Truth as Transcendental in Thomas Aquinas*
Aertsen
Abstract. Aquinas presents his most complete exposition of the
transcendentals in De veritate 1, 1, that deals with the question
"What is truth?". The thesis of this paper is that the question of truth
is essential for the understanding of his doctrine of the transcen-
dentals.
The first part of the paper (sections 1--4) analyzes Thomas's
conception of truth. Two approaches to truth can be found in his
work. The first approach, based on Aristotle's claim that "truth is not
in things but in the mind", leads to the idea that the proper place of
truth is in the intellect. The second approach is ontological:Thomas
also acknowledges that there is truth in every being. The famous
definition of truth as "adequation of thing and intellect" enables him
to integrate the two approaches. Truth is a relation between two
terms, both of which can be called "true" because both are essential
for the conformitybetween thing and intellect.
The second part of the paper (sections 5--7) deals with the
manner in which Thomas gives truth a place in the doctrine of the
transcendentals, and shows that his conception of truth leads to
important innovations in this doctrine: the introduction of relational
transcendentals and the correlation between spirit and being. If
"truth" is transcendental, it must be convertible with "being". Sect. 6
discusses objections that Thomas advances himself to this converti-
bility. Sect. 7 deals with a difficulty in his account of truth as a
relational transcendental. Ontological truth expresses a relation to
an intellect but the relation to the human intellect is accidental for
the truth of things. Essential for their truth can only be a practical
intellect that causes things. In this way, Thomas argues, the divine
intellect relates to all things.
Thomas Aquinas never wrote a separate treatise on the
transcendentals. He does, however, present a compara-
tively extensive exposition of this subject in his disputed
questions De veritate, which date from around 1255. Q.
1, a. 1, deals with the question "What is truth?", and
contains Thomas's most complete account of the con-
cepts that "express a general m o d e of being". In the
secondary literature this account is often discussed in
isolation from the context of the question of truth within
which it is found. In my paper I intend to show that this
context is essential for the understanding of Thomas's
doctrine of the transcendentals. My thesis is that it is
precisely in relation to his conception of truth that the
Topoi 11: 159--171, 1992.
© 1992 KluwerAcademic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
Jan A.
originality of Thomas's doctrine becomes manifest, and
that it is not by accident he presents his most complete
exposition of it in De veritate 1, 1.
I develop this thesis in two parts. The first part
(Sections 1--4) analyzes Thomas's conception of truth,
and shows that his conception differs fundamentally
from that of his contemporaries, particularly at those
points regarded as essential conditions for the tran-
scendentality of truth at the time. The second part
(Sections 5--7) deals with the manner in which Thomas
gives truth a place in the doctrine of the transcendentals.
In this part it will become clear that his conception of
truth leads to important innovations in this doctrine.
(1) A "magisterial" definition of truth: "the indivision
of being and that which is"
In his reply to the question as to what truth is, Thomas
mentions in De veritate 1, 1, several definitions of truth
from the history of philosophy. 1 He presents definitions
from Greek philosophy (Aristotle), the patristic period
(Augustine and Hilary of Poitiers), early medieval
thought (Anselm of Canterbury), and Arabic philoso-
phy (Avicenna). A n o t h e r definition of truth that appears
is the formula "adequation of thing and intellect", which
Thomas attributes to a Jewish philosopher of the tenth
century, Isafic Israeli. Scholars have not been able,
however, to locate this definition in his works. 2 In
addition, Thomas mentions an anonymous definition:
"The true is the indivision of being and that which is"
(verum est indivisio esse et quod est). It is to this latter
definition that I want to devote attention initially.
In another work (In I Sent., 19, 5, 1) Thomas calls
this definition magistralis, which means that it was the
definition of the magistri of the university. Indeed, we
find this definition in Albert the Great, Alexander of
Hales, and Bonaventure) Of the definitions presented
in De veritate, the indivision formula is thus the most
recent one.
160 J A N A. A E R T S E N
The origin of this definition can be traced back to the
Summa de bono (1230) of Philip the Chancellor. This
fact is of great importance because Philip's work,
written twenty-five years before Thomas's De veritate, is
usually regarded as the first account of the transcen-
dentals.4 In the Prologue of his Summa, Philip says that
he will deal with what is most general, namely, "being",
"one", "true", and "good".5 In the second question he
discusses the relation of the true to being.
The starting point of Philip's discussion are five
definitions of truth, which are also mentioned by
Thomas in De veritate, namely, the definitions of
Augustine, Hilary of Poitiers, Anselm, the adequation
formula, and, finally, the definition in terms of indivi-
sion. Philip asks which of these definitions is the most
appropriate. He objects to Hilary's definition ("Truth is
that which declares or manifests being"), because it
contains a reference to a knowing subject. The true must
be defined "without any relation to an intellect'.6 The
definition, "adequation of thing and intellect", expresses,
according to Philip, a secondary type of truth, namely,
the truth of the sign, because the adequation in question
must be understood in terms of a mental sign and the
thing signified. From these objections it is obvious that
he is seeking a purely ontological definition of truth.
Augustine's definition "The true is that which is" (/d
quod est) seems then to be a suitable candidate, for in
his definition Augustine deliberately eliminates the
relation to a knowing subject] Such a relation would
"relativize" truth. Truth resides solely in the thing itself,
expressing its intelligibility. Thus, truth is identical with
being, and this means, in the terminology of thirteenth-
century philosophy, that truth is a transcendental prop-
erty.
Indeed, Philip is of the opinion that Augustine's
definition indicates what truth is secundum substantiam.
Yet he is not satisfied with this definition because it
insufficiently expresses that by which truth, qua concept
(rationem), differs from being. The statement "every
being is true" threatens to become a tautology. Augus-
fine's definition must therefore be modified, and this
modification gives rise to the fifth definition mentioned
by Philip: "the true is the indivision of being (esse) and
that which is".
Philip says of this definition that "it is taken a
Metaphysicis", 8 The modern editor of the Summa
confesses that he could not find the definition in the
Metaphysics. He is in good company, for a similar
remark was made in the thirteenth century by Albert the
Great. 9 That their search was unsuccessful is not
surprising, however, for it seems plausible that it was
Philip himself who framed this definition. He borrowed
its elements from two "metaphysicians", Aristotle and
Boethius. 1°
The central element in his definition is the notion of
"indivision". Now, it is striking that earlier in the
Summa Philip defines "the good" in terms of "indivi-
sion" also. The reason he adduces for this is that the
most general must be defined "in the way one (unum) is
defined", that is, by a negation. 11 He does not clarify,
however, why "one" should be the model for defining
the other transcendentals. The explanation for his
strategy must be sought in a discussion of Aristotle's,
which was the basis for the medieval doctrine of the
transcendentals.
In Book IV of the Metaphysics (c. 2, 1003 b 22ff.)
Aristotle discusses the relation between being and one.
This relation is marked by identity and difference. Being
and one are interchangeable, for they are "the same
nature". Yet the terms "being" and "one" are not
synonyms, for the concept of "one" is different from that
of "being". What is conceptually expressed by "one" is
the "undividedness" of being. From this it follows that
one adds something to being without this addition
entailing a limitation of its extension. One retains its
comprehensive, transcendental character, because it
only adds something conceptual, a negation, to being.
