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420 F.3d 823, 201 Ed. Law Rep. 97, 11 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 493
(Cite as: 420 F.3d 823)
170A Federal Civil Procedure Before ARNOLD, BOWMAN, and RILEY, Circuit
170AXVI New Trial Judges.
170AXVI(B) Grounds
170Ak2332 k. Misconduct of Parties,
BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.
Counsel or Witnesses. Most Cited Cases
Improper questioning by counsel generally entitles Jordan Blair sued the Appellees, alleging that they
the aggrieved party to a new trial if it conveys im- violated various federal and state laws while Blair
proper information to the jury and prejudices the was a student at boarding schools in Missouri and
opposing litigant. Florida. Prior to trial, the District Court granted the
Appellees' motion to dismiss Blair's claim under 42
[8] Federal Civil Procedure 170A 2332
U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) and the Appellees' motion for
170A Federal Civil Procedure summary judgment on Blair's state-law claim of
170AXVI New Trial false imprisonment. The District Court also granted
170AXVI(B) Grounds summary judgment on Blair's state-law battery
170Ak2332 k. Misconduct of Parties, claim with respect to all Appellees except for Bo
Counsel or Witnesses. Most Cited Cases Gerhardt. During trial, the District Court granted
District court has broad discretion in deciding the Appellees' motion for judgment as a matter of
whether questioning by counsel is so prejudicial law on Blair's claim under the Fair Labor Standards
that a new trial is warranted. Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000). Blair's
battery claim against Bo Gerhardt was submitted to
[9] Federal Civil Procedure 170A 2332 the jury, which returned a verdict against Gerhardt
and awarded Blair $20,000 in damages. The Dis-
170A Federal Civil Procedure trict Court denied Gerhardt's motion for a new trial.
170AXVI New Trial Blair appeals the District Court's adverse rulings as
170AXVI(B) Grounds to his *826 claims, and we affirm. Bo Gerhardt
170Ak2332 k. Misconduct of Parties, cross-appeals the District Court's denial of his mo-
Counsel or Witnesses. Most Cited Cases tion for a new trial. We reverse the District Court's
District court abused its discretion in denying new judgment with respect to Gerhardt's motion and re-
trial to private school employee on student's claim mand for a new trial.
of battery based on opposing counsel's continued
emphasis on irrelevant information about condi-
tions at school, despite court's frequent admonitions I.
and sustaining of 52 objections during first two
In October 2001, Blair, who was sixteen years old
days of trial, where irrelevant information possibly
at the time, was arrested in Crawford County,
influenced jury verdict by suggesting that
Arkansas, and charged with terroristic threatening
something more had occurred at school.
and criminal mischief. Blair's parents asked the Ju-
*825 Oscar Amos Stilley, argued, Fort Smith, AR,
venile Division of the Circuit Court of Crawford
for appellant/cross-appellee.
County, Arkansas (Juvenile Court), to place Blair
John D. Briggs, argued, St. Louis, MO, for Bob on probation and order him to complete a residen-
Wills, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. tial term at a Baptist boarding academy in lieu of
sentencing him to a term of confinement at a juven-
John L. Oliver, argued, Cape Girardeau, MO, for ile detention facility. At Blair's juvenile adjudica-
Bo Gerhardt, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. tion hearing, the Juvenile Court ordered that Blair
be placed on probation and that, as a term of his
426, 130 L.Ed.2d 340 (1994). pellees were acting under color of state law, the
District Court did not err in granting the *828 Ap-
Having determined that the District Court's Rule pellees' motion for summary judgment on Blair's §
12(b)(6) dismissal should be treated as a Rule 56 1983 claim.
grant of summary judgment, we must determine
whether it was properly granted. We review de
novo the District Court's grant of summary judg- III.
ment. Shanklin v. Fitzgerald, 397 F.3d 596, 602
Blair next argues that the District Court erred in
(8th Cir.2005). Summary judgment is proper only
granting the Appellees' motion for summary judg-
where there is no genuine issue of material fact and
ment on his state-law claim of false imprisonment.
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
As noted above, we review de novo the District
of law. Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). We view
Court's grant of summary judgment, viewing the
the evidence and the inferences that may reasonably
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmov-
be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
ing party. We affirm if there is no genuine issue of
the nonmoving party. Id.
material fact and the moving party is entitled to
[2] To proceed on his § 1983 claim, Blair was re- judgment as a matter of law. Shanklin, 397 F.3d at
quired to establish that the Appellees deprived him 602.
of his constitutional rights while acting “under col-
[3][4] Missouri state law governs the substance of
or of state law.” See Adams ex rel. Harris v. Boy
Blair's false imprisonment claim. Dairy Farmers of
Scouts of Am.-Chickasaw Council, 271 F.3d 769,
Am., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 292 F.3d 567, 572
777-78 (8th Cir.2001) (noting that conduct of
(8th Cir.2002) (noting that when jurisdiction over
private party may be attributed to state where state
an issue is based on diversity, court applies sub-
has “situated itself in a position of interdependence
stantive law of the forum state). To proceed on his
with” private party). Blair attempts to satisfy this
false imprisonment claim, Blair was required to
requirement by arguing that, because the Juvenile
show that he was confined without his consent and
Court ordered him to attend Mountain Park, state
without legal justification. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 565.130
action may be imputed to the school. The District
(2000); Rankin v. Venator Group Retail, Inc., 93
Court found this argument unavailing and so do we.
S.W.3d 814, 819 (Mo.Ct.App.2002); Hyatt v. Trans
At the request of Blair's parents, the Juvenile Court
World Airlines, Inc., 943 S.W.2d 292, 299
ordered that Blair complete treatment at “Baptist
(Mo.Ct.App.1997). In determining whether a minor
Boys Academy in Missouri (or like facility ).” Joint
has consented to a confinement, we may consider
App. at 250 (Order of Juvenile Court dated October
whether the minor's parents have consented on his
24, 2001) (emphasis added). Contrary to Blair's as-
behalf because parents exercise authority over the
sertions, the Juvenile Court did not place Blair at
custody, care, and management of their children,
Mountain Park or Palm Lane. Rather, the choice of
Whisman v. Rinehart, 119 F.3d 1303, 1309 (8th
boarding school was left to Blair's parents, who
Cir.1997); Mo.Rev.Stat. § 475.025 (2000), and may
completed an application for Blair's admission at
delegate that authority on behalf of their minor chil-
Mountain Park, consented to Blair's transfer to
dren, Mo.Rev.Stat. § 431.061 (2000) (allowing par-
Palm Lane, and signed a power of attorney delegat-
ents to give consent for medical treatment on behalf
ing authority over Blair to school administrators.
of minor children); Mo.Rev.Stat. § 631.105 (2000)
Blair did not establish that Mountain Park or Palm
(authorizing parents to enroll or commit children to
Lane received state-provided funds or accepted re-
treatment facilities).
ferrals or placements directly from state courts. Be-
cause Blair presented no evidence that the Ap- [5] According to Blair, the Appellees detained him
costs that the Appellees would have incurred had Appellees' to deprive Blair of his constitutional
they hired employees to perform those tasks, look- rights, false imprisonment, cruel and unusual pun-
ing at the totality of the economic circumstances, ishment, deprivation of medicine and educational
there is no evidence on which a reasonable jury materials, and denial of bathroom privileges and
could conclude that Blair's activities constituted sleep). Nevertheless, by our count, the Appellees
employment under the FLSA. The District Court properly objected in open court to questioning by
did not err in granting the Appellees' motion for Blair's counsel on eighteen occasions during the
judgment as a matter of law on Blair's FLSA claim. first day and on thirty-four occasions during the
second day of a two-and-a-half-day trial. Among
other objectionable questions, Blair's counsel asked
V.
witnesses whether the school prohibited students
[7][8] Bo Gerhardt argues that the District Court from having the King James version of the Bible;
abused its discretion in refusing to grant his motion whether students were required to attend religious
for a new trial. Gerhardt contends that Blair's attor- services; whether Blair was denied access to an at-
ney repeatedly introduced irrelevant and prejudicial torney; whether the school had a racial nondiscrim-
matters into the proceedings and that this miscon- ination policy; whether students were confined; and
duct was so severe that he is entitled to a new trial. whether students were forced to eat rotten or
“[I]mproper questioning by counsel generally en- spoiled food. The District Court sustained an objec-
titles the aggrieved party to a new trial if it conveys tion after each of these questions, but did not strike
improper information to the jury and prejudices the the offending question or immediately instruct the
opposing litigant.” Silbergleit v. First Interstate jury to disregard the irrelevant information. Al-
Bank of Fargo, 37 F.3d 394, 398 (8th Cir.1994) though the District Court repeatedly reminded
(citing Sanders-El v. Wencewicz, 987 F.2d 483, 484 Blair's counsel to focus on the claims remaining in
(8th Cir.1993)). When counsel repeatedly attempts the case-the FLSA and battery claims-and to refrain
to use irrelevant and prejudicial evidence, the pos- from injecting irrelevant and prejudicial evidence
sibility of improper influence is increased. Id. into the proceeding, these admonitions were unsuc-
Counsel's*830 misconduct may be such that a dis- cessful. Unfortunately, the ongoing introduction of
trict court cannot overcome its prejudicial effect by irrelevant information, the repeated objections by
admonishing the jury or rebuking counsel; in such Appellees, and the frequent warnings and admoni-
case a court should grant a new trial. Id. The Dis- tions by the District Court likely gave jurors the im-
trict Court has broad discretion in deciding whether pression that something more happened than they
questioning by counsel is so prejudicial that a new were being told. When the case is a close one, the
trial is warranted, id., and we review this determin- possibility that improper conduct could have influ-
ation for abuse of discretion only, Marvin Lumber enced the jury's verdict is increased. Silbergleit, 37
& Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., 401 F.3d 901, 917 (8th F.3d at 398. The fact that the jury awarded Blair
Cir.2005). $20,000 on relatively weak evidence of battery sup-
ports our conclusion that Gerhardt was prejudiced
[9] Prior to trial, the Appellees filed a motion in by the misconduct of Blair's counsel.
limine with the District Court seeking to exclude
evidence they argued was irrelevant to Blair's The line of questions posed by Blair's counsel over
FLSA and battery claims. The District Court gran- the course of the two-and-a-half-day trial emphas-
ted the motion insofar as it agreed with the Ap- ized irrelevant information having no bearing on
pellees that the evidence was irrelevant to Blair's the issues remaining in the case and demonstrated a
remaining claims. See Transcript Vol. I at 13-44 persistent effort by Blair's counsel to get this in-
(excluding evidence of, inter alia, a conspiracy by formation before the jury, despite repeated admoni-
VI.
C.A.8 (Mo.),2005.
Blair v. Wills
420 F.3d 823, 201 Ed. Law Rep. 97, 11 Wage &
Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 493
END OF DOCUMENT