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CONCEPT, CHARACTERISTICS, CAUSES named Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta, and Matilde, surnamed Ortiz y Felin,
her sole and universal heirs of all her property. Manuel and Francisca were
to collect the rents and proceeds from the property held in
common and to obtain a partition of the latter, especially during
already deceased, leaving Vicenta and Matilda as heirs. several years when, owing to the insurrection, the country was in
THAT GIVE RISE TO OWNERSHIP a turmoil; and for this reason, aside from that founded on the right of co-
In 1888, the defendants (Matilde and Gaspar), without judicial ownership of the defendants, who took upon themselves the
DE GUIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS authorization, nor friendly or extrajudicial agreement, took upon administration and care of the property of joint tenancy for purposes of
themselves the administration and enjoyment of the properties left by their preservation and improvement, these latter are not obliged to
FACTS: Calixta and collected the rents, fruits, and products thereof, to the serious pay to the plaintiff Vicenta one-half of the rents which might have
detriment of Vicenta’s interest. Despite repeated demands to divide the been derived from the upper story of the said house on Calle
Two parcels of land covering a fishpond equally owned by Primitiva Lejano properties and the fruits accruing therefrom, Sps Gaspar and Matilde had Escolta, and, much less, because one of the living rooms and the
and Lorenza Araniego. The one half undivided portion owned by Araniego been delaying the partition and delivery of the said properties by means of storeroom thereof were used for the storage of some belongings and
was later purchased by plaintiff from his father Teofilo Abejo, the only heir unkempt promises and other excuses. effects of common ownership between the litigants.
of the original owner (husband of Araniego). Prior to this sale, the whole
fishpond was leased by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano with the knowledge Vicenta filed a petition for partition with damages in the RTC. The defendant Matilde, therefore, in occupying with her husband
and consent of Teofilo A. Abejo in favor of De Guia. De Guia continues to the upper floor of the said house, did not injure the interests of
possess the entire fishpond and derived income therein despite the RTC decision: absolved Matilde from payment of damages. It held that the her co-owner, her sister Vicenta, nor did she prevent the latter
expiration of the lease contract and several demands to vacate by Teofilo revenues and the expenses were compensated by the residence enjoyed from living therein, but merely exercised a legitimate right
Abejo and by his successor-in-interest, Jose Abejo. Abejo filed a complaint by the defendant party, that no losses or damages were either caused or pertaining to her as a co-owner of the property.
for recovery of possession with damages against De Guia. However, Abejo suffered, nor likewise any other expense besides those aforementioned,
failed to present evidence of the judicial or extrajudicial partition of the
fishpond. Counsel for Matilde took an exception to the judgment and moved for a
new trial on the grounds that the evidence presented did not warrant the
ISSUE: judgment rendered and that the latter was contrary to law. That motion SALANTADOL vs. RETES
was denied by the lower court. Thus, this petition.
Whether a co-owner can file ejectment case against a co-owner? Whether FACTS:
Abejo was entitled to rent the property? ISSUE:
On January 17,1965, EUFEMIA OMOLE sold her one-third (1/3) share of said
HELD: WON a co-owner is required to pay for rent in exclusively using the co- Lot No. 513 for P l,000.00 to defendant CATALINA RETES. On January l8,
owned property. 1965 the Register of Deeds or the Province of Negros Oriental wrote to
Under Article 484, “there is co-ownership whenever the ownership plaintiff Flavia Salatandol which letter was received on January 21, 1965
of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. A co- RULING: informing her about the document presented for registration affecting the
owner of an undivided parcel of land is an owner of the whole, one-third (1/3) share of Lot No. 513 in favor of Defendant Catalina
and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes: Salatandol to surrender the owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title. Plaintiffs
at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract.” were never notified by the late EUFEMIA OMOLE nor by Defendant Catalina
“Each co-owner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses Retes about the proposed sale.
Article 487 also provides that ‘anyone of the co-owners may bring them in accordance with their object and in such manner as not to injure
an action for ejectment”. This article covers all kinds of actions for the the interests of the community nor prevent the co-owners from utilizing
recovery of possession. Any co-owner may file an action under On January 30, 1965, Plaintiffs wrote to Defendant CATALINA RETES
them according to their rights.”
Article 487 not only against a third person, but also against informing her of their desire to repurchase the said one-third (1/3) share of
another co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts Lot No. 513 which the late Eufemia Omole sold to her and failing to get a
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed
exclusive ownership of the property. However, the only purpose of favorable action from Defendant Catalina Retes, Plaintiffs on February 5,
for use as a dwelling, in the house of joint ownership ; but the
the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff 1965 deposited the amount of Pl,000.00 with the Clerk of the Court of First
record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said Matilde occasioned any
cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the property Instance of Negros Oriental and who, on February 13, 1965 wrote
detriment to the interests of the community property, nor that she
because as a co-owner he has a right of possession. Defendant Catalina Retes informing the latter about the deposit and of
prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story according
Plaintiffs' desire to exercise their right of pre-emption as co-owners of
to her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor were rented
If one co-owner alone occupies the property without opposition Eufemia Omole.
and an accounting of the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs.
from the other co-owners, and there is no lease agreement, the
other co-owners cannot demand the payment of rent. Conversely, Each co-owner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over When Defendant Catalina Retes failed to get the deposit with the Clerk of
if there is an agreement to lease the house, the co-owners can the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other Court, on February 16, 1965 (plaintiffs) filed the instant action for Legal
demand rent from the co-owner who dwells in the house. limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co- Pre-emption. on February 22, 1965 while this case was still pending,
owners, for the reason that, until a division be made, the Defendant Catalina Retes resold the said one-third (1/3) share of Lot No.
The Lejano Heirs and Teofilo Abejo agreed to lease the entire FISHPOND to respective part of each holder cannot be determined and every 513 back to EUFEMIA OMOLE.
DE GUIA. After DE GUIA’s lease expired in 1979, he could no longer one of the co-owners exercises together with his other co-
use the entire FISHPOND without paying rent. participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in On March 11, 1965 Eufemia Omole donated the said one-third (1/3) share
addition to his use and enjoyment of the same. of Lot No. 513 to Defendant Catalina Retes as evidenced by a Deed of
PARDELL vs. BARTOLOME As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters,
Vicenta Ortiz, plaintiff, and Matilde Ortiz, defendant, were situated in the ISSUE:
FACTS: Province of Ilocos Sur, and were in the care of the last named, assisted by
her husband, while the plaintiff Vicenta with her husband was residing Whether or not SALANTADOL has a right of legal pre-emption, given that
Spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in 1875 outside of the said province the greater part of the time between 1885 no notice was given by Omole regarding the sale
and 1882, respectively. Prior to her death, Calixta, executed, on August 17, and 1905, when she left these Islands for Spain, it is not at all strange
1876, a nuncupative will in Vigan, whereby she made her four children, that delays and difficulties should have attended the efforts made