That is the reason why Philip prefers to define the other
transcendentals following the model established by one.
Truth must be defined in terms of indivision.
Philip defines truth as "the indivision of being and
that which is". The last part of the definition is bor-
rowed from Boethius's De hebdomadibus, a treatise in
which a number of propositions about the structure of
being that played a great role in medieval ontology
are presented. One of these, to which Philip explicitly
refers, reads: "In every composite to be (esse) is one
thing, that which is another. ''12 The definition of truth
brings out that these components are undivided, that is,
united.
From the analysis of this "magisterial" definition it
becomes clear which conception of truth is behind the
incorporation of truth in the doctrine of the transcen-
dentals. Philip's definition formulates the conditions for
the transcendentality of the true. First, truth must be
conceived purely ontologically; any relation to the
intellect must be eliminated. Second, truth must be
conceived as a negation, as indivision, in keeping with
 TRUTH AS TRANSCENDENTAL IN THOMAS AQUINAS
the way in which Aristotle conceived one in relation to
being. This first version of the doctrine of transcen-
dentals had a great influence on later thinkers such as
Albert the Great and Bonaventure. 13
From De veritate 1, 1, it appears, however, that
Thomas does not share the opinion of the Masters. His
definition of truth contradicts both conditions that
Philip regarded as essential for its transcendentality. We
must, therefore, look into the reasons that led Thomas
to his conception of truth.
(2) "Truth is not in things, but in the mind" (Aristotle)
The basic idea running through Thomas's discussion of
truth, like a scarlet thread, is that relation to the intellect
is essential for truth. All three works in which he pres-
ents a systematic account of truth, the Commentary on
the "Sentences', De veritate, and the Summa theologiae,
cite a text of Aristotle's from Book VI of the Meta-
physics (c. 4, 1027 b 25) to the effect that "truth and
falsity do not exist, as good and evil, in things, but in the
mind". The proper place of truth is in the intellect. This
thesis forms a formidable obstacle to any purely
ontological conception of truth. Thomas accordingly
employs Aristotle's saying as a counterargument to the
view that truth resides solely in things. 14 That he takes
the statement of the Philosopher as more than merely an
argument from authority becomes apparent when we
look at the context of Aristotle's saying and Thomas's
commentary on it.
In Metaphysics V1, c. 4, Aristotle discusses one of the
meanings of being that he had distinguished in the fifth
book, namely "being as what is true" (ens ut verum).
Being in this sense signifies the truth of a proposition, ff
we ask, for example, "Is a human being an animal?" and
we answer: "He/she is", then this "is" signifies that the
proposition is true. "Being as what is true" is being as a
verbal copula, a sign of the composition of subject and
predicate in a statement. This being therefore has its
origin in the intellect that forms a judgment, or, in
scholastic terminology, in the intellect that composes or
divides concepts. Thus, the context of the statement
cited by Thomas is a discussion in which truth is
presented as connected with being, but in an entirely
different way than in the ontological conception of truth.
For in order to emphasize that "being as what is true"
does not signify something extra-mental, Aristotle then
says: "Falsity and truth are not in things -- it is not as if
161
the good were true, and the bad were in itself false -- but
in thought. ''is
It is striking that Thomas, in his Commentary on the
'Metaphysics', enters at length into this distinction
between the true and the good and gives a philosophical
justification for Aristotle's saying. This justification,
which recurs in many other places in his work, is based
on the insight that a spiritual substance relates to reality
in two different ways: Man directs himself at things by
knowing them and by desiring them. The object of
knowledge is the true; the object of desire is the good.
Between the two processes of knowing and desiring
there is a fundamental distinction, which becomes
evident in their termini. Knowing is a process of assimi-
lation: it is completed when the similitude of the thing
known is in the knower. Truth indicates this completion
or perfection of knowledge and is therefore in the mind.
The appetite, in contrast, is not a process of assimilation
but a movement toward things. It is an inclination
toward the thing in itself, which is desirable because it is
perfect. Good is therefore a perfection in things. 16 This
conclusion does not exclude that truth is a good, for it is
the good specific to the intellect. In this case the intellect
is regarded as a thing that, like every other thing, is
called "good" through its perfection, which for the
intellect exists in the truth. Thus this specific case
confirms the general thesis that the good is in things and
the true is in the mind. 17
Aristotle in Metaphysics VI draws a far-reaching
conclusion from his discussion of "being as what is true".
This kind of being falls outside the inquiry of meta-
physics, it "must be passed over" by the science that
deals with being as being, for the cause of being as what
is true is an operation of the intellect. Being in this sense
belongs therefore rather to logic or the science of the
intellect. Metaphysics is concerned with the reality
outside the mind, with the kind of being that falls under
one of the categories, namely, substance, quality or
quantity, and so on. 18
The distinction that Aristotle makes here between
two modes of being, explained more extensively in
Metaphysics V (c. 7), strongly influenced Thomas's
thought. In many places he presents a twofold division
of being that corresponds with Aristotle's dichotomy39
The first mode of being (let us call it B1) is "outside the
mind", and is "perfect", because it is something positive
in reality. This is the being that is divided by the ten
categories, and signifies either a substance or an
accident. The second mode of being 032) is being
162 J A N A. A E R T S E N
considered as a verbal copula, and signifies what exists
only in the mind, namely, the truth of a proposition.
Concerning the relation between B 1 and B2, Thomas
in his Commentary on the 'Metaphysics' makes a
number of observations that are not to be found in the
same form in Aristotle? ° Three of these prove to be
directly relevant for his analysis of truth. (1) B2
compares to B1 as effect to cause. Thomas does not
explain in what sense "cause" must be understood here.
B1 cannot be an efficient cause, for as we saw, the
distinction between the two modes of being consists
precisely in that B2 is caused by an operation of the
intellect. (2) The domain of B2 is greater than that of
B1. According to B2 anything can be called a being
about which a true proposition can be formed, even
though it is a non-being according to B 1, as is the case
with negations or privations. We can say, for example,
that there is evil, but this does not imply that evil is
something positive in reality. In most of the texts where
Thomas presents the distinction between the modes of
being, his concern is the clarification of this second
feature of the relation between them. (3) B2 is acci-
dental to B 1. For the being of a thing, it is not essential
that a true proposition be affirmed of it. Knowledge or
science is essentially related to and dependent upon
reality, but the reverse does not hold.
In summary, Thomas follows the Aristotelian ap-
proach to truth: the place of truth is not in things but in
the mind. The relation between being and truth is
determined by the distinction between two modes of
being. Truth belongs to a secondary mode of being,
intramental being. Viewed from this perspective, the
conditions for truth to be a transcendental property of
being seem to be absent.
(3) "There Js the same disposition in being and in
truth" (Aristotle)
The above conclusion is, however, only one facet of
Thomas's conception of truth. H e also acknowledges
that there is truth in every being. What is surprising is
that for this idea Thomas again appeals to Aristotle's
Metaphysics. As a counterargument against objections
that suggest that being and truth cannot be convertible
because truth is only in the intellect, he cites a statement
of the Philosopher in Book II of the Metaphysics (c. 1,
993 b 30--31): "There is the same disposition of things
in being and in truth. ''21
H e r e again it is instructive to examine the context of
this statement. In the first chapter of Metaphysics II,
Aristotle argues that "philosophy is rightly called the
science of truth". H e wants to make clear that meta-
physics -- out of all the philosophical disciplines -- pre-
eminently (maxime) considers truth. The starting point
of Aristotle's argument is a general proposition: the
cause of a property that is common to the cause and its
effect is the maximum of that attribute. Fire, for
example, is the hottest, because it is the cause of the heat
in other things. This general proposition is then applied
to truth. The term 'truth' is said universally of all things.
F r o m this it follows that that which causes subsequent
things to be true is itself most true. This must be the first
cause of the being of things. Since first philosophy deals
with the first causes, metaphysics is par excellence the
science of truth. F r o m this reasoning Aristotle infers a
final corollary: Since those things which are the cause of
the being of other things are true in the highest degree, it
follows "that each thing is related to truth in the same
way as it is to being", or, as Thomas puts it, "that there is
the same disposition of things in being and in truth". 22
This argument must have had a strong appeal for
Thomas, for he makes use of it in his proofs for the
existence of G o d and in his doctrine of creation. 23
Metaphysics II is also fundamental for his view that
there is an intrinsic connection between being and truth.
In his reply to one of the objections in De veritate 1, 1,
he presents an explanation of Aristotle's statement. The
thesis that there is the same disposition in being and in
truth means that the order (ordo) in both is identical.
The reason is that "to the degree to which a thing has
entity (entitas), to that degree it is apt to be conformed
(aequari) to the intellect. Consequently, the notion of
truth follows upon that of being. ''24 This second ap-
proach to truth must therefore lead to the conclusion
that truth is not only an intramental mode of being but
also has an ontological dimension.
The approaches taken by Thomas result in two basic
ideas about truth. The first approach leads to the
conclusion, based on Aristotle's claim that truth is not in
things but in the mind, that "being as true" falls outside
metaphysics. The second approach follows Aristotle's
statement that there is the same disposition in being and
in truth, and ends up with a conception of truth as being.
Thomas himself speaks of a "twofold" truth, that of the
intellect and that of the thing. 25
The crucial question is, of course, whether the two
conceptions of truth are compatible. Aristotle does not
 T R U T H AS T R A N S C E N D E N T A L
pose this question in his Metaphysics. Modern scholars
have attempted to resolve the discrepancy between
Books II and VI by supposing a development in
Aristotle's thought and suggesting that the second book
belongs to an early, Platonizing phase. Such a solution is
foreign to Thomas, because for him the books of
Aristotle's Metaphysics form a unity.26 An aspect that is
noteworthy in this regard is his procedure with respect
to the ontological conception of truth. He does n o t
appeal to Augustine's definition of truth, as one would
in fact expect, but appeals to Aristotle. A conscious
strategy could underlie this choice. Precisely by appeal-
ing to the same philosopher, who posits that the place of
truth is in the intellect, Thomas suggests that the two
conceptions of truth belong together.
In his Commentary on the "Metaphysics' Thomas
scarcely enters into the relation between these two
conceptions. In his exposition of the second Book
though, he does refer to the conception of truth in
Metaphysics VI. That a thing is related to being in the
same way as it is to truth is, so Thomas says, "because
the being of the thing is the cause of the true idea that
the mind forms of the thing. For truth and falsity are not
in things, but in the mind, as it is said in the sixth
book. ''27 This observation is not elaborated, yet it does
make clear that for Thomas there is no opposition
between the truth of the thing and the truth of the
intellect, but rather a causal relation between the two.
The disposition of a thing is "the foundation and cause"
of the truth of the intellect.28
In order to determine the relation between the two
truths, it is first necessary to answer a question which is
not explicitly dealt with by Aristotle. His statements
attribute different places to truth but do not say what
truth is. This very question is taken up by Thomas in De
veritate.
(4) Thomas's definition of truth: "adequation of thing
and intellect"
In De veritate 1, 1, Thomas comes to the conclusion that
the definition which Philip the Chancellor had regarded
as secondary expresses the essence of truth most com-
pletely. That is, truth is "the adequation (conformity) of
thing and intellect".29 This formula is often considered
to be the medieval definition of truth. From a historical
perspective, that is incorrect, for it is only with Thomas
that it becomes the most fundamental definition.
When we compare his three main accounts of truth
IN T H O M A S A Q U I N A S 163
with each other, it appears that the definition in terms of
conformity acquires growing significance for Thomas. In
the beginning of his career, in his Commentary on the
'Sentences' (I, 19, 5, 1), he presents the definition of
Anselm of Canterbury ("Truth is rightness perceptible
only to the mind") as the most comprehensive (compre-
hendens omnes veritatis acceptiones). In his last account,
in the Summa theologiae (I, 16, 1), the adequation
formula takes this place. In the account that is chrono-
logically intermediate, De veritate 1, 1, Thomas arranges
the various traditional definitions of truth on the basis of
the three elements contained in the conformity formula:
the thing, the intellect, and the relation between these
two.
Truth, he states, "can be defined in three ways". The
first way pertains to that which precedes the essence of
truth and upon which truth is founded (fundatur). Here
Thomas places the definitions of Augustine and Philip
the Chancellor, who defined truth in purely ontological
terms. In the second way, truth is defined according to
that in which the notion of truth is formally completed
(perficitur). The definition of truth as adequation falls
under this heading. Finally, in a third way truth can be
defined according to the effect that follows upon it
(secundum effectum consequentem), namely, knowl-
edge. And it is in this sense that Hilary of Poitiers says:
"Truth is that which declares or manifests being."
From this arrangement one can surmise why Thomas
preferred the conformity formula to the other defini-
tions of truth, for this definition expresses the relational
character of truth to the fullest. Truth is not, as Philip
the Chancellor thought, a negation, but rather a relation
between two terms, the res (the general name for reality)
and the intellectus. Both are, although in different ways,
essential for the relation of adaequatio -- for which
Thomas also uses the terms conform#as and convenien-
tia. The notion of truth as conformity therefore enables
him to integrate the two approaches to truth discussed
earlier and that resulted in the truth of the intellect and
that of the thing.
The relation of intellect to thing is a relation com-
pleted by an operation of the intellect, for knowledge is
a process of assimilation.3° Here is where the basic idea
of Thomas's first approach to truth belongs. Because the
end-term of the process of knowing, truth, is in the
intellect and is realized by the intellect, the intellect
pertains to the essence of truth. For Thomas it is self-
evident that "all who define truth in the right way place
the intellect in its definition".31
164 J A N A. A E R T S E N
The relation of thing to intellect consists in the
knowability of the thing. This knowability is the condi-
tion for the conformity between intellect and thing, and
constitutes the truth of the thing. H e r e Thomas can
revert to the basic idea of the second approach to truth.
"There is the same disposition in being and in truth",
because something is apt on the basis of its being to
be conformed to the intellect. "Every being is called
true, insofar as it is conformed or conformable to the
intellect. ''32
The adaequatio formula not only expresses the
relational character of truth but also specifies the rela-
tion between thing and intellect. This relation must be
"adequate"; adequation for Thomas is a "commensura-
tion". 33 The concept "truth" presupposes a measure
(mensura) for the relation between thing and intellect. 34
This normative relation becomes apparent in Thomas's
arrangement of the definitions of truth in De veritate.
"That which is" is the "foundation", knowledge is the
"effect" of truth. The res is that which measures.
The thing is the "cause" of the truth that is in the
intellect. 35 It is this causal relation, as we saw at the end
of the preceding section, that Thomas uses in his
Commentary on the 'Metaphysics' to establish a connec-
tion between Aristotle's approach to truth in Book II
and that in Book VI. The fact that he takes the relation
between the truth of the thing and the truth of the
intellect to be a causal relation suggests that he con-
ceives the relation between the two truths in the same
way as that between the two modes of being we saw
earlier, extramental being (B1) and being as true (B2).
The first characteristic of the relation between B1 and
B2 is that they relate to each other as cause and effect.36
F r o m the above discussion of truth it has become clear
that "cause" must be understood here in the sense of
"measure" and "foundation". "Cause" evinces features of
an "exemplary cause".
The central place that Thomas gives to the adaequatio
formula in his arrangement of the definitions of truth
implies at the same time a criticism of the definitions of
Augustine and Philip the Chancellor. Their definitions
are too limited and are imperfect because they concern
only the foundation of truth. Thomas criticizes Augus-
tine's definition ("that which is") because it does not
express the complete concept of truth, which consists in
the conformity of thing and intellect. H e also proposes
an alternative interpretation that turns Augustine's
definition in an Aristotelian direction. Whenever truth is
said to be "that which is", this 'is' must be understood in
the sense of intramental being (B2), which the Philoso-
pher called "that which is true". 37
Given this criticism, the question which arises is how
Thomas can still give truth a place in the doctrine of the
transcendentals. For his conception of truth involves a
denial of the view that Philip the Chancellor had
regarded as a condition for the transcendentality of the
true, namely, that truth must be defined without any
relation to the intellect. Josef Vande Wiele has argued
that Thomas, by defining truth in relation to the
intellect, leaves the level of metaphysics and places
himself on that of the psychology of human knowl-
edge. 38 After the analysis of the way in which Thomas
conceives truth, we must thus turn to his conception of
truth as transcendental.
(5) Thomas's innovations in the doctrine of the
transcendentals
The line of Thomas's argument in De veritate 1, 1, is that
the investigation into what truth is, ends in the doctrine
of the transcendentals. The way in which he develops
this doctrine is one of the most remarkable aspects of
his exposition. Thomas reduces the question "What is
truth?" to that of the condition of all rational knowledge.
His method is the "reduction" or "resolution" of the
contents of our knowledge to a first concept. In every
question as to what something is, we reduce that which
is to be defined to something more general and better
known. When, for example, we ask "What is man?" we
answer by giving the genus "animal" and adding to it a
specific difference. We can go on to ask what this genus
is, and again reduce it to something even more general.
This regress cannot, however, go on indefinitely, for an
infinite regress would render knowledge of things
impossible. The reduction must end with something that
is not known through anything else but is evident
through itself. 39
The principle to which the intellect reduces (resolvit)
all its concepts is being (ens). It is first known in the
sense that it is the condition of the possibility of all
knowledge and is implicit in every concept. 4° This thesis
forms the basis of Thomas's further account, for he
draws from it the conclusion that all other concepts
arise through an addition to being. But in what way is
this addition possible? Not, in any case, in the way in
which a difference is added to a genus. Being is not a
genus that can be specified by the addition of differ-
 TRUTH AS TRANSCENDENTAL IN THOMAS AQUINAS
ences, because there is no difference that does not share
in being. 4~ Outside of being there is nothing. Other
concepts can only add something to being in the sense
that they express a mode (modus) of it which is not yet
made explicit by the term 'being' itself.
The explication of what is implicit in being is possible
in two ways. First, what is expressed can be a special
mode of being. Being is then contracted and limited. 42
This occurs in the modes of being that Aristotle called
the categories, for not every being is a substance, or a
quality, or a quantity, etc. The categories constitute the
first contractions of being. But what is expressed can
also concern a general mode of being, something that
follows upon every being. The terms expressing these
general modes Thomas calls communia, or -- but rela-
tively seldom -- transcendentia. 43 In this way his analysis
arrives at its intended goal, the doctrine of transcen-
dentals. An explicit definition of the notion of tran-
scendentality is not given by Thomas, but from his
exposition it is clear that "transcendental" stands in
opposition to categorial. A transcendental transcends
the special modes of being, because it is not limited to
one category.
In the continuation of De veritate 1, 1, Thomas
distinguishes two groups of transcendentals. The general
mode of being expressed by the first group pertains to
every being in itself (in se). To this group belongs first of
all "thing" (res). What is significant is that Thomas
introduces one of the terms of the truth relation as a
transcendental. The distinction between being and thing
is that the name ens signifies "that which is", viewed
from the act of being, whereas res expresses the quiddity
or essence of a being. 44 The distinction between ens and
res is thus connected with a central thesis of Thomas's
metaphysics, namely, that every being is composed of
essence and the act of being (esse). He derives the term
res etymologically from the Latin ratus, which means
determinate, stable, and valid. 45 That every being is a
thing means that it possesses a determinate essence
whereby it is "thinkable". To the first group of tran-
scendentals belongs, further, one (unum), which ex-
presses a negation: it signifies that being is undivided.
This was the transcendental which served Philip the
Chancellor as a model for determining the other tran-
scendentals.
The general mode of being expressed by the second
group of transcendentals pertains to every being in
relation to something else (in ordine ad aliud). The
introduction of this second group is Thomas's first
165
important innovation in the doctrine of the transcen-
dentals. A transcendental determination is not solely a
negation, as Philip thought, but it can also be something
positive, namely, a relation.
Within the group of relational transcendentals Thomas
distinguishes two types, reflecting the twofold relation of
one being to another. Viewed according to their division
(divisio), this relation involves a negative aspect, which
is expressed by the transcendental "something" (aliquid).
The term 'something', according to Thomas, means
literally "another what" (quasi aliud quid) and indicates
the division of a being from every other thing. But in
addition to this there is a more positive relational mode
of being, namely, the "conformity" (convenientia) of one
being to another. The condition for such a relation is
something whose nature it is to accord with every being.
Such is, Thomas argues, the human soul, which accord-
ing to Aristotle (De anima III, c. 8, 431 b 21) "is in a
sense all things". In the soul there is both a cognitive
power and an appetitive power. The conformity of being
to the appetite is expressed by the term 'good', the con-
formity to the intellect by the term 'true'. 46
Thomas's second important innovation in the doc-
trine of transcendentals is the correlation he introduces
between anima and being. He understands the tran-
scendentals true and good in relation to the faculties of a
spiritual substance, man. Thomas's doctrine manifests
an "anthropocentrism". But this term requires further
qualification since Metz, referring to, among other
things, De veritate 1, 1, has defended the thesis that
Thomas's form of thought is anthropocentric and that
he is "the father of modern thought", in which subjec-
tivity is the model for the understanding of being. 47 The
conclusion that "the Copernican Revolution started in
Thomistic thought" is precipitate, however, as will be-
come clear from what follows (see section 7). Thomas's
doctrine of transcendentals manifests an anthropocen-
trism in the sense that his introduction of relational
transcendentals is an acknowledgement of the special
place man has among other beings in the world.
Through this anthropocentrism Thomas does not,
contrary to what Vande Wiele suggested, leave the tran-
scendental level, for the intellect can in fact be viewed in
two ways. On the one hand, the intellect is a determinate
thing and a particular faculty which, like every being, is a
"something" distinct from other things. But one can also
view the intellect -- and this is Thomas's point of view --
as a faculty with a universal scope, "as apprehensive of
universal being". 48 This insight is expressed in Aris-
166 J A N A. A E R T S E N
totle's statement: "the soul is in a sense all things", which
Thomas, in his Commentary on De anima, interprets as
"man is totum ens". 49 Aristotle's phrase points to the
perfection of intellectual substances. Knowing beings
are distinguished from non-knowing beings in that they
are by nature able to assimilate also the forms of other
things; their nature has "a greater amplitude and exten-
sion". 5° Man's horizon is unlimited; he has an "affinity"
to the whole of being. 51 Man, we might say, is marked by
a transcendental openness; his object is being in general.
Now, being is apt to be united to the soul in two ways.
In one way it can be in the soul, not according to its own
mode of being, but in a spiritual manner, according to its
ratio or species. In this case being is the object of the
cognitive power, which is to say true. In another way
being can be that toward which the soul is inclined. In
this case being is the object of the appetite and it is
called good. 52 That the soul is "in a sense all things" is
the philosophical basis for Thomas's relating the tran-
scendentals true and good to the intellect and will of
man.
De veritate 1, 1, is Thomas's most complete exposi-
tion of the transcendentals, with respect both to their
number and to their systematic arrangement. In com-
parison with Philip the Chancellor's treatise, this text
contains important new elements such as the introduc-
tion of "thing" as transcendental, the notion of relational
transcendentals, and the correlation of spirit and being.
These innovations result from Thomas's conception of
truth as "conformity of thing and intellect", for this
conception forced him to a new consideration of the
transcendental status of truth.
(6) The convertibility of being and the true
The transcendentality of truth can be further clarified by
focusing attention on a general feature of the transcen-
dentals, their convertibility. If "true" is a transcendental
predicate, it must be convertible, or interchangeable
with "being". In the S u m m a theologiae I, 16, 3 (" Utrum
verum et ens convertantur") Thomas presents the
following argument for this convertibility. The true
includes a relationship to knowledge. Now, everything is
knowable insofar as it has being (esse) For this reason it
is said that "the soul is in a sense all things". The true,
therefore, is convertible with being, but the true adds to
being a relation to the intellect, s3
This argument is intended to do justice to the two
aspects that are characteristic of the relation among
transcendentals, their real identity and their conceptual
difference. Yet Thomas's reasoning remains somewhat
implicit, and we need to draw the argument out. In this
section we shall discuss the matter of convertibility, and
in the next section we shall focus on what the true adds
to being.
In Thomas's argument for the identity of verum and
ens, the proper middle term is the notion of "act of
being" or "actuality". His reasoning consists of the
following steps:
1. Something is called "true" insofar as it is apt to bring
about a true idea of itself. That which is true is
knowable.
2. Everything is knowable insofar as it has being (esse),
insofar as it is in act. 54 The actuality of a thing is the
inner basis of its knowability. Following Aristotle,
Thomas sees a close connection between truth and
act. Scientific knowledge is therefore directed to-
wards being in act. Being in potency cannot be
known through itself, but only through that of which
it is the potency. 55
3. Insofar as a thing is in act, it is called "being" (ens),
for the name 'being', Thomas says in De veritate 1, 1,
is taken from the act of being. By this act it is distin-
guished from non-being. Actuality is the ground of
both the knowability and the entity of things.
4. From this it follows "that every being is true", and
the converse.
Elsewhere Thomas makes use of the Neoplatonic
image of light to elucidate that whereby a thing is
knowable. Just as in the material world things become
visible through physical light, so also that through which
things become knowable for the intellect can be called
"light". The actuality of the thing, then, is a light through
which the thing reveals itself to the mind, 56 or is
"unconcealed" in the terminology of Heidegger.
Through the identification of actuality with light,
Thomas indicates two essential aspects of ontological
truth: first, truth is actuality, which expresses what being
is in itself, and second, truth is lucidity, which expresses
that being reveals itself to something other and is
knowable.
One might wonder whether in his argument Thomas
has not moved far away from the view that the place of
truth is in the intellect. At this point he advances certain
objections to the convertibility of ens and verum, and
these are highly illuminating for the understanding of
 T R U T H AS T R A N S C E N D E N T A L
the proper nature of the transcendental true. The first
objection is that truth resides properly in the intellect,
whereas being is properly in things, and that v e r u m and
ens are therefore not convertible. 57 Against this it might
be said, as Thomas points out in his reply, that the
opposition is not as absolute as is suggested. Truth is
both in things and in the intellect, and there are also two
modes of being, extramental being (B1) and being as
what is true 032). But this observation does not take the
edge off the objection. Although between the two truths
and between B1 and B2 there is the same causal order,
the relation between the modes of being on the one
hand, and the modalities of truth on the other hand, is
nevertheless not symmetrical. The reason for this is
precisely that truth, unlike being, expresses a relation to
the intellect.
The primary sense of being is B1. But for Thomas the
primary sense of truth is not the truth of the thing,
although the thing is the cause of the truth of the
intellect. In this respect there is a significant difference
between Heidegger and Thomas. According to both,
truth is said in a primary and in a secondary fashion.
According to the former, the unhiddenness of being
which makes the truth of the proposition possible
should rank as the original truth. 58 According to
Thomas, truth is not primarily found in being, even
though the knowability of being is the foundation of
truth, but rather in that in which the concept of truth is
c o m p l e t e d . The relation of conformity is completed in
and through the intellect. Therefore the truth of the
intellect is the primary sense of truth (T1); the proper
place of truth is, as Aristotle posited, in the mind. Truth
belongs to the thing only in a secondary sense (T2),
namely, insofar as it is related to the intellect.59 Between
the modes of being and those of truth there is therefore
no symmetry with respect to the order of primary and
secondary: B1 is to B2 as T2 is to T1. Being is primarily
in things, truth primarily in the intellect.
The first objection accordingly compels Thomas to
modify the thesis of convertibility. Implicitly, he recog-
nizes that the argument presented above for the con-
vertibility between being and the true (CBT1) has only
limited validity. It pertains exclusively to the relation
between the secondary true, that is the ontological true
(T2), and B1. They are interchangeable s e c u n d u m
s u b s t a n t i a m , the usual type of convertibility. But the
primary true that is in the intellect (T1) cannot be
interchangeable in this way with B1. Thomas introduces
for their relation a new type of convertibility (CBT2).
IN T H O M A S A Q U I N A S 167
T1 is convertible with B1 "in the way in which what
manifests is convertible with what is manifested".6° This
new type of convertibility is based on the idea that truth,
as conformity, includes "the manifestation" of the thing
by the intellect.
A second objection to the convertibility of ens and
v e r u m argues that terms are not convertible when one
has greater extension than the other. It seems that truth
has a greater extension than being, since it extends to
being and non-being. Thomas cites Aristotle's statement
that there is truth "when what is is said to be and what is
not is said not to be". Therefore v e r u m and e n s are not
convertible.61 As a matter of fact, this objection bases
the relation between truth and being on one of the
features of the relation between the two modes of being
mentioned by Thomas. The extension of B2, being as
what is true, is greater than that of B 1, because anything
about which a true proposition can be formed is being in
the sense of B2, even if it is a non-being according to
B 1, as is the case with negations and privations.
The reference to the relation between the modes of
being already suggests the answer to the second objec-
tion. It is correct to say that T1, the truth of the intellect,
has a greater extension than B1, but not that truth has
greater extension than being. B2 is also a mode of being,
and this mode is coextensive with T1. The reply to this
objection shows that e n s and v e r u m are not convertible
because in all cases being is knowable through itself and
is apt to be conformed to the intellect. It is also possible
that what is in itself a non-being is made knowable by
the intellect, such that it acquires the character of an e n s
rationis. 62 This conclusion complements Thomas's
exposition in D e veritate 1, 1. The modes of being
discussed there are the categories and the transcen-
dentals, but rational being is not mentioned as a mode of
being.
(7) T h e true as a relational t r a n s c e n d e n t a l
Although ens and v e r u m are convertible, they are not
synonymous. It is not redundant to say that every being
is true. 63 'True' expresses something that is not ex-
pressed by the name 'being'; it adds something to being,
namely, a relation to the intellect. Thomas always takes
seriously the relational character of ontological truth:
"Truth of things", he emphasizes, includes in its concept
not only the entity of things but also the relation of con-
formity to the intellect.64 The true is a relational tran-
168 J A N A. A E R T S E N
scendental. The question which remains is, what is the
nature of the relation that truth adds to being.
The problem of this addition to being is one of the
main questions in the medieval doctrine of the tran-
scendentals. Since Philip the Chancellor there had been
a consensus that that which the other transcendentals
add to being cannot be a distinct reality or nature. For
such an addition would limit being, with the consequence
that the transcendentals would lose their transcendental
character and would no longer express a general mode
of being. What the transcendentals add to being is not
something secundum rein, but secundum rationem. The
relation that truth adds to being is therefore a relation of
reason. Thomas's additional argument for this conclu-
sion is that every real relation is categorial, and that, in
the Aristotelian system of categories, the relation is an
accident that comes to a substance. But truth cannot add
such a relation to being, since this relation needs to be
transcendental. It cannot therefore be real and must be
purely a relation of reasonY Thomas never entertained
the possibility of a real transcendental relation.
In De veritate 21, 1, Thomas deals extensively with
the problem of the addition and gives a more precise
description of the relation of reason that truth adds to
being. This type of relation occurs when the relation
consists in a dependency and is nonmutual. The subject
of the relation does not really depend upon that to
which it is related, but the converse does not hold.
Thomas illustrates this by appealing to the relation
between scientific knowledge (scientia) and its object.
Whereas science depends upon the object, the object
does not depend upon science. The relation of science
to its object is real, but that of the object to science is a
relation of reason, because the object is only thought in
relation to science. Thomas goes on to give this example
a general import. The same holds in all cases where
things are related as measure and that which is meas-
ured. 66 What is measured is really related to that which
measures, but the measure is not dependent on what is
measured. Such a nonreciprocal relation is the relation
of truth, for the thing is the measure of the truth of the
intellect. The thing is thought to be in relation, not
because the thing itself is really related to the intellect
that understands it, but because the intellect is really
related to the thing.
The relation to the intellect that truth adds to being is
a relation of reason, which is like the nonmutual relation
between a measure and what is measured. At this point,
however, a problem arises to which several scholars
have called attention. 67 One may wonder whether in this
way truth can still be regarded as intrinsic to things. If
"things are called true in virtue of the truth in an intel-
lect", 68 it follows from this that being is called true only
by extrinsic denomination. This conclusion seems to
conflict, however, with Thomas's own basic intuition of
the correlation between being and spirit. His argument
for the convertibility of ens and verum is that being is
knowable by virtue of its actuality, and that the human
soul is "in a sense all things". How can Thomas hold the
view that truth is a transcendental mode of being and at
the same time assert that being is called true by extrinsic
denomination?
It seems to me that Thomas's distinction between the
two modes of truth is crucial for the solution to this
difficulty. Being is called true because it "is apt to bring
about a true idea of itself"; truth is conceived here as
knowability. It is noteworthy that Thomas constantly
formulates ontological truth in terms of "aptitude".
Being is knowable through itself, on the basis of its act of
being. Knowability is the possibility for truth, but it is
not yet truth in the formal sense, which is a conformity.
Truth in the formal sense is primarily in the intellect,
and secondarily in the thing insofar as it is known.
Thomas himself recognizes that a thing is not essentially
(essentialiter) called true in relation to the human
intellect. 69
From this a further conclusion follows necessarily.
The same example that Thomas uses to elucidate the
relation of reason that truth adds to being, the relation
of an object to science, he also employs to indicate a
third feature of the relation between the modes of being.
Because extramental being is not dependent on the
knowledge which the intellect has of it, being as what is
true (B2) is accidental to B1. Likewise, the relation to
the intellect must be accidental to the truth of a thing.
Thomas explicitly draws this conclusion. A thing is
related in an accidental way to the intellect for which it
is knowable because the thing, in its being, is not
dependent upon this intellect. 7°
At this point the limits of Thomas's anthropocen-
trism become clearly discernible. His thought does not
manifest an anthropocentrism in the modern sense that
Metz attributes to the term. A good example of this is
Thomas's attitude toward Augustine's definition of
truth: "the true is that which is". Earlier we saw that in
De veritate 1, 1, he criticizes this definition because it
 TRUTH AS TRANSCENDENTAL IN THOMAS AQUINAS
concerns only the foundation of truth and does not
express the complete concept of truth, which consists in
the conformity of thing and intellect. Yet at other places
he offers a certain justification for Augustine's defini-
tion. In this definition of truth, the relation to the h u m a n
intellect has been eliminated, because what is accidental
(per accidens) is excluded f r o m every definition. 71
If truth adds to being a relation to the intellect but the
relation to the h u m a n intellect is not "essential" for
things, then the unfortunate consequence seems to be
that being is called true only per accidens. Essential for
the truth of things can only be a real relation to the
intellect, a relation of dependence. 72 This conclusion
compels T h o m a s to a further consideration of the
relation between thing and intellect.
The concept of truth presupposes a measure. At the
end of De veritate 1, 1, the various definitions of truth
were arranged according to a scheme in which the entity
(entitas) of a thing was the foundation of the conformity
to the intellect. The way in which this scheme was
presented suggested that it has universality, but in De
veritate 1, 2, T h o m a s in fact acknowledges that the
situation is m o r e complex. The measure of truth can be
located in either term of the adaequatio formula. T h e
criterion for the relation is twofold, namely, either the
res or the intellectus. Sometimes the intellect is that
which measures. That is the case with practical reason,
that is, the intellect directed at making s o m e t h i n g .
Practical reason is the cause of things and is therefore
the measure of artifacts. They are called true insofar as
they acquire the likeness of the f o r m in the mind of the
maker. The relation to the practical intellect is essential
for the truth of artifacts, for they are dependent u p o n it.
Sometimes, however, the relation is reversed, and the
thing is the measure of truth. That is the case with
theoretical reason. The thing is that which measures,
because it is prior to the knowledge the intellect has of
it. It is in this way that natural things are related to the
intellect; they are the measure of man's theoretical
reason. 73
Yet the relation to the h u m a n intellect is accidental
for the truth of things, because this intellect is not the
cause of things. Therefore, T h o m a s now takes a further
step based on the model of practical reason. The
measure for the truth of things can only be a productive
intellect, as practical reason is for artifacts. A n d it is in
this way that the creative intellect of G o d relates to all
things. 74 T h o m a s traces the intelligibility of reality back
169
to its origin: the world is created, that is, m a d e by the
divine art. Essential for the truth of things is the relation
to the divine Logos. Ontological truth has a divine
ground.
F o r T h o m a s the ultimate meaning of adaequatio rei et
intellectus as the definition of truth is: the conformity of
the thing with the divine intellect. At the close of De
veritate 1, 2, he concludes that natural things have been
placed between two intellects, the divine and the human,
and that they are said to be true in virtue of the
conformity with each of the two: with the divine intellect
insofar as they fulfill that to which they are ordered by
this intellect; with the h u m a n intellect insofar as they are
apt to bring about true ideas of themselves. But the first
relation is m o r e fundamental for the truth of things than
is the latter one. 75
Things are called true per se in relation to the divine
intellect. 76 Given this foundation of truth, T h o m a s can
also advance a different version of the thesis of the
convertibility of being and the true (CBT3). All natural
things are related to the divine intellect as artifacts to
art. Therefore each thing is said to be true insofar as it
has its own form, according to which it imitates divine
art. "It is in this way that being and the true are
convertible, since any natural thing is conformed to
divine art through its form. ''77 This third version of the
convertibility thesis contains two elements: every being
is true (in the sense of knowable) on the basis of its own
form; every being is true (in the formal sense) on the
basis of its relation to the divine practical intellect. This
last element expresses the ultimate consequence of
Thomas's thought on the true as a relational transcen-
dental
Notes
* I am grateful to Jorge Gracia, Scott MacDonald and Rudi te Velde
for their valuable comments on an earlier draft.
1 The critical edition of De veritate (DV) can be found in the
Leonine edition of Thomas's works (Aquinas, 1882--), vol. 22.
There is an English translation by Mulligan (1952).
2 See Muckle (1933). The definition may be derived from Islamic
Aristotelians, such as Averroes, to whom the editors of Bonaven-
ture's works point as a possible source (Bonaventure, 1882--, vol. 1,
p. 707, n. 5).
3 Albert the Great, De bono I, q. 1, a. 8 (Albert, 1951), p. 15;
Alexander of Hales, Summa theologiae I, 1, 3, 2 (Alexander, 1924),
n. 88; Bonaventure, Collationes in Hexaemeron IV, 2 (Bonaventure,
1891b), p. 349.
 170 J A N A. A E R T S E N
4 Cf. Pouillon (1939).
Summa de bono, prol. (Philip, 1985), p. 4.
6 Ibid., q. 2 (Philip, 1985), p. 15: "Verum enim dicitur sine respectu
ad intellectum."
7 Soliloquia II, 5 (Augustine, 1877).
8 Summa de bono q. 2 (Philip, 1985), p. 10.
9 Albert the Great, De bono I, q. 1, a. 8 (Albert, 1951), p. 15.
10 In what follows in q. 2 (Philip, 1985), p. 13, Philip says that the
definition "sumitur a philosophis."
11 Summa de bono q. 2 (Philip, 1985), p. 8: "Diffinitio enim boni
prima . . . est data . . . per differentiam in negatione consistentem:
per hunc enim modum oportet prima determinari, ut unum."
12 Boethius, De hebdomadibus, prop. VIII (Boethius, 1973), p. 42.
13 See Albert the Great, De bono (Albert, 1951); Bonaventure,
Breviloquium I, 6 (Bonaventure, 1891a), p. 215.
14 Super I Sent. 19, 5, 1; D V 1, 2 sed contra and Resp.; Summa
theologiae I, 16, 1 sed contra.
15 Aristotle's text does not quite say what Thomas suggests, but
Thomas's reading is taken from the medieval Latin translation of the
Arabic text. Cf. Wippel (1989), p. 297, n. 5.
16 In VI Metaph., lect. 4, 1234, esp.: "Sicut ergo bonum et malum
designant perfectiones, quae sunt in rebus: ita verum et falsum
designant perfectiones cognitionum"; 1240: "Apparet etiam ex his
quae hic dicuntur, quod verum et falsum, quae sunt obiecta
cognitionis, sunt in mente." Cf. D V 1, 2: "Motus autem cognitivae
virtutis terminatur ad a n i m a m . . , sed motus appetitivae terminatur
ad res . . . . Et qnia bonum dicit ordinem entis ad appetitum, verum
autem dicit ordinem ad intellectum; inde est quod Philosophus dicit
in VI Metaph. quod bonum et malum sunt in rebus, verum autem et
falsum sunt in mente"; S.th. I, 16, 1. For the contrast between the
acts of knowledge and appetite see, f. i., De virtutibus in communi a.
9: "Actio intellectus . . . est seeundum quod aliqualiter assimilatur
eognoscibili;.., actio autem virtutis appetitivae consistit in quadam
inclinatione ad appetibile."
17 In VIMetaph., lect. 4, 1239.
is In VI Metaph., lect. 4, 1242: "Et i d e o . . , est praetermittendurn
, .. ens quod significat v e r u m . . . Et ideo pertinet ad scientiam de
intellectu." Cf. In IVMetaph., lect. 17, 736: "Verum autem et falsum
pertinent proprie ad considerationem logici; consequuntur enim ens
in ratione de quo considerat logicus: nam verum et falsum sunt in
mente."
19 De ente et essentia, ch. 1; S.th. I, 3, 4 ad 2; 48, 2 ad 2; Summa
contra gentiles III, 9; De potentia 7, 2 ad 1; De malo 1, 1 ad 19;
Quodl. IX, 2, 2; SuperlSent. 19, 5, 1 ad 1; Super l I Sent. 34, 1, 1. Cf.
Veres (1970).
2o In VMetaph., lect. 9, 896.
21 S.th. I, 16, 3: "Sed contra est quod dicit Philosophus quod eadem
est dispositio rerum in esse et veritate."
22 Thomas carefully articulates Aristotle's argument in his Com-
mentary: In H Metaph., lect. 2, 292--298.
23 See S.th. I, 2, 3 ("the fourth way"); Depotentia 3, 5.
24 D V 1, 1 ad 5. Cf. Summa contragentiles I, 62.
25 Superloannem c. 18, lect. 6, 2365. Cf. S.th I, 16, 3 ad 1: "Verum
est in rebus et in intellectu."
26 This view seems to have regained support among modern
Aristotle scholars. See Owens (1984).
27 In IIMetaph., lect. 2, 298.
28 Cf. In I X Metaph., lect. 11, 1898: " . . . fundamentum et causa
veritatis."
29 D V 1, 1: " . . . adaequatio intellectus et rei dicitur, et in hoc
formaliter ratio veil perficitur."
3o Super I Sent. 19, 5, 1: "In ipsa operatione intellectus . . .
completur relatio adaequationis, in qua consistit ratio veritatis."
31 D V 21, 1: "Et ideo omnes recte diffinientes verum ponunt in eius
diffinitione intellectum." Cf. In I Perihermeneias, lect. 3, 29: "Unde
de quocumque dicatur verum, oportet quod hoc sit per respectum ad
intellectum."
32 D V 2 1 , 1.
33 D V 1, 5: "Veritas adaequationem quandam et commensura-
tionem importat."
34 Super I Sent. 19, 5, 2 ad 2: "Cum veritas sit quaedam rectitudo et
commensuratio, oportet quod in ratione veritatis intelligitur men-
sura."
35 Cf. In IPerih., lect. 7, 84: "Sicut in subiecto est verum vel falsum
in mente, ut dicitur in VI Metaph., in re autem sicut in causa."
36 See Thomas's own formulation in In V Metaph., lect. 9, 895:
"Unde veritas propositionis potest dici veritas rei per causarn. Nam
ex eo quod res est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa est."
37 D V 1 , 1 ad 1; 1, 10 ad 1; SuperlSent. 19, 5, 1 ad 1.
38 Vande Wiele (1954), p. 549.
39 D V 1, 1: "Sicut in demonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in
aliqua principia per se intellectui nota, ita investigando quid est
unumquodque. Alias utrobique in infinitum iretur, et sic periret
omnino scienfia et cognitio rerum."
40 Ibid. 1, 1: "l]lud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi
notissimum et in quod conceptiones omnes resolvit est ens." Cf. S.th.
I--II, 94, 2: "Illud quod primo cadit sub apprehensione est ens, cujus
intellectus includitur in omnibus quaecumque quis apprehendit."
41 D V 1, 1: "Sed enti non possunt addi aliqua quasi extranea per
modum quo differentia additur generi vel accidens subiecto, quia
quaelibet natura est essentialiter ens. Unde probat efiam Philoso-
phus in III Metaph. (c. 8) quod ens non potest esse genus."
42 Cf. D V 2 1 , 1: " . . . per modum contrahendi et determinandi."
43 For instance in D V 21, 3.
44 D V 1 , 1.
45 SuperlSent. 25, 1, 4; SuperllSent. 37, 1, 1.
46 D V 1, 1: "Hoc autem est anima, quae 'quodam modo est omnia',
ut dicitur in III De Anima. In anima autem est vis cognitiva et
appetitiva. Convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc
nomen 'bonum', . . . convenientiam veto entis ad intellectum
exprimit hoc nomen 'verum'."
47 Metz (1962).
48 S.th.I, 8 2 , 4 a d 1 .
49 In III De anima, lect. 13,790.
50 S.th.I, 14, 1.
sl Summa contra gentiles III, 112: "Naturae autem intellectuales
majorem habent affinitatem ad totum quam aliae naturae, nam
unaquaeque intellectualis substantia est quodammodo omnia, in-
quantum totius entis comprehensiva est suo intellectu."
52 D V 2 2 , 1 0 ; S . t h . I , 78,1.
53 S.th. I, 16, 3: " . . . verum habet ordinem ad cognitionem.
Unumquodque autem inquantum habet de esse, intantum est
cognoscibile. Et propter hoc dicitur in III De anima quod 'anima est
quodammodo omnia' secundum sensum et intellectum. Et i d e o . . .
 TRUTH AS TRANSCENDENTAL
convertitur cum ente . . . verum. Sed tamen . . . addit . . . verum
comparationem ad intellectum."
54 S.th. I, 87, 1.
55 S.th. III, lO, 3.
56 In De causis, lect. 6, 168: "Probat autem Philosophus in IX
Metaph. (c. 9) quod u n u m q u o d q u e cognoscitur per id quod est in
actu et ideo ipsa actualitas rei est q u o d d a m lumen ipsius."
57 S.th.I, 16,3obj. l. Cf. D V 1 , 2 o b j . 1.
55 Heidegger (1967), pp. 80--81.
59 D V 1 , 2; S.th. I, 16, i a d 3.
60 S.th. I, 16, 3 ad 1. In D V 1, 2 these types of convertibility are
called per praedicationem and per consequentiam.
61 S.th.I, 16,3obj. 2. Cf. D V l , l obj. 7.
62 S.th. I, 16, 3 ad 2: "Non ens non habet in se unde cognoscatur, sed
cognoscitur inquanmm intellectus facit iUud cognoscibile. U n d e
verum fundatur in ente, inquantum non ens est q u o d d a m ens
rationis, apprehensum scilicet a ratione." Super I Sent. 19, 5, 1 ad 5;
D V l , l a d 7 . Cf. D V 1 , 5 a d 2 .
63 D V 1, 1 ad 1 (quae contra obiciuntur).
64 D V 1, 8.
65 Cf. D V 21, 1 ad 3: "Omnis relatio realis est in genere deter-
minato, sed relationes non reales possunt circuire omne ens."
66 D V 21, 1: "Illa autem r e l a t i o . . , invenitur esse rationis tantum,
secundum quam dicitur referri id quod non dependet ad id ad quod
refertur, sed e converso, cum ipsa relatio quaedam dependentia sit
IN T H O M A S AQUINAS 171
. . . . Et ita est in omnibus aliis quae se babent ut mensura et
mensuratum, vel perfectivum et perfectibile."
67 See Vande Wiele (1954), p. 551; Aertsen (1984), pp. 10--11;
Wippel (1989), pp. 324--326.
6~ S.th. I, 16, 8.
69 In I Perih., lect. 3, 29. Cf. D V 1, 4: "In rebus autem [veritas est]
improprie et secundario."
7o S.th. I, 16, 1: "Per accidens autem [habet res ordinem] ad intel-
lectum a quo cognoscibilis est." Cf. D V 1, 4: "Veritas autem quae
dicitur de rebus in comparatione ad intellectum humanum, est rebus
q u o d a m m o d o accidentalis"; D V 1, 10.
71 &th.I, 1 6 , 1 a d l . Cf. D V 1 , 2 a d 4 .
72 S.th. I, 16, 1: "Per se quidem habet [res] ordinem ad intellectum a
quo dependet secundum suum esse."
73 D V 1 , 2. Cf. InlPerih.,lect. 3, 29.
74 D V 1, 2: "Sed sunt mensuratae ab intellectu divino, in quo sunt
omnia, sicut omnia artificiata in intellectu artificis."
75 D V l, 2: "Prima autem ratio veritatis per prius inest rei quam
secunda, quia prius est eius comparatio ad intellectum divinum quam
humanum."
76 D V 1, 10: "Comparatio ad intellectum divinum est ei essentialis
et secundum earn per se dicitur vera."
77 InIPerih., lect. 3, 30.
Free University, A m s t e r d a m