The no-escape condition
elicited significantly more arousal than the
other three conditions, but the latter did not
differ among themselves.)
Interpreting the results of this experiment,
Corah and Boffa (1970) suggest
that a sense of control is a determinant of the
cognitive appraisal of threat. A procedure which
gives the subject the choice of avoiding or not
avoiding the aversive consequences of a stimulus is
equivalent to giving him perceived control over the
potential threat [p. 4].
We are not concerned here with the adequacy
of this particular interpretation, which seems
basically sound as far as it goes. What is of
interest is the complex interaction which may
be observed among different types of control.
In the study of Corah and Boffa, behavioral
control and decisional control were experi-
mentally manipulated, while cognitive control
(in the sense of reappraisal) was inferred.
DECISIONAL CONTROL AND STRESS
The study by Corah and Boffa introduces
the problem of decisional control, which may
be defined as the range of choice or number
of options open to an individual. There has
been a considerable amount of research on
the consequences of choice in negative situa-
tions. However, most of this research has
concerned the reduction of postdecisional
conflict, for example, reappraising a negative
stimulus in a positive direction following the
voluntary decision to experience that stimu-
lus. Such reappraisals represent the type of
cognitive control discussed in the previous
section. We are concerned here with the con-
ditions of choice per se, that is, with pre-
decisional processes.
If the question were put to most people,
there is little doubt that they would prefer
to have a choice among alternative courses of
action rather than to have decisions made
for them. Yet social commentators from
Hobbes to Fromm have emphasized the will-
ingness of man to relinquish such control, to
"escape from freedom," subjecting himself
to external authority. In spite of this seeming
paradox, relatively little research has been
devoted to the relationship between decisional
control and stress reactions (cf. Steiner,
1970).
Of potential relevance to decisional con-
trol and stress is the program of research by
Zimbardo (1969b) and his colleagues on
"deindividuation." Deindividuation occurs,
according to Zimbardo, in novel or unstruc-
tured settings in which behavior is not con-
strained by situation-bound cues. The con-
trol of behavior, therefore, shifts from the
external physical and social reality to internal
constraints. The result is freedom of choice
to engage in alternative behaviors, and, in
 PERSONAL CONTROL OF AVERSIVE
particular, acts which are emotional, impul-
sive, irrational, and otherwise out of char-
acter. Zimbardo contrasts this type of inter-
nal control with the reappraisals involved in
the reduction of postdecisional conflicts.
Underlying the latter are such considerations
as consistency, commitment, and responsibil-
ity, considerations which play a minor role in
deindividuated behavior.
For better or worse, we have here the emergence
of a kind of freedom different from that made pos-
sible through the use of cognitive control mecha-
nisms we described earlier [i.e., dissonance-reducing
reappraisals]. It is the freedom to act, to be spon-
taneous, to shed the straightjacket of cognition,
rumination, and excessive concern with "ought"
and "should." Behavior is freed from obligations,
liabilities and the restrictions imposed by guilt,
shame, and fear [Zimbardo, 1969b, p. 248],
It will be noted that the situations con-
ducive to deindividuation, as described by
Zimbardo, are similar to situations which
sociologists have described under the heading
of "anomie." The result of deindividuation,
as well as anomie, is often extreme anxiety
or stress on the part of the individual. As
Zimbardo notes, violence in the form of
"senseless" beatings and thrill killings, as
well as other antisocial acts (e.g., vandalism),
are also manifestations of deindividuation.
But not all deindividuated behaviors are
negative, either subjectively or socially. A
variety of ecstatic states, such as Dionysiac
celebrations and shamanistic revelries can
also be considered examples of behavior re-
leased from most normal external constraints,
with great freedom of choice being afforded
the individual.
A somewhat different view of decisional
control has been advanced by Kelly (1955)
and Chein (1972). Instead of viewing free-
dom primarily in terms of the lack of exter-
. nal constraints, these authors emphasize the
agreement of the individual with whatever
constraints do exist. Both Kelly and Chein
analyze behavior in terms of hierarchically
organized systems of personal constructs
(Kelly) or motives (Chein). A person experi-
ences decisional control when goals are estab-
lished by superordinate systems which then
can be met by relevant subordinate behav-
iors. This is, in a sense, a variation on the
STIMULI 299
ancient Stoic ideal of accommodation to
necessity.6 Thus, according to Kelly (1955),
a man controls his destiny
to the extent that he can develop a construction
system with which he identifies himself and which
is sufficiently comprehensive to subsume the world
around him. If he is unable to identify himself with
this system, he may be able to predict events
determinatively, but he can experience no personal
control [p. 126].
At the risk of oversimplification, one might
operationalize the above analysis of deci-
sional control by saying that a person will
experience choice when he is acting accord-
ing to his beliefs or doing that with which
he agrees. An experiment by Lewis and
Blanchard (1971) is relevant to decisional
control so conceived. A situation was ar-
ranged in which subjects were given three
levels of choice as to whether they were going
to give or receive electric shocks in an osten-
sible learning experiment. At the high-choice
level, subjects had complete freedom to
choose whether they would be the "teacher"
or "learner." All subjects in this group chose
to be the teacher, and hence to give rather
than to receive shocks. In the medium-choice
condition, it was rather off-handedly sug-
gested to one half of the subjects that they
be teachers and to the other half that they
be learners. Each subject was then given the
opportunity to choose the other role if he so
desired. In the no-choice condition, subjects
were told definitely to be either the teacher
or the learner. After the experiment, subjects
rated how free they were to assume or reject
the roles to which they were assigned.
Lewis and Blanchard (1971) found that
perceived freedom of choice varied as a func-
6
Consider the following quotation by Epictetus:
Of things some are in our power, and others are
not. . . . And the things in our power are by
nature free, not subject to restraint nor hindrance:
but the things not in our power are weak, slavish,
subject to restraint, in the power of others. Remem-
ber . . . if you think that only which is your own
to be your own, and if you think that what is
another's, as it really is, belongs to another, no man
will ever compel you, no man will hinder you, you
will never blame any man, you will accuse no man,
you will do nothing involuntarily. . . .
Enchiridion I
300 JAMES R. AVER1LL

tion of whether or not subjects (in the Geller, and Rotter (1968). These investiga-
medium- and low-choice conditions) were as- tors found that persons classified as
signed to the role of teacher or learner. This "internals" on behavioral criteria may de-
is what would be expected on the basis of the scribe themselves as "externals" on Rotter's
preceding analysis. That is, the experience (1966) internal-external control scale.
of choice is a function, in part, of how well Hamsher et al. refer to this phenomenon as
a person identifies with the roles he assumes. "defensive externality." It indicates that a
In the present case, the teacher role was the lack (or denial) of experienced control, far
more desirable, as evidenced by the fact that from inevitably leading to stress, may actu-
all subjects in the high-choice condition chose ally be used as a defense against anxiety
it. Subjects assigned to the role of teacher (cf. also the common defense of giving in to
in the medium- and no-choice conditions "fate"). Of course, it could be argued that
probably identified with it, at least to a by shifting responsibility from oneself to the
greater extent than those assigned to the role environment, certain events become more pre-
of learner, and hence experienced greater dictable, which in turn allows some degree of
decisional control. objective control. However true this may be
(and it probably does occur in some in-
OBJECTIVE VERSUS EXPERIENCED CONTROL stances), such an explanation makes unten-
able any claim for a direct relationship be-
This review has emphasized the fact that tween stress reactions and personal control,
personal control can sometimes lead to in- whether objective or experienced. That is, if
creased rather than decreased stress. How- the subjective experience of control is in-
ever, the above experiment by Lewis and voked to help account for the lack of a direct
Blanchard (1971) suggests the need to fur- relationship between objective control and
ther refine our analysis and, in particular, stress, then objective control cannot be in-
to distinguish between objective and experi- voked to save the presumed relationship be-
enced control. We have just seen, for exam- tween the subjective experience of control
ple, that it is not the objective range of and stress.7
choice which determines whether or not a
person experiences decisional control; rather, CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
it is the degree to which he agrees or identi-
fies with the choices he does have, no matter From the foregoing review, it is evident
how limited. Indeed, as the analysis of that no simple relationship exists between
Zimbardo (1969b) has indicated, too many personal control and stress. About the only
response options may lead to conflict, anomie, general statement which can be made with
and feelings of helplessness, as well as to posi- confidence is that the stress-inducing or
tive feelings of freedom. Similarly, with
7
regard to behavioral and cognitive control, Geer et al. (1970) have contrasted control
a person of limited competence might still defined in terms of "experimental arrangements"
and control defined in terms of "the belief in the
experience considerable control provided that subject that he can affect favorably the amount of
his goals were not set beyond his capabilities. stress to which he is subjected." This distinction
In short, although there undoubtedly is a is different from that between objective and experi-
rough relationship between the experience of enced control as defined here. It is almost a truism
control and actual control possibilities, the to say that behavior is based upon a person's per-
ception of, or beliefs about, the environment. The
relationship is by no means one to one. fact that the person has been deceived by experi-
, Might there not be a more direct relation- mental manipulations does not alter this fact. A
ship between stress and the subjective experi- more interesting question is whether, or under what
ence of control than between stress and con- conditions, a person may come to feel that he has
control even when he knows that he does not. The
trol objectively defined? At first, ah affirma- preceding analysis of decisional control illustrates
tive answer to this question appears plausible. one way in which such feelings may be introduced,
There are difficulties, however, which can be that is, by getting the subject to agree with what
illustrated by an experiment by Hamsher, he knows he must do anyway.
 PERSONAL CONTROL OF AVERSIVE
stress-reducing properties of personal control
depend upon the meaning of the control re-
sponse for the individual; and what lends a
response meaning is largely the context in
which it is embedded. For example, neither
the self-administration of a noxious stimulus
nor the mere presence of a warning signal
(the simplest kinds of behavioral and cogni-
tive control, respectively) have much influ-
ence on stress reactions. However, as a situa-
tion becomes more complex, or ambiguous,
then regulated administration (or a warning
signal) can serve as a vehicle for meaningful
information regarding the nature and signifi-
cance of the impending harm. The result is
often—but not always—a decrease in stress
reactions.
These rather mundane observations do not
require much elaboration except to point out
one fact which seems to have been overlooked
in much of the research on personal control.
Many control responses have their own mean-
ing built into them, so to speak. Thus, an
aggressive response to an impending harm
means something different than an escape re-
sponse, although both might be equally ef-
fective in eliminating the source of threat.
Other than the main division of control into
behavioral, cognitive, and decisional varieties,
little attempt has been made in this review
to consider the many qualitatively distinct
ways in which a potentially noxious stimulus
might be controlled under natural conditions.
However, it is reasonable to assume that the
experience of stress is determined, in part, by
the qualitative nature and meaning^ of the
control response. This observation is especially
important in the case of behavioral control.
Most laboratory studies have allowed subjects
only arbitrary and artificial responses (e.g.,
pressing a button, solving mental arithmetic
problems, and the like) in order to prevent or
terminate a noxious stimulus. Although such
responses may be convenient from the experi-
menter's point of view, they probably have
little inherent significance for the subject.
This fact is bound to influence the extent to
which many laboratory studies of personal
control can be generalized to real-life
situations.
STIMULI 301
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