RULING: parents name and they had been living in the said house and lot since original co-owners of Lot No. 2587. Respondent claims that all petitioners
birth. The only reason why the said house and lot was transferred in have occupied portions of the subject property by virtue of his own
The Court ruled that Art. 1623 of the Civil Code clearly and expressly Dominador’s name was when their parents were in need of money for liberality.
prescribes that the thirty (30) days for making the pre-emption or renovating their house, their parents were not qualified to obtain a loan
redemption are to be counted from notice in writing by the and since Dominador was the only one who had a college education, they Respondent developed portions of Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 occupied by
vendor. In the case at bar, the plaintiffs have not been furnished executed a simulated deed of sale in favor of Dominador. him into a resort known as the Borromeo Beach Resort. In his desire to
any written notice of sale or a copy thereof by Eufemia Omole, the expand and extend the facilities of the resort that he established on the
vendor. Said plaintiffs' right to exercise the legal right of preemption or The MTC dismissed the complaint holding that Arnelito’s filiation and the subject properties, respondent demanded that petitioners vacate the
redemption, given to a co-owner when any one of the other co-owners settlement of the estate are conditions precedent for the accrual of the property. Petitioners, however, refused to vacate their homes.
sells his share in the thing owned in common to a third person, as suit. And since Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana, her legal
provided for in Article 1623 of the Civil Code, has not yet accrued. heirs are entitled to their share in the lot. The RTC ordered Narcisa and On 16 February 1994, respondent filed a Complaint5 for ejectment with
Emeterio to turn over the possession of the lot to Arnelito. It also granted the MTC against the petitioners.
But, even assuming ex gratia argurmenti, that the notice from the Register the motion of execution which was opposed by the nephew and nieces of
of Deeds of Negros Oriental to co-plaintiff Flavia Salatandol of the Graciana who claim that they have a share in the lot.
document transferring the one-third (1/3) share of Eufemia Omole to
defendant, was equivalent to notice from the vendor, still, it appears that, The CA reinstated the decision of the MTC holding that Arnelito and the
Found that Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 were owned in common by
while the disputed one-third (1/3) portion of Eufemia Omole and the one- heirs of Graciana are co-heirs thus he cannot eject them from the property
respondent with other persons. It ruled that respondent did not have a
third (1/3) share of the plaintiffs, (there is no mention of the other third via unlawful detainer. Thus the case at bar.
preferential right of possession over the portions occupied by petitioners,
portion) are embraced in one certificate of title, there had been an
since Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 were not yet partitioned nor the disputed
actual partition of the land described in the certificate of title and ISSUE: portions assigned to respondent as his determinate share. Thus, the MTC
each co-owner is in possession of his respective share. This is
held that respondent had no right to evict petitioners therefrom.
deduced from the order of the trial court, dated 30 July 1966, where the
Whether or not Arnelito can validly maintain the ejectment suit Consequently, respondent’s Complaint was dismissed.
court restrained the parties from harvesting the nuts on the "and in
question," referring to the one-third (1/3) share of Eufemia Omole.
HELD: Notably, the MTC held that respondent and the spouses Bascon were the
owners in common of Lot No. 2587 and their respective shares had not yet
As expressed in Article 484 of the Civil Code, a co-ownership exists
NO. The theory of succession invoked by Arnelito would prove that been determined by partition as proven by a testimony given by
whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different
he is not the sole heir of Dominador. Since he was survived was his respondent.
persons. Under such concept, a co-owner cannot point to a
particular portion of the property owned in common as his own, wife, upon his death, Arnelito and Graciana became co-owners of the lot.
because his portion thereof is intangible rather than identifiable. Upon her death, her share passed on to her relatives by consanguinity RTC:
Here, the portion of Eufemia Omole as well as those of the thus making them co-owners as well.
plaintiffs had been identified and localized, so that co-ownership, The RTC reversed the Decision of the MTC.
in its real sense, no longer exists. Petitioner contends that Art. 487 allows him to file the instant petition.
(Art. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.) It It held that Article 487 of the Civil Code, which allows any one of the co-
Hence, the right of redemption or pre-emption under Article 1620 is true that a co-owner may bring such an action w/o necessity of owners to bring an action in ejectment, may successfully be invoked by
of the Civil Code can no longer be invoked by the plaintiffs over joining all the co-owners as plaintiffs because it is presumed to be the respondent because, in a sense, a co-owner is the owner and
the portion appertaining to Eufemia Omole. instituted for the benefit of all BUT if the action is for the benefit possessor of the whole, and that the suit for ejectment is deemed to be
of the plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed. instituted for the benefit of all co-owners. The RTC also ruled that
assuming petitioners were authorized to occupy a portion of the co-owned
Since petitioner brought the suit in his name and for his benefit property, they could resume this occupation when the properties shall
alone and his repudiation of the ownership of the other heirs, the have been partitioned and allocated to the ones who gave them
instant petition should be dismissed. permission to reside therein.

RIGHT OF ANY CO-OWNER (TO CA: Affirmed the ruling of the RTC
FACTS: Whether or not the respondents have the right to evict the petitioners
ADLAWAN vs. ADLAWAN from the property therefrom
Private respondent, the late Juanito Borromeo, Sr., is the co-owner and
FACTS: overseer of certain parcels of land located in Pooc, Talisay, Cebu, RULING:
designated as Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 of the Talisay-Manglanilla Estate.
A house and lot (lot 7226) was registered in the name of Dominador Respondent owns six-eighths (6/8) of Lot No. 2587 while the late spouses it is unmistakable that respondent has a right to eject the petitioners from
Adlawan, the father of (petitioner) Arnelito Adlawan. He is the Inocencio Bascon and Basilisa Maneja own two-eights (2/8) thereof. On the Lot No. 2587.
acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador who is claiming that he is other hand, Lot No. 2592 is owned in common by respondent and the heirs
the sole heir. He then adjudicated to himself the said house and lot to of one Nicolas Maneja. However, the proportion of their undivided shares Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides simply that "[a]ny one of the
himself and out of generosity allowed the siblings of his father to occupy was not determined a quo. co-owners may bring an action in ejectment," is a categorical and an
the property provided that they vacate when asked. Time came when he unqualified authority in favor of respondent to evict petitioners from the
demanded that they vacate and when they refused he filed an ejectment Prior to the institution of the present action, petitioners Tining Resuena, portions of Lot. No. 2587.
suit against them. Alejandra Garay, Lorna Resuena, Eleuterio Resuena, and Unisima Resuena
resided in the upper portion of Lot No. 2587, allegedly under the This provision is a departure from Palarca v. Baguisi, which held that an
His aunt and uncle on the other hand, Narcisa (70) and Emeterio (59) acquiescence of the Spouses Bascon and their heir, Andres Bascon. On the action for ejectment must be brought by all the co-owners. Thus, a co-
denied his allegations claiming that the said lot was registered in their other hand, petitioner Eutiquia Rosario occupied a portion of Lot No. 2592, owner may bring an action to exercise and protect the rights of all. When
allegedly with the permission of the heirs of Nicolas Maneja, one of the


the action is brought by one co-owner for the benefit of all, a favorable On May 25, 1991, after remand of the case to the court of origin, private “Giving consent to a third person to construct a house on the co-
decision will benefit them; but an adverse decision cannot prejudice their respondent was placed in possession of the entire property covered by owned property will injure the interest of the co-ownership and
rights. TCT 34341. prevent other co-owners from using the property in accordance
with their rights.”
Respondent’s action for ejectment against petitioners is deemed Petitioners then filed with Respondent Court of Appeals a petition for
to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of the property annulment of the aforesaid judgment against private respondent and the “The construction of a house on the co-owned property is an act
since petitioners were not able to prove that they are authorized to occupy implementing sheriff. The case was docketed as CA GR SP No. 24846. On of dominion.”
the same. May 8, 1991, Respondent Court issued a resolution directing petitioners
"to implead as party defendant the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, FACTS:
Petitioners’ lack of authority to occupy the properties, coupled with Branch 50, Dagupan City."
respondent’s right under Article 487, clearly settles respondent’s Leonor, Luz and Norma are co-owners of a parcel of land. Norma allowed
prerogative to eject petitioners from Lot No. 2587. Time and again, this ISSUES: Teofila to build a house on a lot adjacent to their co-owned land. The
Court has ruled that persons who occupy the land of another at the house intruded on a portion of their property.
latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between Whether or not the final judgment be annulled on the ground of lack
them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will jurisdiction for not including petitioners who, as co-owners of the subject Leonor was surprised to see a part of Teofila's house intruding unto a
vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action property, are indispensable parties portion of the co-owned property. She then made several demands to
for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.
demolish the intruding structure and to vacate the portion encroaching
RULING: YES. their property.
Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as Leonor then filed a forcible entry against Teofila.
parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an
"[e]stoppel is effective only as between the parties thereto or their action. As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. Leonor's contention:
successors in interest;" thus, only the spouses Bascon or their successors The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action
in interest may invoke such "estoppel." A stranger to a transaction is requires, of course, the joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and
neither bound by, nor in a position to take advantage of, an estoppel She contends that the consent and knowledge of co-owner Norma
the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their
arising therefrom. Maligaya cannot defeat the action for forcible entry since it is a basic
presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is
principle in the law of co-ownership that no individual co-owner can claim
precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) the
title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until
action should be dismissed." The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want
ARCELONA, ET AL vs. COURT OF APPEALS of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as
to those present. Teofila's Contention:

