I. MARRIAGE
It may be
The concept of and nature of marriage
1. Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda 35 Phil 252
FACTS:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos
y Rueda, respondent, were married on January 7, 1915
and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino
Manila. They stayed together for a month before
petitioner returned to her parent’s home. Goitia filed a
complaint against respondent for support outside the
conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent
demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on
his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts
and demanded her husband other than the legal and
valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing,
respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting
injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The
trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that
Goitia could not compel her husband to support her
except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a
judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from
respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support
her outside the conjugal home.
HELD:
YES.
The obligation on the part of the husband to support his
wife is created merely in the act of marriage. The law
provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the
wife, may fulfil the obligation either by paying her a fixed
pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his
option. However, this option given by law is not
absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or
terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is
driven away from the conjugal home because of his
wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to
leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs
and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore
claim support from the husband for separate
maintenance even outside the conjugal home.
2. Silverio v. Republic October 22, 2007 (GR. No. 174689)
FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the
change of his first name “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely” and
his sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC
of Manila, Branch 8, for reason of his sex reassignment. He
alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically
male but thinks and acts like a female. The Regional Trial
Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is consonance
with the principle of justice and equality.
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari
in the Court of Appeals alleging that there is no law
allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration.
Petitioner filed a reconsideration but was denied. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are
allowed by reason of sex reassignment.
HELD: NO.
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A change of name is a privilege and not a right.
allowed in cases where the name is ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is
habitually used; or if the change will avoid confusion. The
petitioner’s basis of the change of his name is that he
intends his first name compatible with the sex he thought
he transformed himself into thru surgery. The Court says
that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no
law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to
sex on the ground of sex reassignment. The Court denied
the petition.
3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. VICTORIANO
DELA CRUZ y LORENZO, Appellant.
G.R. No. 187683 February 11, 2010
FACTS:
Victoriano testified that, at around 6:30 p.m. on August 18,
2002, he came home very drunk from a friend's house.
Before he could enter their house, his wife, Anna, started
nagging him saying, "Hindi ka naman pala namamasada,
nakipag-inuman ka pa." He asked her to go inside their
house but she refused. Thus, Victoriano slapped Anna and
dragged her inside their house.
Due to the continuous nagging of Anna, Victoriano
pushed her aside so he could go out of the house.
However, she fell on a jalousie window, breaking it in the
process. When he helped her stand up, Victoriano noticed
that her back was punctured by a piece of shattered glass
of the jalousie. He brought her outside immediately and
asked the help of his neighbors who were playing tong-its
nearby. Victoriano admitted that Joel accompanied him
and his wife to the hospital.
At the hospital, Victoriano was taken into custody by
policemen for questioning. It was only in the following
morning that Victoriano learned of his wife’s passing.
Victoriano also testified that he does not usually drink; that
he consumed hard liquor at the time of the incident; that
Anna was not immediately treated in the hospital; that he
loved his wife; and that he did not intentionally hurt her.
Joel Song (Joel) testified that between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m.
on August 18, 2002, he and two others, including the aunt
of Victoriano, were playing a card game known as tong-
its just three to four arms length away from the latter’s
house.
While playing, Joel saw Victoriano punching and kicking
his wife, herein victim Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz (Anna),
in front of their house. Joel knew the wife’s name as "Joan."
Victoriano then dragged Anna inside the house by pulling
the latter's hair, then slammed the door. Joel overheard
the couple shouting while they were already inside the
house.
Suddenly, Victoriano and Anna came out of the house,
together with their young daughter. Victoriano was behind
Anna, with his arms wrapped around her. He asked for
Joel’s help. Joel noticed blood spurting out of Anna’s
mouth. He took the couple’s daughter and gave her to
Victoriano's aunt. He then went with them to the Bulacan
Provincial Hospital (hospital) on board a tricycle. However,
Anna died.
RTC – guilty beyond reasonable doubt of PARRICIDE.
CA – affirmed RTC’s decision with modifications. Deleted
exemplary damages, lowered civil liability from 60K to 50K.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N Victoriano is guilty of PARRICIDE.

RULING: YES.
In the case of Parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the
relationship between the accused and the deceased
would be the marriage certificate. In this case, the
testimony of the accused that he was married to the victim,
in itself, is ample proof of such relationship as the testimony
can be taken as an admission against penal interest.
Clearly, then, it was established that Victoriano and Anna
were husband and wife.
The crime of Parricide is defined and punished under
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), to wit:
Art. 246. Parricide. — Any person who shall kill his father,
mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any
of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be
guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death.
It is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased
is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other
descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The
key element in Parricide ― other than the fact of killing ― is
the relationship of the offender to the victim. In the case of
Parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship
between the accused and the deceased would be the
marriage certificate. In this case, the testimony of the
accused that he was married to the victim, in itself, is
ample proof of such relationship as the testimony can be
taken as an admission against penal interest. Clearly, then,
it was established that Victoriano and Anna were husband
and wife.
Victoriano claims that Joel's testimony coincides with his
own, which refers to the slapping incident that occurred
outside their house. It does not at all point to him as the
actual perpetrator of the crime. Thus, Victoriano submits
that Joel’s testimony is merely circumstantial.
But circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, as
we ruled in People v. Castillo:
Direct evidence of the commission of the offense is not the
only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its
conclusions and finding of guilt. Conviction can be had on
the basis of circumstantial evidence provided that: (1)
there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. While no general
rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial
evidence which will suffice in a given case, all the
circumstances proved must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty,
and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that
he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis
except that of guilt. The circumstances proved should
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one fair
and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, is the guilty person. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean the degree of proof
excluding the possibility of error and producing absolute
certainty. Only moral certainty or "that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind" is
required.
In this case, we note the presence of the requisites for
circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction. First,
immediately preceding the killing, Victoriano physically
maltreated his wife, not merely by slapping her as he
claimed, but by repeatedly punching and kicking her.
Second, it was Victoriano who violently dragged the victim
inside their house, by pulling her hair. Third, in Dr. Viray's
Report, Anna sustained injuries in different parts of her
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body due to Victoriano's acts of physical abuse. Fourth,
the location and extent of the wound indicated
Victoriano's intent to kill the victim. The Report revealed
that the victim sustained a fatal stab wound, lacerating
the upper lobe of her right lung, a vital organ. The extent
of the physical injury inflicted on the deceased manifests
Victoriano's intention to extinguish life. Fifth, as found by
both the RTC and the CA, only Victoriano and Anna were
inside the house, other than their young daughter. Thus, it
can be said with certitude that Victoriano was the lone
assailant. Sixth, we have held that the act of carrying the
body of a wounded victim and bringing her to the hospital
― as Victoriano did ― does not manifest innocence. It
could merely be an indication of repentance or contrition
on his part.
In the case at bench, evidence disclosed that appellant
started beating his wife outside their house and was even
the one who dragged her inside. This, to Our mind,
contradicts his theory that he only pushed her so as to go
out of the house to avoid any further quarrel. Such
incongruity whittles down appellant’s defense that he did
not deliberately kill his wife.
Finally, a person pleading intoxication to mitigate penalty
must present proof of having taken a quantity of alcoholic
beverage prior to the commission of the crime, sufficient
to produce the effect of obfuscating reason.26 In short, the
defense must show that the intoxication is not habitual,
and not subsequent to a plan to commit a felony, and that
the accused's drunkenness affected his mental faculties.
In this case, the absence of any independent proof that
his alcohol intake affected his mental faculties militate
against Victoriano’s claim that he was so intoxicated at
the time he committed the crime to mitigate his liability.27
In sum, Victoriano failed to sufficiently show that the CA
committed any reversible error in its assailed Decision. His
guilt was sufficiently established by circumstantial
evidence.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed,
considering that there was neither any mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance. The heirs of the victim are
entitled to a civil indemnity ex delicto of ₱50,000.00, which
is mandatory upon proof of the fact of death of the victim
and the culpability of the accused for such death.
Likewise, moral damages, in the amount of ₱50,000.00,
should be awarded even in the absence of allegation and
proof of the emotional suffering of the victim's heirs,
because certainly the family suffered emotional pain
brought about by Anna's death.
4. De Santis v.Intestate Estate Jalandoni
GR No. 178221, December 1, 2010
FACTS:
Rodolfo Jalandoni died intestate. His brother, Bernardino
Jalandoni filed with RTC a petition for issuance of letters of
administration. Anonuevo et al intervened and claimed
that their mother Sylvia De Santis was daughter of Isabel
and John. They alleged that at the time of Rodolfo’s
death, their grandmother Isabel was the lawful wife of
Rodolfo based on a marriage certificate. Rodolfo’s brother
opposed asserting that the birth certificate of Sylvia states
that Isabel and John were married, hence, Isabel and
Rodolfo’s marriage was null and void. Petitioners argued
that the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia could not
be used as proof that Isabel and John were indeed
married.
ISSUE:
W/N the marriage of Isabel and Rodolfo was valid

HELD:
No. The birth certificate of Sylvia which indicates that
Isabel and John were married is sufficient proof that
indeed they were married. Therefore Isabel’s marriage to
Rodolfo is void because at that time, she was still married
to John. Consequently, her descendants have no share in
the estate of Rodolfo. While a marriage certificate is
considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is
not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of
marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage
may be proven by relevant evidence other than the
marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of
the marriage between his parents.
In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely
serves as the competent evidence of marriage between
Isabel and John Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains
the following notable entries: (a) that Isabel and John
Desantis were "married" and (b) that Sylvia is their
"legitimate" child. In clear and categorical language,
Sylvia’s birth certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage
between Isabel and John Desantis.
Pursuant to existing laws, the foregoing entries are
accorded prima facie weight. They are presumed to be
true. Hence, unless rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence, they can, and will, stand as proof of the facts
attested. In the case at bench, the petitioners and their
siblings offered no such rebuttal.
The petitioners did no better than to explain away the
entries in Sylvia’s birth certificate as untruthful statements
made only in order to "save face." They urge this Court to
take note of a "typical" practice among unwed Filipino
couples to concoct the illusion of marriage and make it
appear that a child begot by them is legitimate. That, the
Court cannot countenance.
The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and
unsupported by any other evidence, do not diminish the
probative value of the entries. This Court cannot, as the
petitioners would like Us to do, simply take judicial notice
of a supposed folkway and conclude therefrom that the
usage was in fact followed. It certainly is odd that the
petitioners would themselves argue that the document on
which they based their interest in intervention contains
untruthful statements in its vital entries.
Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the petitioners
and their siblings themselves which, properly appreciated,
supports the finding that Isabel was, indeed, previously
married to John Desantis. Consequently, in the absence of
any proof that such marriage had been dissolved by the
time Isabel was married to Rodolfo, the inescapable
conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and,
therefore, void ab initio.
The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present
evidence to prove that Isabel’s prior marriage was
dissolved results in a failure to establish that she has interest
in the estate of Rodolfo. Clearly, an intervention by the
petitioners and their siblings in the settlement proceedings
cannot be justified. We affirm the Court of Appeals.
5. [A.C. No. 9081. October 12, 2011.]
RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and MAXIMO A.
GLINDO, complainants, vs. ATTY. JULIETA A.
OMAÑA, respondent.
FACTS:
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Complainants Espinosa and Glindo filed a complaint for
disbarment against Omana. They alleged that on 17
November 1997, Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal
(Marantal) sought Omaña's legal advice on whether they
could legally live separately and dissolve their marriage.
Omaña then prepared a document entitled "Kasunduan
Ng Paghihiwalay." That they were fully convinced of the
validity of the contract dissolving their marriage then
started implementing its terms and conditions.
ISSUE:
WON the Kasunduan ng Paghihiwalay validly dissolved the
marriage of the spouses?
RULING:
No.
Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without
judicial approval is void. 2 The Court has also ruled that a
notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a
marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of
the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal
partnership, 3 which is exactly what Omaña did in this
case.
B. Requisites of a valid marriage
1. [G.R. No. 145226. February 6, 2004.]
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS:
Morigo and Barrete were board mates in Bohol for a
period of four (4) years. After school year 1977-78, they lost
contact with each other until Morogo received a letter
from Barrete. After several exchanges, they became
sweethearts.
In 1990, Barrete proposed to petition Morigo to join her in
Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were
married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina
Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On August 19, 1991, Barrete filed with the Ontario Court
(General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant
which was granted by the said court.
On October 4, 1992, Morigo married Maria Jececha
Lumbago 4 at theVirgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran
City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, Morigo filed a complaint for
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional
Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020 on the
ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, Morigo was charged with Bigamy
and thereafter, found guilty. The court held that want of a
valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of
bigamy.
Petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, the trial court rendered
a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage
between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage
ceremony actually took place.
The CA later affirmed the judgment of conviction.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner committed bigamy?
RULING:
NO.
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, 20 we laid down the elements
of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not
been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had
it not been for the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note
that during the pendency of the criminal case, the RTC
where the nullity case was filed rendered judgment
declaring the nullity of marriage after finding that there
was no actual marriage ceremony performed between
Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what
transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by
the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The
trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in
accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. In
other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from
the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab
initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage,
the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never
married."
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the
accused must have been legally married. But in this case,
legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to
Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under
the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared
void ab initio, the two were never married “from the
beginning.” The contract of marriage is null; it bears no
legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion,
for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at
the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha.
The existence and the validity of the first marriage being
an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical
that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained
where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner,
must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge. IAETSC
1-A. [G.R. No. 4904. February 5, 1909.]
ROSALIA MARTINEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
ANGEL TAN, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
There was received in evidence at the trial what is called
an expediente de matrimonio civil. It is written in Spanish
and consists, first, of a petition directed to the justice of the
peace, dated on the 25th of September, 1907, signed by
the plaintiff and the defendant, in which they state that
they have mutually agreed to enter into a contract of
marriage before the justice of the peace, and ask that the
justice solemnize the marriage. Following this is a
document dated on the same day, signed by the justice
of the peace, by the plaintiff, by the defendant, and by
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Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori. It states the
presentation of the petition above mentioned; that the
persons who signed it were actually present in the office of
the justice on the day named; that they ratified under oath
the contents of the petition, and that they insisted in that
they had there asked for. It also stated that being required
to produce witnesses of the marriage, they presented
Zacarias Esmero as a witness for the husband and Pacita
Ballori as a witness for the wife. Following this is a certificate
of marriage signed by the justice of the peace and the
witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, dated the
25th day of September, 1907, in which it is stated that the
plaintiff and the defendant were legally married by the
justice of the peace in the presence of the witnesses on
that day.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid marriage?
RULING:
Yes.
General Orders, No. 68, section 6, is as follows:
"No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is
required, but the parties must declare, in the presence of
the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each
other as husband and wife."
Zacarias Esmero, one of the witnesses, testified that upon
the occasion in question the justice of the peace said
nothing until after the document was signed and then
addressing himself to the plaintiff and the defendant said,
"You are married." The petition signed by the plaintiff and
defendant contained a positive statement that they had
mutually agreed to be married and they asked the justice
of the peace to solemnize the marriage. The document
signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the justice of
the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the
justice, the contents of the petition and that witnesses of
the marriage were produced. A marriage took place as
shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed
by both contracting parties, which certificate gives rise to
the presumption that the officer authorized the marriage
in due form, the parties before the justice of the peace
declaring that they took each other as husband and wife,
unless the contrary is proved, such presumption being
corroborated in this case by the admission of the woman
to the effect that she had contracted the marriage
certified to in the document signed by her, which
admission can only mean that the parties mutually agreed
to unite in marriage when they appeared and signed the
said document which so states before the justice of the
peace who authorized the same. It was proven that both
the plaintiff and the defendant were able to read and
write the Spanish language, and that they knew the
contents of the document which they signed; and under
the circumstances in this particular case we are satisfied,
and so hold, that what took place before the justice of the
peace on this occasion amounted to a legal marriage.
2. G.R. No. 187417, February 24, 2016
CHRISTINE JOY CAPIN-CADIZ, Petitioner, v. BRENT HOSPITAL
AND COLLEGES, INC., Respondent.
FACTS:
Cadiz was the Human Resource Officer of respondent
Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc. (Brent) at the time of her
indefinite suspension from employment in 2006. The cause
of suspension was Cadiz's Unprofessionalism and Unethical
Behavior Resulting to Unwed Pregnancy. It appears that
Cadiz became pregnant out of wedlock, and Brent
imposed the suspension until such time that she marries her
boyfriend in accordance with law.
Cadiz then filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for
Unfair Labor Practice, Constructive Dismissal, Non-
Payment of Wages and Damages with prayer for
Reinstatement.4
ISSUE:
Whether or not Christine Joy Cadiz’ premarital relations
with her boyfriend and the resulting pregnancy out of
wedlock constitute immorality, hence a valid ground for
dismissal?
RULING:
No. To resolve this, the Court makes reference to the
recently promulgated case of Cheryll Santos Leus v. St.
Scholastica's College Westgrove and/or Sr. Edna
Quiambao, OSB. The Court ruled in Leus that the
determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or
immoral involves a two-step process: first, a consideration
of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
conduct; and second, an assessment of the said
circumstances vis-a-vis the prevailing norms of conduct,
i.e., what the society generally considers moral and
respectable.
In the present case, the surrounding facts leading to
Cadiz's dismissal are straightforward - she was employed
as a human resources officer in an educational and
medical institution of the Episcopal Church of the
Philippines; she and her boyfriend at that time were both
single; they engaged in premarital sexual relations, which
resulted into pregnancy. The labor tribunals characterized
these as constituting disgraceful or immoral conduct. They
also sweepingly concluded that as Human Resource
Officer, Cadiz should have been the epitome of proper
conduct and her indiscretion "surely scandalized the Brent
community."
The foregoing circumstances, however, do not readily
equate to disgraceful and immoral conduct. Brent’s Policy
Manual and Employee’s Manual of Policies do not define
what constitutes immorality; it simply stated immorality as
a ground for disciplinary action. Instead, Brent erroneously
relied on the standard dictionary definition of fornication
as a form of illicit relation and proceeded to conclude that
Cadiz’ acts fell under such classification, thus constituting
immorality.
Jurisprudence has already set the standard of morality
with which an act should be gauged - it is public and
secular, not religious. Whether a conduct is considered
disgraceful or immoral should be made in accordance
with the prevailing norms of conduct, which, as stated
in Leus, refer to those conducts which are proscribed
because they are detrimental to conditions upon which
depend the existence and progress of human society. The
fact that a particular act does not conform to the
traditional moral views of a certain sectarian institution is
not sufficient reason to qualify such act as immoral unless
it, likewise, does not conform to public and secular
standards. More importantly, there must be substantial
evidence to establish that premarital sexual relations and
pregnancy out of wedlock is considered disgraceful or
immoral. The labor tribunals' respective conclusion that
Cadiz's "indiscretion" "scandalized the Brent community" is
speculative, at most, and there is no proof adduced by
Brent to support such sweeping conclusion.
Hence, "premarital sexual relations between two
consenting adults who have no impediment to marry
5 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of
wedlock, gauged from a purely public and secular view
of morality, does not amount to a disgraceful or immoral
conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS." (Cheryll
Santos Lens v. St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove and/or
Sr. Edna Quiambao, OSB).
3. G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner, vs. GLORIA GOO
ABBAS, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) filed for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas
(Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City. Syed alleged the
absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4,
Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise
known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground
for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
Syed, a Pakistani citizen, and Gloria, a Filipino citizen, met
in Taiwan in 1991. He arrived in the Philippines and on
January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he
was at his mother-in-law’s residence, in Malate, Manila,
when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He was told
that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the
requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told
of the nature of said ceremony where he and Gloria
signed a document. He claimed that he only found out
that it was a marriage contract when Gloria told him. He
further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to
apply for a marriage license, and that he had never
resided in that area.
In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar, issued a certification stating
that the marriage license number appearing in the
marriage contract he submitted was the number of
another marriage license issued to another couple. He
also alleged that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against
him in 2001 and 2002. On the other hand, Gloria presented
her own side. Rev. Mario Dauz, a minister of the Gospel
and a brgy captain stated that he is authorized to
solemnize marriage and that he was doing it since 1982
and he is familiar with the requirements. There were two
witnesses, one of them was Atty. Sanchez who handed
him the marriage license on the day of the wedding.
Gloria testified that a certain Qualin went to their house
and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and
after several days returned with an application for
marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did.
After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave
the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer. Gloria also alleged that she has a
daughter with Syed. She filed a bigamy case because
Syed married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura.
The Ruling of the RTC
No valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed,
as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified
that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and
Syed.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and
granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a
diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed
was conducted, and thus held that said certification could
not be accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that
there was sufficient testimonial and documentary
evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married
and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid
down by law.
ISSUE:
WON the marriage of Gloria and Syed was void ab initio.
RULING: Yes.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on
January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family
Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law.
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with
the appearance of the contracting parties before
the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband
and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except
as stated in Article 35(2).
In this case, Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual
marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the
marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her
witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove
that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office
of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which
had allegedly issued said license. It is telling that Gloria
failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof
to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage license
was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where,
admittedly, neither party resided. It is also noted that the
solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract
and a copy of the marriage license were submitted to the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage
license could have simply been secured from that office
and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably
failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was
a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
Hence, All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a
wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage
contract was signed does not operate to cure the
absence of a valid marriage license. Again, this marriage
cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and
thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license,
is void ab initio.1âwphi1
4. G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner, vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
DOCTRINE: A marriage solemnized without a license,
except those covered by Article 34 where no license is
necessary, "shall be void from the beginning."
FACTS:
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin)
filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage
and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court).
Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married
Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had
6 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin
III.
Benjamin and Sally developed a romantic relationship in
1979. Sally’s father was against the relationship. Sally
brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City
where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally,
knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the
marriage contract would not be registered. Sally filed
criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public
documents against Benjamin, using their simulated
marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a
petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on
the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and
that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.
Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the
properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with
Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as
administrator of the properties during the pendency of the
case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as
illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties
became the subject of the partition before the trial court.
Aside from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin
in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded
with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics
Office because it could not be registered due to
Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena. The trial
court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
was not bigamous.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
are void for not having a marriage license.
