220  C hapter  7

rooted in more fundamental differences. This, in turn, gives us a better

sense of ­whether Eu­ro­pean polycentrism and competitive fragmentation
­were highly contingent or sustained by power­ful structural conditions.
In this chapter and in chapters 8 and 9, I argue that the latter is true.
Ideally, we would like to observe par­tic­u­lar features that ­were most
pronounced in East Asia—­the most “empire-­friendly” part of the Old
World—­weakest in, or even absent from, post-­Roman Eu­rope, and of
intermediate strength in other subcontinental regions, including rele-
vant portions of the New World. In practice, the comprehensive survey
that is needed to systematically define, document, and assess a wide set
of criteria could easily fill an entire book. In the following, I therefore
focus in the first instance on a more straightforward juxtaposition of
Eu­rope and East Asia, employing the Chinese imperial tradition as a
counterpoint to medieval and Eu­ro­pean state formation.
However, this contrast appeared only ­after the fall of Rome, and that
is what made it a divergence. Up till then, Eu­rope and East Asia had
shared convergent trends that appeared to put them on similar tracks.
This, of course, makes their subsequent and rather sudden divergence
all the more remarkable and worth investigating. It also helps us pin-
point the most significant variables that drove this pro­cess, and to do so
at dif­fer­ent levels of causation.2
I develop my argument in two stages. In this chapter, I cover the
ancient convergence and subsequent divergence between Eu­rope and
China, and the specific historical circumstances—or proximate
­causes—­associated with the post-­ancient disjuncture. I then explore
more fundamental features that acted upon t­ hese historical pro­cesses:
geography and ecol­ogy (chapter 8) and cultural traits (chapter 9). I ex-
pand my comparison by introducing material from South and Southeast
Asia and the M ­ iddle East whenever it is expedient, but in less detail, in
order to test the broader relevance of putative key variables such as fiscal
arrangements, proximity to the steppe, and cultural homogeneity.
In the summary of my findings at the end of chapter 9, I argue that
the most impor­tant outcomes—­enduring fragmentation in post-­
Roman Eu­rope and serial empire formation elsewhere—­were substan-
tially overdetermined. Notwithstanding Rome’s early success, Eu­rope