FACTS: She counters that the complaint for forcible entry cannot prosper because
Petitioners are co-owners of a fishpond. Private respondent does not
deny this fact, and the Court of Appeals did not make any contrary finding. her entry into the property was not through strategy or stealth due to the
Petitioners Marcelino Arcelona, Tomasa Arcelona-Chiang and Ruth Arcelona The fishpond is undivided; it is impossible to pinpoint which specific consent of one of the co-owners. She further argues that since Norma
are natural-born Filipinos who are now naturalized Americans residing in portion of the property is owned by Olanday, et al. and which portion Maligaya is residing in the house she built, the issue is not just possession
California, U.S.A. Petitioner Ruth Arcelona is the surviving spouse and legal belongs to petitioners. Thus, it is not possible to show over which portion de facto but also one of possession de jure since it involves rights of co-
heir of the deceased Benedicto Arcelona, brother of Marcelino and Tomasa. the tenancy relation of private respondent has been established and ruled owners to enjoy the property.
Together with their three sisters — Pacita Arcelona-Olanday, Maria upon in Civil Case D-7240. Indeed, petitioners should have been
Arcelona-Arellano and Natividad Arcelona-Cruz (hereinafter collectively properly impleaded as indispensable parties. ISSUE:
referred to as Olanday, et al.) — petitioners are co-owners pro-indiviso of a
fishpond which they inherited from their deceased parents. The six
Formerly, Article 487 of the old Civil Code provided that "any one of the WON the consent given by one of co-owner of a parcel of land to a person
Arcelonas (two brothers and four sisters) are named as co-owners in
co-owners may bring an action in ejectment." It was subsequently to construct a house on the co-owned property warrants the dismissal of a
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34341 which evidences ownership over the
held that a co-owner could not maintain an action in ejectment forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against that person?
without joining all the other co-owners.
On March 4, 1978, a contract of lease over the fishpond was executed
between Cipriano Tandoc and Olanday, et al. The lease contract was for a Clearly, the decision in Civil Case D-7240 cannot bind petitioners and
period of three (3) years but was renewed up to February 2, 1984. cannot adjudicate the entire co-owned property, not even that portion A co-owner cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to
belonging to Olanday et al., ownership of the property being still pro- the prejudice of the coownership. A co-owner cannot give valid consent to
indiviso. Obviously, the failure to implead petitioners barred the another to build a house on the co-owned property, which is an act
Private Respondent Moises Farnacio was appointed in turn by Tandoc as lower court from making a final adjudication. Without the tantamount to devoting the property to his or her exclusive use.
caretaker-tenant of the same fishpond, effective on the date the contract presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, a
of lease was executed. After the termination of the lease contract, the judgment therein cannot attain finality.
lessee (Tandoc) surrendered possession of the leased premises to the Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in common
lessors, Olanday, et al. provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is
intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-
ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their
Three days thereafter, on February 7, 1984, Private Respondent Farnacio
rights. Giving consent to a third person to construct a house on the co-
instituted Civil Case D-7240 for "peaceful possession, maintenance of ALTERATION OF A PROPERTY UNDER CO- owned property will injure the interest of the co-ownership and prevent
security of tenure plus damages, with motion for the issuance of an
other co-owners from using the property in accordance with their rights.
interlocutory order" against Olanday, et al. The case was intended to OWNERSHIP
maintain private respondent as tenant of the fishpond. CRUZ vs. CATAPANG


Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the Leis’ half of the property to be divided among his legitimes. Co-ownership The claim of prescription is based first on the contention that under the
others, make alterations in the thing owned in common. It necessarily of the land then began. Rules of Court the deed of extrajudicial partition should have been
follows that none of the co-owners can, without the consent of the other impugned within two years from the date of its execution in 1941. As the
co-owners, validly consent to the making of an alteration by another However, upon failure of Isidro the heirs to exercise the right to challenge in the instant case was made only in 1956, when Civil Case No.
person, such as respondent, in the thing owned in common. Alterations repurchase, the ownership of the land transferred to Cruz. Despite the TCT 3941 was filed, that first case, and more so the case at bar which was
include any act of strict dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or being void for non-compliance with 1607, the ownership did not transfer commenced in 1968, should be and were properly dismissed for tardiness
disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of alteration. The back to the heirs, for compliance with 1607 is merely for purposes of under Rule 74, Section 4, of the Rules of Court.
construction of a house on the co-owned property is an act of dominion. registering the title in the Torrens System.
Therefore, it is an alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code. It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in
There being no consent from all co-owners, respondent had no right to question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned.
construct her house on the co-owned property. The rule covers only valid partitions.

Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the SEGURA vs. SEGURA
The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the
complaint for forcible entry filed against the builder. The consent given by nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property.
Norma Maligaya in the absence of the consent of petitioner and Luz Cruz No extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon those who did not Under the rule, "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any
did not vest upon respondent any right to enter into the co-owned participate in it. person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the
property. Her entry into the property still falls under the classification partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was
"through strategy or stealth". FACTS: not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the
partition had prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941.
Entry into the land effected clandestinely without the knowledge of the FACTS:
other co-owners could be categorized as possession by stealth. Moreover,
respondent's act of getting only the consent of one co-owner, her sister This involves a parcel of land owned by Gertrudes Zamora. She died
Norma, and allowing the latter to stay in the constructed house, can in intestate and without debt and was suvived by her 4 children who never
fact be considered as a strategy which she utilized in order to enter into RAUL ARAMBULO vs. GENARO NOLASCO
decided to divide the property among themselves. The conflict arises
the co-owned property. As such, respondent's acts constitute forcible when Gertrudes' grandchildren filed a complaint for recovery of ownership
entry. A co-owner may dispose a portion of his share without the need of consent
and possession of the disputed inheritance.
from other co-owners.
CRUZ vs. LEIS (132 SCRA 97) On April 6, 1961, three of the nine grandchildren - Nicolas, Santiago and
Gaudencio Segura, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition arrogating
Redemption by a co-owner doesn't terminate the co-ownership nor give the entire property to themselves alone as equal pro indiviso owners. The
her title to the whole property subject of the co-ownership partition was not registered immediately, but only 5 years later, in 1946. Petitioners, together with their siblings and their mother co-owned a
233sq.m. Land in Tondo, Manila. When their mother died, she was
FACTS: succeeded by her husband, Genero Nolasco and their children.
Before such registration, the following developments transpired:

Leis and Isidro married each other in 1923. Isidro subsequently acquired On January 8, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for relief alleging that all
The land was sold to Amojido with right to repurchase. Such right was not
from the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources a parcel of co-owners, except for Nolasco, have authorized to sell their respective
exercised. In November 28, 1946, Amojido executed an affidavit of
land, which was titled in her name, with the description that she was a shares to the properties, saying that in the Civil Code, if one or more co-
consolidation of ownership and obtained a TCT with a reservation of the
“widow”. Leis only passed away in 1973 without executing a will. owners shall withhold their consent to the alterations in the thing owned in
rights of the other heirs annotated therein. Amojito sold the land to Mirope
common, the courts may afford adequate relief.
Mascarenas vda. de Eliso who obtained the TCT in her name, which did not
Isidro then secured a loan from Cruz (PhP 15,000, with 5% interest) retain the annotation. In turn, Elison sold the land to Mildred Elison vda. de
secured by a mortgage on the land from DANR, but failed to pay on due Javelosa. Mildred sold the land to Ernesto and Igmedio Amojido. Nolasco responded that they did not know about the intention to sell,
date. Isidro executed 2 contracts in favor of Cruz: a Deed of Absolute Sale because they were not called to participate in the negotiations regarding
and a Contract indicating a pacto de retro sale. Isidro still failed to the sale of the property.
On January 16, 1958, the Civil Case was dismissed on motion of the
repurchase the property within 1 year, so she consolidated the ownership plaintiff's counsel.
of the land in favor of Cruz. RTC: ruled in favor with petitioners and ordered Nolasco to give their
consent to sale.
The complaint in the case at bar involves the six excluded children. They
When Isidro died, Cruz demanded her heirs to vacate the premises. The alleged that the partition and all subsequent transfers of the subject land
heirs then filed a complaint with the RTC averring that the land was were null and void insofar as these transactions deprived them of their Nolasco filed a notice of appeal to the CA.
conjugal property having been purchased during their marriage. The RTC shares as co-owners of the said property.
found in favor of the heirs. The case was appealed to the CA, but the CA CA: reversed the RTc decision, saying that the petitioners cannot compel
merely affirmed the ruling because Cruz failed to get a judicial order to The defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the action was barred Nolasco to give their consent.
have the land consolidated in his name after failure of Isidro to comply by prior judgment and that in any even whatever rights might have
with the requirements of the right to repurchase (Art. 1607). pertained to the plaintiffs had already been prescribed under the Rules of ISSUE:
Court and the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether the respondents are withholding their consent and whether this
ISSUE: withholding is prejudicial to the petitioners.
Whether or not the land in question is conjugal property, and therefore
subject to the rules on co-ownership? Whether or not the plaintiffs are barred by prescription from questioning RULING:
the alleged extrajudicial partition
HELD: From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co–owner is entitled to
RULING: sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co–owner
Although the land was purchased during the marriage, upon Leis’ death, without the consent of the other co–owners is not null and void. However,
the conjugal property regime ceased, and gave Isidro an equal portion of


only the rights of the co–owner–seller are transferred, thereby making the alive when she died, they are co-owners of the estate. When Pascual died, November 1999 or a year later, a Notice to Vacate was served by the
buyer a co–owner of the property. his children succeeded him in the co-ownership of the property. sheriff upon petitioner who however refused to heed the Notice.

To be a co–owner of a property does not mean that one is deprived of When Donato sold to his daughter the lot, he was only a co-owner of the On 28 April 1999 private respondent started demolishing petitioner’s
every recognition of the disposal of the thing, of the free use of his right same thus he can only sell his undivided portion of the property. Art. 493 house without any special permit of demolition from the court.
within the circumstantial conditions of such judicial status, nor is it states that “each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of
necessary, for the use and enjoyment, or the right of free disposal, that the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, Due to the demolition of her house which continued until 24 May 1999
the previous consent of all the interested parties be obtained. assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person in its petitioner was forced to inhabit the portion of the premises that used to
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the serve as the house’s toilet and laundry area.
alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to
the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from Judgment
termination of the co-ownership.”
with the RTC on the ground that she was not bound by the inaction of her
counsel who failed to submit petitioner’s appeal memorandum.
Only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred making the buyer
EXTENT OF CO-OWNER’S RIGHT (Juliana) a co-owner.
RTC decision: denied the Petition and the subsequent Motion for
(2) NO
When a co-owner sells the entire property without consent from the other
CA (Petition for Certiorari): dismissed the petition for lack of merit
co-owners, only his pro indiviso share on the property is transferred to the When she redeemed the property, it did not end the co-ownership. The
buyer. right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner w/ respect to his/her
share alone as stated in Art. 1612. But she may compel them to reimburse
FACTS: her for half of the repurchase price for a co-owner has the right to compel
other co-owners to contribute to the expenses for the preservation of the Whether or not the portion of the petitioner should be included in the sale,
thing and to taxes. notwithstanding the fact that she did not affix her signature in the alleged
The dispute covers 2 lots, Lot 757 and Lot 1091, which were owned by
deed of sale
Agatona Paulmitan. She had 2 children, Pascual and Donato. Pascual’s (7)
children (Alicio, Elena, Abelino, Adelina, Anita, Baking, Anito) are the
respondents and Donato and his daughter and son-in-law are petitioners. RULING:


Donato executed an Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship, adjudicating to Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in
himself Lot 757 claiming that he is the sole surviving heir thus the OCT of the property the right to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided
A co-owner’s share of the property shall not be included if she did not interest. He may validly lease his undivided interest to a third party
Agatona was cancelled and a TCT was issued in his name. He executed a
consent to the sale independently of the other co-owners. But he has no right to sell or
deed of sale of Lot 1091 in favor of his daughter, Juliana. For non-payment
of taxes, the lot was forfeited and sole at a public to the Provincial Gov’t of alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in
Negros Occidental, however, Juliana was able to redeem the property. FACTS: common because his right over the thing is represented by a quota or
Upon learning these, the children of Pascual filed w/ the CFI a complaint ideal portion without any physical adjudication.
against petitioners to partition the land plus damages. Petitioners’ defense Lilia Sanchez, constructed a house on a 76-square meter lot owned by her
was that the action has already prescribed for it was filed more than 11 parents-in-law. The lot was registered under TCT No. 263624 with the Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes
years after the issuance of the TCT and that Juliana has acquired exclusive following co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, Marilyn and bounds of petitioner’s lot has not been designated. As she was not a
ownership thru the Deed of Sale and by redeeming the said property. Sanchez married to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez, widow, Nenita party to the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the other
Sanchez, single, Susana Sanchez married to Fernando Ramos, and Felipe co-owners, her right to 1/6 of the property must be respected. Partition
The CFI dismissed the complaint and became final and executory. With Sanchez. needs to be effected to protect her right to her definite share and
respect to Lot 1091, the court decided in favor of respondents. They are determine the boundaries of her property. Such partition must be done
entitled to ½ of Lot 1091, pro indiviso. The redemption did not in anyway On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered under TCT No. 289216 in the without prejudice to the rights of private respondent Virginia Teria as
prejudice their rights. The land was ordered to be partitioned and the name of private respondent Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed of Absolute buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.
petitioners were ordered to pay the respondents their share of the fruits Sale supposed to have been executed on 23 June 1995 by all six (6) co-
and the respondents to pay their share in the redemption of the land. The owners in her favor.
CA affirmed the decision thus the case at bar.
Lilia Sanchez claimed that she did not affix her signature on the document SALE OR MORTGAGE OF COMMON
ISSUE: and subsequently refused to vacate the lot, thus prompting Virginia Teria
to file an action for recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot with the PROPERTY
(1) Whether or not Pascual’s children and Donato and Juliana were MeTC. AURORA DEL BANCO, ET AL vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
co-owners of their mother’s lot and ALEJANDRA PANSACOLA, ET AL
(2) Whether or not Juliana acquired full ownership by redeeming the MeTC decision: in favor of Teria, declaring that the sale was valid only to
property the extent of 5/6 of the lot and the other 1/6 remaining as the property of FACTS:
petitioner, on account of her signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale having
HELD: been established as a forgery.
Pansacola Brothers (Benedicto, Jose and Fr. Manuel) entered into an
agreement which provided the following terms:
(1) YES RTC decision: affirmed the RTC, because they failed to submit their
- They will purchase from the Spanish Government the lands
When Agatona died, her estate was still unpartitioned. Art. 1078 states comprising the Island of Cagbalite which has an area of 1,600
that “Where there are 2 or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a writ hectares.
before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the of execution in favor of private Virginia Teria, buyer of the property. On 4 - The land shall be considered as their COMMON PROPERTY
payment of debts of the deceased”. Since Pascual and Donato were still


