PART I – INTRODUCTION
With ordinary foresight, the
TO TORTS AND DAMAGES
TEODORO C. UMALI vs. HON. ANGEL
BACANI
G.R. No. L-40570
January 30, 1976
FACTS:
On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit
the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan.
During the storm, the banana plants standing
near the transmission line of the Alcala
Electric Plant (AEP) were blown down and
fell on the electric wire. The live electric wire
was cut, one end of which was left hanging
on the electric post and the other fell to the
ground. The following morning, barrio
captain saw Cipriano Baldomero, a labourer
of the AEP, asked him to fix it, but the latter
told the barrio captain that he could not do it
but that he was going to look for the lineman
to fix it. Sometime thereafter, a small boy of
3 years and 8 months old by the name of
Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just on the
opposite side of the road, went to the place
where the broken line wire was and got in
contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and
he subsequently died. It was only after the
electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.
ISSUES: (1) WON the proximate cause of
the boy's death is due to a fortuitous event-
storm; (2) WON boy’s parents’ negligence
exempts petitioner from liability.
RULING: Decision affirmed.
(1) A careful examination of the records
convinces the SC that a series of negligence
on the part of defendants' employees in the
AEP resulted in the death of the victim by
electrocution.
employees of the petitioner could have easily
seen that even in case of moderate winds the
electric line would be endangered by banana
plants being blown down.
(2) Art. 2179 CC provides that if the
negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the
victim in this case) was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendants' (petitioners’) lack of
due care, the plaintiff may recover damages,
but the courts shall mitigate the damages to
be awarded. This law may be availed of by
the petitioner but does not exempt him from
liability. Petitioner's liability for injury
caused by his employee’s negligence is well
defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.
PICART vs. SMITH, JR.
G.R. No. L-12219
March 15, 1918
FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La
Union. Picart was riding on his pony over
said bridge. Before he had gotten half way
across, Smith approached from the opposite
direction in an automobile. As the defendant
neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and
blew his horn to give warning of his
approach. He continued his course and after
he had taken the bridge he gave two more
successive blasts, as it appeared to him that
the man on horseback before him was not
observing the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard
the warning signals. However, being
perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or
the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the
pony closely up against the railing on the
right side of the bridge instead of going to the
left. He says that the reason he did this was
that he thought he did not have sufficient time
to get over to the other side. As the
automobile approached, Smith guided it
toward his left, that being the proper side of
the road for the machine. In so doing the
defendant assumed that the horseman would
move to the other side. Seeing that the pony
was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead
of veering to the right while yet some
distance away or slowing down, continued to
approach directly toward the horse without
diminution of speed. When he had gotten
quite near, there being then no possibility of
the horse getting across to the other side, the
defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently
to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in
so doing the automobile passed in such close
proximity to the animal that it became
frightened and turned its body across the
bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was
broken. The horse fell and its rider was
thrown off with some violenceAs a result of
its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff
received contusions which caused temporary
unconsciousness and required medical
attention for several days.
From a judgment of the CFI of La Union
absolving Smith from liability Picart has
appealed.
ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of
negligence such as gives rise to a civil
obligation to repair the damage done
HELD: the judgment of the lower court must
be reversed, and judgment is here rendered
that the Picart recover of Smith damages
YES
The test by which to determine the existence
of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that person
would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence. The existence
of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before
him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the
man of ordinary intelligence and prudence
and determines liability by that. The question
as to what would constitute the conduct of a
prudent man in a given situation must of
course be always determined in the light of
human experience and in view of the facts
involved in the particular case.
Could a prudent man, in the case under
consideration, foresee harm as a result of the
course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty
of the actor to take precautions to guard
against that harm. Reasonable foresight of
harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion
born of this prevision, is always necessary
before negligence can be held to exist. Stated
in these terms, the proper criterion for
determining the existence of negligence in a
given case is this: Conduct is said to be
negligent when a prudent man in the position
of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an
effect harmful to another was sufficiently
probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or
guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the
defendant in the present case we think that
negligence is clearly established. A prudent
man, placed in the position of the defendant,
would in our opinion, have recognized that
the course which he was pursuing was
fraught with risk, and would therefore have
foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as
reasonable consequence of that course.
Under these circumstances the law imposed
on the Smith the duty to guard against the
threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff
himself was not free from fault, for he was
guilty of antecedent negligence in planting
himself on the wrong side of the road. But as
we have already stated, Smith was also
negligent; and in such case the problem
always is to discover which agent is
immediately and directly responsible. It will
be noted that the negligent acts of the two
parties were not contemporaneous, since the
negligence of the defendant succeeded the
negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable
interval. Under these circumstances the law
is that the person who has the last fair chance
to avoid the impending harm and fails to do
so is chargeable with the consequences,
without reference to the prior negligence of
the other party.
LILIUS, ET AL. vs. THE MANILA
RAILROAD COMPANY
G.R. No. L-39587
March 24, 1934
FACTS: Lilius was driving with his wife and
daughter for sightseeing in Pagsanjan
Laguna. It was his first time in the area and
he was entirely unacquainted with the
conditions of the road and had no knowledge
of the existence of a railroad crossing. Before
reaching the crossing in question, there was
nothing to indicate its existence and, it was
impossible to see an approaching train. At
about seven or eight meters from the crossing
the plaintiff saw an autotruck parked on the
left side of the road. Several people, who
seemed to have alighted from the said truck,
were walking on the opposite side. He slowed
down and sounded his horn for the people to
get out of the way. With his attention thus
occupied, he did not see the crossing but he
heard two short whistles. Immediately
afterwards, he saw a huge black mass fling
itself upon him, which turned out to be
locomotive No. 713 of the MRC’s train. The
locomotive struck the plaintiff’s car right in
the center. The 3 victims were injured and
were hospitalized.
Lilus filed a case against MRC in the CFI.
Answering the complaint, it denies each and
every allegation thereof and, by way of
special defense, alleges that the Lilius, with
the cooperation of his wife and coplaintiff,
negligently and recklessly drove his car, and
prays that it be absolved from the complaint.
The CFI decided in favor of Lilius. The 2
parties appealed said decision, each assigning
errors on said judgement.
ISSUE:
WON Manila Railroad Company is liable for
damages
WON the sums of money fixed by the court a
quo as indemnities for damages proper
Injuries sutained by Lilius
for injuries sustained by wife and child
for loss of domestic service of wife to
husband
HELD: The judgment appealed from is
affirmed in toto, with the sole modification
on interest to be added on the indemnity in
favor of Lilius.
1. YES

Upon examination of the oral as well as of the
documentary evidence, this court is of the
opinion that the accident was due to
negligence on the part of the defendant-
appellant company alone, for not having had
on that occasion any semaphore at the
crossing to serve as a warning to passers-by
of its existence in order that they might take
the necessary precautions before crossing the
railroad; and, on the part of its employees —
the flagman and switchman, for not having
remained at his post at the crossing in
question to warn passers-by of the
approaching train
Although it is probable that the defendant-
appellant entity employed the diligence of a
good father of a family in selecting its
aforesaid employees, however, it did not
employ such diligence in supervising their
work and the discharge of their duties. The
diligence of a good father of a family, which
the law requires in order to avoid damage, is
not confined to the careful and prudent
selection of subordinates or employees but
includes inspection of their work and
supervision of the discharge of their duties.
2.
a. With respect to the plaintiffs’ appeal, the
first question to be decided is that raised by
Lilius relative to the insufficiency of the sum
of P5,000 which the trial court adjudicated to
him by way of indemnity for damages
consisting in the loss of his income as
journalist and author as a result of his illness.
As to the amount of P10,000 claimed by
Lilius as damages for the loss of his wife’s
services in his business, which services
consisted in going over his writings,
translating them into foreign languages and
acting as his secretary, in addition to the fact
that such services formed part of the work
whereby he realized a net monthly income of
P1,500, there is no sufficient evidence of the
true value of said services nor to the effect
that he needed them during her illness and
had to employ a translator to act in her stead.
b. Taking into consideration the fact that the
wife — in the language of the court, which
saw her at the trial — “young and beautiful
and the big scar, which she has on her
forehead caused by the lacerated wound
received by her from the accident, disfigures
her face and that the fracture of her left leg
has caused a permanent deformity which
renders it very difficult for her to walk”, and
taking into further consideration her social
standing, neither is the sum adjudicated to her
for patrimonial and moral damages,
excessive.
As to the indemnity in favor of the child
neither is the same excessive, taking into
consideration the fact that the lacerations
received by her have left deep scars that
permanently disfigure her face and that the
fractures of both her legs permanently render
it difficult for her to walk freely, continuous
extreme care being necessary in order to keep
her balance in addition to the fact that all of
this unfavorably and to a great extent affect
her matrimonial future.
c. Lilius also seeks to recover the sum of
P2,500 for the loss of what is called Anglo-
Saxon common law “consortium” of his wife,
that is, “her services, society and conjugal
companionship”, as a result of personal
injuries which she had received from the
accident now under consideration.
Under the law and the doctrine of this court,
one of the husband’s rights is to count on his
wife’s assistance. This assistance comprises
the management of the home and the
performance of household duties. However,
nowadays when women, in their desire to be
more useful to society and to the nation, are
demanding greater civil rights and are
aspiring to become man’s equal in all the
activities of life, marriage has ceased to
create the presumption that a woman
complies with the duties to her husband and
children, which the law imposes upon her,
and he who seeks to collect indemnity for
damages resulting from deprivation of her
domestic services must prove such services.
In the case under consideration, apart from
the services of his wife as translator and
secretary, the value of which has not been
proven, Lilius has not presented any evidence
showing the existence of domestic services
and their nature, rendered by her prior to the
accident, in order that it may serve as a basis
in estimating their value.
Furthermore, inasmuch as a wife’s domestic
assistance and conjugal companionship are
purely personal and voluntary acts which
neither of the spouses may be compelled to
render, it is necessary for the party claiming
indemnity for the loss of such services to
prove that the person obliged to render them
had done so before he was injured and that he
would be willing to continue rendering them
had he not been prevented from so doing
NOTES:
However, in order that a victim of an accident
may recover indemnity for damages from the
person liable therefor, it is not enough that the
latter has been guilty of negligence, but it is
also necessary that the said victim has not,
through his own negligence, , contributed to
the accident.
It appears that Lilius took all precautions
which his skill and the presence of his wife
and child, driving his car at a speed which
prudence demanded according to the
circumstances and conditions of the road,
slackening his speed in the face of an obstacle
and blowing his horn upon seeing persons on
the road. If he failed to stop, look and listen
before going over the crossing, in spite of the
fact that he was driving at 12 miles per hour
after having been free from obstacles, it was
because, his attention having been occupied
in attempting to go ahead, he did not see the
crossing in question, nor anything, nor
anybody indicating its existence, as he knew
nothing about it beforehand. The first and
only warning, which he received of the
impending danger, was two short blows from
the whistle of the locomotive immediately
preceding the collision and when the accident
had already become inevitable.
Preciolita V. Corliss V. The Manila
Railroad Co.
G.R. No. L-21291
March 28, 1969
FACTS: Feb 21, 1957 near midnight:
although the conductor applied the brakes
Ralph W. Corliss' jeep collided with a
locomotive of Manila Railroad Company in
his eagerness to beat, despite the tooting of
the horn and the oncoming locomotive, took
the risk and attempted to reach the other side,
but unfortunately he became the victim of his
own miscalculation case was filed by
Preciolita V. Corliss, 21 year old widow
ISSUE: W/N the Manila Railroad Co. is
negligent

HELD: NO. Decision is affirmed negligence

- The failure to observe for the protection of
the interests of another person that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstance justly demand whereby such
other person suffers injury.

Negligence is want of the care required by the

circumstances. It is a relative or comparative,
not an absolute term and its application
depends upon the situation of the parties and
the degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstances reasonably require. Where the
danger is great, a high degree of care is
necessary, and the failure to observe it is a
want of ordinary care under the
circumstances.

The weight of authorities is to the effect that

a railroad track is in itself a warning or a
signal of danger to those who go upon it, and
that those who, for reasons of their own,
ignore such warning, do so at their own risk
and responsibility Corliss Jr., who
undoubtedly had crossed the checkpoint
frequently, if not daily, must have known that
locomotive engines and trains usually pass at
that particular crossing where the accident
had taken place it was incumbent upon him
to avoid a possible accident — and this
consisted simply in stopping his vehicle
before the crossing and allowing the train to
move on. A prudent man under similar
circumstances would have acted in this
manner.