ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
EXCEPTIONS: VOID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE
BIENVENIDO vs. CA
FACTS
1. 3 OCT 1942, AURELIO CAMACHO, petitioner married CONSEJO VELASCO.
2. 6 FEB 1962, without his marriage being dissolved, he married respondent LUISITA CAMACHO in
Tokyo, Japan.
3. During AURELIO & LUISITA’s marriage, there where instances where one or the other left their house
for long periods of time because of quarrels.
4. 1967, AURELIO met petitioner, NENITA BIENVENIDO who he lived with until his death on 1988.
5. Sometime in 1982, AURELIO bought a house and lot registered to his name
6. 11 JAN 1985, he sold and transferred ownership of the land in favor of the petitioner.
7. After the death of AURELIO, respondent filed a petition for annulment of sale.
8. In her answer, she claimed that she and AURELIO purchased the property in question using their
joint funds.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between AURELIO & LUISITA is void, YES
RULING:
1. The exception involved by respondent in accordance with NCC 83 refers to the subsequent marriage
of the abandoned spouse and not the remarriage of the deserting spouse, after seven (7) year period
had lapsed, cannot be invoked because it was AURELIO who had left his 1st wife.
2. Since AURELIO had a subsisting valid marriage with CONSEJO, his subsequent marriage to respondent
LUISITA was void for being bigamous.
3. There is no basis for holding that property in question was property of the conjugal partnership of
AURELIO & LUISITA as there was no partnership in the first place.
FACTS:
1. Estrellita Tadeo-Matias (Petitioner) was married to Wilfredo Matias who was a member of the
Philippine Constabulary and assigned in Araya, Pampanga. They were married on January 7, 1968.
2. On September 15, 1979, Wilfredo left their conjugal home at San Miguel, Tarlac City in order to
serve his duties. He was never seen or heard from again and has never made contact with any of his or
Petitioner’s relatives. Petitioner constantly sought updates from the Philippine Constabulary regarding
the whereabouts of her husband to no avail.
3. After 3 decades of waiting, Petitioner sought for a claim of death benefits under P.D. 1638 from the
Philippine Veteran’s Affair Office (PVAO) of the AFP. One of its requirements is a judicial declaration of
presumptive death.
4. RTC: Affirmed Petitioner and declared Petitioner’s husband presumptively dead under Art. 41 of the
Family Code.
5. CA: Reversed RTC ruling since Art. 41only allows such declaration in cases of remarriage which
Petitioner did not seek.
ISSUE(S): Whether Petitioner can validly be granted the judicial declaration of presumptive death.
RULING : No. Petitioner erred in filing for judicial declaration of presumptive death which is not a viable
suit.
RATIO:
• Article 41 of the FC involves that presumption of death established therein is only applicable for the
purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage.
• The RTC erred in considering said petition because it was not filed for the purpose of remarriage
under the FC but Art. 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.
• Since Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, an action brought
exclusively to declare a person presumptively dead under either of the said articles actually presents
no actual controversy that a court could decide. The presumption in the said articles is already
established by law. In short, the petition is not authorized by law.
• It is unnecessary for Petitioner to file for judicial declaration of presumptive death to claim death
benefits from the PVAO or the AFP. What is only required is evidence of the claimant that the
concerned soldier had been missing for a number of years and or under the circumstance prescribed
under Art. 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.
MANUEL VS. PEOPLE
Facts:
November 7, 2001, complaint was filed in the RTC of Baguio City. The following facts were presented:
1. On April 22, 1996, Baguio City, Philippines, Eduardo P. Manuel, respondent, contracted a second
marriage with Tina Gandalera-Manuel, complainant, in RTC of Baguio City. It so appeared in the
marriage contract that Manuel was “single”.
2. Eduardo P. Manuel was previously legally married to Rubylus Gana without the said marriage having
been legally dissolved before the second marriage.
3. Tina Gandalera-Manuel did not know the existence of the first marriage of the respondent to Rubylus
Gana.
4. On July 28, 1975, Makati, Eduardo was married to Ruby.
5. On January 1996, Eduardo met Tina in Dagupan City. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio to visit
her and he proposed assuring her that he was single.
6. Starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a
year.
7. Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. He stopped giving
financial support.
8. Sometime in August 2001, Tina learned that Eduardo had been previously married.
9. Eduardo testified that he declared that he was single because he believed in good faith that his
marriage was invalid. He said he did not know he had to go to the court to seek for nullification of his
first marriage before marrying Tina. Ruby was jailed and he had not heard from her for more than 20
years.
ISSUE:
The issues of the petition are:
(1) Whether or not the CA committed reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioner’s first wife
cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration
of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code
RULING:
(1) No. The petitioner’s sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy
is misplaced. The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, is created
by law and arises without necessity of judicial declaration. However, Article 41, of the Family Code,
which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, provides that for the purpose of contracting
a subsequent marriage (under its preceding paragraph), the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in the Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
CALISTERIO V. CALISTERIO
Facts:
1. On April 1992, Teodorico died intestate leaving parcel of land with an estimated value of P 604,750
2. Teodorico was survived by his wife respondent Marietta Calisterio. Teodorico was second husband
of Marietta who had previously been married to James William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan
City.
3. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later without court declaration that James
presumptively dead.
4. On October 9, 1992 petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed a
petition entitled “In matter of Intestate Estate of the deceased Teodorico Calisterio, claiming to be inter
alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent
Marietta being bigamous and thereby null and void.
5. On January 17 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of petitioner Antonia. On
appeal the Court of Appeal rendered decision in favor of Marietta declaring her marriage to Teodorico
valid and entitling her to estate of Teodorico.
Issue:
Whether the marriage of Marietta between the deceased Teodorico valid that in turn would determine
her right as surviving spouse.
RULING:
The marriage of Marietta having contracted during the regime of the Civil Code should be thus deemed
valid notwithstanding the absence of judicial declaration of marriage of presumptive death of James
Bounds. The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, upon its dissolution with the death of
Teodorico, the property should be rightly divided one portion to the surviving spouse and the other
portion to the estate of the deceased spouse.
REPUBLIC v. GREGORIO NOLASCO required by law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of
a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead. Thus, the Decision of the Court of
Facts: Appeals affirming the trial court’s decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead
1. Respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, is hereby reversed and both Decisions are hereby nullified and set aside.
a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship’s port calls. From that chance
meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six months until
they returned to respondent’s hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his
seaman’s contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, REPUBLIC VS CA
Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
2. He obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, FACTS:
Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his
mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that
Alan Alegro, the petitioner, was married with Lea in January 1995. Lea arrived home late in February
Janet Monica had left Antique.
1995 and Alan told her that if she enjoys life of a single person, it will be better for her to go back to
3. Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked
her parents. Lea left after that fight. Allan checked if she went to her parents’ house but was not there
in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No.
and even inquired to her friends. He went back to the parents-in-law’s house and learned that Lea had
38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first
been to their house but left without notice. He then sought help from the Barangay Captain. For
met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had
sometime, Alan decided to work as part-time taxi driver and during his free time he would look for Lea
no news of Janet Monica.
in the malls. In June 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station and an alarm
4. The trial court granted Nolasco’s petition hereby declaring the presumptively death of Janet Monica
notice was issued. He also reported the disappearance in NBI on July 2001. Alan filed a petition in March
Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance.
2001 for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife.
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet
Monica Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a
ISSUE: Whether Alan has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
well founded belief for such declaration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision,
holding that respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had
already died. HELD:

Issue:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead .
Ruling:
No. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with
such diligence as to give rise to a “well-founded belief” that she is dead. Pursuant to Article 41 of the
Family Code, a marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief
The court ruled that Alan failed to prove that he has a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition
with RTC, that his spouse was dead. He failed to present a witness other than the Barangay Captain.
He even failed to present those friends of Lea which he inquired to corroborate his testimony. He also
failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Lea’s whereabouts before filing his petition
in the RTC. It could have enhanced his credibility had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about
Lea's whereabouts considering that Lea's father was the owner of Radio DYMS. He did report and seek
help of the local police authorities and NBI to locate Lea but he did so only after the OSG filed its notice
to dismiss his petition in RTC.
REPUBLIC V. GRANADA
FACTS:
Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of Sumida Electric Company, got married in 1993. In May
1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment.
Yolanda claimed that from that time, she did not receive any communication from her husband,
notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus
regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail. After 9 years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have
Cyrus declared presumptively dead with the RTC Lipa City. On February 7, 2005, the RTC rendered a
Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead. On 10 March 2005, OSG, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration arguing that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed
to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead. The motion was denied. The OSG then
elevated the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in
which the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is
immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary
appeal.
RULING:
Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is final and immediately executory. Even if the RTC erred in
granting the petition, such order can no longer be assailed. A petition for declaration of presumptive
death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of
the Family Code is a summary proceeding “as provided for” under the Family Code. Taken together,
Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of
presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately
final and executory.
RATIO:
Even if the RTC erred in ruling that therespondent was able to prove her “well-founded belief” that her
absent spouse was already dead, such order already final and can no longer be modified or reversed.
Indeed, “[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it
becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.”
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. CANTOR
FACTS:
The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as
husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato. Sometime
in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel. Thereafter, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this
was the last time that the respondent ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor
heard anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts.
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerrys disappearance, the
respondent filed before the RTC a petition for her husbands declaration of presumptive death. She
claimed that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead. Despite inquiries from her
mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors and friends, but to no
avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point to check the patients directory
whenever she went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile,
prompting her to file the petition in court.
The RTC issued an order granting the respondents petition and declaring Jerry presumptively
dead.
The CA through a petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines affirmed in
toto the latter’s order, thus:
The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 65 petition before this Court. It maintains that
although judgments of trial courts in summary judicial proceedings, including presumptive death cases,
are deemed immediately final and executory (hence, not appeal able under Article 247 of the Family
Code), this rule does not mean that they are not subject to review on certiorari.
Likewise, petitioner posited that the respondent did not have a well-founded belief to justify
the declaration of her husband’s presumptive death. It claims that the respondent failed to conduct
the requisite diligent search for her missing husband pursuant to the strict standard under Article 41
of the Family Code.
ISSUES:
1) Whether certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in petitions
for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code; and
(2) Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead.
RULING:
1. By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial
court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party
may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such
petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts.
To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the
RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum.
Hence, petitioner’s resort to certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question the
RTCs order declaring Jerry presumptively dead was proper.
2. These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required
by jurisprudence for the following reasons: (1) the respondent did not actively look for her missing
husband. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search for her husband as her hospital visits were
not planned nor primarily directed to look for him; (2) she did not report Jerrys absence to the police
nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to look for him; (3) she did not present as witnesses Jerrys
relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these
persons, from whom she allegedly made inquiries, were not even named; (4) there was no other
corroborative evidence to support the respondents claim that she conducted a diligent search. Neither
was there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-founded belief other than her bare claims
that she inquired from her friends and in-laws about her husband’s whereabouts.
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the
States policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage. Since marriage serves as the
family’s foundation and since it is the state’s policy to protect and strengthen the family as a basic
social institution, marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the parties.
Santos vs. Santos
FACTS:
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J.Santos
(Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a
petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on June 15,
2007. Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.
Ricardo alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. He went to Celerina's parents in
Cubao, Quezon City, but they did not know their daughter's whereabouts. He also inquired about her
from other relatives and friends, but no one gave him any information. Ricardo claimed that it was
almost 12 years from the date of his RegionalTrial Court petition since Celerina left. He believed that
she had passed away.
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008
when she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other
appropriate remedies. On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment
before theCourt of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that
she was deprived her day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence,
misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac City. According to Celerina, her true
residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City. This residence had been her
and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008. As a result of Ricardo's
misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition declaring
her presumptively dead. Celerina claimed that all the allegations of Ricardo were fraudulent, that she
never resided in Tarlac and never left to work as a domestic helper abroad. Further, she also claimed
that it was not true that she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she never left their
conjugal dwelling in Quezon City. It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with
another woman. Celerina referred to a joint affidavit executed by their children to support her
contention that Ricardo made false allegations in his petition. Celerina also argued that the court did
not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it had never been published in a newspaper.
She added that the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not
furnished copies of Ricardo's petition.
The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008, dismissing Celerina's
petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy. According to the Court of
Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her
reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code.
Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not Court of Appelas erred in dismissing Celerina’s petition on the ground that the proper
remedy is to file a sworn statement before the civil registry declaring her reappearance as stated in
Article 42 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Yes. Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order,
or resolution has become final, and the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. The grounds for
annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
This court defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi. For fraud to become a basis
for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts
pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could
have been litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which
prevents a party from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair
submission of the controversy.
The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain admissions,
presumptions, and conditions. The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for
four consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the absent
spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the subsistence of
another marriage. The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being
terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when he or she reappears. Moreover, a close reading of
the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is
subject to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice
to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance
must either be undisputed or judicially determined. The existence of these conditions means that
reappearance does not always immediately cause the subsequent marriage's termination.
Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause the termination of the
subsequent marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the Family Code are present. Hence,
the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or presumptively dead spouse's
reappearance (1) if the first marriage has already been annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if
the sworn statement of the reappearance is not recorded in the civil registry of the subsequent
spouses' residence; (3) if there is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of reappearance
is disputed in the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet rendered confirming, such fact of
reappearance. When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive
death, a presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that the second
marriage is legal. This presumption should prevail over the continuance of the marital relations with
the first spouse. The second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid. The burden of proof to
show that the first marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity of the
second marriage. The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of determining the
status of the second marriage and the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other
spouse was absent.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent
marriage may be considered valid when the following are present: (1) The prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years; (2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead; (3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse; and (4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse. A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court
declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that the spouse is
already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as validly terminated. Marriages contracted
prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and void.
Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law. Therefore, the party who
contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not immune from an action to declare his
subsequent marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage during the subsistence
of another marriage still applies.
The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the termination of
the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was declared presumptively dead from
availing other remedies existing in law. This court had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent marriage
may also be terminated by filing "an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and
obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage Celerina seeks not
merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects. She contends
that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the subsequent marriage
but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family
Code is valid until terminated, the "children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the
property relations of the spouses in such marriage will be the same as in valid marriages. If it is
terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the
termination shall still be considered legitimate. Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is
a defense against prosecution for bigamy. However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages may be filed solely by the husband or wife." This means that even if Celerina is a real
party in interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the second
marriage, this remedy is not available to her. Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the
subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the
subsequent
marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice to file an
action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.
Disposition:
The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for determination of the existence of
extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity or annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of
the petition.
REPUBLIC v. EDNA ORCELINO-VILLANUEVA
FACTS:
Edna worked as a domestic helper in Singapore in 1992 while her husband worked as a
mechanic in Valencia, Bukidnon. The two got married on December 21, 1978, in Iligan City. While she
was in Singapore(1993) , her children informed her that her husband left their home without telling
them his whereabouts. Due to this news, she was prompted to go back to the Philippines to look and
find his husband. Edna searched and made inquiries about her husband thru their common friends,
and parents-in-law in Iligan and Valencia City and even went far as to his birthplace in Negros Oriental.
15 years later she filed to the RTC a petition to declare Romeo presumptively dead under
Article 41 of the Family Code. During the trial, she was presented as the lone witness.
RTC grants her petition.
The OSG thru a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questioned the decision of
the RTC on the ground that the conclusions reached by the RTC were in direct opposition to established
jurisprudence, as ruled by the Court in Republic v. Nolasco, and U.S. v. Biasbas.
CA dismissed the OSG’s petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the strict standard approach were followed by Edna before she filed a petition for
declaration of presumptive death of her husband.
RULING:
NO. Edna claimed that she made diligent search and inquiries to find her husband but it was
found out that it was all consisted of bare assertions without any corroborative evidence on record.
Edna did not present additional witnesses (her children, their common friends, parents-in-law) but
herself alone. There was not even any attempt to seek the aid of the authorities at the time her
husband disappeared.
Therefore, The petition of respondent Edna Orcelino-Villanueva to have her husband declared
presumptively dead is DENIED.
Republic vs Tampus GR 214243
FACTS:
Respondent Nilda B. Tampus was married to Dante L. Del Mundo on November 29, 1975.
Three days thereafter, or on December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the AFP, left respondent, and went
to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. The couple had no children. Since then, Nilda heard no news from
Dante. She tried everything to locate him, but her efforts proved futile. On April 14, 2009, she filed
before the RTC a petition to declare Dante as presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage,
alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three (33) years without any kind of communication from him,
she firmly believes that he is already dead.
ISSUE: W/N Dante should be declared presumptively dead
RULING:
NO. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-
founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 4119 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive
death: (1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down
in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry; (3) that the present
spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4) that the present spouse files a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that
his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that
based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse
is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As such, the mere absence
of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of any news that such absentee spouse
is still alive, failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not
suffice.
In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by making
inquiries with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also
did not know where to find him. Other than making said inquiries, however, Nilda made no further
efforts to find her husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request
information about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of the authorities
or the AFP itself in finding him. Considering her own pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP
on a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his disappearance, she could have inquired from the
AFP on the status of the said mission, or from the members of the AFP who were assigned thereto. To
the Court's mind, therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing husband, and her purported
earnest efforts to find him by asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict
standard and degree of diligence required to create a "well-founded belief of his death.
Republic of the Phils. Vs. Ludyson C. Catubag
FACTS:
1. Private Respondent Ludyson and Shanaviv were cohabiting with each other as husband and wife,
and had 2 children together.
2. Ludyson and Shanaviv eventually married in 2003. The marriage was solemnized by a Municipal
Judge in Rizal, Cagayan.
3. Sometime in 2006, while Ludyson was working abroad, Shanaviv left their house and never returned
(Ludyson’s relatives took care of the children).
4. Ludyson flew back home and proceeded to look for his wife. He inquired with close friends and
relatives and even travelled as far as Bicol, where he wife was born and raised, but to no avail. He also
searched various hospitals and funeral parlors, also to no avail.
5. Ludyson subsequently sought the help of Bombo Radyo to broadcast the fact of his wife’s
disappearance.
6. In 2012, Ludyson filed a petition with the RTC to have his wife declared presumptively dead.
7. The RTC granted the petition.
8. Petitioner, through the office of the SolGen, elevated the case to the CA via Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65, contending that Ludyson failed to establish a well-founded belief that his wife was
already dead.
9. The CA dismissed the petition, ruling that Petitioner should have filed a MR with the RTC. The
Petitioner filed a MR but the CA denied the same.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Petitioner’s resort to an appeal to the CA under Rule 65 is proper.
2. Whether the Private Respondent has complied with the requisites of a
petition for declaration of presumptive death under Art. 41 of the Family
Code.
RULING:
1. YES. The nature of the proceeding determines the appropriate remedy or remedies available.
Under Art. 41 of the Family Code, a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary
proceeding. Art 253 of the same Code likewise characterizes proceedings under Art. 41 as summary
proceedings. As a consequence of this summary nature, parties cannot seek reconsideration, nor
appeal decision in summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code because these judgments are
immediately final and executory by express mandate of law. However, parties may challenge the
decision in such proceedings through a petition for certiorari to question grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. As previously held by the Court in Republic vs. Sareňogon, Jr., in a
summary proceeding for the declaration for presumptive death, if a party is aggrieved by the decision
of the RTC, then a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 should be filed with the CA. any subsequent
decision by the CA may be elevated to the SC via Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
2. NO. There are 4 requisites under Art. 41 that must be complied with for the
declaration of presumptive death to prosper:
1. The absent spouse has been missing for 4 consecutive years, or 2 if such spouse was in danger
of death when the disappearance occurred;
2. The present spouse wants to remarry;
3. The present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. The present spouse files for a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee.
In this case, Ludyson has complied with the 1st, 2nd, and 4th requisites, nut has not satisfied the
3rd requisite as he has not established a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead. Such belief
must result from diligent efforts to locate the absent spouse. Ludyson failed to establish his allegations.
He did not present the friends and family he claims to have made inquiries to. While he did have a
certification from Bombo Radyo’s manager, he did not seek help from government agencies like the
police or NBI. Ludyson’s assertion, uncorroborated by evidence, falls short of the diligence required to
engender a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated May 23, 2013 of the Regional
Trial Court of Tuao, Cagayan, Branch 11 and the Resolutions dated September 3, 2013 and December
6, 2013 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 131269 are hereby ANNULED and SET
ASIDE. Consequently, the petition of private respondent Ludyson C. Catubag to have his wife, Shanaviv
G. Alvarez Catubag, declared presumptively dead is DENIED. SO ORDERED.