Jerica lalaine A.

Soriano
BSBA-MGT 3RD YEAR

1. Lasallete of Santiago Inc., petitioner vs. NLRC and Clarita Javier, respondents.

a) Summary of the case

The legal principles governing the acquisition of security of tenure by teachers in private educational
institutions were definitively laid down by the Court en banc in University of Santo Tomas, et al. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, et al., a decision promulgated on February 15, 1990.[1] There
the Court said: According to Policy Instructions No. 11 issued by the Department of Labor and
Employment, 'the probationary employment of professors, instructors and teachers shall be subject to
standards established by the Department of Education and Culture.' Said standards are embodied in
paragraph 75 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, to wit:'75. Full time teachers who have
rendered three consecutive years of satisfactory service shall be considered permanent.' (Emphasis
supplied)
The legal requisites, therefore, for acquisition by a teacher of permanent employment, or security of
tenure, are as follows:
1) the teacher is a full time teacher;
2) the teacher must, have rendered three (3) consecutive years of service; and
3) such service must have been satisfactory.
Now, the Manual of Regulations also states that 'a full-time teacher' is one whose total working day is
devoted to the school, has no other regular remunerative employment and is paid on a regular monthly
basis regardless of the number of teaching hours' (par. 77); and that in college, 'the normal teaching load
of a full-time instructor shall be eighteen hours a week'.The standards by which the service of the
probationary teacher may be adjudged satisfactory so that he may acquire permanence in his
employment or security of tenure, are set by the school. The setting of those standards, and the
determination of whether or not they have been met, have been held by this Court to be the prerogative
of the school, consistent With academic freedom and constitutional autonomy by which educational
institutions have the right to chose who should teach.[2]The acquisition of security of tenure by the
teacher in the manner indicated signifies that he shall thenceforth have the right to remain in
employment as such teacher until he reaches the compulsory retirement age in accordance with the rules
of the school or the law. That tenure, once acquired, cannot be adversely affected or defeated by
requiring the teacher to execute contracts stipulating the termination of his employment upon the
expiration of a fixed period or term. Contracts of that sort are anathema and will be struck down as null
and void.

b) Issues and conflicts

 Whether or not private respondent had acquired permanency, or tenure in the position of high school
principal of the educational system of La Salette of Santiago Inc.?
Private respondent has been assigned to different administrative and teaching positions of the
petitioner’s school system, a private school system, where private respondent was initially employed
for three years as high school principal. In 1984 to 1986 private respondent was again assigned
as the high school principal of the petitioner. After her term as high school principal she
received a letter from the petitioner instructing her to report to La Sallete College and stating
the person as her replacement as high school principal. Private respondent wrote a letter to
the petitioner complaining of her sudden removal as high school principal but did not received
any reply so she filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal. The Labor
Arbiter decided in her favor and the CA affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

c) Ruling
The Court held, according to Policy Instructions No. 11 issued by the Department of Labor and
Employment, the probationary employment of professors, instructors and teachers shall be subject
to standards established by the Department of Education and Culture. Said standards are embodied in
paragraph 75 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. Unlike teachers (assistant
instructors, assistant, professors, associate professors, full professors) who aspire for and expect to
acquired permanency, or security of tenure, in their employment, as faculty members, teachers
who are appointed as department heads or administrative officials (e.g., college or department secretaries
principals, directors, assistant deans, deans) do not normally, and should not expect to, acquire a second
status of permanency, or an additional or second security of tenure as such officer. The acquisition
of such an additional tenure, to repeat, is not consistent with normal practice, constitutes the
exception rather than the rule, and may take place only where categorically and explicitly provided
by law or agreement of the parties. Therefore, private respondent did not acquire permanency or
tenure in the position of high school principal of the educational system of La Sallete of Santiago Inc.

2. Malayang Manggaagawa sa ESSO (PFPW) and Phil. Federation of Petroleum workers

vs. ESSO Standard of eastern inc. and carmelino G. alvendia judgen of the court of
first instance of manila.

a. Summary of the case

Two separate appeals from a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations on an indus-trial dispute and
strike declared on February 19, 1965, by members of the Malayang Manggagawa sa Esso (MME) and
certified on November 5, 1965 to said court by the President of the Phil-ippines.

