Tax 2 Digests Part 2 PDF

1. Alejandro Ty v. Hon. Aurelio C.
Trampe
GR No. 117577, December 1, 1995
FACTS: The Municipal Assessor of Pasig sent a notice of assessment to petitioners for certain real properties
located in Pasig City. The assessor having denied the letter of petitioner for reconsideration, they filed a petition
with the RTC to declare the tax assessment void and enjoin the collection of taxes based on the assessment. The
RTC denied the petition for lack of merit. The petitioners argue that the assessment is void for failure to comply
with PD 921 which provides for the preparation of schedule of values within Metro Manila to be prepared jointly
by the City Assessors of the districts within said area. However, respondents argue that PD 921 was impliedly
repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991 as the same vests the authority to assess with the Municipal/City
Assessors.
ISSUE: W/N RA 7160 (LGC of 1991) repealed the provisions of PD 921
RULING: No. PD 921 is still a good law and the schedule of values prepared solely by the municipal assessor is
illegal and void. If the intention of the legislature was to abrogate PD 921, it would have included it in such
repealing clause. An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated
that the two laws are clearly repugnant & inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. While RA 7160 covers almost
governmental functions delegated to local governments units, PD 921 embraces only the Metropolitan Manila
Area and is limited especially to the assessment and collection of real estate (& some other taxes). Therefore, it
is obvious that harmony in these provisions is not only possible, but in fact desirable, necessary and consistent
with the legislative intent & policy. By this harmonization, the preamble of both statutes shall be fulfilled.
2. Hon. Franklin Drilon v. Mayor Alfredo Lim

GR No. 112497, August 4, 1994
FACTS: The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code. The
Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila
Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for
containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and
sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the
power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The
Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the
enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed.
ISSUE: W/N Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional.
CONTRIBUTORS
BANCE|BONIEL|CHENG|DAMASING|EMNACE|FLOR|MURILLO|NALA|PANGANDAMAN|PAZAULAN|QUIRAP|ROA|VILLAMOR
RULING: No. Sec. 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax
ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets
aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local
government that enacted the measure. Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it
with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable
as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. All he did in reviewing the said
measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with
the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances. It was an act not of control but of mere
supervision.
The court however affirmed the finding of the lower court that Drilon erred in ruling that there was no
compliance of the procedure and declare the ordinance valid.
3. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines v. City of Manila

GR No. 156252, June 27, 2006
FACTS: In 2000, the City Mayor of Manila approved Tax Ordinance No. 7988, or the Revised Revenue Code of the
City of Manila, which increased the tax rates applicable to certain establishment operating within the city,
including Coca Cola. Coca Cola then filed a petition before the Secretary of Justice questioning the
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 7988.
Under the Old Revenue Code, all registered businesses in the City of Manila that are already paying the
business tax shall be exempted from payment thereof. However, the Revised Revenue code deleted this provision
which now, in effect, imposed additional business taxes on Coca Cola which is already subject to other business
taxes. The DOJ, while it declared the ordinance null and void, however based its decision on the fact that the
ordinance failed to comply with the mandatory publication requirements under the LGC. The LGC requires the
publication of tax ordinances and revenue measures for three consecutive days. However, Ordinance No. 7988
was published only once. The City of Manila then issued an ordinance amending Ordinance No. 7988.
ISSUE: W/N Tax Ordinance No. 7988 is null and void for failure to satisfy the requirements of publication for 3
consecutive days, regardless of the amendatory ordinance.
RULING: Yes. It is evident that Tax Ordinance No. 7988 is null and void as said ordinance was published only once
in contravention of the unmistakable directive of the LGC. What the City should have done was to enact another
tax measure which strictly complies with the requirements of law, both procedural and substantive. The passage
of the amendatory ordinance did not have the effect of curing the defects of Ordinance No. 7988, which in any
way, does not legally exist. If an order or law sought to be amended is invalid, then it does not legally exists, there
should be no occasion or need to amend it.
CONTRIBUTORS
4. International Container Terminal Services v. City of Manila
CTA A.C No. 11, May 17, 2006
FACTS: International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI) is engaged in the business of stevedoring, arrastre
and warehousing. It pays the City of Manila annually a local business tax equivalent to 75% of 1% of the gross
receipts for the preceding calendar years pursuant to Sec. 18 of Manila Ordinance No. 7794. When it renewed its
business license in 1999, it was assessed tax based on Sec. 18 of the said ordinance and an additional tax of 50%
of 1% of the gross receipts of 1998 based on Sec. 21 of the Ordinance, as amended by Ordinance No. 7807. ICTSI
paid the amount assessed under protest. When the City Treasurer failed to decide on the protest within 60 days,
ICTSI filed a petition for certiorari within 30 days from the lapse of the 60-day period. Respondent however argued
that the petition is premature for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, since the question of
constitutionality should have been lodged before the Secretary of Justice. RTC dismissed the petition with finality.
ISSUES: (1) W/N the assessment taxes by the City of Manila under Secs. 18 and 21 of the Revenue Code of Manila
constitutes double taxation. (2) W/N the petition filed by petitioner was the proper remedy.
RULING: (1) Yes, there is double taxation. Sec. 18 is a tax on contractors while Sec. 21 is a business tax on persons
who sell goods and services in the course of trade or business. However, a contractor as defined by the Ordinance
is one whose activity consists essentially in the sale of all kinds of services for a fee. Evidently, the taxes under
Sec. 18 and Sec. 21 similarly tax persons engaged in the sale of services in the course of its business, which is a
clear case of double taxation.
(2) No. The LGC provides for the following remedies: (a) Procedure for approval and effectivity of tax
ordinances and revenue measures under Sec. 187; (b) protest of assessment under Sec. 195; and (c) Claim for
refund or tax credit under Sec. 196. Under Sec. 195, a taxpayer is given 60 days from receipt of assessment to file
a protest with the local treasurer who shall then render his decision on the protest within 60 days. If the treasurer
denies the protest, the taxpayer has 30 days from receipt to appeal such decision. If the local treasurer fails to
render a decision, the taxpayer shall have 30 days from the lapse of the 60-day period to file an appeal with the
court of competent jurisdiction, otherwise the assessment shall become conclusive and unappealable.
Hence, while it was correct for petitioner to seek recourse with the ordinary courts instead of the
Secretary of Justice (which is the remedy under Sec. 187 and not 195), it was however wrong to file a petition for
certiorari. A petition for certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a remedy of a regular appeal which is
available.
5. Philippine Match Co. Ltd. v. City of Cebu

81 SCRA 99, January 18, 1978
CONTRIBUTORS
FACTS: Cebu City imposed a quarterly tax (sales tax of 1%) on gross sales or receipts of merchants, dealers,
importers and manufacturers or any commodity doing business in Cebu City through Ordinance 279. Sec. 9 of
said ordinance provided that, for the purpose of the tax, "all deliveries of goods or commodities stored in Cebu
City, or if not stored are sold in that city, shall be considered as sales in the city and shall be taxable. Philippine
Match questioned the legality of the tax collected by the City of Cebu on sales of matches stored by the company
in Cebu but delivered to customers outside the city.
ISSUE: W/N the City of Cebu can validly tax sales of matches perfected and paid for in Cebu City but delivered to
customers outside the City.
RULING: Yes. The city can validly tax the sales of matches to customers outside of the city as long as the orders
were booked and paid for in the company’s branch office in the city. Those matches can be regarded as sold in
the city, as contemplated in the ordinance, because the matches were delivered to the carrier in Cebu City.
Generally, delivery to the carrier is delivery to the buyer (Article 1523, Civil Code). A different interpretation would
defeat the tax ordinance in question or encourage tax evasion through the simple expedient of arranging for the
delivery of the matches at the outskirts of the city though the purchases were effected and paid for in the
company’s branch office in the city. The municipal board of the city is empowered to provide for the levy and
collection of taxes for general and special purposes in accordance with law.
6. PLDT v. City of Davao

GR No. 143867, March 25, 2003
FACTS: PLDT paid a franchise tax equal to 3% of its gross receipts, which was paid "in lieu of all taxes on this
franchise or earnings thereof" pursuant to RA 7082. However, the exemption from "all taxes on this franchise or
earnings" was withdrawn by the Local Government Code which gave local government units the power to tax
business enjoying a franchise on the bases of its income received or earned within their territorial jurisdiction.
Davao City then enacted Ordinance No. 519 which imposed a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise at
75% of 1% of the gross annual receipts. However, in 1995, RA 7925 or the Public Telecommunication Policy of
the Policy granted exemption or immunity to telecommunications franchises previously granted immunity, i.e.
Smart and Globe. When PLDT applied for mayor's permit in 1999, it was required to pay local franchise tax. PLDT
challenged the power of the city to collect local franchise tax and demanded a refund.
ISSUE: W/N by virtue of Ra 7925, PLDT is again entitled to the exemption from payment of local franchise tax.
RULING: No. Tax exemptions should be granted only by a clear and unequivocal provision of law which must be
expressed in a language to plain to be mistaken. The runabout way of granting tax exemption to PLDT is not a
direct, clear and unequivocal way of communicating the legislative intent. Nor does the term "exemption" in Sec.
CONTRIBUTORS
23 of RA 7925 mean tax exemption. The term refers to exemption from regulations and requirements imposed
by the NTC.
7. Palma Development Corp v. Municipality of Malangas

GR No. 152492, October 16, 2003
FACTS: Petitioner Palma Development is engaged in milling and selling rice and corn to wholesalers in Zamboanga
City. It uses the municipal port of Malangas as transshipment port for its goods. In January 1994, Malangas passed
Revenue Code No. 9 which imposed service fees for the use of municipal roads or streets leading to the wharf at
P.50/sack of rice or corn. Palma Development paid under protest but argued that Malangas had no authority to
tax goods and vehicles passing through its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: W/N Municipal Revenue Code No. 9 is valid.
RULING: No. While respondent may have the power to tax or impose fees on vehicles using its roads, it cannot
tax the goods that are transported by the vehicles. By express language of Sections 153 and 155 of RA No. 7160,
local government units, through their Sanggunian, may prescribe the terms and conditions for the imposition of
toll fees or charges for the use of any public road, pier or wharf funded and constructed by them. A service fee
imposed on vehicles using municipal roads leading to the wharf is thus valid. However, Section 133(e) of RA No.
7160 prohibits the imposition, in the guise of wharfage, of fees -- as well as all other taxes or charges in any form
whatsoever -- on goods or merchandise. It is therefore irrelevant if the fees imposed are actually for police
surveillance on the goods, because any other form of imposition on goods passing through the territorial
jurisdiction of the municipality is clearly prohibited by Section 133(e).
8. PLDT v. Province of Laguna

GR No. 151899, August 16, 2005
FACTS: PLDT is a holder of a legislative franchise under Act No. 3436 which included the so-called in-lieu-lf-all-
taxes clause which allowed it to pay a franchise tax equivalent to 3% of its gross receipts which shall be in lieu of
all taxes. However, in 1992, the Local Government Code was enacted allowing LGUs to impose local franchise tax.
In 1995, Congress enacted RA 7925 or the Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines which was
aimed at leveling the playing field among telecommunication companies. The same provides that any advantage,
favor or immunity granted under existing franchises shall become part of previously granted telecommunications
franchises. Since Smart and Globe whose franchises were granted after the effectivity of the LGC were granted
tax exemption, PLDT now contends that by virtue of RA 7925, it is also entitled to the same exemption.
CONTRIBUTORS
ISSUE: Is PLDT now exempt from payment of local franchise tax?
RULING: No. Tax exemptions should be granted only by a clear and unequivocal provision of law which must be
expressed in a language to plain to be mistaken. The runabout way of granting tax exemption to PLDT is not a
direct, clear and unequivocal way of communicating the legislative intent. Nor does the term "exemption" in Sec.
23 of RA 7925 mean tax exemption. The term refers to exemption from regulations and requirements imposed
by the NTC.
9. Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation

GR 154993, October 25, 2005
FACTS: In 1998, BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation (Lepanto) received a tax assessment in the amount of
P1.6 million from Luz Yamane, the City Treasurer of Makati, for business taxes. Lepanto protested the assessment
as it averred that Lepanto, as a corporation, is not organized for profit; that it merely exists for the maintenance
of the condominium.
ISSUE: Whether or not a condominium corporation organized solely for the maintenance of a condominium is
liable for local taxation.
HELD: No. Lepanto was not organized for profit. The fees it was collecting from the condominium unit owners
redound to the owners themselves because the fees collected are being used for the maintenance of the condo.
Further, it appears that the assessment issued by Yamane did not state the legal basis for the tax being imposed
on Lepanto – it merely states that Makati is authorized to collect business taxes under the Local Government
Code (LGC) but no other reference specific reference to specific laws were cited.
10. Ericsson Telecoms Inc. v. City of Pasig

GR No. 176667, November 22, 2007
FACTS: Ericsson Telecommunications, Inc. is a corporation engaged in the design, engineering, and marketing of
telecommunication facilities/system with principal address at Pasig City. It was assessed by the City Treasurer of
Pasig City of business tax deficiency for the years 1998 and 1999 and also for 2000 and 2001 based on its gross
revenues. Petitioner filed a Protest arguing that that the local business tax on contractors should be based on
gross receipts and not gross revenue.
ISSUE: What should be the basis of the local business tax? Gross receipts or gross revenue?
CONTRIBUTORS
HELD: The basis should be gross receipts.
Paragraph e, Section 143 of the Local Government Code provides that “The municipality may impose taxes
on the following businesses: (e) On contractors and other independent contractors. . .”
The above provision specifically refers to gross receipts.
The law is clear. Gross receipts include money or its equivalent actually or constructively received in
consideration of services rendered or articles sold, exchanged or leased, whether actual or constructive.
11. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. Hon. Mauricio B. Ambaloc in his capacity as the Provincial Treasurer
of Benguet
G. R. No. 1 80639, June 29, 2010
FACTS: Lepanto Consolidated Mining had a mining lease contract for a mining claim in Benguet. They used the
sand and gravel mined to construct and maintain concrete structures needed in its mining operations such as a
tailings dam, access roads, and offices. The provincial treasurer of Benguet then asked Lepanto Consolidated
Mining to pay sand and gravel tax for the quarry materials extracted from the mining site. The counterargument
was that the said tax applied only to commercial extractions and since Lepanto did not supply other users for
some profit, the tax should not apply.
ISSUE: Is Lepanto liable for the tax imposed by Benguet on the sand and gravel that it extracted from within the
area of its mining claim used exclusively in its mining operations?
HELD: YES. The CTA erred in applying the provision of the Local Government Code (Section 138) since the basis
of Benguet province emanates from the Revised Benguet Revenue Code itself. This notwithstanding, the
provincial revenue measure still did not distinguish between commercial and non-commercial extractions.
In addition, the Petitioner’s argument that when a company is taxed on its main business it can no longer
be taxable for engaging in an activity that is but part of, incidental to, and necessary to such main business, was
held to be inapplicable. The Court said that the cases where the above principle has been applied involved
business taxes and thus the incidental activities could not be treated as separate and distinct from the main
business. Here the tax being imposed was an excise tax levied on the privilege of extracting gravel and sand.
12. Angeles City v. Angeles City Electric Corporation and RTC Branch 57 Angeles City
G.R. No. 1661 34, June 29, 2010
FACTS: On January 22, 2004, the City Treasurer issued a Notice of Assessment to Angeles Electric Corporation
(AEC) for payment of business tax, license fee and other charges for the period1993 to 2004 in the total amount
of P94,861,194.10. Within the period prescribed by law, AEC protested the assessment. When the city Treasurer
CONTRIBUTORS
denied the protest and ordered petitioner to settle its obligation, petitioner filed with the RTC a petition praying
for the issuance of a TRO which was granted. The city government opposed on the ground that per NIRC the
collection of taxes cannot be enjoined.
ISSUE: Whether or not the collection of local government taxes can be enjoined.
HELD: The prohibition on the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the collection of taxes applies only to
national internal revenue taxes and not to local taxes. There is no express provision in the Local Government
Code prohibiting courts from issuing injunction to restrain local governments from collecting taxes. Furthermore,
when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner in the ordinary course of
law except this application for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to stop the
auction sale and/or to enjoin and/or restrain respondents from levying, annotating the levy, seizing, confiscating,
garnishing, selling and disposing at public auction the properties of petitioner, or otherwise exercising other
administrative remedies against the petitioner and its properties, justifies the move of the petitioner in seeking
the injunctive reliefs sought for.
13. Mactan v. Marcos

G.R. No. 1 20082, Sept. 11, 1996
FACTS: Petitioner Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority was created by virtue of R.A. 6958, mandated to
principally undertake the economical, efficient, and effective control, management, and supervision of the
Mactan International Airport and Lahug Airport, and such other airports as may be established in Cebu.
Since the time of its creation, petitioner MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption from payment of realty
taxes in accordance with Section 14 of its charter. However, on October 11, 1994, Mr. Eustaquio B. Cesa, Officer
in Charge, Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu, demanded payment from realty taxes in the total amount
of P2229078.79. Petitioner objected to such demand for payment as baseless and unjustified claiming in its favor
the afore cited Section 14 of R.A. 6958. It was also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government
performing governmental functions, citing Section 133 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is a “taxable person”
RULING: Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. MCIAA’s exemption from payment of taxes is
withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 and 234 of Labor Code. Statutes granting tax exemptions shall be strictly
construed against the taxpayer and liberally construed in favor of the taxing authority.
The petitioner cannot claim that it was never a “taxable person” under its Charter. It was only exempted
from the payment of realty taxes. The grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the
legislative intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except real property tax.
CONTRIBUTORS
14. City Government of San Pablo v. Reyes
G.R. No. 1 27708, March 25, 1999
FACTS: Sec. 1 PD 551 provides that any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary, the franchise tax
payable by all grantees of franchise to generate, distribute, and sell electric current for light, heat, and power
shall be 2% of their gross receipts.
Sec. 137 of the LGC states: Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law, the
province may impose a tax on business enjoying a franchise at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of the gross annual
receipts.
ISSUE: Whether the City of San Pablo may impose a local franchise tax pursuant to the LGC upon the Manila
Electric Company which pays a tax equal to two percent of its gross receipts in lieu of all taxes and assessments
of whatever nature imposed by any national or local authority on savings or income
RULING: YES. the phrase is all-encompassing and clear that the legislature intended to withdraw all tax
exemptions enjoyed by franchise holders and this intent is made more manifest by Sec. 193 of the Code, when it
provides that unless otherwise provided in this code tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed
by all persons, except local water districts, cooperatives, and non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational
institutions, are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the Code.
15. Province Of Bulacan v. CA

G.R. No. 1 26232, Nov. 27, 1998
FACTS: In 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bulacan passed Provincial Ordinance No. 3, Sec 21 of which
provides:
“Sec 21. There is hereby levied & collected a tax of 10% of the FMV in the locality per cubic meter of ordinary
stones, sand, gravel, earth & other quarry resources, such, but not limited to marble, granite, volcanic cinders,
basalt, tuff and rock phosphate, extracted from public lands or from beds of seas, lakes, rivers, streams, creeks
and other public waters within its territorial jurisdiction.”
In a letter dated Nov. 11, 1993, the Provincial Treasurer assessed Republic Cement Corp (RCC) P2,524,692
for extracting limestone, shale and silica from several parcels of private land in the province during in 1992 &
1993.
ISSUES: WON the province of Bulacan, on the basis of the ordinance, has authority to impose taxes on quarry
resources extracted from private lands.
CONTRIBUTORS
RULING: NO. Although Sec 186 of the LGC allows a province to levy taxes other than those specifically enumerated
in the LGC, the same is subject to certain conditions. One of these limitations is Sec 133(h) of the LGC which
provides that a province may not levy excise taxes on articles already taxed by the NIRC. Under Sec 151 of the
NIRC, an excise tax is levied on all quarry resources, regardless of origin, whether extracted from public or private
land.
In this case, since the tax imposed by the Province is an excise tax (being a tax upon the performance,
carrying on, or exercise of an activity), it may not ordinarily impose taxes on stones, sand, gravel, earth and other
quarry resources, as the same are already taxed under the NIRC.
However, as to sand, gravel, earth and other quarry resources extracted from public lands, a province may do so
because Sec 138 of the LGC expressly empowers a province to impose taxes thereon.
Moreover, even if the limitation set by Section 133 of the LGC is disregarded, petitioners may not impose
taxes on quarry resources extracted from private lands on the basis of Sec 21 of Provincial Ordinance No. 3 as the
latter clearly applies only to quarry resources extracted from public lands.
16. First Phil. Ind. Corp. v. CTA