2. Whether Art. 148 should govern Benjamin and Sally’s
property relations
RULING:
Yes.
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided
for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that
they take each other as husband and wife in the presence
of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except
as stated in Article 35(2).
Thus, Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage
solemnized without a license, except those covered by
Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void
from the beginning."
First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September
1973 was duly established before the trial court,
evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage
contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a
purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage
between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.
In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
solemnized without a license. It was duly established that
no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage
License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license
numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for
the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under
Section 3 of Article 3520 which made their marriage void
ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or
inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code,
contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are
"inexistent and void from the beginning."21 Thus, the Court
of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling
that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null
and void ab initio and non-existent.
2. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property
relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148
of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In
the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions
and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The
same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her
share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
5. JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C.
SAMBO, and APOLLO A. VILLAMORA, complainants, vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and
NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II, both of the
Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur,
respondents.
Doctrine: If the parties really did not have a marriage
license and the judge required to apply such after they
were solemnized, the marriage is void.
FACTS:
Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo,
and Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I, Interpreter I,
Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal
Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents
Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-
Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of
Court II of the same court.
Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized
marriages even without the requisite of a marriage
license. Hence, the following couples were able to get
married just by paying the marriage fees to respondent
Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo &
Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato
Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita
Nacario; Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a
consequence, the marriage contracts of the following
couples did not reflect any marriage license number. In
addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts
and did not indicate the date of solemnization reasoning
out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license
to be submitted by the parties which happens usually
several days after the marriage ceremony.
7 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano &
Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code thus
exempted from the marriage license
requirement. According to him, he gave strict instructions
to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the
marriage contract and to file the same with the civil
registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve the
problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the
marriage by securing a marriage license and executing
their marriage contract, a copy of which was then filed
with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not
illegally solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their
marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage
are not included. It was alleged that copies of these
marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant
Sambo. The alleged marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias
& Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not
celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in
the absence of a marriage license and that the marriage
of Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the
requisite license due to the insistence of the parties to
avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did
not sign the marriage contract.
An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against
the respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge illegally solemnized
marriages.
RULING: YES
By solemnizing alone a marriage without a marriage
license, he is the one responsible for the irregularity in not
complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites of marriage and
under Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, he
shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
The fact alone that he did not sign the marriage certificate
or contract, the same did not bear a date and the parties
and the Local Civil Registrar were not furnished a copy of
the marriage certificate, do not by themselves show that
he did not solemnize the marriage.
Contracting parties declare that they take each other as
husband and wife before the solemnizing officer. This
alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper
and irregular, if not illegal, because the contracting parties
are supposed to be first asked by the solemnizing officer
and declare that they take each other as husband and
wife before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at
least two (2) witnesses before they are supposed to sign
their marriage contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).
Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a
necessity. We here emphasize once again our adjuration
that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected
with an office charged with the dispensation of justice,
from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His
conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by
propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be
beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example
of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Integrity in a judicial
office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity. 6 It applies,
without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge
to the least of its personnel, they being standard-bearers
of the exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon
a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family
Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of
marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in
the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it
declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio
and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall
not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of
P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr.,
with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or
similar offenses in the future will definitely be severely dealt
with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits and with prejudice to employment in any branch,
agency or instrumentality of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
C. Legal Capacity
Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 132955 October
27, 2006
FACTS:
In April 1988, Orlando Villanueva married Lilia Canalita-
Villanueva before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In
November 1992, Orlando filed before the trial court a
petition for annulment of his marriage. He claimed that
threats of violence and duress forced him to marry Lilia
who was then pregnant. Orlando anchored his prayer for
the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did
not freely consent to be married to Lilia. He cited several
incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-
grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life
and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from Lilia and
strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at
the premises of the University of the East after his classes
thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka
Celso, a supposed member of the New People’s Army
whom appellant claimed to have been hired by Lilia and
who accompanied him in going to her home province of
Palawan to marry her. He also alleged that he never
cohabited with Lilia after the marriage.
On the other hand Lilia denied Orlando’s allegations and
she said that Orlando freely cohabited with her after the
marriage and she showed 14 letters that shows Orlando’s
affection and care towards her. Lilia prayed for the
dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in
Palawan for almost a month after their marriage; that
petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila,
during which private respondent visited him personally;
and that petitioner knew about the progress of her
pregnancy, which ended in their son being born
prematurely.
ISSUE:
Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the
ground of vitiated consent under Article 45 of the Family
Code
RULING: NO
The court ruled that vitiation of consent is not attendant in
this case.Therefore, the petition for annulment, which is
anchored to his allegation that he did not freely give his
consent, should be dismissed.
8 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
The Supreme Court ruled that Orlando’s allegation of fraud
and intimidation is untenable. On its face, it is obvious that
Orlando is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so
as to have the pending appealed bigamy case [filed
against him by Lilia] to be dismissed.
On the merits of the case, Orlando’s allegation of fear was
not concretely established. The Court is not convinced
that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter
voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that
at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant
worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his
employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that
appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the
very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm’s
way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed
made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he
never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his
school nor the police regarding the activities of those who
were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge
about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.
Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as well.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot
claim that his marriage should be annulled due to the
absence of cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack
of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a
marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend
upon the will of the spouses who can terminate the marital
union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit
becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the
perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the
marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud,
intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant
failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on
any of those grounds, the validity of his marriage must be
upheld.
D. Authority of the Solemnizing Officer
1. MERCEDITA MATA ARANES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE
SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent. 380 SCRA 402
FACTS:
On Feb 17, 2000, Judge Salvador Occiano, Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines
Sur, solemnized the marriage of Mercedita Mata Arañes
and Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage
license at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his
territorial jurisdiction.
When Orobia died, the petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast
properties” of Orobia was not recognized, because the
marriage was a null. She also cannot claim the pension of
her husband who is a retired Commodore of the Philippine
Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against
respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much
hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.
In his Comment, respondent judge averred that he was
requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to
solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000.
He was assured that all the documents were complete,
thus he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala.
However, on 17 February 2000, he acceded to the request
of Arroyo that he solemnize the marriage in Nabua
because Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not
stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan. Before starting the
ceremony he discovered that the parties did not possess
the requisite marriage license, thus he refused to solemnize
the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date.
However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx
of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion,
he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of
human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the
wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of
Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the
solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage
license and admonished the parties that their failure to
give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and
Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the
license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When
they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up
with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same
reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered
to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. Respondent judge vigorously denies that
he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid
despite the absence of a marriage license.
He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered
by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of
Desistance dated 28 August 2001 confessing that she filed
the complaint out of rage, and she realizes her own
shortcomings. She attested that respondent judge initially
refused to solemnize her marriage and that it was because
of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually
solemnized the same.
From the records, petitioner and Orobia filed
their Application for Marriage License on 5 January
2000 to be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither
petitioner nor Orobia claimed it. Also, the Civil
Registrar General and the Local Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur has no records of the marriage. On 8 May
2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge
so the latter could communicate with the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the
issuance of her marriage license. The LCR informed the
judge that they cannot issue the same due to the failure
of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous
spouse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Judge erred in solemnizing the
marriage outside his jurisdiction and without the requisite
marriage license.
RULING: YES
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129,
the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges
of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their
territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize
marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the
requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges
who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate
in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where
a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not
affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability.
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent
judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines
Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and
Orobia in Nabua, may not amount to gross ignorance of
the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of
9 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid
liability for violating the law on marriage. Respondent
judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage
without the requisite marriage license. Marriage which
preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and
that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot
render valid or even add an iota of validity to the
marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the
marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did
not possess such authority when he solemnized the
marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge
acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite
the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court
has consistently held in a catena of cases that the
withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the
legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary
action
2. Navarro v. Domagtoy S.C. A.M. MTJ-96-1088, July 19,
1996
FACTS:
Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G.
Navarro filed a complaint on two specific acts committed
by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge
Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct,
inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. The first
allegation of Navarro to Domagtoy is that the latter
solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja
on September 27, 1994 despite the knowledge that the
groom has a subsisting marriage was merely separated. It
was told that the wife of Gaspar left their conjugal home
and has not returned and been heard for almost seven
years.
The second allegation of the plaintiff was that the said
Judge likewise solemnized marriage of Floriano Dadoy
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s
jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge holds his office
and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized
the said wedding at his residence in the municipality of
Dapa located 40 to 50 km away.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the marriage solemnized by the
defendant Judge Domagtoy were void;
2. Whether or not the acts of Judge Domagtoy exhibits
gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and ignorance of
the law?
RULING:
The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and
Borja was void and bigamous there being a subsisting
marriage between Tagadan and his wife,
notwithstanding, the latter was gone for seven years and
the spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute a summary
proceeding as provided in the Civil Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse. With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo
and Del Rosario, the said marriage was solidified as valid,
Albeit, Judge Domagtoy was not authorized to solemnize
the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario as against Article
3 (1) of the Family Code with regard to irregularity of formal
requisites of marriage. In addition, article 4 par 3 of the
Family Code of the Philippines states that formal requisites
shall not affect the validity of marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable. Hence, Domagtoy
was held administratively liable because of the latter’s
failure to apply the legal principles applicable in these
cases, the Court find Domagtoy have acted in gross
ignorance of the law and because of this he was
suspended for a period of six months.
E. Marriage License
1. Sy vs. CA, G.R. No. 127263, April 12, 2000
FACTS:
Lourdes in Quezon City. After some time, Fernando left
their conjugaldwelling. Two children were born out of the
marriage. Frederick, their son went to his father’s
residence. Filipina filed for legal separation. The Trial
Court dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains and
granted the custody of their children to her. Later
on, Filipina was punched at the different parts of her body
and was even choked by him when she started spanking
their son when the latter ignored her while she was talking
to him.
The Trial Court convicted him for slight physical injuries
only. A new action for legal separation was granted by
repeated physical violence and
sexual infidelity. Filipinathen filed for the declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage citing psychological
incapacity. The Trial Court and Appellate Court denied
her petition. On her petition to this Court, she assailed for
the first time that there was no marriage license during their
marriage.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and
private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a
marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2) Whether or not private respondent is psychologically
incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to
warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.
RULING:
The date of celebration of their marriage on November 15,
1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private
respondent. The pieces of evidence on record showed
that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no
marriage license. A marriage license is a formal
requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab
initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the
marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in
Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private
respondent ever resided in Carmona. The marriage license
was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after
the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The
ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed
contracted without a marriage license. Under Article 80 of
the Civil Code: those solemnized without a marriage
license, save marriages of exceptional character, are void
ab initio. This is clearly applicable in this case. The
remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private
respondent need no longer detain the Court. It is mooted
by the conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to
respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license
at the time their marriage was solemnized.
2. Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, Aug. 28, 2007
FACTS:
10 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
On 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing
the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall
for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange
a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee,
arranged their wedding. They got married on the same
day. Another marriage was held in a church in Tondo. The
marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties
securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage
license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the
marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a
resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to
apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said
place. A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by
petitioner against respondent. Rosita however asserts the
validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a
marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification
from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona,
Cavite. Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three
children. Restituto only filed the annulment of their
marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. Rosita,
in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against Restituto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not their marriage is valid.
RULING:
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Art
53 of NCC. Their marriage contract reflects a marriage
license number. A certification was also issued by the local
civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification is
precise since it specifically identified the parties to whom
the marriage license was issued. Issuance of a marriage
license where none of the parties is resident, is just an
irregularity. Marriage is still valid even if the marriage
license is issued in a place not the domicile of the parties.
3. G.R. No. 133778 , March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of
the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL
& PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG,
respondent.
Doctrine: A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage
under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio. However, there are
several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a
marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that
provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man
and a woman who have lived together and exclusively
with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
FACTS: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline,
Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by
Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving
the children under the guardianship of EngraceNinal. 1
year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. They instituted an
affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5
years exempting from securing the marriage license.
Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After
his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that
said marriage was void for lack of marriage license. The
case was filed under the assumption that the validity or
invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s
successional rights.Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they
are not among the persons who could file an action for
“annulment of marriage” under Article 47 of the Family
Code.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the
declaration of the nullity of Pepito’s marriage after his
death?
RULING:
1. The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence
of the marriage license. The two marriages involved herein
having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their
validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the
time of their celebration. A valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio.
However, there are several instances recognized by the
Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with,
one of which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
before the marriage.
In this case, they cannot be exempted even though they
instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at
least 5 years because from the time of Pepito’s first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito
and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both
Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that
has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their
five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still
void.
2. No. Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no
judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity
of a marriage. “A void marriage does not require a judicial
decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to
make the marriage void but though no sentence of
avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the
sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of
all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction. Under
ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so
far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the
parties is as though no marriage had ever taken place.
And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its
invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which
the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any
time, whether before or after the death of either or both
the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the
facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded
or treated as non-existent by the courts.” It is not like a
voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked
except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime
of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage
cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But
Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there
must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based
only on a final judgment to that effect.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
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nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heir ship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime,
or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon
the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted
to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case.
4. G.R. No. 160172, February 13, 2008
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner, vs. ANNABELLE
ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
Doctrine: The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered
as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage.
FACTS: Petitioner and respondent met and became
sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus
they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had
their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and
had regularly engaged in sex thereafter.
When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil
Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus,
in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage
license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995
stating that they had been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the
same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering
the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner
and respondent went back to their respective homes and
did not live together as husband and wife.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is valid.
RULING: No. Under the Family Code, the absence of any
of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the
essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In
the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented
that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage
license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they
presented an affidavit stating that they had been living
together for more than five years. However, respondent
herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when
she was asked during cross-examination.
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere
irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man
and a woman who have lived together and exclusively
with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with
the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s
name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was
no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was
no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner
and respondent executed so they could push through with
the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap
of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage
license renders their marriage void ab initio.
5. G.R. NO. 141528, October 31, 2006
OSCAR P. MALLION, PETITIONER, VS. EDITHA ALCANTARA,
RESPONDENT.
Doctrine: A previous final judgment denying a petition for
declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity bars a subsequent petition for declaration of
nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license.
FACTS: On October 24, 1995, Oscar P. Mallion (petitioner)
filed a petition with the RTC, Br. 29, of San Pablo City
seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Editha
Alcantara (respondent) under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Said case was docketed as Civil Case No. SP 4341-
95. After trial, the RTC denied the petition in a decision
dated November 11, 1997, for failure to adduce
preponderance of evidence. Appeal was also dismissed
by the Court of Appeals in a resolution dated June 11, 1998
for failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful
fees within the reglementary period.
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 became
final, petitioner filed on July 12, 1999 another petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo
City, but this time, based on a different ground, to wit: their
marriage was celebrated without a valid marriage license,
and therefore such marriage is null and void. Respondent,
on the other hand, filed an answer dated August 13, 1999,
with a prayer for the dismissal of the petition on the ground
of res judicata and forum shopping. The RTC ruled in favor
of respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied in an order dated January 21, 2000.
ISSUE: Whether or not a previous final judgment denying a
petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for
declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage
license.
RULING: Yes. Res judicata is defined as "a matter
adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a
thing or matter settled by judgment. It also refers to the rule
that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters
determined in the former suit."
This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated
system of jurisprudence and is founded upon the following
precepts of common law, namely: (1) public policy and
necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that
there should be an end to litigation, and (2) the hardship
on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the
same cause. A contrary doctrine would subject the public
peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and
prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the
part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquillity
and happiness.
Section 47 (b) and (c) of Rule 49 of the Rules of Court
outlines the dual aspect of res judicata. Section 47 (b)
pertains to it in its concept as "bar by prior judgment" or
"estoppels by verdict," which is the effect of a judgment as
a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the
same claim, demand or cause of action. On the other
hand, section 47 (c) pertains to res judicata in its concept
as "conclusiveness of judgment" or otherwise known as the
rule of auter auction pendant which ordains that issues
actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again
be raised in any future case between the same parties
involving a different cause of action. Res judicata in its
concept as a bar by prior judgment obtains in the present
case.
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is
12 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on
the merits; and (4) there is — between the first and the
second actions -- identity of parties, of subject matter, and
of causes of action.
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three
requisites. What is in issue is the presence of the fourth
requisite. In this regard, the test to determine whether the
causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the
same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there
is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of
the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would
sustain both, the two actions are considered the same,
and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent
action.
It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid
the application of res judicata by simply varying the form
of his action or adopting a different method of presenting
his case.
Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two
petitions brought by him seeking the declaration of nullity
of his marriage are anchored on separate causes of
action for the evidence necessary to sustain the first
petition which was anchored on the alleged
psychological incapacity of respondent is different from
the evidence necessary to sustain the present petition
which is anchored on the purported absence of a
marriage license.
Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking
different grounds for the same cause of action. By
definition, a cause of action is the act or omission by which
a party violates the right of another. In both petitions,
petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of nullity
of his marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground
upon which the cause of action is predicated. These
grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various
aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to the
resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual status of
petitioner and respondent's marriage.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that
the marriage is null and void because no valid celebration
of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a
marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, however,
petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had
been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law.
Petitioner is now bound by this admission.
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the
validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now
deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this
reason, the Court finds that the present action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of
marriage license is barred by the decision in Civil Case No.
SP 4341-95.
6. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JOSE A.
DAYOT, Respondent.
G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008
FACTS:
On 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married. In
lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a
sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had attained
the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment
and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the RTC.
According to Jose, sometime in 1986, Felisa requested him
to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall so she could
claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi
Arabia. There, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper
approached them. They were told that Jose needed to
sign the papers so that the package could be released to
Felisa. He initially refused but Felisa cajoled him, and told
him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her
brother who had learned about their relationship.
Reluctantly, he signed. It was in February 1987 when he
discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa.
Felisa denied Jose’s allegations. She declared that they
had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent
the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980. She had
deferred contracting marriage with him on account of
their age difference.
Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was
subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain
Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990.
On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against
Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint
against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman which
found him administratively liable for disgraceful and
immoral conduct.
On 26 July 2000, the RTC dismissed the. The CA affirmed
the RTC’s ruling.
ISSUE:
Would the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation,
where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum
five-year requirement, effectively render the marriage
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license?
Ruling:
YES
For the exception to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that
the man and the woman must have attained the age of
majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years. The
minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an
indispensability carved in the language of the law. It is
embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but
as one that partakes of a mandatory character.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not
lived together for five years at the time they executed their
sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic
admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only
in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration
of their marriage. The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s
testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor,
Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986. The
appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it
was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her
house. Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24
November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa, is beyond
question.
If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is
but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect.
Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
13 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between
Jose and Felisa without theformal requisite of marriage
license.
7. SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner, vs. GLORIA GOO
ABBAS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
FACTS:
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner
Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria).
Syed, a Pakistani, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino, in
Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992
at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. On January 9, 1993, while
he was in the Philippines, his mother-in-law arrived with two
men and told him that he was going to undergo some
ceremony as one of the requirements for his stay in the
Philippines. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a
document. He claimed that he did not know that the
ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He
further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to
apply for a marriage license, and that he had never
resided in that area.
In July 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite wherein the Municipal Civil Registrar,
Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued him a certification on
July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license
number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted,
Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another
marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and
Myra Mabilangan.
Gloria testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed,
who had married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura
during the existence of their marriage.
RTC held that the marriage of Gloria and Syed was void
ab initio. The CA reversed the RTC’s decision.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Is the marriage between Syed and Gloria null and void?
RULING: YES
In Republic vs. CA, The Court held that the certification
issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his
duty was to maintain records of data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license.
Also, in the case of Cariño v. Cariño, following the case of
Republic, it was held that the certification of the Local Civil
Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage
license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said
license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where
the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly
issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such
marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that
the serial number of the marriage license pertained to
another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage
license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain
why the marriage license was secured in Carmona,
Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party
resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she
is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence
of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she
presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as
none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite.
Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2)."
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage
to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than pure,
that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may,
the same does not make up for the failure of the Gloria to
prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the
given the weight of evidence presented.
8. Raquel Kho vs. Republic of the Philippines and Veronica
B. Kho G.R No. 187462 June 01, 2016
FACTS:
In May 31, 1972, Raquel Kho’s parents called a clerk in the
office of the municipal treasurer to instruct him to arrange
the necessary papers for the intended marriage of their
son, Raquel Kho and Veronica Kho. In June 1, 1972, the
two were married at 3 in the morning at a church.
Claiming that he has never gone to the office of the Local
Civil Registrar to apply for a marriage license and had not
seen nor signed any papers in connection to the
procurement of a marriage license, and considering the
ONE DAY difference between the time the clerk was told
to obtain the papers to the actual moment of the
marriage, no marriage license could have been validly
issued, Raquel Kho filed an action for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage.
The RTC ruled that the marriage was void due to the lack
of the requiresite marriage license and ruled in favor of
Raquel Kho.
Later, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the
RTC and ruled in favor of Veronica Kho.
Raquel Kho filed a petition for review on certiorari with the
Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the issues presented by the petitioner in the
petition for review on certiorari are factual in nature and
whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to delve into
these issues;
2. Whether the certification issued by the local civil registrar
which attests to the absence in its records of a marriage
license, must categorically state that the document does
not exist in the said office despite diligent search;
3. Whether the CA erred in disregarding the petitioner’s
documentary evidences of the lack of a marriage licence
and giving weight to unsupported presumptions in favor of
the respondent; and
14 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
4. Whether the CA erred in setting aside or reversing the
lower courts judgment declaring the marriage a nullity for
the absence of the requisite marriage license.
RULING:
1. No, the issues in the petition are not factual in nature.
However, the rule that a question of fact is not appropriate
for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is not without exceptions, which are the
following:
(a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises, and conjectures;
(b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible;
(c) where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts;
(e) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(f) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, when
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evience on which they are based;
(i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and
(j) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.
In the case, of the RTC and CA on the issue on whether
there was a marriage license obtained by petitioner and
respondent are conflicting. Hence, it was proper for the
Supreme Court to review these findings.