On November 13, 1965, the striking union, MME, affiliate of the Philippine Federation of Petroleum
Workers and the employer-company, Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. (ESSO), concluded without the trial
court's intervention, a return to work agreement pending the resolution of their labor dispute by the
industrial court, and jointly sought the court's approval thereof, which was granted in a partial decision
dated Novem-ber 27, 1965, enjoining the parties to comply with the terms thereof.This gave a peculiar
aspect to the case at bar, as noted by the trial court itself in its decision in that "the parties to the labor
dispute have agreed on a set of proposals to be litigated as issues in this case, and the same parties have
by express stipulation reserved determination of other issues in cases now pending determination in other
branches of this Court."Thus, of eleven demands filed by the striking union after the filing of the joint
motion for approval of the return to work agreement dated November 12, 1965 - although the trial court
had earlier issued in open court an order on November 5, 1965, for the union to formalize in a petition all
its demands in con-nection with the case - the trial court in its decision at bar dismissed outright four
demands since they "are not any of those specifically provided as litigable issues in these proceedings and
are issues in the other cases pending before the different salas of the court of industrial relations. The
parties them-selves by the terms of their Return to Work Agreement of Nov-ember 12, 1965 have reserved
these cases for judicial deter-mination in the different salas where they are now pending consideration."

b. Issues and conflicts

In the light of this fait accompli which impeded the total settlement of the urgent dispute to the prejudice
of the workers, the Court will proceed to the review of the trial court's deci-sion on the limited issues and
demands taken cognizance of and subject of the present appeals. These six demands of the striking union
were the following:
1. That the position of Assistant truck drivers or truck helpers and fillers should not be abolished;
2. In the event that the Can Plant is closed, all employees therein will be trans-ferred to other plant duties
and their position titled will not be changed nor will their wages presently earned be reduced;
3. No change in terms and condi-tions of employment of employees assigned now to the Manila
International Airport or JOCASP which includes, among others, meal allowances and overtime shall be
made;
4. That Rodolfo Espiritu and Rey-naldo Recio, Vice-President and Secretary, respectively, of petitioner
union be reinstated immediately;
5. The retirement age of employees shall be 60, as has been the previous practice of the Company, and
all those who have been retired by the Company at earlier than the age of 60 shall be reinstated; and
6. The memorandum of agreement dated January 6, 1965 be declared invalid and that any loss of benefits
by reason of the enforce-ment of such agreement be restored to the em-ployees concerned.

c. Ruling
The predecessor of the respondent company was Standard Vacuum Co. In 1960, the latter was split into
the present company and Mobil Philippines. The respondent absorbed all the working force in Luzon.
The Pandacan terminal to which most of the employees involved in this case were assigned is the main
distribution center for bulk and package products both during the time of Standard Vacuum Company and
subsequently when the splitting of this company took place afterwards. Because of this development plus
improved and more efficient operating conditions, respondent company real-ized that it has extra or excess
personnel, which later on were termed redundant employees.
On April 8, 1963, respondent company and the Citizens Labor Union (the majority bar-gaining
representative) executed a Collective Bar-gaining Agreement for a period of three years (up to July 8,
1966). At the time of the signing of this Agreement, almost all if not all of the present members of the
petitioner MME were then members of the contracting union including its incumbent president.
'It is expressly understood that the exer-cise by the Company of any of the foregoing functions shall not
alter any of the specific pro-visions of this Agreement, nor shall they be used to discriminate against any
employee because of membership in the Union. It is further under-stood that, in determining
reassignments, em-ployees will be assigned normally to related and comparable work whenever this is
feasible and consistent with efficient operations. Such reassignments will be prompted normally by
emergencies, operational needs of the business and/or lack of work.

3. Aboitiz shipping employees association , lazaro abaigar, Victoriano Aniban, Felipe

Baterzal etc. vs. NLRC and aboitiz shipping Court.

a) Summary of case
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the Resolutions of the public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) dated April 30, 1987 and May 29, 1987 affirming the Decision of August
23, 1985 rendered by Labor Arbiter Julio P. Andres, Jr. holding that: respondent Aboitiz Shipping
Corporation could not be guilty of said charge (unfair labor practice through dismissal) for lack of
employer-employee relationship between them and the individual complainants at the time said act was
allegedly committed in April 1985 and consequently dismissing the case for lack of merit. Hence, this
petition anchored on two grounds:
1. GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION COMMITTED BY THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION WHICH AMOUNTS TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.
2. THE RESOLUTIONS SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED ARE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT."

b) Issue and Conflicts

The real issue however which surfaces from the allegations and arguments of the parties is whether or not
an employer-employee relationship existed between respondent Aboitiz Shipping Corporation (ABOITIZ,
for short) and the petitioners-workers at the time of the latter's alleged dismissal on April 26, 1985.
The issue of the existence of employer-employee relationship between the parties in the case at bar is a
question of fact which has already been resolved by the labor arbiter and upheld by the National Labor
Relations Commission. Review of labor cases are confined to questions of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion. We find that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by public respondent NLRC in
affirming the non-existence of employer-employee relationship between petitioners and private
respondent.