- The co-ownership includes Domingo Arce and Baldomera dominion, but he is at the same time the sole owner of a portion, in the After the execution of the Deed of Sale, Spouses Pamplona constructed
Angulo, minors at that time represented by their father, Fr. instant case, a 1/4 portion (for each group of co-owners) of the Island their house on the Eastern part of Lot No. 1496, as Flaviano pointed to it
Manuel who will contribute for them in the proposed purchase of which is truly abstract, because until physical division is effected as the land which he sold to Geminiano. Shortly thereafter, Rafael (Son of
the Cagbalite Island such portion is merely an Ideal share, not concretely determined. Spouses Pamplona), also built his house within lot 1496 about 1 meter
- Whatever benefits may be derived from the island shall be from its boundary with the adjoining lot.
shared equally by the co-owners in the following proportion: In the agreement of January 20, 1907, the heirs that were represented
a. Benedicto – ¼ share agreed on how the Island was to be partitioned. The agreement of April Flaviano Moreto and vendee Geminiano Pamplona thought all the time
b. Jose – ¼ share 18, 1908 which supplements that of January 20, 1907 reveals that as of that the portion of 781 square meters which was the subject matter of
c. Domingo and Baldomera – 2/4 share (which shall be placed the signing of the 1908 agreement no actual partition of the Island had as their sale transaction was No. 1495 and so lot No. 1495 appears to be the
under the care of their father, Fr. Manuel) yet been done. subject matter in the deed of sale although the fact is that the said portion
sold thought of by the parties to be lot No. 1495 is a part of lot No. 1496.
The co-owners entered into the actual possession and enjoyment of the Definitely, there was no physical partition of the Island in 1859. Neither
island. 2 years later, they agreed to modify the terms and conditions of could there have been one in 1894 because the manner of subdividing the Flaviano died and 5 years after, the plaintiffs demanded the defendants to
the agreement entered into. The new agreement provided for a new Island was only provided for in the later agreements entered into by the vacate the premises where they had their house and piggery on the
sharing and distribution of the lands and whatever benefits may be heirs in 1907 and 1908. There was a distribution of the Island in 1868 as ground that Flaviano had no right to sell the lot which he sold to
derived therefrom: agreed upon by the original co-owners in their agreement of April 11, Geminiano as it belonged to the conjugal partnership of Flaviano and wife
1868. Any agreement entered into by the parties in 1894 could be no Monica, and the latter was already dead when the sale was executed
- The first ¼ portion shall belong to Benedicto more than another agreement as to the distribution of the Island among without the consent of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Monica.
- The second ¼ shall belong to Jose the heirs of the original co-owners and the preparation of a tentative plan
- The third ¼ shall belong to the children of their deceased by a practical surveyor, a Mr. Jose Garcia, mentioned in the first paragraph Spouses Pamplona refused to vacate the premises occupied by them;
brother, Eustaquio Pansacola, namely: Mariano, Maria and of the 1907 agreement, preparatory to the preparation of the real plan to hence, a case was instituted by the heirs of Monica seeking for the
Hipolita be prepared by the surveyor Amadeo, mentioned in the agreement of April declaration of the nullity of the deed of sale as regards to the ½ of the
- The fourth and last ¼ shall belong to their nephews and nieces – 18, 1908. property.
Domingo, Baldomera, Marcelina, Francisca, Candelaria,
Gervasia, who being all minors, are still under the care of their A co-owner cannot, without the conformity of the other co-owners or a The defendants claimed that the sale made in their favor is valid as the lot
brother, Fr. Manuel. The latter is the real father of said minors judicial decree of partition issued pursuant to the provision of Rule 69 of sold is registered in the name of Flaviano Moreto and they are purchasers
the Rules of Court, adjudicate to himself in fee simple a determinate believing in good faith that the vendor was the sole owner of the lot sold.
In 1907, the representative of the heirs of all the original owners of portion of the lot owned in common, as his share therein, to the exclusion
Cagbalite Island intered into an agreement to partition the island, of other co-owners. It is a basic principle in the law of co-ownership both
After a relocation of lots 1495, 1496 and 4545 made by agreement of the
supplemented by another agreement dated 1908. under the present Civil Code as in the Code of 1889 that no individual co-
parties, it was found out that there was mutual error between Flaviano
owner can claim any definite portion thereof. lt is therefore of no moment
Moreto and the defendants in the execution of the deed of sale because
100 years later, in 1968, private respondents (Alejandra Pansacola, et al) that some of the co-owners have succeeded in securing cadastral titles in
while the said deed recited that the lot sold is lot No. 1495, the real
brought a special action for partition, including as parties the heirs and their names to some portions of the Island occupied by them.
intention of the parties is that it was a portion consisting of 781 square
successors-in-interest of the co-owners of the Cagbalite Island in the 2 nd meters of lot No. 1496 which was the subject matter of their sale
contract of co-ownership. In their answer, the petitioners herein (Del It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. They transaction.
Banco, et al) interposed such defenses as prescription, res judicata, must have a subdivision plan drawn in accordance with which they take
exclusive ownership, estoppel and laches. actual and exclusive possession of their respective portions in the plan
and titles issued to each of them accordingly (Caro vs. Court of Appeals,
ISSUE: 113 SCRA 10 [1982]). The mechanics of actual partition should follow the
procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. Whether the petitioners are entitled to the full ownership of the property in
litigation, or only one-half of the same
Whether or not Cagbalite Island is still undivided property owned in
common by the heirs and successors-in-interest of the brothers, CORNELIA PAMPLONA vs. VIVENCIO MORETO, ET AL
Benedicto, Jose and Fr. Manuel
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife. During their
YES. marriage, they acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545 and 1496 of the The records show that the conjugal estate had not been inventoried,
Calamba Friar Land Estate, covered by certificates of title issued in the liquidated, settled and divided by the heirs thereto in accordance with law.
There is nothing in all four agreements that suggests that actual or name of “Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega”. The necessary proceedings for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
physical partition of the Island had really been made by either the original were not instituted by the heirs either in the testate or intestate
owners or their heirs or successors-in-interest. The agreement entered into They had 6 children – Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, and Leandro, all proceedings of the deceased spouse pursuant to Act 3176 amending
in 1859 simply provides for the sharing of whatever benefits can be surnamed Moreto. Section 685 of Act 190. Neither was there an extra-judicial partition
derived from the island. between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse nor
More than 6 years after the death of his wife, Monica, Flaviano Moreto, was an ordinary action for partition brought for the purpose. Accordingly,
The agreement, in fact, states that the Island to be purchased shall be without the consent of the heirs of his deceased wife, and before any the estate became the property of a community between the surviving
considered as their common property. liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Monica and Flaviano could be husband, Flaviano Moreto, and his children with the deceased Monica
effected, executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona, the Deed of Absolute Maniega in the concept of a co-ownership.
In the second agreement entered in 1868 the co-owners agreed not only Sale covering Lot No. 1495 for P900.00, covered by a TCT in the name of
on the sharing proportion of the benefits derived from the Island but also “Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega” although the lot was The community property of the marriage, at the dissolution of this bond by
on the distribution of the Island each of the brothers was allocated. acquired during their marriage. the death of one of the spouses, ceases to belong to the legal partnership
and becomes the property of a community, by operation of law, between
With the distribution agreed upon each of the co-owner is a co-owner of As a result of the sale, a new TCT was issued in the name of “Geminiano the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse, or the
the whole, and in this sense, over the whole he exercises the right of Pamplona, married to Apolonia Onte”. exclusive property of the widower or the widow, it he or she be the heir of


the deceased spouse. Every co-owner shall have full ownership of his part SPOUSES DEL CAMPO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF JOSE ownership. As a matter of fact, the deed of sale executed between the
and in the fruits and benefits derived therefrom, and there is no dispute REGALADO, SR. parties expressly stipulated that the portion of Lot 162 sold to Soledad
that the houses of the spouses Cornelio Pamplona and Apolonia Onte as would be taken from Salome’s 4/16 undivided interest in said lot, which
well as that of their son Rafael Pamplona, including the concrete piggery FACTS: the latter could validly transfer in whole or in part even without the
coral adjacent thereto, stood on the land from 1952 up to the filing of the consent of the other co-owners. Salome’s right to sell part of her
complaint by the private respondents on July 25, 1961, or a period of over undivided interest in the co-owned property is absolute in accordance with
The Bornales were the original co-owners of Lot 162. The lot was divided
nine (9) years. the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-
in aliquot shares among the 8 co-owners as follows:
indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
And during said period, the private respondents who are the heirs of substitute another person in its enjoyment. Since Salome’s clear intention
1. Salome – 4/16 was to sell merely part of her aliquot share in Lot 162, in our view no valid
Monica Maniega as well as of Flaviano Moreto who also died intestate on
2. Consorcia – 4/16 objection can be made against it and the sale can be given effect to the
August 12, 1956, lived as neighbors to the petitioner-vendees, yet lifted no
3. Alfredo -2/16 full extent.
finger to question the occupation, possession and ownership of the land
4. Maria – 2/16
purchased by the Pamplonas, so that We are persuaded and convinced to
5. Jose – 1/16
rule that private respondents are in estoppel by laches to claim half of the We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully
6. Quirico – 1/16
property, in dispute as null and void. Estoppel by laches is a rule of equity dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition
7. Rosalia – 1/16
which bars a claimant from presenting his claim when, by reason of among all the co-owners. However, this should not signify that the vendee
8. Julita – 1/16
abandonment and negligence, he allowed a long time to elapse without does not acquire anything at all in case a physically segregated area of
presenting the same. the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the co-owner/vendor’s
Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 for P200.00 to Soledad undivided interest could properly be the object of the contract of sale
Daynolo. Thereafter, Soledad immediately took possession of the land and between the parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are
We have ruled that at the time of the sale in 1952, the conjugal
built a house thereon. the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal share
partnership was already dissolved six years before and therefore, the
estate became a co-ownership between Flaviano Moreto, the surviving equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction. In other
husband, and the heirs of his deceased wife, Monica Maniega. A few years later, Soledad and husband, Simplicio, mortgaged the subject words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner and
portion of Lot 162 as security for a P4000 debt to Jose Regalado Sr. This acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in common.
was evidenced by a Deed of Mortgage.
We agree with the petitioner that there was a partial partition of the co-
ownership when at the time of the sale Flaviano Moreto pointed out the Resultantly, Soledad became a co-owner of Lot 162 as of the year 1940
area and location of the 781 sq. meters sold by him to the petitioners- Three of the eight co-owners of Lot 162 (Salome, Consorcia, and Alfredo) when the sale was made in her favor. It follows that Salome, Consorcia and
vendees on which the latter built their house and also that whereon sold portions of the said lot to Jose Regalado, Sr. Alfredo could not have sold the entire Lot 162 to Jose Regalado, Sr. on April
Rafael, the son of petitioners likewise erected his house and an adjacent 14, 1948 because at that time, the ideal shares held by the three co-
coral for piggery. Simplicio, heir of Soledad, paid the mortgage debt and redeemed the owners/vendors were equivalent to only 10/16 of the undivided property
mortgaged portion of Lot 162 from Jose Regalado, Sr, who in turn executed less the aliquot share previously sold by Salome to Soledad. Based on the
a Deed of Discharge of Mortgage in favor of Soledad’s heirs. On the same principle that "no one can give what he does not have," Salome, Consorcia
And since Flaviano Moreto was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of the
date, the said heirs sold the redeemed portion of Lot 162 for P1,500 to and Alfredo could not legally sell the shares pertaining to Soledad since a
entire land area or 1,173 sq. meters as his share, he had a perfect legal
herein petitioners (Spouses Del Campo). co-owner cannot alienate more than his share in the co-ownership. We
and lawful right to dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share to the Pamplona
have ruled many times that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as
spouses. Indeed, there was still a remainder of some 392 sq. meters
Meanwhile, Jose Regalado caused the reconstitution of OCT No. 18047. his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-
belonging to him at the time of the sale. therefore may alienate, assign or
The Reconstituted OCT initially reflected the shares of the original co- owners who did not consent to the sale. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, unless
owners in Lot 162. However, the title was transferred later to Jose his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner will only
personal rights are in question.
Regalado Sr. who subdivided the entire property into smaller lots, each transfer the rights of said co-owner to the buyer, thereby making the
covered by a respective title in his name. buyer a co-owner of the property.
The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-owner
as vendor pointed out its location and even indicated the In this case, Regalado merely became a new co-owner of Lot 162 to the
boundaries over which the fences were to be erected without In 1987, petitioners Manuel and Salvacion del Campo brought this
complaint for "repartition, resurvey and reconveyance" against the heirs of extent of the shares which Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could validly
objection, protest or complaint by the other co-owners, on the convey. Soledad retained her rights as co-owner and could validly transfer
the now deceased Jose Regalado, Sr. Petitioners claimed that they owned
contrary they acquiesced and tolerated such alienation, an area of 1,544 square meters located within Lot 162-C-6 which was her share to petitioners in 1951. The logical effect on the second
occupation and possession, We rule that a factual partition or erroneously included in TCT No. 14566 in the name of Regalado. disposition is to substitute petitioners in the rights of Soledad as co-owner
termination of the co-ownership, although partial, was created, and barred Petitioners alleged that they occupied the disputed area as residential of the land. Needless to say, these rights are preserved notwithstanding
dwelling ever since they purchased the property from the Distajos way the issuance of TCT No. 14566 in Regalado’s name in 1977.
not only the vendor, Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the private
respondents herein from asserting as against the vendees-petitioners any back in 1951. They also declared the land for taxation purposes and paid
right or title in derogation of the deed of sale executed by said vendor the corresponding taxes. FELIPE SEGURA, ET AL vs. NICOLAS SEGURA, ET AL
Flaiano Moreto.

Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private Whether or not the sale made by Salome in favor of Soledad be valid, This involves a parcel of land owned by Gertrudes Zamora. She died
respondents received from their deceased parents and/or predecessors-in- notwithstanding that it is a physical portion of the undivided co-owned intestate and without debt and was suvived by her 4 children who never
interest included all the property rights and obligations which were not property decided to divide the property among themselves. The conflict arises
extinguished by their parents' death. And under Art. 1311, paragraph 1, when Gertrudes' grandchildren filed a complaint for recovery of ownership
New Civil Code, the contract of sale executed by the deceased Flaviano RULING: and possession of the disputed inheritance.
Moreto took effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs, who are
the private respondents herein. Accordingly, to the private respondents is On April 6, 1961, three of the nine grandchildren - Nicolas, Santiago and
transmitted the obligation to deliver in full ownership the whole area of Gaudencio Segura, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition arrogating
781 sq. meters to the petitioners (which was the original obligation of their the entire property to themselves alone as equal pro indiviso owners. The
predecessor Flaviano Moreto) and not only one-half thereof. Private There can be no doubt that the transaction entered into by Salome and
Soledad could be legally recognized in its entirety since the object of the partition was not registered immediately, but only 5 years later, in 1946.
respondents must comply with said obligation.
sale did not even exceed the ideal shares held by the former in the co-


Before such registration, the following developments transpired: executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo as vendee to the
exclusion of his wife.
Effects of Redemption of Co-Owned
The land was sold to Amojido with right to repurchase. Such right was not Property By One Co-owner
exercised. In November 28, 1946, Amojido executed an affidavit of Marcelino executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Lilibeth Abille vs CA
consolidation of ownership and obtained a TCT with a reservation of the Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner
rights of the other heirs annotated therein. Amojito sold the land to Mirope (Homeowners Bank) to be secured by Spouses Dalio’s house and lot in San
Mascarenas vda. de Eliso who obtained the TCT in her name, which did not Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount Facts:
retain the annotation. In turn, Elison sold the land to Mildred Elison vda. de of P300,000.00. As security, Gesmundo executed a Real Estate Mortgage
Javelosa. Mildred sold the land to Ernesto and Igmedio Amojido. constituted on the subject property in favor of the bank. The transactions - the land in question is Lot 14694 of Cadastral Survey of Albay
entered into by Gesmundo took place without the knowledge and consent originally belonged to Felisa Alzul as her own private property
On January 16, 1958, the Civil Case was dismissed on motion of the of respondent (Miguela).
plaintiff's counsel. - she married twice (she had an only child Rustico Adille herein
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner defendant and her children to the 2nd marriage were the plaintiffs)
The complaint in the case at bar involves the six excluded children. They (Homeowners Bank) instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the
alleged that the partition and all subsequent transfers of the subject land mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale, a Certificate of Sale was - Felisa sold the property with a right to repurchase for a period of 3
were null and void insofar as these transactions deprived them of their issued in favor of petitioner (HB) as the highest bidder. years (she died on 1942 without being able to redeem)
shares as co-owners of the said property.
After the lapse of 1 year without the property being redeemed, petitioner, - during the period of redemption Abille repurchased by himself alone
The defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the action was barred through its Vice-President, consolidated the ownership by executing an and executed a deed of extrajudicial partition representing himself to
by prior judgment and that in any even whatever rights might have Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale. be the only heir and child of his mother Felisa
pertained to the plaintiffs had already been prescribed under the Rules of
Court and the Civil Code. In the meantime, Marcelino died. In one of her visits to the property, - after some efforts of compromise had failed, his half-siblings filed the
Miguela learned that HB had already employed a certain Roldan Brion to case for partition with accounting on the position that he was only a
ISSUE: clean its premises and that her car, a Ford Sedan, was razed because trustee on an implied trust when he redeemed
Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.
Whether or not the plaintiffs are barred by prescription from questioning - trial court rendered decision in favor of Abille sustaining the position
the alleged extrajudicial partition Miguela instituted a case for nullity of real estate mortgage and certificate that the defendant was and became the absolute owner
of sale, affidavit of consolidation of ownership, deed of sale, reconveyance
with prayer for preliminary injunction and damages against petitioner HB,
RULING: - CA reversed the decision of the trial court
claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the
subject property.
The claim of prescription is based first on the contention that under the Issue: WON a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the property held
Rules of Court the deed of extrajudicial partition should have been in common
In its Answer, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the
impugned within two years from the date of its execution in 1941. As the
ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late
challenge in the instant case was made only in 1956, when Civil Case No.
Marcelino. Held:
3941 was filed, that first case, and more so the case at bar which was
commenced in 1968, should be and were properly dismissed for tardiness
under Rule 74, Section 4, of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: - no, the right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with
respect to his share alone, though the records show that petitioner
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in Whether or not the property is an exclusive property of Marcelino; hence, redeemed the property in its entirety, it did not make him the owner of
question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. the sale made in favor of HB was valid all of it. It did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership (refer
The rule covers only valid partitions. to Art 488)
RULING: - the other co-owners are liable to reimburse him for their shares in
The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the redemption expenses since he cannot claim exclusive right to the
nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. IT IS A CONJUGAL PROPERTY; THE SALE IS VOID. property owned in common
Under the rule, "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any - there was fraud committed in registration of the property
person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the sale of a conjugal - prescription cannot be applied in the case for prescription as a mode
partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was property requires the consent of both the husband and wife. In applying of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by
not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the repudiation of the co-ownership
partition had prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941. consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion - in the instant case petitioner failed to comply with the requisites of
of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the repudiation
sale. Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August - petition is denied
8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property
relations between respondent and her late husband.

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the TAN vs CA
knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real
FACTS: estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their “Consolidation of ownership by mortgagee after expiration of
conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family redemption period terminates co-ownership. A co-owner who
Respondents Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married. During Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other redeems a property with her own funds after such consolidation
their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot situated in San spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be becomes the sole owner thereof.”
Pablo City from Sandra Dalida. The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was void.


FACTS: - SC found the trial courts decision on the ground of prescription under - they initially agreed that Virgilio’s share was 2/3 while Senen was 1/3
Tan Tiong Tick, married to Tan Ong Hun was the registered owner of a Sec 40 of PA No 190 to be inaccurate but by virtue of a written memorandum in 1970 they agreed that their
parcel of land and its improvements in Binondo Manila. They had six - since under Art. 494 no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner interests in the house and lot should be equal
children George Laurel, Teodora, Rosa, Rosita, Mauro Umali, and D. Annie against his co-owners so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes - after the death of their father petitioner demand respondent to vacate
Tan. the co-ownership the house and that the property be sold and proceeds thereof shall be
The land was mortgaged to China Bank to secure payment for several - there’s no repudiation of co-ownership. In view of their lack of a clear divided among them
obligations. Tan Tiong Tick and Tan Ong Hun died without paying their repudiation of the co-ownership, duly communicated to the petitioners
obligations. (the other co-owners), private respondents cannot acquire the shares
of the petitioners by prescription. - because of the refusal of Senen, Virgilio filed an action to compel the
China Bank foreclosed on the mortgage. Two weeks before the redemption sale of the house and lot so they could divide the proceeds
- assailed order is set aside
period expired, China Bank and the Heirs of Tan Tiong Tick entered into a - On July 26, 1979 trial court found both to be co-owners of the house
settlement. It provided that the heirs were given right to repurchase even and lot in equal shares on the basis of their written agreement. But
after the redemption period but before August 3, 1973. ruled that plaintiff has been deprived of his participation in the
The heirs failed to redeem before the legal redemption period so China - Agatona Paulmitan died in 1952 left 2 parcels of land located in the property by defendant's continued enjoyment of the house and lot,
Bank consolidated its ownership and was issued a new TCT. However, D. Province of Negros Occidental free of rent, despite demands for rentals and continued maneuvers of
Annie Tan exercised the right to repurchase pursuant to the settlement - in 1963 the estate of Paulmitan remained unsettled and the titles to defendant to delay partition.
using her personal funds. But the title to the land was registered in the the 2 lots remained in the name of Agatona. - trial court ordered defendant to vacate the property for they could not
name of all the heirs. - in August 11, 1963, petitioner Donato executed an Affidavit of agree to the amount
D. Annie Tan filed an action to reconvey the property to her and damages. Declaration of heirship, extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot - CA set aside the order of the trial court of 26 April 1979 as well as the
RTC ruled that the property was co-owned by the heirs. CA affirmed. No. 757 based on the claim that he is the only surviving heir of assailed judgment rendered by default.
ISSUE: Agatona. TCT No. 35979 was issued in Donato’s name Issue: WON CA erred in not holding that the motion of defendant through
Whether or not co-ownership among the heirs was dissolved by the - As regards Lot No. 1091, Donato executed on May 28, 1974 a Deed of counsel to cancel the pre-trail was dilatory in character
foreclosure and consolidation of title by the bank after the redemption Sale over the same in favor of petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, his daughter
period has expired? - in 1952 Lot No. 1091 was forfeited for non-payment of taxes and was
WON CA erred in remanding the case to the trial court for pre-trial and trial
HELD: sold at a public auction with the Provincial Government of Negros
Occidental being the buyer
Yes. Since the lot and its improvement were mortgaged by the deceased
- in 1974, Fanesa redeemed the property Held:
parents, there can be no question that a co-ownership existed among the
heirs during the period given by law to redeem the foreclosed property. - the respondents filed before the CFI upon learning of the transactions
Redemption by one during this period would have inured to the benefit of - CFI dismissed the complaint upon finding merit in petitioners’ - first issue, the law is clear that the appearance of parties at the pre-
all. affirmative defense (Lot No. 757) trial is mandatory and a party who fails to appear may be considered
The records show, however, that when the petitioner purchased the - as regard to Lot 1091, CFI decided in favor of respondents ruled that as in default. In the case at bar, where private respondent and counsel
disputed property on August 30, 1974, any co-ownership among the as descendants of Agatona they are entitled to 1/2 of 1091 pro diviso failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial, the trial court has authority
brothers and sisters no longer existed. The period to redeem had expired to declare respondent in default.
- Fanesa did not vest exclusive ownership over the entire land but only
more than one year earlier, on July 6, 1973. The respondent China Bank gave her the right to be reimbursed for the amount paid to redeem the - the trial court is correct in denying the motion to postpone pre-trial for
consolidated its ownership and a new title was issued in the bank's name. property lack of merit for pre-trial should be much more than mere perfunctory
When the heirs allowed the one year redemption period to expire without treatment. Its observance must be taken seriously if it is to attain its
- CA affirmed trial court’s decision
redeeming their parents' former property and permitted the consolidation objective i.e speedy and inexpensive disposition of cases
of ownership and the issuance of a new title, the co-ownership was Issue: WON respondents are entitled to 1/2 of Lot 1091, pro diviso
- SC uphold the trial court in ruling in favor of petitioner, except as to
extinguished. Held: the effectivity of the payment of monthly rentals by respondent as co-
Since D. Annie Tan used her personal fund to repurchase the property, she - Yes owner which we here declare to commence only after the trial court
is the lawful sole owner. The respondent China Banking Corporation is - the sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan of the land to his daughter, ordered respondent to vacate in accordance with its order of 26 July
ordered to execute the deed of sale over the disputed property in favor of petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did not give to the latter ownership over 1979.L
the petitioner alone. the entire land but merely transferred to her the one half (1/2) - Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged
undivided share of her father, thus making her the co-owner of the to remain in the co- ownership, and that each co-owner may demand
land in question with the respondents, her first cousins. at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his
- the redemption of the land did not terminate the co-ownership share is concerned
TERMINATION OF CO-OWNERSHIP nor give her title to the entire land subject of the co-ownership
(same issue raised in Adille vs CA)
- being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot
without paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may use the
MARIANO vs De Vega property owned in common so long as it is in accordance with the
- Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership over the entire
Facts: purpose for which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to the
lot by virtue of the redemption she made, nevertheless, she did
- sps Urbano Panganiban and Roberta Espino owned as conjugal interest of the other co-owners.
acquire the right to be reimbursed for half of the redemption
property, during their lifetime 29 parcels of unregistered land without price she paid to the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental on - when petitioner file an action to compel the sale of the property and
improvements and all situated in Dampol 1st, Pulilan, Bulacan
behalf of her co-owners (Article 1613 of CC) the trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of
- both died intestate
- petition is denied respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to
- Mariano instituted an action with the CFI for partition and delivery of
enjoy the possession jointly also ceased
possession of their corresponding shares in the conjugal estate of
decedents-spouses AGUILAR vs CA - the respondent should be held liable for monthly rentals until he and
- petitioners filed the case because private respondents had taken his family vacate
possession of the whole conjugal property and appropriated to - Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are brothers
themselves to the exclusion of petitioners the products coming from - petition is granted
- on October 28, 1969, the 2 brothers purchased a house and lot in
the 29 parcels of land
Parañaque where their father could spend and enjoy his remaining
- the trial court denied the petition
years in a peaceful neighborhood
Issue: WON the trial court erred in deciding the case
- no


PRESCRIPTION AND REPUDIATION OF CO- When the case reached the CA, the CA reversed decision of trial court
saying that petitioners have not acquired the land thru acquisitive
OWNERSHIP prescription. Adverse possession requires the concurrence of the following
DELIMA VS CA circumstances:
Facts: 1. That the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an
WON the petitioners have acquired land thru acquisitive prescription ouster of the cestui que trust;
- Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands
Estate in Cebu by sale on installments from the government leaving as
HELD: 2. That such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the
his only heirs his 3 brothers and a sister
cestui que trust; and