2. No, in a previous case (Nicdao Carino vs. Yee Carino),
the Supreme Court considered the certification issued by
the local civil registrar, that their office had no record of a
marriage license, was adequate to prove the non-
issuance of said license.
In the present case, the petitioner was able to present a
certification issued by the civil registrar attesting that the
Office of the local civil registrar “has no record nor copy of
any marriage license ever issued between the parties.”
3. Yes, the CA erred in disregarding the petitioner’s
documentary evidences of the lack of a marriage licence
and giving weight to unsupported presumptions in favor of
the respondent because the certification issued by the
Civil Registrar coupled with the testimony of the former
Civil Registrar at the time of the wedding is sufficient to
prove the absence of the subject marriage license.
Article 58 of the Civil Code (Note: at the time of the
marriage, the Family Code was not effective yet) makes
explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first issued by the local civil registrar. In addition,
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code makes it clear that a
marriage performed without a marriage license is void.
4. Yes, the CA erred in setting aside or reversing the lower
courts judgment declaring the marriage a nullity for the
absence of the requisite marriage license because the
petitioner has successfully overcome the presumed
validity of the marriage by presenting the certification of
the civil registrar which was sufficient to prove the absence
of the marriage license. In addition, the respondent was
not able to prove that the marriage as valid as it is she who
alleges such validity.
Based on the certification issued by the civil registrar and
the respondent’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged
marriage license or of any evidence to show that such
license was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be
reached is that no valid marriage license was issued.
Hence, the marriage performed is null and void.
9. G.R. No. 188289 August 20, 2014
DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner, vs. LETICIA T.
NOVERAS, Respondent.
David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia)
were married on 3 December 1988 in Quezon City,
Philippines. They resided in California, United States of
America (USA) where they eventually acquired American
citizenship. They then begot two children, namely: Jerome
T.
Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT.
Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. David was engaged in
courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in
San Francisco, California.
During the marriage, they acquired properties in the
Philippines and in the USA:
The Sampaloc property used to beowned by David’s
parents. The parties herein secured a loan from a bank
and mortgaged the property. When said property was
about to be foreclosed, the couple paid a total of ₱1.5
Million for the redemption of the same.
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned
to the Philippines in 2001. In December 2002,Leticia
executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing
David to sell the Sampaloc property for ₱2.2 Million.
According to Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David
abandoned his family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in
Aurora province. Leticia claimed that David agreed toand
executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the presence of
David’s father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3 December 2003
stating that: 1) the ₱1.1Million proceeds from the sale of
the Sampaloc property shall be paid to and collected by
Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to Leticia
₱750,000.00, which is equivalent to half of the amount of
the redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and 3)
that David shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and
interest in the conjugal and real properties situated in the
Philippines.5 David was able to collect ₱1,790,000.00 from
the sale of the Sampaloc property, leaving an unpaid
balance of ₱410,000.00.
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair,
Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the Superior Court
of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California
court granted the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment
was duly entered on 29 June 2005.6 The California court
granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well
as all the couple’s properties in the USA.7
On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial
Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler,
15 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit
and David’s failure to comply with his obligation under the
same. She prayed for: 1) the power to administer all
conjugal properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his
partner to cease and desist from selling the subject
conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal
properties be forfeited in favor of her children; 4) David to
remit half of the purchase price as share of Leticia from the
sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment
of₱50,000.00 and ₱100,000.00 litigation expenses.8
In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the
dissolution of their marriage was entered on 29 June 2005
by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo.
He demanded that the conjugal partnership properties,
which also include the USA properties, be liquidated and
that all expenses of liquidation, including attorney’s fees of
both parties be charged against the conjugal
partnership.9
In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and
Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and
in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce
from the Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein
the court awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia.
With respect to their properties in the Philippines,
Leticiafiled a petition for judicial separation ofconjugal
properties.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the marriage between David and Leticia has
been dissolved pursuant to the divorce decree issued by
the Superior Court of California;
2. Whether the filing of the judicial separation of property
is proper in accordance with the Family Code
RULING:
1. The trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree
which severed the bond of marriage between the parties.
Foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s
applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself. A copy of the
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public
documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be
proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof.
Such official publication or copy must be accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The
certificate may be issued by any of the authorized
Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy
of the original, or a specific part thereof, asthe case may
be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer.
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy
of a document or record is attested for the purpose of
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that
the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be
any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under
the seal of such court.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was
presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove
its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on
divorce were not presented. Even if we apply the doctrine
of processual presumption,divorce is not recognized
between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid
recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the
parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial
court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
10. G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012
MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, Petitioner,
LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, Respondent.
FACTS:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen.
After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United States
from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second
marriage with petitioner herein.
On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the
Philippines.
Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City a Petition for
the issuance of letters of administration for her
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of
Orlando. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings
(Spec. Proc.) No. 228.
On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending,
respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of
Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with
the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 232.
The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232
on the ground of litis pendentia, considering that Spec.
Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was already
pending.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was
not considered an interested person qualified to file a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the
estate of Orlando. In support of her contention,
respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was
filed against petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of
Alaminos, Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case No.
2699-A.
Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy,
alleging that petitioner contracted a second marriage to
Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio
Bristol on 12 December 1959.
On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of
bigamy.3 The trial court ruled that since the deceased was
a divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was
not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage
between him and petitioner was not valid.
Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of
nullity then pending action with the trial court in Dagupan
City filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and
petitioner. It considered the pending action to be a
16 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petitioner
for the crime of bigamy.
Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner
had never been married to Eusebio Bristol.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the acquittal of petitioner in the criminal case
for bigamy meant that the marriage with Bristol was still
valid.
2. Whether the divorce obtained abroad by Orlando may
be recognized under Philippine jurisdiction.
vs.
Ruling:
1. Yes, At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special
proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in
Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married
to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial court concluded that,
because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows
that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid.
By failing to take note of the findings of fact on the
nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner and
Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not
an interested party in the estate of Orlando.
Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy
case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was dismissed, we had
already ruled that under the principles of comity, our
jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a
spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established
as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.7 wherein we
said:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied
in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In
this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage
2. The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the
burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new
matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by
respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian
law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws.1âwphi1 Like any other
facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital
laws are not among those matters that judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The
power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution,
and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative. (Emphasis supplied)
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner
to prove the validity of Orlando’s divorce under the laws
of the United States and the marriage between petitioner
and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the
proceedings to the trial court for further reception of
evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the
subsequent marriage, she has the preferential right to be
issued the letters of administration over the estate.
Otherwise, letters of administration may be issued to
respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of
kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78
of the Revised Rules of Court.
This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis, 10 in
which we said:
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the
divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have
vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However,
the records show that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as
well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under
the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid
down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving
foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and
that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing
or document may be proven as a public or official record
of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo
allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted
photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the
annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which
purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia,
however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws as they must be alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court
for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree
obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent
and Felicisimo. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the
validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be
issued the letters of administration over the estate of
Orlando B. Catalan.
ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ANNULMENT
OR DECLARATION OF NULLITY
1. [G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007 ]
LOLITA D. ENRICO, PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO
B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI,
REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B.
Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli
(Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of
17 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D.
Enrico. Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that
Eulogio and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-
lo, Cagayan.[3] They begot seven children, herein
respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane,
Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd.[4] On 1 May 2004,
Trinidad died.[5] On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married
petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo,
Cagayan.[6] Six months later, or on 10 February 2005,
Eulogio passed away.[7]
In impugning petitioner's marriage to Eulogio, respondents
averred that the same was entered into without the
requisite marriage license. They argued that Article
34[8] of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a
woman who have been living together for at least five
years without any legal impediment from securing a
marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and
Eulogio because they could not have lived together under
the circumstances required by said
provision. Respondents posited that the marriage of
Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latter's
death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely three months
from the date of marriage of Eulogio to
petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years. To further their cause, respondents raised the
additional ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to
Eulogio's serious illness which made its performance
impossible.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio
lived together as husband and wife under one roof for 21
years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted
from the requirement of a marriage license. From their
union were born Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all
surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30
October 1991, respectively. She further contended that
the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal
Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal
Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal
of the action on the ground that it is only the contracting
parties while living who can file an action for declaration
of nullity of marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether of or not the heirs may
validly file the declaration of nullity of marriage between
Eulogio and Lolita?
RULING:
NO. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which provides:
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)
While it is true that Niñal in no uncertain terms allowed
therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of their father's marriage to therein respondent after
the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its
ruling for the reason that the impugned marriage therein
was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code. The Court in Niñal recognized that the applicable
law to determine the validity of the two marriages involved
therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in effect at the
time of their celebration.[23] What we have before us
belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to
be declared void was entered into during the effectivity of
the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts,
petitioner's marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as
contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to
wit:
Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern petitions for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code
of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves
no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family
Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.[24]
Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March
2003, following its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there
is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC with the ruling in Niñal, because they vary in scope and
application. As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines, and is prospective in its application. The
marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on 26
August 2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC.
There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil
expositore non indiget. When the language of the law is
clear, no explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or
the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage.
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders
explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file
petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and
declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by
the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for
annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be
filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by
the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not
have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or
intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death
of their predecessor, and hence can only question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the
other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve
marriage and not to seek its dissolution.[25] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the
court a quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for
respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not
mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already
18 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
without any recourse under the law. They can still protect
their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the
Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal
Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate
heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity,
but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts.
2. G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD
SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS
or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL
VDA. DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS II, respondents.
FACTS:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate.
They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo
Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. During the
lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to
Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the
payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to
deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir,
petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. On May 13, 1992, Teofilo
died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad
and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II).
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action,
docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against respondents
before the court a quo with the following causes of action:
(a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child;
(c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum
of money and damages. The complaint was raffled to
Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage
between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad
was a nullity in view of the absence of the required
marriage license. He likewise maintained that his
deceased brother was neither the natural nor the
adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or wife.
2. Whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest
to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in
controversy.
RULING:
1. No. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases
commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during
the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may
not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule
made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. -
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that
the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse
under the law. They can still protect their successional right,
for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of
Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in
a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death
of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
2. YES. only the presence of descendants, ascendants or
illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from
succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence
of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of
the deceased precludes succession by collateral
relatives.32 Conversely, if there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
decedent.33
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to
be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo,
petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity
of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent
Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like
a brother and sister, acquire successional right over the
estate if the decedent dies without issue and without
ascendants in the direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his
parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if
Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds
to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half
being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the
New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest
to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of
his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the
subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner
succeeds to the entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of
petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage case is contingent
upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate,
adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on
the merits to determine the validity or nullity of the subject
marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to
dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of
action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a
legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo
Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.
3. G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010
ISIDRO ABLAZA, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage
contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late
brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The
19 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
petitioner alleged that the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a
marriage license, due to such license being issued only on
January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void
ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage
license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of
Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him
to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano
before his death, thereby making him a real party in
interest; and that any person, himself included, could
impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano
and Leonila at any time, even after the death of
Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is a real party in interest in the
action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of
his deceased brother.
RULING:
YES. The Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed
herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC
(Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect
on March 15, 2003.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly
provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to
distinguish between marriages covered by the Family
Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil
Code.9 Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to
marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect
on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is
prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings
commenced after March 15, 2003.10
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,11 the following actions for
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted
from the limitation, to wit:
1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the
effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and
2. Those filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the
effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under
the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and
Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the
applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the
rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as
having the right to initiate the action for declaration of
nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had
absolutely no application to the petitioner.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who
can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and
when. Accordingly, in Niñal v. Bayadog,12 the children
were allowed to file after the death of their father a
petition for the declaration of the nullity of their father’s
marriage to their stepmother contracted on December 11,
1986 due to lack of a marriage license. There, the Court
distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable
one, and explained how and when each might be
impugned.
According to Carlos v. Sandoval,14 the plaintiff must still be
the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in
procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and
defended in the name of the real party in interest. 15 Thus,
only the party who can demonstrate a "proper interest"
can file the action.16Interest within the meaning of the rule
means material interest, or an interest in issue to be
affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere curiosity about the question
involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no
material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction
of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is
not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the
ground of lack of cause of action.17
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late
Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir. Assuming that
the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has
a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be
adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a
brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir
under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to
the estate of a deceased brother.
4. G.R. No. 175367 June 6, 2011
DANILO A. AURELIO, Petitioner, vs. VIDA MA. CORAZON P.
AURELIO, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma.
Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988. They
have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.
On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.4 In her petition,
respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were
psychologically incapacitated of performing and
complying with their respective essential marital
obligations.
The psychological make-up of private respondent was
evaluated by a psychologist, who found that the
psychological incapacity of both husband and wife to
perform their marital obligations is grave, incorrigible and
incurable. Private respondent suffers from a Histrionic
Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features; whereas
petitioner suffers from passive aggressive (negativistic)
personality disorder that renders him immature and
irresponsible to assume the normal obligations of a
marriage.5
Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that the
allegations contained in respondent’s petition are
insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity. Specifically,
petitioner contends that the petition failed to comply with
three of the Molina guidelines, namely: that the root cause
of the psychological incapacity must be alleged in the
complaint; that such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage; and that the non-complied
marital obligation must be stated in the petition.17
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for declaration of the nullity of
marriage are sufficient for the court to declare the nullity
of the marriage between Vida and Danilo.
20 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
RULING:
YES. First, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this Court finds
that the root cause of psychological incapacity was
stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the
manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds
of both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the
complaint as the root causes of their psychological
incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert
psychologist clinically identified the same as the root
causes.
Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both
parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about a
disability for them to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent
suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic
Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers
from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality
Disorder.lawph!1 The incapacity of both parties to perform
their marital obligations was alleged to be grave,
incorrigible and incurable.
Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital
obligations that were not complied with were alleged in
the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of
the petition, respondent’s allegations fall under Article 68
of the Family Code which states that "the husband and the
wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."
5. G.R. No. 159594 : November 12, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE HON. COURT
OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION), AND EDUARDO C. DE
QUINTOS, .JR., Respondents.
DOCTRINE:
Marriage; psychological incapacity;
elements. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability
to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or
neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will.
It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the
essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act,
the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual
help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and
(c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her
responsibility and duty as a married person is not enough;
it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable
of doing so due to some psychological illness.
Marriage; psychological incapacity; expert evidence;
thorough and in-depth assessment required. The expert
evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes
a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a
grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.
Marriage; psychological incapacity; proof of natal or
disabling supervening factor required. It is not enough that
the respondent, alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital
obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations.
Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an
adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality
structure that effectively incapacitated him from
complying with his essential marital obligations – must be
shown.
Marriage; psychological incapacity; Santos and Molina
guidelines. The pronouncements
in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential
guides in deciding cases grounded on the psychological
incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has declared the
existence or absence of the psychological incapacity
based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations.
Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the
totality of evidence presented during trial, making it
incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the
existence of the psychological incapacity.
FACTS:
On 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of the
nullity of his marriage to wife Catalina, citing psychological
incapacity on the part of Catalina. Catalina did not
interpose an objection but prayed to be given a share in
the conjugal house and lot.
Eduardo’s allegations with respect to Catalina’s before
are as follows: that Catalina always left their house without
his consent; that she engaged in petty arguments with
him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual
needs; that she spent most of her time gossiping with
neighbors instead of doing the household chores and
caring for their adopted daughter; that she squandered
by gambling all his remittances as an overseas worker in
Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal
home in 1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her paramour.
Results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation administered
on Catalina by a psychiatrist showed that she had traits of
Borderline Personality Disorder, and Catalina’s disorder
was mainly characterized by her immaturity. For her part,
Catalina admitted her psychological incapacity but
denied abandoning the conjugal home without
Eduardo’s consent. She also said that she had only one
live-in partner.
RTC and CA granted the petition. The RTC ruled that
Catalina’s infidelity, her spending more time with friends
rather than with her family, and her incessant gambling
constituted psychological incapacity that affected her
duty to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
It also held that the results of the neuro-psychiatric
evaluation by Dr. Reyes was the best evidence of
Catalina’s psychological incapacity.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the evidence presented is sufficient to support a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on the part of
Catalina.
RULING: NO
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability, and must
conform with the standards laid down in the case of
Republic v. Molina. The existence or absence of the
psychological incapacity must be based strictly on the
facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations. The incapacity should be
established by the totality of evidence presented during
trial. In this case, both lower courts did not exact a
21 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
compliance with the requirement of sufficiently explaining
the gravity, root cause and incurability of Catalina’s
purported psychological incapacity. Rather, they were
liberal in their appreciation of the scanty evidence that
Eduardo submitted to establish the incapacity. Both lower
courts noticeably relied heavily on the results of the neuro-
psychological evaluation by Dr. Reyes despite the paucity
of factual foundation to support the claim of Catalina’s
psychological incapacity. The report claims that
Catalina’s behavior and attitude before and after the
marriage is highly indicative of a very immature and
childish person, rendering her psychologically
incapacitated to live up and meet the responsibilities
required in a commitment like marriage. However, it was
ostensibly vague about the root cause, gravity and
incurability of Catalina’s supposed psychological
incapacity. In other words, the totality of evidence
presented fell short of the required standards. Immaturity
alone did not constitute psychological incapacity.
With respect to the allegation of abandonment (to live with
another man), the Court held that such was established
and even admitted by Catalina in her Answer. Yet,
abandonment was not one of the grounds for the nullity of
marriage under the Family Code. It did not also constitute
psychological incapacity, it being instead a ground for
legal separation under Article 55(10) of the Family Code.
On the other hand, her sexual infidelity was not a valid
ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, considering that there should be a showing
that such marital infidelity was a manifestation of a
disordered personality that made her completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
Needless to state, Eduardo did not adduce such
evidence, rendering even his claim of her infidelity bereft
of factual and legal basis.
6. MENDOZA V. REPUBLIC (G.R. No. 157854, November, 12
2012)
DOCTRINE:
Marriage; petition for nullity of marriage; AM No. 02-11-10;
appearance by the Office of the Solicitor General still
required. The Resolution nowhere stated that appeals by
the OSG were no longer required. On the contrary, the
Resolution explicitly required the OSG to actively
participate in all stages of the proceedings.
Marriage; psychological incapacity; three basic
requirements. To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration
of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the
evidence must sufficiently prove that respondent spouse’s
psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and
existing prior to the time of the marriage.
Marriage; psychological incapacity; totality of evidence
proving incapacity required. Even if the expert opinions of
psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the
granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage,
the actual medical examination was to be dispensed with
only if the totality of evidence presented was enough to
support a finding of his psychological incapacity. This did
not mean that the presentation of any form of medical or
psychological evidence to show the psychological
incapacity would have automatically ensured the
granting of petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
What was essential, we should emphasize herein, was the
“presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party’s psychological condition.” But where, like here, the
parties had full opportunity to present the professional and
expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause,
gravity and incurability of the alleged psychological
incapacity, then the opinions should be represented and
be weighed by the trial courts in order to determine and
decide whether or not to declare the nullity of the
marriages. It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all
other cases they try, must always base their judgments not
solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but
on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their
proceedings.
FACTS:
Anabelle and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the
country from his employment in Papua New Guinea.
Arabelle and Dominic Mendoza got married while
Arabelle was eight months pregnant. They lived together
but depended on their parents for financial support.
Arabelle had different jobs to support the needs of the
family.
When Dominic got employed for Toyota in Bel-Air Makati
in 1994, he spent his first salary celebrating with his friends.
September of the same year, Arabelle found out of
Dominic’s illicit relationship with Zaida, his co-employee.
Communication between them became rare and they
started sleeping in separate rooms.
In November 1995, Dominic gave her a car as a birthday
present only to find out that he did not pay for it, forcing
her to rely on her father-in-law for the payment of the car.
Dominic eventually got fired from his job because of he
ran away with P164,000 belonging to his employer. He was
charged with estafa. Petitioner also found out that he
swindled many of his clients some of them threatening her
and their family.
On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal
abode because petitioner asked him for “time and space
to think things over.” A month later, she refused his attempt
at reconciliation, causing him to threaten to commit
suicide. She and her family immediately left the house to
live in another place concealed from him.
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition
for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage with
Dominic based on his psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC found that all the
characteristics of psychological incapacity which are
gravity, antecedence and incurability, were attendant,
establishing Dominic’s psychological incapacity.
The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that there was
no showing that Dominic’s personality traits either
constituted psychological incapacity existing at the time
of the marriage or were of the nature contemplated by
Article 36 of the Family Code; that the testimony of the
expert witness was not conclusive upon the court, and that
the real reason for the parties’ separation had been their
frequent quarrels over financial matters and the criminal
cases brought against Dominic. CA reversed the decision
of RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not psychological incapacity of Dominic was
established, and thus their marriage is null and void. -NO
RULING:
The appeal has no merit. The CA correctly indicated that
the ill-feelings that the petitioner harbored against
22 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
Dominic furnished the basis to doubt the findings of the
expert witness; that such findings were one-sided and that
he did not participate in the proceedings. The findings and
conclusions on his psychological profile were solely based
on the self-serving testimonial descriptions of him by the
petitioner and her witnesses. The court finds the totality of
evidence adduced by the petitioner insufficient to prove
that Dominic was psychologically unfit. Accordingly, the
RTC’s findings that Dominic’s psychological incapacity
was characterized by gravity, antecedence and
incurability could not stand scrutiny. His alleged
immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of remorse did not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity. The court
denies the petition for certiorari and affirms that decision
of the Court of Appeals.
The findings of Dr. Samson were one-sided, because
Dominic was not himself subjected to an actual psychiatric
evaluation by petitioner’s expert. He also did not
participate in the proceedings. And that the findings and
conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert were
solely based the testimonies of the petitioner.
(3) Family Code Articles 26; 21, 10, 35(1), 35(4), 35(5), 36,
37 & 38
1. G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MARELYN
TANEDO MANALO, Respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a
petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil
Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment
of divorce rendered by the Japanese court. Manalo was
allowed to testify. Among the documents that were
offered and admitted were: (1) Court Order finding the
petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form and in
substance; (2) Affidavit of Publication; (3) Certificate of
Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese
husband; (4) Divorce Decree of the Japanese court; (5)
Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine
Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of
Divorce; and (6) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.
