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ELSEVIER OCEAN ENGINEERING BOOK SERIES
VOLUME 9
LECH K. KOBYLINSKI
Technical University of Gdansk, Poland and Foundation for
Safety of Navigation and Environment Protection
SIGISMUND KASTNER
Bremen University of Applied Sciences, Germany
M.E. McCormick
The John Hopkins University,
Baltimore, MD, USA
2005
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Vll
SERIES PREFACE
In this day and age, humankind has come to the realization that the
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have been exploited to such an extent that their availability to future
generations is now in question. In an attempt to reverse this march towards
self-destruction, we have turned our attention to the oceans, realizing that
these bodies of water are both sources for potable water, food and minerals
and are relied upon for World commerce. In order to help engineers more
knowledgeably and constructively exploit the oceans, the Elsevier Ocean
Engineering Book Series has been created.
The series differs from other ocean engineering book series in that the
books are directed more towards technology than science, with a few
exceptions. Those exceptions we judge to have immediate applications to
many of the ocean technology fields. Our goal is to cover the broad areas of
naval architecture, coastal engineering, ocean engineering acoustics, marine
systems ~ngineering, applied oceanography, ocean energy conversion, design
of offshore structures, reliability of ocean structures and systems and many
others. The books are written so that readers entering the topic fields can
acquire a working level of expertise from their readings.
We hope that the books in the series are well-received by the ocean
engineering community.
Rameswar Bhattacharyya
Michael E. McCormick
Series Editors
ix
FOREWORD
Naval architecture for a long time concentrated on problems that have a direct impact on
the ship's economics, i.e. resistance and powering. The importance of stability was
recognised and shipbuilders from the earliest times knew well that ships have to survive
the perils of the sea. Nevertheless, because of a lack of understanding of stability
principles, the losses of ships due to capsizing or foundering were enormous but seafarers
who considered the losses unavoidable accepted this situation.
Gradually the understanding of stability developed, but it was not before the second half
of the twentieth century that the tools for "investigating dynamic behaviour of the ship in a
seaway became available. Until then, stability was investigated in a quasi-static way and
the main problem was development of the methods of calculation of the righting
moments curve.
Nowadays, safety of shipping is the focus of attention. In order to promote safety at sea
the International Maritime Organisation - IMO was created, (until 1982 called the Inter-
governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation - IMCO). This United Nations Agency
from the very beginning of its work recognised the necessity to set up international
stability safety standards. This fact increased worldwide interest in stability problems.
In many countries research programmes were initiated, and scientists throughout the
world, directly or indirectly, participated in the work of IMO on the development of
stability standards. A number of scientific reports were prepared on stability problems
and published in scientific or technical magazines, or presented to IMO. Several
international conferences, symposia and workshops, particularly devoted to stability and
safety of ships, were organised with hundreds of papers presented. The amount of
knowledge on stability, accumulated over the years, is now enormous. There is, however,
a lack of publications containing the review of.the knowledge in this particular field.
The intention of this book is to fill this gap and to present, as far possible, the state of the
art focused on the regulatory, operational and theoretical aspects of intact stability. The
book is addressed to readers who are interested in promoting safety against capsizing,
who are involved in research on, and practical application of stability regulations on an
international or national level, to ship operators and designers and members of the
maritime administrations. The initiative to write this book belonged to the late N. B.
Sevastianov, professor at the Kaliningrad Institute of Technology (Russia).
The book is divided in two volumes, I and 2. (These correspond to Volumes 9 and 10 of
the Elsevier Ocean Engineering Series). The first volume (authored by L. Kobylinski and
S. Kastner with subtitle "Regulation and Operation") describes the state of the art in the
field of intact ship stability. It is focused on how intact safety is promoted; it considers
stability regulations; its current state is given an historical perspective. The methods used
to develop these regulations are carefully examined. Besides regulations, the first volume
addresses the operational aspect of stability: ocean environment and ship behaviour are
described as they are seen from the bridge. A large amount of graphical material allows
x
using the presented information for practical guidance. Special attention is paid to on-
board stability measurements and their accuracy .•
The second volume (authored by V. L. Belenky and N. B. Sevastianov with the subtitle
"Risk of Capsizing") is a gathering of today's knowledge for tomorrow's development. It
is focused on how risk and reliability can be applied for evaluation and regulation of the
intact stability. First, the framework of future risk-based stability regulations is
considered. Then the book examines physical phenomena associated with stability loss
including broaching, greenwater influence and breaking waves action in order to evaluate
the risk of capsizing in different situations. Much attention is paid to the mechanics of
capsizing: as it seems to be necessary for interpretation and validation of numerical
simulation results. The latter is meant to facilitate confident applicability of these
methods for new ship designs.
PREFACE
This book focuses on the state-of-the-art in the field of promotion of stability safety. It
includes regulatory and operational aspects of intact stability of ships. Ships must be safe
against capsizing at sea. Although capsizing accidents do not happen often nowadays, a
stability accident is one of the worst things that can happen to a ship. In most cases it
involves loss of life, often all hands aboard and total loss of the ship and her cargo.
Catastrophic heel leads to losing cargo, structural damage and serious danger to human
life.
Safety against capsizing or loss of stability accident may be secured by regulatory and
operational means. Stability regulations or requirements allow designing stable ships. But
it is obvious that no ship can be built that cannot be capsized by mismanagement or bad
operation. Therefore, operational measures are equally important for the safety as design
requirements. This book reviews knowledge, experience and information gathered in both
areas for the last 50 years and presents it in a systematic manner.
The authors anticipate that the potential readers of this book are familiar with the basic
stability theory and practical methods of calculation. Therefore, only very brief
references to the general stability concepts are included in Part 1 and Part 2 of this book.
It is the view of the authors that damage stability problems should be dealt with
separately, therefore they are not included here.
Part 1 (written by Professor Lech K. Kobylinski, Technical University of Gdansk) on
regulatory aspects of intact stability presents the progress on setting stability standards
from work at IMO, based on numerous contributions from a large number of shipping
nations. It discusses various methods used for the purpose of developing stability
standards and provides a critical review of standards currently in use. As it is obviously
impossible to assure safety only by design measures, the importance of operational
requirements and of the human factor is stressed. Prospects of developing improved
standards of safety against capsizing in various situations and the newest trends to
achieve enhanced safety at sea that take into account the above mentioned factors are
discussed.
This part is addressed mainly to ship designers, officers of national maritime
administrations, surveyors and plan reviewing engineers of classification societies
allowing them a better understanding of the background of stability requirements they
should respect. It is addressed also to scientists and administrative personnel who work
on the development of new, or the improvement of, existing safety rules involving
stability. Students studying ship stability problems may find useful material for further
study. These professionals are assumed to be interested in current national and
international stability regulations as well as the scientific background of the regulations
that are in force today.
Xll
TABLE OF CONTENTS
6.5.2 General observations and guidelines on model tests of capsizing ................... 150
6.5.3 Results of systematic model tests of capsizing in the Hamburg Ship Model
Basin ................................................................................................................ 153
6.5.4 Systematic model tests of capsizing carried out in Japan ................................ 155
6.5.5 Capsizing model tests in breaking waves ........................................................ 159
6.5.6 Model tests performed in Canada .................................................................... 161
6.5.7 Model tests in beam waves .............................................................................. 164
6.5.8 Model tests in following waves ....................................................................... 164
Chapter 10. Roll excitation and influence of speed and heading .............................. 217
10.1 Motion directions of rigid body ........................................................................... 217
10.2 Mass moment of inertia ........................................................................................ 220
10.3 Linear restoring moment ...................................................................................... 221
10.4 Natural roll period ................................................................................................ 222
10.5 Roll damping ........................................................................................................ 223
10.6 GM - To relationship and the rolling period test .................................................. 225
10.7 Different modes of roll excitation in a seaway ..................................................... 228
10.8 Ship roll in beam seas .......................................................................................... ·228
10.9 Roll in beam seas at large amplitudes .................................................................. 232
10.10 GZ-variation in longitudinal waves .......................................................... ·........ ·234
10.11 The encounter period of ship and waves ............................................................ 239
10.12 The encounter frequency .................................................................................... 243
10.13 Wave group of two regular waves ...................................................... ·····......·.... 243
10.14 Wave encounter of a ship in irregular seas ........................................................ 247
10.15 Wave energy and encounter spectra ................................................................... 251
10.16 Relevant frequencies ofthe spectrum of encounter ........................................... 252
10.17 The bandwidth of the transformed seaway spectrum ......................................... 255
10.18 Irregular time series of wave encounter ............................................................. 257
Chapter 1
Seafaring was always a dangerous enterprise involving serious risk of losing life and
property, and also risk of pollution ofthe environment.
Looking back at the history of seafaring, one may find that in old times perils of the sea
were well recognised and great risks to which ships were subjected at sea were in a way
accepted. In fact, even in the nineteenth century people risking a sea voyage considered
themselves to be very fortunate if they arrived safely at the port of destination and for that
a vote of thanks to God had to be offered. The reflection of this situation could be found
easily in the literature, art and. tales of seamen but also in the reports on casualties,
although systematic statistics of casualties have been carried out only recently.
The industrial revolution of the nineteenth century and rapid expansion of sea
transportation, seafaring and shipbuilding that followed caused the issue of marine safety
to become more important. From one side, in view of the growing number of ships at sea,
a very high risk involved in seafaring could not· be accepted. On the other hand, progress
in marine technology provided realistic possibilities to improve safety against capsizing
or foundering.
From the oldest times shipbuilders were fully aware that ships must be stable at sea.
Seneca in the first century A.D. wrote: " Navis bona dicitur, non que prestiosis coloribus
picta est ... sed stabilis et firma ... et iuncturis aquam exc1udendibus spissa, ad ferendum
incursum maris solida, velox et non sentiens ventum ... "(quote after Gleijeses [1945]).
The knowledge of how to build safe ships was, however, based solely on experience that, in
turn, was based on methods of "trial and error" where "errors" were sea disasters. Lessons
from sea disasters materialised in rough recommendations on appropriate proportions and
dimensions of the ship's hull and its construction that would safeguard stability and good
seakeeping qualities. These recommendations were passed from generation to generation of
shipbuilders and were guarded in extreme secrecy. Naval architecture was really a craft and
not a science. Only in the second half of the nineteenth century did science began to affect
shipbuilding appreciably, although Bouguer [1746] laid down the fundamentals of naval
architecture much earlier.
4 a~~l
In view of the lack of knowledge about the basic laws concerning stability of floating
bodies, the first recommendations on how to build safe ships referred to stability in the
indirect way by requiring sufficient height of the deck above water. With the proper
recommendations regarding distribution of weights and the form of the underwater
portion of the ship, this in fact, secured sufficient stability in most cases.
The oldest traces of safety recommendations refer to the prevention of overloading of ships,
i.e. to the freeboard if we use the modem terminology. In a document found in Tunisia dated
to the first century B.C., containing the contract for transportation of goods by sea, the
skipper solemnly promised not to take any additional load over the agreed quantity. The
load line mark was known already in the middle ages. The Venetian code of maritime law
from 1255 required the insertion of the load line mark in the form of an iron cross-nailed to
the ships' side. [Krappinger 1964]
In the second half of the eighteenth century Lloyd's Register of Shipping issued the first
recommendation on the magnitude of the freeboard - it required 2 to 3 inches per foot of
the height of the hold. Lloyd's subsequently amended the recommendation. Also the
Liverpool Underwriters Society had issued other more elaborate recommendations much
earlier. [Cowley 1988]
Wooden ships, however, were built according to well-grounded, traditional and
experienced practices and were comparatively safe. The introduction of steel as a
material for ships' hulls was an important new development, but with no previous
experience, it caused the number of casualties to quickly increase. The public reaction to
high losses forced the British Government to form the Marine Department of the Board
of Trade, but its resources were small and activity limited. Only in 1864, in view of
further pressure of public opinion, a committee was created to investigate this situation.
The committee presented its report in 1867 proposing draft freeboard standards.
In the following years, there was a rapid development of freeboard rules. In this
connection, the name of Samuel Plimsoll (1824 - 1898) has to be mentioned. He led the
campaign aimed at increasing the safety of ships and proposed the load line mark in the
form used to present days known as the "Plimsoll disc" [Alderman 1972]. The chronicle
of events related to the development ofload line rules is as follows:
1876 - Merchant Shipping Act which required positioning of the load mark on all British
ships over 80 GRT.
1885 - Creation of Load Lines Committee with Lloyd's Register of Shipping, which
developed the first load line tables.
1894 - Second Merchant Shipping Act containing load lines rules compulsory in Britain
up tb 1930.
1903 - See-Berufsgenossenschaft issued first German regulations on load lines.
1927 - Load Lines Committee prepared draft international load lines rules.
1930 - First International Convention on Load Lines adopted (LL Convention).
It has to be stressed that in spite of the passing of the two important Merchant Shipping
Acts of 1876 and 1894 under pressure of public opinion and in spite of the Samuel
Plimsoll campaign, the opinion of legislators was against introducing any regulations. In
Historical Development and Basic Stability Concepts 5
1866 the Head of the Marine Department, Thomas Gray at a conference, expressed the
philosophy of the legislators in the following terms: "there can be no question that
government interference is not only unnecessary, but may really become vicious if it
attempts to attain an end by official inspection and supervision that can be better attained
by the development of free healthy competition and by the self-interest and emulation of
the trader, since it fetters the development of trade, it stands in the way of the
advancement of science, and it interferes to the prejudice of the liberty of the subject ".
The Board's Permanent Secretary, at the same meeting, said that: "they must look to self-
interest and not to government regulations, as the great element of safety of life on board
ship". The ship owners agreed with him that: "ship owner and ship master together are
very much better judges of what ought to be done to a ship than anybody else can
possibly be" (quoted after [Cowley 1988]).
Recalling these opinion that result from liberal ideas of the nineteenth century, one must
remember appalling conditions present on board cargo and passenger ships, where
sometimes one third of the emigrants died during the voyage and numerous casualties
occurred. Legislators and ship owners gave up only under great pressure from public
agitation in response to the high death toll.
The development of the freeboard rules only in an indirect way inadequately secured
safety against capsizing. The LL Convention referred directly to one aspect of stability
only, viz. it required the master must be supplied with information concerning stability.
The most important international instruments, viz. International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention) did not include requirements concerning
stability either, with the exception of a similar provision as in the LL Convention.
The history of SOLAS Conventions was very turbulent. The SOLAS Conventions from
the very beginning included subdivision and damage stability requirements that were to a
great extent influenced by sea disasters.
It is known that by the Middle Ages, it was required in China that junks must be fitted
with collision bulkheads in order to secure surVivability in case of collision. Hulls of
wooden ships were rather resistant to damage and as it was comparatively easy to plumb
a hole, the installation of watertight bulkheads was considered not important. Along with
the substitution of steel for wood in hull construction the situation changed and damage
stability became important elements of safety.
The British Merchant Shipping Act from 1854 included probably the first requirements
concerning subdivision. It required that passenger ships be fitted with a collision
bulkhead and two bulkheads around the machinery space. In 1891, the Committee of the
British Board of Trade proposed subdivision and damage stability rules for passenger
ships (no one bothered at the time about cargo ships and their crews) where a two-
compartment standard was required. The rules were, however, considered by the
maritime world unnecessarily severe and were never implemented. Only after several
serious disasters, where ships foundered due to lack of proper subdivision, did public
opinion force maritime authorities to take actions. (ON WO foundered in 1894 with 250
lives lost, 1897 ELBE with 355 lives lost, 1912 - TITANIC * with 1513 lives lost, 1913-
*) Different sources quote different number of lives lost. The number 1513 is quoted after Encyclopedia
Britannica.
6 CMpwl
EMPRESS OF IRELAND with 1024 lives lost). The TITANIC disaster particularly
caused sharp reaction of the public. Although many lives were lost at sea in minor
casualties, public opinion was always much more sensitive to serious casualties involving
heavy losses than to regular losses of lesser magnitude. Moreover the TITANIC was a
flagship and was claimed to be unsinkable and was on her maiden voyage with many
personalities on board. It was that which shook the marine world and the general public.
The main cause of heavy loss oflife was insufficient life boat capacity, however.
The Court of Formal Investigation ofthe casualty recommended that boatage be provided
for all persons on board as well as effective subdivision to standards determined by the
newly appointed Bulkheads Committee. The final recommendation was that the United
Kingdom should call an International Conference to consider and possibly agree upon an
International Convention.
Between 12 November 1913 and 20 January 1914 the first International Conference on
the Safety of Life at Sea took place but the prepared text of the Convention was never
ratified because of the outbreak of the First World War. It was not until 1929 the SOLAS
Conference took place and adopted subdivision and damage stability regulations basically
following the rules of its unratified predecessor. Further International Conferences
adopted the 1948, 1960 and 1974 Conventions, Protocols to the Conventions and several
amendments.
The 1960 SOLAS Conference adopted an important recommendation requesting
IMCO**) to initiate work on the development of subdivision and damage stability
regulations based on probabilistic approach both for passenger and cargo ships, which
subsequently were developed and adopted by the IMO Assembly by Resolution A.265
(VIII). The 1960 SOLAS Conference recommended also that IMO should develop intact
stability standards for passenger, cargo ships and fishing vessels. IMCO, (IMO) was the
sole United Nations agency responsible for marine safety. It commenced its work in 1959
after its convention came into force. This was an important turning point in the promotion
of maritime safety, and IMO through .its Committees and Subcommittees started
developing safety requirements in various fields of maritime activity, inter allia in the
field of subdivision, load lines and stability.
As it was already mentioned the SOLAS Conventions did not directly refer to intact
stability, except that they included the provision concerning stability information that has
to be supplied to the master.
Adoption of the afore-said recommendation appeared to be an important turning point in
the work on the development of stability standards as for the first time the need for
international stability standards was articulated and also a scientific approach to the
development of safety standards was recommended. At the same time the subdivision and
damage stability requirements of the 1960 SOLAS Convention were strongly criticised as
based on vague assumptions involving several "factors" intended to take account of ship
characteristics in an approximate way. Nevertheless a long time passed until the
**) IMCO- Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation. In 1982, it changed its name to the
International Maritime Organisation -IMO. In the text, references are made to IMO irrespective of whether
it was before or after 1982
Historical Development and Basic Stability Concepts 7
ship could be treated as a dynamic system. The probabilistic approach to safety against
capsizing was also pursued and nonlinear phenomena investigated.
The results of these investigations were published in numerous papers and presented at
specialised international conferences on stability. The first International Conference on
Stability of Ships and Ocean Vehicles (STAB) was organised in Glasgow in 1975.
Subsequently, further STAB Conferences were held in Tokyo in 1982, in Gdansk in
1986, in Naples in 1990, in Melbourne, Florida in 1994, in Varna in 1997 and in
Launceston, Tasmania in 2000. The eighth STAB Conference is scheduled for the year
2003 and it will be held in Madrid. In 1990 also the International Stability Forum was
created with the objective to pursue work on stability problems internationally.
Apart from the STAB conferences, several international symposia and workshops were
also organised in a few countries, with some meeting regularly. In Kaliningrad (Russia)
the Workshop on Physical and Mathematical Modelling of Vessel's Stability in a Seaway
was held in 1993. That was followed two years later by the Symposium on Ship Safety in
a Seaway in memory of Professor N. B. Sevastianov. In 1993 also, the u.S. Coast Guard
organised a Vessels Stability Symposium in New London, Connecticut.
In 1995, the first International Workshop on Contemporary Problems of Stability and
Operational Safety of Ships was organised in Glasgow. This was followed by the second
one in Osaka (1996), the third in Crete (1997), the fourth in St. Johns (1998), and the fifth
in Trieste (2001). Also the International Towing Tank Conference (ITTC) created the
Stability Committee to study first of all problems related to mathematical modelling and
to model tests of stability.
Comprehensive research programmes on stability were accomplished in several
countries. The results of these programmes are elaborated on in subsequent chapters.
However, two such programmes sponsored by the British and Norwegian governments
were aimed at developing "rational" or "improved" criteria and included a wide range of
subjects. The results of the British SAFES HIP project were presented at a specially
organised international conference organised by RINA in 1986. Planning and
supervision of the Norwegian project was performed by an international scientific
Committee consisting of several specialists on stability problems.
It is obvious that the main cause of the increased activity in the field of was the fact that
IMO started in 1962 work towards development of stability standards. Although the
results achieved in this work are remarkable and from a practical point of view an
introduction of the international stability standards resulted in increased safety against
capsizing, there are still many problems to be solved until an ultimate solution, which is
not yet available, can be obtained.
This tremendous effort which certainly resulted in a much better understanding of
stability problems and capsizing phenomena showed, however, that problems of stability
of ships in a seaway including safety against capsizing are extremely complicated and the
task of development of criteria of surviving based on risk of capsizing taking into
consideration all possible situations which may be encountered during the vessel's
lifetime is still far from being accomplished.
25
Chapter 2
In the past the ability to build ships that were safe and had good seakeeping qualities was
based entirely on experience gained over a long time and passed on from generation to
generation. The dimensions and proportions of the ship to be built, ensuring stability and
seaworthiness, were estimated on the basis of this experience. If an accident happened,
the shipbuilders learned from their lesson and improved the construction of subsequent
ships.
This was the oldest concept of safety, where safety was achieved by the "trial and error"
method.
This traditional way of building ships has survived to this day in many developing
countries, where small ships have been built without any drawings and calculations and
the design was solely based on experience. This method however, cannot be accepted any
more, although lessons from accidents still have to be taken in order to improve ship
design for safety. We may only mention the HERALD OF FREE ENTERPRISE;
ALLEXANDER KIELLAND or ESTONIA casuc;lltiesfollowing which several measures
aimed at increasing safety were undertaken.
The method where safety was related to ship size and proportions was used by
classification societies not so long ago, where their regulations specifying hull scantlings
were related to ship parameters. Krappinger [1967] defined this concept of safety as the
assignment of hardware and this concept is often used as a basis of simple safety
requirements up to this day.
A more advanced concept of safety does not include assignment of dimensions or
proportions of an object, but assignment of its physical properties. In respect to stability,
this means assignment of values of metacentric height or of the righting arms at various
angles of heel. The method of estimation of these values could be, however, the same, i.e.
the trial and error method. All older stability criteria or recommendations were actually
based on this method.
The method of establishing criteria in the form of the hardware could be improved if
there were sufficient statistical data and if these data are methodically and scientifically
analysed. There are known cases of the application of this method comparatively recently
(e.g. IMO, Resolution A.207 (VII».
Although standards proposed by Rahola were not officially adopted, they attracted wide
attention in the maritime world and were unofficially adopted as a recommendation by
several countries. In some other countries they constituted a basis for the development of
national requirements. Finally, they were taken into account when IMO developed its
requirements in the mid-sixties, and the method originally invented by Rahola, with
certain improvements, was used in the analysis of casualty records collected by IMO.
This is discussed in detail in subchapter 4.2.
A very good review of the historical stability criteria was included in the book by
Lugovsky [1963] and in the paper by Henricson [1980]. It reveals that there were three
basic approaches in this development.
The first approach represented by Anderson, Posdyunin and Niedermair consisted of the
standardisation of the metacentric height, which was considered as a sufficient measure
of stability. The advantage of this approach is .simplicity; however limiting requirements
to GMo only cannot ensure safety at large angles of heel. In particular, ships with a small
freeboard, having a large GMo , but a small range of righting arm curves might be
dangerous (for example - CAPTAIN).
The second approach consisted of the standardisation of the GZ curve. This was
represented by Denny, Benjamin, and Skinner. Criteria developed by those authors were
based on the physical parameters of the ship, they did not, however, take into
consideration external heeling moments acting on the ship at sea.
The third approach included the consideration of dynamic stability and at least the partial
consideration of external heeling moments. This approach was represented by
Blagoveshchensky, Pierrottet, Rahola, and Norrby. The last approach is the most
advantageous and substantiated as it gives due consideration to the physical phenomena
involved. Most national stability requirements developed later were based on this
approach.
All the above quoted proposed standards of stability were only recommendations without
any legal power. Probably the first official proposal to establish stability criteria was put
forward in 1926 by the American Marine Standardisation Committee [USA 1926]. The
32 Chapter 2
proposed standards included the criterion of minimal metacentric height. They reflected
the tendency of those times. Minimal metacentric height was estimated, taking into
account the wind heeling moment, heeling moment of passengers crowding and heeling
moment caused by flooding of two adjacent compartments.
About the same time the Technical Committee of the Russian Register of Shipping
commenced work on the preparation of national stability criteria. This work was not
completed, although the draft requirements as prepared by the Committee were published
in 1934 [Nogid 1934]. The criteria were based on the calculation of the dynamic wind
heeling moment. In 1938 - 1939 the Russian Register of Shipping resumed work on
stability criteria and the results of this work were presented by Avotin [1940]. The
criteria were based on the calculation of the dynamic wind heeling moment, which has to
be balanced by the restoring moment. This was finally adopted as a basic criterion of
stability in the officially adopted regulations of the Russian Register of Shipping [USSR
1948, 1961]. In 1948 they were approved as temporary requirements and after subsequent
modifications in 1959 and 1963 they received permanent status. For details concerning
the development of these regulations, refer to the book by Lugovsky [1963]. The basic
principle of these requirements consisting of calculation of the dynamic wind heeling
moment, and taking into account rolling, is discussed in subchapter 3.5.
In several countries after WWII attempts were made to develop national stability
requirements. Some countries, e.g. Poland [1957, 1982], German Democratic Republic
[1953], Yugoslavia [1959] and China [Lugovsky, 1963] adopted requirements based on
the regulations of Russia. Also, Japan [1959, 1963] introduced requirements based on
calculation of the dynamic wind heeling moment, taking into account amplitude of
rolling. The standard based on this approach, known as "weather criterion" was adopted
also as a recommendation in some other countries. The USA developed their
requirements in the form of minimal metacentric height taking into account various
heeling moments [USA 1959- 1963]. Canada [1969], Greece [1963], Italy [1963], France
[IMO 1964] and the Netherlands [IMO 1977] officially adopted recommended stability
standards which were, however, not compulsory.
The situation regarding the current status of national stability requirement in various
countries was analysed in 1964 by the IMO Working Group on Intact Stability as a
background for the development of international standards. Results of this analysis were
presented in [IMO 1964]; they were also reported in other publications [Jens 1965,
Kobylinski 1964]. At that time (1964) the information on the current status of national
stability requirements was received from 33 countries. Those countries could be divided
in three groups. The first group, consisting of six countries, reported that they did not
apply any stability requirements. The second group, consisting of sixteen countries,
reported that they required compliance with the SOLAS 1948 regulations. Five of them,
in addition, recommended the application (unofficially) of Rahola criteria. The third
group, consisted of eleven countries, which adopted national stability requirements in
addition to the SOLAS 1948 regulations. The scope of application of these requirements
varied however, and is shown in table 2.2.
In most of the eleven countries of the third group, the regulations also included
requirements pertaining to the GZ curve. A comparison of the requirements is shown in
Development and Present Status of Stability Standards 33
table 2.3. Apparently, the differences among the required parameters in the various
countries were not very large
From the time of the analysis mentioned above, the situation regarding stability
requirements in force in various countries has changed because of IMO developed
international stability requirements for different types of ships, which were implemented
by several countries and included into their own national regulations. At the same time,
most countries gave up further development of their own requirements, although some of
them supplemented IMO requirements. As the application of IMO Resolution A.167
36 Chapter 2
Since its establishment under its founding Convention adopted in 1948, IMO (lMCO) has
made considerable progress towards the development of marine safety requirements.
IMO practically commenced its work in 1959 when its convention came into force.
Three types of instruments can be prepared and adopted within the IMO structure, each
having a different legal status. These are conventions, recommendations and guidelines.
The conventions, together with appendices and attachments are adopted by the
international conferences or by the expanded Maritime Safety Committee. After coming
into force in accordance with the agreed procedure, they became compulsory for all
parties. The IMO Assembly adopts recommendations by its resolutions. Unless countries
implement them by inclusion in their national requirements they are only
recommendations in nature. Guidelines are also recommendations in nature and contain
detailed specifications of less importantance.
At the time IMO commenced its work, no international requirements concerning intact
stability existed except the requirement in the SOLAS 1948 Convention related to the
information to be provided to the Master and to the inclining test. A, similar requirement
was included in the 1966 Load Line Convention. The SOLAS Convention, however,
included specific requirements on carriage of grain
At the 1960 SOLAS Conference some countries submitted proposals to include in the
Convention requirements concerning intact stability. The proposals were not accepted
because the majority of delegations considered that detailed stability requirements need
thorough consideration and checking, for which time during the conference was not
available. Some delegations also were of the opinion that intact stability of passenger
ships is indirectly required by requirements concerning damage stability included in the
SOLAS Convention.
Ultimately, the 1960 SOLAS Conference adopted the important Recommendation No 7,
which actually initiated work towards development of international stability standards.
The text of this recommendation reads:
" 7. Intact Stabilitv of Passen1!er Shivs. Cargo Ships and Fishing Vessels
The Conference, having considered proposals made by certain Governments to adopt as
part of the present Convention Regulations for intact stability, concluded that further
study should be given to these proposals and to any other relevant material, which may
be submitted by interested Governments.
The Conference therefore recommends that the Organisation should, at a convenient
opportunity, initiate studies, on the basis of the information referred to above of (a)
intact stability of passenger ships, (b) intact stability of cargo ships, (c) intact stability of
fishing vessels, and (d) standards of stability information, taking into account the
decision of the present Conference on requirements for damage stability and the results
of any further studies which may be carried out by the Organisation on the subdivision
and damage stability of cargo ships in pursuance of recommendation 8 of the
Conference, the object being the formulation of such international standards as may
appear necessary.
Development and Present Status of Stability Standards 37
The Conference further recommends that in such studies the Organisation should take
into account studies already undertaken by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the
United Nations on the stability of fishing vessels and should co-operate with that
Organisation on that aspect of the matter" (end of quotation).
Following this recommendation, IMO was compelled to create the Sub-Committee on
Subdivision and Stability Problems (STAB) and in 1962 to undertake work on the
development of stability criteria for passenger, cargo and fishing vessels.
Two subsidiary Working Groups - on Subdivision and Damage Stability and on Intact
Stability originated during the beginning of work of the IMO STAB Sub-Committee. The
Working Group on Intact Stability existed until 1968 when it was disbanded and the Sub-
Committee itself undertook further development. Until then, however, the work of the
Working Group was restricted to passenger and cargo ships.
In 1964, IMO also initiated the development of stability requirements for fishing vessels.
As fishing vessels were also under the responsibility of the other United Nations Agency,
the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), a conference was organised in Gdansk in
1963 [FAO 1963] with the participation of both FAO and IMO representatives and
invited experts from various countries in order to consider stability problems of fishing
vessels. This Conference agreed that further work on the development of stability
requirements for fishing vessels would be performed within the IMO structure. Following
this decision, the Panel of Experts on Stability of Fishing Vessels (PFV) was created
within the IMO in which the representatives of the FAO and of the International Labour
Organisation (ILO) also participated.
In 1969, this panel was transformed into the Subcommittee on Safety of Fishing Vessels
(SFV), which in turn, after concluding the 1977 Torremolinos Conference on Safety of
Fishing Vessels, was in 1980 combined with the STAB Sub-Committee into the Sub-
Committee on Stability and Load Lines and on Fishing Vessel Safety (SLF). The SLF
Sub-Committee in 1978 again created the Working Group on Intact Stability as a
subsidiary body, meeting in parallel to the Sub-Committee meetings and reporting at the
end of each meeting to the Sub-Committee. The bulk of the technical and drafting work
in preparation ofrequirements was performed within this working group.
Commencing its work on intact stability criteria the STAB Sub-Committee stated that
when developing international criteria, it is necessary to take into account the heeling
moments from external forces at sea. It realised, however, that such an approach would
not enable the development of stability criteria in a short time. Therefore, the Sub-
Committee decided to base future criteria, as a first step, on statistics of casualties, and in
particular, analysing stability parameters for ships which capsized and for those which
were considered safe in operation. It decided also to analyse the contents of existing
national stability requirements. [IMO 1962] As a result of this decision, the Intact
Stability Working Group (IS) as well as the Panel of Experts on Stability of Fishing
Vessels (PFV) began to collect data on ships and fishing vessels that capsized and on
ships that were considered safe in operation.
A comprehensive discussion of the method used for the development of criteria could be
found in several publications [Thompson and Tope 1970, Nadeinsky and Jens 1968,
Kobylinski 1972; Cox 1976]. Standards were eventually established as a result of the
38 Chapter 2
analysis of the stability parameters for ships that capsized and for those that were safe in
operation. The method of the analysis is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. The analysis, for
passenger, cargo and fishing vessels, was performed jointly by the Federal Republic of
Germany and Poland and submitted to IMO in two basic documents [IMO 1966, 1966a].
Standards developed were then thoroughly checked against a number of existing ships
and compared with criteria already existing in various countries. Results of these
calculations were presented in numerous documents submitted to IMO. A particularly
comprehensive evaluation of the proposed standards was presented by the Polish
delegation to IMO [IMO 1966d,1967].
Eventually in 1968, the IMO Assembly adopted the first international stability
requirements as per Resolution A.167 (ES.IV) for passenger and cargo ships under 100 m
in length and Resolution A.168 (ES.IV) for fishing vessels.
As many small fishing vessels are constructed without any drawings or stability
calculations, which makes application of the criteria of Resolution A.168 (ES.IV)
impossible, separate criterion based upon a regression analysis of dimensions and
stability characteristics of small vessels was developed and adopted by Resolution A.207
(VII). The method of development of the regression formula is discussed in Chapter 4.
Resolution A.267 (VIII), adopted in 1973, contains guidelines for accuracy of stability
calculations and guidelines for the inclining test of fishing vessels. Recommendation for
skippers of fishing vessels on ensuring vessels endurance in conditions of ice formations
was developed with the view to improve safety of vessels fishing in high latitudes. It was
adopted in Resolution A.269 (VIII).
In 1974, the SFV Sub-Committee, in co-operation with ILO and FAO, developed Part B
of the Code of safety for fishermen and fishing vessels. The Code covers all aspects of
safety including the stability requirements of Resolutions A. 167(ES.IV) and A.207(VII).
All other resolutions adopted by IMO related to stability of fishing vessels were also
included. As the Code is applicable to fishing vessels of24 m and over, in 1979, the three
Organisations developed safety guidelines. for small fishing vessels, under the heading
"Voluntary Guidelines", where stability requirements were also included. Currently both
instruments, Part B of the Code and the Voluntary Guidelines are under review by the
SLF Sub-committee ofIMO.
The text of the 1977 Torremolinos Convention was prepared by the SFV Sub-Committee
on the basis of the previously referenced Part B of the Code. Stability related
requirements include requirements of Resolution A.168 (ES.IV) and Part B of the Code,
with small amendments. However, the Convention included a provision for taking into
account external forces caused by fishing gear, water trapped on the deck and the
influence of strong winds and rolling. In an appendix to the Convention, guidelines on
calculating the influence of winds and rolling, of icing and of water trapped on the deck
were attached, as well as guidance for simplified criterion for small fishing vessels (as in
Resolution A.207 (VII)), and for calculating the bow height and the height of the deck
above water.
Because the Torremolinos Convention did not enter into force until 1989, IMO decided to
proceed with the preparation of the Protocol to this convention, which was adopted in
1993. The text of the protocol, which is not yet in force, in the stability part is not
substantially different from the text of the convention.
Development and Present Status of Stability Standards 39
After the new Working Group on Intact Stability was created in 1978, it started with the
consideration of the so-called "rational" stability criteria, and improvement of existing
criteria. Under the term "rational" criteria consideration was given within the Sub-
Committee to performance based criteria utilising probabilistic approach to be applied
instead of prescriptive criteria included in the above-mentioned resolutions. This project,
however, was too difficult to handle at that time and ultimately was abandoned.
Apart from this main task, however, the group was charged with some current work, and
in particular, with the development of stability requirements that have to be included into
IMO codes under development by other Sub-Committees. This task was fulfilled and
stability requirements of codes for off-shore supply vessels - (Resolution A.469(XII)) ,
for dynamically supported craft - (Resolution A.373(X)), for high speed craft -
(Resolution MSC.36/63), for mobile off-shore drilling units (MODU) - (Resolution
A.414(XI) and Resolution A649(16)), for special purpose ships - (Resolution A.534(13))
and for nuclear merchant ships - (Resolution A.491(XII)) were developed. Also, interim
(MSC/Circ.348) and final (MSC/Circ.503) stability criteria for pontoons were developed.
Stability requirements included in some of the above mentioned codes were subsequently
reviewed when the entire codes were revised. In particular, those of Resolution A.373(X)
(superseded by the HSC Code 1996 and 2000 adopted by the resolutions MSC 36(63) and
97(73)) and Resolution A.414(XI) (superseded by Resolution A.649(16)). The main
result of the work of the group was, however, the development of the weather criterion
for passenger and cargo ships (Resolution A.562(14)) and for fishing vessels (Resolution
685(17)).
The important task given to the Sub-Committee in 1988 was the development of the Code
of Stability for all types of ships, which was intended to summarise all stability
requirements included in various Resolutions. This Code had been finalised in 1993
(Resolution A.749(18)) and subsequently amended in 1998 (Resolution MSC 75(69)).
The Code is a "living" document under constant review and into which all new
requirements developed by IMO will be incorporated in the future ..
IMO also developed some operational guidances -related to stability. Those applicable to
fishing vessels were included in the previously referenced Code of Safety for Fishermen
and Fishing Vessels, Part B and in the Torremolinos Protocol 1993. Apart from those,
Guidance on intact stability of existing tankers during liquid transfer operations
(MSC/Circ_706) and Guidance to the master for avoiding dangerous situations in
following and quartering seas (MSC/Circ.707) were adopted by the Maritime Safety
Committee in 1995.
The current status of the IMO stability requirements at certain stages and their
development were discussed in several papers presented to STAB Conferences: by Jens
and Kobylinski [1982] by Plaza and Pertrov [1986 and 1994] and by Plaza and Semenov
[1990].
2.3 Status ofthe International Intact Stability Standards for Various Types of Ships
2.3.1 General
Intact stability criteria developed by IMO for various types of ships are included in
several recommendations adopted by the IMO Assembly or by the Maritime Safety
~ a~~2
Committee ofIMO. From a legal point of view, they are not compulsory unless they are
included in the national regulations of countries concerned. The only compulsory stability
requirements are those included in the 1974 SOLAS and 1966 LL Conventions and
further discussed in subchapter 2.3.4.
The review of IMO work on instruments, which include stability requirements, is given
in subchapter 2.2, and the complete list of these instruments is given in Table 2.7. The
Code on intact stability for all types of ships covered by IMO instruments (Resolution
A.749(18» as amended in 1998 by Resolution MSC 75(69), referred in the following as
the IS Code, superseded many of them or incorporated stability requirements taken from
them. In the IS Code, stability requirements for various types of ships were compiled in
an orderly manner which made application of particular recommended criteria much
easier for designers and operators.
The IS Code separates general criteria applicable to all ships and special criteria for
certain types of ships. It also includes chapters on general provisions against capsizing
and information for the master on icing, on watertight integrity and on determination of
lightship displacement and centres of gravity. It is supplemented by Annexes containing
detailed guidance for the conduct of an inclining test, guidance for skippers of small
fishing vessels on ensuring a vessel's endurance in conditions of ice formation and on
determination of ship's stability by means of rolling period test.
In the following paragraphs, the main principles of the criteria included in the above
mentioned IS Code are briefly discussed. Readers are referred to the original text of the
IS Code together with amendments thereon which are available from IMO.
It has to be noted that satisfying the prescribed criteria is no assurance that under all
circumstances ships will be safe from capsizing. There are ships known, which satisfied
all criteria, but nevertheless capsized. Stability is not the single nor the prime factor that
determines safe operation of a ship, and prudent navigation in a seaway, in particular in
severe weather conditions, as well as proper stowage or lashing of cargo or both, and
proper use of closing appliances contribute to a safe voyage. Resolution A. 167(ES.IV)
included an important statement which was later included in the IS Code which reads:
"Compliance with the stability criteria does not ensure immunity against capsizing,
regardless of the circumstances, or absolve of the master from his responsibilities.
Masters should therefore exercise prudence and good seamanship having regard to the
season of the year, weather forecasts and the navigational zone and should take
appropriate actions as to speed and course warranted by the prevailing circumstances"
(end of quotation).
2.3.2 General Recommended Intact Stability Criteria for Passenger and Cargo
Ships
Stability requirements of the IS Code for passenger and cargo ships of 24 metres in
length and above, but under 100 metres in length were transferred from Resolution
A. 167(ES.IV) and from Resolution A.562 (14) which includes the weather criterion. The
application of weather criterion is, however, not restricted to ships under 100 metres in
length.
2.3.3 Special Criteria for Certain Types of Ships
For ships carrying timber deck cargoes, criteria from Resolution A.167(ES.IV), as
amended by resolution A.206(VII), are applicable. Both Resolutions were replaced by the
IS Code. Reference is also made to Resolution A.715(17): "Code of safe practice for
ships carrying timber deck cargoes, 1991" where requirements on stowage, securing and
Development and Present Status of Stability Standards 43
personnel protection are included. For such ships, if the deck cargo, which remains
securely fixed at a large angle of heel extends longitudinally between superstructures
transversely for the full beam of the ship, with due allowance for a rounded gunwale not
exceeding 4 per cent of the breadth of the ship and/or securing supporting uprights, the
criteria shown in the table 2.5 may be applied in substitution for criteria specified in
subchapter 2.3.2 (see fig.2.12).
The metacentric height GMo should be at all times during a voyage not less than 0.10 m
after correction for free surface effects of liquid in tanks and, where appropriate, the
absorption of water by the deck cargo and/or ice accretion on the exposed surfaces.
Fishing Vessels
Intact stability criteria for fishing vessels originally were adopted by Resolution
A.168(ES.IV),. and amended by Resolution A.268(VII). Later, they were incorporated in
the FAO/IMO/ILO Code of safety for fishermen and fishing vessels, Part B. and in the
Torremolinos International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels 1977 and its
1993 Protocol (both not in force) with some modifications.
The 1993 Protocol to the Torremolinos Convention includes additional requirements of
taking into account the external forces during fishing operations and of the effect of water
on deck. It does not specify, however, the method of calculation of these effects leaving
the decision to the national Administrations. The intact stability criteria for fishing
vessels are included in the IS Code.
General intact stability criteria for passenger and cargo vessels are applicable also to
fishing vessels having a length of 24 m and over, with the exception of the requirement
on the initial metacentric height, which is recommended 0.35 m for single deck vessels.
In vessels with a complete superstructure or vessels of 70 m in length and over, the
metacentric height may be reduced, but should be not less than 0.15 m.
For fishing vessels of 45 m in length and over, the weather criterion as for passenger and
cargo vessels is also applicable. For smaller fishing vessels, but longer than 24 m, the
weather criterion was modified as to the values of wind pressure which should take into
account the wind velocity gradient versus the distance "h" between the centroid of
windage area and the waterplane. Weather criterion for fishing vessels was adopted
originally by Resolution A.685(l7).
For decked fishing vessels under 30 m in length, to which the above requirements may
not be applicable, a simplified regression formula based on statistics has been developed
which relates the minimum recommended metacentric height to some geometrical
characteristics of the hull. It was adopted by Resolution A.207(VII), superseded by the IS
Code. The method of development of this formula is discussed in Chapter 4.6.
With respect to fishing vessels, reference is also made to Resolutions A.208(VII),
A.267(VIII), A.269(VIII) and MSC. CircA08 (see Table 2.7). For small decked fishing
vessels of 12 metres in length and over but less than 24 metres FAO/IMO/ILO Voluntary
guidelines are applicable.
Dynamically Supported Craft
Stability requirements for hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles and similar craft carrying
more than 12 passengers but not more than 450, with all passengers seated and not
proceeding more than 100 miles from a port of refuge are included in the Code of safety
for dynamically supported craft (Resolution A.373(X) amended by Resolution MSC
37(63)). The requirements were also incorporated in the IS Code.
This DSC Code makes a distinction between intact stability of the craft in the
displacement (hull-borne) mode and in the transient and non-displacement (foil or
cushion borne) mode.
For the displacement mode, the stability of a craft should be such that when in still water
conditions, the inclination of the craft from the horizontal is not to exceed SO in any
direction under all permitted cases of loading and taking into account uncontrolled
passenger movements as may occur. A calculation of the dynamic stability should be
made with respect to critical design conditions.
The method recommended includes the effect of heeling moments when turning and of
the wind pressure and rolling. The method of application of the wind and rolling effect is
shown in fig. 2.14 (when using a static stability curve) and in fig. 2.15 (when using a
dynamic stability curve). It differs from the method adopted for passenger and cargo
vessels in that the amplitude of rolling has to be taken from the upright position of the
craft.
Development and Present Status of Stability Standards 45
For details of the calculation method of heeling moment due to turning and of the wind
heeling moment refer to Chapter 3.
The method of calculation of stability in the transient and foil-borne mode for hydrofoils
is not specified in the DSC Code and only general recommendations are given. The only
exception is a simplified formula for calculation of the metacentric height for hydrofoil
boats with surface piercing foils, which is mentioned as one possible method.
The DSC Code also contains a recommendation for calculating ice accretion similar to
that for fishing vessels.
By Resolution MSC 36/63 a revised version of the DSC Code, applicable to high speed
craft constructed on or after 1st January 1996, was adopted under the title International
code of safety for high speed craft - (HSC Code) (see subchapter 2.304).
The Code for the construction and equipment of mobile off-shore drilling units
(Resolution Ao4I4(XI)) (1979 MODU Code) included stability criteria which are
governed by the entirely different design features of MODU's compared with
conventional ships and are therefore different from those for other types of vessels. The
revised version of the Code was adopted by Resolution A.649(16) (1989 MODU Code),
with alternative criteria for twin-pontoon column stabilised semisubmersible units
adopted by Resolution A.650(16). The revised Code is applicable to MODU's whose
keels are laid or which are at a similar stage of construction on or after 1 May 1981. The
new Code supersedes the 1979 MODU Code regarding these units. Requirements for
MODU"s were also incorporated in the IS Code.
The principle for the stability provisions for MODU's in the 1979 Code is the concept of
withstanding the wind heeling moment (weather criterion).
48 Chapter2
Provisions for special purpose ships included in the Code of safety for special purpose
ships (Resolution A.534(13», also incorporated in the IS Code, require that the intact
stability for ships of under 100 m in length should comply with the provisions for
passenger and cargo ships, except that the alternative criteria given in the Guidelines for
the design and construction of offshore supply vessels (Resolution A.469(12» may be
used for special purpose ships of similar design and characteristics. The intact stability of
ships of 100 m in length and above should be to the satisfaction of the Administration.
Pontoons
Stability criteria for containerships greater than 100m in length are included in the IS
Code. As experience did show, large containerships (longer than 100 m), when sailing in
following waves could exercise substantial loss of the righting arm, and therefore
increased stability criteria are recommended for those ships. The criteria for
containerships are summarised in Table 2.5, where coefficient C is introduced.
The coefficient C is a function ofthe following parameters:
C = j(d,D',Bm,KG,CB,Cw,L)
where: Bm - breadth of the ship on the waterline at half draught, D' - moulded depth of
the ship corrected for defined parts of volumes.
For the method of calculation of this coefficient, reference is made to the original text of
the Code. The method of calculation of the coefficient C is explained in subchapter 6.5.3.
Development and Present Status a/Stability Standards 49
Carriage of Grain
High-speed Craft
Stability requirements for high-speed craft are covered by the International code of safety
for high speed craft (HSC Code) adopted by Resolution MSC 36(63), amended by MSC
119(74), which is mandatory under the provisions of Chapter X of the 1974 SOLAS
Convention, as amended. By resolution MSC 97(73), a revised version of this Code was
adopted (HSC Code 2000) which enters into force on 1st July 2002.
The angle of heel due to steady
wind when the heeling arm hHwl
is applied should not exceed
16°. The maximum GZ value
should occur at an angle of at
least 10°.
The effect of rolling in a seaway
upon craft's stability should be
demonstrated mathematically.
In doing so, the residual area
under the GZ curve (A2), i.e.
beyond the angle of heel (<Ph)
should at least be equal to 0.028
mrad up to an angle of roll <Pro
In the absence of model tests,
this angle should be taken as 15°
or an angle of (<Pd - <Ph),
whichever is less. This is shown
in fig. 2.20.
In the IS Code, certain operational, design and constructional requirements are included.
Although they are not directly related to stability criteria themselves, they have an
important bearing on the safety against capsizing. Operational and design provisions
include a detailed specification of information to be supplied to the master, operating
booklets for certain types of ships, and operational procedures related to weather
conditions. They include also loading conditions to be examined, recommendation on
calculation of stability curves, a detailed description of the procedure for inclining test,
etc. These matters are discussed in Part 2 of the book.
Constructional provisions as included in the IS Code include aspects related to
maintaining watertight integrity of the hull. Those aspects are covered also in SOLAS
and in the Load Lines Convention to which reference is made.
52 Chapter 2
All IMO instruments related to stability are summarised in Table 2.7. As previously
mentioned, many IMO recommendations were incorporated in the IS Code which
superseded them. Nevertheless, they are all included in the Table for the sake of
completeness.
In numerous papers, at many international conferences and symposia and also at several
sessions of the IMO Sub-Committee, the problem of developing solutions for stability
criteria were discussed and several proposals were advanced in this respect. In general,
four possible approaches could be adopted in order to develop stability criteria. They are
as follows:
1. Balancing external heeling forces/moments with the righting moment.
2. A statistical approach including collection and analysis of casualty records.
3. A probabilistic approach involving calculation of the probability of capsizing using
mathematical simulation of the behaviour of the ship in a seaway and under action of
other external forces.
4. Systematic model tests.
The method of balancing external heeling moments with the righting moment was
already applied, for example, in the in development of weather criterion as in Resolution
A.562(14). This method has also been used in the development of stability standards for
certain types of ships or when taking into account shifting of loads, crowding passengers
on one side, etc. This method is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
Statistics of casualties constituted the basis for existing stability standards of IMO as in
Resolution A.167(ES.lV) and A. 168(ES.lV). Also, some older criteria, such as the
Rahola criteria were based on statistics. Statistical methods are discussed in Chapter 4.
The probabilistic approach to safety against capsizing and to the establishment of stability
criteria seems to be a natural solution as both external environmental loads as well as the
ship's stability characteristics during a voyage are random quantities. This approach,
which is strongly connected with the mathematical simulation of capsizing leading to
calculation of the probability of capsizing in a seaway deserves more consideration. The
ultimate goal of the probabilistic approach is development of performance based criteria
The probabilistic approach to the development of stability standards is discussed in Part 1
of the Volume 2 and in Chapter 5 of this Part, and methods for a mathematical simulation
of capsizing are discussed in Part 2 ofthe Volume 2
Systematic model tests were also proposed as a possible method to develop stability
criteria. Model tests of capsizing in open waters in natural wind created waves were
performed in some places and results of the experiments were available. Also, model
tests of capsizing were performed in towing tanks. However, to conduct systematic model
tests of capsizing in a realistically simulated environment poses extreme difficulties and
might be an enormously costly and time consuming enterprise. Therefore, this method
has not been used yet. It is discussed in Chapter 6.
57
Chapter 3
3.1 General
and
M H <M HCrit or hH < hHCrit
where: MH, hH - heeling moment and arm respectively
MR, hR - righting moment and arm respectively
MHcrih hHcrit - critical heeling moment a.ndarm respectively (see Chapter 1.3)
even keel in calm water are considered, constitutes a far-reaching simplification. If on the
other hand, heeling moments are calculated using simplified methods, the criteria
developed in this way must be taken cautiously and accepted only after wide practical
experience with their application has been gained.
One of the most important applications of this principle is "weather criterion", where
heeling of the ship under action of wind and waves is considered. Weather criterion has
been included in stability requirements for almost all types of ships. It was, however,
evaluated through an approximate quasi-dynamic method including many simplifications.
Apart from the effect of wind and rolling, almost all national and international stability
requirements include the consideration of other heeling moments caused by: crowding of
passengers, pulling towing hawser, centrifugal forces in turning, forces caused by fishing
gear and also such factors as the effect of free surfaces of liquids in tanks and icing. They
are, however, considered as acting not necessarily simultaneously. The possibility of
those factors of acting at the same time is taken into account in present standards solely
on the basis of speculation supported by experience.
In general, it might be concluded that the method of developing stability standards on the
basis of comparing heeling and righting moments is not rigorous and includes widely
simplified consideration of physical phenomena involved. It may also provoke the
impression that criteria produced assure absolute safety, which obviously is not the case.
Their application to ships of novel design features may be dangerous, because the safety
margin required to maintain stability at sea is based on experience gained with existing
ship types. With these reservations, however, this method provides probably the best
criteria that could be achieved at present.
The principle of balancing of heeling and righting moments requires assessment of all
possible factors causing heeling of ships or influencing the position of the centre gravity,
thus affecting the righting moments curve.
There are a number of such factors. They could be categorised according to various
principles. Krappinger and Hormann [1984] divide all factors into two groups;
1. Factors, which at least in principle could be controlled and which could be avoided by
applying suitable measures. Included in this group are factors such as shifting of
cargoes due to faulty stowage, wrong distribution of cargoes, water inrush through
unsecured openings, etc.
2. Factors, which could not be controlled by the crew. Included in this group are factors
such as wind and waves, water on deck, shifting of cargoes due to heavy rolling,
icing, etc.
This classification is, however, not suitable for developing design standards and rather
might be more applicable to developing operational requirements. This applies also to a
proposal by Cleary [1975], who distinguished factors either as a surprise event for which
the crew may not be prepared or events to which the crew can be expected to prepare for.
Standards Based on the Consideration of Heeling Moments 59
Dorin et al [1975] proposed probably the most comprehensive list of factors influencing
the ship's stability. According to this proposal all factors could be divided into three
groups:
1. Factors generating heeling moments,
2. Factors reducing stability,
3. Factors reducing stability and generating heeling moments simultaneously.
Each classification approach has its merits and deficiencies. From the point of view of
formulation of stability criteria, there is some merit in classifYing all factors as those
influencing righting moments and those that cause external heeling moments. Strictly
speaking, even such classification is dubious, because some factors (e.g. water in tanks)
could be classified either way. Some others are rather related to operational measures
rather than to design standards. Therefore in this chapter division of all factors will be
discussed in three groups:
1. Heeling moments caused by shifting the position ofthe centre of gravity,
2. Heeling moments created by external pulling forces,
3. Effect of wind and seaway.
The vertical position of the centre of gravity of the ship in any loading condition is
assumed to be the initial condition to which all factors affecting ship's stability are
applied. Although some of the factors could be evaluated by simple methods described in
many basic manuals, they will be all discussed in the following sections for the sake of
completeness. However, only those heeling moments are discussed which may affect
conventional ships. Many special types of ships, e.g. floating cranes, offshore support
ships, oceanographic vessels etc. are subjected to heeling moments specific to those
ships. Methods of calculation of some of these heeling moments are discussed only
briefly.
3.3 Heeling Moments Caused by Shifting the Position of the Centre of Gravity
With G'Mo new reduced metacentric height. When there are several tanks filled partially
with fluids, then the reduced metacentric height can be calculated by the formula:
3.3.2 Icing
Ice accretion is actually additional mass taken onboard. The mass of ice is usually
considered to be distributed symmetrically, so it does not produce any heeling moment.
Intensive ice formation usually occurs on the stem, bulwark rail, front walls of.
superstructures and deckhouses, hawser openings, anchors, deck gear, forecastle deck and
upper deck, freeing ports, aerial stays, masts and spars. The most intensive ice formation
takes place when the wind and sea come from ahead. In beam and quartering winds, ice
accumulates quicker on the windward side of the vessel thus leading to a constant list that
is extremely dangerous.
The main problem is the estimation
of the accrued ice. Ice accretion
depends on the geographical zone,
season and atmospheric conditions
and can be estimated only on the
basis of statistical observations.
Allowances for ice accretion are
included in some national
requirements and also in the IS Code
(Resolution A.749(18)). According
to the IS Code, for vessels operating
in areas where ice accretion is likely
to occur, the mass of ice accrued
should be:
- 30 kg/m2 on exposed weather decks and gangways;
- 7.5 kg/m2 for projected lateral areas of each side of the vessel above the water plane.
62 Chapter3
The projected lateral area of discontinuous surfaces of rails, spars (except masts) and
rigging of vessels having no sails and the projected lateral area of other small objects
should be computed by increasing the total projected area of continuous surfaces by 5%
and the static moments of this area by 10%. The areas, where the ice accretion should be
taken into account are specified in the IS Code as well as in the Torremolinos Convention
(Protocol).
The above figures may be, however, inadequate in certain areas. In particular, in
Canadian waters it is recommended to adopt a higher figure for accrued mass of ice.
Also, the Rules of the Russian Register of Shipping [USSR 1961] adopted higher figures.
The mass of ice accrued on the total area of the horizontal projection of weather decks
should be assumed to be 30 kg/m2. The mass of ice on the windage area should be 15
kg/m2.
Much higher figures were adopted by the rules of the German Navy [Arndt 1965, Arndt
et al. 1982]. They are:
- 50 kg/m2 on exposed weather decks, superstructures and front sides of deckhouses
- 100 kg/m2 on transverse projected areas of weapons, boats, masts, rigging and other
small objects on deck.
The effect of added mass on the metacentric height and on the righting arm curves is
discussed in subchapter 1.5 and this effect is shown in figs. 1.21 and 1.22.
provisions of the USSR (Poland, Rwnania, GDR, China) [IMO 1964] (fig.3.23b). France
and the Netherlands also adopted this principle [Jens 1965; IMO 1964] along with the
German navy, however with heeling moment dependent on heeling angle [Vogt 1988]. In
the above described models, the ship was asswned to be in the upright position initially.
The asswnption that the dynamic wind heeling moment is acting when the ship is heeled
to a specified angle to the windward side was adopted in the regulations of the Register of
Shipping of the USSR [1961] (fig.3.23c). The same principle, with an amendment, was
adopted by Japan [Japan 1959]. The amendment specifies that the amplitude of roll to the
windward side is calculated from the static angle of heel to leeward side (fig.3.23d). This
principle was adopted in IMO Resolutions A.562(l4), A.685(17) and A.749(18) (IS
Code).
In the regulations of Yugoslavia [1959] another principle was applied (fig.3.23.e). It was
asswned that the ship is heeled under the static action of the wind heeling moment. It was
asswned further that when the ship heels under action of this moment, at the resulting
angle of heel, a dynamic heeling moment equal to 1.96 times the static moment is
applied. The wind heeling moment is asswned to be variable and related to the heeling
angle.
The comparison of the above models of wind action is not directly possible because in
different models different methods were used for the calculation of wind pressure and of
amplitude of rolling, including various coefficients derived from practice. Neither of the
models described above reflects correctly the complicated phenomena of ship motions in
waves under action of wind. The dynamic system of ship motions under influence of
waves and wind was studied by the authors already mentioned at the beginning of this
paragraph. Those investigations allowed some evaluation of the simplified models
adopted in the development of the weather criterion, but they had no direct bearing on
criteria finally included in the IS Code.
2. The physical model of heeling is based on the assumed righting moment curves in
still water. The effect of heave on the righting arm curve is neglected. The effect of
waves is non-existent and the model adopted is a one-degree of freedom model
neglecting coupling effects. In fact, this is a still water model with initial inclination
only. Calculation of the amplitude of rolling is highly simplified, neglecting nonlinear
effects and the possibility of parametric resonance.
3. The most important parameter, wind pressure is selected arbitrarily in such a way that
the average ship considered safe has to satisfy the criterion. The same applies to the
other important parameter, that is, the amplitude of rolling. Therefore calculation of
the weather criterion is not related to the actual wind force that the ship may
encounter.
4. The main drawback of the adoption of the weather criterion is, however, the wrong
feeling of safety. With all these sophisticated calculations, the designer as well as the
operator, may consider that a ship satisfying the criterion is absolutely safe. This
obviously is not the case and a false feeling of safety might lead to a casualty.
At the time when the adoption of the weather criterion was considered at IMO, the above
shortcomings were pointed out by several members at the sessions of the IMO-
Subcommittee as well as were stressed in some published papers (e.g. [Kuo and Welaya
1981)). Nevertheless, despite the simplifications, the application of the weather criterion
provides an additional degree of safety in many cases, especially for ships with a large
windage area. Analysis of the application of the weather criterion and the statistical
criteria of Resolution A.167(ES.IV) to a number of ships (IMO 1978) revealed that in
some cases statistical criteria are more severe, in others, weather criterion is more severe.
The weather criterion was more severe for ships in light ship condition because of the
larger windage area. This is in line with previous observations and proposals to make
criteria of Resolution A. 167(ES.IV) more severe for ships in ballast condition. Casualties
of some ships in ballast condition were sad confirmation of this conclusion, if only the
casualty of MS HELLAND HANSEN [Dahle and Kjaerland 1980] may be quoted.
The final conclusion might be that in view of the lack of more rigorously developed
criteria, the weather criterion should be considered as the best which could be developed
at present with reservations, however, that it has to be applied together, not instead of, the
statistical criteria. This point of view was actually adopted during the development of the
IS Code (Resolution A.749(18)).
At its 45th session the SLF Sub-Committee having in mind that weather criterion as in the
IS Code (Resolution A.749(l8)) might be unsuitable for certain types of ships decided
following proposals by Germany [IMO 2002a] and Italy [IMO 2002b] to initiate process
of amending the Code. In particularly the Sub-Committee agreed on some interim
modifications to the weather criterion, in particular, modifications of the procedure of
calculation of the rolling amplitude as shown in equation (3.49) and the table 3.8 (factors
rand s).
91
Chapter 4
4.1 General
Analysis of statistical data on stability parameters of capsized ships may be used for
establishing stability standards. This data could be supplemented by the analysis of
stability parameters of ships considered safe in operation. As previously mentioned in
subchapter 2.1, stability criteria established by the German Professional Mariner's
Association were based on the analysis of stability arm curves of 15 fishing vessels, 6 of
which capsized in December 1894 (see fig. 2.2). Also, stability criteria developed by
Benjamin were based on the analysis of righting arm curves of ships, which capsized.
Those however, were not very rigorous approaches. A more systematic attempt to
develop stability standards was made by Rahola [1935, 1939] who applied an original
method of analysis of stability parameters of ships that capsized and of ships considered
safe in operation. As this method, with modifications, was also applied by IMO when
developing stability standards included in Resolutions A.167(ES.IV) and A.168(ES.IV),
the work of Rahola is described in more detail in this chapter. Also, the method adopted
by the IMO STAB Sub-Committee is described together with other proposed more
rigorous methods based on statistical analysis of stability parameters.
Stability criteria proposed by J. Rahola were developed on the basis of statistical analysis
of fourteen vessels, which capsized within the period from 1870 to 1938. In his analysis,
Rahola considered stability characteristics of those vessels dividing them into three
groups:
1. Vessels with insufficient stability;
2. Vessels with critical stability;
3. Vessels sufficiently safe.
Fig. 4.1 shows righting arm curves for all ships analysed. Some vessels were classified as
belonging to two or even three groups depending on whether the superstructures were
included in the calculations of righting arm curves or not.
92 Chapter4
In his analysis, Rahola selected the following parameters for consideration: the angle of
maximum GZ, the angle of vanishing stability and GZ values at 15°, 20°, 30° and 40°.
Therefore, in fact, he considered the area under the GZ curve, or in other words dynamic
stability. The righting arms for all ships were then plotted in the form of the vertical bars
for each vessel as shown in fig. 4.2 for 15°,20°, 30° and 40°. In the diagram, righting
arms estimated as insufficient were blackened and those judged as critical were shaded,
both on the left side of the vertical lines for respective angles of heel. The righting arms
judged as sufficient were plotted on the right side of the vertical lines and hatched from
above.
The method of plotting the righting arms adopted by Rahola allowed drawing the
demarcation line between sufficient and critical values of righting arms. The demarcation
line is shown as the broken line in fig. 4.2. He recommended that righting arm curves for
ships should be above this demarcation line and the GZ values for respective angles of
heel should be adopted as standards. Those are the standards referred to in subchapter
2.1.
Statistical Methods of Developing Stability Standards 93
Apart from the analysis of values of righting arms in the form of the diagram shown in
figA.2, Rahola also thoroughly analysed the form of the stability curves. He pointed out
that the righting arm at 200 heel is strongly influenced by GMo and therefore for large
ships having a small GMo, it might be difficult to achieve GZ20 = 0.14 m, which was the
critical value recommended. He suggested that if for those ships it would be impossible
to obtain this value, the range of righting arm curves should be greater, which could be
easily achieved with larger freeboard. For small vessels having larger GMo values, the
righting arm curves are usually without a hollow (see fig. 4.1) and the value GZ20 = 0.14
m could be easily achieved. In order to make the criteria more flexible, Rahola also
introduced criterion for dynamic stability.
The analysis performed by Rahola is far from rigorous. The classification of vessels
analysed belonging to different categories was made on the basis of personal judgement.
Nevertheless, the criteria proposed by Rahola were used in many countries for a long
time and the method of plotting of righting arms was subsequently used in the
development ofIMO criteria.
the stability information was to be submitted was developed. Also, for these ships, tables
were prepared of stability parameters.
Item 5 of the programme included analysis of the collected data. This task was performed
jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland and the results were submitted to
IMO in several documents separately prepared for passenger and cargo ships and for
fishing vessels [IMO 1965; 1966; 1966a; 1966b].
After IMO Resolutions A.167(ES.IV) and A168(ES.IV) had been adopted and further
intact stability casualty data were collected, it was decided to repeat the analysis in order
to find out if additional data might change conclusions drawn in the first analysis. This
second analysis was performed by Poland [IMO 1985]. Actually, the second analysis
confirmed, in general, results achieved in the first analysis. In the following text, results
of the second analysis that was based on the larger database are referred to.
The analysis performed consisted of two parts. In the first part, details relevant to
casualties were evaluated, which allowed qualitative conclusions with regard to the
circumstances of casualties to be developed and therefore the specification of general
safety precautions. In the second part, stability parameters of ships reported as casualties
were compared with those for ships that were operated safely. Two methods were
adopted in this analysis. The first was identical with the method adopted by Rahola and
the second was the discrimination analysis. The results of the analysis of intact stability
casualty data and of the first part of the analysis of stability parameters are included in
subchapter 4.4 of this Chapter. The results ofthe discrimination analysis are referred to in
subchapter 4.5.
4.4 Results of the Analysis of Intact Stability Casualty Records and Stability
Parameters
The evaluation of details relevant to the casualties .is shown in figures 4.3 to 4.8.
In all 166 casualties reported, the ships
concerned were: 80 cargo ships, 1 cargo
and passenger ship, 1 bulk carrier, 4 off-
shore supply ships, 7 special service
vessels, and 73 fishing vessels.
Distribution of ship's length is shown in
fig. 4.3. It is seen that the majority of
casualties occurred in ships of less than
60 m in length.
A great variety of cargoes were carried so
that no definite conclusions could be
drawn. It may be noted, however, that in
35 cases of 80 cargo ships reported, deck
cargo was present.
A result of the analysis of the location of the casualty is shown in fig. 4.4. It is seen that
the majority of casualties -(72 % of all casualties) occurred in restricted water areas, in
The type of analysis described above is not entirely rigorous; it was partly based on
intuition and allows arbitrary judgement. Nevertheless, from the point of view of
practical application, it provided acceptable results and finally was adopted as a basis for
IMO stability criteria. There are several shortcomings to this method. They relate,
however, mostly not to the principle but rather to its execution. These shortcomings were
properly summarised [Bird and Odabasi 1975] as follows:
1. Statistical procedures are not rigorous.
2. Types and sizes of ships of investigated population were widely different.
3. Loading conditions at the time of casualty were different. Adopted assumption that
the loaded arrival condition can be taken, as safe is not justified.
4. The environmental conditions for each casualty were different, the significance of this
fact was ignored.
5. The ages, especially of so-called "existing" ships were different.
6. The fact that some of the so-called "existing" ships (assumed to be safe) might
become casualties in the future was neglected.
7. The possible influence of ships dynamics in a seaway was neglected.
8. There is a lack of connection of criteria with the environmental conditions.
Statistical Methods of Developing Stability Standards ] 0]
As previously stated, the statistical method used by Rahola and later in the IMO analysis
of intact stability casualty records is not rigorous. When two populations of data, as in
this case, data for capsized ships and for ships considered safe, are available and the
critical values of parameters from these two sets have to be obtained, the method of
discrimination analysis may be applied.
The first application of the discrimination analysis in order to estimate critical values of
stability parameters was proposed by the Polish delegation to IMO [IMO 1965]. The
results of this analysis were later included in a joint report by FRG and Poland [IMO
1966, 1966a], and constituted the basis fOJ;development of IMO stability criteria along
the previously described Rahola method.
In this investigation, discrimination analysis was applied independently to nine stability
parameters. Using data from intact stability casualty records (group 1) and from intact
stability calculations for ships considered safe in operation (group 2) the distribution
functions were plotted, where for group I the distribution function F 1 and for group 2
function (l - F2) were drawn. Practically, on the abscissa axis of the diagram, values for
the respective stability parameter were plotted and the ordinates represent the number of
ships in per cent of the total number of ships considered having the respective parameter
smaller than the actual value for ships of group I and greater than the actual value for
ships of group 2 considered safe.
The point of intersection of both curves in the diagram
provides the critical value of the parameter in question.
This value is dividing the parameters of group 1 and of
group 2. In an ideal case, both distribution functions
should not intersect and the critical value of the
respective parameter is then at the point between two
curves (see fig. 4.17, upper part).
In reality, both curves always intersect and the critical
value of the parameter is taken at the point of
intersection. At this point, the percentage of ships
capsized having the value of the respective parameter
higher than the critical value is equal to the percentage
of safe ships having the value of this parameter lower
than the critical value.
The set of diagrams prepared in this way for various
stability parameters based on IMO statistics for cargo
and passenger ships and for fishing vessels was included
in the reports submitted to IMO [IMO 1966, I966a, 1985]. One of the diagrams is
reproduced in fig. 4.18. It means that the probability of capsizing of a ship with the
parameter considered higher than the critical value is the same as the probability of
survival of a ship with this parameter lower than the critical value.
In order to increase the probability of survival, the value of the parameter should be
increased, say up to x· (fig. 4.17), at which the probability of survival (based on the
102 Chapter4
population investigated) would be 100 %. However, this would mean excessive severity
of the criterion, which usually is not possible to adopt in practice because of unrealistic
values of parameters obtained in this way.
The fact that both distribution curves do intersect could be explained in two ways. It is
possible that ships of group 2 having values of the parameter in question x < Xcrit are
unsafe, but they were lucky not to meet excessive environmental conditions which might
cause capsizing. On the other hand, the conclusion could also be drawn that consideration
of only one stability parameter is not sufficient to judge the stability of a ship.
The last consideration led to an attempt to utilise the IMO data bank for a discrimination
analysis where a set of stability parameters was investigated [Krappinger and Sharma
1974]. From the IMO casualty statistics, the authors excluded ships where shifting of
cargo occurred or where circumstances of the casualty were unexplained.
As can be seen from fig. 4.18, the accurate estimation of the critical value of the
respective parameter is dubious because those values are very sensitive to the running of
the curves in the vicinity of the intersection point, especially if the population of ships is
small.
The critical value is much less sensitive if the arithmetical mean of the for both groups is
used:
(4.1)
Chapter 4
In general, the separation ability achieved was higher than when taking each parameter
separately. The fact that in some combinations there are negative coefficients could be
explained by mutual interaction of particular parameters. This is explained in fig 4.19.
For example, by the determined value of GZ40, an increase of GMo influences
unfavourably the safety. Similarly, an increase of e40 modifies the righting arm curves
unfavourably.
In spite of the fact that the above described method constitutes a good tool for analysis of
statistical data of stability parameters for capsized ships and safely operated ships, it was
not applied in the practice of establishing national or international stability standards.
The method of regression analysis could be used when a number of data on stability
parameters of ships are available in order to establish a relationship between stability
parameters and ship parameters. One example of the application of this method is known.
In 1967 the Panel of Experts on Fishing Vessels Stability (PFV) of IMO recommended to
develop an appropriate stability standard for small fishing vessels less than 30 m in
length. For small fishing vessels, usually no drawings and stability data are available;
therefore, the application of criteria of Resolution A. 168(ES IV) is not possible. It was
proposed that a stability standard for those vessels could be developed in the form of a
formula for GMcrit that could be compared with the actual GMo estimated on the basis of
the rolling test. The value of GMcrit should correspond to the criteria of Resolution
A.168(ES IV).
Statistical Methods of Developing Stability Standards 105
Chapter 5
5.1 Introduction
An essential achievement of the human mind in the twentieth century is the transition
from formulating basic laws of physics in a deterministic way to formulating them in a
probabilistic sense. Safety understood as safety against an accident, in respect to ships as
well as human beings and environment is a concept that could be evaluated quantitatively
on the basis of probability. Application ofthe probabilistic approach to safety regulations
is known in many areas, in particular in nuclear and chemical technology. The crucial
turning point in the analysis of the behaviour of ships in a seaway constituted the paper
published by St. Denis and Pierson [1953] where probabilistic methods were employed.
In the everyday language safety could be understood in many ways. Often, under the term
of safety, one may understand exclusion of the possibility of an accident, in particular
with regard to human life. Historical experience shows, however, that accidents happen
notwithstanding which safety measures are undertaken. Safety could never be equal to
100 per cent.
Probably the most serious problems in accepting the probabilistic concept of safety result
from human nature. The realisation, for example, that safety is never absolute in the
quantitative sense seems to disturb or even terrorise some people when the decisions on
new enterprises have to be taken. Even if it can be proven the probability of failure is
much less, for example, such as an improbable event as a meteorite strike, the
undertaking might be considered by the public as unsafe.
There are, however, serious arguments in favour of the application of the probabilistic
approach to stability criteria. Caldwell [1986] stressed that first of all the majority of
factors affecting safety against capsizing, external as well as internal, are of a random
character. External factors, such as wind and seaway are obviously random quantities.
Less obvious is that the stability characteristics of a ship are also of a random character.
112 Chapter 5
For example, the displacement and the position of the centre of gravity vary randomly
with the loading and unloading of cargo, fuel and stores consumption and with gradual
changes of the mass of the ship with age. Variations of the metacentric height in service
are also of a random character because of errors in the estimation of the position of the
centre of gravity of the light ship during inclining experiments and errors in the
estimation of various pieces of cargo and stores. Those variations also introduce the
element of randomness into the current estimation of stability.
Because real environment is of a random character and the data on casualties allow us a
posteriori to estimate risk level, it is logical that the level of risk associated with seafaring
may constitute the basis for the establishment of design criteria and operational
requirements.
Great progress has been achieved recently in the application of probabilistic methods in
other domains of technology and such methods are already widely accepted. The offshore
industry made great efforts to apply safety criteria based on the probabilistic approach
[Fidgerald and McGrant 1991, Rimington 1991]. IMO Resolution A.265(VIII):
Regulations on subdivision and stability of passenger ships as an equivalent to Part B of
Chapter II-I of the SOLAS 1960 Convention, adopted in 1973 was based, at least
partially, on the probabilistic approach. So are the subdivision requirements for cargo
ships, included as an amendment to the 1974 SOLAS Convention.
The above arguments make a case in favour of the application of the probabilistic
approach to the development of stability criteria. Using probabilistic approach it would
be possible in principle to develop performance based instead of existing prescriptive
criteria. Several authors, as previously mentioned, advanced this idea, but all of them
stressed practical difficulties in application of this approach. Boroday and Rakhmanin
[1975] attribute this idea to Firsov who published a paper in the late 1950's on a
probabilistic approach to stability criteria.(not available to the author). From the 1970's
onwards several authors considered this concept, inter allia Sevastianov [1970, 1992,
1993], Caldwell [1986], Krappinger and Hormann [1984], Krappinger [1967], Kastner
[1969, 1970] and Kobylinski [1975, 1984, 1990]. In the 1980's more attention was
devoted to this concept and numerous papers were published on this subject. Also IMO
Sub-Committee during late seventies considered application of probabilistic approach to
stability criteria [IMO 1975-1990, 1978, 1979]. During the fifth STAB Conference, a
special workshop was organised on the probabilistic approach to stability standards that
evoked wide discussion [Kobylinski 1994]. However, in spite of those efforts there are
no definite proposals presented of stability criteria based on probabilistic approach.
In common language, capsizing usually is understood as the passing of the ship from the
upright position or zero degrees angle of heel to the upside down position or 180 degrees
heel. The above concept of capsizing is, however, not satisfactory from the point of view
of studying safety against capsizing. The ship oscillates in a seaway under the action of
waves and wind. The oscillations are stable and after heeling to starboard there is
consecutive heel to port. At a certain time, heeling to one side might be such that the ship
Probabilistic Approach to the Development of Stability Standards 113
does not come back to the upright position, increases its heeling and ultimately capsizes.
The above-described process of capsizing is connected with the occurrence of a large
amplitude of rolling; it may also be defined by instability of the oscillatory motion.
As described by Boroday and Rakhmanin [1975], the stability of an oscillating system is
estimated by the ability of the system to absorb and dissipate the kinetic energy
transmitted to the system by external disturbances. The main portion of the energy of the
rolling ship is transferred into the work of the righting moment; therefore, the stability of
rolling depends to a great extent on the characteristics of the righting moment curve. This
curve is strongly nonlinear which corresponds to the nonlinear stiffness characteristics of
the system. Because of this feature of the righting moment curve, the rolling ship belongs
to the category of systems with "soft" stiffness characteristics. It means that the period of
rolling increases with the increasing amplitude and that the amplitude cannot increase
indefinitely. In other words, the rolling ship always has a limited range of stability in
comparison with the system with "hard" stiffness characteristics.
The limit of range of stable oscillations shows that a possibility of capsizing exists if
external disturbances are too large for the particular ship. The relative danger due to the
occurrence of such disturbances could be estimated using the concept of reserve stability
that ensures safety under such disturbances. From the point of view of the energy
balance, the reserve stability is generally proportional to the difference between the
limiting value of work of the righting moment and the total kinetic energy in rolling
under the influence of external loads.
It is obvious that in order to estimate the reserve stability, it is necessary to obtain
information on the magnitude of the external loads. If the reserve stability is positive, the
external loads are not dangerous, otherwise the rolling motion is unstable and the ship
capsizes.
In the mathematical theory of motion, the definition of stability according to Lyapunov
(see: Minorsky [1948]) is adopted. Odabasi [1982] proposed to apply this definition to
the stability of ships. This concept was. also utilised by other authors considering
mathematical theory of ship motions in a seaway (e.g. Phillips [1986], Caldeira-Saraiva
[1986])
Without going into the details of the Lyapunov theory, in the following is provided only a
sufficiently broad intuitive definition of stability in the sense of Lyapunov. Let us
consider a periodic phenomenon indicated by a motion of the representative point R on a
closed trajectory C (fig.5.2). Let us consider also a slightly perturbed motion depicted by
the motion of R' on C'. If the initial distance of RR', which is assumed to be small and
remains small for any value of time t, such a motion is called stable in the sense of
Lyapunov. It is noted that the stability in this sense requires not only that C and C' be
sufficiently close to each other, but imposes that the motions of Ron C and R' on C' be
strictly isochronous.
Criterion of stability of motion could be used for the assessment of stability of solutions
of equations describing the motion of a body. Kastner [1969, 1970] stated that this
concept could be used for the estimation of whether changes of physical characteristics
of a ship, for example changes of the righting arm curves in waves do not cause a loss of
stabilityof motion. In this way, mathematical criteria of stability of motion under the
114 Chapter 5
assumption of small disturbances could be determined. This concept, however, has one
important fault: if the solution for the disturbed motion differs from the solution for the
undisturbed motion(unstable motion), it does not necessarily mean that it will lead to
capsizing and on the contrary, capsizing may occur when the motion is assessed as
stable.
During the second STAB Conference in 1982
[Rakhmanin, et al 1982], there were prolonged
discussions on the definition of stability of
motion and stability criterion. The discussions
did not result
in an unanimous conclusion and there were
revealed widely different opinions among the
theoreticians and those applying stability
criterion. As the concept of stability in relation to
ships has many different meanings in practice,
attempts to establish one single definition of
stability seems to be of no use. More purposeful
from the point of view of safety against
capsizing would be to define capsizing, loss of stability and stability accident. With these
definitions the concept of stability will also be found.
When considering practical problems of safety from the stability point of view, it would
be better to introduce a concept of loss of stability instead of capsizing. Nevertheless,
both concepts in the following discussion will be considered as synonymous, although
loss of stability better describes situations occurring in reality when a ship considered as
capsized may not necessarily be in the upside down position.
With excessive rolling amplitudes, the ship may be in a situation where further handling
is impossible. Water may inrush through openings in decks and superstructures. The
rudder may be disabled and the ship may have to be abandoned.
Kastner [1969,1970], Abicht [1972] and Odabasi [1982] proposed to define this situation
as a capsizing or loss of stability accident. Also, several members of the discussion panel
at the second STAB Conference [Rakhmanin et al 1982] offered a similar definition of
the loss of stability or capsizing concept. Morrall [1982] proposed to define loss of
stability as the situation where amplitudes of rolling exceed a certain limit and make
operation of the ship impossible, ship systems inoperable or when broaching results in
large amplitudes of rolling making manoeuvring impossible.
It is worthwhile to mention that the above definitions of capsizing coincide with a much
earlier definition of stability proposed by Weinblum [1952]( see Subchapter 1.2)
Capsizing or loss of stability will then be defined as exceeding the amplitude of rolling or
heel at which operating or handling of a ship is impossible for various reasons. On the
other hand, under the term stability accident, we understand this as any accident related to
the stability of a ship that does not, however, lead to capsizing and/or loss of the ship
(e.g. heel due to shifting cargo, etc).
Probabilistic Approach to the Development of Stability Standards 115
Where: Pi = T;!T is probability that the ship is in the i-th geographi,cal area
Ti is part of the voyage time (or ship's lifetime) spent in the i-th area
Tis total voyage time (or ship's lifetime)'
Pij is probability of meetingj-th weather force in the i-th area
Pi! is probability of meeting [-th encounter angle relative to wind in the i-th area
pim is probability of occurring m-th loading condition in the i-th area
Pin is probability of appearance of n-th additional factor in the ith area
The above probabilities could be estimated on the yearly basis of the analysis of the
ship's route, statistics of weather conditions and loading conditions and experts opinions.
Discrete values of all of the above circumstances have to be chosen and then the number
of situations identified. The probabilities of each situation occurring should be then
estimated under the condition that the sum of the probabilities has to be equal to one.
In practical calculations the planned route should be divided in a number of sections in
such a way that in each section probability distributions of weather conditions (wind and
waves) and of stability characteristics of the ship could be considered stationary and
ship's heading being constant. The number of sections depends on the route.
On the basis of weather conditions statistics to each situation that depends on the weather
condition the definite probability could be assigned. Because of the symmetry of the ship
116 Chapter 5
only five possible ship's headings relative to the direction of waves could be adopted:
head waves (H), oblique waves (0), beam waves (B), quartering waves (Q) and following
waves (F). This is illustrated in the table 5.1 and in fig.5.2. It has to taken into account
that the wind direction is not necessary the same as wave propagation direction.
In the next step the sea state scale consisting of 9 degrees is adopted and usually also
division in four seasons is taken. Then for the i-th section of the route the matrix of
external conditions could be found.
Loading conditions have to be analysed during the single voyage. The number of discrete
positions of the centre of mass caused by loading condition and fuel and water
consumption depends on the ship's type cargo carried and the voyage. Changes of the
position of the centre of mass due to ship's age are rather slow and may be considered in
yearly periods.
Additional factors endangering stability in each situation, may be events such as shifting
of cargo, crowding passengers on one side, rudder action, openings not closed, water
trapped on deck and others that should be considered separately or in groups.
If, for example, the number of sections to which the route is divided is assumed 20 and if
we assume further that the situation kj is characterised by the time spend in that situation,
sea force, season, heading relative to direction of wind and waves, stability parameters
and additional factors as they may occur then the total number of situations to be
considered could be of the order lx105• The calculation of probability of capsizing for
such a number of situations is realistic, bearing in mind that for the great majority of
situations, particularly for those that correspond to low sea force this probability could be
assumed as equal zero.
The probability PCk in formula (5.1) is the short-term probability of capsizing in k-th
situation where stationary conditions occur, i.e. for the definite sea state, heading and
stability characteristics of the ship. It may be calculated by this formula:
where: tk is the time during which the ship remains in this situation and Ie is the so called
risk function that is the probability of capsizing within the period (t, t+d ) on the
condition that until then capsizing did not occur. A is assumed constant in each situation.
The basic discussion of the background of the formulae (5.1) to (5.3) could be found in
Chapter 9 of the Volume 2. The possibility to use the above approach to the development
of stability criteria was discussed also by Kobylinski [1993, 1994], including an example
where the assumed at choice values of probabilities were adopted. Hutchinson [1981]
demonstrated also that operational and human factors could be included in the analysis.
Although in principle, the lifetime probability of capsizing could be calculated as shown
in [Kobylinski 1993], there are no known attempts to apply this as a stability criterion.
Calculation of LP C or even P Ck meets serious difficulties. Calculation of risk function It
in the formula (5.3), for short-term probability of capsizing in principle could be
evaluated by three different methods:
1. Analysis of records of casualties,
2. Model tests,
3. Mathematical modelling.
lIB Chapter 5
With regard to the first method it is obvious that collecting data on casualties suitable for
the estimation of risk function required in the probabilistic analysis would be extremely
difficult, because not only precise stability characteristics of the ship capsized and
environmental conditions at the time of casualty have to be known, but also data and time
history of the ship operation (i.e. loading conditions) until casualty occurred are
necessary. Statistical data on casualties collated by IMO [l966,1966a] (see Chapter 4) do
not include necessary information particularly information regarding time history of ship
operation. Descriptions of many stability casualties were included in the book by
Aksyutin and Blagoveshchensky [1975] but even those descriptions, some of them very
detailed and accurate, do not include necessary information for this purpose. It is
unrealistic to assume that such data will be available in the future except, perhaps, in few
isolated cases. There are very limited possibilities to perform probabilistic analysis on the
basis of available data.
Model experiments are discussed in Chapter 6 where the limitations of this method are
also stressed. Model tests provide extremely useful information on the behaviour of ships
in a seaway, they also could be, in principle, used to evaluate the rate of capsizing in
situations simulated in the towing tank or in open waters. Model tests are actually
recommended as a method of checking survivability of damaged passenger ro-ro ships by
Resolution 14 of the 1995 SOLAS conference.
Seakeeping tanks are equipped with wave generators usually capable of creating waves of
desired significant wave height and wave spectrum. Models run on the simulated
irregular seaway, but because of the limited length of the tank usually meet only few
waves. In order to take long time record of motions and in particularly in order to assess
probability of capsizing runs should be repeated many times, which makes such tests very
time consuming and costly. Moreover, because each run starts from zero with a randomly
chosen realization of wave pattern, wave groups or extremely high waves may not be
created. It is even much more difficult to produce freak or abnormal waves. To produce
such wave in a small model tank few.successful attempts are known (fig.5.3) [Buckley
1994], however this is far from a standard practice in larger tanks where model tests may
be actually performed.
Probabilistic Approach to the Development of Stability Standards 119
The realization of more complex scenarios, where factors other than environmental are of
importance, is hardly possible in towing tanks.
Model tests of capsizing could be performed also in open waters (see Chapter 6).
Although those tests provided extremely useful information on the possible capsizing
scenarios they appear to be very costly and time consuming because of the necessity to
wait for suitable weather conditions. This method was never considered as a standard
practice.
The estimation of the critical seaway climates is necessary for the mathematical or
physical modelling of capsizing in assumed situations. This fact was recognised by the
IMO as early as in 1968 and at that time the Joint Ad Hoc Working Group for the Study
of External Forces Affecting Ships was created with the task to study wave and wind
characteristics. This group consisted of several international organisations interested in
oceanographic research. The Group at its five sessions considered characteristics of wind
and waves, statistics of wave groups, sea spectra in various areas and attempted to assess
wave characteristics at the time and place of some casualties by hindcast analysis [IMO
I 970a].
120 Chapter 5
When calculating lifetime probability of capsizing using voyage simulation method, for
each situation considered wave data could be taken from the Global Wave Statistics
[Hogben et al 1967, 1986]. Global Wave Statistics provides data on significant wave
heights, modal period and direction of propagation for four seasons in various areas of
the world's oceans and there is a common practice to adopt in simulation exercises the
seaway spectra (Bretschneider, JONSW AP) related to it. Using those data -wave scatter
diagrams short-term probability could be calculated by numerical simulation.
In numerical simulations most often the seaway is assumed consisting of irregular 2-D
waves with the spectrum having one peak. As a rule deep water is assumed. It would also
be necessary to consider the existence of wave groups in the deep-sea wave pattern that
often cause capsizing. Moreover, in certain areas breaking and conical waves have to be
considered that might be very dangerous especially for small vessels. Data acquired from
the Global Wave Statistics are not good enough for assessing ship survivability in such
situations. Ships with unlimited range of operation must survive extreme weather
conditions that might be met during their lifetime. For the purpose of assessing ship's
survivability Buckley [1988,1993,1997] derived climatic and extreme worldwide wave
spectra, which were based on millions of measurements taken primarily by NOAA buoys
or taken from other sources.
The essence of this concept consists of the calculation of the probability of capsizing
(loss of stability accident), not for all possible combinations of environmental and
] 22 Chapter 5
internal conditions, but in some selected situations deemed to be dangerous. From the
statistical records of stability casualties and on the basis of experience it appears that
only a few possible situations during the service life of a ship are really dangerous. In
particular, capsizing caused by the action of waves and wind may occur only in heavy
weather. Naturally, the choice of dangerous situations is an important issue.
The authors of the above references were of the unanimous opinion that in a stormy sea,
the highest probability of a loss of stability accident occurs when the ship is in the
following three situations:
2. In a following sea,
Situation where the ship is in head seas and the possibility of parametric resonance exists
was not considered at that time and the attention to this situation was drawn in particular
after the accident of a post-Panamax Cll ship was analysed [France, et a12003].
In each of the above situations several scenarios of capsizing have to be analysed taking
also into account, apart from waves and wind action, also other factors contributing to
capsizing.
As stated above, capsizing scenarios should take into account conclusions taken from
statistics and records of casualties. The other sources of information are model tests and
interesting conclusions regarding possible way of capsizing could be drawn from
observation of the model behavior in waves. The other source of information are detailed
descriptions of actual casualties, many of them are included in the book by Aksyutin and
Blaygoveschensky [1975]. In general, a multitude of capsizing scenarios is possible.
Cleary and Letourneau [1986] listed 34 possible causes of capsizing, de Kat, et al [1994],
Alman, et al [1999] prepared a list of capsizing scenarios in a more systematic way. Also,
the IMO working group considered this problem when considering dangerous situations
(IMO [1979]).
Some of the possible capsizing scenarios are listed in the Table 5.3. They are developed
from single modes mentioned above. In the list that is not in any way exhaustive except
environmental effects some other factors, such as water on deck, shifting of cargo, icing,
and free surfaces of fluids are included. Obviously some other factors have to be added
depending of the type of ship and its cargo. The matrix of possible scenarios is obviously
extremely large.
The real difficulty lies in assigning the probabilities to each scenario. Statistics is not very
helpful in this case and opinions of experts might be more appropriate. One way to
organize opinion of experts is Delfic procedure, where a number of experts are
individually asked to complete questionnaires in which their replies are required to be
substantiated. Then, during a series of iterations, the experts are repeatedly asked the
same questions to establish whether they refine their answers in light of being provided
(anonymously) with the replies and justifications of the other experts. The iteration
continues until satisfactory degree of agreement is reached
.~
In this way, the number of necessary calculations and analyses would be substantially
smaller making the calculation of the probability of capsizing more realistic. Naturally,
the choice of dangerous situations is an important issue. The conditions for which
"dangerous situation" should be satisfied could be defined as follows [Cleary 1975; Dorin
et a1.l975; Kobylinski 1975; IMO 1979]:
1. The situation should be a realistic one in the sense that the probability of the joint
action of several factors endangering safety against capsizing is sufficiently high,
2. The results of action of the adopted combinations of external factors could be related
to the sufficient number of ship characteristics (parameters defining hull form,
architectural features, mass distribution etc.), and
The above opinions were confirmed by the statistics for capsizing accidents. Two such
statistics are particularly conclusive. From table 5.4, which includes Japanese data on
casualties of fishing and cargo vessels for the years 1973-1977, it is seen that more than
half of all capsizings occurred in stormy weather. In a rough sea, about one third of the
casualties occurred in following or quartering seas and about two thirds in beam or head
seas. Accidents in head seas were not separated from those in beam seas, however from
other sources it is known that capsizing in beam seas occurs more often and weathering
in head seas is considered as the most safe although in the last situation certain types of
ships may encounter parametric resonance.
Probabilistic Approach to the Development of Stability Standards 125
In both situations, save wind and wave action, also other possible external heeling forces
have to be accounted for. An assessment of the possibility of the simultaneous occurrence
of several additional factors endangering stability is, however, a difficult task and such a
possibility could be estimated only on the basis of opinions of experts supplemented by
the analysis of casualties.
Several authors discussed the problem whether the lifetime probability of capsizing
could be used as a criterion of stability [Kobylinski, 1975,1984, I993b,1994;
Sevastyanov 1970, 1978, 1979, 1982, 1993, McTaggart, 1993, Kastner 1975a]. There are
strong arguments in favour of this approach because the probability of capsizing is the
real measure of risk to the ship during its operation. On the other hand there are serious
difficulties in adopting probability of capsizing as a measure of safety.
If the risk function and the long-term probability of capsizing could be evaluated there
would be a problem of how to use them for assessment of ship's safety. The probability
of capsizing is measured by very small numbers because capsizing is a rare event. To
evaluate such probability with sufficient accuracy would be an extremely difficult task
with uncertain result. Sevastianov [1970] even argued that the required accuracy of the
calculation of LPc lies outside ofthe possibilities ofthe method (see Part 1, Volume 2).
Sevastianov [1992] analysed the possibility of applying three criteria that could be used
in the probabilistic approach (see also Chapter 9, Volume 2 of the book):
1. Probability of safe operation during time t:
126 Chapter5
requires great accuracy of its estimation, which would be very difficult to achieve
because of the scarcity of statistical data.
The third criterion, average lifetime of a ship before it capsizes, is not practical. From the
formula (5.6) it is seen that this will be on the order of 8000 years. It is clear that no ship
has a chance to remain afloat during such a "theoretically possible" lifetime and any
prolongation or shortening of this period will not have any effect on the opinion of
mariners about its safety.
In theory the lifetime probability of non-capsizing could be used as a criterion of safety.
The most obvious method would be to calculate values of this probability for a
population of existing ships considered safe in operation and in this way to estimate
hidden preferences. Those values could be then used as a criterion for assessment of the
required probability of non-capsizing in the design process of new ships. However, this is
hardly realistic because of extremely small numbers involved and high scatter of such
probabilities for existing ships which could be used for comparison (Belenky [1993],
Bielanski [1994]). The other method, using expressed preferences estimated on the basis
of the opinion of the public leads to nowhere because the attitude of the public with
regard to dangers is irrational and people have no feeling regarding degree of danger
expressed by extremely small probabilities. It cannot be expected that required
probabilities could be estimated in this way.
Instead there is a tendency to estimate the probability of
survival in the dangerous situation the ship may meet
simulating capsizing scenarios as, for example, in the Table
5.3. This leads to the recently advanced tendency to replace
prescriptive criteria as e.g. in the IMO IS Code by
performance oriented criteria. The First Principle
Methodology (FPM) has to be used for this purpose.
Several authors discussed the applicability of FPM to safety
against capsizing. (Pierson [1993], Buckley [1994, 1997],
Faulkner and Buckley [1997]). In the FPM ship responses
to various hazards, particularly to hazards posed by seaway,
are directly calculated and assessed whether they are
acceptable or not. FPM employs analytical methods by
which responses to assumed seaway criteria are calculated
on the cause and effect basis. This methodology is most
useful in assessing safety of non-conventional ships, to
which existing prescriptive criteria are not readily
applicable, but it might be also useful to assess safety of
conventional ships in abnormal conditions. The block
diagram ofFPM is shown in fig.5.6.
Operational requirements identify areas and routes of
operation, loading conditions and, if necessary, also other requirements. Seaway criteria
in respective areas of operation comprise long-term climatic wave conditions as well as
extreme storm wave conditions. Critical design conditions specify those conditions which
must be observed in the design process and on the basis of which ship responses are
calculated using analytical methods (capsize simulation).
Probabilistic Approach to the Development of Stability Standards 127
be four orders lower than for the first and second persons. According to Caldwell [1986],
the risk for third persons should be three orders lower than for the first and second
persons.
Rimington [1991] discussing risk level considered in British nuclear power station design
referred to the HSE discussion document from February 1988 where it was suggested that
tolerability levels should be based on current experience in other industries where hourly
FAR is about 12.10-8 . It was suggested that this is the dividing line between what is just
tolerable and what is intolerable for workers. From table 5.9 it is seen that this is exactly
the value of FAR for the world fleet on average, but for some other industries the current
figures are 3 to 5 times higher.
It seems that the level of risk
that presently exists in seafaring
is socially acceptable and
generally work at sea is not
particularly risky except for the
deep-sea fishing and offshore
industries, but even their risk is
much lower than, for example,
the construction industry.
For the estimation of the socially
acceptable risk, in particular risk
related to loss of ship's stability
accidents, FAR is not the best
measure. The public, in general,
does not realise what the term
"mortality rate", which is given
in a very small number means in
practice. From experience, it is
known that society is inclined to
accept accidents where a single
person dies, e.g. as in automobile
accidents. But, where there are
many fatalities in a single
accident, society generally feels
that the safety level is
inadequate, notwithstanding the
fact that the mortality rate might
be much smaller. The effect of a
casualty on public opinion
depends also on where the
casualty occurred and what
kinds of persons were involved.
Good examples are the TITANIC, the HERALD OF FREE ENTERPRISE and the
ESTONIA disasters, which caused violent reactions of the public and organisations
responsible for safety. On the other hand, the most serious marine casualty (with the
Probabilistic Approach to the Development of Stability Standards 131
exception of war casualties), the DONA PAZ, with more than 4000 fatalities was hardly
noticed because it occurred in the Philippines.
FAR also is not a good measure of the risk of capsizing. First of all, capsizing usually
causes loss ofthe ship, but not necessarily the loss oflives. Even without the loss oflives,
it could have very serious consequences, for example, serious pollution of the
environment. Secondly, data on FAR available refer to all fatalities at sea, but not to the
fatalities caused by capsizing. Generally the latter are not available, although Caldwell
[1986] published some data on FAR related to loss of ships, but still they are referred to
all causes. The respective figure is 3.10-8 which compares favourably with the mortality
rate from all causes equal 20.10-8 to 25.10-8 •
From the point of view of stability, it is better substantiated to use the rate of loss of
stability accidents. The difficulty is that required data are hardly obtainable. Based on
statistics it could be found that the hourly loss of ships rate is about 0.35.10-6 to
0.65.10-6 depending on the ship's type (ships lost per hour related to the number of
ships in operation).
For the statistics available, however, data on ship's capsizing mentioned in Lloyd's
statistics may be included in all three categories: capsizing, foundering and missing.
Assuming that apart from capsizings, one half of the founderings and one half of the
ships missing are due to loss of stability accidents, then about 19 % to 25 % of all ship
losses could be attributed to loss of
stability accidents. Stability is
therefore important although not
the most frequent cause of ship
losses. Capsizing, however, usually
involves heavy loss oflife.
When assessing safety in general,
and safety against capsizing in
particular, economic considerations
have to be taken into account. The
requirements of safety and
economy are partially opposed to
each other. When making a
decision to build a ship, the
optimisation calculation should be
performed where safety criterion is
estimated taking into account minimal cost. It is shown in fig 5.10 [Hutchison 1986] that
with the above procedure, the problem of safety is reduced to the problem of economy. It
we take into account the possible loss of life, this method is not acceptable, although
there are attempts to evaluate cost oflife in economic terms. It seems, however, that such
a relationship could be found only when the risk of human life is compared with gains
achieved by first and second persons and with social advantages for third persons. In
seafaring, the general aim of increased safety is to reduce the mortality rate and to reduce
damage to the environment and thirdly, to achieve maximal profit.
133
Chapter 6
6.1 General
Committee on Stability was created with the aim inter alia to develop standard guidelines
for model testing of stability.
Krappinger and Hormann [1984] proposed to divide all model experiments related to
capsizing of ships into three groups:
1. Tests intended to gain information on hydrodynamic forces which are required as
input in the equations of motions in mathematical modelling.
2. Tests intended to gain information on the physical phenomena involved when ships
capsize. In this category there are also included model tests aimed at explaining
causes of capsizing of particular casualties.
3. Systematic model tests of capsizing aimed at development of safety standards.
Model tests of groups 2 and 3 are conducted using self-propelled free or only partially
captive models that are manually or automatically controlled. Such model tests are
performed usually in open water or in large seakeeping tanks. Model tests of group 1 are
conducted using captive models of ships or simplified bodies in towing tanks. Model tests
of group 1 are not discussed here because they are related to general seakeeping theory
rather than to specific problems related to safety standards. From groups 2 and 3, only
those model tests are discussed which are aimed at investigating capsizing phenomena or
aimed at developing or improving stability standards.
Model tests of capsizing belong to the most difficult category of model tests. Capsizing
usually is the final link in the chain of events, which could be initiated sometimes by a
minor incident. There are many possible scenarios leading to capsizing which could be
different for different types of ships. Such scenarios are impossible to reproduce in model
tests. Therefore, usually model tests of capsizing are limited to reproducing as far as
possible the action of the seaway. If model tests are performed in open water in natural
wind created waves, the influence of wind is also present.
The following factors have to be observed in model tests of capsizing [Krappinger et al
1984]:
1. The realistic simulation of all changing environmental conditions;
2. The simulation of the above water shape of the ship including openings in the
superstructure, bulwarks, freeing ports etc;
3. Simulation ofthe action ofthe helmsman (human factor);
4. There is no practical possibility to obtain full simulation of conditions at the time of
loss of the ship
Because capsizing is a rare event, model tests of capsizing require extremely long test
durations that are not very practical. In order to overcome this problem, the severity of
the seaway could be increased but even so, if tests are performed in a towing tank, runs
have to be repeated many times.
The real conditions that are at sea during stormy weather cannot be reproduced in towing
tanks. In open water the situation is better, but characteristics of waves that are naturally
created in lakes where such tests are performed do not entirely represent the real
conditions at sea. The problem, whether wind created waves in lakes properly reproduce
seaway spectra occurring at sea, was studied by Dudziak [1963a] and Kastner [1963].
The conclusion was that if the depth of the water in the lake and fetch were sufficiently
Model TestsafCapsizing 135
large the wave spectra in the lake, although not exactly identical, are nevertheless
practically close enough to wave spectra in open sea for performing model tests.
The behaviour of the ship in stormy seas depends on the behaviour of the helmsman, i.e.
on human factor. In assessing the safety, worse seamanship has to be assumed and this
could be partially taken into account if some kind of autopilot is used, which simulates
ship handling in a manner being in contrast to good seamanship.
In spite of these difficulties, model tests of capsizing create a very useful tool for the
investigation of capsizing phenomena. According to the opinion expressed, [Krappinger
et al 1984; Hormann 1982] results of model tests cannot lead to a definite answer in the
sense of safety, but could provide means for learning about the physics of capsizing and
the relative assessment of safety against capsizing.
In order to ascertain the possibility of estimation of the behaviour of the full-scale ship on
the basis of model tests, it is necessary to satisfy the geometric, kinematic and dynamic
similarities of the model.
Geometric similarity is satisfied when all dimensions of the model are scaled down from
the respective dimensions of the full-scale ship. The model scale is:
136 Chapter 6
The most important limitation is lack of possibility to control the weather and seaway. In
order to perform tests in conditions that properly simulate real required environmental
conditions, sometimes a very long waiting period is needed. Planning of experiments
requires availability of statistical data on wave formation in the chosen water area in
order to estimate the period when the probability of the occurrence of the desired seaway
is the greatest. The model size has to be adjusted with regard to the characteristics of
waves in the area. Obviously, the model's size should not be too small in order to avoid
excessive scale effect and in order to make it possible to install propulsion and equipment
inside. Therefore, the waves expected should not be too small and in general, significant
wave height Hl!3 should not be less than about 0.15 m, which requires that the testing
area should be quite large.
The difficulty, which is not easily overcome, is that wind is not scaled down with the
model size. Therefore, generally the wind heeling moment is too large in spite of the fact
that in models tested higher tiers of superstructures, masts and rigging are not
reproduced, which makes the windage area considerable smaller than with the full scale
ship.
The experiments in open waters require logistic support and because of the
unpredictability of weather conditions, plenty of idle time. This causes such tests to be
quite expensive and only a few cases where such experiments were performed are known.
In spite of the above-mentioned difficulties, this method offers important advantages that
are clearly visible from the experience of researchers who performed such tests. They
could be summarised as follows:
• This method offers the possibility of obtaining more realistic severe sea conditions
than could be generated in a laboratory.
• There are relatively much larger measuring distances than in a model tank; therefore
more data samples could be obtained, especially in following and quartering seas.
• The information on the behaviour of the model could be obtained in a short time.
Watching the model behaviour is a good help for the imagination. Ship motions and
geometrical dimensions appear in a more vivid and comprehensive way than in
reality.
• There is a possibility to run the model at all possible headings with all degrees of
freedom. This is not possible in the majority oflaboratories.
• Economy of operation is possible since the capital investment is lower.
accompanying craft is used where research staff, source of energy and data acquisition
system are situated and the model is connected with elastic cable with the craft.
Comparatively larger models are required in the first method in order to contain all
equipment, while by using the second method they could be much smaller. The
advantage of having an accompanying craft is also the possibility of observing (and
filming) the behaviour of the model at a close distance, the disadvantage being the
negative influence of the connecting cable. Both methods could be, however, combined
utili sing advantages of both of them.
In both methods it is necessary to install the following measuring and control systems:
1. A system for measuring waves, wind direction and velocity.
2. A system for measuring motion parameters of the model.
3. A system for controlling of the model course and speed.
4. A system of propulsion ofthe model.
5. A system of transmitting and recording data.
6. Film or video cameras.
As far as it is known, there were only four projects of this type which were all conducted
by university teams. This is because universities have no access to large seakeeping tanks
and have the opportunity to employ students and academic staff who are not under such
pressure of time as the professional staff of towing tanks.
Altogether 9 models were tested within these projects, some of them with varying GMo
and freeboard. Particulars of the models tested are compiled in table 6.1. When
investigating the causes of loss of the stem trawler GAUL [Morrall 1980], its model in
addition to capsizing tests in the seakeeping tank was also tested in Solent. However,
because these tests constituted only a fraction of the more systematic tests in the tank,
they are referred to in the section on model tests in tanks.
Two models were tested: one cargo ship and one fishing boat. The data for the cargo ship
are shown in table 6.2. Data for the fishing boat cannot be found in the publications. The
experiments were limited to runs in head and in following seas, as it has been found that
in these situations the model capsized more easily than in beam seas. During the
experiments, it was attempted to find the highest value of GMo at which the model always
capsized and the lowest value of GMo at which the model did not capsize. In fact, the
difference between these two values was found rather small.
data was recorded on the catamaran, including wind velocity and direction. There was
also a sensor for measurements of the wave height that, because of the very small
motions of the catamaran, provided reliable results. However, the second measurement of
the wave height was taken using a fixed wave sensor on the wave buoy or, later, on a
platform positioned at the bottom of the lake in the area of the experiments. During the
experiments conducted in 1993, the model was not connected by the cable with the
catamaran, but was remote controlled and all data from the model were transmitted by
radio to the data acquisition centre on the catamaran, which was following the model at a
certain distance.
Altogether three models were constructed and tested as shown in table 6.2. The data for
the cargo ship cannot be traced in the literature although some results of tests were
published.
One model of a fast cargo liner was tested in two loading conditions. The dimensions of
the model are shown in table 6.2. The model was controlled by radio from the Froude-
Kriloff craft and was entirely independent, fitted with an autopilot. Measuring apparatus
and recorder were installed in the model. Four quantities were recorded during tests,
namely:
I. yaw angle versus time,
2. rudder angle versus time,
3. -pitch angle versus time,
4. roll angle versus time.
Waves and wind were measured on a specially constructed buoy positioned in the area of
the experiments. The buoy was constructed as a tension leg stable platform. Such a
platform had total buoyancy that exceeded the platform weight and was moored by
vertically tensioned anchor lines in which the tension equals the difference between the
buoyancy and weight. As a result, vertical movements of the buoy were negligible. The
buoy was connected by cable with the supporting craft on which the records of wave
height and wind velocity and direction were taken. At the time of the experiments, the
accompanying Froude-Kriloff craft was stationary and the model was controlled from
there.
• The flooding of the deck depends also on the bulwark and on the freeing ports.
Generally, in moderate sea conditions the bulwark protects the deck against flooding.
However, in heavy seas the bulwark helps to accumulate water on deck. With the
same model in the same sea conditions a large pseudostatic heel was observed with
the bulwark and no pseudo static heel when the bulwark was removed. Closing freeing
ports slightly increased pseudostatic heel [Dudziak 1975, IMO 1970b ].
• Pseudo static heel may occur, even ifthere is no bulwark when stability is very low.
• Deckhouses the breadth of which are smaller than the ship's breadth have an
important effect on the deck flooding and the pseudostatic heel. Water can collect
between the deckhouse and bulwark causing additional heel to the windward side and
eventually capsizing. On the other hand, the increase, even small, of the height of the
freevboard considerably reduces risk of capsizing [Dudziak 1975].
• The average duration and
height of large pseudo static
heeling angles were related
to the appearance of the
sequence of large waves of
almost identical intensity.
This was observed in all
courses with respect to the
oncoming sea. If the
number of large waves was
small, then the model was
able to upright itself, if the
number of high waves in
the group was large, the model capsized.
• In head seas the model rolled mildly at the beginning with small amplitudes, then
inclined to one side and capsized. The curve of angular velocities indicates passing
waves. This is shown in fig. 6.7. [Kastner 1962].
Model Tests afCapsizing 149
Pure loss of stability was the most frequently observed mode of capsizing. Such
capsizings occurred most frequently in very steep waves of a length between 0.5 and 1.5
of the ship length and at a high model speed. Capsizing occurred if the model was on the
wave crest for a sufficiently long time.
Broaching caused by the loss of directional stability on the face of the wave was mainly
observed on relatively short, steep waves with the model at high speed. A pure broaching
effect was rarely observed in the experiments as the large containt;r vessel has sufficient
directional stability. Capsizings observed were a result of the combined effect of
broaching, loss of stability on the wave crest and of motion instability.
The third mode, capsizing due to low cycle resonance was caused by the oscillations of
the righting arm that led to a resonant build-up of roll motions. This occurred when the
increased righting arm at wave through
amidships resulted in a large roll velocity
timed to meet a crest amidships one half an
encounter period later. This, however, was
observed rarely.
The majority of tests of capsizing were with models of fishing vessels mostly small,
because those small vessels were most susceptible to capsizing in heavy seas. Many tests
were planned to explain the possible causes of capsizing of real ships.
There are various possibilities for conducting model tests of capsizing, which mainly
depend on the facilities available and on the purpose of the tests. Special wide seakeeping
tanks are available in some ship hydrodynamic laboratories and in other cases seakeeping
tests have to be performed in narrow towing tanks. The tests could be conducted either
with free remote controlled models or with partially captive models. They may be
subjected to the action of waves only or, in some cases, attempts are made to simulate the
wind effect as well.
If capsizing tests are performed in large seakeeping tanks using free remote controlled
models, such tests actually do not differ from those in open waters except that there is no
wind effect. In such tanks, models could be tested at different courses with respect to
waves. Creating an additional heeling moment by shifting transversely small weights in
the model could simulate the wind effect. In some tanks, fans are employed in order to
create wind, but this is rather difficult with a model running at speed.
In towing tanks capsizing tests if the model is moving at certain speeds could be
performed in head, following or quartering seas. For the last case, however, only small
angles of deviation from pure following seas may be tested. When the model is
stationary, then it could be positioned at all angles with respect to oncoming waves, but
there is the problem to restrain the model in the proper position. This problem was
discussed by Shaughnessy et al [1994].
Model Tests afCapsizing 151
During the tests the metacentric height was changed, the freeing ports were kept closed or
open; the model speed was chosen as either normal or half speed. The irregular waves
generated had a significant wave height of about 0.3 m and the spectrum chosen was the
Pierson-Moskowitz type.
Preliminary tests revealed typical modes of capsizing that were: shipping water on deck,
dynamic effect of waves and loss of stability on the wave crest. From the tests it appeared
that shipping water had the most important influence on susceptibility to capsizing and
the ability to clear the water from the deck with freeing ports open radically reduced the
number of runs where capsizing occurred. Table 6.7 shows some results of runs with
model A (purse seiner) at half normal speed.
Chapter 6
This methodology was applied when testing two models of fishing vessels with the aim to
assess danger of capsizing. Particulars of the models are given in table 6.9. Models were
free running, autopilots controlled and were tested in the manoeuvring and seakeeping
tank of the National Research Institute of Fisheries Engineering, having dimensions of
60x25x3.2 m and fitted with a segmented type wave generator.
Results of the tests performed are compiled in table 6.10. For model A, the minimum
GMo in order to comply with the IMO IS Code is 1.0m (for full-scale vessel), whereas for
model B the critical GMo is 1.65m. From the results obtained, it can be seen that model A
with the GM satisfying the IMO IS Code requirements capsized in quartering seas
whereas model B even at a GM substantially less than required did not capsize. It means
that for this particular model the IS Code slightly overestimates the danger of capsizing.
ModelTestsa/Capsizing 159
On the other hand, if we take into consideration that IMO guidance to the master for
avoiding dangerous situations (MSC/Circ.707) recommends to reduce the Froude number
to 0.3 in heavy quartering seas, then after reducing speed correspondingly, model A did
not capsize even in quartering seas. The hull parameters of both vessels suggest that
vessel A might be slightly more vulnerable to capsizing than vessel B, but this does not
substantiate such differences of results as were revealed in the tests performed. The
reason for such behaviour is not clear and the author suggested that this problem has to be
investigated further
By swell, we mean the longest waves generated in a storm. Due to the larger velocity of
crest propagation compared with shorter waves, swell approaches areas outside the
originating wind field. Swell advances a longer distance at the same time than shorter
waves.
Although swell has smaller wave steepness than the shorter waves, it can have
considerable wave height due to its large wave length.
The above formulae and values in table 9.1 demonstrate, that longer waves have a larger
wave period, increasing with the square root of the wavelength. In the next 3 formulae,
the constants are also approximated in the (metric) SI system with g=9.81m/s2:
9.6 Irregular Waves
The natural seaway on the oceans is irregular. It is also referred to as random sea, or as
confused sea. The sea shows rarely a unidirectional, regular sinusoidal wave pattern, but
we observe a mixture of waves of different length, height and direction.
The natural seaway can be decomposed to a sum of partial sinusoidal waves, each having
a relatively small steepness, even for a severe sea. Therefore, the spectral approach with a
sum of partial waves constitutes a valid representation for a random sea.
From careful observation, certain typical or characteristic parameters can be estimated,
such as a significant wave height, period, and direction of progress. St. Denis and Pierson
[1953] introduced a mathematical description of natural seaways. Their work was a
milestone to allow a calculation of random seas and linear ship motion.
The unidirectional, irregular wave pattern 1; is seen as the sum of regular partial waves,
see fig. 9.11 (at =0). From a record of the irregular sea, Fourier analysis can calculate
partial waves. An irregular record can be plotted again as a sum of the partial waves,
according to equation 9.30
9.11 Wave Data from Observations
One of the most extensive data collection of waves was set up by the British National
Physical Laboratory in collaboration with the Meteorological Office, published as
"Ocean Wave Statistics" by Hogben and Lumb [1967]. Ocean data was based on the
meteorological logbooks of voluntary observing ships numbering about 500 ships for all
shipping routes on the oceans. It contained frequency distributions of visually observed
wave heights, periods and directions for 50 sea areas. The wave data reports archived by
a number of member states started in 1949 under the auspices of the World
Meteorological Organisation (WMO).
The succeeding volume is "Global Wave Statistics", published by British Maritime
Technology Limited (BMT), [Hogben, et al. 1986]. The book supplies statistics of ocean
wave climate for the entire globe for 104 areas of the ocean. This improved data is more
reliable because it is based on much larger samples covering longer periods of time.
A huge number of visual observations of both waves and winds reported from ships in
normal service all over the world have been evaluated by a quality enhancing analysis
and data fitting using a computer program. Although the statistics presented relate only to
waves, wind observations have been used to improve the reliability of the wave statistics.
Furthermore, instrumental data from nine stations were used to validate results, e.g.
Ocean Weather Station India (59° N, 19° W) in the North Atlantic.
For each ofthe 104 areas, data was given in tables with the categories:
• Annual and four seasons,
• All directions and 8 directional sectors.
9.12 Wave Climate
the Black Sea, [Boukhanovsky, et al. 2000)). While 1 is triangular, II is more trapezoidal
in shape. Storm class III is similar to IV, but the peaks exchanged (not drawn).
Storm class I, with 50% occurrence in the Black Sea, has the largest percentage of the
five storm classes, see table 9.8. Wave class II (wind waves) shows for all classes of wind
and storm the largest percentage.
217
Chapter 10
Natural seaway on the oceans acts on the ship. The ship must respond and carries out
motions due to the seaway excitation. The resulting oscillatory motion of the ship as a
rigid free floating body can be decomposed into six different directions of the motion, the
so-called degrees of freedom (DOF).
The oscillatory ship motion is described by three translatory and by three rotational
degrees of freedom. Fig. 10.1 shows the three translatory motions of the rigid ship body:
surge, sway, and heave, and the three rotational motions: roll, pitch, and yaw. The general
definition is compiled in table 10.1.
226 ChaprerlO
by people running athwartships in unison. As soon as the roll amplitude is large enough,
no more excitation is allowed. The initial roll amplitude for the measured roll decay
should not exceed five degrees.
It is advisable to take the time measurements in the region of large roll velocity to have
clear-cut points for begin and end of the period. This does not mean to measure when the
ship passes exactly the upright position, as this is rarely possible to be estimated
correctly. A fixed landmark for reference when the ship is closer to the upright position is
suggested. When the ship passes the upright position, roll velocity is at the maximum,
and the mark is passed quickly. This method is of particular advantage for large roll
periods.
IMO [1993] gives detailed instructions to the test procedure. IMO requires the time to be
taken for not less than about five complete oscillations. The counting should begin,
contrary to the above proposal, when the ship is at the extreme end of a roll. After
allowing the roll to completely fade away, this operation should be repeated at least twice
more.
Jens [1964] evaluated the accuracy of rolling tests with coasters in the Baltic Sea. He
concluded:
• The accuracy of measured rolling periods decreased with larger roll periods. Even
very small disturbances (from wind, waves, and rudder action) are affecting the
natural roll significantly. The Cr value (see subchapter 10.6) varied for one ship
condition between 0.7 and 0.83, so the statistical deviation of the measurements was
too large. The rolling test should not be used at very small GM values and
corresponding large natural roll periods (in the order of s 10cm and 2': 20s).
• The smaller the GM of the ship is, the more accurate is the application of the
inclination test to measure GM (see chapter 13).
• Distribution of cargo, ballast, and height of deck cargo have a dominant influence on
the Cr value.
IMO allows estimating the stability by means of rolling period tests for small ships of up
to 70 m in length. IMO Resolution A.749(l8) was adopted on 4 November 1993
Roll Excitation and Influence of Speed and Heading 227
However, it must be stressed that for any vessel the Cr -value should rather be determined
directly. In order to estimate the rolling coefficient of the ship, both the inclining
experiment for GM and the rolling period test for To must be carried out at the same
loading condition of the ship. This allows gathering experimental data on the actual Cr-
values of the particular vessel at various loading conditions.
234 ChaprerJO
trough is therefore below the GZ-curve in still water. The overall GZ reduction in the
crest is larger than the gain in the trough.
A detailed calculation for wave lengths from 0.6Ls to 1.75Ls shows the reduction (S-C) of
GZ in the crest C compared with still water (S), see fig. 10.13. The maximum of the GZ
reduction in a crest is not at a wave length equal to ship length, but at a smaller wave
length between 0.75Ls to 0.9Ls for the hull form used [Kastner, 1975]. For easy
comparison of different ships, a wave of ship length is still recommended for the method.
The reason for using frequencies instead of periods is that in following waves we find
conditions where encounter periods become very large, and correspondingly the
encounter frequencies of waves are very small. The information is the same. It is easier to
look at figures such as IE close to or even equal.to zero, than at the corresponding Ie with
values approaching infinity. In stem quartering seas at large ship speed, the encounter
period TE for shorter waves goes to infinity. This means practically, the ship runs with
these waves for a long time. The corresponding/E curves show zero encounter frequency.
In the diagrams, zero heading means following seas. The heading of 45 degrees means
stem quartering seas; 90 degrees, starboard beam seas; 180 degrees, head seas.
From figs. 10.23 and 10.24 it is obvious that for large ship speed, a number of regular
waves coincide at a very narrow frequency band in following and stem quartering seas.
Basically, the same results as above with the single waves can be obtained by
transforming the seaway spectra onto the running ship. Fig. 10.26 shows an example of
an encounter seaway spectrum in following seas. As we recall, see subchapter 9.4, a
seaway spectrum represents the energy of the seaway, distributed over the frequency.
We consider the irregular seaway as a summation of partial regular waves with different
partial wave heights, frequencies, and phases. To transform the irregular seaway pattern
from the ocean onto the ship advancing with the speed V at the heading X, we must
perform the same transformation as shown above for a single regular wave, but now with
all the partial waves which are members of the irregular seas.
St. Denis and Pierson [1953] were the first to present the spectra formulation of the
seaway. It is included in many books on ship hydrodynamics (e.g. Principles of Naval
Architecture, Lewis, [1989]). Kastner [1969, 1970] applied the irregular wave encounter
to the simulation of nonlinear roll resonance in irregular seas. Here, we compile the main
formulae for the spectral transformation.
Roll Excitation and Influence of Speed and Heading 255
The spectral representation has been normalised, i.e. the area under the curve is set equal
to unity. This allows a quick comparison of different seaway spectra and the energy
distribution versus the frequency, independent of the total seaway energy.
In figures 10.30 and 10.31, we have seen the energy of the irregular seaway transformed
onto the ship with speed and heading becoming more concentrated on a smaller
frequency band in following and stem quartering seas. In case the total energy of the
seaway spectrum concentrates in a narrower frequency band due to the transformation
onto the advancing ship, the seaway energy within this band must be larger than with the
not yet transformed seaway spectrum, because of the preservation of energy,
At a narrow band of the encounter frequency, all the energy of the particular waves is
going to act upon the ship in the same time sequence. In other words, running a ship in
following or stem quartering seas, closely resembles regular wave excitation, no matter
how irregular or confused the sea is. This appears to be a very strange result. However,
the above equations and the graphical representation show this surprising aspect very
clearly. Following and stem quartering seas are most serious with respect to danger from
capsizing due to the narrow frequency excitation. In case either the natural period or the
half of the natural period coincides with the narrow excitation, a large roll due to
resonance builds up, see subchapter 11.1.2.
The wave encounter in irregular seas is shown in fig. 10.33, calculated with an Excel
program by Skalicky [1998] modified by the author, using the seaway spectrum
according to Bretschneider (chapter 9). Figure 10.33a shows the encounter spectrum in
stem quartering seas at V/T = 3 knls. A random choice of an irregular wave sequence SE
passing the ship is plotted (fig. 1O.33b). Equation (10.77) sums the partial waves by linear
superposition, (10.78) gives the random choice of phase and (10.79) the amplitude of the
components by the seaway spectrum. The time series, SE , shows the typical pattern ofthe
way the ship experiences irregular seas. Fig. 10.33b demonstrates the build-up of wave
261
Chapter 11
A cyclic excitation of the ship as a dynamic system can cause particularly large
amplitudes of the response, depending on the frequency of the excitation with respect to
the natural frequency of the system. The roll amplitude can considerably exceed the
hydrostatic heel at constant heeling moment. The cyclic attenuation of the natural roll is
called resonance.
Damping reduces the resonance peak. Ships generally have small damping values. There
is a frequency range around the resonance peak, where the roll amplitude is still large.
The frequency range with large roll amplitudes is increased when Non-linearity in the roll
response is taken into account.
There are several but basically different mechanical ways leading to roll resonance. In a
seaway, the type of roll resonance excitation depends mainly on the ship heading relative
to the waves. The heading influences the underwater hull shape in the wave.
Extreme roll amplitudes of the rolling shit:>due to her response behaviour can lead to
damage of ship and cargo. The resonant roll, can be excited to very large amplitudes of
the rolling motion, which may not allow the ship to recover. Then the ship is prone to
capsize. Thus resonant roll is extremely dangerous for the ship in severe seas.
In the following subchapters, the main resonance phenomena for the rolling ship are
pointed out. To prevent failure from resonance is an important topic for all engineering
design. The basic mathematical background on the theory of oscillations of a mechanical
system can be found in a number of handbooks on physics, mathematics, dynamics, and
engmeenng.
Here we restrict the derivations to the level we find necessary for a good understanding to
avoid resonance in ship operation. We refer in particular to Klotter, who first presented
the mathematical theory in detail, and whose nomenclature has been widely used in
engineering and presented in handbooks, see e.g. "Hiitte" [Czichos, 1991].
264 Chapter 11
It must be kept in mind, that the above considerations are based solely on the linear (and
uncoupled) differential roll motion equation. Therefore they are only valid for small roll
angles, generally up to 5 degrees. Linear solutions can be applied as a first approach with
later corrections if required.
The non-linear bending of the roll response peak widens this linear range of large
resonance amplitudes, as was pointed out in subchapter 10.9. According to the graph in
fig. 10.9 of chapter 10, the frequency range of large roll in beam seas widens even more,
when
To check resonance according to equation (11.8) can only be a first approach. It must be
evaluated further in case the ship is close to this condition. A wider range below and
above the resonant peak should be considered too. It seems to be reasonable to account
for the amplitudes larger than half the peak value. The non-linear frequency shift of the
maximum roll must be taken into account too. Only if this is the case, we have included
all large amplitudes, which could be dangerous for the ship with respect to resonant
rolling.
In practice, it is important to assume a range of excitation frequency for dangerous
resonant roll in beam seas, to be on the safe side. These considerations are given for
better understanding of the roll behaviour, and they should be applied for forecasting the
ResonanceandLarge Roll Motion 265
expected roll. However, the master always experiences the result of his decisions at sea.
Fortunately, the irregularity of the sea and the wave group phenomenon often allow him
to take further measures in between the wave groups to get out of the resonance zone.
The shipmaster must not be misled when he has survived the first extreme rolls.
In subchapter 11.1.4, the general steps for avoiding roll resonance will be discussed.
Although much research has gone into beam sea resonance, other ship directions to the
waves are even more dangerous with respect to resonant roll. This is due to the reduction
of the restoring capabilities of the ship by the action ofthe sea.
irregular seas? Pierson [1954] states: "What do we really see when we see the sea? What
we see has nothing to do with the properties of a simple harmonic progressive wave."
Figure 11.7 depicts the large range of K from 2kn/s through 3.3kn/s. This is not
surprising considering the many different sea states. Observing a wave group during a
smaller duration as well as the heading may play some role too. This seems to be very
vague, but the task is really not that simple: To find the correct period the ship encounters
the waves from just one observed estimate of the irregular sea! Research on practical
scenarios at sea and feedback from experience are needed to give a clear advice strategy
for different situations. New development of ship-borne wave measuring technique,
based on microwave radar with ship motion compensation, would lead to dramatic
improvements in this area.
The single and the double encounter period should not be nearly equal to the natural roll
period, To.
Some margin around the mean natural period must be considered to be on the safe side.
In beam seas, the margin can account for the frequency shift of the peak roll due to the
nonlinearity of the GZ curve at large roll. In longitudinal (and to some extent in
quartering) seas, the natural roll period varies in a range due to the upper and lower GZ
curve in wave trough and wave crest.
The IMO guidance MSC 707 (see subchapter 14.2.4) avoids many of the above problems
by giving a "dangerous zone" for the V/T parameter from 0.8 through 2.0kn/s within zero
and 45 degrees heading, but also aims for avoiding resonance. Even with the problems
mentioned, checking all the parameters including the encounter period is advisable. The
method of avoiding resonance as discussed here can only assist the master to better
understand the ship behaviour and to give h,ints. Roll is a small frequency band event, so
changes in heading and speed will be very effective. A large advantage: The outcome can
be experienced at once.
Longitudinal and quartering seas must be looked at with respect to parametric (Mathieu)
resonance. Beam sea resonance shows less danger of capsizing at the same loading
condition compared to stern and stern quartering seas, but can cause large acceleration
forces. Head and head quartering shows parametric resonance at larger GM due to the
smaller encounter period, so large roll accelerations are anticipated. Pitch in head seas
allows for a good estimate of the encounter period, TE•
Measures under critical roll conditions to avoid resonance are:
• Change of heading of ship with respect to the waves,
• Reduction of ship speed,
• Changing GM by ballast, when sufficient time is available.
Resonance and Large Roll Motion 277
losses by proper measures in advance is an important task of responsible ship design and
operation. In order to improve the safety from capsizing by setting up requirements and
recommendations for designing a safe ship and for operating her safely, it is necessary to
know the ship behaviour to be expected in such extreme situations.
Table 11.3 compiles the main origin of severe loads on the ship prone to capsize. The risk
to capsize depends on the particular situation of the ship. Superposition of several factors
causes disaster. To foresee the ship's behaviour, the reaction to all single loads and to
load combinations must be studied in detail.
The theoretical solution of ship dynamics at extreme roll, including capsize in severe
seas, is mathematically rather complicated. During the second half of the late 20th
century, theory was developed tremendously, see volume 2. It seemed natural to conduct
model experiments first, when appropriate theory was not available, in order to establish
the dynamic pattern of capsizing. Model testing is still needed to verify scientific results.
Most promising is the numerical step-by-step calculation in the time domain of the ship
behaviour in irregular seas in all 6 degrees of freedom.
The danger of capsizing by parametric resonance in following regular waves was first
shown theoretically and experimentally by Grim [1951, 1952]. Arndt and Roden [1958]
and Paulling [1961] demonstrated with model measurements the variation of the righting
moment in following seas. To continue studying the influence of irregular sea on the
capsizing phenomenon, extensive experimental work was started with free running ship
models. The test area was a lake or a bay, taking advantage of the natural irregular wind
waves in open waters. We refer to research groups headed by
Wendel in Germany from 1962 to 1970 [Kastner, 1962, 1964a, 1973; Kastner and Roden,
1965; Wendel, 1965];
Kobylinski in Poland from 1963 to 1969, see chapter 6 [Dudziak and Kobylinski, 1969];
Paulling in the U.S.A. from 1970 to1974 [Paulling, et aI, 1972, 1974, 1975];
280 Chaprerll
Fig. 11.21 shows results of a non-linear computer simulation [Neves and Valerio, 2000].
The non-linear coupling in regular waves demonstrates the influence of heave and pitch
modes on large roll motion. Plotted is the roll velocity versus the roll angle, which is
conventionally known as the phase diagram. In the example shown, the heading is 15
degrees, the frequency of wave encounter is 0.42 rad/s, wave height is 1.5m, and length
to height ratio of the wave is 17.
Grochowalski [1993, 1997] studied the mechanism of ship capsizing of fishing vessels in
heavy seas in more detail from model experiments using a carriage in a towing tank. He
points out the dangers from bulwark and deck submergence during dynamic motions of a
ship in steep quartering waves. The generated additional force and heeling moment
significantly increases the likelihood of ship capsizing. Grochowalski differentiates
between "water on deck" and "deck in water". Additional heeling moment is generated
by the lateral motion, which is composed of sway and yaw. This creates relative
velocities of the flowing water onto the deck with subsequent dynamic pressure on the
submerged deck surface. Coupled sway and heave create a heeling moment for the deck
in water condition, see also fig. I 1.22.
11.2.6 Videos on Capsizing Model Tests
In addition to a large number of gauges installed in ship models to measure their
behaviour, several films were shot to show the extreme phenomena. With improved
technology, the newer films are better than the earlier ones, when the testing started. The
old film records have been transformed to video, while new ones can be taken directly
with video giving improved sharpness.
Most ofthe following videos have only been available at the specific Institutions for
research and lecturing. However, the 1998 video from Japan is specifically designed to
explain the capsizing phenomena:
• Freighters, coasters, Navy ships, Pl6n/Eckernforde, Germany (1962-1970), Kastner,
Bremen;
• Container ships, S.F. Bay, U.S.A. (1971-1974), Paulling, Berkeley;
• Container ships, Hamburg Model Basin, Germany (1982);
• Tests on fishing boats, Institute for Marine Dynamics, Canada (1993);
• Container ships, Japan Captains Association [1998].
The last three films have narration. The 1998 video from Japan compiles the state of the
art and has been particularly produced to explain the theoretical background of the
capsizing phenomenon. It is strongly recommended for viewing so as to visualise the
extreme roll motion pattern of ships as shown therein.
290 Chaprerll
Specifically designed videos are certainly a good tool for Maritime education and
training, e. g. the examples developed in Sweden and the U.S.A. on the safety of fishing
vessels:
Seavision, a PC-based dynamic stability simulator for fishing vessels. SSPA Maritime
Consulting AB, Goteborg;
Fishing Vessel Stability. Videotape series on safety and survival at sea. North Pacific
Fishing Vessel Owner's Association, Seattle 1996.
were 30 capsizes with an average of 0.069 % of the fleet per year (ships larger than 25
gross tons).
To detect causes, the capsizing rate must be related with the ship type, see table 11.7. For
the dry cargo ships, in 10 of the 12 cases of capsizing, shifting of cargo was the main
cause. The cargo was palletised sacks or plastic bags. Even when stowed as tight as
possible, such cargo may shift in adverse weather. The capsize probability of dry cargo
ships of more than 500 gross tons is very low. Therefore, safety must be improved for
ships of less than 500 gross tons. Hjort suggests that such ships should comply with the
stability criteria without the use of water ballast in the homogeneously loaded departure
condition.
It must be kept in mind that the operational data of table 11.7 are a long-term statistic
over years and includes less severe seas and calm water too. In comparing with table 11.6
and figures 11.29 and 11.30, experiments are designed solely for short-term extremes in
adverse seas.
So-called rational stability criteria try to base safety standards for the stability of ships on
the probability theory. Kobylinski [1997a] gave a detailed overview at the STAB97
Conference. Part 1 of this book details the development of stability regulations. Belenky
[2000] presented a state of the art review of the probabilistic approach. The probability of
capsize is further treated in volume 2.
305
Chapter 12
The purpose of merchant shipping is the economic transportation of cargo at sea. For
most ships, cargo constitutes the main portion of the total ship mass. This portion
depends on the particular ship type designed for carrying a specific type of cargo. The
design displacement, Ll, is the sum of the empty ship (mass of light ship mLs) and the
deadweight dw:
Kennell [2001] presented statistics on the mLS III ratio versus deadweight density Pdw.
Most of the ocean-going cargo ships displace 20000 to 60000 LT (I long ton = 1016kg =
1.016 metric ton) with speeds of 15 to 25 knots, with the exception oflarge tankers. They
exhibit a wide variation of deadweight density ranging from about 10 lb/cuft for Ro/Ro
ships to over 50 lb/cuft for tankers, see fig.12.1. The corresponding deadweight mass
fraction dwlLl varies from 0.4 (Ro/Ro) to 0.9 (tanker).
Ship and cargo experience the same motions in a seaway. For a fully loaded very large
crude carrier (VLCC), oscillation of the ship means that the 90% ship portion of cargo
316 Chapter 12
Depicted is the circle path around the assumed rolling centre C. The cargo mass follows
this circle path due to the rolling motion. The cargo on the starboard side experiences the
largest resulting normal-to-deck acceleration force component, P, at the maximum rolling
to starboard. Note that heave is descending on the left graph, while on the right heave is
ascending, fig. 12.11. Note also the opposite tangential direction of the dynamic force
component due to the roll amplitude on either side.
Evaluation of the above equations for the three acceleration components depending on
the location in the ship (equations (12.38)-(12.40)) require either detailed motion
calculations of the ship in a seaway, or approximation values. Classification societies
have developed approximation formulae and computer programs for detailed
calculations. Of course, any approximation can be done in quite different ways. So it is
not surprising the formulae found in the literature sometimes differ considerably.
However, when looking at it carefully, one can realise the same background. Each of the
three above equations accounts for five out of six motion degrees of freedom (DOF), see
also example equ. 12.47. Usually only three DOF are taken into consideration.
Therefore, we do not try to compile approximations for the forces acting on the cargo, but
refer to the specific regulations of Classification Societies. To give only a short reference,
Lloyds Register [1998] determines the forces acting in the securing system of containers
for each loading condition and associated set of motions ofthe ship. The following forces
are to be taken into account:
• Static gravity forces,
• Inertial forces generated by accelerations due to roll, pitch and heave motions of the
ship,
• Wind forces
• Force imposed by the securing arrangements,
• Wave impact forces.
When the ship response data is not available, the values for roll, pitch and heave as given
in table 12.5 are used, according to Lloyd's Register [1998], with ship length L = Lpp .
The roll and pitch angle is to be calculated as follows (valid within the range marked by *
in the table):
ForcesduetoRollMotion 319
In fact, this a is not a roll angle at all. It is defined by the ratio of the horizontal and
vertical resultant acceleration force in the transverse plane of the ship. However, with
larger values it certainly shows the increase of transverse acceleration force, which can
cause shifting of cargo. Table 12.7 cites some results of the study of extreme values of
the calculated equivalent angle for risk conditions. The equivalent angle a combines ship
motions and accelerations and can give a good representation to estimate the risk of cargo
shifting in operation.
[1984], and Turnbull and Dawson [1983] gave detailed analysis on lashing of trailers.
The friction force of cargo to the deck assists in preventing cargo from shifting.
Accelerations reducing the force normal to the deck, vibrations and slamming impulses
can reduce the friction force and slacken the lashing. Fig. 12.15 depicts coefficients of
friction, defined as the ratio of friction force and
the force normal to the contact surface:
12.7 Ships lost after Shifting of Cargo and Corresponding Operational Conditions
Wagner [1979] analysed about 100 accidents. He concluded that 40% were due to too
small stability, whereas in 60% the main cause was shifting of cargo. In a study by Kaps
and Kastner [1985] for the German Ministry of Transport, they pointed out a number of
practical problems in cargo lashing. Shifting of cargo appears generally due to severe
Forcesdue to Roll Motion 321
seaway. Either insufficient stability results in large heel, which can start cargo shifting, or
too large stability leads to too large motion with high transverse accelerations acting on
the cargo. Furthermore, insufficient lashing and too much free space left allows the cargo
to shift.
Kaps and Kastner [1984, 1985, 1985a] evaluated the casualty returns of Lloyd's Register
of Shipping. Only total losses of ships of more than 100 gross tons are considered.
Foundered means loss by capsizing, structural failure, ingress of water. Fig. 12.16 shows
the number of cargo ships foundered after cargo shifted in a 10-year period 1974-1983.
The authors propose that at least half of the large difference between "all ships
foundered" and the ones "foundered after cargo shifted" can be attributed to cargo
shifting as well. They call it a "grey
area" in the statistics. Cargo shifting is
originated by insufficient lashing,
false stowage, and reduced
seaworthiness of the ship. It falls
within the responsibility of the ship's
officer.
The total of ships lost in this 10-year
period were 2923 ships with a total of
about 12 million gross tons (GT), an
average of 4100 GT per ship. Out of
this total, 1094 ships with an average
of 2040 GT fall into the category
"foundered", i.e. 37.4% of all ships
lost, and 18.6% of the total tonnage
lost. Out of this again 738 ships with an average of 2440 GT were dry cargo ships, with
25.3% of the total and 15% of the total tonnage.
As a whole, 130 ships with an average of2180 GT have foundered after cargo shifted (in
a 10 year period!). The authors assume this figure to be very much higher, so a total of
15% of the number of ships or 9% of the total tonnage can be attributed to cargo shifting.
About half the cargo shifted cases reported were bulk cargo, or cargo to be considered as
bulk due to the specific ways of stowage. This large percentage comes close to the
"classical" causes of a ship loss such as collision, grounding and fire. The authors
consider the large share of shifting in the ship losses to be a serious problem. The
dominant role of shipping is the transport of cargo on the oceans, and severe sea
conditions must be overcome.
Imminent operational errors are:
• Wrong handling of tank fluids,
• Insufficient lashing of cargo on deck:,
• Ingress of water not noticed by the master.
Once shifting has started, it reduces ship stability and increases the heel, which in turn
induces further shifting of cargo. Critical types of cargo are steel pallets, dry bulk
including sacks, timber, containers, heavy cargo, and dangerous goods.
322 Chapter]2
Type of cargo and type of ship play an important role. Multipurpose carriers feature
mainly large cargo holds to cope with different cargo, but the space does often not allow
sufficient subdivision. Specialised ships have an advantage. However, even special ship
types such as Ro-Ro ships or container ships need careful attention concerning ship
motions and cargo lashing. An example is the extensive loss and damage to deck stowed
containers of a post-Panamax container ship due to parametric rolling in extreme head
seas [France, et a/2003].
Casualties show the importance of safety management procedures (see Chapter 14) for
prevention of a ship loss or damage to cargo. Critical operational conditions with respect
to shifting of cargo can be identified as follows:
• Lack of time for checking stowage and securing because of mechanised loading at
large capacity,
• Qualification and motivation appear to be at different levels and are sometimes not
adequate,
• Sometimes time pressure prevents a reasonable meteorological navigation,
• Measures to reduce ship motions are not always successful. Adequate knowledge and
assisting tools are not yet always available.
Container ships seem to need improvements in sea behaviour. Stability requirements have
been increased by IMO Resolution A.749 (18) adopted 1993. Kaps and Kastner [1984,
1985, 1985a] defined three typical causes for container ships to operate at adverse
stability:
1. Containers loaded on deck have less weight than assumed in shipyard stability
calculations. The result is a ship with larger GM and GZ values, which makes the ship
stiffer with increased motion accelerations in a seaway.
2. The ship is loaded according to shipyard calculation and corresponds to the
requirements. However, for a fine hull form with small block coefficient, longitudinal
and quartering seas lead to large variations in the righting moment. In severe seas
with the ship in resonance, large motion acceleration can damage lashing and cargo.
3. Containers loaded on deck have too much mass. The sea behaviour is improved
showing softer motions, but the righting moment (GZ curve) is too small. This
condition is critical for capsize.
The above reference to the cargo securing regulations by classification societies is to
show the practical importance of considering the acceleration forces for the cargo
securing. The goal is to cope with the maximum values to be expected. With the progress
of computer programs, a detailed analysis can be carried out for use in ship operation. In
particular, linear assumptions will be replaced by non-linear methods, at least for roll.
The state of the art of the mathematical methods for extreme ship motion is described in
volume 2.
Calculating inertia forces on cargo takes the dynamic behaviour and seakeeping qualities
of the ship into account and allows for better judgement. The numerical approach will
give the ship operator specific data for his decisions, to reduce dynamic loads on cargo
and to operate the ship safely.
323
Chapter 13
reliability. They promote the best utilisation of the ship's cargo capacity by means of
accurate cargo planning. Loading conditions can be saved, documented and evaluated
statistically. By verifying stability and strength against relevant criteria before departure,
using such programs improves ship safety.
According to the instructions of the program MARINER [1998], the basic functions refer
to:
• Deadweight and displacement table,
• Stability status,
• Longitudinal strength status,
• Dry bulk cargo weight by draft survey.
To perform these tasks, the following input is required:
• Details of cargo,
• Status of ballast, fuel, oil and fresh water tanks,
• Any miscellaneous or extra items,
• Draft survey by observation.
Loading programs carry out the calculations, save the data, and show results on the
computer screen. The screen layout generally shows the ship profile at the top, including
the ship's name and title of the loading condition. A status panel is constantly updated
during editing, and a graphical summary of the results on ship strength and stability is
shown. The MARINER program shows the following data on the screen and in printed
reports:
• Displacement table,
• Cargo reports,
• Drafts and trim,
• Intact stability curve,
• Shear force diagram,
• Bending moment diagram,
• Torsion diagram,
• Mass of the cargo by draft survey.
Furthermore, the program calculates details with respect to intact ship stability:
• The applicable stability criteria, such as the minimum criteria set by the IMO for all
seagoing conditions ofthe vessel,
• Additional stability criteria, e. g. the grain stability when carrying grain,
• The GZ curve with the GM line, including the effect of free surfaces,
• The required calculated values against the relevant criteria:
GM, area 0-30, area 0-40, area 30-40, max GZ, angle ofmax GZ, down-flooding
angle, limiting KG, grain heeling moment, grain heeling angle, residual area.
Of the many programs in use, we mention Onboard-NAP A [2000]. It serves ship loading,
damage stability and performance predictions onboard passenger ships, Ro-Ro ships, car
ferries, tankers, navy ships, etc. The core technology is shared with the original ship-
oriented design tool for naval architects. For the different types of ships and cargo, the
user can define a cargo database. The same is possible for dangerous goods (IMDG).
NAP A permits onboard calculations of ship hydrostatics and intact stability, damage
Measurement and Accuracy of Stability Status 327
Hamburg, 2000). The consumption of tanks is measured by automatic tank level gauging
with electro-pneumatic or electric transmitters, see fig 13.2.
Hoffman suggests an on-board system designed for navigating the ship in rough seas to
include the following features:
• Recording capabilities of some selected response and environmental data,
• On-line processing of the data,
• Prediction and trend capabilities of several responses,
• Criteria for establishing severity of response and warning signals,
• Guidance charts based on pre-calculated data or previously accumulated full-scale
information,
• Manoeuvring analysis to help the captain select ideal course and speed, to minimise
damage, reduce fuel consumption or save time.
The classification society, Germanischer Lloyd, in co-operation with industry, developed
a ship-borne Load and Motion Indicator (LAM I) giving the master objective aid for his
decisions in a seaway [Westram and Hachmann, 1986]. This was part of a large scale
R&D program, "Ship of the Future", aimed at enhancing the bridge operation of modem
cargo vessels. The system evaluates measurements of ship response, and it presents the
actual motion and structural response on a screen on the bridge, see fig. 13.5.
The most important data of the actual ship behaviour is indicated in both the longitudinal
and the main cross section of the ship. The maximum scale corresponds to the maximum
ship motion and load. In the event 50 percent of the design value is exceeded, the signal
colour changes to red. The screen displays (digitally) the value of the maximum within
the last 15 minutes. Shown on the screen were:
Measurement and Accuracy afStability Status 333
• Fore-body impacts,
• Vertical acceleration in the fore-body,
• Stresses in the deck at mid-ship,
• Additional power needed due to the seaway,
• Transverse acceleration in the uppermost container row,
• Roll motion.
Extensive tests on the prototype of the GL system were carried out on board the container
ship "Stuttgart Express" (a ship of the 2nd generation, with a length of 205 meters, later
reconstructed to 230 m) from 1982 to 1985 in the North Atlantic. During this
development phase, the GL system evaluated the signals from fifteen gauges:
• Vertical acceleration • Vertical acceleration • Transverse acceleration
close to the bow, mid-ship, mid-ship,
• Longitudinal • Roll angle, • Pitch angle,
acceleration mid-ship,
• Strain gauge port mid- •
Strain gauge starboard • Strain gauge at hatch
ship, mid-ship, comer starboard,
• Ship speed, • Course ofthe ship, • Wind velocity,
• Wind direction, • Torque ofthe propeller • Propeller revolutions.
shaft,
It turned out that the number of sensors could be reduced considerably. A minimum of
three accelerometers (nos. 1, 2, 3) are sufficient, as data on speed, course, wind and
propulsion are often available on the bridge anyway. With respect to stability of the ship,
roll angle must of course be included. Measured signals are filtered and digitised.
Spectral analysis allows identification of different origin of the response, such as motion
of the rigid ship and the impact of waves on the structure. The minimum digitising rate is
10Hz. A statistical evaluation of a record of at least 15 minutes is recommended for
basic sampling at ship scale.
The single curve on the screen, as shown in fig. 13.5, was developed as an equivalent
combined load and response function, showing the last six hours of operation depicting
the trend. The combined function versus time serves as an indicator of the expected
damage costs when the sustainable load is being exceeded. It comprises the particular
components such as transverse acceleration in the upper container tier, stress in the main
deck, and combination effects of several load components. The combined function also
includes a cost parameter for additional propulsion power required due to the seaway.
The single function allows judging the reduction in efficiency at increasing risk in ship
operation.
Hoffman, et al [2000] reported on the latest results of hull response monitoring systems
(HRMS). They quote the report SSC-401 by the ship structure committee [Slaughter, et
aI, 1997], describing the commercial state of HRMS. Compared with the above early
development, theoretical tools are now more advanced, and the database of full-scale
measurements is more reliable. Several classification societies including GL, LR and
DNV, as well as ship owners have undertaken further research and development of such
systems. The concept is based on processing records of the actual wave spectrum. The
monitoring system implemented some key points:
334 Chaprer13
consumption. The great advantage of ship routeing is the general availability and the low
cost. The average time saving is 10 hours crossing the North Atlantic and 18 hours the
Pacific.
A route to minimise deck accelerations or roll angles may also be desired, but requires
specific information on the ship behaviour. To include ship performance and behaviour in
a seaway, response characteristics must be available for any particular ship, including the
effect of loading condition, speed and heading.
Hoffman [1976] suggested combining the routeing service with a ship-borne warning and
guidance system (see subchapter 13.1.5). Local area adaptation corrects the basic route
proposed by the long-term service. Ship-borne on-line routeing based on measurements
of ship response and numerical short-term predictions allow modification of the route. A
measuring system in combination with routeing carries an enormous potential to increase
ship safety while reducing operation costs.
An example described in literature is the ship-borne decision support and monitoring
system by Chen and Sucharski [1993]. The system minimises heavy weather damage and
optimises operational efficiency. The ship-borne system allows calculating ship
behaviour at sea in combination with wave forecasts. Decisions can be based on short -
term seakeeping response and rational criteria rather than on experience alone. The
advance in ship hydrodynamics allows one to base decision systems at sea on rational
grounds and to give objective measures. Chen and Sucharski cite a few problems in
routeing, which are solved by new mathematical tools, such as:
• Uncertainty of the operating environment,
• Replacement of simplified models for ship response by sophisticated programs,
• Uncertainty ofhurnan operators.
Chapter 13
and Artificial Intelligence (AI). Their system comprises the ship response database (DB),
and the field of activity with the knowledge base (KB). Included is the evaluation of
situations and recognition of conditions within a complex hierarchical structure under the
conditions of incomplete and uncertain information. Actually measured data of the
interaction process of ship and environment is used for the mathematical decisions.
They developed regressive mathematical models for operative control during the flooding
of compartments due to damage, and to control this emergency situation to prevent
sinking and capsizing. This is one of the very early practical applications of artificial
intelligence in ship safety.
Shipping experience has shown the need for a higher degree of accuracy for ship stability
calculations, assisted by ship borne inclining experiments. So far IMO gives only a
marginal note on the in-service inclination test in Chapter 2 of Resolution A.749(18)
[IMO 1993]. It is well known, however, that large inaccuracies of the in-service status
can more than offset the inherent safety margins of stability criteria set by authorities.
Therefore, the Operational Ship Inclining experiment (OSI) for the ship in service is a
practical tool for the ship operator to improve accuracy of stability estimates. It is
advisable to analyse the measuring errors of the inclination test. After giving insight into
the proper use of gauges, and into proper evaluation of measurements of actual ship
stability in operation, some hints are given here with respect to achieving reliable results.
Halden [1994] developed modem practical equipment to carry out and to analyse OSI
automatically, see subchapter 13.1.4. However, international requirements to make the
operational ship inclining mandatory are still missing. It can be anticipated, that
permanent stability control as an additional measure of safety will be a future must for all
ships. Operational ship inclining (aS I) results in economic advantage such as more
efficient loading of the ship and expected reduction in damage. Economy is the main
driving force to improve operational stability and safety.
optimum length ought to be chosen to allow enough reading resolution, and at the same
time reduce any dynamic effects. In case the pendulum is in resonance, damping of the
pendulum alone cannot correct the measuring error (see subchapter 13.2.4).
a liquid should be provided to dampen oscillations of the pendulum. The pendulums may
be placed in any location on the ship, longitudinally and transversely.
Both SYI and OSI must be carried out with the ship in still water, with all lines being
slack, with the ship free of the pier and camels. The importance of good mooring
arrangements cannot be overemphasised. It is good practice to supplement the bow and
stem lines with two spring lines as long as practical.
IMO recommends a length of the pendulum between 4m and 6m. The length should be
long enough to give a measured deflection of at least 15cm. This will require a pendulum
length of at least 3m, when considering a 3 degrees heel increment. The deflections larger
than l5cm for a length of equal or more than 3 m in table 13.3 are marked bold.
However, IMO warns on the use of an excessively long pendulum on a tender ship. The
long pendulum may not settle down, and the accuracy would be questionable (see the
above derivation on the dynamic response ofa pendulum in subchapter 13.2.4).
The typical inclination is to be between two and three degrees, but, in no case, should the
maximum angle of heel be greater than f01.\rdegrees. For larger ships, a one degree heel
increment is accepted. With the inclining mass, p, in the initial position for the upright
ship, one-half degree is acceptable, according to IMO.
Tables 13.2 and 13.3 vary the length of the pendulum in multiples of 0.573 m. A reading
length of 0.573m has the advantage of a lcm reading corresponding to a 1 degree angle
measurement. The Bremen tests with container ships [Kaps and Kastner, 1989] have
shown that this length is sufficient. For the practical use in as I, a pendulum length of
1.146 m is recommended (marked bold in table 13.3). Here a 1cm reading corresponds to
0.5 degree. Careful reading allows an accuracy ofO.2mm= 0.01 degree.
Chapter 14
For the future, the best way is seen in defining so-called rational stability criteria, based
on the actual conditions of the ship in the particular environment [Kobylinski, 2000].
This is a field under discussion among experts, and certainly not to be resolved
completely in the near future. In a workshop on information to the master at the
International Conference STAB 94, Rakhmanin stated:
• Stability is a key factor ensuring ship safety.
• The shipmaster bears the ultimate responsibility for the ship's fate and lives aboard.
• Any system of standard requirements is far from ideal and cannot guarantee 100%
level of safety. This stands for the master's knowledge, experience and skill, and may
playa decisive role for ship survival.
The shipowner has to provide the ship with the Loading and Stability Manual, where the
hydrostatic parameters of typical loading conditions are compiled, see subchapter 14.2.2.
It seems natural, that masters take the GZ-curve the ship was designed for by naval
architects as measures for their operational condition of stability. However, the minimum
requirements do not show the assumptions at which the minimum set values were
derived. This has a dangerous drawback, when the ship encounters extremely severe
environmental conditions at sea. The minimum GZ-curve allowed does not guarantee safe
ship at any rate, see also Kobylinski [2000].
The inadequacy of common design criteria on ship stability to include the role of human
factors in marine regulations was expressed by Cleary [1994], quote:
1. Regulations assume knowledgeable humans, but humans often assume that any
marine craft that has been "approved" is so well protected that the operator can test
it to the limit.
2. The output of a naval architect is in a form, which shows how well the design meets
minimum rules. But that output is not intelligent information for operators.
3. The trend to avoid "stopping the ship" at any cost affects operation. It affects ship
systems safety, and it affects ship 's actual level of safety.
4. The IMO trend is to be driven by consensus.
5. Video training is proposed as a tool, which includes the limits of safety.
It is dangerous to rely on the mandatory minimum
when more is needed in an extreme situation.
Kastner [1986] proposed to define a safety margin
of operational stability. This margin is needed
additionally to the required minimum to cope with
extreme situations. Running the ship in an extreme
situation with an additional safety margin depends
on the master. We call it the master's range of
judgement, see fig. 14.1. This expression points
out the need to act responsibly in severe seas,
rather than relying on given standards.
Fig. 14.1 shows the probability density of the GZ
at 30 degrees of heel as might be needed during a
voyage, compared to a deterministic single value
Chapter 14
parameters, the loading condition with draught and stability, the sea region, and the
season of navigation. Their calculation scheme can be used for operational decisions on a
quantitative basis with regard to weather restrictions.
The authors point at the operational stability of a ship in various real life situations.
Operational stability is significantly defined by the ability of the master to load and
control the vessel, to observe the characteristics of the ship design, and to act in
dangerous sea conditions.
What seems to be a very basic principle in the Russian regulations is the possibility to
assign restrictions to ships not satisfying an unrestricted region of navigation. There are
five categories with two control parameters: the permissible distance from a place of
refuge and the allowable height of waves with a 3% probability exceeding the level of
8.5m to 305m.
Here is the non-dimensional roll damping (parameter D in chapter 10). The authors
conclude that limitations in ao by ship hull design can improve the roll behaviour, when
limiting parametric roll to about 17 degrees.
Results of German federally funded co-operative research were presented at the STG
summer meeting in Gdansk 2001. Cramer and KrUger [2001] reported on numerical
simulation methods to predict large roll angles. This becomes important for Ro/Ro and
Ro/Pax vessels, characterised by high values of initial metacentric heights, so the
seakeeping behaviour becomes more and more important. Pereira, et al [200 I] reported
on nonlinear simulation techniques for ship motions in six degrees of freedom. They use
a strip method converting the hydrodynamic coefficients obtained in the frequency
domain to be converted for the use in the time simulation. In the Hamburg model basin,
Blume and Brink [2001] set up model testing for validating the prediction of extreme roll
up to capsizing. Clauss, et al [2002] report on deterministic seekeeping model tests for
the analysis of extreme roll and capsizes. The federally funded program ROLL-S further
develops numerical methods for simulating ship motions in extreme seas. The target is to
design safer ships with reduced risk from capsizing.
The methods of stability assessment refer to the minimum stability requirements. They
include additional criteria for certain types of cargo or modes of operation, as given in the
Intact Stability Code (Resolution IMO A.749 (18)). Deviations of the ship status from the
required values can lead to severe danger for the ship. It is important to reduce
uncertainties in the assessment before leaving port. We have three levels of assessment,
at increasing accuracy:
Comparing the intended loading plan with similar conditions where stability is known.
Individual calculation of masses and moments. of cargo distribution and tank filling (mass
and centre of gravity of cargo and tank fillings must be available with sufficient accuracy,
and computer programs will facilitate the method).
Measurement of stability by an in-service inclining test, or by observation via the
observed natural period of roll is applied. Measurement is the most accurate method.
When carried out during the loading process, it needs further adaptation to the final state
at departure, and to the worst condition during the voyage.
Fuel consumption, ballast, water absorption of cargo, and icing, must of course be
controlled while at sea. All cargo should be properly stowed and secured, in accordance
with the code of safe practice for cargo stowage and securing.
In severe weather, the speed of the ship should be reduced, and/or the course changed, if
excessive rolling, propeller emergence, shipping of water on deck, or heavy slamming
occurs. Water trapping in deck wells should be avoided. Special attention should be paid
when the ship is travelling in following or stem quartering seas. Dangerous dynamic
Safety Management and Operational Requirements 371
phenomena such as parametric resonance, broaching to, reduction of stability on the wave
crest can occur and lead to danger from capsizing, see the next section.
14.2.4 Guidance to the Master for Avoiding Dangerous Situations in Following and
Quartering seas
First, national authorities started to
include basic recommendations on
avoidance of resonance in stability
requirements [BMV, 1984]. Takaishi
[1994], Takaishi et al [1997] developed
the technical background and objectives
of new international IMO guidelines
approved in 1995. This MSC 707
guidance to the master for avoiding
dangerous situations in following and
quartering seas [IMO 1995] consists of
four parts:
advice to the master will eventually provide the solution in developing a set of detailed
criteria for each potentially dangerous situation. However, any attempt to offer precise
guidance may fail, due to the complexity of real situations at sea. Guidance must provide
operators with a more general understanding, e.g. where risky combinations of speed and
heading exist (see paper and discussion by Alman, et al [1999]).
operation of the ship (section 4). The master's responsibility and authority is particularly
defined (section 5), in particular implementing the policy, motivating the crew, issuing
instructions, verifying that requirements are observed, and reviewing the safety
management system (SMS) for the ship.
In the short term, legislators expect the IMO code to give a significant contribution to
establishing an effective compliance regime for the mandatory requirements and the non-
mandatory codes, guides, and standards in shipping [Knudsen, 1993]. At a later stage,
safety management in shipping may develop to levels where all factors to safety and
protection of the environment are subject to adequate management control.
The ISM code is certainly a large step forward towards improving safety procedure in
shipping operation. Now, the shipping company must set up a safety and environmental
protection policy, which describes how the objectives will be achieved. A main
advantage of the ISM code for safer shipping can be seen in the requirement of
identifying risks and establishing safeguards. It is mandatory to continuously improve
safety management skills of personnel. However, systematic identification of hazards and
specific risk analysis methodology are not required by the Code [Knudsen, 1993].
Assurance on the quality of ship and equipment and setting up management schemes will
only work, when the responsible persons involved in shipping contribute with knowledge
and experience. IMO has put a lot of effort into regulations and guidelines supporting
personnel development. In 1997, IMO adopted Resolution A.850 (20) [IMO 1997b] on
human element vision, principles and goals for the organisation. IMO acknowledges the
close relationship between the human elements and safety. Quote: The human element is
a complex multi-dimensional issue that affects maritime safety and marine environmental
protection. It involves the entire spectrum of human activities performed by ships crews,
shore-based management, regulatory bodies, recognised organisations, shipyards,
legislators, and other relevant parties, all of whom need to co-operate to address the
human element effectively.
One of the goals with respect to maritime education and training (MET) is, quote: to
provide material to educate seafarers so as to increase their knowledge and awareness of
the impact of human element issues on safe ship operations, to help them to do the right
thing.
Statistical analysis of marine accidents demonstrates that the human element is involved
considerably. Boniface and Bea [1996] cite the UK P&I Club analysis of the claims in
1993 and estimated human errors to be the primary cause of 62% of those accidents.
Around 60 percent of accident claims are directly due to human error, a further 30
percent are indirectly related to human error too, by failure of components designed and
operated by human beings [Kuo, 2000].
There are mainly two sources of malfunction due to wrong operation of complicated
technical systems. One is negligence and laxness in handling the system, the other is
overload and pressure. Fig. 14.18 shows the probability density of human errors versus
380 Chapter 14
the intensity of stressors [Salvendy, 1987]. The human errors have a flat minimum in a
wide range of stressors, where persons can cope with all demands. However, when the
culture of operating the system is too lax, the probability of human errors increases. The
same reduced ability to find the right decisions results in overload and pressure on
persons.
Personnel selection, training, experience and support have a positive effect. They
decrease the probability of human errors considerably.
There is no clear-cut definition of the term "human factors". An evident definition by
Gregory [1987] is: "Human factors concern the efficiency of persons in their working
environment. "
Kuo [2000] presented a thorough
study on the impact of human
factors on ship stability. For
practical applications, he defines
as follows: "The term human
factors is concerned with the
interfacing of a set of personal
capabilities and characteristics
with a combination of hardware,
software, working environment
and organisational culture in the
effective performance ofa task."
In both interpretations the main
aspect of human factors is the connection of two distinct groups. They connect persons,
described by their capabilities and their performance, with a complicated technical
system.
The impact of human factors on safe ship operation is considerable. This is particularly
true with respect to stability. Kuo [2000] gives some important points to be looked at:
• Standard procedures may sometimes not be appropriate and may be difficult to
implement, thus leading to accidents.
• Information may not be communicated correctly among multilingual and
multicultural crews.
• Emphasis on training with practical demonstrations, group exercises and training
software is advised.
• Assigning specific responsibilities to clearly designated individuals is a prerequisite.
In identifying human factors contributing to accidents, we speak of "human errors". Kuo
[2000] cites two opposing views. "Nothing can be done about it because it involves
human beings, or, human errors must and can be eliminated." A realistic option is
certainly to recognise the different natures of human beings, and trying to minimise the
probability of the occurrence of human errors and impact by appropriate methods.
Human errors are associated with human actions, omissions and neglect. Their impact
can be extremely serious. Kuo [2000] ends up with three levels of human error:
Saftty Management and Operational Requirements 381
I. Skill-based
Tasks are carried out on a routine basis, but concentration may fail.
2. Rule-based
Here procedures are often carried out from experience of training. A good rule can be
misused, or a poor rule is implemented, or the appropriate rule not applied at all.
3. Knowledge-based
Here the solution must be worked out, as previously applied methods are
inappropriate. This level is often associated with unexpected emergency situations.
Furthermore, Kuo identifies twelve factors that can lead to human errors, such as:
Attitude, communication, concentration, confidence, experience, human limitations,
information, management, procedure, time constraints, tiredness, training. He suggests
selecting only three of the most significant factors to apply an analytical decision analysis
method. This will overcome most of the deficiencies. His so-called safety case concept
includes a methodology to address the most relevant factors. The first step is to analyse
the problem, then to set up a safety management system incorporating the best way to
manage safety [Kuo, 1998]. This concept is particularly good for considering situations
or systems for which there is little previous experience, and for problems associated with
human factors. Part of the safety case concept analysis is:
• Hazard identification (what aspects of a system can go wrong),
• Risk assessment (what are the chances and effects of the hazards),
• Risk reduction,
• Emergency preparedness (what to do if a severe situation arises).
Improved methods in management, engineering and operation are needed to reduce the
probability of human errors. The reduction of human errors by personnel training,
experience and support is shown in fig. 14.18.
Boniface and Bea [1996] reviewed the key principles in human performance
methodologies. They developed a human error modelling system, named Human Error
Risk Reduction Operating System (HERROS), to provide insights and solutions at all
stages of the life cycle of a ship.
IMO [1995a] revised the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW). It is to be seen as an international maritime
training guide. Still, operational decisions that have influence upon capsizing are left to
the discretion of the captain, as Dahle [1993] complained. STCW quotes specifically, that
training of ship and engine officers should give them knowledge on the calculation of
intact stability, and on the safe stowage and handling of cargo. Instructions on how to
handle the ship in severe conditions with minimum stability are considered important.
Miller and Paitl [2001] report on the U.S. fishing vessel-training suite. It includes a
training document "Best practices guide to vessel stability", supported by an interactive
stability trainer. This trainer is a free floating, scaled fishing vessel which replicates
actual operating conditions such as sloshing liquid, loading catch, lifting operations, and
icing conditions.
The backbone of proper shiphandling is Maritime education and training (MET). An
important role in international enhancement is played by the World Maritime University
(WMU) in Malmo/Sweden, founded on behalf ofIMO in 1983 [Weinstein, 1996].
382 Chapter14
There is widespread agreement on the need to improve stability and safety of ships. It has
been recognised that better information to the master is important. Improvements in the
area of human factors must be co-ordinated with research on maritime safety regulations.
Grochowalski, et al suggested [1994], making a distinction between "stability" and
"stability safety". Stability safety depends on the ship characteristics and on ship
operation, which must be optimised together, while stability alone, is just a feature of the
ship to resist capsizing.
To stress the importance of ship operation on the ability of the ship in service to prevent
capsize and to reduce damage from rolling and roll acceleration, the term operational
stability has been used throughout this book. The main concern of safe operation with
respect to intact stability is to avoid severe situations such as synchronous and parametric
rolling, surf riding, and broaching, and to give provisions for survival.
The inclusion of ship dynamics to assess operational stability beyond the conventional
hydrostatic approach will improve taking vital action in advance. General application and
further development of the tools now available in operational stability of ships and ocean
vehicles will contribute substantially to safer shipping in the near future.
The main topics of operational stability are currently at different stages of development
and implementation and are compiled as follows:
1. Management of stability and safety with reference to the ship type and mission,
supported by performance based intact stability criteria,
2. Automatic estimate of ship static stability status continuously,
3. Ship-borne measurement equipment on behaviour at sea,
4. Numerical time domain simulation of dynamic ship behaviour with reliable computer
programs allowing study, training and forecast on adverse seakeeping scenarios,
5. Short-term routeing assisted by sea data evaluation from ship-borne gauges and from
satellites,
6. Storage of black box data on extreme events and decisions taken (voyage data
recorder VDR),
7. Risk analysis and development of risk oriented scenarios for survival in heavy seas,
8. Reduction of human errors by mandatory assistance using onboard computer systems,
but responsibility stays with the master,
9. Maritime education and training (MET) using modem tools such as video, virtual
reality systems, numerical simulators, computer feedback trainers, and physical
models for demonstration of risk scenarios,
10. Steady transfer of research and feedback among operators, designers, administrators
and scientists.
383
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409
Subject Index
i\ccuracy,226, 353, 355, 357 Dangerous situation, 39, 75, 122, 123,
Artificial intelligence (AI), 338, 339 124,159,174,359,366,371
Automatic ship inclining, 330 Decision system, 323, 335
Deck-in-water
Bandwidth, 256, 258 effect, 163
Beam seas, 228, 231, 232 heeling moment, 163,288
Beaufort, 191, 192 Degrees of freedom, 217, 220
Breadth parameter, 205, 209 Disaster, 187
Breaking waves Discrimination analysis, 95,101
model tests, 159 Displacement, 11, 14
Bretschneider spectrum, 204 Double-pendulum, 344
Broaching, 149 Downtime, 363, 364, 367
Buoyancy force, 11, 12, 20 Dynamic
heel angle, 18, 89
response, 343, 347, 348,349,356
Capsize index, 364
stability, 7,12,18,41,92
Capsizing, 186
stability arm (lever), 13, 17
angle, 17, 18
modes, 265, 280
Education and training, 188
probability, 52,101,110,115,117,
128,152,167,290,301 Emergency response, 339
rate, 291, 294, 304 Emergency situations, 178
Casualty, 184 Encounter
records, 8,31,94,95,101,110,117, frequency, 243, 248,252
124 period, 239
spectrum, 247,251, 254, 270, 282
statistics, 320
Centre of buoyancy, 75, 136 Error
Centre of gravity, 19,28,57,59,70, 112 transmission, 343, 350, 351, 357, 358
Container ship, 180 type I, 299
Coupled equation, 219 type II, 299, 302
Coupling, 266, 288 Excitation, 218, 228
Criterion (criteria) external, 218, 228
parametric, 228, 235,265
space, 339
Cross-curves of stability, 13,22 Expert system, 324, 339
Crowding of passengers, 28, 41, 50, 62
Ferry, 186
Damage stability, 5, 6, 36 Fishing vessel, 288, 290
Folding frequency, 254
410
Free surface effect, 43, 49, 59 spectrum, 202, 204, 206, 257
Freeboard,4, 13,67, 133, 164 swell,212,215
Free-trim method, 14 ISM code, 360, 378, 379
Friction force, 320
Froude number, 237, 249, 256, 285 Knowledge base, 338, 339
Generalised metacentric height, 12, 13 Large roll, 219, 226, 228, 257
Gravity force, 11,59,307 Lashing of cargo, 187
Gravity waves, 191, 197 Load lines, 4, 6
Greenwater, 66
Guide-lines, 177
°
Longitudinal stability, 1
Loose goods, 64, 65
Loss of stability, 113, 114, 131
Heading angle, 239
Heeling moment, 15, 17,20,28,57, 76, Management system, 359
150,180,181,182,183,187 Marine environment, 191
anchor cable, 75 Maritime education and training (MET),
crowding of passengers, 62 379
deck-in-water, 163 Mathieu equation, 265, 272
fishing gear, 75 Measurement, 323, 328, 329, 342, 353,
free surface, 59 354,356
greenwater, 66, 67 Measuring error, 342, 349, 350, 351,355
icing, 61 Metacentre, 10, 11, 12
shifting of cargo, 65 Metacentric height, 7, 10, 11, 13,22,27,
suspended loads, 70 28,31,32,43,59,152,265,273
towing, 73, 74 Metacentric radius, 10, 11, 22, 60
turning, 70, 71 Model tests (experiments), 9, 51, 52, 83,
wind, 77,83,84,139 117,133,134,138,139,161,174
Human error, 379 breaking waves, 159
Human factor, 379 following seas, 164
Hydrostatics, 178 methodology, 133
open waters, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147
Ice accretion, 43, 45, 61, 62 Quartering seas, 156
Inclination test, 271 seakeeping/towing tanks, 149, 150,
Inertia force, 312 153,155,157
Inertia mass moment, 221 Moment balance, 187
Information technology, 178, 188 Motion stability, 113
Initial metacentric height, 11,43,49, criterion, 113
136,137 Lyapunov theory, 113
Initial stability, 10, 11
Intact stability, 39, 43 Natural roll period, 223
Intelligence system, 337, 339 Navigation, 359, 362, 365, 371
Irregular waves, 201, 206 Neural network, 339, 340
encounter spectrum, 247, 251, 254, Nonlinearity, 272
270,282 Non-linearity, 261, 264, 271
group, 237,258,270,282
significant height, 212
Subject Index 411
moments curve, 58
Operational Risk, 9, 34, 85,128,131,146,170
error, 321 assessment, 188, 359, 367
restrictions, 364 function, 125, 174
ship inclining (OS1), 329, 343, 355, Roll
357 acceleration, 306, 312
stability, 178, 183, 186 amplitude, 42, 86, 88
Oscillatory ship motion, 217 coefficient, 225, 227, 312
damping, 223, 230,231
Partial wave, 243, 248, 258 decay, 223, 224
Pendulum, 329, 344, 347, 348, 354, 356 equation, 220
Phase angle, 230, 250 excitation, 228
Potential energy, 179, 182, 183 experiment, 271
Probabilistic approach, 9, 52, 111, 168 inertia, 220
Probability distribution linear, 220, 228, 230
binomial, 293 motion, 177
Poisson, 293, 294 parametric, 371
Rayleigh, 207 restoring, 221
Pseudostatic angle, 68 small, 230
Pure loss of stability, 147, 149, 156, 164 synchronous, 371
velocity, 306
Ro-Ro ship, 186
Quartering seas, 228, 257
Routeing/Routing, 324, 334, 335, 336,
341
Radius of gyration, 221, 225
Random sea, 201
Safety
Random trials, 290, 296
assessment, 168, 170
Range of judgement, 361
envelope, 324, 336
RAO, 345, 347, 349
management, 322, 362, 379, 381
Rare event, 178, 278, 293, 294, 302
margin, 47, 268
Reaction, 218
measures, 178
Reading range, 348
region, 362
Regression analysis, 104
Scenarios, 183,360,374,382
Reliability analysis, 170
Seaway spectrum, 202, 204, 206, 254,
Resonance, 183, 186, 187
256,257
low cycle, 280, 282
Securing, 306,309, 316, 320
parametric, 228
Securing of cargo, 309
Response, 261, 287
Shifting of cargo, 63, 65, 181, 183, 186,
Reynolds number, 135, 136
319,320
Righting
Ship losses, 184
arm (lever), 11, 12,26,48,59,93,
Ship operation, 177, 178, 183
153,154,221,235
Ship-fixed direction, 309
arm of form, 12
Shipyard inclining (SY1), 355
arm of weight, 12
Short-term statistic, 202
arms curve, 13, 14, 153
Simulation, 247
moment, 12, 15, 17, 18,20,46,57,
SOLAS Convention, 5, 6, 49
180,221
412