b) Ruling
They therefore pray that the resolutions of public respondent be set aside; that this Court declare the
illegality of dismissal of individual petitioners; and that their reinstatement with full backwages to private
respondent as regular employees thereof be granted.In the resolution of April 18, 1988, this Court gave
due course to the petition and required the parties to file their simultaneous memoranda within thirty (30)
days from notice.Records reveal that petitioners are not regular employees of the private respondent at the
time of their alleged illegal dismissal. For one, petitioners, on June 20, 1984, filed individual application
for employment with Narben's Service Contractor. They were eventually issued payslips, deducted SSS
premiums, Pag-ibig fund and witholding tax from their salaries by this Contractor.As held in Mafinco
Trading Corporation vs. Ople, 70 SCRA 139 (1976), the existence of employer-employee relationship is
determined by four (4) elements, namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the
payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control employees' conduct. From a
reading of the provisions of the aforesaid service contract, the concurrence of these four elements on
NARBEN's will easily be noted. For NARBEN's had the right to hire the necessary number of carpenters
to accomplish the carpentry requirements of respondent corporation and to fire them. It had charge of the
payment of wages of its laborers and the power of administrative supervision and general control as to the
time, manner and method of performance of work.

4. Dr. Renato Sara and Romeo Arana vs. NLRC GR.No. 73199, October 26 1998

a) Summary of the case

LABOR LAW; EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP; FOUR-FOLD TEST TO DETERMINE
EXISTENCE THEREOF; PRESENCE OF OTHER REQUISITES NEGATED IN CASE AT BAR. —
To determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, this Court in a long line of decisions
has invariably applied the following four-fold test: [1] the selection and engagement of the employee; [2]
the payment of wages; [3] the power of dismissal; and [4] the power to control and employee’s conduct.
In the case at bar, we find that although there was a selection and engagement of private respondent in
1977, the verbal agreement between the parties negated the existence of the other requisites.
RIGHT TO COMPENSATION DEPENDS ON THE VOLUME OF SALE OR PURCHASE; POWER
TO TERMINATE MUTUALLY UPON THE PARTIES. As to the payment of wages, the verbal
agreement entered into by the parties stipulated that parties respondent would be paid a commission of
P2.00 per sack of milled rice sold as well as a 10% commission on palay purchase. The arrangement thus
was explicitly on a commission basis dependent on the volume of sale or purchase. Private respondent
was not guaranteed any minimum compensation nor was she allowed any drawing account or advance of
any kind against unearned commissions. Her right to compensation depended upon and was measured by
the tangible results she produced — the quantity of rice sold and the quantity of palay purchased. The
power to terminate the relationship was mutually vested upon the parties. Either may terminate the
business arrangement at will, with or without cause.
ABSENCE OF POWER TO CONTROL EVIDENT. Noticeably absent from the agreement between the
parties is the element of control. Among the four (4) requisites, control is deemed the most important that
the other requisites may even be disregarded. Under the control test, an employer-employee relationship
exists if the "employer" has reserved the right to control the "employee" not only as to the result of the
work done but also as to the means and methods by which the same is to be accomplished. Otherwise, no
such relationship exists. The absence of control is made more evident by the fact that private respondent
was not even obliged to sell the palay she purchased to petitioners. She was at liberty to sell the palay to
any trader offering higher buying rates. She was thus free to sell it to anybody whom she pleased. Private
respondent worked for petitioners at her own pleasure and was not subject to definite hours or conditions
to work.

b) Issue and Conflict

The primordial issue in this case is whether an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners
and private respondent as to warrant cognizance by the Labor Arbiter of LRD-ROXII-006-82.
To determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, this Court in a long line of decisions 5
has invariably applied the following four-fold test:
1. The selection and engagement of the employee;
2. The payment of wages;
3. The power of dismissal;
4. The power to control and employee’s

c) Ruling
We find that although there was a selection and engagement of private respondent in 1977, the verbal
agreement between the parties negated the existence of the other requisites.
As to the payment of wages, the verbal agreement entered into by the parties stipulated that parties
respondent would be paid a commission of P2.00 per sack of milled rice sold as well as a 10% commission
on palay purchase. The arrangement thus was explicitly on a commission basis dependent on the volume
of sale or purchase. Private respondent was not guaranteed any minimum compensation nor was she
allowed any drawing account or advance of any kind against unearned commissions. Her right to
compensation depended upon and was measured by the tangible results she produced — the quantity of
rice sold and the quantity of palay purchased.

The power to terminate the relationship was mutually vested upon the parties. Either may terminate the
business arrangement at will, with or without cause.Finally, noticeably absent from the agreement between
the parties is the element of control. Among the four (4) requisites, control is deemed the most important
that the other requisites may even be disregarded. 6 Under the control test, an employer-employee
relationship exists if the "employer" has reserved the right to control the "employee" not only as to the
result of the work done but also as to the means and methods by which the same is to be accomplished. 7
Otherwise, no such relationship exists. chanrobles.com: claw.red
We observe that the means and methods of purchasing and selling rice or palay by private respondent
were totally independent of petitioners’ control. As established by the NLRC: chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library.

5. Mario Tiu and Jonathan Hayuhay vs. NLRC and Republic broadcasting system
Inc.

a) Summary of the case

1. Republic Broadcasting System Inc. (RBS) had a collective bargaining agreement with GMA Channel
7 Employees Union (GMAEU). After the first quarter of 1991, RBS management noted the huge amount
of overtime expense it incurred during the said period, which averaged to P363,085.26 monthly. To
streamline its operations, the president of RBS created a committee to formulate guidelines on the
availment of leaves and rendering of overtime work.
2 RBS, through its personnel department, furnished GMAEU a copy of the new guidelines and requested
the latter to comment thereon. The union did not file any comment. Subsequently, RBS officially issued
the implementing guidelines on the availment of leaves and rendering of overtime services. The following
day, GMAEU sent a letter to the president of RBS wherein it argued that:
3. Thereafter, RBS management and GMAEU officials to thresh out the issues raised by GMAEU in its
26 letter. Both talks, however, were short lived as the union refused to hold further talks with RBS.
4. GMAEU filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) based
on unfair labor practices allegedly committed by RBS, as follows:
5.The NCMB set a conciliation meeting, but the Union held a strike vote among its members and
submitted the results thereof to the NCMB which showed that majority of the union members voted to go
on strike.
6.During the conciliation meeting held on 19 July 1991, RBS, through counsel, informed GMAEUs
officers that RBS did not violate any provision in the collective bargaining agreement since the issuance
of the guidelines was a management prerogative duly recognized in their agreement. As regards GMAEUs
charges of coercion, union interference and discrimination, RBS argued that these alleged unfair labor
practices were neither raised by the union in its letter nor during their subsequent talks. RBS counsel
requested GMAEUs officers to name the persons or officers of RBS involved in the alleged unfair labor
practices and to state the specific act or acts complained of so that RBS management could adequately
refute said allegations or impose appropriate disciplinary actions against its erring officers. GMAEUs
officers, however, ignored both RBS and the labor conciliators requests for a bill of particulars.

b) Issue and Conflict

WON the strike is legal

c) Ruling
The notice of strike filed by the union before the NCMB on 12 July 1991 contained general allegations
that RBS management committed unfair labor practices by its gross violation of the economic provisions
in their collective bargaining agreement and by alleged acts of coercion, union interference and
discrimination which amounted to union busting. It is the union, therefore, who had the burden of proof
to present substantial evidence to support these allegations.
It is not disputed that prior to 12 July 1991, the union treated RBS issuance of the guidelines on the
availment of leaves and rendering of overtime services as gross violations of the existing collective
bargaining agreement. In its talks with the union, RBS painstakingly explained that the said allegation was
unfounded because the issuance of said guidelines was RBS management prerogative. Up to that point,
the union never raised the issue of unfair labor practices allegedly committed by RBS official under Article
248 of the Labor Code. But in its notice of strike filed two days later, the union raised issues of coercion,
discrimination, and union interference for the first time.
Significantly, the union had two (2) conciliatory meetings arranged by the NCMB at which it could have
substantiated these additional allegations. However, the fact that it had submitted the results of the strike
vote even ahead of the conciliatory meetings, and continuously refused to substantiate its allegations in
its notice of strike thereafter, lends credence to the NLRCs observation that these charges were
indiscriminately hurled against RBS to give a semblance of validity to its notice of strike.

6. Associated Labor Union vs. judge Amador E. Gomez , judge Jose C. Borromeo
and superior gas and equipment co. of cebu inc. GR.No. L-25999, feb. 9, 1967.

a) Summary of the case

1. LABOR LAW; UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE; COERCION OF EMPLOYEES BY MANAGEMENT
OR UNION. — The alleged act by management of coercing or instigating members of a union to resign
therefrom is clearly an unfair labor practice under the Industrial Peace Act because it is aimed at crippling
the union, throwing it off balance, destroying its bargaining authority, and is an attack against the Magna
Carta of Labor. By the same token, the charge of management against the union that the latter is coercing
the resigned employees to rejoin the union is no less a case of unfair labor practice.
2. ID.; COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICE CASES. — A rule buttressed upon statute and reason and frequently reiterated in
jurisprudence is that labor cases involving unfair labor practice are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations.
3. ID.; ID.; AVERMENT OF DAMAGES DOES NOT DEFEAT CIR’S JURISDICTION TO HEAR
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGE REASON THEREFOR. — The averment that the employer
has suffered damages by reason of a strike does not work to defeat the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations to hear an unfair labor practice charge, because the right to damages still has to depend on the
evidence in the unfair labor practice case in that court. To hold otherwise is to sanction split jurisdiction
which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.
4. ID.; UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CASE INITIATED BY UNION IN THE COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS DOES NOT "DIVEST" THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
JURISDICTION WHICH THE LATTER DID NOT ORIGINALLY HAVE. — Where the union filed an
unfair labor practice case in the Court of Industrial Relations on the very same day that management went
to the Court of First Instance, which is without jurisdiction over the subject matter, and previous thereto
the union struck precisely because of the unfair labor practice allegedly indulged in by management, the
unfair labor practice case cannot be said to be an afterthought of the union nor calculated merely to divest
the Court of First Instance of jurisdiction which it did not possess.
5. ID.; PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS, ISSUANCE THEREOF BY COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE
NULL AND VOID IN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CASES. — As the Court of First Instance is
without jurisdiction over an unfair labor practice case, it does not have authority to provide for an ancillary
remedy in the case and the injunction it issues therein is coram non judice, and is void.

b) Issue and conflict

The solicited cease-and-desist order.
The quintessence of this case is jurisdiction.
We take stock of Sugeco’s petition against the Union in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Case No.
P.-9221). Read as it should be, Sugeco in paragraph 10 thereof charges the Union with "coercing the
resigned employees to rejoin" the same. And this, obviously to neutralize the Union claim that Sugeco
was coercing and cajoling its members to separate therefrom.This charge and countercharge require us
to focus attention on the Industrial Peace Act. 7 Section 4(a) and (b) thereof recite, as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) It shall be unfair labor practice for an employer:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(b) It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library.

c) Ruling
The Court of First Instance of Cebu, we rule, is without jurisdiction over the subject-matter of Case No.
R-9221. Its judges, therefore, did not have the authority to provide for an ancillary remedy in that case.
Hence, the injunction below complained of was issued coram non judice. It is void.
For the reasons given:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) the petition herein for a writ of certiorari and prohibition is hereby granted, and the writ of
preliminary injunction we issued on May 18, 1966 is declared permanent;
(2) the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of First Instance of Cebu in Case No. R-9221,
entitled "Superior Gas and Equipment Co. of Cebu, Inc., Petitioner, v. Associated Labor Union,"
respondent", is hereby declared null and void; and
(3) the respondent judges, or whoever shall take their place, are hereby directed to dismiss the said Case
No. R-9221.

7. PLDT vs. Jose B. Teves GR.No143511, Nove. 15, 1010

a) Summary of the case

Respondent was employed as Clerk of PLDT until he was terminated because he violated the (3)
unauthorized leaves of absence committed within 3 years, contrary to the policy of PLDT. From 1990 and
1992, there were 3 instances of unauthorized leaves of absence from the Respondent. On the final instance,
the explanation of Teves was unmeritorious, which led to his dismissal. He filed a complaint of illegal
dismissal before the Labor Arbiter.
The Arbiter found out that the dismissal was legal, but it ordered PLDT to give 20,000 php to Teves.
Teves appealed to the NLRC, which reversed the Arbiters decision. It upheld the validity of the absence
on account of Teves wife having complications during childbirth.
PLDT filed a petition for Certiorari with the CA, which affirmed the decision of the NLRC. The CA found
that respondent's comportment cannot be characterized as grave so as to constitute grave misconduct; that
his first two leaves of absence were satisfactorily justified

b) Issue
Does the conduct of Teves warrant and justify dismissal?

c) Ruling
Even assuming that respondent's absenteeism constitutes willful disobedience, such offense does not
warrant respondent's dismissal.Not every case of insubordination or willful disobedience by an employee
reasonably deserves the penalty of dismissal. There must be a reasonable proportionality between the
offense and the penalty.While management has the prerogative to discipline its employees and to impose
appropriate penalties on erring workers, pursuant to company rules and regulations, however, such
management prerogatives must be exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employers interest
and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws and
valid agreements. The Court is wont to reiterate that while an employer has its own interest to protect, and
pursuant thereto, it may terminate an employee for a just cause, such prerogative to dismiss or lay off an
employee must be exercised without abuse of discretion.Its implementation should be tempered with
compassion and understanding.The employer should bear in mind that, in the execution of said
prerogative, what is at stake is not only the employees position, but his very livelihood,his very
breadbasket.