The Office of the Solicitor’s General, as it appeared for the
petitioner Republic of the Philippines, did not present any
controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of
Manalo.
The trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. It
opined that, based on Article of Article 15 of the New Civil
Code, the Philippine law “does not afford Filipinos the right
to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or
living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to
foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the
Philippines or in another country.
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held
that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines is
applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce
against her Japanese husband because the decree they
obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former
capacitating him to remarry.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between a foreigner and a
Filipino was dissolved through a divorce filed abroad by
the latter?
RULING:
Yes. Article 26 of the Family Code which reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by
Executive Order 227)
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on the
Philippine Courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. It
authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign
divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not
allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the
merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.
Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a
valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality,
but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care, and
support of the children or property relations of the spouses,
must still be determined by our court.
The Court state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitation him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Moreover, invoking the nationality principle is erroneous.
Such principle, found under Article 15of the Civil Code, is
not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mere
existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that
the State may provide for an exception thereto. Also, blind
adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed
if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to
certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally
protected by law.
The Court, however, asserts that it cannot yet write finis to
this controversy by granting Manalo’s petition to recognize
and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the
Japanese Court. Before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to
the foreign law allowing it.
The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further
proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant
Japanese law on divorce.
2. Tenchavez v. Escaño
G.R. No. L-19671, 29 November 1965
23 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
FACTS:
Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32, on February 24, 1948, before a Catholic
chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the local
civil registrar. However, the two were unable to live
together after the marriage and as of June 1948, they
were already estranged. Vicenta left for the United Stated
in 1950. On the same year she filed a verified complaint for
divorce against Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on the
ground of “Extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character.”
A decree of divorce, “final and absolute” was issued in
open court by the said tribunal. She married an American,
lived with him in California, had several children with him
and, on 1958, acquired American Citizenship.
On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956,
against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and
Mena Escaño whom he charged with having dissuaded
and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and
alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic
Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed
the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta’s
parents denied that they had in any way influenced their
daughter’s acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is
valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the parents of Vicenta alienated the
affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct
toward her husband.
RULING:
1. No. Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez’ marriage
remain existent and undissolved under the Philippine Law.
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil Code, laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.
Escaño’s divorce and second marriage cannot be
deemed valid under the Philippine Law to which Escaño
was bound since in the time the divorce decree was
issued, Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.
The acts of the wife in not complying with her wifely duties,
deserting her husband without any justifiable cause,
leaving for the United States in order to secure a decree of
absolute divorce, and finally getting married again are
acts which constitute a willful infliction of injury upon the
husband’s feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy, thus entitling Tenchavez to a
decree of legal separation under our law on the basis of
adultery.
2. No. There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out
of improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit
for annulment, or her subsequent divorce.
A portion of Section 529 reads: The law distinguishes
between the right of a parent to interest himself in the
marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a
tranger to intermeddle in such affairs. …A parent is liable
for alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious
conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or
daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable
unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from
unworthy motives.
Therefore, her parents, in respecting Vicenta’s
independent decisions, certainly cannot be charged with
alienation of affections in the absence of malice or
unworthy motives.
3. ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL V.
ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and
RICHARD UPTON respondents.
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the
Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a
citizen of the United States. They were married in
Hongkong in 1972 and established their residence in the
Philippines. They begot two children born on April 4, 1973
and December 18, 1975, respectively. But the parties were
divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982 and the
petitioner had remarried also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.
On July 8, 1983, Richard Upton filed a suit against
petitioner, asking that Alice Van Dorn be ordered to render
an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila and be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner
and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the
Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
As to Richard Upton, the divorce is binding on him as an
American Citizen. Owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. The divorce is likewise valid as to the
petitioner.
As such, pursuant to his national law, private respondent
Richard Upton is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue Alice Van Dorn to exercise
control over conjugal assets. He was bound by the
Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he did
not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation
before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.
4. G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the
City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD
GEILING, respondents.
24 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
FACTS:
On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a
Filipina and the respondent to the case, and Erich Geiling,
a German national, were married at Friedenweiler in the
Federal Republic of Germany. After about three and a half
years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding
against Pilapil in Germany in January 1983 while Pilapil filed
an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before RTC of Manila in January 23, 1983 where it
is still pending as a civil case. On January 15, 1986, the local
Court of Germany promulgated a divorce decree on the
ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody
of the child,Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was granted to
petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed two complaints
for adultery alleging that, while still married to respondent,
petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chia and
Jesus Chua sometime in 1982 and 1983 respectively. The
respondent city fiscal approved a resolution directing the
filing of two complaints for adultery against petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion in both criminal cases
to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings thereon. Respondent judge merely reset the
date of the arraignment but before such scheduled date,
petitioner moved for the suspension of proceedings. On
September 8, 1987, respondent judge denied the motion
to quash and also directed the arraignment of both
accused. Petitioner refused to be arraigned and thus
charged with direct contempt and fined.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent’s adultery charges
against the petitioner is still valid given the fact that both
had been divorced prior to the filing of charges.
RULING:
The law provides that in prosecutions for adultery and
concubinage the person who can legally file the
complaint should only be the offended spouse. The fact
that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country in 1983, is admitted. According to Article 15 of the
Civil Code, with relation to the status of Filipino citizens
both here and abroad, since the legal separation of the
petitioner and respondent has been finalized through the
courts in Germany and the RTC in Manila, the marriage of
the couple were already finished, thus giving no merit to
the charges the respondent filed against the petitioner.
Private respondent, being no longer married to petitioner
holds no legal merit to commence the adultery case as
the offended spouse at the time he filed suit in 1986. The
temporary restraining order issued in this case was made
permanent.
5. FE D. QUITA v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 124862.
December 22, 1998
FACTS:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were
married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not
however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way
their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for
divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted
in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July
1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from
each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties.
On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce.
Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix
Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended
in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time,
to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. Respondent
Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan),
claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and
Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda,
all surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as surviving
children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition. On 30
April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and the Padlan
children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July
1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce
between petitioner and Arturo.
ISSUE:
W/N private respondent be declared an heir pursuant to
the subsequent marriage contracted with Arturo?
RULING:
NO. Private respondent was not declared an heir.
Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of
birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947,
their marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated
during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If
there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive
shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to
the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the
decedent.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private
respondent raised, among others, the issue as to whether
petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent
considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A.
and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the
above quoted procedural rule.11 To this, petitioner replied
that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally
married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained.12
Reading between the lines, the implication is that
petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her
divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial
court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship.
In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is
brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even
furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic
notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the
reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer certificate
title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy
thereof before another trial court. When asked whether
she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she
was since 1954.19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of
petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year.
We emphasize however that the question to be
determined by the trial court should be limited only to the
right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving
spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already
resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on
22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and
Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous
marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts.
80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a
surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship.
25 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the
remand of the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings and declaring null and void its decision
holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as
intestate heirs is AFFIRMED.
6. Llorente vs CA GR 124371 November 23, 2000
FACTS:
Alicia( 2nd wife), Lorenzo N. Llorente,`Paula (1ST wife),
Ceferino Llorente (brother), Crisologo Llorente(son)
Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the
United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30,
1957.
February 22, 1937: Lorenzo and Paula Llorente were
married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in
Nabua, Camarines Sur
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed
for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal
home
November 30, 1943: Lorenzo was admitted to United States
citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization
1945: When Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave to visit
his wife and he visited the Philippines, He discovered that
his wife Paula was pregnant and was “living in” and having
an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino
Llorente
December 4, 1945: Paula gave birth to a boy registered in
the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as Crisologo Llorente
with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate
and the line for the father’s name was left blank
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her
February 2, 1946: the couple drew and signed a written
agreement which was witnessed by Paula’s father and
stepmother to the effect that
1. all the family allowances allotted by the United States
Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations
for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be
suspended
2. they would dissolve their marital union in accordance
with judicial proceedings
3. they would make a separate agreement regarding
their conjugal property acquired during their marital life;
and
4. Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous
act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to
separate from Lorenzo peacefully.
November 16, 1951: Lorenzo returned and filed for divorce
with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for
the County of San Diego
December 4, 1952: the divorce decree became final. On
January 16, 1958: Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in
Manila and lived together as husband and wife and bore
3 children: Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.
March 13, 1981: Lorenzo executed a Last Will and
Testament where he bequeathed all his property to Alicia
and their three children.
December 14, 1983: Lorenzo filed with the RTC, Iriga,
Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance
of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that
Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.
January 18, 1984: RTC denied the motion for the reason
that the Lorenzo was still alive
January 24, 1984: RTC admitted finding that the will was
duly executedthe will to probate
June 11, 1985: before the proceedings could be
terminated, Lorenzo died
RTC on the petition for letters of administration filed by
Paula over Lorenzo’s estate contending that she was the
surviving spouse and WITHOUT terminating the testate
proceedings filed by Alicia, gave due course to Paula’s
petition divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo
Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines,
therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia
Fortunato at Manila is void.
Paula T. Llorente: 1/3 estate and ½ conjugal estate
illegitimate children: Raul, Luz and Beverly: 1/3 estate
RTC denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but
modified that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children
“legitimate or otherwise” of Lorenzo since they were not
legally adopted by him thus, Beverly Llorente as the only
illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitles her to 1/3 of the estate
and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate
CA: Affirmed with modification
ISSUE:
W/N the divorce is valid and proven
RULING:
YES. Petition is GRANTED. REVERSES the decision of the
Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree
of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N.
Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in
and for the County of San Diego, made final on December
4, 1952. REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for
determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N.
Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’
successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with
instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all
deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased
within the framework of the Rules of Court.
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.: nationality principle in Article 15
of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorces, the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality.
Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law.
Quita v. Court of Appeals: once proven that NO longer a
Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce, the ruling in
Van Dorn would become applicable
26 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
Divorce of Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was
valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of
comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the
succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best
left to the determination of the trial court.
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his
second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the
will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes,
since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on
“family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity.
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit
from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which
must be pleaded and proved.
Whether the will was executed in accordance with the
formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine
law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
7. GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO [G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001.]
DOCTRINE:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is
valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
However, the divorce decree and the governing personal
law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be
alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March
1, 1987. 4 They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989, 5 a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian
citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship"
issued by the Australian government. 6 Petitioner — a
Filipina — and respondent were married on January 12,
1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
City. 7 In their application for a marriage license,
respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino." 8
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal
assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with
their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. 9
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage 10 in the court a quo, on
the ground of bigamy — respondent allegedly had a prior
subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January
12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's
marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
TDCaSE
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993,
he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its
subsequent dissolution. 11 He contended that his first
marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly
dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in
1989; 12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner in 1994.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the
ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and
recognized in the Philippines.
ISSUES:
(1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson was proven, and
(2) whether respondent was proven to be legally
capacitated to marry petitioner.
Proving the Divorce Between
Respondent and Editha Samson
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha
Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court. 35 However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce
decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence,
counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but
only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local
Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. 36 The trial court ruled
that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.
37 Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded
weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object
properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a
written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. 38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the
Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer
bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired
Australian citizenship in 1992. 39 Naturalization is the legal
act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political
and civil rights belonging to a citizen. 40 Naturalized
citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former
states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By
becoming an Australian, respondent severed his
allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that
had tied him to Philippine personal laws. aSDCIE
Burden of Proving Australian Law
The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action." 41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the
burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new
matters. 42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by
respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian
law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws. 43 Like any other facts,
they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws
are not among those matters that judges are supposed to
know by reason of their judicial function. 44 The power of
judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in
the negative.
27 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
Second Issue: Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution
of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But
divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1)
absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the
bond in full force. 45 There is no showing in the case at bar
which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains
a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this
decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has
died) commits the offense of bigamy." 48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce
obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did
not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for
the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that
the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's
capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on
this matter.
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that
respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen,
was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12,
1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the court
a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto
clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry
without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to
show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at
the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the
second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her
marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law,
he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct
result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the
most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial
court to receive evidence, if any, which show respondent's
legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the
court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage
on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence
two existing marriage certificates, which were both
obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila
dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City
dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and
substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a
quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which
conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties'
marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above
discussed.
8. Republic v Orbecido, GR No. 154380, October 5, 2005
FACTS:
The petition herein filed is a petition for authority to remarry
filed before the RTC, a declaratory relief governed by Rule
63, ROC. The antecedent facts are as follows.
Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros M. Villanueva, both
Filipinos got married on May 24, 1981 at the United Church
of Christ in the Philippines, Ozamis City. The marriage was
blessed with two children. In 1986, Lady Myros went to the
United States with her son and there, after few years, was
declared a naturalized American citizen. In 2000, Cipriano
learned from his son that his wife had already obtained a
divorce decree and married a certain Innocent Stanley.
Cipriano upon hearing the same, filed before the RTC a
petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2, Art
26, FC. The RTC granted the petition of Cipriano, the OSG
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied and so
it subsequently filed before the Court the present case
raising a pure question of law. It was contended by the
OSG that the said law contemplates only mixed marriages,
that is between a foreigner and a Filipino but not for both
Filipinos ab initio. The proper remedy according to the
OSG was to file for annulment or legal separation.
ISSUE:
W/N Cipriano can remarry under Par. 2, Art 26, FC.
RULING:
Yes. The Court had the occasion to present a historical
background of the law now in question. Accordingly, the
original draft of the FC signed into law in July 6, 1987 lacks
the portion now being assailed by Cipriano. On July 17,
1987, few days after the signing of the FC, EO 227 was
issued amending Art. 26 among others. It was in this EO
where Par 2 of the present Art 26 was inserted. Records of
the proceedings of the FC deliberations showed that the
intent of Par 2, Art 26 according to Judge Alicia Sempio -
Diy was to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse. As to jurisprudence, it was only in the 1998 case of
Quita v CA where the Court hinted via obiter dictum that
a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no
longer married under Philippine law and thus can remarry.
After all the foregoing, the Court now declares in the
present petition that Par 2, Art 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
declaration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later
on, one of them becomes naturalized as foreign citizen
and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner
at the time of the solemnization of marriage. The
reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at
the time the valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. The twin
elements to validly apply this law are as follows: 1) There is
a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2) A valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.
However, the contention of Cipriano was denied for not
being able to prove by presentation of evidence that his
wife was already a naturalized American citizen and that
a foreign divorce decree was already granted by a court
abroad.
9. Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas Case Digest G.R. No. 186571,
August 11, 2010
FACTS:
Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen but now a
naturalized Canadian, married Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a
Filipina. He soon left to Canada after their wedding due to
work commitments. He returned to Philippines on April 2005
only to find out Daisylyn has an affair with another man.
28 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
Gerbert returned to Canada to file a divorce that took
effect on January 2006.
Two years later, he found another Filipina and wanted to
marry her in the Philippines. He went to Pasig City
Registrar's Office to register his Canadian divorce decree
but was denied considering that his marriage with Daisylyn
still subsists under Philippine law, that the foregin divorce
must be recognized judicially by the Philippine court.
Gerbert subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a
judicial recognition of foreign divorce but was
subsequently denied since he is not the proper party and
according to Article 26 of the Civil Code, only a Filipino
spouse can avail the remedy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 26 can also be applied to Corpuz'
petition of recognition of the foreign divorce decree.
RULING:
The Court held that alien spouses cannot claim the right as
it is only in favor of Filipino spouses. The legislative intent of
Article 26 is for the benefit of the clarification of the marital
status of the Filipino spouse.
However, aliens are not strip to petition to the RTC for his
foreign divorce decree as it is a conclusive presumption of
evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree
with confirmity to the alien's national law.
The Pasig City Registrar's Office acted out of line when it
registered the foreign divorce decree without judicial
order recognition. Therefore, the registration is still deemed
to be void.
10. G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB
AHMAD A. TAMANO,Respondents.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision
dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution dated
September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89
declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave s (Estrellita)
marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as
void ab initio.
FACTS:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamanomarried
Estrellita twice – initially under the Islamic laws and tradition
on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently,
under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at
Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage
contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was indicated as
“divorced”. Since then, Estrellita has been representing
herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano s wife, and upon
his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri
Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A.
Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest
of Sen. Tamano s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a
complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration
of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano
for being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen.
Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites,
and that this marriage remained subsisting when he
married Estrellita in 1993.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen.
Tamano was bigamous.
RULING:
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda and
late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by
PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is
void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda
was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim
rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships
between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil
Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one
marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage
provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized
except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which
was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior
marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce
under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws.
However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article
13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to “marriage
and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein
only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in
any part of the Philippines.” But Article 13 of PD 1083 does
not provide for a situation where the parties were married
both in civil and Muslim rites.”
11. G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA
MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who
married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay)
in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not
sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring
his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost
contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara
(Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in
Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to
Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical
abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to
contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara
void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki
filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of
29 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage).”
The decision of the lower courts (RTC): dismissed the
petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment ·(or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on
improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner,
Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file
a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
3. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the
foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.
RULING:
1. No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that
the rule in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that only the husband or
wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the petition
is bigamy.” While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are
declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of
the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence
of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance
with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
2. Yes, the recognition of the foreign divorce decree may
be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact.”
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in
any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status
of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and
material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising
from it.
3. Yes, there is neither circumvention of the substantive
and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine
law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No.
8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action
to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to
recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided
under foreign law.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts
are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a
case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide
on the “family rights and duties, or on the status, condition
and legal capacity” of the foreign citizen who is a party to
the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to
the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating
to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign
country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend
its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex
nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1)
whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether
any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to
repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public
policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment,
Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations.
ARTICLE 34
1. Leonila Santiago v. People of the PH GR 200233 July
15, 2015
FACTS:
4 months after solemnization of marriage, Leonila
(petitioner) and Nicanor Santiago were served an
information for Bigamy for the prosecution adduced that
Nicaonor was still married to Estela when he entered into
the 2nd marriage; he was able to escape while petitioner
pleaded ‘not guilty’ relying on the fact that when she
married him, she thought he was single. She soon averred
that their marriage was void due to lack of marriage
license, wherein she should not then be charged with
bigamy. 11 years after inception if criminal case, Estela
Galang, the first wife, testified for the prosecution. She
alleged that she had met petitioner and introduced
herself as the legal wife. Petitioner denied allegation and
stated that she met Estela only after she had already
married Nicanor.
ISSUE:
1. W/N petitioner is co-accused in the instant case of
Bigamy.
2. W/N marriage between Leonila and Nicanor is valid
RULING:
Lower courts consistently found that petitioner indeed
knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the
following circumstances: (1) when Nicanor was courting
and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they
openly showed their disapproval of him (2) it was
incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know
of his true civil status (3) Estela, who was the more credible
witness, compared to petitioner who had various
inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she
had already told petitioner on two occasions that the
former was the legal wife of Nicanor. In People v. Archilla,
knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse’s
existing prior marriage, constitutes an indispensable
30 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
cooperation in the commission of Bigamy, which makes
her responsible as an accomplice. She is not co-accused.
She is guilty of Bigamy as an accomplice thereby
sentenced to 6m arresto mayor to 4y prision correccional.
2. Office of the Court Administrator v Necessario
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691, April 2, 2013
FACTS:
This is an administrative case that stemmed from the 6 July
2007 Memorandum of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA).2 The judicial audit team created by
the OCA reported alleged irregularities in the
solemnization of marriages in several branches of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Cebu City.3 Certain package fees were
offered to interested parties by "fixers" or "facilitators" for
instant marriages.4
On 24 August 2007, the OCA through Senior Deputy Court
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño submitted its
Memorandum dated 29 August 20079 and Supplemental
Report.10 Six hundred forty-three (643) marriage
certificates were examined by the judicial audit team.11
The team reported that out of the 643 marriage
certificates examined, 280 marriages were solemnized
under Article 3412 of the Family Code.13 The logbooks of the
MTCC Branches indicate a higher number of solemnized
marriages than the number of marriage certificates in the
courts’ custody.14 There is also an unusual number of
marriage licenses obtained from the local civil registrars of
the towns of Barili and Liloan, Cebu.15 There were even
marriages solemnized at 9 a.m. with marriage licenses
obtained on the same day.16 The town of Barili, Cebu is
more than sixty (60) kilometers away from Cebu City and
entails a travel time of almost two (2) hours.17 Liloan, Cebu,
on the other hand, is more than ten (10) kilometers away
from Cebu City.1
On 27 November 2007, the Court En Banc issued a
resolution: a) requiring Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil
R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales
of the MTCC, Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8, respectively, of Cebu
City, to comment on the findings of the 14 August 2007
Supplemental Report of the OCA, within fifteen (15) days
from notice; b) directing the Process Servicing Unit to
furnish the judges with a copy of the Supplemental Report;
c) requiring the court personnel listed below to show cause
within fifteen (15) days from notice why no disciplinary
action should be taken against them for their alleged
grave misconduct and dishonesty and impleading them
in this administrative matter:
The Court in the same resolution also: a) ordered the
referral to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas for appropriate action on the ad.
On 12 November 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a
Memorandum of Law with Plea for Early Resolution, Lifting
of Suspension and Dismissal of Case.59 This Court in a
Resolution dated 11 December 2007 lifted the suspension
of the respondent judges but prohibited them from
solemnizing marriages until further ordered.60
In its Memorandum dated 15 June 2010,63 the OCA
recommended the dismissal of the respondent judges and
some court employees, and the suspension or admonition
of others.
The OCA summarized the liabilities of the respondents, to
wit:
JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO is guilty of gross
inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages
with questionable documents and wherein one of the
contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere
affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the required
certificate from his embassy. He is also guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for solemnizing marriages under
Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both of the
contracting parties were minors during the cohabitation.
xxx
JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA is guilty of gross inefficiency or
neglect of duty for failure to make sure that the
solemnization fee has been paid. He is also guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for solemnizing marriages under
Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both of the
contracting parties were minors during the cohabitation.
JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES is guilty of gross inefficiency
or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with
questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the
solemnization fee has been paid and for solemnizing
marriages wherein one of the contracting parties is a
foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity
to marry in lieu of the required certificate from his embassy.
He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for
solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage
license.
JUDGE ROSEBELLA M. TORMIS is guilty of gross inefficiency
or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with
questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the
solemnization fee has been paid, for solemnizing
marriages wherein one of the contracting parties is a
foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity
to marry in lieu of the required certificate from the embassy
and for solemnizing a marriage with an expired license.
xxx
HELEN MONGGAYA is guilty of grave misconduct for
violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel that prohibits court personnel from
soliciting or accepting any gift, favor or benefit based on
any or explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor
or benefit shall influence their official actions and for giving
false information for the purpose of perpetrating an
irregular marriage.
RHONA RODRIGUEZ is guilty of gross misconduct for
violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel and for inducing Maricel Albater to falsify
the application for marriage license by instructing her to
indicate her residence as Barili, Cebu.
DESIDERIO ARANAS and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for
providing couples who are to be married under Article 34
of the Family Code with the required affidavit of
cohabitation.
CELESTE RETUYA, EMMA VALENCIA and REBECCA ALESNA
are guilty of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code
of Conduct for Court Personnel which prohibits court
personnel from receiving tips or other remuneration for
assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or
involved in actions or proceedings with the Judiciary.64
The OCA, however, recommended the DISMISSAL of the
complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg,
Corazon P. Retuya, and Marilou Cabañez, for lack of merit.
31 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
ISSUE:
The issue now before this Court is whether the judges and
personnel of the MTCC and RTC in Cebu City are guilty of
gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or gross
inefficiency and gross misconduct, and in turn, warrant the
most severe penalty of dismissal from service.
RULING:
The findings in the 2010 Memorandum of the Office of the
Court Administrator are supported by the evidence on
record and applicable law and jurisprudence.
This Court has long held that court officials and employees
are placed with a heavy burden and responsibility of
keeping the faith of the public.
65 In Obañana, Jr. v. Ricafort, we said that:
Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in
the performance of official functions must be avoided. This
Court shall not countenance any conduct, act or omission
on the part of all those involved in the administration of
justice which would violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish the faith of the people in the
Judiciary.6
Liability of Judge Anatalio S. Necessario
The OCA reported that Judge Necessario solemnized a
total of one thousand one hundred twenty-three (1,123)
marriages from 2005 to 2007.67 However, only one hundred
eighty-four (184) marriage certificates were actually
examined by the judicial audit team.68 Out of the 184
marriages, only seventy-nine (79) were solemnized with a
marriage license while one hundred five (105) were
solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. Out of the
79 marriages with license, forty-seven (47) of these licenses
were issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu. This
translates to 42.93% of the marriages he solemnized with
marriage license coming from Liloan for over a period of
years.69 There were also twenty-two (22) marriages
solemnized by the judge with incomplete documents such
missing as marriage license, certificate of legal capacity
to marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation.70
Judge Necessario solemnized nine (9) marriages that had
questionable supporting documents such as marriage
licenses.71 The OCA found that the place of residence of
the contracting parties appearing in the supporting
documents differ from the place where they obtained
their marriage license.72 The documents invited suspicion
because of erasures and superimpositions in the entries of
residence.73 Likewise, in lieu of the required certificate of
legal capacity to marry, a mere affidavit was submitted by
the parties.74 Variations in the signatures of the contracting
parties were also apparent in the documents.75
To summarize, the liabilities of the judges are the following:
First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized
marriages even if the requirements submitted by the
couples were incomplete and of questionable character.
Most of these documents showed visible signs of
tampering, erasures, corrections or superimpositions of
entries related to the parties’ place of residence.111 These
included indistinguishable features such as the font, font
size, and ink of the computer-printed entries in the
marriage certificate and marriage license.
Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of
duty regarding the payment of solemnization fees. The
Court, in Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo,114 defined neglect of
duty as the failure to give one’s attention to a task
expected of him and it is gross when, from the gravity of
the offense or the frequency of instances, the offense is so
serious in its character as to endanger or threaten public
welfare. The marriage documents examined by the audit
team show that corresponding official receipts for the
solemnization fee were missing115 or payment by batches
was made for marriages performed on different dates.116
The OCA emphasizes that the payment of the
solemnization fee starts off the whole marriage application
process and even puts a "stamp of regularity" on the
process.
Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also
solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a
foreigner who did not submit a certificate of legal
capacity to marry from his or her embassy. What the
foreigners submitted were mere affidavits stating their
capacity to marry. The irregularity in the certificates of
legal capacity that are required under Article 21 of the
Family Code117 displayed the gross neglect of duty of the
judges. They should have been diligent in scrutinizing the
documents required for the marriage license issuance.
Any irregularities would have been prevented in the
qualifications of parties to contract marriage.118
Fourth, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise
guilty of gross ignorance of the law under Article 34 of the
Family Code119 with respect to the marriages they
solemnized where legal impediments existed during
cohabitation such as the minority status of one party.120
The judges’ gross ignorance of the law is also evident when
they solemnized marriages under Article 34 of the Family
Code without the required qualifications and with the
existence of legal impediments such as minority of a party.
Marriages of exceptional character such as those made
under Article 34 are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule
on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage
license.126 Under the rules of statutory construction,
exceptions as a general rule should be strictly but
reasonably construed.127 The affidavits of cohabitation
should not be issued and accepted pro forma particularly
in view of the settled rulings of the Court on this matter. The
five-year period of cohabitation should be one of a
perfect union valid under the law but rendered imperfect
only by the absence of the marriage contract.128 The
parties should have been capacitated to marry each
other during the entire period and not only at the time of
the marriage.129
To elaborate further on the gravity of the acts and
omissions of the respondents, the Family Code provides
the requisites for a valid marriage:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided
for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that
they take each other as husband and wife in the presence
of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except
32 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential
requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but
the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)
The absence of a marriage license will clearly render a
marriage void ab initio.130 The actions of the judges have
raised a very alarming issue regarding the validity of the
marriages they solemnized since they did not follow the
proper procedure or check the required documents and
qualifications. In Aranes v. Judge Salvador Occiano,131 the
Court said that a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license is void and the subsequent issuance of the license
cannot render valid or add even an iota of validity to the
marriage. It is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage
and the act of solemnizing the marriage without a license
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.4) Montañez vs
Cipriano
ARTICLE 35
1. MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES v. LOURDES TAJOLOSA
CIPRIANO. G.R. No. 181089; October 22, 2012.
FACTS:
On April 8, 1976, Lourdes Cipriano (Lourdes) married
Socrates Flores (Socrates). On January 24, 1983, during the
subsistence of the said marriage, Lourdes married Silverio
V. Cipriano (Silverio). In 2001, Lourdes filed with the RTC of
Muntinlupa a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage
with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s psychological
incapacity. The RTC rendered its decision declaring the
marriage of Lourdes with Socrates null and void. Said
decision became final and executory on October 13,
2003.
On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Montañez, Silverio’s
daughter from the first marriage, filed a complaint for
bigamy against Lourdes alleging that Lourdes failed to
reveal to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates.
Lourdes moved to quash the information alleging that her
first marriage to Socrates had already been declared void
ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak
of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983. She
also averred that she had contracted her second
marriage before the effectivity of the Family Code; hence,
the existing law at that time did not require a judicial
declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to
contracting a subsequent marriage. Hence, the RTC
granted the motion to quash.
ISSUE:
Was the RTC correct in quashing the information for
bigamy?
HELD:
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender
has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of
the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential
in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second
marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be
valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted
a second marriage with Silverio in 1983, her first marriage
with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the
same had not yet been annulled or declared void by a
competent authority. Clearly, the annulment of
respondent's first marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity was declared only in 2003.
In Mercado v. Tan, we ruled that the subsequent judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the
crime of bigamy had already been consummated.
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court
already made the declaration that Article 40, which is a
rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively
because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that
said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights." The
Court went on to explain, thus: “The fact that procedural
statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions.
The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no
vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural
laws.” GRANTED.
2. G.R. No. 189607 April 18, 2016
RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner, vs. LEA P. DE LEON
CASTILLO, Respondent.
SERENO, CJ:
DOCTRINE:
The requirement of a judicial decree of nullity (to avoid
being charged with Bigamy) does not apply to marriages
that were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family
Code, particularly if the children of the parties were born
while the Civil Code was in force. (Apiag v. Cantero and
Ty v. Court of Appeals)
FACTS:
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea)
married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January 1979,
respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo
(Renato).
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying that his
marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting
marriage to Bautista and her psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code
Respondent opposed the Petition and contended that her
marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not
secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a
member of the denomination to which the solemnizing
officer belonged.
On 2002, Lea filed an action to declare her first marriage
to Baustista void. On 2003, the RTC of Parañaque City,
33 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
declared Lea's first marriage to Bautista null and void ab
initio.
On 23 March 2007, the RTC declared the marriage
between Lea and Renato null and void ab initio on the
ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41
of the Family Code.
The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista
was subsisting when she married Renato on 6 January
1979, makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus
rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's
argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of
nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior subsisting
marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial
declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing.
Lastly, it also said that even if respondent eventually had
her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains
that the first and second marriage were subsisting before
the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain
a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista
before contracting her second marriage with Renato.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration insofar as the
distribution of their properties were concerned. His motion,
however, was denied by the RTC. Thereafter, both
petitioner and Respondent filed their respective Notices of
Appeal.
The CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and
Order and upheld the validity of the parties' marriage. In
reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages
were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil
Code is the applicable law since it is the law in effect at
the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the
Family Code. Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil
Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage.
Petitioner's MR was denied. Hence, this Petition for Review
on Certiorar under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
WON the CA was correct in reversing the RTC’s
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage.
RULING:
YES. SC denied the petition. The CA decision was affirmed.
The CA did not err in upholding the validity of marriage
between Lea and Renato. Hence, we find no reason to
disturb it.
The subsequent marriage of Lea and Renato is valid in
view of the invalidity of her first marriage with Bautista
because of the absence of a marriage license. That there
was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void
ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is
immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil
Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC
declaring Lea’s marriage to Bautista null, only serves to
strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage
to Renato is valid.
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be
determined in accordance with the law in effect at the
time of its celebration. In this case, the law in force at the
time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code.
The children of the parties were also born while the Civil
Code was in effect.
Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a
voidable marriage in the following ways: (1) a void
marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from
the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the marriage
is valid until annulled by a competent court; (2) a void
marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage
can be ratified by cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a
void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a
voidable marriage cannot be collaterally attacked; (4) in
a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the
offspring are natural children by legal fiction, while in
voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the
children conceived before the decree of annulment are
considered legitimate; and (5) "in a void marriage no
judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary,"
while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial
decree.
This Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero and Ty v. Court of
Appeals, the requirement of a judicial decree of nullity
does not apply to marriages that were celebrated before
the effectivity of the Family Code, particularly if the
children of the parties were born while the Civil Code was
in force. In Ty, this Court clarified that those cases continue
to be governed by Odayat v Amante, People v Mendoza,
and People v Aragon.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code
cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to
do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and
of her children.
3. G.R. No. 191566 July 17, 2013
PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. EDGARDO V.
ODTUHAN, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The Family Code has settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence. A declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a
cause of action or a ground for defense. A judicial
declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent
marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a
bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
FACTS:
On 1980 respondent Edgardo married Jasmin Modina. On
1993, Edgardo married Eleanor A. Alagon. On 1994, he
filed a petition for annulment for his marriage with Modina.
RTC granted this on 1999, declaring his marriage with
Modina void ab ignition for lack of a valid marriage
license. On 2003, Alagon died. Private complainant,
Evelyn Abesamis Alagon found out about the previous
marriage. She filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging
Edgardo with Bigamy.
Edgardo filed an Omnibus Motion praying to be allowed
to present evidence with Motion to Quash. He asserts that
the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy and the
criminal action or liability has been extinguished.
The RTC denied the Omnibus Motion. A petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 was also filed before the CA. CA
rendered the herein assailed decision, granting the
34 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
petition and ordering the RTC to give due course to
Edgardo’s motion. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
WON the subsequent court judgment declaring Edgardo’s
first marriage void ab initio did not extinguish his criminal
liability which already attached prior to said judgment.
RULING:
YES. The petition is meritorious. SC granted the petition. The
CA decision is set aside, and the case is remanded to the
RTC for further proceedings.
The CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari filed by
respondent. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying his motion to quash and to allow him
to present evidence to support his omnibus motion.
The Family Code has settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of
the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required
either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. It has
been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration
of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage
can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous
marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when
he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long
as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the
marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
If we allow respondent’s line of defense and the CA’s
ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy can simply
evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that
a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone
institutes a complaint against him.
Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons
to quash the information against him, because he
obtained the declaration of nullity of marriage before the
filing of the complaint for bigamy against him. Again, we
cannot sustain such contention. Settled is the rule that
criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
commission of the offense and from that instant, liability
appends to him until extinguished as provided by law and
that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or
information is material only for determining prescription.
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
4. AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and
MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners, vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES
ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
PEREZ, J.:
DOCTRINE:
In a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it
cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested
party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally
without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the
lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
FACTS:
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration
of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein
respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and
daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners
Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was
married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth
Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo Quiazon died intestate on December 12, 1992. His
natural daughter, Maria Lourdes Quiazon (Elise), then
minor represented by her mother Ma. Lourdes Belen, filed
a petition for letters of administration before the RTC of Las
Piñas City. Elise claims that she is the natural daughter of
decedent, having been conceived and born at the time
when her parents were both capacitated to marry each
other. Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to
Amelia. Amelia was previously married to Filipito Sandico.
Eliseo left real properties worth P2,020,000.00 and personal
properties worth P2,100,000.00.
Amelia attacked the venue, raising Eliseo’s death
certificate where it reflects Capas, Tarlac as the residence
at the time of death. (This was not given credence by the
RTC and CA)
In 2005, RTC issued Letters of Administration in favor of Elise.
Elise attained the legal age, at this time.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in
toto. CA held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and
Lourdes lived together as husband and wife and
established a common residence in Las Piñas City, the
venue was properly laid. Petitioner’s MR was denied. Thus,
this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
WON the court erred in declaring that Amelia was not
legally married to Eliseo due to her pre-existing marriage?
No.
WON Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia was void for being
bigamous? Yes.
RULING:
NO. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The CA decision
was affirmed in toto.
Unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of
Appeals erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as
void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no
marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of
rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned
even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. It
must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of
the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was
the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling
in Niñal v. Bayadog applicable four-square to the case at
hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed
therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after
the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from
voidable marriages, to wit:
35 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even
after the death of either party but voidable marriages can
be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not
after death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the
action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage
can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a
void marriage.
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no
marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of
rights, such that any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which
may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise,
whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her
father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of
such marriage even after the death of her father. The said
marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action
attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as
an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar.
Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir, has a cause of
action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void
marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either
party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause
of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s
marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to determine
whether or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void
for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the
existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and
Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the
Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and
signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas
de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate
is a competent evidence of marriage and the certification
from the National Archive that no information relative to
the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative
value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the
fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than 50
years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage
can no longer be found in the National Archive, given the
interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently,
in the absence of any showing that such marriage had
been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage
was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the
latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
DIRECT AND COLLATERAL ATTACK FOR THE VALIDITY OF
MARRIAGE
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA,
respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the
Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by
the State." In more explicit terms, the Family Code
characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal,
and family life." So crucial are marriage and the family to
the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation . . ." As a matter of policy,
therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of
contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on
the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that
their union is so defective with respect to the essential
requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso
jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more.
A declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground
of defense.
FACTS:
On 1991, Delia Soledad Domingo filed for a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of
property against Roberto Domingo. Delia only knew of
Roberto’s previous marriage with Emerlinda dela Paz when
the latter sued the for bigamy in 1983.
From 1979 to the time of filing of the case, Delia worked in
Saudi Arabia, and would only go back to the Philippines
during her annual one-month vacation. Roberto was
completely dependent upon her for support. She
purchased real and personal properties worth P350,000
which were under the possession and administration of
Roberto.
On 1989, during her annual vacation, Delia discovered
that Roberto was cohabiting with another woman. And
that he had been disposing of her properties without her
knowledge and consent. She appointed her brother,
Moises Avera as her atty-in-fact. But Roberto refused to
turn over possession and administration of the properties.
The petition prayed for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, and issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of
administration over the properties. Delia sought to be
declared the sole owner of the properties.
Roberto filed a motion to dismiss, claiming since his
marriage with Delia was void-ab-initio, there was no need
to file declaration of nullity. The action was superfluous and
stated no cause of action.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss. A MR was also denied.
A special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion for denying the
motion to dismiss was filed. CA dismissed the petition.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage
was necessary?
WON the same should only be filed for purposes of
remarriage?
RULING:
The petition was denied. The CA ruling was affirmed.
36 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and
private respondent celebrated during the former’s
marriage with Emerlinda dela Paz was still subsisting, is
bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning void. But there
is still a need for judicial declaration of such nullity. (Vda.
De Consuegra vs GSIS and Wiegel vs Sempio-Diy)
The Family Code settled all conflicting jurisprudence. A
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground
of defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable
in law for said projected marriage be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void.
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the
Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by
the State." In more explicit terms, the Family Code
characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal,
and family life." So crucial are marriage and the family to
the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation . . ." As a matter of policy,
therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of
contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on
the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that
their union is so defective with respect to the essential
requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso
jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more. Were
this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to
a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations
indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be
as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy
could conceive. For such a social significant institution, an
official state pronouncement through the courts, and
nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not
only would such an open and public declaration by the
courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of
marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through
records accessible to everyone.
ARTICLE 36
1. AURELIO V. AURELIO
G.R. No. 175367, [June 06, 2011]
DOCTRINE: The following are the guidelines to aid the
courts in the disposition of cases involving psychological
incapacity: (1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage;
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable; (5) Such illness must
be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage; (6) The
essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision; (7) Interpretations given by the
National AppellateMatrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts; (8) The trial
court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
FACTS: Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida
Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988.
They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo
Gabriel.
On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In her petition,
respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were
psychologically incapacitated of performing and
complying with their respective essential marital
obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that such
state of psychological incapacity was present prior and
even during the time of the marriage ceremony. Hence,
respondent prays that her marriage be declared null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code. It alleged among
others that said psychological incapacity was manifested
by lack of financial support from the husband; his lack
of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his working
wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousy and
distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated between
hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to assist in the
maintenance of the family.
On the side of the wife on the other hand, is effusive and
displays her feelings openly and freely. Her feelings
change very quickly – from joy to fury to misery to despair,
depending on her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance
for boredom was very low. She was emotionally immature;
she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She
cannot delay to gratify her needs. She gets upset when
she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her
spirits immensely. Their hostility towards each other
distorted their relationship. Their incapacity to accept and
fulfill the essential obligations of marital life led to
the breakdown of their marriage.
On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss
the petition. Petitioner principally argued that the petition
failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet
the standards set by the Court for the interpretation and
implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
RTC denied the petition. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage shall be declared null and
void?
HELD: Yes. The marriage is null and void.
RATIO: Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that
the allegations contained in respondent's petition are
insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity. Specifically,
petitioner contends that the petition failed to comply with
three of the Molina guidelines, namely: that the root cause
of the psychological incapacity must be alleged in the
complaint; that such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage; and that the non-complied
marital obligation must be stated in the petition.
37 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
First, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this Court finds that
the root cause of psychological incapacity was stated
and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the
manifestation of respondent that the
family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent
were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their
psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent and
expert psychologist clinically identified the same as the
root causes.
Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both
parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about a
disability for them to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent
suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic
Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers
from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder.
The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital
obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and
incurable.
Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital
obligations that were not complied with were alleged in
the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of
the petition, respondent’s allegations fall under Article 68
of the Family Code which states that “the husband and
the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.”
2. REPUBLIC V. GALANG
G.R. No. 168335, [June 6, 2011]
DOCTRINE:
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The
defect should refer to “no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.”
FACTS:
In March 1994, Nestor and Juvy contracted marriage in
Pampanga and thereafter they resided in the house of the
Nestor’s father. Nestor worked as an artist-illustrator while
Juvy stayed at home. They had one child, Christopher.
In August 1999, Nestor filed with the RTC a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy, under
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. He alleged
that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to exercise
the essential obligations of marriage, as she was a
kleptomaniac and a swindler; that Juvy suffers from
“mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted
discernment and total lack of care, love and affection
[towards him and their] child.” He posited that Juvy’s
incapacity was “extremely serious” and “appears to be
incurable.”
Having found no collusion between the parties, the case
was set for trial. In his testimony, Nestor alleged that he was
the one who prepared their breakfast because Juvy did
not want to wake up early; Juvy often left their child to their
neighbors’ care; and Christopher almost got lost in the
market when Juvy brought him there. He added that Juvy
stole his ATM card and falsified his signature to encash the
check representing Nestor’s father’s pension. He, likewise,
stated that he caught Juvy playing “mahjong” and
“kuwaho” three (3) times. Finally, he testified that
Juvy borrowed money from their relatives on the pretense
that their son was confined in a hospital.
Nestor presented Anna Liza Guiang, a psychologist, who
testified that she conducted a psychological test on
Nestor. In her Psychological Report, the psychologist made
the following findings:
Psychological Test conducted on client Nestor Galang
resembles an emotionally-matured individual. He is well-
adjusted to the problem he meets, and enable to throw-
off major irritations but manifest[s] a very low frustration
tolerance which means he has a little ability to endure
anxiety and the client manifests suppressed feelings and
emotions which resulted to unbearable emotional pain,
depression and lack of self-esteem and gained emotional
tensions caused by his wife’s behavior.
