CHAPTER 7

From Convergence to Divergence

UNDE RSTANDING DIVERGENCE

the “first ­G reat Divergence” was not merely a break between

Roman and post-­Roman modes of state formation in Eu­rope. It was also
a genuine divergence, as trajectories of state formation began to separate
between post-­Roman Eu­rope and other parts of the Old World. As
we saw in the opening chapter, it was the per­sis­tent absence of large-­
scale empire from the past millennium and a half of Eu­rope’s history
that made it stand out. The proportion of Eu­ro­pe­ans ruled by Rome,
some 80 ­percent or more, was similar to the share of population claimed
by the largest empires of several other macro-­regions, such as ­those of
the Achaemenids and Umayyads (~80 ­percent) and the Ottomans
(~60 ­percent) in the ­Middle East and North Africa region; the Maurya,
Delhi, and Mughal empires (~90 ­percent) and the Gupta and Harsha
empires (~60 ­percent) in South Asia; and vari­ous Chinese dynasties in
East Asia (~80–90 ­percent). The recurrent creation of such entities out-
side Eu­rope prevented the emergence of stable state systems.1
This divergence places the failure of hegemonic empire in post-­
Roman Eu­rope in a much broader context. Identifying specific circum-
stances that accounted for this outcome, as I tried to do in chapters 5
and 6, can just be a first step. Only comparison between Eu­rope and
other parts of the Old World can tell us w ­ hether t­ hese outcomes w
­ ere

219
220  C hapter  7

rooted in more fundamental differences. This, in turn, gives us a better

sense of ­whether Eu­ro­pean polycentrism and competitive fragmentation
­were highly contingent or sustained by power­ful structural conditions.
In this chapter and in chapters 8 and 9, I argue that the latter is true.
Ideally, we would like to observe par­tic­u­lar features that ­were most
pronounced in East Asia—­the most “empire-­friendly” part of the Old
World—­weakest in, or even absent from, post-­Roman Eu­rope, and of
intermediate strength in other subcontinental regions, including rele-
vant portions of the New World. In practice, the comprehensive survey
that is needed to systematically define, document, and assess a wide set
of criteria could easily fill an entire book. In the following, I therefore
focus in the first instance on a more straightforward juxtaposition of
Eu­rope and East Asia, employing the Chinese imperial tradition as a
counterpoint to medieval and Eu­ro­pean state formation.
However, this contrast appeared only ­after the fall of Rome, and that
is what made it a divergence. Up till then, Eu­rope and East Asia had
shared convergent trends that appeared to put them on similar tracks.
This, of course, makes their subsequent and rather sudden divergence
all the more remarkable and worth investigating. It also helps us pin-
point the most significant variables that drove this pro­cess, and to do so
at dif­fer­ent levels of causation.2
I develop my argument in two stages. In this chapter, I cover the
ancient convergence and subsequent divergence between Eu­rope and
China, and the specific historical circumstances—or proximate
­causes—­associated with the post-­ancient disjuncture. I then explore
more fundamental features that acted upon t­ hese historical pro­cesses:
geography and ecol­ogy (chapter 8) and cultural traits (chapter 9). I ex-
pand my comparison by introducing material from South and Southeast
Asia and the M ­ iddle East whenever it is expedient, but in less detail, in
order to test the broader relevance of putative key variables such as fiscal
arrangements, proximity to the steppe, and cultural homogeneity.
In the summary of my findings at the end of chapter 9, I argue that
the most impor­tant outcomes—­enduring fragmentation in post-­
Roman Eu­rope and serial empire formation elsewhere—­were substan-
tially overdetermined. Notwithstanding Rome’s early success, Eu­rope
 F rom C onvergence to D ivergence   221

was always less likely to be ruled by very large empires than other parts
of the Old World, most notably East Asia. This holds true regardless of
­whether we privilege geographic, ecological, or cultural ­factors.

STATE FO RMATION IN EU­R OPE A N D E AST ASI A:

ANC I E NT PAR A LLEL S, CONVERGE N C E S,
AND D I F F E RENCES

Parallels

The eastern and western ends of Eurasia had not always developed in
such strikingly dif­fer­ent ways. For more than a millennium, state forma-
tion proceeded in parallel or even convergent ways. In the early first
millennium BCE, po­liti­cal power in Eu­rope and the Mediterranean on
the one hand and in East Asia on the other was spatially highly frag-
mented. Eu­rope was a vast expanse of small and stateless groups lined
by Mediterranean city-­states. In the Levant, which had long been home
to larger and more complex polities, widespread collapse at the end of
the Bronze Age had shattered empires from Anatolia to Mesopotamia
and Egypt, leaving mostly smaller kingdoms in its wake. In what are now
the central-­eastern reaches of the ­People’s Republic of China, the West-
ern Zhou regime gradually lost its grip on its numerous local vassals.
The erosion of central authority created a web of more than a hundred
smaller polities that w
­ ere interspersed with ethnically dif­fer­ent but simi-
larly modestly sized groups.
Over time, diversity very gradually diminished as larger po­liti­cal enti-
ties emerged and absorbed competitors. This pro­cess commenced a
­little sooner in the West but in both cases yielded comparable results.
In the ­Middle East, the Neo-­Assyrian empire expanded from the ninth
and especially the eighth centuries BCE onward, as did Kushite and
Saite Egypt from the eighth and seventh centuries. Stretching from the
Balkans to the Indus valley, the vast Iranian-­centered empire of the Ach-
aemenids that arose in the second half of the sixth ­century BCE eclipsed
every­thing that had come before. ­After Alexander the ­Great’s conquest
caused it to unravel in the late fourth ­century BCE, several substantial