- TCT 2744 was issued in the name of “The Legal Heirs of Lino Delima, Petitioners claim that they have acquired acquisitive prescription by
deceased, represented by Galileo Delima” possessing and paying the taxes of the land. SC said that tax declarations 3. That the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive.
- On 1953 Galileo executed an affidavit of extrajudicial declaration of are not conclusive proofs of ownership. SC said that tac declarations
heirs, TCT 2744 was cancelled and TCT 3009 was issued in 1954 in the cannot be sole proof because the tax declaration in their name could have SC said that the case at bar did not meet all 3 requirements.
name of Galileo Delima alone to the exclusion of the other heirs. He been done out of convenience for the co-owners.
paid taxes from 1954 to 1965
- in 1968 petitioners who are surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita filed MARITEGUI VS. CA
According to the petitioners, there was such repudiation which was
with the CFI an action for reconveyance and/or partition of property
and annulment of TCT 3009 against Galileo and Vicente (joined as admitted by the private respondent herself Testifying for herself at the FACTS:
party defendant for his refusal to joint in their action) hearing on her opposition in the registration proceedings, she declared:
- trial court rendered decision in favor of the petitioners This is a case for partition of several pieces of land belonging to Lupo
- respondents appealed to the CA, the appellate court reversed the trial ATTY. CANLAS: Mariategui, who died without a will.
court’s decision and upheld the claim of Galileo that all the brothers
and sister had already relinquished and waived their rights to the
Q: After the death of Tomas Pangan, did you ask the heirs of Tomas Pangan During his lifetime, Lupo contracted three (3) marriages. The first wife
property in his favor, considering that he alone paid the remaining
balance of the purchase price of the lot and the realty taxes of your alleged share in the property in question? died, so he contracted a second marriage. The second wife also passed
Issue: WON petitioners' action for partition is already barred by the away so he contracted a third marriage. The third wife also preceded Lupo
statutory period provided by law which shall enable Galileo Delima to A: Yes, sir. in death.
perfect his claim of ownership by acquisitive prescription to the exclusion
of petitioners from their shares in the disputed property The issue in this case arose because at the time of his death, Lupo left
Q: What did they tell you?
certain properties which he acquired when he was still unmarried. Later,
Held: Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of
- the petitioners are already barred by prescription having only filed the A: They said that I have no right to a share and they won't give me my extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves a certain
action in 1968 (more than 10 years have already lapse) share. lot of the Muntinglupa Estate and title was issued. Now, Lupo’s children by
- the moment when Galileo executed an extrajudicial declaration of his third marriage filed a complaint with the lower court, contending that
heirs, in effect denying or repudiating the ownership, the statute of Q: How many years ago did you ask from them? since they were co-heirs of Lupo’s estate they were deprived of their
limitations started to run for the purposes of the action instituted by respective shares in the lot mentioned. In answer, the other party said
Galileo seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and
A: Immediately after the death of their father. that the complaint was not really for annulment of the deed of
of their rights thereunder.
extrajudicial partition but for recognition of natural children.
- since an action for reconveyance of land based on implied or
constructive trust prescribes after 10 years, it is from the date of the Q: That was some 20 years ago?
issuance of such title that the effective assertion of adverse title for The lower court ruled in favor of Lupo’s heirs from the first and second
purposes of the statute of limitations is counted marriage. Thus, the case was elevated to the CA, where they raised the
A: I do not know how many years ago.
- petition is denied issue of their parents’ lawful marriage and their legitimacy as children.
Q: And during all that span of more than 20 years ago you did not file any CA ruled that all the heirs of Lupo were entitled to equal shares in the
action to recover your share on the land in question? estate. Hence, this petition.

The subject property is a 635 sq. meter lot owned by Leon Hilario. A: No sir, it was only this time . ISSUES:
Petitioners are Hilario’s grand children thru Silveria (daughter) and
respondent, Teodora Garcia, thru Catalina (daughter of Hilario). For title to prescribe in favor of the co-owner, however, there must be a Whether or not the action for partition has prescribed
clear showing that he has repudiated the claims of the other co-owners
Petitioners filed an application of title on the ground of their continuous and that they have been categorically advised of the exclusive claim he is Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to successional rights
possession of the property. There were no oppositors, so the application making to the property in question. It is only when such unequivocal over the said lot
was approved. notice has been given that the period of prescription will begin to run
against the other co-owners and ultimately divest them of their own title if HELD:
Subsequently, respondent claims to have a right over the property as an they do not seasonably defend it.
heir of Leon (since her mother is a daughter of Leon).


The case is really one for partition. The question of the status of the In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful,
private respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the private respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo and uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or
estate of the deceased. therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in
for recognition is inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription does good faith and with just title for ten (10) years. In extraordinary
Existence of the Marriage not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the action prescription ownership and other real rights over immovable property are
for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty (30)
Lupo and Felipa were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other years, without need of title or of good faith.
1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo to his words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the
son who testified that “when his father was still living, he was able to co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner. The disputed lots are unregistered lands, both parcels being covered only
mention to him that he and his mother were able to get married before a by tax declarations formerly in the name of Ramon Bauzon and now
Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal.” The spouses deported themselves as Petition dismissed. transferred to Luis and Eriberta Bauzon. While tax declarations and
husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Although receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership, yet, when coupled with
no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was HEIRS OF MANINGDING VS CA proof of actual possession, as in the instant case, tax declarations and
likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no receipts are strong evidence of ownership.
record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided Facts:
all the requisites for its validity are present. In the instant case, Roque Bauzon possessed the subject parcels of land in
Heirs of Maningding and Bauzon claim that they own the disputed lots in the concept of owner by virtue of the donation propter nuptias. The
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken common and pro-indiviso. Bauzon aver that their father Roque was the possession was public as it was Roque Bauzon who personally tilled and
place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a owner of the lots by virtue of a deed of donation. cultivated the lots. The acts of reaping the benefits of ownership were
woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a manifest and visible to all. These acts were made more pronounced and
lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there public considering that the parcels of land are located in a municipality
According to the Maningdings, Roque repudiated the co-ownership over
being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that the sugarland in 1965 and adjudicated it to himself and Maningding wherein ownership and possession are particularly and normally known to
things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the the community. Roque peacefully possessed the properties as he was
renounced and quitclaimed their shares over the riceland in favour of
ordinary habits of life. Roque. Roque transferred the Riceland to his son, Luis and the sugarland never ousted therefrom nor prevented from enjoying their fruits. His
possession was uninterrupted and in good faith because of his well-
to his daughter, Eriberta, both evidenced by deeds of sale.
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded belief that the donation propter nuptias was properly executed
founded on the following rationale: and the grantors were legally allowed to convey their respective shares in
Heirs of Maningding allegedly discovered the transfers made by Roque
his favor. He likewise appropriated to himself the whole produce of the
Bauzon in favor of his children only in 1986. Consequently, the heirs
“The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of parcels of land to the exclusion of all others.
sought the partition of the properties as well as the accounting of the
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a produce but were unsuccessful.
new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is Prescription, as a rule, does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. 11 Co-
Bauzon’s contentions:
towards legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent owners cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners,
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that title may
* the Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation over the riceland was
evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that prescribe in favor of one of the co-owners, it must be clearly shown that
executed not only by Juan Maningding and Maria Maningding but also by
such is the common order of society and if the parties were not what they he has repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were apprised of
Segunda Maningding.
thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive
violation of decency and of law. period would begin to run. Mere refusal to accede to a partition, without
* denied having executed the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication with regard to
specifying the grounds for such refusal, cannot be considered as notice to
the sugarland.
So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife the other co-owners of the occupant's claim of title in himself in
and such relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of repudiation of the co-ownership. The evidence relative to the possession,
* had been in open, continuous, notorious, adverse and actual possession as a fact upon which the alleged prescription is based, must be clear,
their being married must be admitted as a fact.
of the subject properties. complete and conclusive in order to establish said prescription without any
Filiation shadow of doubt; and when upon trial it is not shown that the possession
Issue: of the claimant has been adverse and exclusive and opposed to the rights
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private of the others, the case is not one of ownership, and partition will lie. 12
WON Rogue Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by
respondents. Jacinto’s birth certificate was a record of birth referred to in
acquisitive prescription. Therefore while prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the
Article 172 of the Code. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts
contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the acts of ownership exercised are vague and uncertain, such prescription
Ruling: arises and produces all its effects when the acts of ownership do not
two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have
presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners. As
YES. disclosed by the records, Roque Bauzon and his heirs possessed the
they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo in the same
manner as their brother Jacinto. property from 1948 to 1986 to the exclusion of petitioners who were never
Rogue Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by given their shares of the fruits of the properties, for which reason they
acquisitive prescription. Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring (or demanded an accounting of the produce and the conveyance to them of
Prescription of Action for Partition
losing) ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the their shares. Unfortunately they slept on their rights and allowed almost
manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the


thirty-six (36) years to lapse before attempting to assert their right.

Perforce, they must suffer the consequence of their inaction.