G.R. No. 125948, Dec. 29,1998
FACTS: FPIC is a grantee of a pipeline concession to contract, install and operate oil pipelines. Sometime in Jan
1995, it applied for a mayor's permit with the Office of the Mayor of Batangas City. However, before it could be
issued, the respondent City Treasurer required it to pay a contractor’s business tax on its gross receipts for FY1993
pursuant to Sec 143(e) of the LGC.
FPIC paid the tax under protest and on January 20, 1994, it filed a letter-protest addressed to the City
Treasurer. On March 8, 1994, the protest was denied on the ground that since FPIC is not considered engaged in
transportation business, it cannot claim exemption under Sec 133(j) of the LGC as said exemption applies only to
common carriers transporting goods & passengers through moving vehicles or vessels either by land, sea or
water.
ISSUE: WON FPIC is a common carrier or a transportation contractor and thus not liable for paying the local
business tax.
RULING: YES. Under the following laws, PFIC is considered a common carrier:
a) Art 1732 of the Civil Code defines a Common Carrier as "any person, corporation, firm or association
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air,
for compensation, offering their services to the public."
b) Petroleum Act of the Phils also considers FPIC a common carrier and that such petroleum operation is a
public utility.
CONTRIBUTORS
c) The BIR in BIR RULING 69-83 likewise said that since PFIC is a pipeline concessionaire that is engaged only
in transporting petroleum products, it is considered a common carrier under Republic Act No. 387.
As FPIC is a common carrier, it is therefore, exempt from the business tax as provided for in Sec 133 (j) of the
LGC.
17. Manila Electric v. Province of Laguna

G.R. No. 131359, May 5, 1 999
FACTS: MERALCO was granted a franchise by several municipal councils and the National Electrification
Administration to operate an electric light and power service in the Laguna. Upon enactment of Local
Government Code, the provincial government issued ordinance imposing franchise tax. MERALCO paid under
protest and later claims for refund because of the duplicity with Section 1 of P.D. No. 551. This was denied by the
governor (Joey Lina) relying on a more recent law (LGC). MERALCO filed with the RTC a complaint for refund, but
was dismissed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the imposition of franchise tax under the provincial ordinance is violative of the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution and of P.D. 551.
HELD: No. There is no violation of the non-impairment clause for the same must yield to the inherent power of
the state (taxation). The provincial ordinance is valid and constitutional.
RATIO: The Local Government Code of 1991 has incorporated and adopted, by and large, the provisions of the
now repealed Local Tax Code. The 1991 Code explicitly authorizes provincial governments, notwithstanding “any
exemption granted by any law or other special law, . . . (to) impose a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise.”A
franchise partakes the nature of a grant which is beyond the purview of the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution. Article XII, Section 11, of the 1987 Constitution, like its precursor provisions in the 1935 and the
1973 Constitutions, is explicit that no franchise for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except under
the condition that such privilege shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress as and when
the common good so requires.
18. PBA v. CA
G.R. No. 1 19122, Aug. 8, 2000
FACTS: PBA received a tax assessment from the BIR for deficiency on amusement taxes
PBA contested the said deficiency on amusement taxes with the CTA however was denied. The same was
raised to the CA and was also denied as well as a subsequent MR.
CONTRIBUTORS
PBA now raises the case to the SC
Petitioner contends PD 231, otherwise known as the Local Tax Code of 1973, transferred the power and
authority to levy and collect amusement taxes from the sale of admission tickets to places of amusement from
the national government to the local governments. Petitioner cited BIR Memorandum Circular No. 49-73 and BIR
Ruling No. 231-86.
ISSUES: (1) Does the National government have jurisdiction to tax PBA or is it the local government as provided
in SEC. 13 of the Local Tax code? NO; (2) Is the Petitioner liable for the said amusement taxes? YES.
RULING: The province can only impose a tax on admission from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters,
cinematographs, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement. The authority to tax professional
basketball games is not therein included.
With the reference to PD 871 by PD 1456 and PD 1959, there is a recognition under the laws of this
country that the amusement tax on professional basketball games is a national, and not a local, tax. Even up to
the present, the category of amusement taxes on professional basketball games as a national tax remains the
same. This is so provided under Section 125 of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code. Section 140 of the Local
Government Code of 1992 (Republic Act 7160), meanwhile, retained the areas (theaters, cinematographs,
concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement) where the province may levy an amusement tax without
including therein professional basketball games.
Last issue for resolution concerns the liability of petitioner for the payment of surcharge and interest on
the deficiency amount due. Petitioner contends that it is not liable, as it acted in good faith, having relied upon
the issuances of the respondent Commissioner. All things studiedly considered, the Court rules that the petitioner
is liable to pay amusement tax to the national government, and not to the local government, in accordance with
the rates prescribed by PD 1959.
19. Valley Trading Co., Inc. v. CFI of Isabela

171 SCRA 501
FACTS: The records show that petitioner Valley Trading Co., Inc. filed a complaint in the court a quo seeking a
declaration of the supposed nullity of Section 2B.02, Sub-paragraph 1, Letter (A), Paragraph 2 of Ordinance No.
T-1, Revenue Code of Cauayan, Isabela, which imposed a graduated tax on retailers, independent wholesalers
and distributors; and for the refund of P23,202.12, plus interest of 14 % per annum thereon, which petitioner
had paid pursuant to said ordinance. Petitioner likewise prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction to enjoin the collection of said tax. 3 Defendants in said case were Dr. Carlos A. Uy and
Moises Balmaceda, who were sued in their capacity as Mayor and Municipal Treasurer of Cauayan, Isabela,
respectively, together with the Sangguniang Bayan of the same town. Petitioner takes the position that said
ordinance imposes a "graduated fixed tax based on Sales" that "in effect imposes a sales tax in contravention of
CONTRIBUTORS
Sec. 5, Charter I, par. (L) of P.D. 231 amended by P.D. 426 otherwise known as the Local Tax Code " 4 which
prohibits a municipality from imposing a percentage tax on sales
ISSUE: Whether or not Preliminary injunction is proper because of the patent nullity of the ordinance which
imposed the tax
HELD: The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in the present case, as in any other case, is addressed to
the sound discretion of the court, conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of the movant which
should be protected. It is an extraordinary peremptory remedy available only on the grounds expressly provided
by law, specifically Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
The circumstances required for the writ to issue do not obtain in the case at bar. The damage that may be caused
to the petitioner will not, of course, be irrepairable; where so indicated by subsequent events favorable to it,
whatever it shall have paid is easily refundable. Besides, the damage to its property rights must perforce take a
back seat to the paramount need of the State for funds to sustain governmental functions. Compared to the
damage to the State which may be caused by reduced financial resources, the damage to petitioner is negligible.
The policy of the law is to discountenance any delay in the collection of taxes because of the oft-repeated but
unassailable consideration that taxes are the lifeblood of the Government and their prompt and certain
availability is an imperious need.
20. Estanislao v. Costales

196 SCRA 853
FACTS: Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created to “principally undertake to
economical, efficient and effective control, management and supervision of the Mactan International Airport…
and such other airports as may be established in the province of Cebu…” Section 14 of its charter excempts the
Authority from payment of realty taxes but in 1994, the City Treasurer demanded payment for realty taxes on
several parcels of land belonging to the other. MCIAA filed a petition in RTC contending that, by nature of its
powers and functions, it has the same footing of an agency or instrumentality of the national government. The
RTC dismissed the petition based on Section 193 & 234 of the local Government Code or R.A. 7160. Thus this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MCIAA is excempted from realty taxes?
RULING: With the repealing clause of RA 7160 the tax exemption provided. “All general and special in the charter
of the MCIAA has been expressly repeated. It state laws, acts, City Charters, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations, or part of parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the
provisions of the Code are hereby repeated or modified accordingly.” Therefore the SC affirmed the decision and
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order of the RTC and herein petitioner has to pay the assessed realty tax of its properties effective January 1,
1992 up to the present.
21. Lung Center of the Philippines v. Quezon City

G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity established by virtue of PD No. 1823, seeks exemption from
real property taxes when the City Assessor issued Tax Declarations for the land and the hospital building.
Petitioner predicted on its claim that it is a charitable institution. The request was denied, and a petition hereafter
filed before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QC-LBAA) for reversal of the resolution of the
City Assessor. Petitioner alleged that as a charitable institution, is exempted from real property taxes under Sec
28(3) Art VI of the Constitution. QC-LBAA dismissed the petition and the decision was likewise affirmed on appeal
by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
CBAA.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of PD 1823 and the 1973 and
1987 Constitution and Section 234(b) of RA 7160; (2) Whether or not petitioner is exempted from real property
taxes.
RULING: (1) Yes. The Court hold that the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and
1987 Constitution. Under PD 1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock corporation which, subject to the
provisions of the decree, is to be administered by the Office of the President with the Ministry of Health and the
Ministry of Human Settlements. The purpose for which it was created was to render medical services to the public
in general including those who are poor and also the rich, and become a subject of charity. Under PD 1823,
petitioner is entitled to receive donations, even if the gift or donation is in the form of subsidies granted by the
government.
(2) Partly No. Under PD 1823, the lung center does not enjoy any property tax exemption privileges for its
real properties as well as the building constructed thereon.
The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the property taxes only. This provision
was implanted by Sec.243 (b) of RA 7160.which provides that in order to be entitled to the exemption, the lung
center must be able to prove that: it is a charitable institution and; its real properties are actually, directly and
exclusively used for charitable purpose. Accordingly, the portions occupied by the hospital used for its patients
are exempt from real property taxes while those leased to private entities are not exempt from such taxes.
22. Mactan Airport Authority v. Pres. Marcos

GR 120082, September 11, 1 996
CONTRIBUTORS
FACTS: Petitioner Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority was created by virtue of R.A. 6958. Since the time
of its creation, petitioner MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption from payment of realty taxes in accordance
with Section 14 of its charter. However, on October 11, 1994, Mr. Eustaquio B. Cesa, Officer in Charge, Office of
the Treasurer of the City of Cebu, demanded payment from realty taxes in the total amount of P2229078.79.
Petitioner objected to such demand for payment as baseless and unjustified claiming in its favor the afore cited
Section 14 of R.A. 6958. It was also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government performing
governmental functions, citing Section 133 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Respondent City refused to cancel and set aside petitioner’s realty tax account, insisting that the MCIAA
is a government-controlled corporation whose tax exemption privilege has been withdrawn by virtue of Sections
193 and 234 of Labor Code that took effect on January 1, 1992.
RULINGS: Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. MCIAA’s exemption from payment of taxes is
23. Manila International Airport Authority v. CA

GR No. 155650, July 20, 2006; 495 SCRA 591
FACTS: Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is the operator of the Ninoy International Airport located
at Paranaque City. The Officers of Paranaque City sent notices to MIAA due to real estate tax delinquency. MIAA
then settled some of the amount. When MIAA failed to settle the entire amount, the officers of Paranaque city
threatened to levy and subject to auction the land and buildings of MIAA, which they did. MIAA sought for a
Temporary Restraining Order from the CA but failed to do so within the 60 days reglementary period, so the
petition was dismissed. MIAA then sought for the TRO with the Supreme Court a day before the public auction,
MIAA was granted with the TRO but unfortunately the TRO was received by the Paranaque City officers 3 hours
after the public auction. MIAA claims that although the charter provides that the title of the land and building are
with MIAA still the ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines. MIAA also contends that it is an
instrumentality of the government and as such exempted from real estate tax. That the land and buildings of
MIAA are of public dominion therefore cannot be subjected to levy and auction sale. On the other hand, the
officers of Paranaque City claim that MIAA is a government owned and controlled corporation therefore not
exempted to real estate tax.
CONTRIBUTORS
ISSUE: Whether or not the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion and thus cannot be the
subject of levy and auction sale.
RULING: Under the Local Government code, government owned and controlled corporations are not exempted
from real estate tax. MIAA is not a government owned and controlled corporation, for to become one MIAA
should either be a stock or non stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation for its capital is not divided
into shares. It is not a non stock corporation since it has no members. MIAA is an instrumentality of the
government vested with corporate powers and government functions. Under the civil code, property may either
be under public dominion or private ownership. Those under public dominion are owned by the State and are
utilized for public use, public service and for the development of national wealth. The ports included in the public
dominion pertain either to seaports or airports. When properties under public dominion cease to be for public
use and service, they form part of the patrimonial property of the State. The court held that the land and buildings
of MIAA are part of the public dominion. Since the airport is devoted for public use, for the domestic and
international travel and transportation. Even if MIAA charge fees, this is for support of its operation and for
regulation and does not change the character of the land and buildings of MIAA as part of the public dominion.
As part of the public dominion the land and buildings of MIAA are outside the commerce of man. To subject them
to levy and public auction is contrary to public policy. Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the
airport land and buildings from public use, these properties remain to be of public dominion and are inalienable.
As long as the land and buildings are for public use the ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines.
24. City Government of QC v. BAYANTEL

GR No. 162015, March 6, 2006
FACTS: BAYANTEL, is a legislative franchise holder under RA 3259, which required it to pay real property taxes to
the gov’t. When the LGC took effect, it granted local governments within the Metro Manila Area the power to
levy tax on real properties. After LGC took effect, Congress amended BAYANTEL’s original franchise, where it had
the latter pay franchise tax which is to be “in lieu of all taxes”. BAYANTEL owned several real properties in QC.
Gov’t of QC, by virtue of the Constitution and LGC, enacted QC Revenue Code, imposing real property tax on all
real properties in QC and withdrew tax exemptions in general. They assessed BAYANTEL’s properties. Meanwhile,
RA 7925 ("Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the entity, or shall at least bear the dry seal thereof or any
other official indication of the authenticity and completeness of such copy. took effect, which aims to level the
playing field among telecommunications companies. BAYANTEL sought to have its properties excluded from
paying real property taxes, but was denied. QC Treasurer sent delinquency notices and issued warrants to levy
the properties for public auction. BAYANTEL, which originally appealed to LBAA, withdrew its appeal and filed a
petition for prohibition with TRO with the RTC. RTC issued the TRO, followed by a writ of preliminary injunction
and ultimately declared BAYANTEL’s QC properties as exempt from real property tax. Related to topic: QC Gov’t
argues that RTC erred in giving due course to the petition for prohibition as BAYANTEL failed to avail of available
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administrative remedies provided in the LGC. The appeal mechanics under the LGC constitute Bayantel’s plain
and speedy remedy in this case.
ISSUE: W/N Bayantel is required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief with the trial
court. – NO.
HELD: Section 22 of rule 65 governs petitions for prohibition. Since BAYANTEL’s properties were already levied
because of nonpayment of real property taxes, an appeal to the LBAA is not a speedy and adequate remedy. One
of the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion- of administrative remedies rule is when, as here, only legal issues
are to be resolved. It should be noted that before an appeal to the LBAA can be considered in this case, prior
payment under protest of P43M should be given. Given this reality, an appeal to the LBAA may not be considered
as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It is thus understandable why Bayantel opted to withdraw its earlier
appeal with the LBAA and, instead, filed its petition for prohibition.
25. Sta. Lucia Realty v. City of Pasig

G.R. No. 166838, June 15, 2011
FACTS: Petitioner is the registered owner of several parcels of land with TCT Nos. 39112, 39110 and 38457, all of
which indicated that the lots were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Pasig.
The parcel of land covered by TCT No. 39112 was consolidated with that covered by TCT No. 518403,
which was situated in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Cainta, Province of Rizal.The two combined lots
were subsequently partitioned into three, for which TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, and 599131, now all bearing the
Cainta address, were issued. TCT No. 39110 was also divided into two lots, becoming TCT Nos. 92869 and
92870.The lot covered by TCT No. 38457 was not segregated, but a commercial building owned by Sta. Lucia East
Commercial Center, Inc., a separate corporation, was built on it.
Upon Pasig’s petition to correct the location stated in TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, and 599131, the Land
Registration Court ordered the amendment of the TCTs to read that the lots with respect to TCT No. 39112 were
located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Pasig City.
Cainta filed a petition for the settlement of its land boundary dispute with Pasig before the Antipolo RTC
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3006, is still pending up to this date.
ISSUES: Whether Sta. Lucia should continue paying its real property taxes to Cainta, as it alleged to have always
done, or to Pasig, as the location stated in Sta. Lucias TCTs?
HELD: Under Presidential Decree No. 464, or the “Real Property Tax Code,” the authority to collect real property
taxes is vested in the locality where the property is situated. This requisite was reiterated in Republic Act No.
7160, or the Local Government Code. Thus, while a local government unit is authorized under several laws to
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collect real estate tax on properties falling under its territorial jurisdiction, it is imperative to first show that these
properties are unquestionably within its geographical boundaries. The Court cited the case of Mariano, Jr. v
Commission on Elections which stated that “the importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial
boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they
define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires.” Clearly
therefore, the local government unit entitled to collect real property taxes from Sta. Lucia must undoubtedly
show that the subject properties are situated within its territorial jurisdiction; otherwise, it would be acting
beyond the powers vested to it by law.
The Pasig RTC should have held in abeyance the proceedings in Civil Case No. 65420, in view of the fact
that the outcome of the boundary dispute case before the Antipolo RTC will undeniably affect both Pasigs and
Caintas rights. In the meantime, to avoid further animosity, Sta. Lucia is directed to deposit the succeeding real
property taxes due on the subject properties, in an escrow account with the Land Bank of the Philippines.
26. Alejandro Ty v. Hon. Aurelio C. Trampe

GR No. 117577, December 1, 1995
FACTS: The Municipal Assessor of Pasig sent a notice of assessment to petitioners for certain real properties
located in Pasig City. The assessor having denied the letter of petitioner for reconsideration, they filed a petition
with the RTC to declare the tax assessment void and enjoin the collection of taxes based on the assessment. The
RTC denied the petition for lack of merit. The petitioners argue that the assessment is void for failure to comply
with PD 921 which provides for the preparation of schedule of values within Metro Manila to be prepared jointly
by the City Assessors of the districts within said area. However, respondents argue that PD 921 was impliedly
repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991 as the same vests the authority to assess with the Municipal/City
Assessors.
ISSUE: W/N RA 7160 (LGC of 1991) repealed the provisions of PD 921
RULING: No. PD 921 is still a good law and the schedule of values prepared solely by the municipal assessor is
illegal and void. If the intention of the legislature was to abrogate PD 921, it would have included it in such
repealing clause. An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated
that the two laws are clearly repugnant & inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. While RA 7160 covers almost
governmental functions delegated to local governments units, PD 921 embraces only the Metropolitan Manila
Area and is limited especially to the assessment and collection of real estate (& some other taxes). Therefore, it
is obvious that harmony in these provisions is not only possible, but in fact desirable, necessary and consistent
with the legislative intent & policy. By this harmonization, the preamble of both statutes shall be fulfilled.
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27. Antonio Callanta, officer-in-charge of the Office of the City Assessor v. Ombudsman
G.R. 115253-74 JAN 30, 1998
FACTS: A general revision of assessment was conducted by the Office of the City Assessor in 1988 and sometime
thereafter. Notices of assessment together with the new tax declarations were subsequently sent to the property
owners. Thereafter, respondents, without the authority of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals, reassessed
certain properties which resulted in the reduction of assessed values of the properties.
The City of Cebu filed criminal and administrative charges against the officers and staff of the City
Assessor's Office for "violations of Section 106 of the Real Property Tax Code[,] for gross negligence or willful
underassessment of real properties within the city's taxing jurisdiction and for violation of the Anti‐Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act for the act of causing undue injury to the City Government by giving private persons
unwarranted benefits, advantages or preferences in the discharge of their official and administrative functions
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence by unauthorized reassessment of
real properties of taxpayers. Petitioners explained that the acts complained of were done within the bounds of
their official duties and functions, citing Sec. 22 of P.D. 464 and that Sec. 30 of P.D. 464 does not prohibit the
Assessor from either correcting from whatever error or flaw he and his deputies may have made.
ISSUE: W/N officials and employees of the Office of the City Assessor reduce the new assessed values of real
properties upon requests of the affected property owners.
HELD: There is no merit in the contentions of petitioners. Under the procedure, the issuance of a notice of
assessment by the local assessor shall be his last action on a particular assessment. On the side of the property
owner, it is this last action which gives him the right to appeal to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals.
The act of herein petitioners in providing the corresponding notices of assessment the chance for the
property owners concerned to file a motion for reconsideration and for acting on the motions filed is not in
accordance with law and in excess of their authority and therefore constitutes ultra vires acts.
Whenever the local assessor sends a notice to the owner or lawful possessor of real property of its revised
assessed value, the former shall thereafter no longer have any jurisdiction to entertain any request for a review
or readjustment. The appropriate forum where the aggrieved party may bring his appeal is the LBAA, as provided
by law.
28. Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos

261 SCRA 667, 1996
CONTRIBUTORS
FACTS: Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority was created by virtue of R.A. 6958, mandated to principally
undertake the economical, efficient, and effective control, management, and supervision of the Mactan
International Airport and Lahug Airport, and such other airports as may be established in Cebu.
Since the time of its creation, petitioner MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption from payment of realty
taxes in accordance with Section 14 of its charter. However, on October 11, 1994, Mr. Eustaquio B. Cesa, Officer
in Charge, Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu, demanded payment from realty taxes in the total amount
of P2229078.79. Petitioner objected to such demand for payment as baseless and unjustified claiming in its favor
the afore cited Section 14 of R.A. 6958. It was also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government
performing governmental functions, citing Section 133 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Respondent City refused to cancel and set aside petitioner’s realty tax account, insisting that the MCIAA
is a government-controlled corporation whose tax exemption privilege has been withdrawn by virtue of Sections
193 and 234 of Labor.
RULINGS: Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. MCIAA’s exemption from payment of taxes is
29. Testate Estate of Concordia T. Lim v. City of Manila

G.R. No. 90639, February 21, 1990
FACTS: The late Concordia Lim was the owner of certain parcels of land. The City Treasurer of Manila required
her to pay the real estate properties due on said properties for the years 1977, 1978 and the first quarter 1979,
during which time the titles were not in Lim’s name.
ISSUE: WON Lim is liable to pay realty taxes.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that Lim was not liable to pay realty taxes for those taxable periods. “In real
estate taxation, the unpaid tax attaches to the property and is chargeable against the taxable person who had
actual or beneficial use and possession of it regardless of whether or not he is the owner.” Moreover, “[t]o impose
the real property tax on the estate which was neither the owner nor the beneficial user of the property during
the designated periods would not only be contrary to law but also unjust.” In this case, the Supreme Court found
that Lim was not the taxable beneficial user. Neither was GSIS (under whose name the titles were registered
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during the subject taxable periods). However, the High Court could only rule on the non-liability of Lim and GSIS.
It held that it could not rule on the liability of the lessees whose identities as the taxable beneficial users of the
parcels of land were not even clear because they were never impleaded.
30. Mindanao Bus v. CDO

G.R. No. L-1 7870, Sept. 29, 1962
FACTS: Petitioner is a public utility company engaged in the transport of passengers and cargo by motor vehicles
in Mindanao with main offices in Cagayan de Oro (CDO). Petitioner likewise owned a land where it maintains a
garage, a repair shop and blacksmith or carpentry shops. The machineries are placed thereon in wooden and
cement platforms. The City Assessor of CDO then assessed a P4,400 realty tax on said machineries and repair
equipment. Petitioner appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals but it sustained the City Assessor's decision, while
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) sustained the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries and equipment are considered immobilized and thus subject to a realty
tax
HELD: The Supreme Court decided otherwise and held that said machineries and equipment are not subject to
the assessment of real estate tax.
Said equipment are not considered immobilized as they are merely incidental, not essential and principal
to the business of the petitioner. The transportation business could be carried on without repair or service shops
of its rolling equipment as they can be repaired or services in another shop belonging to another.
31. Caltex v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals & City Assessor of Pasay
GR No. L-50466, May 31, 1982
FACTS: Caltex loaned machines and equipment to gas station operators under an appropriate lease agreement
or receipt. The lease contract stipulated that upon demand, the operators shall return to Caltex the machines
and equipment in good condition as when received, ordinary wear and tear excepted.
The lessor of the land, where the gas station is located, does not become the owner of the machines and
equipment installed therein. Caltex retains the ownership thereof during the term of the lease.
The City Assessor of Pasay City characterized the said items of gas station equipment and machinery as
taxable realty. However, the City Board of Tax Appeals ruled that they are personalty.
The CBAA held that the said machines are real property within the meaning of Ses. 3(k) & (m) and 38 of
the Real Property Tax Code, PD 464, and that the Civil Code definitions of real and personal property in Articles
415 and 416 are not applicable in this case.
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ISSUE: WON the pieces of gas station equipment and machinery permanently affixed by Caltex to its gas station
and pavement should be subject to realty tax.
HELD: Yes. The subject machines and equipment are taxable improvement and machinery within the meaning of
the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code, because the same are necessary to the operation of the gas
station and have been attached/affixed/embedded permanently to the gas station site.
This case is also easily distinguishable from Board of Assessment Appeals v. Manila Electric Co., (119 Phil.
328) where Meralco's steel towers were exempted from taxation. The steel towers were considered personalty
because they were attached to square metal frames by means of bolts and could be moved from place to place
when unscrewed and dismantled.
32. Meralco Securities v. CBAA

G.R. No. L-46245, May 31 , 1982
FACTS: Pursuant to a pipeline concession issued under the Petroleum Act of 1949, Petitioner installed from
Batangas to Manila a pipeline system consisting of cylindrical steel pipes joined together and buried not less than
one meter below the surface along the shoulder of the public highway. The pipes are embedded in the soil and
are firmly and solidly welded together so as to preclude breakage or damage thereto and prevent leakage or
seepage of the oil.
Pursuant to the Assessment Law the provincial assessor of Laguna treated the pipeline as real property
and issued tax declarations.
Meralco appealed the assessments to the defendants, but the latter ruled that pipeline is subject to realty
tax. The defendants argued that the pipeline is subject to realty tax because they are contemplated in Assessment
Law and Real Property Tax Code; that they do not fall within the category of property exempt from realty tax;
that Articles 415 & 416 of the Civil Code, defining real and personal property have no applications to this case
because these pipes are constructions adhered to soil and things attached to the land in a fixed manner, and that
Meralco is not exempt from realty tax under petroleum law.
ISSUE: Whether the aforementioned pipelines are subject to realty tax.
HELD: Yes, the pipelines are subject to realty tax.

Sec. 2 of the Assessment Law provides that the realty tax is due “on real property, including land, buildings,
machinery, and other improvements.” This provision is reproduced with some modification in Section 38, Real
Property Tax Code, which provides that “there shall be levied, assessed, and collected xxx annual ad valorem tax
on real property such as land, buildings, machinery, and other improvements affixed or attached to real property
xxx.”
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It is incontestable that the pipeline of Meralco Securities does not fall within any of the classes of exempt
real property enumerated the Assessment Law and Real Property Tax Code.
Article 415[l] and [3] of the NCC provides that real property may consist of constructions of all kinds
adhered to the soil and everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be
separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object.
The pipeline system in question is indubitably a construction adhering to the soil. It is attached to the land
in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without dismantling the steel pipes which were welded to
form the pipeline.
33. City of Baguio v. Busuego

G.R. No. L-29772 September 18, 1980
FACTS: The GSIS entered into a contract to sell with herein defendant. the contract entered into by the GSIS and
the defendant-appellant manifests the latter's willingness at the signing thereof to pay and shoulder all taxes and
assessments on the subject property and insurance thereon during the term of the said contract. However,
appellants purchaser after having voluntarily paid taxes due on the property in the amount of P287.00 for the
year 1963 backed out of his undertaking upon discovering that section 28(c) of Commonwealth Act 186 2 exempts
the GSIS from the payment of taxes. His theory is that while title to the property has not passed to him, per
paragraph 4 of the contract, and ownership remains with the seller, there could not be any obligation to pay taxes
on the property that should be assumed by him as purchaser, since the owner-seller, in whom title remains, is
exempt from taxes.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent is tax exempt?
HELD: the delivery of possession by the seller GSIS to the purchaser was clearly with the intention of passing to
the latter the possession, use of and control over said property, and all the other attributes of ownership, short
of the naked ownership such that it included in said transfer the incidental obligation to pay the taxes thereon,
for nothing more was left to the GSIS except its right to receive full payment of the purchase price. The fact that
in the contract to sell the GSIS, although aware of its own exemption from taxation stipulated and exacted from
the purchaser the payment of taxes amounts to an interpretation on its part that such an immunity was not to
be transmitted to a private person who becomes the beneficial owner and user of the property. 4 Verily, this
interpretative regulation by the administrative agency officially charged with the duty of administering and
enforcing Commonwealth Act 186 which contains the tax-exempting provision at issue carries great weight in
determining the operation of said provision. While the GSIS may be exempt from real estate tax 5 the exemption
does not cover property belonging to it "where the beneficial use thereof has been granted for consideration or
otherwise to a taxable person.
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34. SSS v. Bacolod City
GR L-35726, 21 July 1982
FACTS: The Social Security System (SSS) is a government agency created under RA 1161. In pursuance of its
operations, SSS maintains a number of regional offices, one of which is a 5-storey building occupying 4 parcels of
land in Bacolod City. Said building and lands were assessed for taxation. For failure to pay the realty taxes thereon,
the city levid upon said properties. SSS sought reconsideration on the ground that SSS is a government-owned
and -controlled corporation and is exempt from payment of real estate taxes.
ISSUE: Whether SSS property in Bacolod City is tax-exempt.
HELD: The distinction whether the government-owned or controlled corporation exercises ministrant or
proprietary function is of no relevance as the exemption does not relate to legal fees but on realty taxes. The
Charter of Bacolod City does not contain any qualification whatsoever in providing fro the exemption from real
estate taxes of lands and building owned by the Government/ It is axiomatic that when public property is involved,
exemption is the rule and taxation is the exception. PD 24, amending the Social Security Act of 1954, has already
removed all doubts as to the exemption of the SS from taxation (Section 16).
35. The Board of Assessment Appeals of Zamboanga del Sur v. Samar Mining Company
G.R. No. L-28034, February 27, 1971
FACTS: Samar is a domestic corporation engaged in the mining industry. As the mining claims and the mill of
Samar are located inland and at a great distance from the loading point or pier site, it decided to construct a
gravel road as a convenient means of hauling its ores from the mine site at Buug to the pier area at Pamintayan,
Zamboanga del Sur. Samar received a letter from the Provincial Assessor of Zamboanga del Sur assessing the 13.8
kilometer road 2 constructed by it for real estate tax purposes in the total sum of P1,117,900.00. On July 14,
1964, Samar appealed to the Board of Assessment Appeals of Zamboanga del Sur, (hereinafter referred to as
Board, for short), contesting the validity of the assessment upon the ground that the road having been
constructed entirely on a public land cannot be considered an improvement subject to tax within the meaning of
section 2 of Commonwealth Act 470.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Samar should pay realty tax on the assessed value of the road it constructed
on alienable or disposable public lands that are leased to it by the government.
HELD: There is no question that the road constructed by respondent Samar on the public lands leased to it by the
government is an improvement. But as to whether the same is taxable under the aforequoted provision of the
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Assessment Law, this question has already been answered in the negative by this Court. In the case of Bislig Bay
Lumber Co., Inc. v. Provincial Government of Surigao, 100 Phil. 303, where a similar issue was raised as to whether
the timber concessionaire should be required to pay realty tax for the road it constructed at its own expense
within the territory of the lumber concession granted to it, this Court, after citing Section 2 of Commonwealth
Act 470.
36. City Treasurer of Quezon City v. CA and Bernardita Tolentino

G.R. No. 120974, December 22, 1997
FACTS: Alberto Sta. Maria owned a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 68818 which he sold in 1964 to Teresa L.
Valencia who, as a consequence, had the title canceled and TCT No. 79818 issued in her name. She however
failed to have the tax declaration transferred in her name. Thus she paid the real estate taxes from 1964 to 1978
in the name of its previous owner Alberto Sta. Maria.
On 20 December 1973 Valencia entered into a contract of sale of the property on installment with a
mortgage in favor of respondent Bernardita C. Tolentino. However, from 1979 to 1983 Valencia failed to pay the
real estate taxes due on the land. As a result, notices of tax delinquency and intent to sell the property [9] were
sent to Alberto Sta. Maria's address which was simply stated as "Olongapo, Zambales." The notices were then
returned to petitioner City Treasurer of Quezon City for a "better complete address." In the auction sale on 29
February 1984 the spouses Romeo and Verna Chua bought the land in question, which was already covered by
TCT No. 79818 in the name of Teresa L. Valencia but it showed on its face that the land was still covered by TCT
No. 68818 and not TCT No. 79818. Apparently, the Office of the City Treasurer was unaware that TCT No. 68818
had already been canceled by TCT No. 79818. However, in the Final Bill of Sale issued to the Chua spouses still
appeared in the name of Alberto Sta. Maria, the former owner, so that the vendee spouses lost no time in filing
a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the cancellation of TCT No. 79818 and the issuance of
a new title in their name. On 4 February 1987 the court granted their petition and TCT No. 357727 was issued in
the name of the spouses Romeo and Verna Chua.
Sometime in April 1989, as purchasers of the property in the auction sale, the Chuas demanded delivery
of possession from Bernardita C. Tolentino and Teresa L. Valencia. As a consequence, Tolentino sued for
annulment of the auction sale in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Finding the action to be well taken, the
trial court granted the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the court a quo. Hence this petition for review on
certiorari by the City Treasurer of Quezon City.
ISSUE: Was there a valid assessment to the delinquent taxpayer?
HELD: The controversy lies in the failure of petitioner City Treasurer to notify effectively the delinquent taxpayer
who at the time of the auction sale was Teresa L. Valencia. Apparently, petitioner proceeded on the wrong
premise that the property was still owned by the former registered owner, Alberto Sta. Maria, who sold the
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property to Valencia in 1964. In fact, at the time of the auction sale, the property was already covered by a
conditional sale on installment in favor of respondent Bernardita C. Tolentino. Plainly, at the time of the auction
sale, Alberto Sta. Maria who appeared to have been notified of the auction sale was no longer the registered
owner, much less the delinquent taxpayer.
For one who is no longer the lawful owner of the land cannot be considered the "present registered
owner" because, apparently, he has already lost interest in the property, hence is not expected to defend the
property from the sale at auction. The purpose of PD No. 464 is to collect taxes from the delinquent taxpayer
and, logically, one who is no longer the owner of the property cannot be considered the delinquent taxpayer.
The fact that the pertinent phrase, "'failure to do so shall make the assessment in the name of the previous
owner valid and binding on all persons interested, and for all purposes, as though the same had been assessed in
the name of its actual owner," found in both RA No. 537 and RA No. 409 was not incorporated in PD No. 464
implies that the assessment of the subject property in 1983 in the name of Sta. Maria would not bind, much less
adversely affect, Valencia. We can infer from the omission that the assessment in the name of the previous owner
is no longer deemed an assessment in the name of the actual owner. The notification to the right person, i.e., the
real owner, is an essential and indispensable requirement of the law, non-compliance with which renders the
auction sale void.
37. National Power Corporation v. RTC

G.R. No. 72477, October 16, 1990
FACTS: On October 10, 1984, the Province of Misamis Oriental filed a complaint 1 with the Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro City, Branch XXV against NAPOCOR for the collection of real property tax and special education
fund tax in the amounts of P11,105,008.10 and P11,104,658.10, respectively, covering the period 1978 to 1984.
Petitioner NAPOCOR then defendant therein, filed a motion to dismiss 2 dated January 12, 1985 on the grounds
that the court has no jurisdiction over the action or suit and that it is not the proper forum for the adjudication
of the case. In support of this motion NAPOCOR cited Presidential Decree No. 242 dated July 9, 1973 which
provides that disputes between agencies of the government including govemment-owned or controlled
corporations shall be administratively settled or adjudicated by the Secretary of Justice.
On July 23, 1985, Barangay Aplaya, Municipality of Jasaan, Misamis Oriental filed a complaint in
intervention 5contending that non-payment by NAPOCOR of real property taxes would adversely affect its interest
since under the law, ten percent (10%) of the real property tax collected on properties within its jurisdiction shall
accrue to the general fund of the barangay. Thereafter, the case was set for trial pursuant to the court's order.
ISSUE: Which Muicipality can collect against NAPOCOR?
HELD: The proceeds of the real property tax are divided among the province, city or municipality where the
property subject to the tax is situated and shall be applied by the respective local government unit for its own
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use and benefit. Even the barrio where the property is situated shares in the real property tax collections.
Likewise, the entire proceeds of the additional one per cent (1%) real property tax levied for the Special Education
Fund created under R.A. 5447, are divided among the province, city and municipalities where the property is
situated.
38. Reyes v. Almanzor

GR Nos. L-49839-46, April 26, 1991; 196 SCRA 322
FACTS: Petitioners JBL Reyes et al. owned a parcel of land in Tondo which are leased and occupied as dwelling
units by tenants who were paying monthly rentals of not exceeding P300. Sometimes in 1971 the Rental Freezing
Law was passed prohibiting for one year from its effectivity, an increase in monthly rentals of dwelling units where
rentals do not exceed three hundred pesos (P300.00), so that the Reyeses were precluded from raising the rents
and from ejecting the tenants. In 1973, respondent City Assessor of Manila re-classified and reassessed the value
of the subject properties based on the schedule of market values, which entailed an increase in the corresponding
tax rates prompting petitioners to file a Memorandum of Disagreement averring that the reassessments made
were "excessive, unwarranted, inequitable, confiscatory and unconstitutional" considering that the taxes
imposed upon them greatly exceeded the annual income derived from their properties. They argued that the
income approach should have been used in determining the land values instead of the comparable sales approach
which the City Assessor adopted.
ISSUE: Is the approach on tax assessment used by the City Assessor reasonable?
HELD: No. The taxing power has the authority to make a reasonable and natural classification for purposes of
taxation but the government's act must not be prompted by a spirit of hostility, or at the very least discrimination
that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under
similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different
both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Consequently, it stands to reason that petitioners
who are burdened by the government by its Rental Freezing Laws (then R.A. No. 6359 and P.D. 20) under the
principle of social justice should not now be penalized by the same government by the imposition of excessive
taxes petitioners can ill afford and eventually result in the forfeiture of their properties.
39. Pecson v. CA
G.R. No. 105360
FACTS: Pedro Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot on which he built a 4-door-2-storey apartment building.
He failed to pay realty taxes amounting to P12k so the lot was sold at public auction to Mamerto Nepomuceno
who later on sold it to the Sps. Nuguid.
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Pecson challenged the validity of the auction before the RTC but was dismissed but the RTC held that the
apartment bldg was not subject of the litigation. On appeal, the CA appealed in toto the decision of the RTC that
the apartment bldg was not included in the auction sale.
After an entry of judgment was made, the Sps. Nuguid filed a motion with the RTC for a motion for delivery
of possession of the lot and the apartment bldg citing Art. 546 of the CC. The RTC issued an order declaring that
the owner of the lot and apartment bldg were the Sps. Nuguid and to pay the construction cost of the apartment
before a writ of possession would be issued and to pay rent to the spouses. Pecson moved for reconsideration
but the Trial court did not act on it, instead it issued a writ of possession. The CA affirmed in part the decision
declaring the cost of construction can be offset from the amount of rents to be collected and that since Sps.
Nuguid opted to appropriate the improvement, Pecson is entitled to be reimbursed the cost of construction at
the time it was built in 1965 which is at P53k and the right the retain the improvement until full indemnity is
paid.Thus the case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 448 and 546 applies in the case at bar
HELD: YES. With regard to Art. 448, the provision on indemnity may be applied in analogy. Whoever is the owner
of the land may appropriate whatever has been built, planted or sown after paying indemnity. However, it does
not apply when the owner of the land is also the builder of the works on his own land who later on loses ownership
by sale or donation.
Art. 546 refers to the necessary and useful expenses which shall be refunded to the possessor in good faith with
right of retention. However, it does not state how to determine the value of the useful improvement. The
respondents [court and private respondents alike] espouses as sufficient reimbursement the cost of construction
in 1965, however, this is contrary to previous rulings which declares that the value to the reimbursed should be
the present market value of said improvements so as not to unjustly enrich either of the parties. [the trial court
erred in ordering Pecson to pay rent since the Sps. Nuguid has yet to pay the indemnity therefore Pecson has the
right to retain the improvements and the income thereof. The case was remanded to the trial court for
determination of the current market value of the apartment bldg and ordered the Sps to pay Pecson otherwise
it shall be restored to Pecson until payment of indemnity.
40. Ismael Mathay, Jr. v. Victor Macalincag

