Artificial Intelligence

Author(s): Hugo F. Reading

Source: Man, New Series, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Mar., 1983), pp. 183-185
Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2801770
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 CORRESPONDENCE

Artificial intelligence be complex. A complex sufficient condition

Polythetic classification, expounded and discus-
sed in Man by Needham (I975), Solheim (I976)
and Ellen (I976), has a heuristic value in that, if
viewed in conjunction with research in artificial
intelligence (AI), it helps create an awareness of
the possibility of the automatic discovery of
causal and nomic connexions between generic
social phenomena. Such automatic discovery
goes beyond the computer simulation, automa-
tic classification, cluster analysis and multivari-
ate analysis well-established in social science.
It has been suggested that human survival
would have been impossible without the de-
velopment of the concepts and classifications
necessary for parsimonious accounts of nature
(Raven et al. I97I). Temkin (i965) speaks of the
universal urge to sort particulars. Piaget (I976)
describes how the child makes dichotomous
distinctions and carries out 'grouping' opera-
tions. If concepts were to characterise entities
richly, the very purpose of conceptualisation
would be defeated.
Initially, we might suppose that it is
monotheticity which results in our perceiving
and describing the world in terms of concepts
based on only a few characteristics. It is clear,
however, that although polythetic classes are
usually more richly characterised than are
monothetic ones, irrespective of the way in
which characteristics are distributed amongst
members, this is not true of the members of the
classes. However, the ability of computers to
handle rich characterisation, as shown by the
computerisation of numerical taxonomy, sug-
gests further possibilities where the processing
of complex social patterns is concerned.
Let us explicate 'causal and nomic connexions
between generic social phenomena'. Included
under 'phenomena' are characteristics (charac-
ters, properties, qualities, features, attributes, I977), as well as AI research on knowledge rep-
traits), events, states of affairs, system-states. resentation, should aid the development of such
By 'nomic' is meant any invariable concomi-
tance, a concomitance which need not support
either a counterfactual or a subjunctive con-
ditional. The connexion may take the form of an
invariable concomitance of properties and so be
nonsequential. The connexion may have a
probablistic character.
Causation is best viewed in terms of condi-
tionship (von Wright I97I; 38 sqq.). Conditions
may be necessary or sufficient or both and may sons of societies in terms of 'the differential
takes the logical form 'both p and q must be
present for r'. A complex necessary condition
takes the form 'either q or r must be present for
p'. Although it is instantiations of generic phe-
nomena which are observed, it is connexions
between generic phenomena which are sought.
The nomothetic method is usually thought of
as involving abstraction in its first contact with
objects, in that it separates a partial aspect or
property from a total object. However, adv-
ances in the description, perception, recogni-
tion, matching, analysis and manipulation of
patterns, configurations and structures suggest
that holistic comparisons could serve a
nomothetic purpose.
Popper (I960: 77) distinguishes totalities
from Gestalt wholes. He maintains that a total-
ity cannot be scientifically studied because any
piece of the world is describable by an infinite
number of propositions. Thus, it is not a social
totality which needs to be represented. Given
that it is possible to construct different overlap-
ping sequences of connexions and that a totality
may be selectively and systematically described
in different ways, what needs to be represented
is the resulting configuration. According to
Lehnert (I979), it is not yet possible adequately
to describe a physical configuration, as the
necessary representational system for spatial re-
lations has not been developed. Likewise, it
would seem that the adequate description of a
social configuration awaits the development of
the necessary representational system for the
abstract relations involved.
The mathematical theory of patterns,
pioneered by Grenandeir (I976), the study of the
properties of systems in general and the iden-
tification of system-forming relations and con-
nexions (von Bertalanffy I969; Blauberg et al.
a system.
The three main statistical schools in
sociocultural anthropology, the Kulturkreis,
California and Yale schools, in spite of a vast
output of correlation analysis and even some
multivariate analysis of cross-cultural data, have
failed to develop a methodology for structural
comparisons. Levi-Strauss (I972: 95-6) has
pointed the way by suggesting holistic compari-