The incapacity of the defendant is manifested [in] such a
manner that the defendant-wife: (1) being very
irresponsible and very lazy and doesn’t manifest any sense
of responsibility; (2) her involvement in gambling activities
such as mahjong and kuwaho; (3) being an estafador
which exhibits her behavioral and personality disorders; (4)
her neglect and show no care attitude towards her
husband and child; (5) her immature and rigid behavior;
(6) her lack of initiative to change and above all, the fact
that she is unable to perform her marital obligations as a
loving, responsible and caring wife to her family. There are
just few reasons to believe that the defendant is suffering
from incapacitated mind and such incapacity appears to
be incorrigible.
The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage in its decision of
January 22, 2001. The RTC Judge, relying on the Santos
Case, stated in the decision that the psychological
incapacity of respondent to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage can be characterized by
(a) gravity because the subject cannot carry out the
normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family
shouldered by any average couple existing under ordinary
circumstances of life
and work; (b) antecedence, because the root cause of
the trouble can be traced to the history of the subject
before marriage although its overt manifestations appear
over after the wedding; and (c) incurability, if treatments
required exceed the ordinary means or subject, or involve
time and expense beyond the reach of the subject – are
all obtaining in this case.
ISSUE:
Whether there is basis to nullify the respondent’s marriage
to Juvy on the ground that at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological
incapacity that prevented her from complying with her
essential marital obligations.
HELD:
None. The Supreme Court held that the totality of Nestor’s
evidence – his testimonies and the psychologist, and the
psychological report and evaluation – insufficient to prove
Juvy’s psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code.
RATIO:
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.
The defect should refer to “no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage.” It must be confined to “the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. [Louel Santos vs. CA]
It is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert opinion in
a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality
of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists
and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can
be duly established. [Brenda Marcos vs. Marcos]
38 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
Instead of serving as a guideline, Molina Doctrine
unintentionally became a straightjacket; it forced all
cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be
bound by it. [Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te] In Ting vs. Velez-Ting, far
from abandoning Molina, the Ngo Te case simply
suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements; the
Ngo Te case merely stands for a more flexible approach in
considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages
based on psychological incapacity.
In the present case, the psychologist did not even identify
the types of psychological tests which she administered on
Nestor and the root cause of Juvy’s psychological
condition. There was no showing that any mental disorder
existed at the inception of the marriage. The report failed
to prove the gravity or severity of Juvy’s alleged condition,
specifically, why and to what extent the disorder is serious,
and how it incapacitated her to comply with her marital
duties; the report did not even categorically state the
particular type of personality disorder found. The report
failed to establish the incurability of Juvy’s condition. The
report’s pronouncements that Juvy “lacks the initiative to
change” and that her mental incapacity “appears
incorrigible” are insufficient to prove that her mental
condition could not be treated, or if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond her means to undertake.
Petition was granted. Galang’s petition for the declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Juvy Salazar under Article 36 of
the Family Code was dismissed.
particular type of personality disorder found. The report
failed to establish the incurability of Juvy’s condition. The
report’s pronouncements that Juvy “lacks the initiative to
change” and that her mental incapacity “appears
incorrigible” are insufficient to prove that her mental
condition could not be treated, or if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond her means to undertake.
Petition was granted. Galang’s petition for the declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Juvy Salazar under Article 36 of
the Family Code was dismissed.
3. Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner vs. Cesar
Encelan, Respondent
G.R. No. 170022; January 09, 2013
DOCTRINE: To constitute psychological incapacity, it must
be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are
manifestations of a disordered personality that actually
prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential
marital obligations.
Facts: Cesar Married Lolita, and they had two children. To
support the family, Cesar went abroad and worked as an
OFW in Saudi Arabia. After two years of working abroad,
Cesar learned that Lolita is having an illicit affair with Alvin
Perez, and thereafter, left the conjugal dwelling together
with the two children. But even with such circumstances,
Cesar never failed to send financial support for the family.
On June 1995, Cesar filed a petition against Lolita for the
declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s
psychological incapacity. Cesar, during a hearing even
presented a psychological evaluation report on Lolita with
the finding that “Lolita was not suffering from any form of
psychiatric illness, but had been unable to provide the
expectations expected of her for a good and lasting
marital relationship.... and her transferring from one job to
another depicts some interpersonal problem with co-
workers as well as her impatience in attaining her
ambitions .... and her refusal to go with her husband
abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good marital
and family relationship...” Cesar found ally in RTC as it
gave him a favourable decision which declared his
marriage to Lolita null and void. The court of Appeals also
affirmed the decision of RTC, and thereafter, the case was
elevated to the Supreme Court, thus, this case.
Issue: Whether or not psychological incapacity is
indeed present in the person of Lolita as to nullify a valid
marriage.
Ruling: No. Article 36 of the Family Code governs
psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of
nullity of marriage. It provides that “[a] marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.” In interpreting this
provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological
incapacity contemplates “downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations”; not merely the refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical
antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the
celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the
condition of the errant spouse.
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the
conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply
grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological
incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and
abandonment are manifestations of a disordered
personality that completely prevented the erring spouse
from discharging the essential marital obligations.
Aside from the time element involved, a wife’s
psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be
equated with her professional/work relationship;
workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart
from their marital counterparts. While both spring from
human relationship, their relatedness and relevance to
one another should be fully established for them to be
compared or to serve as measures of comparison with one
another.
Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social
institution protected by the State. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of its existence its existence and
continuation and against its dissolution and nullity. It
cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties nor by
transgressions made by one party to the other during the
marriage.
Marriage is an inviolable social institution protected by the
State and any doubt should be resolved in favour of its
existence and continuation against its dissolution and
nullity. In this case, sexual infidelity and abandonment of
the conjugal dwelling do not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for
legal separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it
must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment
are manifestations of a disordered personality that
actually prevented the erring spouse from discharging the
essential marital obligations, which the court found not
present in the person of Lolita.
4. CAMACHO- REYES V. REYES
G.R. No. 185286, [August 18, 2010]
FACTS:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent
Ramon Reyes at the University of the Philippines (UP),
39 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years
old. The casual acquaintanceship quickly developed into
a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship.
At that time, respondent held a job in the family business,
the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioner’s good impression of
the respondent was not diminished by the latter’s habit of
cutting classes, not even by her discovery that respondent
was taking marijuana.
Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies,
obtaining a degree in AB Sociology from the UP. By 1974,
respondent had dropped out of school on his third year,
and just continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant.
In 1976, the year following petitioner’s graduation and her
father’s death, petitioner and respondent got married. At
that time, petitioner was already five (5) months pregnant
and employed at the Population Center
Foundation. Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the
respondent’s family in Mandaluyong City. All
livingexpenses were shouldered by respondent’s parents,
and the couple’s respective salaries were spent solely for
their personal needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner
a monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary. When
their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial
difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed expenses. A
year into their marriage, the monthly allowance of
P1,500.00 from respondent stopped. Further, respondent
no longer handed his salary to petitioner. When petitioner
mustered enough courage to ask the respondent about
this, the latter told her that he had resigned due to slow
advancement within the family business. Respondent’s
game plan was to venture into trading seafood in the
province, supplying hotels and restaurants, including
the Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new business took
respondent away from his young family for days on
end without any communication. Petitioner simply
endured the set up, hoping that the situation will
change. To prod respondent into assuming more
responsibility, petitioner suggested that
they live separately from her in-laws. However, the new
living arrangement engendered further financial difficulty.
While petitioner struggled to make ends meet as the
single-income earner of the household, respondent’s
business floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at
business, a fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful.
Respondent gave money to petitioner sporadically.
Compounding the family’s financial woes and further
straining the parties’ relationship was the indifferent
attitude of respondent towards his family. That his business
took him away from his family did not seem to bother
respondent; he did not exert any effort to remain in touch
with them while he was away in Mindoro.
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred
residence and, this time, moved in with petitioner’s
mother. But the new set up did not end their marital
difficulties. In fact, the parties became more estranged.
Petitioner continued to carry the burden of supporting a
family not just financially, but in most aspects as well.
In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a
miscarriage, gave birth to their third son. At that time,
respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on
the health of either the petitioner or the newborn. A week
later, respondent arrivedin Manila, acting
nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with nary
an attempt to find out how the hospital bills were settled.
In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondent’s fishpond
business stopped operations. Although without any means
to support his family, respondent refused to go back to
work for the family business. Not surprisingly, the
relationship of the parties deteriorated.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent
was having an extra-marital affair. Petitioner soon realized
that respondent was not only unable to provide financially
for their family, but he was, more importantly, remiss in his
obligation to remain faithful to her and their family.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties’
marriage was a surgical operation on petitioner for the
removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be
operated on, respondent remained unconcerned and
unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played
dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her
as she was wheeled into the operating room. After the
operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of
respondent’s lack of concern, and asked her mother to
order respondent to leave the recovery room.
Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and his spouse,
Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter group,
invited and sponsored the parties to join the group. The
elder couple scheduled counseling sessions with
petitioner and respondent, but these did not improve the
parties’ relationship as respondent remained
uncooperative.
In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A.
Dayan for a psychological assessment to “determine
benchmarks of current psychological functioning.” As with
all other attempts to help him, respondent resisted and did
not continue with the clinical psychologist’s
recommendation to undergo psychotherapy. At about
this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondent’s
siblings, told respondent to move out of their house.
Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner. With
the de facto separation, the relationship still did not
improve. Neither did respondent’s relationship with his
children.
Finally, in 2001,5 petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition
for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with the
respondent, alleging the latter’s psychological incapacity
to fulfill the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner’s
allegations that he was psychologically
incapacitated. After trial (where the testimonies of two
clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella Magno,
and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were presented in
evidence), the RTC granted the petition and declared
the marriage between the parties null and void on the
ground of their psychological incapacity. The CA
reversed. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether the respondent was suffering from psychological
incapacity. –YES.
Whether the marriage should be declared null and void
under Art. 36. –YES.
HELD:
Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the
determination of psychological incapacity in conjunction
to the totality of the evidence presented, with emphasis
on the pervasive pattern of behaviors of the respondent
and outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is] of expert
40 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on
the psychological condition of the respondent, the Court
finds that the marriage between the parties from its
inception has a congenital infirmity termed “psychological
incapacity” which pertains to the inability of the parties to
effectively function emotionally, intellectually and socially
towards each other in relation to their essential duties to
mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to
mutually render help and support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In
short, there was already a fixed niche in the psychological
constellation of respondent which created the death of his
marriage. There is no reason to entertain any slightest
doubt on the truthfulness of the personality disorder of the
respondent.
The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were
unanimous in their findings that respondent is suffering from
personality disorder which psychologically incapacitated
him to fulfill his basic duties to the marriage.
This psychological incapacity of the respondent, in the
uniform words of said three (3) expert witnesses, is serious,
incurable and exists before his marriage and renders him
a helpless victim of his structural constellation. It is beyond
the respondent’s impulse control. In short, he is weaponless
or powerless to restrain himself from his consistent
behaviors simply because he did not consider the same as
wrongful. This is clearly manifested from his assertion that
nothing was wrong in his marriage with the petitioner and
considered their relationship as a normal one. In fact, with
this belief, he lent deaf ears to counseling and efforts
extended to them by his original family members to save
his marriage. In short, he was blind and too insensitive to
the reality of his marital atmosphere. He totally
disregarded the feelings of petitioner who appeared to
have been saturated already that she finally revealed her
misfortunes to her sister-in-law and willingly submitted to
counseling to save their marriage. However, the hard
position of the respondent finally constrained her to ask
respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling. Even the
siblings of the respondent were unanimous that separation
is the remedy to the seriously ailing marriage of the parties.
Respondent confirmed this stand of his siblings. As
previously adverted to, the three experts were one in
diagnosing respondent with a personality disorder, to wit:
1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas
Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of
the examiner, that [petitioner] manifested inadequacies
along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive
to the emotional needs of her husband, who needed a
great amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage. [Respondent], on the other hand, has
manifested strong clinical evidences (sic), that he is
suffering from a Personality Disorder, of the antisocial type,
associated with strong sense of Inadequacy along
masculine strivings and narcissistic features that renders
him psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties
and responsibilities of marriage. This is characterized by his
inability to conform to the social norms that ordinarily
govern many aspects of adolescent and adult behavior.
His being a “free spirit” associated with no remorse, no guilt
feelings and no anxiety, is distinctive of this clinical
condition. His prolonged drug intake [marijuana] and
maybe stronger drugs lately, are external factors to boost
his ego.
The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to
his underlying defense mechanisms, or the unconscious
mental processes, that the ego uses to resolve conflicts. His
prolonged and closed attachments to his mother
encouraged cross identification and developed a severe
sense of inadequacy specifically along masculine strivings. Axis III : None
He therefore has to camouflage his weakness, in terms of
authority, assertiveness, unilateral and forceful decision Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental Problems:
making, aloofness and indifference, even if it resulted to
antisocial acts. His narcissistic supplies rendered by his
Severe He seems to be very good at planning and starting
mother was not resolved (sic).
things but is unable to accomplish anything; unable to
give priority to the needs of his family; in social
It existed before marriage, but became manifest only after relationships.
the celebration, due to marital demands and stresses. It is
considered as permanent in nature because it started
Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning – Fair (Emphasis
early in his psychological development, and therefore
supplied)
became so engrained into his personality structures (sic). It
is considered as severe in degree, because it hampered,
interrupted and interfered with his normal functioning 3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno
related to heterosexual adjustments. (emphasis supplied)
Diagnosis for [petitioner]: Axis I Partner Relational Problem
2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan
Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style with Self-
In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt to Defeating features
project a reserved, aloof and detached attitude.
[Respondent] exhibits withdrawal patterns. He has deep Axis III No diagnosis
feelings of inadequacy. Due to a low self-esteem, he tends
to feel inferior and to exclude himself from association with Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord
others. He feels that he is “different” and as a result is prone (spouse’s immaturity, drug abuse, and infidelity)
to anticipate rejections. Because of the discomfort
produced by these feelings, he is apt to avoid personal
and social involvement, which increases his Severity: 4-severe
preoccupation with himself and accentuates his
tendency to withdraw from interpersonal contact. Diagnosis for [respondent]
[Respondent] is also apt to be the less dominant partner.
He feels better when he has to follow than when he has to Axis I Partner Relational Problem
take the lead. A self-contained
Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with marked
person[,] he does not really need to interact with others in narcissistic, aggressive sadistic and dependent features
order to enjoy life and to be able to move on. He has a
small need of companionship and is most comfortable
Axis III No diagnosis
alone. He, too[,] feels uncomfortable in expressing his
more tender feelings for fear of being hurt. Likewise, he
maybe very angry within but he may choose to repress this Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord
feeling. [Respondent’s] strong need for social approval, (successful wife)
which could have stemmed from some deep seated
insecurities makes him submissive and over [compliant]. He Severity: 4 (severe)
tends to make extra effort to please people. Although at
times[, he] already feels victimized and taken advantage [Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality
of, he still tolerates abusive behavior for fear of disorder with marked narcissistic features and aggressive
interpersonal conflicts. Despite his [dis]illusion with people, sadistic and dependent features, is psychologically
he seeks to minimize dangers of indifference and incapacitated to fulfill the essential obligations of
disapproval [of] others. Resentments are suppressed. This is marriage: to love, respect and render support for his
likely to result in anger and frustrations which is likewise apt spouse and children. A personality disorder is not curable
to be repressed. as it is permanent and stable over time.

There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the
moment[,] experiencing considerable tension and
anxiety. He is prone to fits of apprehension and
nervousness. Likewise, he is also entertaining feelings of
hopelessness and is preoccupied with negative thought.
He feels that he is up in the air but with no sound
foundation. He is striving [for] goals which he knows he will
never be able to attain. Feeling discouraged and
distressed, he has difficulty concentrating and focusing on
things which he needs to prioritize. He has many plans but
he can’t accomplish anything because he is unable to see
which path to take. This feeling of hopelessness is further
aggravated by the lack of support from significant others.
Diagnostic Impression
From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is
evidence that the marriage of [petitioner] and
[respondent is] null and void from the very beginning.
(emphasis supplied)
The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, citing The
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
Fourth Edition (DSM IV), instructs us on the general
diagnostic criteria for personality disorders:
A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior
that deviates markedly from the expectations of the
individual’s culture. This pattern is manifested in two (2) or
more of the following areas:

(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting

Axis I : Drug Dependence
self, other people, and events)

Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder

(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and
appropriateness of emotional response)
[Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder]

41 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK

(3) interpersonal functioning
(4) impulse control
B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a
broad range of personal and social situations.
C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant
distress or impairment in social, occupational or other
important areas of functioning.
D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset
can be traced back at least to adolescence or early
adulthood.
E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a
manifestation or a consequence of another mental
disorder.
F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct
physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a drug of abuse,
a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., head
trauma).
Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can
diagnose the psychological make up of a person based
on a number of factors culled from various sources. A
person afflicted with a personality disorder will not
necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case,
considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a
pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent
consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors’ separate
diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence and
cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’
conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of events)
alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point
to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations.
In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of behavior
manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to
perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his:
(1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3)
substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid
money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not
connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal
charges of estafa.
In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in
light of the foregoing disquisition, we find ample basis to
conclude that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the
petitioner.
5. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LAILA TANYAG-SAN JOSE
and MANOLITO SAN JOSE
517 SCRA 123 (2007)
Being jobless and a drug user is not a state or condition or
attitude shown to be a malady or disorder rooted on some
incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition.
FACTS:
42 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
Repondents Manolito San Jose and Laila Tanyag-San Jose
got married. Thereafter Laila gave birth to two children.
Laila, then left Manolito for being jobless and hooked into
gambling and drugs.
Laila then filed a Petition for Declartion of Nullity on the
ground of psychological incapacity before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City.
Dr. Nedy Tayag found that Manolito was psychologically
incapacitated based on the testimony of Laila. Dr.
Tayag further said that he suffers from anti-social
personality disorder because of the following overt
manipulations: the presence of drug, the absence of
remourse, the constant incapacity in terms of maintaining
the marital relationship, the lack of concern to his family,
and his self-centeredness.
The RTC denied Laila‘s petition on the ground that it is not
enough to prove that one failed to perform his
marital duty, it is essential that it must be shown that the
other party is incapable of doing so due to psychological
incapacity not physical illness. Laila appealed to Court
of Appeals (CA). The CA held that Manolito was
psychologically incapacitated hence their marriage is
void ab Initio. The CA concluded that the deficiency of
Manolito was so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Manolito is psychologically incapacitated
HELD:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for nullity of
marriage, has been succinctly expounded in the recent
case of Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris v. Brix Ferraris(Ferraris),
the term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for
the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady
so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of the
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
As the earlier-quoted Report of Dr. Tayag shows, her
conclusion about Manolito‘s psychological incapacity
was based on the information supplied by Laila which she
found to be ―factual.‖ Undoubtedly, the doctor‘s
conclusion is hearsay. It is ―unscientific and unreliable,‖ so
this Court declared in Choa v. Choa where
the assessment of the therein party sought to be declared
psychologically incapacitated was based merely on the
information communicated to the doctor by the therein
respondent-spouse. In this case, Dr. Gauzon had no
personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these
had merely been relayed to him by respondent. The
former was working on pure suppositions and secondhand
information fed to him by one side. Consequently, his
testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.
Parenthetically, Dr. Tayag’s Psychological Report does not
even show that the alleged anti-social
personality disorder of Manolito was already present at
the inception of the marriage or that it is incurable. Neither
does it explain the incapacitating nature of the
alleged disorder nor identify its rootcause. It merely states
that “such disorder is considered to be grave and is
deeply immersed within the system and continues to
influence the individual until the later stage of life.”
Manolito’s alleged psychological incapacity is thus
premised on his being jobless and a drug user, as well as
his inability to support his family and his refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Manolito’s state or condition or attitude has not
been shown, however, to be a malady or disorderrooted
on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological
condition.
ARTICLE 40:
BIGAMY
VINCENT MERCADO, petitioner vs.
MA.CONSUELO TAN, defendant
G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000
FACTS:
The accused, Vincent Mercado was in lawful wedlock with
Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on
April 10, 1976. Despite the prior marriage he got married to
complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991. On
October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed
by complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor
of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the
institution of the present case before this Court against said
accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an
Information dated January 22, 1993. On November 13,
1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was
lodged in the Prosecutor’s Office, accused filed an action
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma
V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated
May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado
and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.
Despite this, the Trial Court charged Vincent with bigamy
since his prior marriage was still subsisting at the time he
had contracted his second marriage. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The
petitioner then filed a case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Is the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage
necessary for remarriage?
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the
assailed decision. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, ‘the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.’ But
here, the final judgment declaring null and void accused’s
previous marriage came not before the celebration of the
second marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy
against accused was already tried in court. And what
constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any person
who shall contract a second subsequent marriage
‘before’ the former marriage has been legally dissolved.
It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void
from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.
As with a voidable marriage, there must be a
judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before
contracting the second marriage.
ARTICLE 41
WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF OF DEATH
1. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
v. GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
G.R. No. 94053. March 17, 1993.
FACTS:
43 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed
before the Regional Trial Court a petition for
the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet
Monica Parker, involving Article 41 of the Family Code. The
petition prayed that respondent’s wife be declared
presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the
marriage be declared null and void.
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition
through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had
been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant
case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not
possess a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead; and second, Nolasco’s attempt to
have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a
cunning attempt to circumvent the law on marriage.
Respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and
that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject,
in a bar in England during one of his ship’s port calls. From
that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived
with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six months until they
returned to respondent’s hometown of San
Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman’s
contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married
Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites
officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San
Jose.
He obtained another employment contract as a seaman
and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique.
Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas,
respondent received a letter from his mother informing him
that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same
letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her
himself whenever his ship docked in England proved
fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his
missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool,
England, the address of the bar where he and Janet
Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed
that he inquired from among friends but they too had no
news of Janet Monica.
The trial court granted Nolasco’s petition hereby declaring
the presumptively death of Janet Monica Parker Nolasco,
without prejudice to her reappearance.
The Republic appealed to the Court
of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in
declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead
because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that
there existed a well founded belief for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision,
holding that respondent had sufficiently established a
basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already
died.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his
wife is already dead.
RULING:
No. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed
to conduct a search for his missing wife with
such diligence as to give rise to a “well-founded belief”
that she is dead. Pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code,
a marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead. In fine,
respondent failed to establish that he had the well-
founded belief required by law that his absent wife
was already dead that would sustain the issuance of
a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead. Thus, the Decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming the trial court’s decision declaring
Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby
reversed and both Decisions are hereby nullified and set
aside.
2. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 159614. December 9, 2005.
FACTS:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the
Regional Trial Courtbfor the declaration of presumptive
death of his wife, Rosalia “Lea” A. Julaton.
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea
were married on January 20, 1995 in Catbalogan, Samar.
He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home
late in the evening and he berated her for being always
out of their house. He told her that if she enjoyed the life of
a single person, it would be better for her to go back to her
parents. Lea did not reply. Alan narrated that, when he
reported for work the following day, Lea was still in the
house, but when he arrived home later in the day, Lea was
nowhere to be found. Alan thought that Lea merely went
to her parents’ house in Bliss, Sto. Niño, Catbalogan,
Samar. However, Lea did not return to their
house anymore.
Alan further testified that, he inquired Lea’s whereabouts
but to no avail.
Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look
for Lea, but his mother asked him to leave after the town
fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home
for the fiesta. Alan agreed. However, Lea did
not show up. Alan then left for Manila on August 27, 1995.
He went to a house in Navotas where Janeth, Lea’s friend,
was staying. When asked where Lea was, Janeth told him
that she had not seen her. He failed to find out Lea’s
whereabouts despite his repeated talks with
Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver.
On his free time, he would look for Lea in the malls but still
to no avail. He returned to Catbalogan in 1997 and again
looked for his wife but failed.
On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to
the local police station. The police authorities issued an
Alarm Notice on July 4, 2001. Alan also reported Lea’s
disappearance to the National Bureau of Investigation on
July 9, 2001.
On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting
the petition.
The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals
which rendered judgment on August 4, 2003, affirming the
decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the declaration of presumptive death of
the wife is valid
RULING:
No. In view of the summary nature of proceedings under
Article 41 of the Family Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of
due diligence set by the Court in locating the
whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied
with. It is the policy of the State to protect and strengthen
the family as a basic social institution. Marriage is the
foundation of the family. Since marriage is an inviolable
social institution that the 1987 Constitution seeks to protect
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. For
44 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
respondent’s failure to prove that he had a well-founded
belief that his wife is already dead and that he exerted the
required amount of diligence in searching for his missing
wife, the petition for declaration of presumptive death
should have been denied by the trial court and the
Honorable Court of Appeals. For the purpose of
contracting the subsequent marriage, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this
Code for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. The spouse present
is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been
absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse
may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not
define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello
Callon writes that “es menester que su creencia sea firme
se funde en motivos racionales.” The Court finds and so
holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a
well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the trial
court, that his spouse Rosalia “Lea” Julaton was already
dead. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and
set aside.
WHEN THERE IS DELIVERY OF PRESUMPTIVE LEGITIMES
1. DIÑO V. DIÑO G.R. No. 178044, [January 19, 2011]
DOCTRINE:
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages
which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the
Family Code, which should be declared void without
waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was
declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not
under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of
properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership.
FACTS:
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L.
Diño(respondent) got married on 14 January 1998 before
Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent,
citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a psychological
report establishing that respondent was suffering
from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was incurable
and deeply ingrained in her system since her early
formative years.
The trial court granted the petition on the ground that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time
of the celebration of the marriage and declared their
marriage void ab initio. It ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued
upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family
Code.
Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of
petitioner, modified its decision holding that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that adecree
of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
HELD:
Yes. The trial court’s decision is affirmed with modification.
Decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued
upon finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting for
the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
RATIO:
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void
marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of
the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties
who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the
case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following
elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to
marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or
their marriage is void.
All these elements are present in this case and there is no
question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the
property relations between petitioner and respondent.
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis
because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases
governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.
Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision
granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be
issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule
on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section
19(1) of the Rule appliesonly to marriages which are
declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment
under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article
50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which
are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family
Code, which should be declared void without waiting for
the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages
are governed either by absolute community of property
or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree to
a complete separation of property in a marriage
settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the
property relations of the parties is governed by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains,
there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the
properties before a decree of annulment could be issued.
That is not the case for annulment of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is
governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was
declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not
under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of
properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the
45 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void
marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The
rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the
spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil
Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the
Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x.” It is
not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in
the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
2. YU V. JUDGE REYES-CARPIO AND YU
G.R. No. 189207, [June 15, 2011]
DOCTRINE:
It is more proper to rule first on the declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of each party’s psychological
incapacity to perform their respective marital obligations.
If the Court eventually finds that the parties’ respective
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is indeed
meritorious on the basis of either or both of the parties’
psychological incapacity, then the parties
shall proceed to comply with Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code before a final decree of absolute nullity of
marriage can be issued. Pending such ruling on
the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage, the
Court finds no legal ground, at this stage, to proceed with
the reception of evidence in regard the issues on custody
and property relations, since these are mere incidents of
the nullity of the parties’ marriage.
FACTS:
Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
against Caroline T. Yu with the RTC of Pasig. Judge Suarez
on May 30, 2006 issued an order stating that Eric’s partial
offer of evidence dated April 18, 2006 would be submitted
for resolution after certain exhibits have been remarked.
But the exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity
of the marriage of Eric and Caroline. On September 12,
2006, Caroline moved to submit the case for resolution,
considering that the incidents on custody, support, and
property relations (incidental issues) were mere
consequences of the declaration of nullity of the parties’
marriage.
Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident
on declaration of nullity cannot be resolved without
presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody,
support, and property relations. Eric added that the
incidental issues and the issue on declaration of nullity
can both proceed and be simultaneously resolved. RTC
ruled in favour of Eric’s opposition.
Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that the
case was re-raffled to another branch presided by Judge
Reyes-Carpio. While the case was being tried by Judge
Reyes-Carpio, Caroline filed an Omnibus Motion seeking
the strict observation by the said judge of the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage as
codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, and that the case on
the declaration on nullity be already submitted for
resolution ahead of the incidental issues, and not
simultaneously. Eric opposed this motion.
Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying
that the main cause of action is the declaration of nullity
of the marriage and the incidental issues are
merely ancillary incidents thereto. Eric moved for
reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Reyes-
Carpio. Eric then filed for certiorari with the CA under Rule
65. CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUES/HELD:
Whether the main issue of nullity of marriage must be
submitted for resolution first before the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations
(incidental issues) – NO.
RATIO:
It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or
what are alleged to have been exercised with grave
abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders. An
interlocutory order is one which “does not finally dispose of
the case, and does not end the Court’s task of
adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining
their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but
obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by
the Court. Eric Yu to prove that the assailed orders were
issued with grave abuse of discretion and that those were
patently erroneous. Considering that the requisites that
would justify certiorari as an appropriate remedy to assail
an interlocutory order have not been complied with, the
proper recourse for petitioner should have been an
appeal in due course of the judgment of the trial court on
the merits, incorporating the grounds for assailing the
interlocutory orders.
It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow
the presentation of evidence on the incidents on custody,
support, and property relations. It is clear in the assailed
orders that the trial court judge merely deferred the
reception of evidence relating to custody, support, and
property relations. And the trial judge’s decision was not
without basis. Judge Reyes-Carpio finds support in the
Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Particularly, Secs.
19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations after
the trial court renders a decision granting the petition, or
upon entry of judgment granting the petition:
Section 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision
granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be
issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule
on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody,
support of common children and delivery of their
presumptive legitimes. – Upon entry of the judgment
granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt
of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting
the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party,
shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, including
custody, support of common children and delivery of their
presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings.
Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception
of evidence on custody, support, and property relations
but merely deferred it, based on the existing rules issued by
this Court, to a time when a decision granting the petition
is already at hand and before a final decree is issued.
Conversely, the trial court, or more particularly the family
court, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and
distribution, custody, support of common children, and
46 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
delivery of their presumptive legitimes upon entry of
judgment granting the petition. And following the
pertinent provisions of the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly consistent with
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code, contrary to what
petitioner asserts. Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family
Code state:
Article 50. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for
the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes,
unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous
judicial proceedings.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive
legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date
of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in
cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by
mutual agreement judicially approved, had already
provided for such matters.
Also, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of
the reception of evidence on custody, support, and
property relations. Conversely, the trial court may receive
evidence on the subject incidents after a judgment
granting the petition but before the decree of nullity or
annulment of marriage is issued. And this is what Judge
Reyes-Carpio sought to comply with in issuing the assailed
orders. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Eric Yu’s
assertion that ruling the main issue without receiving
evidence on the subject incidents would result in
an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment is certainly
speculative and, hence, contravenes the legal
presumption that a trial judge can fairly weigh
and appraise the evidence submitted by the parties.
Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio
acted in a capricious and whimsical manner, much less in
a way that is patently gross and erroneous, when she
issued the assailed orders deferring the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations. To
reiterate, this decision is left to the trial court’s wisdom and
legal soundness. Consequently, therefore, the CA cannot
likewise be said to have committed grave abuse of
discretion in upholding the Orders of Judge Reyes-Carpio
and in ultimately finding an absence of grave abuse of
discretion on her part.
ARTICLE 41
1. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. ROBERT P.
NARCEDA, respondent G.R. No. 182760 April 10, 2013
FACTS:
Robert and Marina Narceda contracted marriage on July
22, 1987. Marina went to Singapore in 1994 and never
returned. Robert tried to look for her but he could not find
her. Several years later, Robert was informed by a town
mate in La Union who came home from Singapore that his
wife was already living with a Singaporean husband.
In view of his wife’s absence and his desire to remarry,
Robert filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition
for a declaration of presumptive death and/or absence of
Marina.
The court then granted the petition in 2005. Petitioner
appealed and claimed that the respondent failed to
conduct a search for his missing wife with diligence
required by law and enough to give rise to a well-founded
belief that his wife was dead. The Court of Appeals (CA)
dismissed the appeal on the ground that the judgment of
the RTC in the summary proceeding is immediately final
and executory. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
petition.
HELD:
No. By express provision of the law, the judgment of the
court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final
and executory. It follows that no appeal can be approved
from trial court’s judgment in a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse
under Article 41 of the Family Code.
However, an aggrieved party may file a petition for
certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the
Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of
Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the
RTC’s and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such
concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom
of choice of court forum.
From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party
may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is
because the errors which the court may commit in the
exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which
are the proper subject of an appeal.
2. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES , vs. JOSE B. SAREÑOGON,
JR. G.R. No. 199194 February 10, 2016
DOCTRINE:
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded
belief." It depends upon the circumstances of each
particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on
a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this
requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and
inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It
requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).
FACTS:
On November 4, 2008, respondent Jose B. Sareñogon, Jr.
(Jose) filed a Petition before the RTC of Ozamiz City for the
declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Netchie
S. Sareñogon (Netchie).
The RTC set the Petition for initial hearing on April 16, 2009.
It likewise directed the publication of said Order in a
newspaper of general circulation in the cities of Tangub,
Ozamiz and Oroquieta, all in the province of Misamis
Occidental. Nobody opposed the Petition. Trial then
followed.
Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis
Occidental in 1991. They later became sweethearts and
on August 10, 1996, they got married in civil rites at the
Manila City Hall. However, they lived together as husband
and wife for a month only because he left to work as a
seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic
47 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
helper. For three months, he did not receive any
communication from Netchie. He likewise had no idea
about her whereabouts. While still abroad, he tried to
contact Netchie’s parents, but failed, as the latter had
allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental. He returned
home after his contract expired. He then inquired from
Netchie’s relatives and friends about her whereabouts, but
they also did not know where she was. Because of these,
he had to presume that his wife Netchie was already
dead. He filed the Petition before the RTC so he could
contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the
Family Code.
Jose’s testimony was corroborated by his older brother
Joel Sareñogon, and by Netchie’s aunt, Consuelo Sande.
These two witnesses testified that Jose and Netchie lived
together as husband and wife only for one month prior to
their leaving the Philippines for separate destinations
abroad. These two added that they had no information
regarding Netchie’s location.
The RTC held that Jose had established by preponderance
of evidence that he is entitled to the relief prayed for under
Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC found that Netchie
had disappeared for more than four years, reason enough
for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed already
dead. On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition. Hence,
this action.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC properly granted Jose’s Petition
RULING:
NO.
In Republic v. Cantor, the Court has held that:
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be
obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse
had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was
already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there
are four essential requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the
Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that
the absentee is dead; and,
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
With respect to the third element (which seems to be the
element that in this case invites extended discussion), the
holding is that the – mere absence of the spouse (even for
such period required by the law), or lack of news that such
absentee is still alive, failure to communicate [by the
absentee spouse or invocation of the] general
presumption on absence under the Civil Code [would] not
suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise that
Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present
spouse the burden of proving the additional and more
stringent requirement of "well-founded belief" which can
only be discharged upon a due showing of proper and
honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not
only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more
importantly, that the absent spouse is [either] still alive or is
already dead.
In the case at bar, the RTC ruled that Jose has "well-
founded belief" that Netchie was already dead upon the
following grounds:
(1) Jose allegedly tried to contact Netchie’s parents while
he was still out of the country, but did not reach them as
they had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental;
(2) Jose believed/presumed that Netchie was already
dead because when he returned home, he was not able
to obtain any information that Netchie was still alive from
Netchie’s relatives and friends;
(3) Jose’s testimony to the effect that Netchie is no longer
alive, hence must be presumed dead, was corroborated
by Jose’s older brother, and by Netchie’s aunt, both of
whom testified that he (Jose) and Netchie lived together
as husband and wife only for one month and that after
this, there had been no information as to Netchie’s
whereabouts.
The application of this stricter standard becomes even
more imperative if we consider the State’s policy to
protect and strengthen the institution of marriage. Since
marriage serves as the family’s foundation and since it is
the state’s policy to protect and strengthen the family as
a basic social institution, marriage should not be permitted
to be dissolved at the whim of the parties.
x x x [I]t has not escaped this Court’s attention that the
strict standard required in petitions for declaration of
presumptive death has not been fully observed by the
lower courts. We need only to cite the instances when this
Court, on review, has consistently ruled on the sanctity of
marriage and reiterated that anything less than the use of
the strict standard necessitates a denial. To rectify this
situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of
the strict standard this Court requires in cases under Article
41 of the Family Code."
Given the Court’s imposition of "strict standard" in a
petition for a declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41 of the Family Code, it must follow that there was
no basis at all for the RTC’s finding that Jose’s Petition
complied with the requisites of Article 41 of the Family
Code, in reference to the "well-founded belief" standard.
If anything, Jose’s pathetically anemic efforts to locate the
missing Netchie are notches below the required degree of
stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside
from his bare claims that he had inquired from alleged
friends and relatives as to Netchie’s whereabouts, Jose did
not call to the witness stand specific individuals or persons
whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search
or quest for the allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he
prove that he sought the assistance of the pertinent
government agencies as well as the media. Nor did he
show that he undertook a thorough, determined and
unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years
(and what those years were), and naming the particular
places, provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that
he visited, or went to, and identifying the specific persons
he interviewed or talked to in the course of his search.
3. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. NILDA B.
TAMPUS, Respondent. G.R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
48 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
FACTS:
Respondent was married to Dante L. Del Mundo on
November 29, 1975 in Cordova, Cebu. The marriage
ceremony was solemnized by Municipal Judge Julian B.
Pogoy of Cordova, Cebu.5 Three days thereafter, or on
December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), left respondent, and went to Jolo,
Sulu where he was assigned. The couple had no children.
Since then, respondent heard no news from Dante. She
tried everything to locate him, but her efforts proved
futile. Thus, on April 14, 2009, she filed before the RTC a
petition8 to declare Dante as presumptively dead for the
purpose of remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of
thirty-three (33) years without any kind of communication
from him, she firmly believes that he is already dead. Due
to the absence of any oppositor, respondent was allowed
to present her evidence ex parte. She testified on the
allegations in her petition, affirming that she exerted efforts
to find Dante by inquiring from his parents, relatives, and
neighbors, who, unfortunately, were also not aware of his
whereabouts. She averred that she intends to remarry and
move on with her life.10
The RTC granted the petition and declared Dante as
presumptively dead for all legal purposes, without
prejudice to the effect of his reappearance. The CA
affirmed the RTC Decision declaring Dante as
presumptively dead. The CA gave credence to the RTC's
findings that respondent had exerted efforts to find her
husband by inquiring from his parents, relatives, and
neighbors, who likewise had no knowledge of his
whereabouts. Further, the lapse of thirty-three (33) years,
coupled with the fact that Dante had been sent on a
combat mission to Jolo, Sulu, gave rise to respondent's
well-founded belief that her husband is already dead.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in upholding the RTC Decision
declaring Dante as presumptively dead.
RULING: YES
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be
obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse
had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was
already dead.
Under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Family Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death:
(a) that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4)
consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the
Civil Code;
(b) that the present spouse wishes to remarry;
(c) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that
the absentee is dead; and
(d) that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show
that all the foregoing requisites under Article 41 of the
Family Code exist.
The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires
the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the
result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the
absent spouse and that based on these efforts and
inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances,
the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion
of active effort, not a passive one. As such, the mere
absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed under
the law, lack of any news that such absentee spouse is still
alive, failure to communicate, or general presumption of
absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.22 The
premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon
the present spouse the burden of complying with the
stringent requirement of "well-founded belief which can
only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-
to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the
absent spouse's whereabouts, but more importantly,
whether the latter is still alive or is already dead.
In this case, respondent testified that after Dante's
disappearance, she tried to locate him by making inquiries
with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his
whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not know
where to find him. Other than making said inquiries,
however, she made no further efforts to find her husband.
She could have called or proceeded to the AFP
headquarters to request information about her husband,
but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of the
authorities or the AFP itself in finding him. Considering her
own pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP on a
combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his
disappearance, she could have inquired from the AFP on
the status of the said mission, or from the members of the
AFP who were assigned thereto. To the Court's mind,
therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing
husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find him by
asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy
the strict standard and degree of diligence required to
create a "well-founded belief of his death. Furthermore,
Nilda did not present Dante's family, relatives, or neighbors
as witnesses who could have corroborated her
asseverations that she earnestly looked for Dante. These
resource persons were not even named.
Finally, other than respondent's bare testimony, no other
corroborative evidence had been offered to support her
allegation that she exerted efforts to find him but was
unsuccessful. What appears from the facts as established
in this case was that respondnet simply allowed the
passage of time without actively and diligently searching
for her husband, which the Court cannot accept as
constituting a "well-founded belief that her husband is
dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-
founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends
upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and
extent of the inquiries made by the present spouse.26
Having fallen short of the stringent standard and degree
of due diligence required by jurisprudence to support her
claim of a "well-founded belief that her husband Dante is
already dead, the instant petition must be granted.
4. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner, vs.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent. G.R. No.
165545 March 24, 2006
CARPIO MORALES,J.:
FACTS:
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P.
Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage.6 More than 15 years
later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the then
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sorsogon a petition7 to
declare Alice presumptively dead. CFI granted the
petition. Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared
presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon
contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent).
On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the
49 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
Social Security System (SSS) since 1960 and a retiree
pensioner thereof effective July 1994, died. Respondent
thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits and was
granted.
Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a
daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa) contested
before the SSS the release to respondent of the death and
funeral benefits. She claimed that Bailon contracted three
marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second with
her mother Elisa, and the third with respondent, all of
whom are still alive; she, together with her siblings, paid for
Bailon’s medical and funeral expenses; and all the
documents submitted by respondent to the SSS in support
of her claims are spurious.
Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez (Norma), who
claimed to be daughters of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona
(Elisa), contested before the SSS the release to respondent
of the death and funeral benefits and submitted an
Affidavit averring that they are two of nine children of
Bailon and Elisa who cohabited as husband and wife as
early as 1958; and they were reserving their right to file the
necessary court action to contest the marriage between
Bailon and respondent as they personally know that Alice
is "still very much alive."
Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be the brother and guardian
of "Aliz P. Diaz," filed before the SSS a claim for death
benefits accruing from Bailon’s death, he further attesting
in a sworn statement18 that it was Norma who defrayed
Bailon’s funeral expenses.
Elisa and seven of her children19 subsequently filed claims
for death benefits as Bailon’s beneficiaries before the SSS.20
SSS advised respondent of the cancellation of her monthly
pension for death benefits in view of the opinion rendered
by its legal department that her marriage with Bailon was
void as it was contracted while the latter’s marriage with
Alice was still subsisting. Respondent protested the
cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits.
The SSS, however, maintained the denial of her claim for
and the discontinuance of payment of monthly pension.
Respondent thus filed a petition27 against the SSS before
the SSC for the restoration to her of her entitlement to
monthly pension. Respondent informed the SSS that she
was returning, under protest.
SSC found that the marriage of respondent to Bailon was
void and, therefore, she was "just a common-law-wife."
The CA reversed and set aside Resolution and Order of the
SSC and thus ordered the SSS to pay respondent all the
pension benefits due her. It held that nowhere does the
law contemplates the possibility that respondent SSS may
validly declare the second marriage null and void on the
basis alone of its own investigation and declare that the
decision of the RTC declaring one to be presumptively
dead is without basis. Respondent SSS cannot arrogate
upon itself the authority to review the decision of the
regular courts
ISSUE: 1. WON SSC has jurisdiction to make a finding with
respect to the validity of the marriage of Bailon and
respondent. NO
2. WON the 2nd marriage is valid. YES
3. WON the reappearance of the 1 st wife (ALICE) is
sufficient to terminate the 2nd marriage. NO
RULING: 1.) NO
That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with
respect to SSS coverage, benefits and contributions, there
is no doubt. In so exercising such power, however, it
cannot review, much less reverse, decisions rendered by
courts of law as it did in the case at bar when it declared
that the December 10, 1970 CFI Order was obtained
through fraud and subsequently disregarded the same,
making its own findings with respect to the validity of Bailon
and Alice’s marriage on the one hand and the invalidity
of Bailon and respondent’s marriage on the other.
In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC
virtually acted as an appellate court. The law does not
give the SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with orders of
regular courts in the exercise of its authority to determine
the beneficiaries of the SSS.
2.) The two marriages involved herein having been
solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the
Family Code, the applicable law to determine their validity
is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of
their celebration.42
Article 83 of the Civil Code43 provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person
with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal
and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the
absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he
has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed
dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage
so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
until declared null and void by a competent court.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a
subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the
first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior
marriage is first annulled or dissolved or contracted under
any of the three exceptional circumstances. It bears
noting that the marriage under any of these exceptional
cases is deemed valid "until declared null and void by a
competent court." It follows that the onus probandi in
these cases rests on the party assailing the second
marriage.44
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been
absent for 15 consecutive years45 when Bailon sought the
declaration of her presumptive death, which judicial
declaration was not even a requirement then for purposes
of remarriage.46
Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased)
commented: Where a person has entered into two
successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the
validity of the second marriage, and the burden is on the
party attacking the validity of the second marriage to
prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved; it is
not enough to prove the first marriage, for it must also be
shown that it had not ended when the second marriage
was contracted. The presumption in favor of the
innocence of the defendant from crime or wrong and of
50 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
the legality of his second marriage, will prevail over the
presumption of the continuance of life of the first spouse or
of the continuance of the marital relation with such first
spouse.47 (Underscoring supplied)
3.) Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being
voidable,48 it is terminated by final judgment of annulment
in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears
or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a
subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42 thereof
provides:
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by
the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the
absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the
previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of
reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the
instance of any interested person, with due notice to the
spouses of the subsequent marriage and without
prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially
determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit
provided by the above-quoted provision of the Family
Code does not preclude the filing of an action in court to
prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a
declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent
marriage.49
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate
the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court
action, such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if
made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage,
will not terminate such marriage.50 Since the second
marriage has been contracted because of a presumption
that the former spouse is dead, such presumption
continues inspite of the spouse’s physical reappearance,
and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as
legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is
terminated as provided by law.51
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration
of an affidavit of reappearance or by judicial declaration
but by death of either spouse as in the case at bar,
Tolentino submits: x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent
marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the
effects of dissolution of valid marriages shall arise. The
good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be
raised, because, as in annullable or voidable marriages,
the marriage cannot be questioned except in a direct
action for annulment.52(Underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in
accordance with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s marriage
prior to the former’s death in 1998, respondent is rightfully
the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.
LEGAL SEPARATION
Grounds for legal separation
1. VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner, vs. MA. ELENA
FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 166357 September 19, 2011
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported
by well-established facts. It is the plaintiff’s burden to
convince the court of the existence of these facts.
Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but
it does not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity.
FACTS: Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent
Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) were married and they had
four children. Shortly after the birth of their youngest son,
Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano
(Jocelyn), who bore him three more children. Malyn left
the conjugal home and her four children with Tyrone.
Tyrone went to the USA with Jocelyn and their children. He
left his four children from his marriage with Malyn in a
rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a
driver. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement,
the children stayed with Malyn on weekends.9
Nine years since the de facto separation from his wife,
Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code.12 He alleged that
Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and
comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of
the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that
her psychological incapacity was manifested by her
immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their
children during their co-habitation, as shown by Malyn’s
following acts: she left the children without proper care
and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night;
she left the house to party with male friends and returned
in the early hours of the following day; and she committed
adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered in
flagrante delicto.13
Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr.
Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard
Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyn’s psychological
incapacity. Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the
factual allegations regarding Malyn’s behavior – her
sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her
frequent nights-out with friends – may reflect a narcissistic
personality disorder (NPD).17 NPD is present when a person
is obsessed to meet her wants and needs in utter disregard
of her significant others.18 Malyn’s NPD is manifest in
her utter neglect of her duties as a mother.19 Dr. Gates
reported that Malyn’s personality disorder "may have
been evident even prior to her marriage" because it is
rooted in her family background and upbringing, which
the psychologist gathered to be materially deprived and
without a proper maternal role model.20
Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by her
interviews with Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrone’s sister-in-
law), and the son Miggy. She also read the transcript of
Tyrone’s court testimony.21 Fr. Healy corroborated Dr.
Gates’ assessment. He concluded that Malyn was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital
duties.22 He explained that her psychological incapacity is
rooted in her role as the breadwinner of her family. This role
allegedly inflated Malyn’s ego to the point that her needs
became priority, while her kids’ and husband’s needs
became secondary. Malyn is so self-absorbed that she is
incapable of prioritizing her family’s needs. Fr. Healy
clarified that playing mahjong and spending time with
friends are not disorders by themselves. They only
constitute psychological incapacity whenever inordinate
amounts of time are spent on these activities to the
detriment of one’s familial duties.23 Fr. Healy characterized
51 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
Malyn’s psychological incapacity as grave and
incurable.24 He based his opinion on his interview with
Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as well as the report of Dr.
Natividad Dayan (Dr. Dayan), Malyn’s expert witness.25 He
clarified that he did not verify the truthfulness of the factual
allegations regarding Malyn’s "habits" because he
believed it is the court’s duty to do so.26 Instead, he formed
his opinion on the assumption that the factual allegations
are indeed true.
The RTC concluded that both parties are psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code. The trial court then declared the
parties’ marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code.55
The CA reversed the trial court’s ruling. Both parties’
allegations and incriminations against each other do not
support a finding of psychological incapacity. The parties’
faults tend only to picture their immaturity and
irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial
obligations. At most, there may be sufficient grounds for a
legal separation.
ISSUE: WON petitioner has sufficiently proved that
respondent suffers from psychological incapacity
RULIING: NO.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed
by Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations.72 The burden of proving psychological
incapacity is on the plaintiff.73 The plaintiff must prove that
the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or
behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that
completely disables him or her from understanding and
discharging the essential obligations of the marital state.
The psychological problem must be grave, must have
existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.74
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife
(respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He
presented the testimonies of two supposed expert
witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of
these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or
behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently
proven. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s
allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions,
visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery,
and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined
that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed
constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time
devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a
psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or
underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were
not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented
contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the
petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent
constantly played mahjong and neglected their children
as a result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it
was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so
frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and
a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that
she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was
only two to three times a week and always with the
permission of her husband and without abandoning her
children at home. The children corroborated this, saying
that they were with their mother when she played
mahjong in their relative’s home. Petitioner did not present
any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong
sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her
family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated
the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to
respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least that could have
been done was to prove the frequency of respondent’s
mahjong-playing during the years when these two
children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus,
while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong,
its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on
the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s
alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with
friends, and obsessive need for attention from other men.
No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to
beauty salons or her frequent partying with friends.
Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of
respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove that
respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only
testified that respondent appeared to be dating other
men. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was able to
prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with
another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot,
by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention
from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal
separation, but it does not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent
actually engaged in the behaviors described as
constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that
she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed,
the totality of the evidence points to the opposite
conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that
respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of
appreciating and performing her marital and parental
duties. Not once did the children state that they were
neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated
that she took care of them, was around when they were
sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that
respondent made real efforts to see and take care of her
children despite her estrangement from their father. There
was no testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment
and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the
fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the
second elementary level despite having tutors, there is
nothing to link their academic shortcomings to Malyn’s
actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds
no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological
incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and,
perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from
dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to
their children. There may be grounds for legal separation,
but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a
marriage.
2. G.R. No. 153206 October 23, 2006
52 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, petitioner, vs. LUCITA
G. ONG, respondent.
FACTS:
William Ong and Lucita Ong have been married for more
than 20 years when Lucita filed a complaint for Legal
separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code.
Lucita alleged that since their third year of marriage, her
husband William subjected her to physical violence
like slapping, kicking and pulling her hair and bang her
head against the concrete wall.and been violent towards
their three children. He would scold them using his belt
buckle to beat them. One day after a violent quarrel
wherein William hit Lucita on several different parts of her
body, pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the
house which she did.
Lucita’s statements about William’s abusive behavior were
corroborated by her sister Linda Lim. Dr. Vicente Elinzan
whom Lucita consulted the day after she left her conjugal
home also testified about her injuries.
The trial court granted Lucitas petition for legal separation
which the CA affirmed.
William then filed this petition for review on certiorari
-On the decision denying all of Lucita’s allegations and
that he never inflicted physical harm on her or their
children.
-He also argued that the real motive of Lucita and
her family in filing the complaint is to deprive him of his
control and ownership over his conjugal properties with
Lucita.
-That the CA overlooked some facts of the case which
warrant an exception to the general rule that questions of
fact cannot be the subject for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
-The CA erred in relying on the testimonies of Lucita her
sister and their parents’ doctor Dr. ElinZano since their
testimonies are tainted with relationship and fraud
and since Lucita abandoned the family home she has also
given a ground for legal separation and therefore should
NOT- be granted one pursuant to Art. 56 par. 4 of The
family code – Where both parties have given ground for
legal separation
ISSUE: WON Lucita Ong should be granted a decree on
legal separation
HELD: The claim that the real motive of Lucita in filing the
case is for her family to take control of the
conjugal properties is absurd. Lucita left because of her
husband’s repeated physical violence and grossly abusive
conduct. That the physical violence and grossly abusive
conduct were brought to bear upon Lucita have been
duly established. He can derive no personal gain from
pushing for the financial interests of her family at the
expense of her marriage of 20 years and
the companionship of her husband and children.
The assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of
witnesses is given great respect. Relationship alone is
not enough to discredit and label a witness’ testimony as
biased and unworthy of credence. Witnesses Linda Lim
and Dr. Elinzano gave detailed and straightforward
testimonies the court finds that their testimonies are not
tainted with bias.
The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is
abandonment without justifiable cause for more than
one year. Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct,
such does not constitute abandonment contemplated in
the said provision.
PETITION DENIED: Lucita should be granted a decree
of legal separation.
Defenses in actions for legal separation
1. G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute
MACARIO LAPUZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. EUFEMIO S.
EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee.
FACTS:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation
against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953. They were
married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically
after nine days. They had lived together as husband and
wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her
husband abandoned her. They acquired properties
during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her
husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go
Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a
decree of legal separation, which among others, would
order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of
his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and
subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the
parties adduced their respective evidence. However,
before the trial could be completed, respondent already
scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died
in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly
notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss
the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the
grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-
year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and
that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal
separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the
deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
ISSUE:
Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in
an action for legal separation, abate the action and will it
also apply if the action involved property rights.
HELD:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of
the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These
rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their
source being the decree itself; without the decree such
rights do not come into existence, so that before the
finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of
the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death
producing a more radical and definitive separation; and
the expected consequential rights and claims would
necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot
and academic and there could be no further interest in
continuing the same after her demise that automatically
dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights
acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and
determined in a proper action for partition by either the
appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
2. G.R. No. L-11766 October 25, 1960
SOCORRO MATUBIS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ZOILO
PRAXEDES, defendant-appellee.
53 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
Facts: In 1943, Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes were
legally married. In 1948, they entered into a contract
wherein they agreed that they shall live separately and
that they should not prosecute each other for adultery or
concubinage or any other crime or suit arising from their
separation. In January 1955, Zoilo began cohabiting with
Asuncion, who later gave birth to their child. In April 1956,
Socorro filed a complaint for legal Separation on the
ground of abandonment and concubinage against Zoilo.
The lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription and condonation/consent.
ISSUE:
1.) Did the action prescribe?
2.) Did Socorro consented to the commission of
concubinage by her husband?
RULING:
1.) Yes. Under Art. 102 of the Code Code, an action for
legal separation cannot be filed except within one year
from and after the date on which the plaintiff became
cognizant of the cause and within five years from after the
date when cause occurred (now 5 years under Art. 57,
FC). The complaint was filed outside the periods provided
for by the above Article. By the very admission of plaintiff,
she came to know the ground (concubinage) for the legal
separation in January, 1955. She instituted the complaint
only on April 24, 1956.
2.) Yes. The very wording of the agreement gives no room
for interpretation other than that given by the trial judge.
Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are
necessarily the import of paragraph 6(b) of the
agreement. The condonation and consent here are not
only implied but expressed. The law specifically provides
that legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Having condoned and/or consented in
writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's
sympathy.
(1) Condonation
G.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956
BENJAMIN BUGAYONG, plaintiff-appellant, vs. LEONILA
GINEZ, defendant-appellee
FACTS:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States
Navy, was married to defendant Leonila Ginez on August
27, 1949, at Asingan, Pangasinan, while on furlough leave.
Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived with
their sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. After
some time, or about July, 1951, Leonila Ginez left the
dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed her husband by
letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in
Asingan, Pangasinan, from which place she later moved
to Dagupan City to study in a local college there.
As early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began
receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco (plaintiff's sister-
in-law) and some from anonymous writers(which were not
produced at the hearing) informing him of alleged acts of
infidelity of his wife which he did not even care to mention.
On cross-examination, plaintiff admitted that his wife also
informed him by letter, which she claims to have
destroyed, that a certain "Eliong" kissed her. All these
communications prompted him in October, 1951 to seek
the advice of the Navy Chaplain as to the propriety of a
legal separation between him and his wife on account of
the latter's alleged acts of infidelity, and he was directed
to consult instead the navy legal department.
In August, 1952, plaintiff went to Asingan, Pangasinan, and
sought for his wife whom he met in the house of one Mrs.
Malalang, defendant's godmother. She came along with
him and both proceeded to the house of Pedro
Bugayong, a cousin of the plaintiff-husband, where they
stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and
wife. Then they repaired to the plaintiff's house and again
passed the night therein as husband and wife. On the
second day, Benjamin Bugayong tried to verify from his
wife the truth of the information he received that she had
committed adultery but Leonila, instead of answering his
query, merely packed up and left, which he took as a
confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. After
that and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted efforts to
locate her and failing to find her, he went to Bacarra,
Ilocos Norte, "to soothe his wounded feelings".
On November 18, 1952, Benjamin Bugayong filed in the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint for legal
separation against his wife, Leonila Ginez, who timely filed
an answer vehemently denying the averments of the
complaint and setting up affirmative defenses. After the
issues were joined and convinced that a reconciliation
was not possible, the court set the case for hearing on
June 9, 1953. Plaintiff's counsel announced that he was to
present 6 witnesses but after plaintiff-husband finished
testifying in his favor, counsel for the defendant orally
moved for the dismissal of the complaint, but the Court
ordered him to file a written motion to that effect and
gave plaintiff 10 days to answer the same.
The motion to dismiss was predicted on the following
grounds: (1) Assuming arguendo the truth of the
allegations of the commission of "acts of rank infidelity
amounting to adultery", the cause of action, if any, is
barred by the statute of limitations; (2) That under the same
assumption, the act charged have been condoned by the
plaintiff-husband; and (3) That the complaint failed to
state a cause of action sufficient for this court to render a
valid judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether OR NOT there was condonation between
Bugayong and Ginez that may serve as a ground for
dismissal of the action.
RULING
YES.
ART. 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal
separation cannot by either of them. Collusion between
the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the
dismissal of the petition.
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense
constituting a ground for legal separation or, as stated in I
Bouver's Law Dictionary, p. 585, condonation is the
"conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife
of a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed".
A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-
husband, especially those portions quoted above, clearly
shows that there was a condonation on the part of the
husband for the supposed "acts of rank infidelity
54 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
amounting to adultery" committed by defendant-wife.
Admitting for the sake of argument that the infidelities
amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant,
a reconciliation was effected between her and the
plaintiff. The act of the latter in persuading her to come
along with him, and the fact that she went with him and
consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro
Bugayong and together they slept there as husband and
wife for one day and one night, and the further fact that
in the second night they again slept together in their house
likewise as husband and wife — all these facts have no
other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a
reconciliation between them was effected and that there
was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The
reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came
to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.
Although no acts of infidelity might have been committed
by the wife, We agree with the trial judge that the conduct
of the plaintiff-husband above narrated despite his belief
that his wife was unfaithful, deprives him, as alleged the
offended spouse, of any action for legal separation
against the offending wife, because his said conduct
comes within the restriction of Article 100 of the Civil Code.
(2) Recrimination
G.R. No. L-10699 October 18, 1957
WILLIAM H. BROWN, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JUANITA
YAMBAO, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of
First Instance of Manila to obtain legal separation from his
lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that
while interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to
1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas internment camp, his
wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field
of whom she begot a baby girl that Brown learned of his
wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from
internment; that thereafter the spouse lived separately
and later executed a document liquidating their conjugal
partnership and assigning certain properties to the erring
wife as her share. The complaint prayed for confirmation
of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the children
issued of the marriage; that the defendant be declared
disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for their remedy
as might be just and equitable.
City Fiscal Rafael Jose appeared at the trial, and cross-
examined plaintiff Brown. His questions (strenuously
objected to by Brown's counsel) elicited the fact that after
liberation, Brown had lived maritally with another woman
and had begotten children by her. Thereafter, the court
rendered judgment denying the legal separation asked,
on the ground that, while the wife's adultery was
established, Brown had incurred in a misconduct of similar
nature that barred his right of action under Article 100 of
the new Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for legal separation should be
granted?
RULING:
NO.
Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that:“The legal
separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse,
provided there has been no condonation of or consent to
the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are
offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either
of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal
separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.”
In the case at bar, it is pursuant to the second sentence of
the aforementioned law, wherein Brown and Yumbao are
both offenders, hence, a legal separation cannot be
granted.
Appellant Brown argues that in cross-examining him with
regard to his marital relation with Lilia Deito, who was not
his wife, the Assistant Fiscal acted as consel for the
defaulting wife, "when the power of the prosecuting
officer is limited to finding out whether or not there is
collusion, and if there is no collusion, which is the fact in the
case at bar, to intervene for the state which is not the fact
in the instant case, the truth of the matter being that he
intervened for Juanita Yambao, the defendant-appellee,
who is private citizen and who is far from being the state.".
The argument is untenable. Collusion in matrimonial cases
being "the act of married persons in procuring a
divorce by mutual consent, whether by preconcerted
commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or by failure,
in pursuance of agreement to defend divorce
proceedings" (Cyclopedia Law Dictionary; Nelson,
Divorce and Separation, Section 500), it was legitimate for
the Fiscal to bring to light any circumstances that could
give rise to the inference that the wife's default was
calculated, or agreed upon, to enable appellant to
obtain the decree of legal separation that he sought
without regard to the legal merits of his case. One such
circumstance is obviously the fact of Brown's cohabitation
with a woman other than his wife, since it bars him from
claiming legal separation by express provision of Article
100 of the new Civil Code. Wherefore, such evidence of
such misconduct, were proper subject of inquiry as they
may justifiably be considered circumstantial evidence of
collusion between the spouses.
(3) Collusion/Mutual Consent
ARABELLE J. MENDOZA, Petitioner, vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and DOMINIC C.
MENDOZA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the
country from his employment in Papua New Guinea. They
had been next-door neighbors in the appartelle they were
renting while they were still in college she, at Assumption
College while he, at San Beda College taking a business
management course. After a month of courtship, they
became intimate and their intimacy ultimately led to her
pregnancy with their daughter whom they named Allysa
Bianca. They got married on her eighth month of
pregnancy in civil rites solemnized in Pasay City on June
24, 1991, after which they moved to her place, although
remaining dependent on their parents for support. It was
petitioner who supported for the family’s financial needs
because Dominic’s job has unstable salary. It was alleged
in the evidence by the petitioner that Dominic had an
affair with his co-worker, incurred debts and criminal
charges which forced petitioner to end their relationship
and move away from Dominic. A petition for declaration
of nullity was filed by herein petitoner before the RTC on
the ground of article 36, psychological incapacity
55 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
presenting as evidence Dr. Samson, a psychiatrist. OSG
opposed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of the psychiatrist is sufficient
to establish psychological incapacity.
RULING:
No. The guidelines incorporate the three basic
requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v.
Court of Appeals: “psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability.” The foregoing guidelines do not
require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root
cause may be “medically or clinically identified.” What is
important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party’s psychological condition.
For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough
to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to.
In light of the foregoing, even if the expert opinions of
psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the
granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage,
the actual medical examination of Dominic was to be
dispensed with only if the totality of evidence presented
was enough to support a finding of his psychological
incapacity. This did not mean that the presentation of any
form of medical or psychological evidence to show the
psychological incapacity would have automatically
ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. What was essential, we should
emphasize herein, was the “presence of evidence that
can adequately establish the partys psychological
condition.”
By the very nature of cases involving the application of
Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight
to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding
the psychological temperament of parties in order to
determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity
and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However,
such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions
sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity
of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as
decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining
the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical or
psychological examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other
given case presented before it, must always base its
decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the
parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the
course of the proceedings.
We have time and again held that psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental, not
physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must
concomitantly be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage that, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, to observe love, respect and fidelity, and to
render help and support. We have also held that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. To qualify as psychological incapacity as a
ground for nullification of marriage, a persons
psychological affliction must be grave and serious as to
indicate an utter incapacity to comprehend and comply
with the essential objects of marriage, including the rights
and obligations between husband and wife. The affliction
must be shown to exist at the time of marriage, and must
be incurable.

Accordingly, the RTCs findings that Dominic’s

psychological incapacity was characterized by gravity,
antecedence and incurability could not stand scrutiny.
The medical report failed to show that his actions
indicated a psychological affliction of such a grave or
serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted. His
alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of remorse for
his dishonesty and lack of affection did not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity. His inability to share
or to take responsibility or to feel remorse over his
misbehavior or to share his earnings with family members,
albeit indicative of immaturity, was not necessarily a
medically rooted psychological affliction that was
incurable. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility did not
equate with psychological incapacity. Nor were his
supposed sexual infidelity and criminal offenses
manifestations of psychological incapacity. If at all, they
would constitute a ground only for an action for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.

56 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK