ELECTION LAW

1. CAGAS V. COMELEC
- Cagas, while he was representative of the first legislative district of Davao del
Sur, filed with Hon. Franklin Bautista, then representative of the 2nd legislative
district of the same province a bill creating the province of Davao Occidental
(H.B. No. 4451)
o It was signed into law as R.A. No. 10360, the Charter of the Province
of Davao Occidental.
- Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360 provides for the date of the holding of a plebiscite
o The Province of Davao Occidental shall be created, as provided for in
this Charter, upon approval by the majority of the votes cast by the
voters of the affected areas in a plebiscite to be conducted and
supervised by the COMELEC within 60 days from the date of the
effectivity of this Charter.
- As early as 27 November 2012, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, the
COMELEC suspended the conduct of all plebiscites as a matter of policy and
in view of the preparations for the 13 May 2013 National and Local Elections.
- During a meeting held on 31 July 2013, the COMELEC decided to hold the
plebiscite for the creation of Davao Occidental simultaneously with the 28
October 2013 Barangay Elections to save on expenses.
- Cagas filed a petition for prohibition, contending that the COMELEC is without
authority to amend or modify section 46 of RA 10360 by mere resolution
because it is only Congress who can do so thus, COMELEC's act of suspending
the plebiscite is unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it resolved to hold
the plebiscite for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental on 28 October 2013,
simultaneous with the Barangay Elections?
- Section 10, Article X of the Constitution emphasizes the direct exercise by the
people of their sovereignty.
o After the legislative branch’s enactment of a law to create, divide,
merge or alter the boundaries of a local government unit or units, the
people in the local government unit or units directly affected vote in a
plebiscite to register their approval or disapproval of the change.
- The Constitution does not specify a date as to when plebiscites should be held.
o This is in contrast with its provisions for the election of members of
the legislature in Section 8, 4, Article VII.
o The Constitution recognizes that the power to fix date of elections is
legislative in nature, which is shown by the exceptions in previously
mentioned Constitutional provisions, as well as in the election of local
government officials.
2. SEVILLA V. COMELEC
Doctrine:
Section 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. – When the Commission en banc is
equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be
reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be
dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment
or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or
motion shall be denied.
Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure specifically states that if
the opinion of the COMELEC En Banc is equally divided, the case shall be
reheard.
RE- CONSULTATION RE-HEARING

HELD: No, the COMELEC’s power to administer elections includes the power to
conduct a plebiscite beyond the schedule prescribed by law. A re-consultation means a 2nd Rehearing is defined as a "2nd
- The conduct of a plebiscite is necessary for the creation of a province. deliberation of persons on some consideration of cause for purpose
- Sections 10 and 11 of Article X of the Constitution provide that: subject. of calling to court's or administrative
o No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, board's attention any error,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in Re-consultation involves a re- omission, or oversight in first
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code evaluation of the issues and consideration. A retrial of issues
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite arguments already on hand only by presumes notice to parties entitled
in the political units directly affected. the members of the tribunal, without thereto and opportunity for them to
o The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political the participation of the parties be heard.
subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof.
The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic A rehearing clearly presupposes the
autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executive and participation of the opposing parties
legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority for the purpose of presenting
that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring additional evidence, if any, and
coordination.
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further clarifying and amplifying
their arguments
Issue: WON COMELEC en banc's Resolution must be reheard?
Held: YES
- Sevilla and So were candidates for the Bgy. Chairman position (Bgy. Sucat,
Muntinlupa City) during the 2010 BGY and SK elections.
- Sevilla was proclaimed the winner with a winning margin of 628 votes over So.
- So filed an election protest with the MeTC based on the ff:
o electoral fraud,
o anomalies and irregularities and
o prayed for the manual revision of the ballots.
- MeTC dismissed the election protest after the recount of the ballots.
- Instead of filing a notice of appeal, So filed MR, which was later on denied, for
being a prohibited pleading.
- A certiorari petition was then filed with the COMELEC, alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the MeTC Judge.
- The COMELEC 2nd division granted the certiorari petition which was affirmed
by COMELEC EB, by a vote of 3-3. It found that the MeTC judge committed
GADALEJ in
o Not complying with the mandatory requirements on the form of the
decision in election protests involving pairs or groups of ballots written
by 2 persons, and for
o Failure to mention in her appreciation of the ballots that she examined
the Minutes of Voting and Counting to ascertain whether there were
illiterate voters or assisted voters in the protested precincts.
- Hence, this Rule 65 petition filed by Sevilla, contending the ff:
o Dismissal was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion since the
MeTC Judge complied with the rules; she made clear, specific and
detailed explanations pertaining to the specific strokes, figures or
letters showing that the ballots had been written by one person,
o COMELEC had loss of jurisdiction to entertain the petition after the
court a quo's dismissal order became final and executory due to So's
wrong choice of remedy
- So notes that the assailed October 6, 2012 EB Resolution was deliberated upon
only by 6 Commissioners because the 7th Commissioner had not yet been
appointed by the President at that time.
- Considering that the Resolution was not a majority decision by the COMELEC
en banc, So prays for the dismissal of the petition so that it can be remanded to
the COMELEC for a rehearing by a full and complete Commission.
- In the present case, while the October 6, 2012 Resolution of the COMELEC
en banc appears to have affirmed the COMELEC 2nd Division's Resolution
and, in effect, denied Sevilla's motion for reconsideration, the equally divided
voting between three Commissioners concurring and three Commissioners
dissenting is not the majority vote that the Constitution and the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure require for a valid pronouncement of the assailed October
6, 2012 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc.
- In essence, based on the 3-3 voting, the COMELEC en banc did not sustain the
COMELEC 2nd Division's findings on the basis of the three concurring votes
by Commissioners Tagle, Velasco and Yusoph;
- Conversely, it also did not overturn the COMELEC 2nd Division on the basis
of the three dissenting votes by Chairman Brillantes, Commissioner Sarmiento
and Commissioner Lim, as either side was short of one (1) vote to obtain a
majority decision.
- Recall that under Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, a majority
vote of all the members of the Commission en banc is necessary to arrive
at a ruling.
- In other words, the vote of 4 members must always be attained in order
to decide, irrespective of the number of Commissioners in attendance.
- Thus, for all intents and purposes, the assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution
of the COMELEC en banc had no legal effect whatsoever except to
convey that the COMELEC failed to reach a decision and that further
action is required.
- The October 6, 2012 COMELEC en banc's Resolution must be reheard
pursuant to the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
- To break the legal stalemate in case the opinion is equally divided among
the members of the COMELEC en banc, Section 6, Rule 18 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure mandates a rehearing where parties are
given the opportunity anew to strengthen their respective positions or
arguments and convince the members of the COMELEC en banc of the
merit of their case.
- In the present case, it appears from the records that the COMELEC en banc
did not issue an Order for a rehearing of the case in view of the filing in the
interim of the present petition for certiorari by Sevilla.
- In both the cases of Juliano and Marcoleta, cited above, the SC remanded the
cases to the COMELEC en banc for the conduct of the required rehearing
pursuant to the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
 ELECTION LAW
- Based on these considerations, the SC thus find that a remand of this case is
necessary for the COMELEC en banc to comply with the rehearing requirement
of Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
3. BARRO V. COMELEC
- The case is a Petition for certiorari alleging that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the orders dating Nov 25, 2008 and Jan 9, 2009.
o The 2008 order dismissed petitioner’s appeal for failure to pay the
appeal fee prescribed by the COMELEC rules of procedure within the
reglementary period.
o While the 2009 order denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
- Petitioner and respondent, Continedas were candidates for Brgy. Captain in
Plaridel Leyte in 2007.
o Petitioner garnered 150 votes while respondent garnered 149 votes
o Petitioner was proclaimed.
- On Nov 2007, respondent filed a protest before the MTC impugning the result
of the canvass in 2 precincts of the Brgy.
- After revision of ballots the MTC found that petitioner and respondent both
garnered 151 votes.
o MTC: since they received same number of votes there shall be a
drawing of lots and the party favored by luck shall be proclaimed the
winner.
- Petitioner filed an appeal and stated on the petition that she has paid the appeal
fee required under Sec 9 Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests
before the Court Involving Elective Municipal and Brgy officials.
- Nov 25, 2008, the COMELEC issued an ordered dismissing the appeal for
failure to pay the appeal fee in the amount of 3k, within the period to file the
notice of appeal (non payment constitutes a ground for the dismissal of appeal.
- Petitioner filed an MR and on the same dated also posted Postal Money orders
in the total sum of 3.2k payable to the Cash Division of the COMELEC to cover
the appeal fee  MR was still denied.
Issue: WON the COMELEC first division committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the petition. – YES
Held: Based on petitioner’s pleadings and the fact that the MTC gave due course to
petitioner’s appeal, it may be presumed that petitioner paid the appeal fee of 1K to the
trial court simultaneously with the filing of the Notice of Appeal, despite absence of the
receipt showing payment of the appeal fee of 1K.
- The appeal to the COMELEC of the trial court's decision in election
contests involving municipal and barangay officials is perfected upon the
filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of the 1K appeal fee to the
court that rendered the decision within the five-day reglementary period.
- The non-payment or the insufficient payment of the additional appeal fee
of ₱3,200.00 to the COMELEC Cash Division, in accordance with Rule
40, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, does
not affect the perfection of the appeal and does not result in outright or
ipso facto dismissal of the appeal.
o Following, Rule 22, Section 9 (a) of the COMELEC Rules, the
appeal may be dismissed.
o And pursuant to Rule 40, Section 18 of the same rules, if the fees
are not paid, the COMELEC may refuse to take action thereon
until they are paid and may dismiss the action or the proceeding.
o In such a situation, the COMELEC is merely given the
discretion to dismiss the appeal or not.
- Accordingly, in the instant case, the COMELEC First Division, may dismiss
petitioner's appeal, as it in fact did, for petitioner's failure to pay the ₱3,200.00
appeal fee.
- Be that as it may, the SC still finds that the COMELEC First Division gravely
abused its discretion in issuing the order dismissing petitioner's appeal.
o The SC notes that the notice of appeal and the 1K appeal fee
were, respectively, filed and paid with the MTC of Kapatagan,
Lanao del Norte on April 21, 2008.
o On that date, the petitioner's appeal was deemed perfected.
o COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8486 clarifying the rule on the
payment of appeal fees only on July 15, 2008, or almost three
months after the appeal was perfected.
o Yet, on July 31, 2008, or barely 2 weeks after the issuance of
Resolution No. 8486, the COMELEC First Division dismissed
petitioner's appeal for non-payment to the COMELEC Cash
Division of the additional ₱3,200.00 appeal fee.
- Considering that petitioner filed his appeal months before the clarificatory
resolution on appeal fees, petitioner's appeal should not be unjustly
prejudiced by COMELEC Resolution No. 8486.
o Fairness and prudence dictate that the COMELEC First
Division should have first directed petitioner to pay the
additional appeal fee in accordance with the clarificatory
resolution, and if the latter should refuse to comply, then, and
only then, dismiss the appeal.
o Instead, the COMELEC First Division hastily dismissed the
appeal on the strength of the recently promulgated clarificatory
resolution — which had taken effect only a few days earlier. This
unseemly haste is an invitation to outrage.
- It must be stated, however, that for notices of appeal filed after the promulgation
on July 27, 2009 of Divinagracia v. COMELEC, errors in the matter of non-
payment or incomplete payment of the 2 appeal fees in election cases are no
longer excusable.
 ELECTION LAW
2nd Issue: WON the COMELEC first division committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in acting on the MR without elevating
the same to the COMELEC en banc, and in denying the MR. – YES
- It is settled that under Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, what may
be brought to this Court on certiorari is the decision, order or ruling of
the COMELEC en banc. However, this rule should not apply when a
division of the COMELEC arrogates unto itself and deprives the en banc
of the authority to rule on a motion for reconsideration, like in this case.
- Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution provides for the procedure for the
resolution of election cases by the COMELEC, thus:
o The COMELEC may sit en banc or in 2 divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of
election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
- The constitutional provision is reflected in Sections 5 and 6, Rule 19 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure as follows:
o Sec. 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed of. — Upon the
filing of a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling
of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall, within twenty-four
(24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner.
The latter shall within 2 (2) days thereafter certify the case to the
Commission en banc.
o Sec. 6. Duty of Clerk of Court of Commission to Calendar Motion for
Reconsideration. — The Clerk of Court concerned shall calendar the
motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en
banc within ten (10) days from the certification thereof.
- In this case, the First Division of the COMELEC violated the cited provisions
of the Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure when it resolved
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of its final Order dated November 25,
2008, which dismissed petitioner’s appeal.
- By arrogating unto itself a power constitutionally lodged in the Commission en
banc, the First Division of the COMELEC exercised judgment in excess of, or
without, jurisdiction. Hence, the Order issued by the First Division of the
COMELEC dated January 9, 2009, denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, is null and void.
4. KABATAAN PARTY-LIST V. COMELEC
DOCTRINE: The requirement for biometrics validation before being able to vote is not
a “qualification” to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the
registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably regulate.
FACTS
- Former president Benigno Aquino III signed into law RA 10367, mandating the
COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics registration system for new
voters in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and updated list of
voters through the adoption of biometric technology.
- "registered voters whose biometrics have not been captured shall submit
themselves for validation." and
- "Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing
of application for registration for purposes of the May 2016 Elections shall
be deactivated."
- COMELEC issued Resolution No. 972116 which serves as the implementing
rules and regulations of RA 10367, thus, prescribing the procedure for
validation, deactivation, and reactivation of voters' registration records (VRRs).
o “the registration records of voters without biometrics data who failed
to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of
applications for registration for the purpose of the National and Local
Elections shall be deactivated”
- Petitioners filed the instant petition with application for TRO + writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing the constitutionality of the
biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA 10367.
o They contend that the biometrics requirement rises to the level of an
additional qualification with a penalty of deactivation, and the latter is
not a valid form of disqualification.
o Such requirement violates the 1987 Constitution, considering that,
applying the strict scrutiny test, it is not poised with a compelling
reason for state regulation and hence, an unreasonable deprivation of
the right to suffrage
ISSUE: WON the requirement of biometric validation before a citizen can vote is
an unconstitutional requirement of literacy and property –
HELD: NO
- The SC ruled in favor of the COMELEC
o Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution delineates the current
parameters for the exercise of suffrage;
 1st,, he must be a Filipino citizen;
 2nd, he must not be disqualified by law; and
 Third, he must have resided in the Philippines for at least 1
year and in the place wherein he proposes to vote for at least
6 months immediately preceding the election.
- Petitioners' claim that biometrics validation imposed under RA 10367 is
unconstitutional, must fail.
o Under Section 2 (d) of RA 10367, "validation" is defined as "the
process of taking the biometrics of registered voters whose biometrics
have not yet been captured."
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o Thus it is apparent that this requirement is not a "qualification"
to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the
registration procedure, of which the State has the right to
reasonably regulate.
o It was institutionalized conformant to the limitations of the 1987
Constitution and is a mere complement to the existing Voter's
Registration Act of 1996.
- In the case of Akbayan-Youth vs. COMELEC, the Court held that “the state
may enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the
ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election”
- In sum, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a
literacy, property or other substantive requirement as contemplated by the
Framers of the Constitution - that is, one which propagates a socio-economic
standard which is bereft of any rational basis to a person's ability to intelligently
cast his vote and to further the public good - the same cannot be struck down
as unconstitutional, as in this case.
5. MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO V. COMELEC
- 2 Jul 2009: Petitioner Magdalo filed for registration/accreditation as a regional
political party with the COMELEC, for participation in the 10 May 2010
National and Local Elections as a party-list group.
- COMELEC denied Petition filed by MAGDALO, holding that the participation
of the party’s organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, in the
Oakwood Mutiny shows their purpose in employing violence and using unlawful
means to achieve their goals in the process defying the laws of organized
societies, in violation of Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution.
- MAGDALO filed an MR, which was eventually denied by the COMELEC en
banc, hence the instant suit.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the
Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks
to achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means – NO
HELD: The COMELEC Resolutions are sustained.
- Liberal Party v. COMELEC:
o To join political contests, candidates—and political parties—must
comply with a 2-step process:
 Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for
purposes of our election laws;
 Accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the privileged
participation that our election laws grant to qualified
registered parties
 Accreditation can only be granted to a registered
political party, organization or coalition; stated
otherwise, a registration must first take place before
a request for accreditation can be made.
o Once registration has been carried out, accreditation is the next natural
step to follow.
- Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations
and coalitions that "seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful
means" shall be denied registration.
- This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that
"no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be
entitled to accreditation."
- Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the
accompaniment of vehemence, outrage or fury.
- It also denotes physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force
which is employed against common right, against the laws, and against public
liberty.
- On the other hand, an unlawful act is one that is contrary to law and need not
be a crime, considering that the latter must still unite with evil intent for it to
exist.
- The power vested by the Constitution and BP 881 in the COMELEC to register
political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the
elections is purely administrative in character.
- In exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether the party
or organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by
employing acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal
in nature.
- Although this process does not entail any determination of administrative
liability, as it is only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for registration,
the ruling of this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo is nonetheless analogously
applicable.
6. MIRANDA V. ABAYA
- Jose “Pempe” Miranda, then incumbent mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, filed
his CoC for the same mayoralty post for the synchronized May 11, 1998
elections.
- Priv. Resp. Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or
Cancel CoC.
o The petition was GRANTED by the COMELEC in its resolution.
o The COMELEC further ruled to DISQUALIFY Jose “Pempe”
Miranda.
- On May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing a CoC, petitioner Joel G.
Miranda filed his CoC for the mayoralty post, supposedly as a substitute for his
father, Pempe Miranda.
 ELECTION LAW
- During the May 11, 1998 elections, Miranda and Abaya vied for the mayoralty - More importantly, under the express provisions of Section 77 of the Code, not
seat, with petitioner garnering 22,002 votes, 1,666 more votes than Abaya who just any person, but only “an official candidate of a registered or accredited
got only 20,336 votes. political party” may be substituted.
- On May 13, 1998, Abaya filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void Substitution o In Bautista vs. COMELEC this Court explicitly ruled that “a cancelled
with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO because certificate does not give rise to a valid candidacy”.
the CoC of Pempe Miranda, whom petitioner was supposed to substitute, had o A person without a valid CoC cannot be considered a candidate in
already been cancelled and denied due course. much the same way as any person who has not filed any CoC at all can
- The COMELEC En Banc rendered the assailed decision aforequoted, resolving not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all. The law
to GRANT the motion for reconsideration, thus nullifying the substitution by clearly provides:
petitioner Joel G. Miranda of his father as candidate for the mayoralty post of - “SEC. 73. CoC.—No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless
Santiago City. he files a sworn CoC within the period fixed herein.”
o It is but logical to say that any person who attempts to run for an
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC’s action nullifying the substitution by and elective office but does not file a CoC, is not a candidate at all. No
proclamation of petitioner for the mayoralty post of Santiago, Isabela is proper amount of votes would catapult him into office. In Gador vs.
and legally sound- YES COMELEC, the Court held that a CoC filed beyond the period fixed
by law is void, and the person who filed it is not, in law, a candidate.
HELD: The Court finds that the COMELEC’s action nullifying the substitution by and Much in the same manner as a person who filed no CoC at all and a
proclamation of petitioner for the mayoralty post of Santiago City, Isabela is proper and person who filed it out of time, a person whose CoC is cancelled or
legally sound. denied due course is no candidate at all. No amount of votes should
- Petitioner insists that the substitution at bar is allowed under Section 77 1 of the entitle him to the elective office aspired for.
Omnibus Election Code o Applying this principle to the case at bar and considering that Section
- Petitioner capitalizes on the fact that the COMELEC ruled to disqualify 77 of the Code is clear and unequivocal that only an official candidate
“Pempe” Miranda in the May 5, 1998 resolution and he heavily relies upon the of a registered or accredited party may be substituted, there
above-quoted provision allowing substitution of a candidate who has been demonstrably cannot be any possible substitution of a person whose
disqualified for any cause. CoC has been cancelled and denied due course.
o While there is no dispute as to WON a nominee of a registered o A deceased candidate is required to have duly filed a valid CoC,
or accredited political party may substitute for a candidate of the otherwise his political party would not be allowed to field a substitute
same party who had been disqualified for any cause, this does candidate in his stead under Section 77 of the Code. In the case of
not include those cases where the CoC of the person to be withdrawal of candidacy, the withdrawing candidate is required to have
substituted had been denied due course and cancelled under duly filed a valid CoC in order to allow his political party to field a
Section 78 of the Code. substitute candidate in his stead. Most reasonable it is then, under the
o While the law enumerated the occasions where a candidate may be foregoing rule, to hold that a valid CoC is likewise an indispensable
validly substituted, there is no mention of the case where a candidate requisite in the case of a substitution of a disqualified candidate under
is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and the provisions of Section 77 of the Code, just as it is in the 2 previous
cancellation of his CoC. Under the foregoing rule, there can be no valid instances.
substitution for the latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance o To include those disqualified candidates whose CoC had likewise been
candidate whose CoC is denied due course and/or cancelled may not denied due course and/or cancelled among those who may be
be substituted. If the intent of the lawmakers were otherwise, they substituted under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, leads to
could have so easily and conveniently included those persons whose the absurdity where a substitute is allowed to take the place of
certificates of candidacy have been denied due course and/or cancelled somebody who had not been a candidate in the first place—a person
under the provisions of Section 78 of the Code. who did not have a valid CoC prior to substitution.

1
SEC. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal.— If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an
official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and
certified by, the same political party may file a CoC to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate
nominated by the political party concerned may file his CoC for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than
mid-day of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid- day
of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in
the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.”
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o Nemo dat quod non habet. What right can a non-candidate pass on to his
substitute? Clearly, there is none because no one can give what he does
not have.
7. LLUZ V. COMELEC
- Vicencio was a candidate for post punong barangay of Barangay 2, Poblacion,
Catubig, Samar in 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
Elections.
o He stated in his CoC that his profession or occupation as CPA.
o He won the election.
- Lluz and Aldeosa charged him before Law Department of COMELEC with
violation of Section 262 in relation to Section 74 of B.P. 881 for misrepresenting
himself as CPA.
o Proof: Certification of Jose Ariola (Director II of PRC) that Vicencio’s
name does not appear in book of Board of Accountancy.
- Vicencio claimed in his Answer that he passed the CPA Board exams in 1993
with rating of 76%
- PRC Records Section OIC Emma Francisco appeared before Law Dept and
produced a Certification that Vicencio took 1993 CPA Boards and obtained
failing mark of 40.71%
- Law Dept recommended the dismissal of complaint citing Romualdez-Marcos
vs COMELEC and Salcedo II vs COMELEC and held that misrepresentation
in private respondent's CoC was not material to his eligibility as a candidate and
could not be a ground for his prosecution.
- COMELEC En Banc ordered Law Department to file information as the cases
cited do not apply in this case as Vicencio sought to be prosecuted for election
offense. Misrepresentation made need not be material to his eligibility and
election offenses are mala prohibita.
- MR was granted as the nature of a candidate's occupation is definitely not a
material matter.
- MR denied
ISSUE: WON misrepresentation of profession/occupation on CoC is punishable
as an election offense – NO.
- Abella v. Larrazabal:
o Larrazabal's act of misrepresenting her residence, a fact required to be
stated in her CoC under Section 74 and which was also a qualification
for all elective local officials, gave rise to 2 causes of action against her
under B.P. 881:
 one, a criminal complaint under Section 262; and
 2, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC under
Section 78. While in Salcedo II v. COMELEC, it was
concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated
by Section 78 of the Code refers to qualifications for elective
office.
- Several conclusions then follow
o 1st, a misrepresentation in a CoC is material when it refers to a
qualification for elective office and affects the candidate's eligibility.
o 2nd, when a candidate commits a material misrepresentation, he or she
may be proceeded against through a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a CoC under Section 78, or through criminal prosecution under
Section 262 for violation of Section 74. Third,a misrepresentation of
a non-material fact, or a non-material misrepresentation, is not a
ground to deny due course to or cancel a CoC under Section 78. In
other words, for a candidate's CoC to be denied due course or canceled
by the COMELEC, the fact misrepresented must pertain to a
qualification for the office sought by the candidate.
- For local elective offices including that of punong barangay in R.A. 7160 or the
Local Government Code of 1991 prescribes only qualifications pertaining to
citizenship, registration as a voter, residence, and language.
o Profession or occupation not being a qualification for elective
office, misrepresentation of such does not constitute a material
misrepresentation. candidate may not be disqualified from
running for office under Section 78 as his or her CoC cannot be
denied due course or canceled on such ground.
- With the gravity of the punishment provided by B.P. 881 for violation of
election offenses, we glean the intention of the law to limit culpability under
Section 262 for violation of Section 74 only to a material misrepresentation.
- SC: more reasonable construction of the term "pertinent portions"  to mean
only those portions of which prescribe qualification requirements of a candidate.
- BP 881 Sec 264 prescribes penalty not only could be disqualified from holding
public office and from voting but could also be deprived of his liberty were the
COMELEC to pursue a criminal case against him.
- With the gravity of the punishment provided by B.P. 881 for violation of
election offenses, we glean the intention of the law to limit culpability under
Section 262 for violation of Section 74 only to a material misrepresentation. We
thus adhere to the more reasonable construction of the term "pertinent
portions" found in Section 262, in particular reference to Section 74, to mean
only those portions of Section 74 which prescribe qualification requirements of
a candidate.
NOTES
Art. 183 of RPC- Perjury is willful assertion of a falsehood under oath upon a material
matter. “Material matter” refers to the main fact which is the subject of inquiry, in terms
of being an element in the execution of a statement under oath it must be understood as
referring to a fact which has an effect on the outcome of the proceeding for which the
statement is being executed.
 ELECTION LAW
8. TAGOLINO V. COMELEC
- On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of
candidacy (CoC) with the COMELEC, seeking congressional office as
Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte under the ticket of
the Liberal Party.
- Subsequently, on December 6, 2009, one of the opposing candidates,
Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition, alleging that
Richard, who was actually a resident of College Street, East Greenhills, San
Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910
Carlota Hills, Canadieng, Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla asserted that
Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency requirement under Section
6, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) and thus
should be declared disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. In
addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard’s CoC be denied due course and/or
cancelled.
- On February 17, 2010, the COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution
granting Juntilla’s petition without any qualification.
- Aggrieved, Richard moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by
the COMELEC En Banc through a Resolution dated May 4, 2010.7
Thereafter, in a Manifestation of even date, Richard accepted the said
resolution with finality “in order to enable his substitute to facilitate the filing
of the necessary documents for substitution.”
- On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her
CoC together with a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance10 from the
Liberal Party endorsing her as the party’s official substitute candidate vice
her husband, Richard, for the same congressional post.
- In response to various letter-requests submitted to the COMELEC’s Law
Department (Law Department), the COMELEC En Banc, in the exercise of
its administrative functions, issued Resolution No. 889011 on May 8, 2010,
approving, among others, the recommendation of the said department to
allow the substitution of private respondent.
- The substitution complied with the requirements provided under Section 12
in relation to Section 13 of Comelec Resolution No. 8678 dated October 6,
2009.
Issue: WON there is valid substitution
Held: No. A. Distinction between a petition for disqualification and a petition to deny
due course to/cancel a certificate of candidacy.
- The Omnibus Election Code (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a
candidate’s bid for public office.
o A petition for disqualification under Section 68; and
o A petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of
candidacy under Section 78.
- The distinctions between the two are well-perceived.
o Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is
hinged on either:
 (a) a candidate’s possession of a permanent resident status
in a foreign country; or
 (b) his or her commission of certain acts of disqualification.
Anent the latter, the prohibited acts under Section 68 refer
to election offenses under the OEC, and not to violations
of other penal laws.
 In particular, these are: (1) giving money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters or public officials performing
electoral functions; (2) committing acts of
terrorism to enhance one’s candidacy; (3)
spending in one’s election campaign an amount in
excess of that allowed by the OEC; (4) soliciting,
receiving or making any contribution prohibited
under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the OEC;
and (5) violating Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261,
paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 634 of
the OEC. Accordingly, the same provision
(Section 68) states that any candidate who, in an
action or protest in which he or she is a party, is
declared by final decision of a competent court
guilty of, or found by the COMELEC to have
committed any of the foregoing acts shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate for
public office, or disallowed from holding the
same, if he or she had already been elected.
- It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still
technically considered to have been a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue
as such only because of supervening infractions which do not, however, deny
his or her statutory eligibility. In other words, while the candidate’s
compliance with the eligibility requirements as prescribed by law, such as
age, residency, and citizenship, is not in question, he or she is, however,
ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought by
the commission of the above-mentioned election offenses.
- On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC
proceeding under Section 78 of the OEC is premised on a person’s
misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required for the
 ELECTION LAW
elective office aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks the relevant
qualification; he or she must have also made a false representation of the same
in the CoC. The nature of a Section 78 petition was discussed in the case of
Fermin v. COMELEC, where the Court illumined:
- Let it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the
CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the
candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the
qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted
that the candidates states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office
he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for
public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in
the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to
deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already
likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under
Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or
qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a
“Section 78” petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo
warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. (Emphasis
supplied)
- Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the deliberateness of the
misrepresentation, much less one’s intent to defraud, is of bare significance
in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the person’s declaration of a
material qualification in the CoC be false. In this relation, jurisprudence holds
that an express finding that the person committed any deliberate
misrepresentation is of little consequence in the determination of whether
one’s CoC should be deemed cancelled or not. What remains material is that
the petition essentially seeks to deny due course to and/or cancel the CoC on
the basis of one’s ineligibility and that the same be granted without any
qualification.
- Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered
to have been a candidate for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a
person whose CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled under
Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all. The reason being is
that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to
a valid candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes. In Talaga v. COMELEC
(Talaga), the Court ruled that:
- xxxx
- While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to
continue as a candidate, a person who certificate is cancelled or denied due
course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never
filed a CoC.
9. FEDERICO V. COMELEC
- Edna Sanchez (Edna) and private respondent Osmundo M. Maligaya (Maligaya)
were candidates for the position of municipal mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas
- Armando Sanchez, husband of Edna and gubernational candidate of the
province of Batangas, died.
- 2 days later, Edna withdrew her CoC (COC) for the position of mayor. She then
filed a new COC for the position of governor as substitute candidate for her
deceased husband.
- Petitioner Federico filed his COC as official candidate of the Nationalista Party
and as substitute candidate for mayor, in view of the withdrawal of Edna.
- Maligaya filed his Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel CoC of Federico
before the COMELEC
- Maligaya sought to have Federico declared ineligible to run as substitute
candidate for Edna because the period to file the COC for substitute candidates
had already lapsed
- COMELEC En Banc gave due course to the COC of Edna as substitute
gubernational candidate in the Batangas province and to that of Federico as
substitute mayoralty candidate in Sto. Tomas.
- By that time, however, the official ballots had already been printed.
- On the day of elections, the name "SANCHEZ, Edna P." was retained in the
list of candidates for Mayor of Sto. Tomas, and garnered the highest number of
votes against Maligaya
- The Municipal Board of Canvassers printed the Certificate of Canvass of Votes
and Proclamation of Winning Candidates showing "SANCHEZ Edna P." as the
winning mayoralty candidate.
- This prompted Maligaya to file his Petition to Annul Proclamation of
Respondent Edna Sanchez upon learning of the proclamation of Federico as
the winning mayoralty candidate
- Maligaya filed his Petition to Annul Proclamation of Respondent, Renato M.
Federico.
- Meanwhile, Maligaya's petition to deny due course and to cancel the COC of
Federico was denied by the COMELEC
- It gave due course to Federico's COC, which then upheld Federico's
substitution.
Issues: WON Federico validly substituted Edna who withdrew her candidacy for the
mayoralty position  If Federico was disqualified, should he be succeeded by Intervenor
Silva under the LGC or replaced by Maligaya.
Ruling: NO, Federico's substitution of Edna Sanchez as mayoralty candidate was not valid
- COMELEC En Banc annulled Federico's proclamation as mayor on the ground
that his substitution of Edna was invalid, the substitute COC and CONA having
been filed after the deadline provided for under Section 13 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678.
 ELECTION LAW
- "the COMELEC, which has the constitutional mandate to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election," has
been empowered to set the dates for certain pre-election proceedings.
- In the exercise of such constitutional and legislated power, especially to
safeguard and improve on the Automated Election System (AES), COMELEC
came out with Resolution No. 8678.
- The substitute for a candidate who withdrew may file his CoC as herein provided
for the office affected not later than December 14, 2009.
- Considering that the deadline for substitution in case of withdrawal had
already lapsed, no person could substitute her as mayoralty candidate.
- The sudden death of then Governor Armando Sanchez and the
substitution by his widow in the gubernatorial race could not justify a
belated substitution in the mayoralty race.
- The resolution was void as it lacked legal basis as Federico's substitution was
invalid, his COC having been filed only on May 5, 2010, or after December 14,
2009, the deadline provided for under Section 13 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8678
- Accordingly, the Court agrees with the OSG that Resolution No. 8889 was void
as it was in contravention of the guidelines set forth under Resolution No. 8678.
- With respect to Federico, it cannot be regarded as a valid source of any right,
like the right to be voted for public... office. Indeed, a void judgment can never
be final and executory and may be assailed at any time.
- "Where a proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at
all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the
COMELEC of the power to declare such nullity and annul the proclamation.
- Without question, the votes garnered by Edna could not be credited to
Federico as he was never a legitimate candidate.
10. JALOSJOS, JR. V. COMELEC
DOCTRINE: The disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the Revised
Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the
enforcement and administration of "all laws" relating to the conduct of elections. Even
without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code,
or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty
to cancel the CoC of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction.
- Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010 elections
o Jalosjos was running for his third term
- Cardino filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny
due course and to cancel the CoC of Jalosjos alleging that:
o Jalosjos made a false material representation in his COC when he
declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor
o long before Jalosjos filed his CoC, Jalosjos had already been convicted
by final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisión mayor by the
RTC
o Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence
- Jalosjos admitted his conviction but stated that he had already been granted
probation
- Cardino countered that the RTC revoked Jalosjos’ probation in an Order
- Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC issued an Order declaring that
Jalosjos had duly complied with the order of probation and that during the 2004
elections, the COMELEC denied a petition for disqualification filed against him
on the same grounds
- COMELEC First Division granted Cardino’s petition and cancelled Jalosjos’
CoC à Jalosjos "is not eligible by reason of his disqualification as provided for
in Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160."
o "Jalosjos has indeed committed material misrepresentation in his CoC
when he declared, under oath, that he is eligible for the office he seeks
to be elected to when in fact he is not by reason of a final judgment in
a criminal case, the sentence of which he has not yet served."
o COMELEC First Division found that Jalosjos’ certificate of
compliance of probation was fraudulently issued; thus, Jalosjos has not
yet served his sentence
o The penalty imposed on Jalosjos was the indeterminate sentence of
one year, eight months and twenty days of prisión correccional as
minimum, to four years, 2 months and one day of prisión mayor as
maximum
- COMELEC En Banc denied Jalosjos’ motion for reconsideration
o With the proper revocation of Jalosjos’ earlier probation and a clear
showing that he has not yet served the terms of his sentence, there is
simply no basis for Jalosjos to claim that his civil as well as political
rights have been violated
o Having been convicted by final judgment, Jalosjos is disqualified to run
for an elective position or to hold public office
o His proclamation as the elected mayor in the May 10, 2010 election
does not deprive the Commission of its authority to resolve the present
petition to its finality, and to oust him from the office he now
wrongfully holds
Issue: WON Jalosjos is perpetually disqualified in running for a public office
because of his criminal conviction by final judgment
RULING: YES. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the
disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the
court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government
agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.
 ELECTION LAW
- The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal Both constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office.
conviction by final judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a
proper ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective
- Jalosjos’ CoC was void from the start since he was not eligible to run for any
public office, and commits a false material representation if he states in
public office at the time he filed his CoC his CoC that he is eligible to so run.
- Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray
votes hence VOID AB INITIO à Cardino, as the only qualified candidate,
actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor
- A false statement in a CoC that a candidate is eligible to run for public office is
a false material representation which is a ground for a petition under Section 78 - The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should
of the OEC be applied distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word
- Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his CoC "that he is "perpetually" refers to the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the
eligible for said office." phrase "during the term of the sentence" refers to the temporary special
- A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office so if a disqualification
candidate is not actually eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a - The duration between the perpetual and the temporary (both special) are
criminal case from running for public office, and he still states under oath in his necessarily different because the provision, instead of merging their durations
CoC that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes into one period, states that such duration is "according to the nature of said
a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78 penalty" — which means according to whether the penalty is the perpetual or
- A sentence of prisión mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification the temporary special disqualification
under Section 40 of the Local Government Code and under Section 12 of the - The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect
Omnibus Election Code immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final.
- The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, - The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the
the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not
special disqualification. - The last sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be permitted
to hold any public office during the period of his perpetual special
disqualification."  Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it is
ART. 30 RPC ART. 32 RPC immediately executor
- Any public office that the convict may be holding at the time of his conviction
becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes
Temporary absolute perpetual special disqualification
ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually
disqualification produces the means that "the offender shall not
effect of "deprivation of the right be permitted to hold any public
In the case of Jalosjos, he became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective
to vote in any election for any office during the period of his
public office from the time his judgment of conviction became final.
popular elective office or to be disqualification," which is
elected to such office." perpetually.
- Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility,
The duration of the temporary
which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to
absolute disqualification is the
the statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath the false material
same as that of the principal
representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility”
penalty.
- One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for
public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a
CoC stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly
required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material representation
that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.
- Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional
and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the
 ELECTION LAW
candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false,
the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or
cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under
Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since
they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the
distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before
proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of
the winning candidate.
- A candidate for mayor during the 2010 local elections certifies under oath four
statements: (1) a statement that the candidate is a natural born or naturalized
Filipino citizen; (2) a statement that the candidate is not a permanent resident
of, or immigrant to, a foreign country; (3) a statement that the candidate is
eligible for the office he seeks election; and (4) a statement of the candidate’s
allegiance to the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
- What is indisputably clear is that the false material representation of Jalosjos is
a ground for a petition under Section 78
- However, since the false material representation arises from a crime penalized
by prisión mayor, a petition under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code or
Section 40 of the Local Government Code can also be properly filed
- The petitioner has a choice whether to anchor his petition on Section 12 or
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code. The law expressly provides multiple remedies and the choice
of which remedy to adopt belongs to the petitioner
The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos’ CoC.
- 15, 2013, resolving "to CANCEL and DENY due course the CoC filed by
- A void CoC on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of
the CoC can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes
- Jalosjos’ CoC was cancelled because he was ineligible from the start to run for
Mayor
- Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the
COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the CoC of anyone suffering from
the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office
by virtue of a final judgment of conviction
- To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the
CoC of one suffering from perpetual special disqualification will result in the
anomaly that these cases so grotesquely exemplify
- The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to "enforce and
administer all laws" relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu
proprio bar from running for public office those suffering from perpetual
special disqualification by virtue of a final judgment
11. ROMEO JALOSJOS V. COMELEC (2013)
- On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its Decision convicting
petitioner by final judgment.Consequently, he was sentenced to suffer the
principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal for each count,
respectively, which carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code. On April 30,
2007, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued an order commuting his
prison term to 16 years, 3 months and 3 days.
- On April 26, 2012, petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City.
However, because of his previous conviction, his application was denied by the
Acting City Election Officer of the Election Registration Board (ERB),
prompting him to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Zamboanga City. Pending
resolution of the same, he filed a CoCon October 5, 2012, seeking to run as
mayor for Zamboanga City in the upcoming local elections scheduled on May
13, 2013. In his CoC, petitioner stated,inter alia,that he is eligible for the said
office and that he is a registered voter of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City.
- On October 18, 2012,the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account
of his perpetual absolute disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the
right to vote in any election. Such denial was affirmed by the Regional Trial
Court in its Order which, pursuant to Section 138 of Batas Pambansa Bilang
881, as amended, otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code" (OEC),
was immediately final and executory.
- The COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 on January
Romeo G. Jalosjos as Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National
and Local Elections" due to his perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his
failure to comply with the voter registration requirement.
ISSUES:
1. Did the COMELEC En Banc act beyond its jurisdiction when it issued motu
proprio Resolution No. 9613 and in so doing, violated petitioner's right to due
process?
2. Had petitioner's perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective office
already been removed by Section 40 (a) of the LGC?
HELD:
- The COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its quasi-judicial functions when it
issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any pending
petition or resolve any election case before it or any of its divisions.Rather, it
merely performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling
petitioner's CoC on the basis of his perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact
of which had already been established by his final conviction.In this regard, the
COMELEC En Banc was exercising its administrative functions, dispensing
 ELECTION LAW
with the need for a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling under Section
3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-judicial
proceedings.
- The denial of due course to and/or cancellation of one's CoC generally
necessitates the exercise of the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions
commenced through a petition based on either Sections 12 or 78of the OEC,
or Section 40 of the LGC, when the grounds therefor are rendered conclusive
on account of final and executory judgments as when a candidate's
disqualification to run for public office is based on a final conviction.
- There is also no violation of procedural due process since the COMELEC En
Banc would be acting in a purely administrative manner.
- The petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC,
carried with it the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification and in
turn, pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC, disqualified him to run for elective
office. As discussed, Section 40 (a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein
a penal provision such as Article 41 in this case directly and specifically prohibits
the convict from running for elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of 2 (2)
years from petitioner's service of his commuted prison term, he remains bound
to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which
consequently, disqualifies him to run as mayor for Zamboanga City.
- It is well to note that the use of the word "perpetual" in the aforementioned
accessory penalty connotes a lifetime restriction and in this respect, does not
depend on the length of the prison term, which is imposed as its principal
penalty. Instructive on this point is the Court's ruling in Lacuna v. Abes,where
the Court explained the meaning of the term "perpetual" as applied to the
penalty of disqualification to run for public office.
- The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualified the
convict for public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last
only during the term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30,
Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13
October 1961.
- But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of
perpetual special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage.
- This accessory penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected
to or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special
disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence.
12. DIMAPILIS V. COMELEC
- Petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in the
October 2010 Barangay Elections. He also ran for re-election for the same
position in the 2013 Barangay Election, and filed his CoC declaring under
oaththat he is “eligible for the office to be elected to.”
o He won in the said election and was proclaimed as the duly elected.
- On the same day, COMELEC filed a petition for Disqualification against
the petitioner pursuant to Section 40 of RA 7160 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991.
- It claimed that in an Ombudsman Consolidated Decision, petitioner was barred
from running in an election since he was suffering from the accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office as a consequence
of his dismissal from service as then Kagawad of Brgy. Pulung Maragul, after
being found guilty, along with others, of administrative offense of Grave
Misconduct,
- Petitioners averred that the petition should be dismissed, considering that:
o while the petition prayed for his disqualification, it partakes the nature
to deny due course to or cancel CoC which should be a distinct and
separate actions
o COMELEC Law Department is not a proper party to a petition for
disqualification, and cannot initiate such case motu proprio, and
o RTC Angeles City had permanently enjoined the implementation of
the aforesaid OMB decision, grounded on the condonation doctrine.
- COMELEC 2nd Division granted the petition and cancelled petitioner’s CoC,
annulled his proclamation as the winner, and directed the Board of Canvassers
to reconvene and proclaim the qualified candidate who garnered the highest
number of votes as the duly elected Punong Barangay.
- COMELEC En Banc affirmed 2nd Div ruling, observing that:
o evident intent of the CA decision was only to enjoin the
implementation of the OMBDecision, while petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was pending, and notthereafter, and
o absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative
prosecution and vice versa.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling petitioner’s CoC
HELD: NO, petitioner’s perpetual disqualification to hold public office is a material fact
involving eligibility.
- A CoC is a formal requirement for eligibility to public office. Section 74 of the
OEC provides that the CoC of the person filing it shall state, among others, that
he is eligible for the office he seeks to run, and that the facts stated therein are
true to the best of his knowledge.
- To be "eligible" relates to the capacity of holding, as well as that of being elected
to an office. Conversely, "ineligibility" has been defined as a "disqualification or
legal incapacity to be elected to an office or appointed to a particular position."
In this relation, a person intending to run for public office must not only possess
the required qualifications for the position for which he or she intends to run,
but must also possess none of the grounds for disqualification under the law.
- In this case, petitioner had been found guilty of Grave Misconduct by a final
judgment, and punished with dismissal from service with all its accessory
penalties, including perpetual disqualification from holding public office. Verily,
perpetual disqualification to public office is a material fact involving eligibility
 ELECTION LAW
which rendered petitioner's CoC void from the start since he was not eligible to
run for any public office at the time he filed the same.
- The COMELEC has the duty to motu proprio bar from running for public
office those suffering from perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
Under Section 2 (1), Article IX (C) of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC
has the duty to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election."
- The Court had previously ruled that the COMELEC has the legal duty to cancel
the CoC of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to hold public office, albeit, arising from a criminal conviction.
Considering, however, that Section 52 (a), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service similarly imposes the penalty of
perpetual disqualification from holding public office as an accessory to the
penalty of dismissal from service.
- Even without a petition under either Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code,
or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under
a legal duty to cancel the CoC of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty
of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final
judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the
COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office.
The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the
disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction.
Due process
- As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process by cancelling his
CoC without a separate and dedicated hearing beside from the disqualification
case, the court held that the act of cancellation in this case was merely
administrative. Indeed, the cancellation of one’s CoC generally necessitates the
exercise of the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial functions commenced through a
petition based on either Sec12 or 78 of the OEC (Omnibus Election Code), or
Sec40 of the LGC, when the grounds therefor are rendered conclusive on
account of final and executory judgments, as in this case, such exercise falls
within the COMELEC’s administrative functions.
- Petitioner's re-election as Punong Barangav of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in the 2013
Barangay Elections cannot operate as a condonation of his alleged misconduct.
- Carpio Morales: Court abandoned the "condonation doctrine," explaining that
election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is
simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the
notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any
administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term.
With the cancellation of his CoC, petitioner is deemed to have not been a
candidate in the 2013 Barangay Elections, and all his votes are to be considered
stray votes. Who wins?
- A person whose CoC had been cancelled is deemed to have not been a candidate
at all because his CoC is considered void ab initio, and thus, cannot give rise to
a valid candidacy and necessarily valid votes. The cancellation of the CoC
essentially renders the votes cast for him or her as stray votes, and are not
considered in determining the winner of an election. This would necessarily
invalidate his proclamation and entitle the qualified candidate receiving the
highest number of votes to the position.
- There is another more compelling reason why the eligible candidate who
garnered the highest number of votes must assume the office. The
ineligible candidate who was proclaimed and who already assumed office is a de
facto officer by virtue of the ineligibility.
- The rule on succession in Section 44 of the Local Government Code cannot
apply in instances when a de facto officer is ousted from office and the de jure
officer takes over. The ouster of a de facto officer cannot create a permanent
vacancy as contemplated in the Local Government Code.
- There is no vacancy to speak of as the de jure officer, the rightful winner in the
elections, has the legal right to assume the position.
13. DIAMBRANG V. COMELEC
DOCTRINE: CoC - void ab initio  Candidate is not considered a candidate from the
very beginning even if CoC was cancelled after the elections.
- Diambrang and Patad were candidates for Brgy. chairman in the 2010 Barangay
Elections.
o Patad won (183 votes)| Opponent Diambrang (78 votes)
- BUT, Barangay Board of Canvassers (BBOC) proclaimed Diambrang as
the duly elected Punong Barangay based on the assumption that Patad
was disqualified for being a fugitive from justice
o Assumption based on the recommendation of the Provincial Election
Supervisor that was not yet final and executory because the
COMELEC had not issued any ruling on the matter.
- Patad  petition to annul Diambrang’s proclamation  COMELEC.
- 2nd division  gave due course
o noted that the recommendation of Cuevas to disqualify Patad was
overturned by the COMELEC First Division in its Resolution dated
14 January 2011.
o Diambrang, who only obtained the 2nd highest number of votes in the
elections, could not be declared as the winning candidate even if Patad
was disqualified.
- COMELEC EB Resolution  the COMELEC En Banc annulled the
proclamation of Diambrang and ordered the first ranked Barangay Kagawad of
Barangay Kaludan to succeed as the new Punong Barangay.
ISSUE: WON Diambrang can be proclaimed as the elected Punong Barangay in view of
Patad’s disqualification (Moot and academic)
 ELECTION LAW
HELD: YES, Patad's disqualification arose from his being a fugitive from justice, he was
never qualified to be a candidate.
- It does not matter that the disqualification case against him was finally decided
by the COMELEC En Banc only on 14 November 2011 as Patad's CoC was
void ab initio.
- As such, Diambrang, being the first-placer among the qualified candidates,
should have been proclaimed as the duly-elected Punong Barangay.
o However, due to supervening events as we previously discussed,
Diambrang can no longer hold office.
- The assailed Decision of the COMELEC En Banc was promulgated on 30
January 2012.
o The COMELEC En Banc ruled that Diambrang, as a 2nd placer, could
not be declared as the duly-elected winner despite Patad’s
disqualification.
- On 9 October 2012, Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC, SC held:
o Decisions of this Court holding that the 2nd-placer cannot be
proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared
ineligible should be limited to situations where the CoC of the first-
placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be
cancelled because of a violation of law that took effect, or a legal
impediment that took effect, after the filing of the CoC.
o If the CoC is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such
void CoC was never a candidate in the elections at any time.
o All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be
counted.
 Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the
elections.
o If a CoC void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day,
of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for
that candidate are stray votes.
o If a CoC void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections,
all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the CoC
is void from the very beginning.
o This is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the
cancellation of a CoC that is void ab initio.
o Otherwise, a CoC void ab initio can operate to defeat one or more
valid certificates of candidacy for the same position.
14. MAQUILING V. COMELEC
Facts:
- Respondent Arnado - natural born Filipino, subsequently naturalized US citizen.
- He applied for repatriation under RA 9225 before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Francisco and took his oath of allegiance on July 10, 2008.
o On the same day an order of approval of his citizenship retention and
reacquisition was issued.
- On April 28, 2010 respondent Balua, another mayoralty candidate filed a
petition to disqualify Arnado and cancel his COC.
o Contention: Arnado is not a resident and a foreigner, attaching a
certification from the Bureau of Immigration April 23, 2010 indicating
the nationality of Arnado as American.
- A memorandum of a travel record dated Dec 3, 2009 indicating that Arnado has
been using his US Passport in entering and departing the Philippines.
- COMELEC required respondent Arnado to file his answer but he failed to do
so so Baula moved to declare him in default.
- Neither motion was acted upon because Arnado garnered the highest number
of votes and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 elections.
- It was only after the proclamation he filed his answer and submitted the ff:
o Affidavit of renunciation and oath of allegiance
o Affidavit by witnesses attesting Arnado is a long time resident in his
family’s ancestral house
o Certification from the brgy he is a resident
o Certificatoin that Maximo Arnado Sr. was Mayor from 1964 to 73 and
79 to 86.
o Voter certification by the Election Officer that he is a registered voter
since April 2009.
- COMELEC 1st division: ruled in favor of Arnado
o Finding that Balua failed to present any evidence to support his
contention in the residency requirement.
 Re: citizenship - disagreed that he is a filipino citizen.
- They further argued that his continued use of his passport is a strong indiciation
that he had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he only
executed the affidavit of renunciation to enable him to run for office. He used
it 6 times.
- COMELEC En Banc: Petitoner now intervened stating that for the COMELEC
to apply Sec 44 of the LG Code to apply – rules on succession.
- COMELEC: reversed and granted Arnado’s MR.
o The use of the passport does not operate to revert back his status as a
dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is now law saying such.
Issue: WON the COMELEC committed reversible error in proclaiming Arnado as
qualified to run for public office
Held: YES, the use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship
is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and
citizenship + it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it
recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective
position.
- Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003
provides:
 ELECTION LAW
o Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and
the following conditions:
o Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the CoC,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
- Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office.
He took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship.
- Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice:
o 1st, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for repatriation before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and
o again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit
of Renunciation.
- By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship and retained American citizenship = dual citizen.
- After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American
citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the
requirements for eligibility to run for public office.
- By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a
Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the
laws of the foreign country.
o However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently
and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign
citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his
continued possession of a foreign citizenship.
- Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after
reno uncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport
to travel in and out of the country before filing his CoC on 30 November
2009.
The pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino
citizen at the time he filed his CoC, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.
- Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and
30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport
four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had
earlier executed.
- By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented
himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of
both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and
privileges granted by the United States of America.
- The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute
and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all
civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the
citizenship.
- The SC agrees with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a
foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which
he acquired by repatriation.
- However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado
voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen.
Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado
represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.
- This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign
citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively
imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.
- Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is
acquired through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct
from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by
law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the CoC already carries
with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. Dual citizens by
naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally
renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public
office.
- By the time he filed his CoC on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual
citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American
citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification
under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, he was not qualified
to run for a local elective position.
- In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a
period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which
date he first used his American passport after renouncing his American
citizenship.
- Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption
of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.
o Citizenship requirement must be possessed not just at the time of the
renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act
which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to
attack.
Maquiling is not a 2nd-placer as he obtained the highest number of votes from
among the qualified candidates.
- An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful
winner. By express legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in
the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening
circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election
date.
 ELECTION LAW
- Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but
necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast
in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive
legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office.
- With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in
the election as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the
qualified candidates.
- Aratea v. COMELEC + Jalosjos v. COMELEC
o A void COC cannot produce any legal effect.
o The votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered
at all in determining the winner of an election.
- Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the
electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an
ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the
sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates
form part of that voice and must also be respected.
- That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed
office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive
ground that existed prior to the filing of the CoC voids not only the COC but
also the proclamation.
- Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646
o Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate
is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
- With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his CoC is
thus rendered void from the beginning.
o It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado
rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the
elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections
were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.
15. ARNADO V. COMELEC
DOCTRINE: Only natural-born Filipinos who owe total and undivided allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines could run for and hold elective public office. Under
Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with "dual citizenship" is
disqualified from running for any elective local position.
- For those who avail themselves of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 and intend to
run for public office, Section 5(2) thereof provides the additional requirement
of making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships
prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC (CoC).
- Landslide election victory cannot override eligibility requirements.
- Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine
citizenship after he was naturalized as citizen of the USA. Subsequently, and in
preparation for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines, Arnado
applied for repatriation under RA 9225 before the Consul General of the
Philippines in San Francisco, USA.
- He took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10,
2008 and, on even date, an Order of Approval of Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition was issued in his favor. On April 3, 2009, Arnado executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
- On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his CoC (CoC) for the mayoralty post of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections.
- Balua, another mayoralty candidate filed a petition to disqualify Petitioner
Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC on the ground that Arnado remained a US
citizen because he continued to use his US passport for entry to and exit from
the Philippines after executing aforesaid Affidavit of Renunciation.
- While Balua's petition remained pending, the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded
where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was proclaimed the
winning candidate.
- On October 5, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued held that Arnado's
continued use of his US passport effectively negated his April 3, 2009 Affidavit
of Renunciation. Thus, he was disqualified to run for public office for failure to
comply with the requirements of RA 9225. The COMELEC First Division
accordingly nullified his proclamation and held that the rule on succession
should be followed.
- In the meantime, Maquiling, another mayoralty candidate who garnered the 2nd
highest number of votes, intervened in the case. He argued that the COMELEC
First Division erred in applying the rule on succession.
- The COMELEC En Banc reversed the ruling of the COMELEC First Division.
o It held that Arnado's use of his US passport did not operate to revert
his status to dual citizenship; that he continued to use his US passport
because he did not yet know that he had been issued a Philippine
passport at the time of the relevant foreign trips; and that, after
receiving his Philippine passport, Arnado used the same for his
subsequent trips.
- Maquiling then appealed to the SC. While Maquiling’s petition was pending, the
period for the filing of CoCs for local elective officials for the May 13, 2013
elections officially began. On October 1, 2012, Petitioner Arnado filed his CoC
for the same position. Respondent Capitan also filed his CoC for the mayoralty
post of Kauswagan.
- Before the May 2013 elections, the SC ruled on the Maquiling petition.
 ELECTION LAW
o It set aside the COMELEC en banc’s resolution and disqualified
Petitioner Arnado from running for elective position, and declared
Maquiling as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte
in the May 2010 elections and that the subsequent use of his US
passport, Petitioner Arnado effectively disavowed or recalled his April
3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. The issuance of the Maquiling
Decision sets the stage for the present controversy.
- Shortly after the Maquiling Decision, Petitioner Arnado executed an Affidavit
Affirming Rommel C. Arnado's "Affidavit of Renunciation Dated April 3,
2009.”
- Private Respondent Capitan, Petitioner Arnado’s lone rival in the May 2013
elections, filed a Petition seeking to disqualify him from running for municipal
mayor of Kauswagan and/or to cancel his CoC based on the ruling of this Court
in Maquiling.
Arguments:
Petitioner: That the Maquiling case is not on all fours with the present controversy; that
Capitan's Petition was filed beyond the 25-day reglementary period reckoned from the
filing of the CoC sought to be cancelled; and, that the COMELEC must uphold the
sovereign will of the people of Kauswagan who expressed, thru the ballots, their
overwhelming support for him as their mayor. Arnado prayed that the COMELEC 2nd
Division's September 6, 2013 Resolution be reversed and that he be declared as eligible
to run for mayor of Kauswagan. Petitioner Arnado avers that his former counsel, revealed
that he executed an Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance on November 30,
2009. Hence, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, he is a citizen of the
Philippines who does not owe allegiance to any other country and, therefore, is qualified
to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the May 13, 2013 elections.
Respondent COMELEC: It disqualified Petitioner Arnado from running in the May 2013
elections. That at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, Arnado still failed to
comply with the requirement of RA 9225 of making a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship. While he executed the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation, the same was deemed withdrawn or recalled when he subsequently traveled
abroad using his US passport, as held in Maquiling case.
Issue: WON Arnado is qualified to run?
Held: No. The Petition is devoid of merit. COMELEC’s decision is affirmed.
- Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with "dual
citizenship" is disqualified from running for any elective local position.
The phrase "dual citizenship" in said Section 4(d) must be understood as
referring to "dual allegiance.''
- RA 9225 allowed natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization abroad to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full civil and political rights upon compliance
with the requirements of the law. They may now run for public office in the
Philippines provided that they:
(1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws; and,
(2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath prior to or at the time
of filing of their CoC.
- In this case, Arnado failed to comply with the 2nd requisite because, as held in
Maquiling v. COMELEC, his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was
deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit.
- Consequently, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of
the May 13, 2013 elections, Arnado had yet to comply with said 2nd
requirement. The COMELEC also noted that while Arnado submitted an
affidavit dated May 9, 2013, affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation, the same would not suffice for having been belatedly executed.
- The reason for Arnado's disqualification to run for public office during the 2010
elections — being a candidate without total and undivided allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines - still subsisted when he filed his CoC for the 2013
elections on October 1, 2012.
o The COMELEC En Banc merely adhered to the ruling of this Court in
Maquiling lest it would be committing grave abuse of discretion had it
departed therefrom.
- The use of a foreign passport amounts to repudiation or recantation of the oath
of renunciation. Arnado’s use of his US passport in 2009 invalidated his oath of
renunciation resulting in his disqualification to run for mayor of Kauswagan in
the 2010 elections. Since then and up to the time he filed his CoC for the 2013
elections, Arnado had not cured the defect in his qualification. Maquiling,
therefore, is binding on and applicable to this case.
Landslide election victory cannot override eligibility requirements
- While in this case Arnado won by landslide majority during the 2013 elections,
garnering 84% of the total votes cast, the same “cannot override the
constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications.” In Velasco v. COMELEC, this Court pronounced that election
victory cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass election eligibility
requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of laws pertaining to elections will
become toothless.
16. AGUSTIN V. COMELEC
- 1997: Agustin was naturalized as a US Citizen
- October 5, 2012: Agustin filed his CoC for the Mayoralty of Marcos, Ilocos
Norte for the 2013 Local Elections, as the official official candidate of the
Nacionalista Party.
- In his CoC, Agustin declared that:
 ELECTION LAW
o he was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to;
o that he was a natural born Filipino citizen; and
o that he had been a resident of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte
for 25 years.
- Respondent Pillos, a rival mayoralty candidate, filed a Petition to Deny Due
Course to Agustin’s CoC with the COMELEC, alleging that Agustin had
misrepresented the length of his residency in Marcos, considering that he only
registered as a voter therein only on May 31, 2012, and had not resided in Marcos
for the requisite one-year period to be elected.
- In response, Agustin alleged that the one-year requirement referred to residency,
not to voter registration, and that that residency was not dependent on
citizenship, such that his travel to Hawaii for business purposes did not violate
the residency requirement
- Further, Agustin attached a copy of his Affidavit of Renunciation of
U.S./American Citizenship executed on October 2, 2012.
- Agustin thus contends that his residency could not be impugned simply because
of the vintage of his registration as a voter.
- The COMELEC dismissed Pillos’ motion.
- In an MR, Pillos alleged that BOI certification showed that Agustin voluntarily
declared in his travel documents that he was a citizen of the USA and continued
to make use of his USA passport despite his renunciation of his USA citizenship
on October 2, 2012.
- Thus, COMELEC cancelled and denied due course to the petitioner's CoC.
ISSUE: WON Agustin is eligible for the office of Mayor of Marcos, Ilocos Norte.
HELD: NO, while the SC found that Agustin made no material misrepresentation in
his CoC, but was, from the beginning, disqualified to run as Mayor of the Municipality of
Marcos, Ilocos Norte, because he remained a dual citizen.
- On October 5, 2012, the date he filed his CoC he was, therefore, exclusively a
Filipino citizen, rendering him eligible to run for public office.
- His CoC was valid for all intents and purposes of the election laws because he
did not make therein any material misrepresentation of his eligibility to run as
Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte.
- However, on October 6, 2012, Agustin travelled abroad using his USA passport,
representing himself as a US citizen, and continued using his American passport
in subsequent travels abroad.
- He thereby effectively repudiated his oath of renunciation on October 6, 2012,
and was thereafter regarded as a dual American-Filipino citizen.
- Such reversion to dual citizenship disqualifies Agustin from being elected to
public office in the Philippines.
- Pillos, being the qualified candidate obtaining the highest number of votes,
should be proclaimed duly elected as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos,
Ilocos Norte in the 2013 elections.
17. PENERA V. COMELEC
- Penera and respondent Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica
during the 14 May 2007 elections.
- Andanar filed before the Office of the Regional Election Director (ORED),
Petition for Disqualification against Penera, as well as the candidates for Vice-
Mayor and SB who belonged to her political party, for unlawfully engaging in
election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement
of the campaign period.
- Andanar claimed that a day before the start of the authorized campaign period
on 30 March 2007, Penera and her partymates went around the different
barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and requesting the
people to vote for them on the day of the elections.
- Penera alone filed an Answer to the Petition on 19 April 2007, averring that
o the charge of premature campaigning was not true. Although Penera
admitted that a motorcade did take place, she explained that it was
simply in accordance with the usual practice in nearby cities and
provinces, where the filing of COCs was preceded by a motorcade,
which dispersed soon after the completion of such filing.
o In fact, Penera claimed, in the motorcade held by her political party,
no person made any speech, not even any of the candidates. Instead,
there was only marching music in the background and “a grand
standing for the purpose of raising the hands of the candidates in the
motorcade.”
o Cited Barroso v. Ampig in her defense:
 A motorcade held by candidates during the filing of their
COCs was not a form of political campaigning.
- After the parties filed their respective Position Papers, the records of the case
were transmitted to the COMELEC main office in Manila for adjudication.
- While the case was pending, the 14 May 2007 elections took place and, as a result
thereof, Penera was proclaimed the duly elected Mayor of Sta. Monica. Penera
soon assumed office on 2 July 2002.
- The COMELEC 2nd Division Resolution
o disqualified Penera from continuing as a mayoralty candidate in Sta.
Monica, for engaging in premature campaigning, in violation of
Sections 80 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
ISSUES: WON Penera is guilty of premature campaigning - NO + WON
premature campaigning may be committed by one who is not a candidate – NO
HELD: Under the assailed September 11, 2009 Decision, a candidate may already be
liable for premature campaigning after the filing of the CoC but even before the
start of the campaign period.
- Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done
before the start of the campaign period. I
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- In short, the Decision considers a person who files a CoC already a “candidate”
even before the start of the campaign period.
- HOWEVER, with the November 2009 Decision, the Court now holds that the
previous ruling is contrary to the clear intent of the law.
o Lanot v. COMELEC
 A person who files a CoC is not a candidate until the start of
the campaigning period.
 Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a CoC
is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
- Congress elevated the doctrine enunciate in the Lanot case into a statute by
inserting the same as the 2nd sentence of the third paragraph of the amended
Section15 of RA8436.
o According to such law, Congress inserted the word “only” so that the
first provisio now reads:
 “Provided, that, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid
campaign period xxx.”
- Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its mandatory directive that
election offenses can be committed by a candidate “only” upon the start of the
campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so committed.
o A candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done
during the campaign period, not before.
o Any election offense that may be committed by a candidate
under the election law cannot be committed before the start of
the campaign period.
o Hence, in ruling Penera liable for premature campaign for
partisan political acts before the start of the campaigning period,
the assailed decision ignores the express and clear intent of the
law.
18. MARTINEZ III V. HR
- Martinez and Salimbangon were among the candidates for Representative in the
4th Legislative District of Cebu Province.
- Edilito C. Martinez filed his CoC for the same position.
- Martinez filed a petition to declare Edilito a nuisance candidate. COMELEC
2nd Division declaring Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate only on June
12, 2007 or almost 1 month after the elections.
- July 9, 2007 Salimbangon was proclaimed winner having garnered 67,277 votes
while Martinez got 67,173 votes, or a difference of 104 votes.
- Martinez filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam and HRET granted his motion
to convert into Regular Protest of all 1,129 precincts.
- The election protest is based on 300 ballots more or less with only
"MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative
which the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) did not count for Martinez on
the ground that there was another congressional candidate (Edilito C. Martinez)
who had the same surname. Martinez also alleged that he lost several thousand
votes as a result of incorrect appreciation of ballots not counted in his favor.
- During the revision, ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ"
written on the line for Representative were not counted and temporarily
classified as stray. These comprise majority of the 9,831 stray ballots claimed by
Martinez.
- HRET sustained BEI considering the ballots as stray based in Sec. 211 (1) of
Omnibus Code [ "Where only the first name of a candidate or only his surname
is written, the vote for such candidate is valid, if there is no other candidate
with the same first name or surname for the same office."] HRET dismissed
the protest and affirmed the proclamation of Salimbangon and declares as
representative having won margin of 453 votes.
- MR denied
Issue: WON the ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" be
counted for Celestino Martinez- yes. Granted and declared Martinez as winner.
Held:
- Petitioner sought to declare Edilito C. Martinez as a nuisance candidate
immediately after the latter filed his CoC as an independent candidate and long
before the May 14, 2007 elections.
o Averments:
 Martinez who was a driver of a motorcycle for hire, locally
known as "habal-habal"
 did not own any real property in his municipality,
 had not filed his income tax return for the past
years, and
 being an independent candidate did not have any
political machinery to propel his candidacy nor did
he have political supporters to help him in his
campaign.
 Martinez, after the filing of his CoC, was never
heard of again and neither did he start an electoral
campaign.
o Given such lack of bona fide intention of
Edilito C. Martinez to run for the office
for which he filed a CoC, petitioner
contended that his candidacy would just
cause confusion among the voters by the
similarity of their surnames, considering
that petitioner was undeniably the
frontrunner in the congressional district in
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the 4th Legislative District of Cebu as his
mother, Rep. Clavel A. Martinez, was the
incumbent Representative of the district.
- The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate
proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people.
o What is sought is the correction of the canvass of votes, which was the
basis of proclamation of the winning candidate.
o Election contests, therefore, involve the adjudication not only of
private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also of
paramount public interest considering the need to dispel uncertainty
over the real choice of the electorate.
- In controversies pertaining to nuisance candidates as in the case at bar, the law
contemplates the likelihood of confusion which the similarity of surnames of 2
candidates may generate.
o A nuisance candidate is thus defined as one who, based on the
attendant circumstances, has no bona fide intention to run for the office
for which the CoC has been filed, his sole purpose being the reduction
of the votes of a strong candidate, upon the expectation that ballots
with only the surname of such candidate will be considered stray and
not counted for either of them.
- Bautista vs COMELEC
o The pendency of proceedings against a nuisance candidate on election
day inevitably exposes the bona fide candidate to the confusion over the
similarity of names that affects the voter's will and frustrates the same.
o It may be that the factual scenario in Bautista is not exactly the same as
in this case, mainly because the COMELEC resolution declaring
Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was issued before and not after the
elections, with the electorate having been informed thereof through
newspaper releases and other forms of notification on the day of
election.
o Undeniably, however, the adverse effect on the voter's will was
similarly present in this case, if not worse, considering the substantial
number of ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ"
written on the line for Representative - over five thousand - which
have been declared as stray votes, the invalidated ballots being more
than sufficient to overcome private respondent's lead of only 453 votes
after the recount.
o Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective of election
laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voter.
- These can be gleaned from the findings of the Commission on the personal
circumstances of Edilito C. Martinez clearly indicating lack of serious intent to
run for the position for which he filed his CoC, foremost of which is his sudden
absence after such filing.
o In contrast to petitioner who is a well-known politician, a former
municipal mayor for 3 terms and a strong contender for the position
of Representative of the 4th Legislative District of Cebu (then
occupied by his mother), it seems too obvious that Edilito C. Martinez
was far from the voters' consciousness as he did not even campaign
nor formally launch his candidacy. The HRET likewise failed to
mention the total number of votes actually cast for Edilito C. Martinez.
The evidence clearly shows that Edilito C. Martinez, who did not even
bother to file an answer and simply disappeared after filing his CoC,
was an unknown in politics within the district, a "habal-habal" driver
who had neither the financial resources nor political support to sustain
his candidacy.
- HRET gravely abused its discretion in affirming the proclamation of respondent
Salimbango and votes should have been properly counted in favor of petitioner.
Laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots
must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice
of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. The prohibition
against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and
confusion in ascertaining the true will of the electorate.
- The ballots indicating only the similar surname of 2 candidates for the same
position may, in appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate
and not considered stray, even if the other candidate was declared a nuisance
candidate by final judgment after the elections. Accordingly, the 5,401 votes for
"MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" should be credited to petitioner giving him
a total of 72,056 votes as against 67,108 total votes of private respondent.
Petitioner thus garnered more votes than private respondent with a winning
margin of 4,948 votes.
NOTES:
Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Nuisance candidates. -- The Commission may motu proprio or upon a verified petition
of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a CoC if it is shown that said
certificate has been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause
confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or
by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona
fide intention to run for the office for which the CoC has been filed and thus prevent a
faithful determination of the true will of the electorate."
19. DELA CRUZ vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
20. BANAT V. COMELEC
- Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT)
filed before the National Board of Canvassers(NBC) a petition to proclaim the
 ELECTION LAW
full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution. However,
the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELEC’s national
board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by
the COMELEC en banc.
- BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the resolution
of COMELEC to their petition to proclaim the full number of party list
representatives provided by the Constitution.
- The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a resolution proclaiming
thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections in May 2007.
- The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-
list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party,
organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v.
COMELEC formula.
- Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through
Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher)
asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the
Veterans formula. COMELEC denied the consideration.
- Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for certiorari with mandamus and
prohibition assailing the resolution of the COMELEC in its decision to use the
Veterans formula.
ISSUES + RULING
WON the twenty % allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling
- The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list
representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives.
WON the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional
- Yes, it is constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats
that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory
device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.
WON the 2% threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one
seat is constitutional
- The 2nd clause of Section 11(b) of R. A. 7941 “those garnering more than 2 %
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes” is unconstitutional. The 2% threshold only in relation
to the distribution of the additional seats presents an unwarranted obstacle
to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and
prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives."
How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?
- In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section
11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
- The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
- The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least 2% of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
- Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
- Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
- Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from
participating in the party-list elections?
- Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties
from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-
list elections through their sectoral wings. Also, in defining a "party" that
participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party,"
R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in
the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections
is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. However, by the vote of 8-7, the Court
decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties
from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
21. CABALLERO V. COMELEC
Doctrine: In order to justify the cancellation of COC under Section 78, it is essential that
the false representation mentioned therein pertains to a material matter for the sanction
imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate - the right to
run for the elective post for which he filed the CoC. We concluded that material
representation contemplated by Section 78 refers to qualifications for elective office, such
as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run
for a local elective office as provided for in the Local Government Code. Furthermore,
aside from the requirement of materiality, the misrepresentation must consist of a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible.
- Petitioner and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr. were both
candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province
of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections.
- Nanud filed a Petition to deny due course to or cancellation of petitioner's CoC
alleging that the latter made a false representation when he declared in his COC
that he was eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes despite being a
Canadian citizen and a non-resident thereof.
- During the December 10, 2012 conference, petitioner, through counsel,
manifested that he was not properly served with a copy of the petition and the
petition was served by registered mail not in his address in Barangay Imnajbu,
Uyugan, Batanes.
o He, however, received a copy of the petition during the conference.
- Petitioner did not file an Answer but filed a Memorandum controverting private
respondent's substantial allegations in his petition.
 ELECTION LAW
o Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3,
2012, he took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
before the Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on
September 13, 2012 and became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen
pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.
o Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes on
October 1, 2012 to conform with Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225. He
claimed that he did not lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes
despite becoming a Canadian citizen as he merely left Uyugan
temporarily to pursue a brighter future for him and his family; and that
he went back to Uyugan during his vacation while working in Nigeria,
California, and finally in Canada.
- On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding that
petitioner made a material misrepresentation in his COC when he declared that
he is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes within one year prior to
the election. COMELEC grants the cancellation of COC of petitioner.
- The COMELEC First Division did not discuss the procedural deficiency raised
by petitioner as he was already given a copy of the petition and also in
consonance with the Commission's constitutional duty of determining the
qualifications of petitioner to run for elective office.
o It found that while petitioner complied with the requirements of RA
No. 9225 since he had taken his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines
and had validly renounced his Canadian citizenship, he failed to
comply with the other requirements provided under RA No. 9225 for
those seeking elective office, i.e., persons who renounced their foreign
citizenship must still comply with the one year residency requirement
provided for under Section 39 of the Local Government Code.
o Petitioner's naturalization as a Canadian citizen resulted in the
abandonment of his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes; thus,
having abandoned his domicile of origin, it is incumbent upon him to
prove that he was able to reestablish his domicile in Uyugan for him
to be eligible to run for elective office in said locality which he failed
to do.
- Elections were subsequently held on May 13, 2013 and the election returns
showed that petitioner won over private respondent. Private respondent filed
an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Defer Proclamation.
- On May 14, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes.
- On May 16, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the
COMELEC En Banc assailing the May 3, 2013 Resolution issued by the
COMELEC's First Division canceling his COC.
- On May 17, 2013, private respondent filed a Petition to Annul Proclamation.
- On November 6, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued its assailed Resolution
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
- Petitioner filed with us the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a TRO.
- In the meantime, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution of the May 3,
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division as affirmed by the En Banc
and prayed for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, the appropriate correction
of the certificate of canvas to reflect that all votes in favor of petitioner are stray
votes, declaration of nullity of petitioner's proclamation and proclamation of
private respondent as the duly-elected Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes in the May 13,
2013 elections.
- On December 12, 2013, COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a
Writ of Execution.12 Private respondent took his Oath of Office13 on
December 20, 2013.
- Petitioner contends that when private respondent filed a petition to deny due
course or to cancel his COC with the Office of the Municipal Election Officer
of Uyugan, Batanes, a copy thereof was not personally served on him; that
private respondent later sent a copy of the petition to him by registered mail
without an attached affidavit stating the reason on why registered mail as a mode
of service was resorted to. Petitioner argues that private respondent violated
Section 4, paragraphs (1) and (4),1 Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, thus, his petition
to deny due course or cancel petitioner's CoC should have been denied outright.
Issue: WON the petitioner complied with the other requirements provided under
RA No. 9225
Ruling: While private respondent failed to comply with the above-mentioned
requirements, the settled rule, however, is that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are
subject to liberal construction.
- Moreover, the COMELEC may exercise its power to suspend its own rules as
provided under Section 4, Rule 1 of their Rules of Procedure.
- Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. - In the interest of justice and in order to obtain
speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission, these rules or
any portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission.
- Under this authority, the Commission is similarly enabled to cope with all
situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square
with the need to do justice, in any case without further loss of time, provided
that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired
- Petitioner next claims that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile.
o He argues that he was born and baptized in Uyugan, Batanes; studied
and had worked therein for a couple of years, and had paid his
community tax certificate; and, that he was a registered voter and had
exercised his right of suffrage and even built his house therein.
o He also contends that he usually comes back to Uyugan, Batanes
during his vacations from work abroad, thus, his domicile had not been
lost.
 ELECTION LAW
o Petitioner avers that the requirement of the law in fixing the residence o However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen.
qualification of a candidate running for public office is not strictly on - Petitioner’s retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did
the period of residence in the place where he seeks to be elected but not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes.
on the acquaintance by the candidate on his constituents' vital needs o He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on
for their common welfare; and that his nine months of actual stay in September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his
Uyugan, Batanes prior to his election is a substantial compliance with new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made
the law. it as such.
o Petitioner insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in - The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to present competent
canceling his COC. evidence to prove that he was able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan
- The Court is not persuaded. within a period of one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013
- RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition elections.
Act of 2003, declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost o It found that it was only after reacquiring his Filipino citizenship
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a by virtue of RA No. 9225 on September 13, 2012 that petitioner
foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship under the can rightfully claim that he re-established his domicile in
conditions of the law. The law does not provide for residency requirement for Uyugan, Batanes, if such was accompanied by physical presence
the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any thereat, coupled with an actual intent to reestablish his domicile
effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current there. However, the period from September 13, 2012 to May 12, 2013
residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. was even less than the one year residency required by law.
- RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical
and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship.
Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and
foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in
the foreign country of which he is also a citizen. However, when a natural-born
Filipino with dual citizenship seeks for an elective public office, residency in the
Philippines becomes material.
- Clearly, the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must be a
resident of the place where he seeks to be elected at least one year immediately
preceding the election day. Respondent filed the petition for cancellation of
petitioner's COC on the ground that the latter made material misrepresentation
when he declared therein that he is a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least
one year immediately preceding the day of elections.
- The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as
referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal
residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."
o A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually
the place where the child's parents reside and continues until the same
is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). It
consists not only in the intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention.
- Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan,
Batanes.
o Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan,
Batanes.