8. Renato S. Gatbonton NLRC, Mapua Institute of technology and jose Calderon

GR. No. 146779, Jan. 23, 2006
a) Summary of the case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks
to set aside the Decision1 dated November 10, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
57470, affirming the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC); and the CA
Resolution dated January 16, 2001, denying the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Renato S. Gatbonton is an associate professor of respondent Mapua Institute of Technology
(MIT), Faculty of Civil Engineering. Some time in November 1998, a civil engineering student of
respondent MIT filed a letter-complaint against petitioner for unfair/unjust grading system, sexual
harassment and conduct unbecoming of an academician. Pending investigation of the complaint,
respondent MIT, through its Committee on Decorum and Investigation placed petitioner under a 30-day
preventive suspension effective January 11, 1999. The committee believed that petitioner's continued stay
during the investigation affects his performance as a faculty member, as well as the students' learning; and
that the suspension will allow petitioner to "prepare himself for the investigation and will prevent his
influences to other members of the community.
Thus, petitioner filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal suspension, damages and attorney's fees,4
docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 01-00388-99.
Petitioner questioned the validity of the administrative proceedings with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila in a Petition for Certiorari but the case was terminated on May 21, 1999 when the parties entered
into a compromise agreement wherein respondent MIT agreed to publish in the school organ the rules and
regulations implementing Republic Act No. 7877 (R.A. No. 7877) or the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act;
disregard the previous administrative proceedings and conduct anew an investigation on the charges
against petitioner. Petitioner agreed to recognize the validity of the published rule and regulations, as well
as the authority of respondent to investigate, hear and decide the administrative case against him.
On June 18, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, premises considered, the thirty day preventive suspension of complainant is hereby declared
to be illegal. Accordingly, respondents are directed to pay his wages during the period of his preventive
suspension.
The rest of complainant's claims are dismissed.

b) Issue and conflict

Both respondents and petitioner filed their appeal from the Labor Arbiter's Decision, with petitioner
questioning the dismissal of his claim for damages. In a Decision dated September 30, 1999, the NLRC
granted respondents' appeal and set aside the Labor Arbiter's decision. His motion for reconsideration
having been denied by the NLRC on December 13, 1999, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari
with the CA.
On November 10, 2000, the CA promulgated the assailed decision affirming the NLRC decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and
ORDERED DISMISSED, and the challenged decision and order of public respondent NLRC
AFFIRMED.
A.THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE NLRC WAS NOT
GUILTY OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RENDERING BOTH THE APPEAL DECISION
AND THE NLRC RESOLUTION.
B.THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE NLRC'S DISMISSAL OF
PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES.

c) Ruling
The Mapua Rules is one of those issuances that should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is
to enforce and implement R.A. No. 7877, which is a law of general application. In fact, the Mapua Rules
itself explicitly required publication of the rules for its effectivity, as provided in Section 3, Rule IV
(Administrative Provisions), which states that "[T]hese Rules and Regulations to implement the Anti-
Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 shall take effect fifteen (15) days after publication by the Committee."
Thus, at the time of the imposition of petitioner's preventive suspension on January 11, 1999, the Mapua
Rules were not yet legally effective, and therefore the suspension had no legal basis.
Moreover, even assuming that the Mapua Rules are applicable, the Court finds that there is no sufficient
basis to justify his preventive suspension. Under the Mapua Rules, an accused may be placed under
preventive suspension during pendency of the hearing under any of the following circumstances:
(a) if the evidence of his guilt is strong and the school head is morally convinced that the continued stay
of the accused during the period of investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of the
institution; or
(b) the accused poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other members of the educational
community.
In petitioner's case, there is no indication that petitioner's preventive suspension may be based on the
foregoing circumstances. Committee Resolution No. 1 (Re: Preventive Suspension of Engr. Renato
Gatbonton) passed by the Committee on Decorum and Investigation states the reasons for petitioner's
preventive suspension, to wit:
Whereas, the committee believe[s] that the continued stay of the respondent during the period of
investigation,
Affects the respondent's performance as a faculty member and laboratory head considering the
psychological effects depression and/or emotional stress during investigation;
Affects the student['s] learning and other members of the Mapua Institute of Technology community.
Whereas, the committee believe[s] that this preventive suspension will allow the respondent to prepare
himself for the investigation and will prevent his influences to other members of the community.

9. Lopez Sugar Corporation vs. Hon. Sec. Labor and Employment, Nat’l Congress of
Unions in the sugar industry of the Phils. (NACUSIP) and Commercial and Agro-
Industrial Labor (CAILO) G.R NOo. 93117, Aug. 1, 1995.

a) Summary of case
LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; CERTIFICATION ELECTION; GENUINE
PETITION FROM A LEGITIMATE LABOR UNION, A REQUISITE. — While Article 257 cited by the
Solicitor General directs the automatic conduct of a certification election in an unorganized establishment,
it also requires, however, that the petition for certification election must be filed by a legitimate labor
organization among which is the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees
in an appropriate collective bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining. Article 212(h) defines a
legitimate labor organization as "any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE and includes any
branch or local thereof." The law did not reduce the Med-Arbiter to an automaton which can instantly be
set to impulse by the mere filing of a petition for certification election. He is still tasked to satisfy himself
that all the conditions of the law are met, and among the legal requirements is that the petitioning union
must be a legitimate labor organization in good standing.
2.REQUISITES FOR LOCAL OR CHAPTER. — A local or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor
organization only upon submission of the following to the BLR: "1) A charter certificate, within 30 days
from its issuance by the labor federation or national union, and "2) The constitution and by-laws, a
statement on the set of officers, and the books of accounts all of which are certified under oath by the
secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by its president. "Absent
compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does not become a legitimate labor
organization."cralaw virtua1aw library
3.CHAPTER POSSESSING ONLY A CHARTER CERTIFICATE, NOT A LEGITIMATE LABOR
UNION; PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION FILED SHOULD BE DISMISSED. — The
only document extant on record to establish the legitimacy of the NACUSIP-TUCP Lopez Sugar Central
Supervisory Chapter is a charter certificate and nothing else. The instant petition, at least for now, must
thus be GRANTED.

b) Issue and Conflict

1. W/N Public Respondent Honorable Secretary of Labor and Employment (has) committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it refused to dismiss a petition for certification election
despite clear lack of legal and factual basis for holding the same?
2. W/N the application of Article 257 clearly must first be occasioned by a genuine petition from a
legitimate labor organization?

c) Ruling
1. The law did not reduce the Med-Arbiter to an automaton which can instantly be set to impulse by the
mere filing of a petition for certification election. He is still tasked to satisfy himself that all the conditions
of the law are met, and among the legal requirements is that the petitioning union must be a legitimate
labor organization in good standing.
2. The petition for certification election was filed by the NACUSIP-TUCP, a national labor organization
duly registered with the DOLE under Registration Certificate. The legitimate status of NACUSIP-TUCP
might be conceded; being merely, however, an agent for the local organization (the NACUSIP-TUCP
Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory Chapter), the federation's bona fide status alone would not suffice. The
local chapter, as its principal, should also be a legitimate labor organization in good standing.
- The only document extant on record to establish the legitimacy of the NACUSIP-TUCP Lopez Sugar
Central Supervisory Chapter is a charter certificate and nothing else. The instant petition, at least for now,
must thus be GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Secretary of Labor, dated 06 March 1990, affirming that of
the Med-Arbiter, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petition for certification election is dismissed. No
costs.
10. Blue Bar Workers Union vs. Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan and the Court
of Industrial Relations, G.R No. L-29743 Sept. 30, 1969.