G.R. No. 97618, December 16, 1993
FACTS: On March 21, 1991, Ismael A. Mathay, Jr., describing himself as "a member of Congress, and registered
owner of lands in Quezon City and resident of Metro Manila," instituted in this Court a special civil action of
prohibition against Victor Macalincag, then the Undersecretary of Finance, the City Assessor and the City
Treasurer of Quezon City. His petition sought the perpetual enjoinment, as unconstitutional and void, of "(a) the
schedule of market values prepared by respondent City Assessor for all classes of real property situated in Quezon
City ("to take effect not earlier than January 1, 1991," and "implemented gradually over a three-year period on a
1/3 2/3 2/3 scheme"), (b) the approval of said schedule by respondent Victor Macalincag, (c) the revised and/or
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increased assessments of the properties prepared by the City Assessor based on the illegal schedule of market
values, and (d) the oppressive and excessive real estate tax increases being implemented by respondents City
Assessor and City Treasurer pursuant to the illegal schedule of market values and unlawful approval, all in
violation of the Constitution and laws.
ISSUE: Whether the Schedule of Market Values are valid?
HELD: Section 9 of P.D. 921 is specific and mandatory. The undisputed fact that the City Assessor of Quezon City
solely prepared the Schedule of Market Values in question, without the participation of the other City Assessors
of Metropolitan Manila, with the City Assessor of Manila acting as Chairman, indicates that the said Schedule of
Market Values was prepared contrary to and unauthorized under Section 9 of P.D. 921 and its implementing rule
on Section 1.02 of AR No. 7-77. The conclusion is, therefore, inevitable that the said Schedule of Market Values,
having been prepared by the respondent City Assessor contrary to the express provision of and without authority
under Section 9 is illegal and therefore void.
41. Patalinghug v. CA
GR. No. 104786, Jan. 27, 1994
FACTS: In 1982, SP of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 363, otherwise known as the “Expanded Zoning
Ordinance of Davao City,” prohibiting the construction of funeral parlor within 50-meters from any residential
structures, churches and other institutional buildings. Patalinghug constructed a funeral parlor. Due to several
complaints relying on the ordinance, the SP of Davao City made an investigation and found out that the nearest
residential structure is owned by Wilfred Tepoot, only 8 inches to the south. Notwithstanding the findings,
Patalinghug continued the construction.
ISSUES: Whether petitioner’s operation of a funeral home constitutes permissible use within a particular district
or zone in Davao City?
HELD: No. Tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning purposes. A property may
well be declared by its owner as residential for real estate taxation purposes but it may well be within a
commercial zone. Even if Tepoot’s building was declared for taxation purposes as residential, once a local
government has reclassified an area as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must prevail.
42. Sesbreño v. CBAA

G.R. No. 106588, March 24, 1997
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FACTS: Sesbreno bought real property to which it constructed a residential property. He duly registered the same
for taxation purposes and declared therein he owned a residential house made of strong materials. However, the
field inspectors found otherwise—what he constructed was a 5‐storey building made of materials. As such, they
increased by 1000% the assessment made on the property, to which petitioner naturally contested.
ISSUE: Whether market value is the sole basis for determining assessed value for taxation purposes.
RULING: No. The cited provision merely defines "market value." It does not in any way direct that the market
value as defined therein should be used as basis in determining the value of a property for purposes of real
property taxation. On the other hand, Section 5 of PD 464 provides unequivocally that "(a)ll real property,
whether taxable or exempt, shall be appraised at the current and fair market value prevailing in the locality where
the property is situated." Contrary to petitioner's contention, acquisition cost cannot be and is not the sole basis
of the current and fair market value of a property. The current value of like properties and their actual or potential
uses, among others, are also considered.
43. Lopez v. City of Manila,

G.R. No. 127139, Feb. 19, 1999
FACTS: RA 7160 or the Local Government Code requires the conduct of the general revision of real property. The
revision of real property assessments prescribed therein was not yet enforced in the City of Manila. Upon receipt
of Memorandum Circular No. 04-95 from the Bureau of Local Government Finance relating to the failure of most
of the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, including the City of Manila, to conduct the general
revision of real property and after obtaining the necessary funds from the City Council, the City Assessor began
the process of general revision based on the updated fair market values of the real properties.
The City Assessor’s Office submitted the proposed schedule of fair market values to the City Council for its
appropriate action. The council then enacted Manila Ordinance No. 7894 which was approved. With the
implementation of the ordinance, the tax on the land owned by the petitioner was increase hence he filed a
special proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the City of Manila Ordinance No. 7894 for being “unjust,
excessive, oppressive or confiscatory.”
ISSUE: W/N the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with in the instant case
RULING: NO. As a general rule, where the law provides for the remedies against the action of an administrative
board, body, or officer, relief to courts can be sought only after exhausting all remedies provided. Where a
remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to
the courts, not only to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but
also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to courts.
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44. Cag. Robina v. CA
G.R. No. 122451, Oct. 12, 2000
FACTS: The Assets Privatization Trust (APT) offered for sale all the assets and properties of Cagayan Sugar
Corporation (CASUCO), which was foreclosed and transferred to APT by DBP. Petitioner as the highest bidder
acquired the property for P 464, 000.00. Among the properties were sugar mill machineries. The provincial
assessor of Cagayna issued a Notice of Assessment of Real Property with a market value of P 391, 623, 520 and
assessed valued of P 312, 298, 820. The petitioner appealed on the ground that it was excessive, erroneous and
unjust. LBAA fixed the value of machineries at P 260, 327, 060 for assessment purposes. Petitioner contends that
the formula provided in PD 464 must be applied.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent erred in finding the assessment of petitioner’s machineries proper and correct
under PD 464 or the Real Property Tax Code.
RULING: No. The real property being taxed if for 1990 and the law applicable is PD 464 and not RA 7160. Sec. 28
of PD 464 must be read in consonance of Sec 3 which defines market value. Under the latter provision, LBAA and
CBAA were not precluded from adopting various approaches to value determination including adopting the APT
florr bid price for petitioner’s properties. Tax assessment of tax examiners are presumed correct and made in
good faith. Petitioner fails to show that the use of APT floor price pursuant to Sec. 3 of PD 464 was incorrect and
done in bad faith. Petitioner has not also shown that the current value of its property will be significantly lower it
its proposed formula is adopted.
45. Light Rail Transit v. CBAA

G.R. No. 127316, Oct. 2, 2000
FACTS: LRTA, a government corporation was created for the construction, peration, maintenance and/or lease of
light rail transit system in the Philippines. BY virtue of its enabling law, EO 603, LRTA acquired real properties. For
an effective maintenance and management, it entered in a Contract of Management with Meralco Transit
Organization (METRO). METRO undertook to manage, operate and maintain the Light Rail Transit System owned
by LRTA. Meanwhile, the City Assessor of Manila assessed the real properties of LRTA. LRTA paid the realty taxes
under protest contending that properties are not those contemplated under the Real Property Tax Code and if
the same are real properties, these are for public use therefore exempt from realty taxation.
ISSUE: Whether LRTA’s real properties may be assessed with realty taxes.
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RULING: Yes. Under the Real Property Tax Code, the law in force at that time, provides that real property is
classified for assessment purposes on the basis of actual use, which is defined as "the purpose for which the
property is principally or predominantly utilized by the person in possession of the property." Unlike public roads
which are open for use by everyone, the LRT is accessible only to those who pay the required far. It is apparent
that LRTA does not exist solely for public service. Although it is a public utility, it is nonetheless profit-earning.
Even granting that the national government indeed owns the carriageways and terminal stations, the exemption
would not apply because their beneficial use has been granted to petitioner, a taxable entity.
46. Commissioner of Customs v. Marina Sales, Inc.,

G.R. No. 183868
FACTS: Marina Sales, Inc is a manufacturer of juice concentrates and is appointed by CO-RO Food A/S of Denmark,
maker of the juice concentrates, to be its manufacturing arm in the Philippines. As such, it usually imports raw
materials and for that BOC assessed them with 1% import duty rate. In 2003, Marina made an importation and
paid the corresponding 1% import tax. However, BOC examiners contested the tariff classification, that
importation should have been classified under the 7% import duty rate. Due to the reclassification, the imported
materials were withheld, Marina undertook to pay the reclassified rate should it be finally determined that the
reclassification was correct.
ISSUE: Whether the reclassification as invoked by the BOC is correct.
RULING: No. To fit into the category listed under the Tariff Harmonized System Headings calling for a higher
import duty rate of 7%, the imported articles must not lose its original character. In this case, however, the
laboratory analysis of Marinas samples yielded a different result. The report supported Marinas position that the
subject importations are not yet ready for human consumption.
47. Commissioner of Customs v. AGFHA Incorporated

G.R. No. 1 87425, March 28, 2011
FACTS: In December 1993, a shipment containing bales of textile grey cloth arrived in Manila International
Container Port (MICP). The Commissioner, however, held the shipment because its owner/consigned was
allegedly fictitious. AGFHA intervened and asserted that it is the owner of the shipment. After seizure and
forfeiture proceedings, the District Customs, MICP, ordered the forfeiture of the shipment in favour of the
government. The case reached the CTA which consequently ordered the release of the said shipment. The
decision became final and executory. A motion for execution was filed by AFGHA, yet the action was held in
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abeyance in view of the Commissioner’s appeal. In the end, a writ of execution was issued, but the same was
returned unsatisfied because, as reasoned out by the Commissioner, the shipment was lost.
ISSUE: Whether respondent is entitled to recover the value of the lost shipment only on its acquisition cost at the
time of importation.
RULING: Yes. Citing Zagala v. Jimenez interpreting RA 529 amended by RA 4100, stipulations of obligations in
foreign currency are void. Payments of monetary obligations subject to certain exceptions shall be discharged in
the currency which is the legal tender in the Philippines. But since R.A. No. 529 does not provide for the rate of
exchange for the payment of foreign currency obligations incurred after its enactment, the Court held in a number
of cases that the rate of exchange for the conversion in the peso equivalent should be the prevailing rate at the
time of payment.
48. 1. Chevron Philippines, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs

G.R No. 1 78759, August 11, 2008
FACTS: Chevron in an importer, distributor and marketer of petroleum products in the Philippines. In 1996, the
subject importations arrived which were covered by 8 bills of lading. The shipments were unloaded from the
carrying vessels onto petitioner’s oil tanks over a period of 3 days from the date of their arrival. Subsequently,
the import entry declarations (IEDs) were filed and 90% of the total customs duties were paid. The import entry
and internal revenue declarations (IEIRDs) of the shipments were thereafter filed.
The importations were appraised at a duty rate of 3% as provided under RA 8180 and petitioner paid the import
duties. Prior to the effectivity of RA 8180 on April 16, 1996, the rate of duty on imported crude oil was 10%. Three
years later, then Finance Secretary received a letter denouncing the deliberate concealment, manipulation and
scheme wmployed by petitioner in the importation of crude oil, thereby resulting in huge losses of revenue for
the government. This letter was endorsed to the Bureau of Customs (BOC) for investigation. On August 1, 2000,
petitioner received a demand letter from the District Collector requiring the immediate settlement of the amount
of P73,535,830 representing the difference between the 10% and 3% tariff rates on the shipments. Petitioner
objected to the using of the 10% duty rate and insisted that the 3% tariff rate should instead be applied.
Furthermore it raised the defense of prescription against the assessment pursuant to Section 1603 of the Tariff
and Customs Code (TCC). Thus, it prayed that the assessment for deficiency customs duties be cancelled and the
notice of demand be withdrawn. The Special Investigator found that there was an irregularity in the filing and
acceptance of the import entries beyond the 30-day non-extendible period prescribed under Section 1301 of the
TCC and in the release of the shipments after the same had already been deemed abandoned in favor of the
government. Petitioner was then ordered to pay P1,180,170,769.21 representing the total dutiable value of the
importations.The CTA en banc held that it was the filing of the IEIRDs that constituted entry under the TCC. Since
these were filed beyond the 30-day period, they were not seasonably "entered" in accordance with Section 1301
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in relation to Section 205 of the TCC. Consequently, they were deemed abandoned under Sections 1801 and 1802
of the TCC. It also ruled that the notice required under Customs Memorandum Order was not necessary in view
of petitioner's actual knowledge of the arrival of the shipments. It likewise agreed with the CTA Division's finding
that petitioner committed fraud when it failed to file the IEIRD within the 30-day period with the intent to "evade
the higher rate." Petitioner was ordered to pay respondent the total dutiable value of the oil shipments
amounting to P893,781,768.21.
ISSUES: Whether or not “entry” under Section 1301 in relation to Section 1801 of the TCC refers to the IED or the
IEIRD.
RULING: The position of petitioner, that the import entry to be filed within the 30-day period refers to the IED
and not the IEIRD, has no legal basis. Under the relevant provisions of the TCC, both the IED and IEIRD should be
filed within 30 days from the date of discharge of the last package from the vessel or aircraft. The IED serves as
basis for the payment of advance duties on importations whereas the IEIRD evidences the final payment of duties
and taxes. The operative act that constitutes "entry" of the imported articles at the port of entry is the filing and
acceptance of the "specified entry form" together with the other documents required by law and regulations.
The "specified entry form" refers to the IEIRD. The word "entry" refers to the regular consumption entry (the
IEIRD) and not the provisional entry (the IED).
49. ASAALI v. COC

26 SCRA 383
FACTS: Petitioners are owners of five sailing vessels, which were declared by the respondent Commissioner of
Customs forfeited including the cargoes therein for smuggling. Petitioners, however, questions the validity of
their interception and seizure by customs officials on the high seas, the contention being raised was that the
importation had not yet begun and that the seizure was effected outside the territorial waters.
ISSUE: Whether the inception and seizure is valid.
RULING: Yes. It is a well-settled doctrine that a state has the right to protect itself and its revenues, a right not
limited to its territories but extending to the high seas. Moreover, it would be absurd that the five vessels, all
Philippine-registered, to sneak out of the Philippines and go to British North Borneo. It is definitely bound for the
Philippines, to which, the Philippines has a right to protect itself and its revenues, even on the high seas.
50. Felicisimo Rieta v. People of the Philippines,

G.R. No. 147817, August 12, 2004; 436 SCRA 273
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FACTS: Having received information that smuggled items would be transported by an identified cargo truck
coming out of the Port Area, on the night of October 14, 1979, Colonel Lacson radioed his men posted along
Roxas Boulevard to stop the truck and his men later actually intercepted it. They searched the cargo truck and
found 305 cases of blue seal cigarettes. Petitioner was identified as one of the three passengers in the cargo
truck, seated on the front. Subsequently charged with conspiring with 6 other co-accused in defrauding the
government of legitimate duties accruing to it from the imported untaxed cigarettes, petitioner put up in denial
and alibi as his defense. He was convicted of the crime charged.
ISSUE: Whether the conviction is proper.
RULING: Yes. In its legal sense, corpus delicti does not necessarily refer to the body of the person murdered, to
the firearms in the crime of homicide with the use of unlicensed firearms, to the ransom money in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom, or, in the present case, to the seized contraband cigarettes. Corpus delicti refers to the
specific injury or loss sustained or to the fact of the commission of the crime, which may be proved by the
testimony of eyewitnesses. Prosecution witnesses in this case testified on the existence of the 305 cases of blue-
seal cigarettes found in the possession of petitioner and his co-accused. Persons found to be in possession of
smuggled items are presumed to be engaged in smuggling and the petitioner failed to rebut this presumption
because he did not present evidence to support his claim of good faith and lack of knowledge of the unlawful
source of cigarettes.
51. De la Fuente v. De Veyra

G.R. No. L-35385, January 31, 1983; 120 SCRA 451
FACTS: Private respondents are owners of the M/V Lucky Star I which was apprehended by petitioners while it
was unloading blue seal cigarettes into smaller vessels off the coast of Zambales. The M/V Lucky Star I and the
blue sealed cigarettes were all forfeited by the Commission on Customs (COC). The RTC took cognizance of an
action for prohibition and injunction and declared itself without authority over the blue seal cigarettes but said
that since the vessel was more than 30 tons, the COC cannot forfeit them but they may impose the corresponding
fines.
ISSUE: Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING: No. It is well-settled that the exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the
Collector of Customs precludes a Court of First Instance from assuming cognizance over such cases. Therefore,
the assailed orders of respondent judge are set aside.
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52. National Development Company v. Collector of Customs
9 SCRA 429
FACTS: The Customs authorities found that the vessel carried on board an unmanifested cargo consisting of one
television set and respondent Collector of Customs sent a written notice to the operator of the vessel and the
latter answered stating that the television set was not cargo and so was not required by law to be manifested.
The operator requested an investigation and hearing but respondent finding the operator’s explanation not
satisfactory imposed on the vessel a find of P5,000, ordering said fine to be paid within 48 hours from receipt,
with a threat that the vessel would be denied clearance and a warrant of seizure would be issued if the fine will
not be paid.
NDC, as owner, and operator AV Rocha filed for special civil action for certiorari before the CFI of Manila
against the respondent. Respondent contended that petitioners have not exhausted all available administrative
remedies, one of which is to appeal to the Commissioner of Customs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of respondent is correct.
RULING: No. Respondent collector committed grave abuse of discretion because the petitioner NDC was not given
an opportunity to prove that the TV set involved is not a cargo that needs to be manifested. Exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not required where the appeal to the administrative superior is not a plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, as where it is undisputed that the respondent officer has acted
in utter disregard of the principle of due process.
53. Chia v. Acting Collector of Customs

G.R. No. L-4381 0, September 26, 1 989; 177 SCRA 755
FACTS: A verified report of a confidential informant that asserted electronic and electrical equipment and other
articles illegally imported into the Philippines by a syndicate engaged in unlawful “shipside” activities foreign
goods are unloaded from foreign ships in transit through the Bureau of Custom, thereby evading payment of the
corresponding customs duties, and were found inside the “Tom’s electronics” and “Sony Merchandising” after
valuation, the Collector of Customs issued warrants of seizure and detention.
ISSUE: Whether the warrants of seizure and detention are general warrants issued in violation of Rulev126,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court
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RULING: No. The warrants issued by the Collector of Customs in this case were not general warrants, as
erroneously alleged by petitioner, for they identified the stores to be seized, described and specified the provision
of the Tariff and Customs Code.
54. Republic v. Court of First Instance of Manila

213 SCRA 222
FACTS: The Collector of Customs rendered a decision dated September 25, 1975 directing the forfeiture of the
machinery for having been imported in violation of the implementing rules and regulations on overcrowded
industries concomittant with the power vested to the Collector of Customs under Section 2312 of the Tariff and
Customs Code.
On September 29, 1975, respondent corporation filed a petition with the respondent court, docketed as
Civil Case No. 99524, entitled "Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation v. Alfredo Francisco, etc." asking for the annulment
of herein petitioner’s order dated August 19, 1975 and September 8, 1975, and an order restraining petitioner
from enforcing them. The court granted the petition.
ISSUE: WON respondent court has jurisdiction.
RULING: No. In the more recent case of Enrile v. Vinuya, the Supreme Court held that "the prevailing doctrine is
that the exclusive jurisdiction in seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the Collector of Customs precludes a court
of first instance from assuming cognizance over such a matter." It went on to quote Justice Zaldivar in Papa v.
Mago, who enunciated that "it is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive
jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the
goods are actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been
issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings."
Since the respondent court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition of the respondent company it
follows that the court has no authority to issue an injunction against the petitioner.
55. Jao v. CA
G.R. No. 104604, October 6, 1995
FACTS: Pursuant to an issued warrant of seizure and detention by the District Collector of Customs, the customs
personnel searched two premises located along Quirino Avenue, Paranaque and Honduras St., Makati and seized
all untaxed vehicles and parts found therein. Petitioners are owners of these untaxed vehicles and parts.
Consequently, petitioners filed a case for injunction and damages with prayer for restraining order and
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preliminary injunction, which the said RTC had granted. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC since the latter
had no jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to try the case
RULING: No. The Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of
seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with
these proceedings. Even if the seizure by the Collector of Customs were illegal, which has yet to be proven, we
have said that such act does not deprive the Bureau of Customs of jurisdiction thereon.
56. Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya

37 SCRA 381
FACTS: A Cadillac car, owned by Andres Vinuya, became a subject of a seizure and detention issued by the
Collector of Customs. Subsequently, a replevin case was filed before the Regional Trial Court, which took
cognizance of the said case.
ISSUE: Whether the Regional Trial Court (then CFI) has jurisdiction over replevin cases
RULING: No. Section 2303 of Tariff and Customs Code is a provision, which clearly indicates the intention of the
law to confine in the Bureau of Customs the determination of all questions affecting the disposal of property,
proceeded against in a seizure and forfeiture proceedings. The judicial recourse of the property owner is not in
the Courts of First Instance but in the Court of Tax Appeals, and only after exhausting administrative remedies in
the Bureau of Customs.
57. Collector of Customs v. Torres

45 SCRA 273
FACTS: On or about September 15, 1963, a shipment of 158 packages of imported goods and personal effects
arrived and were unloaded at the port of Manila. Said packages were covered by Customs Consumption Entries
Nos. 74586 and 74587, series of 1963. After the amount of P10,887.00 as customs duties, internal revenue taxes,
fees and other charges were paid by respondents Angela Alvaran and Elpidio Floresca, said packages were
released from the Manila customhouse. On October 19, 1963, while the packages were being transported from
the customs area to their destination the packages were intercepted by agents of the Manila Police Department
and were brought to the MPD Headquarters. The Collector was then informed. The Collector was further
informed that "initial findings by the Task Force show that said goods were released from the customs zone
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without proper appraisal by customs personnel, thereby causing damage and losses to the government." It was
further supported by a seizure and detention warrant issued by the Collector of Customs. Private respondents,
owners of the said merchandise, filed a petition praying for a writ of injunction before the CFI of Rizal which took
cognizance of the case.
ISSUE: Whether the CFI of Rizal has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING: No. It is now the settled rule that it is the Court of Tax Appeals and not the Court of First Instance that
has jurisdiction to review the actuations of the Customs authorities regarding the legality or illegality of a seizure,
detention, or release of imported goods; and regarding fines, forfeiture or other penalties imposed in relation
thereto, or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws or part of laws administered by the Bureau
of Customs.
58. Collector of Customs v. Villaluz

71 SCRA 356, June 18, 1976
FACTS: This case involved six consolidated cases which included violations of different tax laws for incorrectly
declaring items in the Baggage Declaration Entry. It turned out that the items brought inside the country were
FORTY (40) cartons of "untaxed blue seal" Salem cigarettes and FIVE (5) bottles of Johny Walker Scotch Whiskey,
also "untaxed", without the necessary permit from the proper authorities and various assorted Watches, Bags,
Montagut shirts and Dress materials which are highly taxable. In connection with these, criminal complaints were
filed and the respondent Judge Villaluz of the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, assumed jurisdiction over the
objection of petitioners counsel, conducted the preliminary examination and investigation, simultaneously in the
manner provided for by Section 13, Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court. Petitioners, in maintaining that
respondent Judge has no such power, rest their claim on Section I of Republic Act No. 5179 arguing that said
court, having been conferred limited jurisdiction, cannot exercise such power of preliminary investigation, the
same not being embraced and contemplated within its given function to "try and decide" specific criminal cases.
ISSUE: Whether a circuit criminal court judge has power to conduct preliminary investigations of criminal
complaints directly filed with him
RULING: Yes. The power of preliminary examination and investigation, which may be exercised by judges of the
Circuit Criminal Courts, is without doubt, "not inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act No. 5179," and
likewise, "necessary to carry their jurisdiction into effect." Both Section 1(3), Article III of the 1935 Constitution
provide the source of the power of all Judges, including Judges of the Court of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal
Courts, and other courts of equivalent rank, to conduct the examination to determine probable cause before the
issuance of the warrant of arrest and therefore sustain the proceedings conducted by respondent Judge leading
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to the issuance of the warrants of arrest and his referral of the cases to the fiscal or other government prosecutor
for the filing of the corresponding information.
However, the Court directed the return of the article seized from him who is the subject of seizure
proceedings before customs authorities and the writ of preliminary injunction issued therein made permanent.
Respondent Judge ignored the established principle that from the moment imported goods are actually in the
possession or control of the Customs authorities, even if no warrant of seizure had previously been issued by the
Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings, the Bureau of Customs acquires
exclusive jurisdiction over such imported goods for the purpose of enforcing the Customs laws, subject to an
appeal only to the Court of Tax Appeals and to final review by the Supreme Court. Such exclusive jurisdiction
precludes the Court of First Instance as well as the Circuit Criminal Court from assuming cognizance of the subject
and divests such courts of the prerogative to replevin properties subject to seizure and forfeiture proceedings for
violation of the Tariff and Customs Code because proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are
not criminal in nature since they do not result in the conviction of wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of
a penalty.
59. Mison v. Natividad

213 SCRA 734
FACTS: In a sworn letter 6 dated 7 February 1988 and addressed to the Commissioner of Customs, one Butch
Martinez informed the former of the existence of both "assembled and disassembled" knocked-down vehicles,
particularly Toyota Lite Aces, at the compound CVC Trading, which is owned by a certain Mr. Castro and located
at St. Jude Avenue, St. Jude Village, San Fernando, Pampanga. Martinez requested for an immediate investigation
thereon and prosecution for the violation of customs laws. Private respondents, owners of the subject vehicle,
filed a petition before the Regional Trial court which took cognizance of the case arguing that the only issue to be
resolved is the ownership of the said vehicles; hence, properly within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Consequently,
a writ of preliminary injunction was ordered by the RTC against the Customs.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC does have jurisdiction over the said petition and had validly issued the writ of preliminary
injunction thereto.
RULING: No. The court a quo has no jurisdiction over the res subject of the warrant of seizure and detention. The
respondent Judge, therefore, acted arbitrarily and despotically in issuing the temporary restraining order,
granting the writ of preliminary injunction and denying the motion to dismiss, thereby removing the res from the
control of the Collector of Customs and depriving him of his exclusive original jurisdiction over the controversy.
Respondent Judge exercised a power he never had and encroached upon the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Collector of Customs. By express provision of law, amply supported by well-settled jurisprudence, the Collector
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of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings and regular courts cannot interfere
with his exercise thereof or stifle or put it to naught.
In the 1966 case of Pacis v. Averia, "The Tariff and Customs Code, in Section 2530 thereof, lists the kinds of
property subject to forfeiture. At the same time, in Part 2 of Title VI thereof, it provides for the procedure in
seizure and forfeiture cases and vests in the Collector of Customs the authority to hear and decide said cases.
[Section 2312, R.A. 1937] The Collector’s decision is appealable to the Commissioner of Customs Section 2313,
R.A. 1937] whose decision is in turn appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals. [Section 2402, R.A. 1937, Sections 7
and 11, R.A. 1125]. An aggrieved party may appeal from a judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals directly to this
Court [Section 18, R.A. 1125; Rule 44, Rules of Court]. On the other hand, Section 44(c) of the Judiciary Act of
1948 [As amended by R.A. 3828] lodges in the Court of First Instance original jurisdiction in all cases in which the
value of the property in controversy amounts to more than ten thousand pesos. This original jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance, when exercised in an action for recovery of personal property which is a subject of a
forfeiture proceeding in the Bureau of Customs, tends to encroach upon, and to render futile, the jurisdiction of
the Collector of Customs in seizure and forfeiture proceedings. This is precisely what took place in this case.
60. Zuno v. Cabredo

402 SCRA 75, April 30, 2003
FACTS: Atty. Winston Florin, the Deputy Collector of Customs of the Sub-port of Tabaco, Albay, issued on
September 3, 2001 Warrant of Seizure and Detention against a shipment of 35,000 bags of rice aboard the vessel
M/V Criston, for violation of Section 2530 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP). A few days
after the issuance of the warrant of seizure and detention, or on September 25, 2001, Antonio Chua, Jr. and
Carlos Carillo, claiming to be consignees of the subject goods, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco City,
Albay, a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) seeking to enjoin the Bureau of Customs and its officials from detaining the subject shipment. On
September 28, 2001, Judge Cabredo issued the TRO and by virtue of said TRO, the 35,000 bags of rice were
released from customs to Antonio Chua, Jr. and Carlos Carillo.
Respondent judge is charged with grave misconduct, knowingly rendering and unjust interlocutory order,
manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence for issuing a temporary restraining order
(TRO) restraining Deputy Collector of Customs from detaining the subject bags of rice allegedly for violation of
the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. Court Administrator Velasco, in his evaluation, stated that the
questioned TRO was clearly illegal and issued in excess of jurisdiction because the Collector of Customs has
exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings. The Court Administrator concluded that the act of
respondent judge in issuing the questioned TRO amounted to gross ignorance of the law.
ISSUE: Whether the issuance of the TRO was valid.
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RULING: No. The judge had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned TRO. Respondent’s actuation in this case is
tantamount to grave misconduct. It is a basic principle that the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction
over seizure and forfeiture proceedings of dutiable goods. A studious and conscientious judge can easily be
conversant with such an elementary rule. Respondent judge was dismissed from service.
61. Bureau of Customs v. Ogario

G.R. No. 138081 , March 30, 2000; 329 SCRA 289
FACTS: On December 9, 1998, Felipe A. Bartolome, District Collector of Customs of Cebu, issued a Warrant of
Seizure and Detention of 25,000 bags of rice, bearing the name of SNOWMAN, Milled in Palawan" shipped on
board the M/V "Alberto", which was then docketed at Pier 6 in Cebu City. The warrant was issued on the basis of
the report of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), Region VII that the rice had been illegally
imported. The report stated that the rice was landed in Palawan by a foreign vessel and then placed in sacks
marked "SNOWMAN," Milled in Palawan." It was then shipped to Cebu City on board the vessel M/V "Alberto."
Forfeiture proceedings were started in the customs office in Cebu.
On December 10, 1998, respondent Mark Montelibano, the consignee of the sacks of rice, and his buyer,
respondent Elson Ogario, filed a complaint for in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. Petitioners moved to
dismiss the complaint, but the same was denied on the ground that the warrant of seizure and detention issued
by the Collector of Customs on the basis of mere suspicion cannot divest the court of his jurisdiction. The trial
court rendered judgment in favor of respondents and ordered the return of the confiscated rice to respondents
upon posting of a bond. Reconsideration of the same was denied as well as petitioner’s recourse to the Court of
Appeals. Meanwhile, the Collector of Customs rendered judgment forfeiting in favor of the government the
25,000 bags of rice.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over forfeiture cases before the Collector of Customs.
RULING: No. The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods and the question of
whether probable cause exists for the seizure of an imported item is not for the courts to determine but rests
solely with the customs authorities. The rule that Regional Trial Courts have no review powers over such
proceedings is anchored upon the policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the government's drive, not
only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon Customs, but more importantly, to render effective and efficient
the collection of import and export duties due the State, which enables the government to carry out the functions
it has been instituted to perform. Even if the seizure by the Collector of Customs were illegal, which has yet to be
proven, we have said that such act does not deprive the Bureau of Customs of jurisdiction thereon.
It is likewise well-settled that the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code and that of Republic Act No. 1125, as
amended, otherwise known as "An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals," specify the proper fora and procedure
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for the ventilation of any legal objections or issues raised concerning these proceedings. Thus, actions of the
Collector of Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of Customs, whose decision, in turn, is subject to the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals and from there to the Court of Appeals.
62. Feeder International Line v. Court of Appeals

197 SCRA 842
FACTS: The M/T "ULU WAI" foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated by Feeder International
Shipping Lines of Singapore, left Singapore on May 6, 1986 carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric
tons of fuel oil consigned to Far East Synergy Corporation of Zamboanga, Philippines. The vessel anchored at the
vicinity of Guiuanon Island in Iloilo when the Customs team found out that the vessel did not have on board the
required ship and shipping documents, except for a clearance from the port authorities of Singapore clearing the
vessel for "Zamboanga." In view thereof, the vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of Seizure and
Detention over the same was issued after due investigation.
On March 17, 1987, the District Collector of Iloilo issued a decision finding MT ULU-WAI and its petroleum
cargo violating Section 2530 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. The Commissioner of Customs
affirmed in toto the decision of the District Collectors. On June 25, 1987, Feeder filed a petition for review with
the Court of Tax Appeals, for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a restraining order to enjoin
the Commissioner from implementing his decision. On December 14, 1988, the Court of Tax Appeals affirmed the
decision of the Commissioner of Customs. Feeder, on January 19, 1990, filed a petition for review of the Court of
Tax Appeals’ decision with this Court.
ISSUE: Whether Feeder was deprived of property without due process of law and that its right to be presumed
innocent was not recognized and the decision was not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING: No. Findings of fact of the CA and of the administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are entitled to great
weight and are conclusive and are binding upon this Court absent showing of a grave abuse of discretion.
Considering, that proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in nature since they
do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not required in order to justify the forfeiture of the goods. In this case, the degree of proof
required is merely substantial evidence which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.
Section 1202 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides that importation begins when the carrying vessel
or aircraft enters the jurisdiction of the Philippines with intention to unload therein. Mere intent to unload is
sufficient to commence an importation. In the case at bar, that petitioner is guilty of illegal importation, there
having been an intent to unload, is amply supported by substantial evidence as clearly demonstrated by this
comprehensive discussion in respondent court's decision.
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63. Tenorio v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 110604, October 10, 2003; 413 SCRA 234
FACTS: Petitioners PI Lt. Christopher Tambungan and Gilbert Cruz secured a search warrant from the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of San Juan, Metro Manila to search the dwelling of private respondent Antonio
Coseng who was suspected of having in his possession untaxed and smuggled goods. On the strength of the said
search warrant, the search team seized goods, not only those described in the search warrant but also other
articles. However, instead of turning over the seized goods to the court, which issued the warrant, petitioners
Tambungan and Cruz delivered them to the Bureau of Customs. Hence, the MeTC issued an order directing
petitioners to turn over to the court the seized articles. Petitioners, however, failed to comply with the order of
the Court. Thus, for their contumacious failure to turn over the seized goods as ordered, the MeTC cited
petitioners for indirect contempt.
ISSUE: Whether the Collector of Customs has original and exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases,
particularly on the determination of the legality or illegality of the search and seizure of goods.
RULING: No, the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Collector on the said goods pertains only to the goods seized
pursuant to the authority under the Tariff and Customs Code. Goods seized on the basis of a search warrant
issued by the court are in custodia legis, subject to the control and disposition of the court that issued the search
warrant. Thus, officers enforcing the search warrant had no authority to deliver the items seized to another
person or agency of the government without the approval of the court, which issued the warrant.
64. Tong Tek, et al v. The Commissioner of Customs

G.R. No. L-1 1947, June 30, 1959; 105 SCRA 1071
FACTS: On March 7, 1955, the Acting Collector of Customs rendered a decision in the seizure proceedings, finding
petitioners guilty of attempted exportation of gold without the corresponding license from the Central Bank and
ordered the forfeiture of the articles involved therein in favor of the government. From said decision, petitioners
appealed to the Acting Commissioners of Customs who, on April 21, 1955, affirmed the decision of the Acting
Collector. The matter was later elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and said court, in its decision of November
21, 1956, ruled that the 138 gold bars were validly forfeited under section 1363-(f) and (m-1) of the Revised
Administrative Code.
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ISSUES: (1) WON gold bars are subject to forfeiture under Section 1363 of the Revised Administrative Code; (2)
WON the Court of Tax Appeals erred in upholding the validity of the order of forfeiture of the 138 gold bars; (3)
WON petitioner's acquittal in the criminal action bars the forfeiture of the merchandise in another proceeding
RULINGS: (1) Yes. It must be remembered that the Revised Administrative Code is a general legislation. As such,
it must have been intended to meet not only the peculiar conditions obtaining at the time of its enactment but
also designed to comprehend those that may normally arise after its approval. The term "merchandise of
prohibited exportation" used in the code is broad enough to embrace not only those already declared prohibited
at the time of its adoption but also goods, commodities or articles that may be the subject of activities undertaken
in violation of subsequent laws; (2) Yes. The carrying out of transactions or undertakings without complying with
the requirements of Circular Nos. 20. 21, and 42 makes these undertakings illegal. And as a natural consequence
thereof, the articles involved in such unauthorized ventures become prohibited and, therefore, subject to
forfeiture under Section 1363-(f) of the Revised Administrative Code; (3) No. It is clear that although the act upon
which the seizure proceedings were based may be the same as that involved in the criminal action, the provisions
of the Administrative Code under which the articles are being confiscated specifically include attempts. Under
the latter statute, therefore, it is not necessary that the offense be completely executed as required under the
provisions of the Central Bank circulars; it is sufficient that all the elements of an attempted exportation, as in the
case at bar, are present. Consequently, acquittal under the latter legal provisions does not constitute a bar to
forfeiture proceedings under the Revised Administrative Code.
65. Farolan, Jr v. CTA

217 SCRA 298
FACTS: Bagong Buhay Trading was assessed P272,600.00 as duties and taxes due on the shipment in question.
Since the shipment was also misdeclared as to quantity and value, the Collector of Customs forfeited the subject
shipment in favor of the government. The Commissioner of Customs affirmed the Collector of Customs but the
two were subsequently denied by the CTA and the questioned goods were ordered to be returned to Bagong
Buhay Trading. Private respondent alleges that of the 143,454 yards (64 bales) released to Bagong Buhay, only
116,950 yards were in good condition and the 26,504 yards were in bad condition. Consequently, private
respondent demands that the Bureau of Customs be ordered to pay for damages for the 43,050 yards it actually
lost.
ISSUES: (1) WON the shipment in question is subject to forfeiture under Section 2530-M subparagraphs (3), (4)
and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code; (2)WON the Collector of Customs may be held liable for the 43,050 yards
actually lost by private respondent;
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RULING: (1) No. Under Section 2530, paragraph m, subparagraphs (3) and (4), the requisites for forfeiture are:
(1) the wrongful making by the owner, importer, exporter or consignees of any declaration or affidavit, or the
wrongful making or delivery by the same persons of any invoice, letter or paper — all touching on the importation
or exportation of merchandise; and (2) that such declaration, affidavit, invoice, letter or paper is false. In the case
at bar, although it cannot be denied that private respondent caused to be prepared through its customs broker
a false import entry or declaration, it cannot be charged with the wrongful making thereof because such entry or
declaration merely restated faithfully the data found in the corresponding certificate of origin, certificate of
manager of the shipper, the packing lists and the bill of lading which were all prepared by its suppliers abroad. If,
at all, the wrongful making or falsity of the documents above-mentioned can only be attributed to Bagong Buhay's
foreign suppliers or shippers; (2) No. On this point, the political doctrine that "the state may not be sued without
its consent," categorically applies. The Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the
private respondent sustained with regard to its goods. Otherwise, to permit private respondent's claim to prosper
would violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since it demands that the Commissioner of Customs be
ordered to pay for actual damages it sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is
obvious that this case has been converted technically into a suit against the state.
66. Yaokasin v. Commissioner