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 I84 CORRESPONDENCE

features characteristic of the systems of rela- not limited to re-discovery is the inductive in-
tionships which define them'. It is possible to ference system Meta-DENDRAL, of the family
study the permutations and transformations of programmes known collectively as DE-
amongst structural elements. Intra- and cross- NDRAL (Buchanan I979), which has suc-
cultural comparisons of structures at different ceeded in discovering new chemical rules. The
levels may be made. If we accept the view of rules take the form 'When situation S occurs,
Levi-Strauss that societies consist of diverse, action A occurs'. The programme successively
partially autonomous orders of interrelated en- summarises the chemical input data (IN-
tities, it follows that no society can be repre- TSUM), generates plausible rules through a
sented by a single configuration. heuristic search of the legal rule space
It may be instructive to look at attempts at (RULEGEN), and then refines the rules
automatic theory formation and rule generation(RULEMOD). If automatic structure elucida-
in other domains where structures are found. tion is possible in the domain of chemical phe-
The rise of the transformational-generative nomena, why should it not be possible in the
approach in linguistics and the appearance in domain of social phenomena?
mathematical linguistics of the algebraic, as dis- These approaches to the conception, under-
tinct from the statistical, approach has resulted standing, analysis, representation, description
in the computerised study of the relations be- and manipulation of structures in various do-
tween deep and surface structures and the auto- mains suggest that the creation of an artificial
matic search for generative rules. In i958, Levi- intelligence system for rule formation in the
Strauss foresaw the computerised study of syn- domain of social phenomena is now a practical
tactic structures. He did not, however, consider proposition. Even when we take into account
the possibility of the computerised study of the formidable epistemological problems and
social structures. Fortes pointed out that these methodological pitfalls which will remain, and
also have a syntactic character. also the continuing personal and social sources
Computer applications and the field use of of bias, it remains a practical proposition. Col-
microcomputers are found in both archaeology laboration between knowledge engineers and
and sociocultural anthropology. In addition to experts will be necessary, but this has proved
SPSS and SP-Micro are software packages for successful in other fields (Feigenbaum I979).
archaeological quantitative analysis, such as Hugo F. Reading
AQUA and ARCHON. There are archaeolo- London
gical programmes, such as CLUSTRAN, for
cluster analysis and also programmes for pattern
recognition (Laflin I980). SOLCEM is a prog- Bertalanffy, L. von I969. General system theory.
ramme which generates an integrated overall New York: George Braziller.
interpretation of a cemetery excavation record. Blauberg, I. V. et al. I977. Systems theory: philo-
But according to Doran (I977), its limited sophical and methodological problems. Mos-
efficiency could only be improved by the ap- cow: Progress Publishers.
plication of AI work on knowledge representa- Buchanan, B. G. I979. Issues of representation
tion. For ethnographers, there are programmes in conveying the scope and limitations of
in APL for the qualitative analysis of ethnosci- intelligent assistant programs. Machine In-
ence texts and also the Electric Window prog- telligence 9.
ramme for editing ethnographic files (Werner Doran, J. I977. Knowledge representation for
I982). archaeological inference. Machine Intelli-
Research in AI has produced a number of gence 8.
intelligent systems. There are domain-specific, Ellen, R. F. I977. Polythetic classification. Man
knowledge-based inductive inference systems, (N. S.) I2: I77.
some of them pattern-directed, which seek out Feigenbaum, E. A. I979. The art of artificial
patterns in the input data. There are theorem- intelligence-themes and case studies of
provers, intelligent assistants and discovery sys- knowledge engineering. In Auerbach Annual
tems. No archaeological or ethnographic prog- 1979 Best Computer Papers (ed.) I. L.
ramme, with the exception of SOLCEM, is Auerbach. New York: Elsevier/North-
anywhere near to being an intelligent assistant, Holland.
let alone a discovery programme. Foley, J. M. I 978. A computer analysis of met-
In literary analysis, however, we have a rical patterns in Beowulf Hum 12, 7I-80.
promising development in the generation of Grenander, U. I976. Pattern synthesis. New
'metrical templates' by the automatic compari- York: Springer-Verlag.
son of successive metrical patterns in poetry Laflin, S. (ed.). I980. Computer applications in
(Foley I 978). An example of a discovery system archaeology 1980. Birmingham: Computer
limited to re-discovery is the mathematical AM Centre, University of Birmingham.
programme, which has re-discovered many Lehnert, W. I979. Representing physical ob-
concepts in number theory (Lenat I978). One jects in memory. In Philosophical perspec-

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 CORRESPONDENCE
tives in artificial intelligence (ed.)
Harvester Press.
Lenat, D. B. I978. On automated scientific
theory formation: a case study using the
AM program. Machine Intelligence 9.
Levi-Strauss, C. I972. Structural anthropology.
Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Needham, R. I975. Polythetic classification:
convergence and consequences. Man
(N.S.) 10, 349-69.
Piaget, J. I976. The psychology of intelligence.
Littlefield: Adams & Co.
Popper, K. R. I960. The poverty of historicism.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Raven, P. H. et al. I97I. The origins of tax-
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Ancestors, sociology and comparative
analysis
Perhaps Tale ancestors can at this stage best be
left to rest (or exercise authority) in peace. But
Calhoun's brief comments about my compari-
son (Keesing I970a) between Kwaio and Tallen-
si conceptualisations of descent and kinship,
which he finds a 'forced and unsociological
analogy' (Calhoun I980: 309), call for clarifica-
tion. I do not doubt, nor did I then question,
that there are striking differences between
Kwaio and Tallensi in the structure of descent
groups. Nor did I suggest that whether conne-
xions are matrilateral or patrilineal [in the Tal-
lensi system] 'is . . . a matter of indifference'
(Calhoun I980: 3 I0). Indeed it is only a 'matter
of indifference' in a limited range of contexts in
Kwaio society. My argument had to do with the
conceptual system of which descent groups are a
realisation: that is, with the cultural categories in well a total category of cognatic descendants (a
terms of which Kwaio and Tallensi define social
relationships. Since Calhoun persistently misin-
terprets my argument, and understands me to
be arguing against 'the importance of the dif-
ferentiation between agnatic and nonagnatic
kin', a reiteration of my point seems in order.
Following Scheffler (I966), I noted three
types of descent construct that appeared to be
culturally recognised among both Kwaio and
Tallensi: an agnatic descent construct; a cognatic
descent construct, in which male and female
filial links equally count in establishing a chain
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of connexion
M. Ringle: to ancestors; and a (residually
defined) nonagnatic descent construct is which
at least one filial link in a chain of descent in
female. These three descent constructs in turn
define, with reference to any salient ancestor,
three categories: agnatic descendants (A);
cognatic descendants (B) (subsuming A), and
nonagnatic descendants, (C or B-A) (i.e., a
category of all B's who are not A's).
My argument does not presuppose that all
members of category B are attributed undiffe-
rentiated status by virtue of their being cognatic
descendants, apparently the basis of Calhoun's
misunderstanding. Let me illustrate with the
Kwaio. Kwaio say that all cognatic descendants
of an ancestor orioritana (lit. 'return from') that
ancestor. They comprise the category of people
who, for instance, have rights to property cre-
ated by that ancestor. ' However, these rights are
notinequal and undifferentiated; and one basis for
differentiation is whether descendants are
agnates (futa ani wane, lit. 'born of men') or
nonagnates (futa anigeni, lit. 'born of women');
they have different status in many contexts of
ritual, land rights and descent group politics.
I infer that Tallensi make similar distinctions.
I do not doubt that Tale individuals related to
ancestors through ba doyam (which Fortes glos-
ses as 'paternal parentage') have a qualitatively
different status, with both specialjural and mor-
al implications, from those related to these
ancestors by ma dcsam ('maternal parentage';
Fortes I949: 30). I suggested that the connexion
of Tale individuals to their ancestors (not simply
their 'mothers' brothers') through non-agnatic
links, and the collective participation of
nonagnatic descendants (Fortes's 'extra-clan
kinsfolk') in sacrifices to lineage ancestors,
appeared to imply a Tallensi conceptualisation
of these relationships in terms of descent, not
simply of filiation (i.e., cognatic kinship).
Fortes (I945: iso) himself slips into such a usage
when he observes that a Tallensi sacrifice is a
'sacrament in which all the descendants of
lineage ancestors, through both men and
women, participate'.
If Tallensi conceptualise a category of
nonagnatic descendants (a category C), then
they would seem to have to conceptualise as
category B). The logic is obvious, since categ-
ory C is residually and negatively defined. In
order to conceptualise people as descending
non-agnatically, you need an inclusive concept
of 'descending'-as implied by Fortes's 'all the
descendants of lineage ancestors, through both
men and women'. Tallensi would seem to (have
to) invoke precisely such an inclusive concep-
tion of cognatic descent to define the total con-
gregation entitled to take part in a sacrifice to
lineage ancestors. Since Tale ancestors clearly
take an interest in nonagnatic as well as agnatic