a) Summary of the case

1. LABOR LAWS AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; INDUSTRIAL PEACE ACT; LABOR UNIONS;
CERTIFICATION ELECTION; CERTIFICATION OF MAJORITY UNION TO REPRESENT
EMPLOYEES FOR PURPOSES OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING; CASE AT BAR. — In a consent
election, conducted on July 3, 1968 and supervised by CIR’s personnel in the premises of Blue Bar
Coconut Philippines, Inc. at Lusacan, Tiaong, Quezon, the Blue Bar Workers’ Union a local affiliate of
Lakas Ng Manggagawang Makabayan (LAKAS) which had an existing collective bargaining agreement
with the Company, garnered the majority number of votes as against the Plum Federation of Industrial
and Agrarian Workers (PLUM). After the CIR certified LAKAS as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of all the regular rank and file employees and workers of the Company for purposes of collective
bargaining, petitioner moved to prevent respondent Union LAKAS and Blue Bar Coconut Philippines Inc.
from considering a new set of collective bargaining proposals which might affect the existing bargaining
agreement between petitioner and said company. After filing the required surety bond, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued on Jan. 3, 1969. On June 23, 1969, LAKAS wrote to the Company
stating that it was giving up all its rights, claims and interests in the case at bar because of an agreement
with its local officers that they are joining voluntarily with the petitioner Blue Bar Workers’ Union.
On September 20, 1967, Plum Federation of Industrial and Agrarian Workers (PLUM for short) petitioned
CIR for certification as the majority union and as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the
rank-and-file employees and workers in the Blue Bar Coconut Philippines, Inc. 1
Upon the averment that petitioner Blue Bar Workers’ Union is a local affiliate of another labor union —
respondent Lakas Ng Manggagawang Makabayan (Lakas) — and that it has an existing collective
bargaining agreement with the Blue Bar Coconut Philippines, Inc., said Blue Bar Workers’ Union filed in
said case on September 27, 1967 a motion for intervention which CIR granted. 2
Blue Bar’s foregoing allegations in reference to the existence of the collective bargaining agreement were
confirmed by the company in its answer dated October 10, 1967 and filed with CIR. 3
On July 3, 1968, a consent election conducted and supervised by CIR’s personnel was held in the premises
of the Blue Bar Coconut Philippines, Inc. at Lusacan, Tiaong, Quezon. In the official ballots used in said
election, the name of petitioner Blue Bar Workers’ Union appeared in parentheses below that of
respondent union Lakas Ng Manggagawang Makabayan. The official tally sheet shows that out of a total
of 714 votes cast in the election, 526 votes were garnered by petitioner Blue Bar Workers’ Union-Lakas
Ng Manggagawang Makabayan as against 155 in favor of the PLUM. 4
On July 17, 1968, CIR issued the controverted order certifying Lakas as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of all the regular rank-and-file employees and workers of Blue Bar Coconut Philippines, Inc., for
purposes of collective bargaining with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment. That order disregarded the name of petitioner union.
b) Issue and Conflicts
On July 17, 1968, CIR issued the controverted order certifying Lakas as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of all the regular rank-and-file employees and workers of Blue Bar Coconut Philippines, Inc., for
purposes of collective bargaining with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment. That order disregarded the name of petitioner union. 5chanrobles virtual law
library.It was petitioner union's turn, on September 4, 1968, to file its motion for reconsideration of the
orders of July 17, 1968 and August 26, 1968. This too was denied by CIR en banc on October 3, 1968.
Petitionerappealed to this Court. 7chanrobles virtual law library
Thereafter, on November 26, 1968, petitioner filed before this Court a manifestation stating that
respondent Lakas insists on demanding for a new collective bargaining agreement with Blue Bar Coconut
Philippines, Inc., despite the existing collective bargaining agreement between petitioner and the
company. Petitioner prayed that said manifestation be considered together with its prayer for preliminary
injunction. 8 On the same date, respondent Lakas filed its answer to the present petition for certiorari .
And on December 11, 1968, Lakas also filed its comment to the manifestation of petitioner. 9chanrobles
virtual law library

c) Ruling
This Court resolved on December 19, 1968 to deny the motion for intervention of the Blue Bar Coconut
Philippines, Inc. dated December 17, 1968 since such intervention was "not necessary for a determination
of the issues raised herein." We, however, directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain respondent court from enforcing its orders of July 17, 1968 and August 26, L968 and its resolution
of October 3, 1968 upon petitioner's filing a bond in the sum of P1,000.00 and the approval thereof by this
Court. A surety bond in the amount of P1,000.00 subscribed by the Philippine Guaranty Co., Inc. having
been filed and approved by the Chief Justice, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued on January 3,
1969. 11 chanrobles virtual law library.This case was submitted for decision on February 17,
1969.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library.Then came the letter of respondent Lakas
to Blue Bar Coconut Philippines, Inc. dated June 23, 1969. Lakas, in that letter, informed the employer
that "in accordance with an understanding and agreement with our local officers that they are joining
voluntarily with the Blue Bar Workers' Union, we are giving up all our rights, claims and interests" in the
case at bar "on the issue of Union recognition in favor of Blue Bar Workers' Union." Request was there
made that said company "fully recognize" petitioner "as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative
of the employees." Petitioner, in view of this letter, filed on August 19, 1969 a manifestation and motion
praying that decision be rendered herein by this Court recognizing said petitioner (Blue Bar Workers'
Union) as the sole collective bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of Blue Bar Coconut
Philippines, Inc. 12chanrobles virtual law library
In a resolution of this Court of August 22, 1969, respondent Lakas was asked to comment within 10 days
from notice thereof, on the foregoing manifestation and motion. Notwithstanding the lapse of the 10-day
period, respondent union failed of compliance. 13chanrobles virtual law library
.