GR No. 84111, December 22, 1989
FACTS: The Philippine Coast Guard seized 9,000 sacks of refined sugar owned by petitioner Yaokasin, which were
then being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and turned them over to the custody of the Bureau of Customs. On
June 7, 1988, the District Collector of Customs ordered the release of the cargo to the petitioner but this order
was subsequently reversed on June 15, 1988. The reversal was by virtue of Customs Memorandum Order (CMO)
20-87 in implementation of the Integrated Reorganization Plan under PD 1, which provides that in protest and
seizure cases where the decision is adverse to the government, the Commissioner of Customs has the power of
automatic review. Petitioner objected to the enforcement of Section 12 of the plan and CMO 20-87 contending
that these were not published in the Official Gazette. The Plan, which was part of PD 1, was however published
in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Whether circular orders such as CMO 20-87 need to be published in the Official Gazette to take effect.
RULING: No. Article 2 of the Civil Code does not apply to circulars like CMO 20-87, which is an administrative
order of the Commissioner of Customs, addressed to his subordinates, the custom collectors. Said issuance
requiring Collectors of Customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of the Plan, is addressed only to particular
persons or a class of persons, hence no general applicability. As held in Tanada v. Tuvera, it need not be published,
on the assumption that it has been circularized to all concerned. Moreover, Commonwealth Act 638 provides an
enumeration of what shall be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that beside legislative acts, resolutions
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of public nature of Congress, executive, administrative orders and proclamations shall be published except when
these have no general applicability.
67. Negros Navigation Co., Inc. v. the Commissioner of Customs, et., al.
8 SCRA 250
FACTS: On December 20, 1960, the Negros Navigation Co., Inc., filed with the Court of Tax Appeals a petition
alleging in substance that it had purchased two new marine engines to replace the old ones used by one of its
motor vessels named "Don Julio"; that the old engines were temporarily deposited along the berthing place of
the ship in the Iloilo wharf and that notwithstanding that said old marine engines were not cargoes brought by
said ship and were merely used as replacement and spare parts, the Collector of Customs assessed against the
company storage charges in the amount of P19,601.92. The company prayed that it be declared exempt from the
payment of said storage charges. On February 7, 1961, the Commissioner of Customs moved to dismiss the
petition on the ground that the Court of Tax Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the same in view of the fact
that the company did not appeal the decision of the Collector of Customs to the Commissioner of Customs within
the reglementary period and, therefore, there is no decision of the Commissioner of Customs that may be
reviewed.
ISSUE: Whether Opinions of Commissioner of Customs on matters referred to him by the Collector is appealable.
RULING: No. Where the Commissioner of Customs, upon request for opinion by a Collector of Customs, concurs
in the decision of the latter, such concurrence cannot be considered a decision from which appeal to the Court
of Tax Appeals may be interposed, because any action taken by the Commissioner of Customs on matters referred
to him by the Collector is only supervisory in nature, and his conformity or disagreement with the decision of the
latter will not transform said decision into that of the Commission. Irrespective of the nature of the
Commissioner's opinion on such matters, the aggrieved party can still appeal the controversy to him within 15
days from receipt of the adverse ruling of the Collector. If not satisfied with the Commissioner's decision, a party
may appeal therefrom to the Court of Tax Appeals within 30 days from receipt of notice of the decision or ruling
sought to be reviewed.
68. CMS State Inc v. COC

10 SCRA 14
FACTS: On August 30, 1960 petitioner addressed a letter to the Collector of Customs of Davao City claiming that
the assessment and collection of wharfage dues on shipments of logs by petitioner were illegal and void because
there is no government wharf or pier at Baganga, Davao; that the lack of written protest by petitioner is no bar
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to the recovery of the charges, on the other hand, there was an implied protest and that justice and equity
demand that illegal taxes collected by the Government should be returned to the taxpayer even when not paid
under protest, etc. The letter was forwarded to the Commissioner of Customs in Manila, for the latter to decide
and for such legal action as he may deem proper to take. The Commissioner of Customs of Manila ruled that such
collection was in accordance with law. That the filing of protest within the reglementary period is mandatory and
a condition precedent for the recovery of customs duties, fees and other charge allegedly erroneously or illegally
collected and non compliance therewith bars and is fatal to the action. Thereafter, the decisions of the Collector
of Customs becomes final and conclusive not only as against the importer or exporter but the government as
well.
ISSUES: Whether the CTA erred in ruling that the petition was premature
RULING: No. The present petition for review is premature, inasmuch as no written protest or appeal from the
action or decision of the Acting Collector of Customs of Davao City was taken pursuant to the provisions of
Sections 2309 and 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code. As repeatedly held by our Supreme Court only final
decisions of the Commissioner of Customs are appealable to this Court. The above ruling of the Court of Tax
Appeals is in accordance with law is affirmed.
69. People v. CFI of Rizal

101 SCRA 86
FACTS: Petitioner seeks to nullify the Order by the Courts of First Instance of Rizal which stalled the prosecution
of private respondents Sgt. Jessie C. Hope and Monina Medina for the alleged violation of section 3601 of the
Tariff and Customs Code. The order declared as inadmissible in evidence the allegedly smuggled articles obtained
by apprehending agents in the course of a warrantless search and seizure. The seizure of the merchandise was in
a moving vehicle done by authorized agents commissioned to enforce customs laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI of Rizal is correct
RULING: No. As can be gleaned from Section 2533 of the code, seizure proceedings, such as those instituted in
this case, are purely civil and administrative in character, the main purpose of which is to enforce the
administrative fines or forfeiture incident to unlawful importation of goods or their deliberate possession. The
penalty in seizure cases is distinct and separate from the criminal liability that might be imposed against the
indicted importer or possessor and both kinds of penalties may be imposed. In the case at bar, the decision of
the Collector of Customs, as in other seizure proceedings, concerns the res rather than the persona.
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70. Commissioner of Customs v. Alikpala
36 SCRA 208
FACTS: The respondent judge herein issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the Commissioner of Custom
from proceeding with the seizure and sale at public auction of the imported fruits by the private respondents
herein. The Commissioner was further directed to release immediately the imported goods to the custody of the
private respondents on the strength of the surety bonds filed by latter. The Commissioner’s cause of action is
expressed in the issues below.
ISSUES: 1. Whether the respondent Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case; 2. Assuming,
ad arguendo, that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, did the respondent Court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the writ of preliminary injunction despite
the fact that the respondents' complaint states no cause of action upon which the grant of injunction may be
predicated.
RULING: 1. Yes. Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for injunction before it.
The remedy prayed for was one in equity. The jurisdiction of respondent Court was not invoked to determine the
validity of the seizure proceedings, which are pending before the Collector of Customs and regarding which an
appeal could be eventually taken only to the Tax Court, but rather to stop the projected auction sale of the goods
in question and secure the release thereof under surety bond, without prejudice to the main issue concerning
the validity of the seizure. Such relief is interlocutory in nature, and is sanctioned by Section 2301 of the Tariff
and Customs Code, which provides that "upon making any seizure the Collector shall issue a warrant for the
detention of the property; but if the owner or importer desires to secure the release of the property for legitimate
use, the Collector may surrender it upon the filing of a sufficient bond, in an amount to be fixed by him,
conditioned for payment of the appraised value of the article and/or any fine, expenses and costs which may be
adjudged in the case; 2. No. The release on bond, it may be repeated, is expressly authorized by Section 2301 of
the Tariff and Customs Code.
71. CF Sharp & Co. Inc v. COC

22 SCRA 760
FACTS: At or about four thirty in the morning of April 1, 1962, a water patrol of the Bureau of Customs
apprehended M/L Cheton while it was passing through the breakwater of Manila loaded with 1,865 cartons of
untaxed blue seal cigarettes. The vessel was seized for violation of Section 2530(a) of the Tariff and Customs Code
and immediately thereafter was subjected to forfeiture proceedings.
CONTRIBUTORS
ISSUE: Whether or not M/L Cheton is subject to forfeiture in favor of the government in accordance with
paragraph a., Section 2530 of the Tariff and Customs Code
RULING: Yes. There is no question that M/L Cheton was apprehended carrying untaxed cigarettes of foreign origin
without the necessary papers showing that they were entered lawfully through a port of entry. There is no
question also that said cigarettes were liable for forfeiture pursuant to the Customs and Tariff Code. On the basis
of the aforestated facts, the conclusion is inevitable that the M/L Cheton was used in connection with unlawful
importation of said cigarettes. The burden was therefore shifted to the boat's owner to show that the carriage
by M/L Cheton of the smuggled cigarettes was lawful. No such showing was made. Hence, the Court of Tax
Appeals committed no error in ordering the forfeiture of the launch in question. By way of comment on
petitioner's stand, it would be absurd to require the Government to prove that a vessel was engaged in smuggling,
after it has already been caught red-handed, that is, loaded with smuggled goods.
72. Vierneza v Commissioner of Customs

24 SCRA 394, 1968
FACTS: At about 2:00 a.m. on September 16, 1957 the M/V "Legaspi" a coastwise vessel coming from Jolo docked
at the port of Cebu on her way to Manila. Acting upon a confidential telegraphic report from an informer in Jolo
that the said vessel was carrying a substantial quantity of smuggled foreign cigarettes, the Customs authorities of
the port of Cebu conducted a search of the vessel which eventually led to the discovery of eight cases containing
SIX HUNDRED FIFTY (650) CARTONS of Chesterfield cigarettes and ONE HUNDRED TEN (110) CARTONS of Camel
cigarettes without the required Internal Revenue strip stamps. . Upon further investigation, it was found that a
woman passenger was accompanying the subject merchandise appearing later to be Mrs. Felicidad Vierneza, the
present claimant, who all the while holds the bill of lading. Believing that there is a strong evidence of violations
of Customs laws, the Collector of Customs of Cebu seized the merchandise and instituted the forfeiture
proceedings for violation of Section 2530 (f), (g) and (m-4) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and
Section 174 of the Internal Revenue Code. Petitioner argues that the Collector of Customs of Jolo, who has
"jurisdiction over all matters arising from the enforcement of tariff and customs laws within his collection district"
ISSUE: Whether the Collector of Customs of Cebu had jurisdiction to order the seizure and forfeiture of said
cigarettes
RULING: Yes. It is a settled jurisprudence that forfeiture proceedings are in the nature of proceedings in rem
wherein the jurisdiction to proceed against the res is vested in the court of the district where the same is found
or seized (25 C.J.S. 572). Therefore, the Collector of Customs of Cebu, who has the authority under the Tariff and
Customs Code to institute forfeiture proceedings, lawfully assumed jurisdiction to forfeit, in favor of the
Government, the smuggled cigarettes found and seized within his collection district. It is no defense that the
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owner of the vessel sought to be forfeited had no actual knowledge that his property was used illegally. The
absence or lack of actual knowledge of such use is a defense personal to the owner himself, which cannot in any
way absolve the vessel from the liability of forfeiture.
73. Llamado v. Commissioner of Customs

G.R. No. L-28809, May 16, 1983; 122 SCRA 118
FACTS: A Cessna plane containing de gaza lamps was unloaded at the Alabat airstrip. Later that night, a motorized
boat carrying Fortune Blue Seal Cigarettes unloaded the goods and was later loaded in a DC-3 plane. The
DC-3 plane took off using the de gaza lamps as a guide to safely take off from
the airstrip. A few days after, a warrant was issued for seizure and detention
of the Cessna Plane. Petitioner argue that a Cessna was not used to transport
the contraband goods but only bring the de gaza lamps.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Cessna plane was used in the unlawful importation of cigarettes within the meaning
of Section 2530 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
RULING: Yes. It is not necessary that the vessel or aircraft must itself carry the contraband. There is nothing in the
law that requires it. In the case at bar, it is undeniable that the Cessna plane was deliberately
used to ensure the DC-3 plane take off without peril and transport the goods to
Pampanga.
74. Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals

September 20, 1985, 138 SCRA 581
FACTS: Private respondent Jose Pascual is the registered owner of the M/B "Maria Victoria-P", a motor boat, duly
licensed by the Bureau of Customs to engage in coastwise trade. On December 16, 1963, the said vessel was
apprehended by the elements of the Philippine Navy five miles off the coast of Naic, Cavite for carrying untaxed
105 cases and 90 parks of Salem cigarettes and 414 cases of Union cigarettes. The authorities turned over the
vessel, its crew and its cargo of blue seal cigarettes to the Small Craft Unit of the Philippine Navy for disposition.
Thereafter, seizure against the vessel and the cargo of blue seal cigarettes were instituted before
the Collector of Customs. For failure of anybody to claim ownership over the cigarettes, the same were forfeited
in favor of the Government. The Collector of Customs declared the vessel forfeited in favor of the Government.
The decision was affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs. On appeal, the Court of Tax Appeals modified the
decision of the Commissioner of Customs and ordered private respondent to pay a fine of P5,000.00 instead of
the forfeiture of the vessel. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motor boat M/B "Maria Victoria-P" is subject to forfeiture under the Tariff and Customs
Code, particularly paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 2530.
CONTRIBUTORS
RULING: Yes. M/B "Maria Victoria-P" was a vessel duly authorized to engage in coastwise trade. It is undisputed
and, in fact, established that it was used in the illegal importation of blue seal cigarettes. Thus, the law applicable
is paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 2530 of the Tariff and Customs Code. The provision prescribes in an unequivocal
term the imposition of the penalty of forfeiture in cases of unlawful importation of foreign articles regardless of
whether such importation occurred with or without the knowledge of the owner of the vessel. The vessel was
not used in catching fish but was used in the smuggling of blue seal cigarettes. Hence, THE VESSEL M/B "MARIA
VICTORIA-P" IS ORDERED FORFEITED IN FAVOR OF THE GOVERNMENT.
75. Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Star Ferry, Inc., October 21, 1993, 227 SCRA 317 G.R. Nos. L-31776-78
October 21, 1993
FACTS: On June 12, 1966, the S/S Argo, the Orestes and the UN-L-106, as well as two wooden bancas of unknown
ownership, were apprehended for smuggling by a patrol boat of the Philippine Navy along the Explosives
Anchorage Area of Manila Bay. The patrol boat caught the crew of the S/S Argo in the act of unloading foreign
made goods onto the UN-L-106, which was towed by the Orestes and escorted by the two wooden bancas. The
goods of 330 cases of foreign-made cigarettes, assorted ladies' wear, clothing material and plastic bags, all of
which were not manifested and declared by the vessel for discharge in Manila. No proper notice of arrival of the
S/S Argo was given to the local customs authorities. Thereafter, seizure and forfeiture proceedings were
separately instituted before the Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila against the said vessels with their
cargo, charging them with violations of Section 2530 (a), (b) and (c) of the Tariff and Customs Code. Criminal
charges were likewise filed against the officers and crew of said vessels and watercraft. The Court of Tax Appeals
held the said vessel and the goods cannot be forfeited in favor of the government because the Port of Manila is
a port of entry (R.A. 1937, Sec. 701). The Commissioner of Customs argues that the phrase "except a port of
entry" should mean "except a port of destination," and inasmuch as there is no showing that the Port of Manila
was the port of destination of the S/S Argo, its forfeiture was in order.
ISSUE: WON the Port of Manila is a port of entry so the said vessel and goods cannot be forfeited in favor of the
government
RULING: Yes. Section 2530(a) in unmistakable terms provides that a vessel engaged in smuggling "in a port of
entry" cannot be forfeited. This is the clear and plain meaning of the law. It is not within the province of the Court
to inquire into the wisdom of the law, for indeed, we are bound by the words of the statute. Neither can we put
words in the mouths of the lawmaker. A verba legis non est recedendum. It was only in 1972, after this case was
instituted, when the questioned exception ("except a port of entry") in Section 2530(a) of the Tariff and Customs
Code was deleted by P.D. No. 74.
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76. Acting Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals
No. L-62636, April 27, 1984; 129 SCRA 70
FACTS: On 20 February 1980, Andrulis representing himself as an American businessman "on joint ventures with
his Filipino counterparts", arrived in Manila and checked in at a hotel. Two days later, he left the hotel
surreptitiously without paying for his bills. The scheduled departure of Andrulis was on that same day. At the
Manila International Airport (MIA), the Customs authorities looked for Andrulis from among the passengers who
were already on board Philippine Airlines bound for Singapore. When Andrulis finally yielded to the authorities
and surrendered the luggage he was carrying, the authorities found therein various foreign currencies consisting
of US$59,639.00; 53,100 Indonesian Rupiah, and Singapore $308.00. A criminal charge was filed against him for
violation of CB Circular No. 534 in relation to RA 265, the Central Bank Charter. On 10 March 1980, the Assistant
City Fiscal dismissed the charge on the rationalization that the Government had failed to present evidence that
the currencies were not brought in by Andrulis.
ISSUE: Who has the burden of proof in seizure or forfeiture proceedings?
RULING: The burden of proof lies upon the claimant. The applicable law, Section 2535 of the Tariff and Customs
Code, is explicit in this regard. Here, the requirement of the law that the existence of probable cause should first
be shown before filing of the forfeiture proceedings, had been fully met. When Andrulis was apprehended at the
MIA and was found to have in his possession the various foreign currencies, he could not produce the required
Central Bank authorization allowing him to bring them out of the country. This constituted prima facie evidence
of infringement of the provisions of CB Circular No. 534 and provided sufficient basis for the seizure 'of the said
foreign exchange. Probable cause having been shown, the burden of proof was upon Andrulis to establish that
he fell within the purview of the exception prescribed in the second paragraph of the aforequoted Section 3 of
CB Circular No. 534 in that he actually brought into the country the foreign currencies and was just taking them
out. This burden, Andrulis had failed to satisfactorily discharge.
77. Commissioner of Customs v. Navarro

No. L-33146, May 31, 1977; 77 SCRA 264
FACTS: The stress, and rightly so, by the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs in their
exhaustive and scholarly petition for certiorari was on the jurisdictional issue. It sought to nullify and set aside in
order of respondent Judge Pedro C. Navarro issuing a writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for by private
respondents Juanito S. Flores and Asiatic Incorporated the importers of 1,350 cartons of fresh fruits, restraining
petitioners from proceeding with the auction sale of such perishable goods. Classified as non-essential consumer
commodities, they were banned by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 289, 294 and 295 as prohibited importation or
importation contrary to law and thus made subject to forfeiture proceedings by petitioner Collector of Customs
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pursuant to the relevant sections of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioners pointed out that seizure and
forfeiture proceedings, which, as held in a number of decisions, was a matter falling within the exclusive
competence of the customs authorities.
ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction over the confiscated goods?
RULING: Customs. That such jurisdiction of the customs authorities is exclusive was made clear in Pacis v. Averia.
This Court, speaking through Justice J. P. Bengzon, realistically observed: “This original jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance, when exercised in an action for recovery of personal property which is a subject of a forfeiture
proceeding in the Bureau of Customs, tends to encroach upon, and to render futile, the jurisdiction of the
Collector of Customs in seizure and forfeiture proceedings.” The court “should yield to the jurisdiction of the
Collector of Customs.” Such a ruling, as pointed out by Justice Zaldivar in Auyong Hian v. Court of Tax Appeals,
promulgated less than a year later, could be traced to Government v. Gale, 26 a 1913 decision, where there was
a recognition in the opinion of Justice Carson that a Collector of Customs when sitting in forfeiture proceedings
constitutes a tribunal upon which the law expressly confers jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions
touching the forfeiture and further disposition of the subject matter of such proceedings.
78. COC v. CTA*

328 SCRA 822
FACTS: Section 17 of the PD 66 (EPZA Law) exempts from customs and internal revenue laws, supplies brought
into the export processing zone. Philphos, an enterprise registered with the Export Processing Zone, is entitled to
tax incentives. Consequently, Philphos sought the refund of customs duties it had paid for the period October to
December 1991 and January to June 1992 on purchased on fuels and petroleum products from Petron which
imported the same and paid the corresponding customs duties but passed on said customs duties to Philphos as
part of the selling price. These fuel supplies are indispensable for Philphos’ business as they run the machines,
which manufacture the fertilizers. The Supreme Court held that Section 17(1) certainly covers petroleum supplies
used, directly or indirectly by Philphos to facilitate its production of fertilizers, subject to the minimal requirement
that these supplies are brought into the zone. The supplies are not subject to customs and internal revenue laws
and regulations, nor to local tax ordinances. Section 17(1) considers such supplies exempt even if they are used
indirectly, as they had been in this case. The Bureau of Customs denied the claim for refund. On appeal, the CTA
issued a Tax Credit Certificate in favor of Philphos. The CA affirmed the CTA’s decision in toto. Both relied on
Section 17(1) of the EPZA law to justify the conclusion that Philphos is entitled to the refund.
ISSUE: Whether Section 18i of the EPZA law that is applicable and precludes Philphos’ claim for refund.
CONTRIBUTORS
RULING: No. The Supreme Court held that solutio indebiti provisions in the past have been applied in cases when
taxes were collected through error or mistake; solutio indebiti is a quasi-contract, thus the claim for refund has
not yet prescribed. Section 18 of the EPZA law does not exclude the broad grant of benefits accorded by Section
17. These “additional incentives” under Section 18 are to be enjoyed in conjunction with the incentives under
Section 17. The Supreme Court, however, slightly modified the award. Instead of a tax credit, which avails only if
the supplies form part of the export product, a refund of the same is warranted the circumstances.
79. Nestle v. CA
G.R. No. 1 3411 4, July 6, 2001
FACTS: Petitioner Nestle Philippines Inc. transacted 16 separate importations of milk and milk products from
different countries between the period of July and November 1984. It paid the corresponding customs duties and
advance sales taxes to the Collector of Customs of Manila for each transaction based on the published Home
Consumption Value (HCV) as indicated in the Bureau of Customs Revision Orders but it seasonably filed the
corresponding protests before the said Collector of Customs. In the said protests, petitioner claimed for the
refund of the alleged overpaid import duties and advance sales taxes. With regards to advance sales taxes, the
CTA eventually ruled in favor of the petitioner. However, the Collector of Customs failed to render a decision on
the 16 protest cases for almost 6 years for the alleged overpaid customs duties. In order to prevent the claims
from becoming stale on the ground of prescription, petitioner immediately filed a petition for review with the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CTA dismissed the said petition for want of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether remand of this case to the CTA is warranted.
RULING: Yes, for the proper verification and determination of the factual basis and merits of the petition and in
order that the ends of substantial justice and fair play may be subserved. In the light of the Sections 2308 and
2309 of the Tariff and Customs Code, it appeared that in all cases subject to protest, the claim for refund of
customs duties may be foreclosed only when the interested party claiming refund fails to file a written protest
before the Collector of Customs. Accordingly, once a written protest is seasonably filed with the Collector of
Customs the failure or inaction of the latter to promptly perform his mandated duty under the Tariff and Customs
Code should not be allowed to prejudice the right of the party adversely affected thereby. Technicalities and
legalities, however exalted, should not be misused by the government to keep money not belonging to it, if any
is proven, and thereby enrich itself at the expense of the taxpayers.
80. COC v. Phil. Phosphate

G.R. No. 1 44440, September 1, 2004
CONTRIBUTORS
81. Viduya v Berdiago

73 SCRA 553
FACTS: Respondent Berdiago is the owner of a Rolls Royce car model 1966, which arrived in the Port of Manila
on January 8, 1968. However, the petitioner, Jose Viduya, then Collector of Customs of Manila, obtained reliable
information that fraudulent documents were used by Berdiago in securing the release of the car from the Bureau
of Customs, making it appear therein that the car was a 1961 model instead of a 1966 one, thus enabling
respondent to pay a much lower customs duty. As the car was kept in a dwelling house at the Yabut Compound,
two officials of the Customs Police Service as duly authorized agents of petitioner, applied to respondent
Judge for a warrant to search said dwelling house and to seize the Rolls Royce found therein. Respondent
Judge in the challenged order quashed such search warrant. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the warrant
CONTRIBUTORS
RULING: Yes. Except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority
under customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs
laws. As the car was kept in a dwelling house, petitioner through two of his officers in the Customs Police Service
for and was able to obtain the search warrant. There was evidently need for the issuance of search warrant. It
ought not have been thereafter quashed.
82. Pacsi v Pamaran

56 SCRA 16
FACTS: On July 22, 1964, Acting Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis was informed by the General Affairs
Administration of the Department of National Defense that the automobile was a “hot car”. By virtue thereof,
Pacis, through his subordinates, looked into the records of his office and found that although the amount
collectible on the said car should be P2, 500, more or less.
Based on such discrepancy, he instituted seizure proceedings and issued a warrant of seizure and detention. The
automobile was also taken by the Department of National Defense against and brought to the General Affairs
Administration for compound.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner, in the discharge of his official function, lay himself open to a criminal prosecution
for usurpation by judicial function
RULING: No. It is undeniable that petitioner, as Acting Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, had the
requisite authority for the issuance of the contested warrant of seizure and detention for the automobile
owned by respondent Ricardo Santos. What was done by him certainly could not be the basis of a prosecution
for usurpation of judicial function.
83. Republic v Lim Tian Teng Sons & Co, Inc.
FACTS: Lim Tian Teng Sons & Co, Inc (LTI), a domestic corporation, in the exportation of copra. In the case, Lim
Tian received said assessment on January 30, 1957 and on the following day requested reinvestigation of its tax
liability. The CIR, however, did not reply to the request for reinvestigation. Instead, he referred the case to the
Solicitor General for collection of the tax. The lower court interpreted this action of the Collector of
Internal Revenue as a denial of defendant’s request for reinvestigation. Instead of appealing to the Tax
Court, however, Lim Tian reiterated its request for reinvestigation.
ISSUE: Was the court correct in considering the assessment final and executory?
CONTRIBUTORS
RULING: Yes. The period of 30 days within which the taxpayer may appeal to the CTA, said period had long lapsed
when the CIR filed the complaint in this case on September 2, 1958. Taxpayer’s failure to appeal to the CTA in
due time made the assessment in question final, executory and demandable.
84. CIR v. Alikapala

36 SCRA 208
FACTS: Petitioner seeks to nullify and set aside the order of respondent Judge Pedro C. Navarro which issued a
writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for by private respondents Juanito S. Flores and Asiatic
Incorporated, the importers of 1,350 cartons of fresh fruits, restraining petitioners from proceeding with
the auction sale of such perishable goods. Classified as non-essential consumer commodities, they were
banned by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 289, 294 and 295 as prohibited importation or importation contrary
to law and thus made subject to forfeiture proceedings by petitioner Collector of Customs pursuant to the
relevant sections of the Tariff and Customs Code.
ISSUE: WON the CFI of Rizal has jurisdiction
RULING: No. The question of seizure and forfeiture is for the administrative in the first instance and then the
Commissioner of Customs. This is a field where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction controls. Thereafter an
appeal may be taken to the Court of Tax Appeals. A court of first instance thus devoid of competence to act
on the matter. There is further judicial review, but only by this Court in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction.
That such jurisdiction of the customs authorities is exclusive was made clear in Pacis v. Averia decided in
1966. This Court, speaking througH Justice J. P. Bengzon, realistically observed: "This original jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance, when exercised in an action for recovery of personal property which is a subject of a
forfeiture proceeding in the Bureau of Customs, tends to encroach upon, and to render futile, the jurisdiction
of the Collector of Customs in seizure and forfeiture proceedings." The court "should yield to the jurisdiction
of the Collector of Customs."
85. CIR v Ayala Securities Corporation

GR No. L-29485
FACTS: On November 29, 1955, respondent corporation filed its income tax returns for the fiscal year, which
ended September 30, 1955, attaching therewith its audited financial statements showing a surplus of
P2,758,442.37. The tax due thereon was paid within the time prescribed by law. Subsequently however, it
was advised of an assessment of P758,687.04 on its accumulated surplus after which, in a letter dated April 19,
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1961, it protested against the same and sought reconsideration thereof claiming that the accumulation was
for a bona fide business purpose and not to avoid the imposition of income tax on the individual shareholders,
and that said assessment was issued beyond the 5-year prescriptive period. In a letter dated February 18,
1963, received by respondent corporation three days later, the Chief Manila Examiners, of the Office of
petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue called attention to its outstanding and unpaid tax and
requested payment of the amount within 5 days from receipt of the letter. Believing that the same
constituted a denial of its protest, the respondent corporation filed with the Court of Tax Appeals a petition for
review of the assessment. The Court of Tax Appeals rendered a decision cancelling and declaring of no force and
effect the assessment of petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether the tax court erred in taking cognizance of the case
RULING: No, the tax court did not err. The assessment is not binding on Respondent Corporation as it was made
after the prescriptive period therefor had expired; and that consequently, a ruling on the respondent
corporation’s accumulated profits or surplus was unnecessary.
86. CIR v. Gonzales

GR L-19495
FACTS: Matias Yusay, a resident of Pototan, Iloilo, died intestate on May 13, 1948, leaving two heirs, namely, Jose
S. Yusay, a legitimate child, and Lilia Yusay Gonzales, an acknowledged natural child. Intestate proceedings for
the settlement of his estate were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo (Special Proceedings
No. 459). Jose S. Yusay was therein appointed administrator. The Bureau of Internal Revenue assessed on
October 29, 1953 estate and inheritance taxes in the sums of P6,849.78 and P16,970.63, respectively. On
January 25, 1955 the Bureau of Internal Revenue increased the assessment to P8,225.89 as estate tax
and P22,117.10 as inheritance tax plus delinquency interest and demanded payment thereof on or before
February 28, 1955. More than a year later, particularly on July 12, 1957, an agent of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue apprised the Commissioner of Internal Revenue of the existence of said reamended
project of partition. Whereupon, the Internal Revenue Commissioner caused the estate of Matias Yusay to be
reinvestigated for estate and inheritance tax liability. Like in previous assessments, the fair market value of the
real properties was arrived at by adding 40% to the assessed value.
ISSUE: WON the right of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to assess the estate and inheritance taxes in
question prescribed
RULING: No. As stated, the Commissioner came to know of the identity of the heirs on September 24, 1953 and
the huge underdeclaration in the gross estate on July 12, 1957. From the latter date, Section 94 of the Tax Code
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obligated him to make a return or amend one already filed based on his own knowledge and information
obtained through testimony or otherwise, and subsequently to assess thereon the taxes due. The running of
the period of limitations under Section 332(a) of the Tax Code should therefore be reckoned from said date
for, as aforesaid, it is from that time that the Commissioner was expected by law to make his return and
assess the tax due thereon. From July 12, 1957 to February 13, 1958, the date of the assessment now in dispute,
less than ten years have elapsed. Hence, prescription did not abate the Commissioner's right to issue said
assessment.
87. Surigao v. CTA
FACTS: Petitioner Surigao Electric Co., grantee of a legislative electric franchise, contested a warrant of distraint
and levy to enforce the collection from Mainit Electric of a deficiency franchise tax plus surcharge. The
controversy culminated in a revised assessment dated April 29, 1963 in the amount of P11,533.53, representing
the petitioner’s deficiency franchise tax and surcharges thereon for the period from April 1, 1956 to June
30, 1959. The petitioner then requested a recomputation of the revised assessment in a letter to the
Commissioner dated June 6 1963. The Commissioner, however, in a letter dated June 28, 1963 denied the request
for recomputation. Petitioner appealed to the CTA which was subsequently dismissed on the ground that the
appeal was filed beyond the 30-day period of appeal provided by Section 11 of Republic Act 1125.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner’s appeal to the CTA was time-barred
RULING: Yes. The thirty day period cannot be counted from July 16, 1963, the day it received the June 28, 1963
letter, would, in effect, leave solely to the petitioner’s will the determination of commencement of the
statutory 30-day period and place the taxpayer in a position to delay at will and on convenience the finality of a
tax assessment.
88. COC vs. Planters Product*

82018, March 16, 1989
CONTRIBUTORS
89. DYPAC v. CTA

L-31369, Oct. 18, 1977
FACTS: "On March 9, 1967, respondent assessed against petitioner the amounts of P85,233.02 and P54,408.23
as forest charges and surcharges and sales tax and surcharge, respectively, or a total sum of P139,641.25 for the
period from April, 1961 to May, 1963.
"On April 19, 1967, petitioner protested the assessment and requested that it be cancelled or withdrawn. "In a
letter dated April 16, 1967, respondent denied the protest of petitioner which letter was received by the
petitioner on May 16, 1967.
"On July 3, 1967, petitioner reiterated its objections to the assessment, making reference to its previous letter of
April 19, 1967, and again requested that the same be cancelled or withdrawn. Respondent, in a letter dated
October 18, 1967, received by petitioner on November 7, 1967, denied the request for cancellation of the
assessment and held that —
‘In view of the foregoing, you are hereby requested for the last time to pay the aforesaid sum of P139,641.25
within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof; otherwise, collection thereof will be enforced thru the remedies
prescribed by law without further notice. ‘Failure on your part to settle the said tax account will also constrain
this Office to recommend the criminal prosecution of your President and/or other responsible officers for the
enforcement of the penal sanctions of the Revenue Code. On July 5, 1968, petitioner filed the instant petition for
review.brary
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for review was filed within the reglementary period?
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RULING: We hold that the point from which the period to appeal should be counted is the receipt by the petitioner
on November 7, 1967 of the letter dated October 18, 1967 of the respondent Commissioner.
Paragraph 1, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125, in express terms, allows appeal from the "decision or ruling of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue." The word "decision" has been interpreted to mean decisions of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue on protests of taxpayers against assessments. 1 And, in computing the 30-day
period for appeal to the Tax Court, counting should begin from the date of receipt of the decision of the
Commissioner on the disputed assessment. 2 However, where several requests for reconsideration have been
filed with the Commissioner, it would appear that the communication from the latter overruling taxpayer’s
request for reconsideration and affirming the disputed assessment in terms clearly indicating finality of the action
taken, constitutes the appealable decision or ruling.
90. Morales v. CIR

G.R. No. L-16759, August 31, 1966
FACTS: On May 14, 1956 respondent issued a new assessment for P641.39 and P631.60 as deficiency estate and
inheritance taxes, respectively, with interest in both instances, or a total of P1,272.99; and on October 11, 1956
respondent asked petitioner to pay the amount within ten days. On October 15, 1956 petitioner addressed a
letter to respondent, contending that under Section 331 of the Internal Revenue Code reassessment of the taxes
had already prescribed, because more than five years had elapsed since the submission of the deed of
extrajudicial partition on which the original assessments were based.
On October 14, 1958 respondent served on petitioner a warrant of distraint and levy, with the corresponding
notices of seizure and sale. The sale of the distrained properties was scheduled to be held on December 15, 1958.
On December 8, 1958 petitioner filed with the Court of Tax Appeals a "petition for review," stating therein that it
was "an appeal from the decision of the respondent, as contained in his letter dated December 5, 1958."
Petitioner assails the ruling as erroneous and points out that in his petition for review before the Court of Tax
Appeals he specifically stated that respondent's letter of December 5, 1958 was the decision he was appealing
from, and therefore his petition, filed only three days later, was timely.
ISSUE: Whether or not issue is reviewable in the Court of Tax Appeals?
RULING: The allegations in the petition filed in said Court are clear: that the warrant of distraint and levy as well
as the notices of seizure and sale issued by respondent were null and void because the deficiency estate and
inheritance tax assessments on which they were based, both dated May 14, 1956, were issued more than five
years after petitioner filed his tax return on April 28, 1951. This question of prescription was the same one raised
by petitioner in his letter to respondent of October 15, 1956, wherein he said that a reassessment of his tax
liability was no longer feasible by reason of the lapsed of the five-year period. It was the question that respondent
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decided in his reply-letter to petitioner dated December 28, 1956, rejecting the latter's plea on the ground that
the law applicable was not Section 331 but rather Section 332 (a) of the Tax Code, which fixes a ten-year
prescriptive period, no tax return having filed by petitioner in this case. In other words, it was the very question
decided by respondent on December 28, 1956 that petitioner sought to present to the Court of Tax Appeals in
his petition for review, the decision being then properly appealable because it was on a "disputed assessment"
within the meaning of Section 7 (par. 1) of Republic Act No. 1125 (creating the Court of Tax Appeals), which states
that this Court "shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal . (1) decisions of the Collector
of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments.
91. Tuason & Legarda Ltd. v. CIR

G.R. No. L-18552. September 30, 1965.
FACTS: On December 16, 1958 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue— hereinafter referred to simply as
respondent — served on petitioner an assessment for specific tax in the amount of P3,255.40 and P300.00 as
penalty of the stock of distilled spirits aforesaid. In reply thereto petitioner informed said respondent on January
16, 1959 that the stock had already oxidized and was unfit for human consumption, and asked for authority to
destroy it in the presence of and under the supervision of a government representative
On February 13, 1959 the Chief, Specific Tax Branch, respectively, recommended the destruction of said alcohol
and compounded liquors, having found them to be unfit for human consumption. However, on April 29 of the
same year, Inocencio Gonzales, Jr., Chief Laboratory Section, after an analysis of the same substances, made a
report to the contrary. As a result, respondent denied petitioner's request for authority to destroy the stock, but
in his letter of July 3, 1959 respondent reduced the original assessment to P2,814.95, plus P300.00 as a penalty.
The respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, instead of replying to this last request, served on petitioner
on January 20, 1960 a warrant of distraint and levy for P3,525.40, (the original assessment) plus P300.00 as a
penalty,
On February 11, 1960, petitioner filed its petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals. The respondent filed
in due time his answer alleging as affirmative defense that the Court had no jurisdiction over the petition since it
was filed more than 30 days after receipt of the letter-demand dated July 3, 1959 and/or the other letter dated
September 30 of the same year.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CTA was correct in dismissing the petition on the ground it was filed out of time?
RULING: It is clear from the above facts that the letter of respondent dated July 3, 1959 was, in legal
contemplation, the ruling or decision from which petitioner should have appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals.
In computing the period of appeal in this case, We believe that petitioner's last written request for authority to
destroy the distilled spirits and compounded liquors in question did not suspend the running of said period,
because it was a mere reiteration of two previous petitions already denied by respondent. Consequently, the
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conclusion is inevitable that when petitioner filed its petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals, the
questioned assessment had already become final, executory and incontrovertible.
92. Roman Catholic v. CIR

L-16683, Jan. 31 , 1962
FACTS: This petition was filed by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cebu to obtain review of a decision of the
Court of Tax Appeals dismissing his appeal from the ruling of the Collector (now Commissioner) of Internal
Revenue of February 1, 1958, for lack of jurisdiction, and affirming Income Tax Assessments Nos. 17-EC-00301-
55 and 17-AC-600107-56 against said petitioner.
On February 18, 1957, petitioner, in behalf of the Roman Catholic Church in Cebu, filed an income tax return for
1956, showing the its gross income amounting to P 18,856.42. Petitioner claimed deductions for depreciation
worth P 20, 226.15.
On the theory that the gross incomes in 1955 and 1956 were realized independently of the use of the buildings,
furniture and fixtures, respondent totally disallowed the deductions for depreciation, thereby determining
against petitioner, on July 15, 1956 and March 30, 1957, income tax liabilities for 1955 and 1956 in the respective
amounts of P1,825.00 and P2,493.00.
Meanwhile, on December 4, 1957, respondent issued a warrant of distraint and levy against the properties of the
Roman Catholic Church, to satisfy the sums of P1,916.25 and P2,617.65 as deficiency income tax and surcharge
due for 1955 and 1956.
On February 7, 1958, petitioner paid under protest the total amount of P5,201.52 as income tax for the years
1955 and 1956, including surcharge and interests. And on February 1, 1958, he filed before this Court his petition
for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Court of Tax appeal was correct in dismissing the petition?
RULING: This contention is untenable. We cannot countenance the theory that would make the commencement
of the statutory 30-day period solely dependent on the will of the taxpayer and place the latter in a position to
put off indefinitely and at his convenience the finality of a tax assessment. Such an absurd procedure would be
detrimental to the interest of the Government, for 'taxes are the lifeblood of the government, and their prompt
and certain availability an imperious need.'
93. CIR v. Union Shipping

No. 661 60, May 21, 1990
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FACTS: In a letter dated December 27, 1974 petitioner assessed against Yee Fong Hong, Ltd. and/or herein private
respondent Union Shipping Corporation for deficiency income taxes due for the years 1971 and 1972. Private
respondent protested the assessment.
Petitioner, without ruling on the protest, issued a Warrant of Distraint and Levy. In a letter, private respondent
reiterated its request for reinvestigation. Petitioner, again, without acting on the request for reinvestigation and
reconsideration of the Warrant of Distraint and Levy, filed a collection suit against private respondent.
In 1979, private respondent filed with respondent court a Petition for Review. The CTA ruled in favor of private
respondent. Hence, this is a petition for review on certiorari
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of a warrant of distraint and levy is proof of the finality of an assessment and
is tantamount to an outright denial of a motion for reconsideration of an assessment.
HELD: The Supreme Court had already laid down the dictum that the Commissioner should always indicate to the
taxpayer in clear and unequivocal language what constitutes his final determination of the disputed assessment.
There appears to be no dispute that petitioner did not rule on private respondent's motion for reconsideration
but contrary to the above ruling of this Court, left private respondent in the dark as to which action of the
Commissioner is the decision appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals. Had he categorically stated that he denies
private respondent's motion for reconsideration and that his action constitutes his final determination on the
disputed assessment, private respondent without needless difficulty would have been able to determine when
his right to appeal accrues and the resulting confusion would have been avoided.
94. Yabes v. Flojo

L-46954, July 20, 1982
FACTS: In May 1962, Doroteo Yabes received an assessment notice from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(CIR) demanding him to pay P15k in taxes. Doroteo filed a protest within the prescribed period. The protest was
initially denied in September 1962 however, a few days after the denial, the CIR advised Doroteo to execute a
waiver of the statute of limitations (SOL) and to allow the CIR to hold in abeyance the ruling of his case until a
similar case (Cirilo Constantino Case) which involves exactly the same issue would be decided by the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA). Doroteo complied but while waiting for the CTA to decide that case, Doroteo died. The CTA finally
decided the Constantino Case but the same was appealed to the Supreme Court (SC). And so the CIR asked the
successors-in-interest of Doroteo, Elpidio and Severino Yabes, to execute another waiver while waiting for the SC
decision. The waiver was duly executed and it extended the period of prescription within which the CIR may
collect the assessed tax to December 31, 1970.
The Constantino Case was decided by the SC in February 1970. On December 4, 1970, before the lapse of the
extended period (12/31/70), the CIR filed a tax collection suit against the estate of Doroteo Yabes with the Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Cagayan. Elpidio et al received the summons on January 20, 1971. Elpidio et al then filed
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an appeal with the CTA on February 12, 1971. At the same time, Elpidio et al filed a motion to dismiss (MTD) the
collection suit with CFI Cagayan on the ground that the filing of the collection suit is a denial by the CIR of the
protest; that such denial is appealable to the CTA; that CFI Cagayan therefore has no jurisdiction over the case.
However, Judge Napoleon Flojo of CFI Cagayan denied the MTD.
ISSUE: Whether or not CFI Cagayan has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: No. The CTA acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case when Elpidio et al appealed. The formal
assessment notice (FAN) is considered to have been formally made when the tax collection suit was filed on
December 4, 1970. The FAN is considered received by Elpidio et al when they received the summons on January
20, 1971. From there, they have 30 days to file an appeal with the CTA. They filed their appeal on February 12,
1971 – well within the 30 day period to appeal.
95. CIR v. Concepcion

L-23912 March 15, 1968
FACTS: Respondent Jose Concepcion, as ancillary administrator of the estate of Mary H. Mitchell-Roberts, and
respondent Jack F. Mitchell-Roberts, husband of the deceased sought a refund of the sum of P1,181.33 and
P2,616.10 representing estate and inheritance taxes on 50 shares of stock of Edward J. Nell Company issued in
the names of both spouses "as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship and not as tenants in common." The
above assessment was made by petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the ground that there was a
transmission to the husband of one-half share thereof upon the death of the wife, the above shares being
conjugal property. Respondents maintained on the other hand that there was no transmission of property since
under English law, ownership of all property acquired during the marriage vests in the husband. Moreover, the
shares of stock were issued to the spouses "as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship and not as tenants in
common." Not being agreeable to the theory entertained by petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
respondents, in a previous case, CTA Case No. 168, appealed such a decision under Republic Act No. 1125. The
Court of Tax Appeals, however, dismissed such an appeal as the petition for review because it was filed beyond
the reglementary period of 30 days. That decision rendered on April 29, 1957, became final.
ISSUE: Whether or not the taxpayer who had lost his right to dispute the validity of an assessment, the period for
appealing to the Court of Tax Appeals having expired?
RULING: The expedient of an appeal from a denial of a tax request for cancellation of warrant of distraint and levy
cannot be utilized for the purpose of testing the legality of an assessment, which had become conclusive and
binding on the taxpayer, there being no appeal, the procedure set forth in Section 306 of the National Internal
Revenue Code is not available to revive the right to contest the validity of an assessment once the same had been
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irretrievably lost not only by the failure to appeal but likewise by the lapse of the reglementary period within
which to appeal could have been taken. Clearly then, the liability of respondent Concepcion as an ancillary
administrator of the estate of the deceased wife and of respondent Mitchell-Roberts as the husband for the
amount of P1,181.33 as estate tax and P2,616.10 as inheritance tax was beyond question. Having paid the same,
respondents are clearly devoid of any legal right to sue for recovery. The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
ordering petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue to refund the above total sum of P3,797.43 cannot stand.
96. Aguinaldo v. CIR

L-29790, Feb. 25, 1982
FACTS: Aguinaldo Industries is engaged in the manufacture of fishing nets (a tax exempt industry), which is
handled by its Fish Nets Division. It is also engaged in the manufacture of furniture which is operated by its
Furniture Division. Each division is provided with separate books of accounts. The income from the Fish Nets
Division, miscellaneous income of the Fish Nets Division, and and the income from the Furniture Division are
computed individually.
Petitioner acquired a parcel of land in Muntinlupa Rizal as site for its fishing net factory. The transaction was
entered in the books of the Fish Nets Division. The company then found another parcel of land in Marikina
Heights, which was more suitable. They then sold the Muntinlupa property and the profit derived from the sale
was entered in the books of the Fish Nets Division as miscellaneous income to separate it from its tax exempt
income.
For 1957, petitioner filed 2 separate ITRs (one for Fish Nets and one for Furniture). After investigation, BIR
examiners found that the Fish Nets Div deducted from its gross income PhP 61k as additional remuneration paid
to the company’s officers. Such amount was taken from the sale of the land and was reported as part of the
selling expenses. The examiners recommended that such deduction be disallowed. Petitioner then asserted in its
letter that it should be allowed because it was paid as bonus to its officers pursuant to Sec.3 of its by-laws: “From
the net profits shall be deducted for allowance of the Pres. - 3%, VP - 1%, members of the Board - 10%.”
CTA imposed a 5% surcharge and 1% monthly interest for the deficiency assessment. Petitioner then stressed
that the profit derived from the sale of the land is not taxable because the Fish Nets Div enjoys tax exemption
under RA 901.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is liable for surcharge and interest for late payment?
RULING: YES. Interest and surcharges on deficiency taxes are imposable upon failure of the taxpayer to pay the
tax on the date fixed in the law for the payment thereof, which was, under the unamended Section 51 of the Tax
Code, the 15th day of the 5th month following the close of the fiscal year in the case of taxpayers whose tax
returns were made on the basis of fiscal years. A deficiency tax indicates non-payment of the correct tax, and
such deficiency exists not only from the assessment thereof but from the very time the taxpayer failed to pay the
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correct amount of tax when it should have been paid and the imposition thereof is mandatory even in the absence
of fraud or willful failure to pay the tax is full.
97. CIR v. P&G
FACTS: For the taxable year 1974 ending on 30 June 1974, and the taxable year 1975 ending 30 June 1975, private
respondent Procter and Gamble Philippine Manufacturing Corporation ("P&G-Phil.") declared dividends payable
to its parent company and sole stockholder, Procter and Gamble Co., Inc. (USA) ("P&G-USA"), amounting to
P24,164,946.30, from which dividends the amount of P8,457,731.21 representing the thirty-five percent (35%)
withholding tax at source was deducted.
On 5 January 1977, private respondent P&G-Phil. filed with petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue a claim
for refund or tax credit in the amount of P4,832,989.26 claiming, among other things, that pursuant to Section
24 (b) (1) of the National Internal Revenue Code ("NITC"), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 369, the
applicable rate of withholding tax on the dividends remitted was only fifteen percent (15%) (and not thirty-five
percent [35%]) of the dividends.
ISSUE: Which is the applicable dividend tax rate in the instant case: the regular thirty-five percent (35%) rate or
the reduced fifteen percent (15%) rate?
RULING: The 15% rate should be used. The economic objectives sought to be achieved by the Philippine
Government by reducing the thirty-five percent (35%) dividend rate to fifteen percent (15%) are set out in the
preambular clauses of P.D. No. 369 which amended Section 24 (b) (1), NIRC.
More simply put, Section 24 (b) (1), NIRC, seeks to promote the in-flow of foreign equity investment in the
Philippines by reducing the tax cost of earning profits here and thereby increasing the net dividends remittable
to the investor. The foreign investor, however, would not benefit from the reduction of the Philippine dividend
tax rate unless its home country gives it some relief from double taxation (i.e., second-tier taxation) (the home
country would simply have more "post-R.P. tax" income to subject to its own taxing power) by allowing the
investor additional tax credits which would be applicable against the tax payable to such home country.
Accordingly, Section 24 (b) (1), NIRC, requires the home or domiciliary country to give the investor corporation a
"deemed paid" tax credit at least equal in amount to the twenty (20) percentage points of dividend tax foregone
by the Philippines, in the assumption that a positive incentive effect would thereby be felt by the investor.
98. CIR v Procter and Gamble

204 SCRA 377
FACTS: Procter and Gamble Philippines declared dividends payable to its parents company and sole stockholder,
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P&G USA. Such dividends amounted to P24.1 million. P&G paid a 35% dividend withholding tax to the BIR, which
amounted to P8.3 million. It subsequently filed a claim with the CIR for a refund or tax credit claiming a reduced
withholding tax rate of 15%.
ISSUE: Whether the company is entitled to refund
RULING: Yes. The rate goes down to 15% if the country of domicile of the foreign stockholder corporation shall
allow such foreign corporation a tax credit for taxes deemed paid in the Philippines, applicable against the tax
payable to the domiciliary country by the foreign stockholder corporation. Requirements were met.
99. Plaridel v. CIR

GR L-21520
FACTS: Petitioner Plaridel Surety & Insurance Co., is a domestic corporation engaged in the bonding business. On
November 9, 1950, petitioner, as surety, and Constancio San Jose, as principal, solidarily executed a performance
bond in the penal sum of P30,600.00 in favor of the P. L. Galang Machinery Co., Inc., to secure the performance
of San Jose's contractual obligation to produce and supply logs to the latter.
San Jose later failed to deliver the logs to Galang Machinery and the latter sued on the performance bond. On
October 1, 1952, the Court of First Instance adjudged San Jose and petitioner liable. On February 19 and March
20, 1957, petitioner effected payment in favor of Galang Machinery in the total sum of P44,490.00 pursuant to
the final decision. In its income tax return for the year 1957, petitioner claimed the said amount of P44,490.00 as
deductible loss from its gross income and, accordingly, paid the amount of P136.00 as its income tax for 1957.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the claimed deduction of P44,490.00 and assessed against
petitioner the sum of P8,898.00, plus interest, as deficiency income tax for the year 1957.
ISSUE: WON the P44,490.00 paid by petitioner to Galang Machinery is a deductible loss for income tax purposes.
RULING: No. Loss is deductible only in the taxable year it actually happens or is sustained. However, if it is
compensable by insurance or otherwise, deduction for the loss suffered is postponed to a subsequent year,
which, to be precise, is that year in which it appears that no compensation at all can be had, or that there is a
remaining or net loss, i.e., no full compensation.
There is no question that the year in which the petitioner Insurance Co. effected payment to Galang Machinery
pursuant to a final decision occurred in 1957. However, under the same court decision, San Jose and Cuervo were
obligated to reimburse petitioner for whatever payments it would make to Galang Machinery. Clearly, petitioner's
loss is compensable otherwise (than by insurance).itc-alf It should follow, then, that the loss deduction can not
be claimed in 1957.
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100. CIR v. Wander
FACTS: Wander is a domestic corporation, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Glaro SA Ltd, a Swiss corporation
not engaged in trade or business in the Philippines. In two instances, Wander filed its withholding tax return and
remitted to Glaro (the parent company) dividends, on which 35% tax was withheld and paid to the BIR. Wandee
now files a claim for refund of the withheld tax contending that it is liable only to 15% withholding tax pursuant
to Section 24B1 of the Tax Code. The BIR did not act upon the claim filed by Wander so the corporation filed a
petition to the CTA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Wander is entitled to the 15% withholding tax rate
RULING: Yes. The dividends received from a domestic corporation is liable to a 15% withholding tax, provided
that the country in which the foreign corporation is domiciled shall allow a tax credit against the taxes due to
have been paid in the Philippines. In the case, Switzerland did not impose any tax on the dividends received by
Glaro thus it should be considered as a full satisfaction of the given condition.
101. Abra Valley College v Aquino

GR No. L-39086, June 15, 1988
FACTS: Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated with the SEC
in 1948 filed a complaint to annul and declare void the Notice of Seizure and the Notice of Sale of its lot and
building located at Bangue, Abra for nonpayment of real estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. The
trial court ruled for the government holding that the second floor of the building is being used by the director for
residential purposes and that the ground floor used and rented by Northern Marketing Corporation, a commercial
establishment, and thus the property is not being used for educational purposes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for educational purposes.
RULING: In the case at bar, the lease of the first floor of the building to the Northern Marketing Corporation
cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education. The test of
exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution. Thus, half of the
assessed tax should be returned to petitioner.
102. COC v. Claribel

19 SCRA 234
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FACTS: On September 14, 2005, PNB filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, asserting its entitlement to be
refunded the amount of P445,578.92, by explaining each transaction involved and pinpointed by the CTA Division.
This however was still denied by the CTA Division in its Resolution[16] dated November 15, 2005, for lack of merit.
Aggrieved, PNB, filed a partial appeal by way of Petition for Review under Section 18 of Republic Act No. 9282[18]
before the CTA En Banc, to review and modify the CTA Division's August 11, 2005 Decision. This petition was
received by the CTA En Banc on December 27, 2005, four days beyond the additional 15 days granted to PNB to
file its petition.
ISSUE: WON the petition for review was correctly denied
RULING: Yes. To recall, PNB filed its petition with the CTA En Banc four days beyond the extended period granted
to it to file such petition. PNB argues that it was filed on time since it was mailed on the last day of the extended
period, which was on December 23, 2005. It has been established that a pleading "filed by ordinary mail or by
private messengerial service x x x is deemed filed on the day it is actually received by the court, and not on the
day it was mailed or delivered to the messengerial service."
It is worthy to note that PNB already asked for an additional period of 15 days within which to file its petition for
review with the CTA En Banc. This period expired on December 23, 2005. Knowing fully well that December 23,
2005 not only fell on a Friday, followed by three consecutive non-working days, but also belonged to the busiest
holiday season of the year, PNB should have exercised more prudence and foresight in filing its petition.
103. Panoja v. David

1 SCRA 608
FACTS: Pantoja filed this petition for prohibition in the Cebu court of first instance charging the respondent
officers with lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, even as he denied liability for the internal revenue tax.
He said they had given him no opportunity to be heard. He further alleged prescription of the tax liability and
consequent lack of power on the part of the respondent Collector to levy and distraint his property, inviting
attention to the eleven (11) years that had elapsed from the assessment in 1939 to the distraint in 1950.
The three respondents (the Collector and the two treasurers), moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and of cause of action. The court of first instance after denying the motion, and the subsequent
motion to reconsider, set the case for hearing on September 2, 1954. Meanwhile, the Court of Tax Appeals was
organized in June 1954. So, on July 21, 1954, upon motion of respondents, the Cebu court transferred the case
to the Court of Tax Appeals pursuant to sec. 22 of Republic Act 1125.
ISSUE: WON the Court of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction to annul distraint orders by the Collector of Internal
Revenue.
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RULING: Yes. The power of the Court of Tax Appeals to act on petitions for the annulment of distraint orders by
the Collector of Internal Revenue has been recognized by this Court in Collector of Internal Revenue v. Zulueta,
53 Off. Gaz. 6532 and Blaquera v. Rodriguez, 54 Off. Gaz. 8632. In the first, the reason for annulling was - like the
present case - prescription of the right of the Collecting Officers to issue the warrant of distraint. In the second,
this Court reiterated the view that the Court of Tax Appeals constituted the legal forum wherein to discuss the
validity of a distraint by the Collector of Internal Revenue. Again, in Collector v. Avelino, L-9202, November 19,
1956, we held that proceedings to invalidate a warrant of distraint or levy did not violate the prohibition against
injunctions to restrain the collection of taxes, because the proceedings were directed at the right of the Collector
to collect it by distraint or levy.
104. Filipinas Investment v. Commissioner

GR L-23501
FACTS: Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, through the Director of Regional District No. 3, issued a
letter dated April 18, 1961, to petitioner Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation, assessing against the latter
the sum of P5,007.00 as advance sales tax on an automobile which it purchased from a tax-exempt individual,
plus P300.00 as compromise penalty, or a total of P5,307.00.
Believing itself not liable therefor, petitioner, through counsel, disputed the above assessment in a letter dated
May 15, 1961, and requested that the same be cancelled and/or withdrawn. (Exhs. 3, B, CTA rec., pp. 64-65).
Meanwhile, BIR Assistant Regional Director Toledo followed up said assessment with a demand letter dated June
21, 1961. Petitioner appealed to the CTA but on August 8, 1964, the Tax Court, after finding that petitioner
consumed thirty-three (33) days in filing its petition for review from the date of receipt of respondent
Commissioner's ruling on the disputed assessment.
ISSUE: WON the petition for review was filed out of time
RULING: Yes. The appealed resolution should be affirmed. It should be noted that respondent Commissioner's
letter-assessment of April 18, 1961 became a "disputed" assessment when petitioner requested for the
cancellation and or withdrawal of the same in its letter of May 15, 1961 (St. Stephen's Association v. Collector of
Internal Revenue, G.R. No. L-11238, August 21, 1958); that respondent's letter of August 17, 1962, denying
petitioner's request for cancellation constitutes the decision on the "disputed" assessment, which is appealable
to the Tax Court, as contemplated under Sections 7 and 11 of Republic Act No. 1125;1 that petitioner's letter of
September 28, 1962 which respondent received on October 1, 1962 is a mere pro-forma request for
reconsideration of the letter-decision of August 17, 1962 and did not adduce new facts or arguments; and that
respondent's letter of July 22, 1963 which petitioner received on August 12, 1963 is the resolution on the said
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request for reconsideration (North Camarines Lumber Co., Inc. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. L- 12353,
September 30, 1960).
105. Advertising Associates, Inc. v. CA
FACTS: This case is about the liability of Advertising Associates, Inc. for P382,700.16 as 3% contractor’s percentage
tax on its rental income from the lease of neon signs and billboards imposed by Section 191 of the Tax Code.
More than a year later, Acting Commissioner Efren I Plana wrote a letter dated May 23, 1979 in answer to the
requests of the taxpayer for the cancellation of the assessments and the withdrawal of the warrants of distraint.
Advertising Associates received a letter on June 18, 1979. Nineteen days later or on July 7, it filed its petition for
review since the letter contained the statement “it constitutes our final decision”.
ISSUE: Whether the petition was filed out of time
RULING: No. Petition for review was filed on time. The reviewable decision is that contained in Commissioner
Plana’s letter of May 23, 1979 and not the warrants of distraint. The directive is in consonance with the Court’s
dictum that the Commissioner should always indicate to the taxpayer in clear and unequivocal language what
constitutes his final determination of the disputed assessment.
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24. City Government of QC v. BAYANTEL

25. Sta. Lucia Realty v. City of Pasig

26. Alejandro Ty v. Hon. Aurelio C. Trampe

ISSUE: W/N RA 7160 (LGC of 1991) repealed the provisions of PD 921

28. Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is a “taxable person”

29. Testate Estate of Concordia T. Lim v. City of Manila

ISSUE: WON Lim is liable to pay realty taxes.

30. Mindanao Bus v. CDO

32. Meralco Securities v. CBAA

ISSUE: Whether the aforementioned pipelines are subject to realty tax.

HELD: Yes, the pipelines are subject to realty tax.

33. City of Baguio v. Busuego

ISSUE: Whether the respondent is tax exempt?

ISSUE: Whether SSS property in Bacolod City is tax-exempt.

36. City Treasurer of Quezon City v. CA and Bernardita Tolentino

ISSUE: Was there a valid assessment to the delinquent taxpayer?

37. National Power Corporation v. RTC

ISSUE: Which Muicipality can collect against NAPOCOR?

38. Reyes v. Almanzor

40. Ismael Mathay, Jr. v. Victor Macalincag

ISSUE: Whether the Schedule of Market Values are valid?

42. Sesbreño v. CBAA

43. Lopez v. City of Manila,

45. Light Rail Transit v. CBAA

46. Commissioner of Customs v. Marina Sales, Inc.,

ISSUE: Whether the reclassification as invoked by the BOC is correct.

47. Commissioner of Customs v. AGFHA Incorporated

48. 1. Chevron Philippines, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs

49. ASAALI v. COC

ISSUE: Whether the inception and seizure is valid.

50. Felicisimo Rieta v. People of the Philippines,

ISSUE: Whether the conviction is proper.

51. De la Fuente v. De Veyra

ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of respondent is correct.

53. Chia v. Acting Collector of Customs

54. Republic v. Court of First Instance of Manila

ISSUE: WON respondent court has jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to try the case

56. Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya