11. GARCIA VS.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts: In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any
other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad
valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil
products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475
was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at
9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate
Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:

All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private
bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not
assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating
measures.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all
other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow,
however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures,
are prohibited to be exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.

Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President “subject to such limitations and
restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .” In this
case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.

12. ARANETA VS. DINGLASAN (THE FIRST EMERGENCY POWER CASE)

G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949

FACTS: This case involves Commonwealth Act 671, otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL
EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO
PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act.
Antonio Araneta is being charged for violation of EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential
buildings. Judge Rafael Dinglasan is the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the
Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He avers that EO 62, issued by virtue of CA No. 671, is null and void as the effect of
CA No. 671 granting emergency power to the president has already ceased. Three other cases were consolidated with
the case of Araneta. These are: 1.) L-3055, an appeal by Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which
controls exports in the Philippines; 2.) L-3054 filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds
pursuant to EO 225;
and 3.)L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo attacking EO 226 that appropriates funds to hold the national elections. All the
petitioners aver that CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect hence all E0s passed pursuant to it had likewise ceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has already ceased when Congress has met in session?

HELD: Yes. CA 671 became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and
that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the first regular session
of Congress instead of the first special session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving
effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general
legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate." Such acts were to be good only up to the
corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by
the National Assembly." Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in order to
continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal. Article VI of the Constitution provides that
any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been defined to mean "restricted; bounded;
prescribed; confined within positive bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or scope." It is to be presumed that
Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law repugnant
to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the
constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony
with the Constitution either. If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for the
delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was
intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law."
13. EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, SR., ETC., ET AL. vs. VICENTE GELLA, ETC., ET AL. (THE SECOND EMERGENCY
POWER CASE)
G.R. No. L-6266 February 2, 1953

FACTS: Eulogio Rodriguez, et. al. seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the first appropriating
the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for
relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities.
These EOs were issued pursuant to Commonwealth Act 671. Note that prior to Araneta vs. Dinglasan, Congress passed
House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his
perception that war is still subsisting as a fact.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EOs issued issued have no force and effect on the ground that they are violative of the
principle of separation of power.

HELD: Yes, the EOs are invalid. As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EOs issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be
rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world war
for which CA 671 has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit for the
emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing
bill the intent of Congress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For “while Congress
might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words,
it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to
be the law.” Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary
only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to
keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created under the Act is
coupled with interest.

14. PEOPLE vs. VERA

G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937

FACTS: This case involves the constitutionality of the old probation law. Respondent Cu Unjieng was convicted by the
trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the
lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221. Judge
Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However,
Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered
alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221,
which grants provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is
stated that it is applicable to a cities like Manila as it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if
Manila is covered by the law, it is unconstitutional because it is violative of the equal protection clause of the constitution.
It also avers that the said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards, thus it constitutes undue delegation of
power.

ISSUE: Whether or not Act 4221 or the old probation law is an undue delegation of legislative power on the ground that
there is no standard set by congress for its implementation.

HELD: Yes. There is undue delegation of power because there is no standard provided by Congress on how provincial
boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is
violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected
by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only
in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not
lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice
and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide
appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that
convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation.

15. US VS ANG TANG HO

Facts:

During a special session, the Philippine Legislature passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the
Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the
Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant
to this Act, the Governor General issued Executive Order 53 fixing the price at which rice should be sold.

Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty
centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the Executive Order. He was charged in violation of
the said Executive Order and was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00
fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.

Issues:

Whether or not there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.

Discussions:

By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and enact laws is vested
exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands. As to the question
here involved, the authority of the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold in
the manner power in violation of the organic law.

Act No. 2868, as analysed by the Court, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should
contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination
of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be
delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and
provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors
or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but
which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

Rulings:

Yes. When Act No. 2868 was analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes
the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the
sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not “any cause” for enforcing the act, and what
was and what was not “an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,” and under certain undefined conditions to
fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be
issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law
should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was “any cause,” or what was “an extraordinary rise
in the price of rice, palay or corn,” Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be
issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because
the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades
or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale “of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80)
which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53.”

16. PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR-GENERAL

G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965

FACTS: President Diosdado Macapagal, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code,
issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities. petitioner
Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, questioned the said EOs and petitioned the court
to restrain the Auditor General and his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds
in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. Petitioner alleges that said
executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No.
2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the 33 municipalities is null and void on the ground that the President has no power
to create municipalities.

HELD: Yes, the creation of the 33 municipalities is null and void as the power to create municipal corporations is solely
legislative in nature. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details
in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation
of powers, that said law:

(a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
— and

(b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform
in the performance of his functions.
Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the
essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable
certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate
upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures
inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers
and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the
power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by
the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.
17. Tobias v Abalos 239 SCRA 106 G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994

Facts:

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong.” Prior to the
enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative
district. The petitioners contend on the following:

(1) Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes from the "one subject-one bill" rule provided in the Constitution by
involving 2 subjects in the bill namely (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division
of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

(2) The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law
has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec.
5(1) of the Constitution.

(3) The said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the
minimum population requirements.

(4) That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec.
5(4) of the Constitution stating that “within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section

Issue:

WON the RA No. 7675 is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

The court ruled that RA No. 7675 followed the mandate of the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution
stating that each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution). Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a
highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.

As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the
Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of
250 members is not absolute with the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law."

As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect pre-empts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative
districts, it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49
thereof. Congress cannot possibly pre-empt itself on a right which pertains to itself.

Hence, the court dismissed the petition due to lack of merit.

18. Mariano v COMELEC

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995, 242 SCRA 211

FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita
Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante
Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo
Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as
unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one of the questioned sections
of R.A. No. 7854.

HELD:
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must
be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3)
the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on
the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many
contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in
said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these
contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual
case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this
abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has
no jurisdiction.
19. Montejo vs. COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first district of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of Section 1 of
Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of equality of
representation.

The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5 districts. The 3rd district is composed of:
Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango and
Villaba.

Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its subprovince by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 enacted
on 1959. Said section spelled out the municipalities comprising the subprovince: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran,
Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised therein.

On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and the subprovince of Biliran became a regular province. (The
conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite.) As a
consequence of the conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd district composed the new province of Biliran. A further
consequence was to reduce the 3rd district to five municipalities (underlined above) with a total population of 146,067 as
per the 1990 census.

To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province of Leyte,
respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent representatives of the province and other
interested parties and on December 29, 1994, it promulgated the assailed resolution where, among others, it transferred
the municipality of Capoocan of the 2nd district and the municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd district of
Leyte.

Issue:

Whether the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and reapportionment is
valid or not.

Held:

Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled and set aside.

The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission shows that COMELEC was denied the major power of
legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Regarding the first elections after the enactment of the 1987
constitution, it is the Commission who did the reapportionment of the legislative districts and for the subsequent elections,
the power was given to the Congress.

Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended to the 1987 constitution as the source of its power of
redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. Said ordinance states that:

Section 2: The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments to the reapportionment herein
made.”

Section 3 : Any province that may hereafter be created…The number of Members apportioned to the province out of
which such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so increases, is geographically located
shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one
hundred and twenty days before the election.

Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations per district. Examples include error in the correct name of a
particular municipality or when a municipality in between which is still in the territory of one assigned district is forgotten.
And consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the
respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power
granted by section 3 to the respondent is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities.)

Notes:

Petitioner also prayed for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the 1st district to the 2nd district. It is likewise
denied.
20. Romualdez-Marcos vs Commission on Elections

Facts:

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation
and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency.
Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for candidates for
the House of Representatives.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the Constitution

Held:

Yes. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of
petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months,
because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioner’s domicile of origin
by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual
removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and
acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the
domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because
the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos
in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming
that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband
died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her
domicile of choice

21. AQUINO vs. COMELEC

(248 SCRA 400)

FACTS

On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new
Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the
aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a petition for disqualification, he amended the entry on his residency in
his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections dismissed the petition on 6 May and
allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on a motion for reconsideration of the above dismissal,
the Commission on Election later issued an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved
the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack
of constitutional qualification of residence.

ISSUE

Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the
disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.

HELD

The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers
when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers
unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in
that community for electoral gain. Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (1992) election indicates that he was a
resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. Aquino’s
connection to the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The
intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying
one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his
claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to
acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati
City. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections.
22. CO vs. HRET

Facts:

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district are the petitioners, Sixto
Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and
not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

Issue: Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.

Held:

Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondent’s grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China and
established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan
was born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed with the court an application for
naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen.

In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose
Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during those elections.

Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father
were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural born citizens. Besides, private respondent did more
than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.

On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence
and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. To
require him to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The
Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements.

23. Dimaporo v. Mitra

FACTS:

Dimaporo was elected as a representative for the second legislative district of Lanao del Sur during the 1987
congressional elections.

Dimaporo filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of ARMM. Secretary and Speaker of the
House excluded the name of Dimaporo from the Roll of Members of HR Under Art IX of Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code. Dimaporo lost the election wrote a letter intending to resume performing his duties and functions as an elected
member of the Congress. Unfortunately, he was not able to regain his seat in the Congress.

Dimaporo contended that he did not lose his seat as a Congressman because Art. IX Sec. 67 of BP 881 is not
operative in the present constitution, and therefore not applicable to the members of Congress.

Grounds may be termed to be shortened:

1. Holding any officer or employment in the government or ant subdivision, agency, or instrumentality t
hereof.
2. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for a disorderly behavior
3. Disqualification as determined by a resolution of the electoral tribunal in an election contest
4. Voluntary renunciation of office
ISSUE: W/N Dimaporo can still be considered as a member of Congress even after he has filed for another government
position

HELD: No.

In the constitution there is a new chapter on the accountability of public officers. In the 1935 Constitution, it was
provided that public office is a public trust. Public officers should serve with the highest degree of responsibility and
integrity.

If you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who has mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office other
than the one he was elected to, then that clearly shows that he did not intend to serve the mandate of the people which
was placed upon him and therefore he should be considered ipso facto resigned.

The filling of a certificate shall be considered as an overt act or abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to the
people and he should therefore resign if he want to seek another position which he feels he could be of better service.
24. Jimenez vs. Cabangbang

FACTS:
On November 14, 1958, defendant Cabangbang published an open letter to the President in several newspapers
of general circulation in the Philippines. The publication talked about the alleged operational plans of the then Secretary of
National Defense to launch his presidential career in 1961 elections. Cabangbang's letter mentioned the names of
Nicanor Jimenes and his comrades as subordinates to the 'Planners' behind the alleged operation. They sued
Cabangbang for the crime of libel and sought financial compensation for the damages caused by the letter. The
defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the letter was a privileged form of communication and that
it was not libellous.

ISSUE:

Whether the contested publication could be classified as a privileged form of communication under the provisions
of sec. 15, Article VI of the Constitution.

RULING:

No. Under the provisions of sec. 15, Article VI of the Constitution, "speech or debate therein" only refers to the
utterances made by Congress members in the performance of their official duties, such as delivering speeches, making
statements, or casting votes in the Congressional hall while the same is in session. It could also refer to the introduction of
bills in Congress, whether it is session or not, and other acts performed by Congress members in their official capacity
whether there was a session or not, whether inside or outside the premises of one's office.

In the case at bar, the Court ruled that Cabangbang's letter cannot be classified as a privileged form of communication
because it was published during a time when the Congress was not in session. Moreover, the defendant was not
performing his official duty as either a member of Congress when he intended the letter to be published. Therefore, the
open letter was not privileged. Because of these reasons, Cabangbang's open letter cannot be classified as a privileged
form of communication.

25. Zandueta v. Dela Costa

NATURE
This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Honorable Francisco Zandueta against the Honorable Sixto de la
Costa to obtain from this court a judgment declaring the respondent to be illegally occupying the office of Judge of the
Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Fourth Judicial District, ousting him from said office, and holding that
the petitioner is entitled to continue occupying the office in question by placing him in possession thereof, with costs to
said respondent

FACTS
Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No.145, the petitioner, the Honorable Francisco Zandueta was
discharging the office of judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial District, comprising solely the City of Manila, and was
presiding over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of said city, by virtue of an ad interim appointment issued by
the President of the Philippines in his favor on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments of the
National Assembly-On November 7, 1936, the date on which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known as the
Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect, the petitioner received from the President of the Commonwealth a new ad
interim appointment as judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the
Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan-The National Assembly adjourned without its Commission on
Appointments having acted on said ad interim appointment-Another ad interim appointment to the same office was issued
in favor of said petitioner, pursuant to which he took a new oath-After his appointment and qualification as judge of first
instance of the Fourth Judicial District, the petitioner, acting as executive judge, performed several executive acts-On May
19, 1938, the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved the aforesaid ad interim appointment
of said petitioner-On August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines appointed the herein respondent, Honorable Sixto
de la Costa, judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and his appointment was approved by the
Commission on Appointments

ISSUE
WON the petitioner may question the validity of Commonwealth Act No. 145 to entitle him to repossess the office
occupied by him prior to the appointment issued in his favor by virtue of the assailed statute

HELD
When a judge of first instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance of a judicial district by virtue of a legal
and valid appointment, accepts another appointment to preside over the same branch of the same Court of First Instance,
in addition to another court of the same category, both of which belong to a new judicial district formed by the addition of
another Court of First Instance to the old one, enters into the discharge of the functions of his new office and receives the
corresponding salary, he abandons his old office and cannot claim to repossess it or question the constitutionality of the
law by virtue of which his new appointment has been issued.The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when
a public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by law, —which new office is
incompatible with the one formerly occupied by him — , qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by taking the
necessary oath, and enters into the performance of his duties by executing acts inherent in said newly created or
reorganized office and receiving the corresponding salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the office he was
occupying by virtue of his former appointment (46Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he cannot question the constitutionality
of the law by virtue of which he was last appointed (11 American Jurisprudence, 166, par. 121;id., 767, par. 123). He is
excepted from said rule only when his non-acceptance of the new appointment may affect public interest or when he is
compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies. In the case under consideration, the petitioner was free to accept or
not the ad interim appointment issued by the President of the Commonwealth in his favor, in accordance with said
Commonwealth Act No. 145. If the petitioner believed that Commonwealth Act No.145 is unconstitutional, he should have
refused to accept the appointment offered him or, at least, he should have accepted it with reservation, had he believed
that his duty of obedience to the laws compelled him to do so, and afterwards resort to the power entrusted with the final
determination of the question whether a law is unconstitutional or not.-The petitioner, being aware of his constitutional and
legal rights and obligations, by implied order of the law(art. 2, Civil Code), accepted the office and entered into the
performance of the duties inherent therein, after taking the necessary oath, thereby acting with full knowledge that if he
voluntarily accepted the office to which he was appointed, he would later be stopped from questioning the validity of said
appointment by alleging that the law, by virtue of which his appointment was issued, is unconstitutional. The petition for
quo warranto instituted is denied and the same is dismissed with costs to the petitioner.

26. Avelino vs Cuenco (G.R. No. L-2821)

FACTS: On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Tañada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to formulate
charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino. He requested to do so on the next session (Feb. 21, 1949). On
the next session day however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by
Tañada, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad and other Senators, Avelino was forced to open session. He however,
together with his allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Tañada from delivering his piece. Motions being
raised by Tañada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even ruled Tañada and Sanidad, among
others, as being out of order. Avelino’s camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad however
countered and they requested the said adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly
left his chair and he was immediately followed by his followers. Senator Tomas Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be
made of record — it was so made — that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent
upon Senate President Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session
in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate. Tañada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later,
Arranz yielded to Sanidad’s Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This was unanimously
approved and was even recognized by the President of the Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office
thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.

HELD: No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. This is in view of the separation
of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case
because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to
choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the
Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.

Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution?

There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a
minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al) twelve senators from
passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been
approved only by ten or less.

**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the USA.

Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning session (presided by Avelino)? Are there two
sessions in one day? Was there a quorum constituting such session?

The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced by the minutes entered into the journal. There
were 23 senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve senators
constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each
House” shall constitute a quorum, “the House” does not mean “all” the members. Even a majority of all the members
constitute “the House”. There is a difference between a majority of “all the members of the House” and a majority of “the
House”, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the
Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if
the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one
had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the
same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14, 1949)

Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance of the case and that they are willing to bind
themselves to the decision of the SC whether it be right or wrong. Avelino contends that there is no constitutional quorum
when Cuenco was elected president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee senators; one being confined and
the other abroad but this does not change the number of senators nor does it change the majority which if mathematically
construed is ½ + 1; in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only 12 senators when Cuenco was
elected unanimously there was no quorum.
The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent events
which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the result of the majority’s pronouncement on the quorum upon
the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the constitutional requirement in that regard has become a
mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in Cuenco’s election as
Senate President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such
formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the
Avelino’s persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, the SC believes that the
Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and that the majority’s ruling is in
conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has been legally elected
as Senate President and the petition is dismissed.

Justice Feria: (Concurring)

Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that “the majority of all the members of the National Assembly
constitute a quorum to do business” and the fact that said provision was amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as to
read “a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business,” shows the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to base the majority, not on the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on actual members or
incumbents, and this must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of
death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the house or for other causes which make attendance of the member
concerned impossible, even through coercive process which each house is empowered to issue to compel its members to
attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. That the amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and
not a mere oversight, or for considering the use of the words “of all the members” as unnecessary, is evidenced by the
fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original Constitution which required “concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the
National Assembly to expel a member” was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitution, so as to require
“the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House”. Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United
States and absent from the jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the Senate at its session of February 21,
1949, were twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.

27. OSMENA vs. PENDATUN

FACTS: In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”. In the said
speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was
passed by the lower house in order to investigate the charges made by Osmeña during his speech and that if his
allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.

Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmeña avers that the resolution
violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an
answer where he averred that the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to
discipline its members.

ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?

HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon members of the
legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the
legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the
courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the
legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein.
Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is dismissed.

28. Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs Sandiganbayan

FACTS: In January 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur filed a case against
Ceferino Paredes, Jr. (who was then the governor of the same province), Atty. Generoso Sansaet (counsel of Paredes),
and Mansueto Honrada (a clerk of court). The three allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment and of
the Transcript of Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no arraignment notice had ever been issued against
him in a criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification from the judge handling the case
himself that the criminal case against him never reached the arraignment stage because the prosecution was dismissed.
Atty. Sansaet on his part maintained that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies.
Paredes claimed that Sansaet only changed his side because of political realignment. Subsequently, the Office of the
Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of Public Documents. Paredes appealed but
was eventually denied by the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, may be suspended by order of the Sandiganbayan.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan,
despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of congress. The SC ruled:

“x x x. Petitioner’s invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution – which deals with the power of each House
of Congress inter alia to ‘punish its Members for disorderly behavior,’ and ‘suspend or expel a Member’ by a vote of two-
thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty
days – is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is
not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on
petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.”

29. United States vs Juan Pons

FACTS: Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived in
Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso
subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons’ house. On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25
barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs
officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since
the act of trading and dealing opium is against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently
importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381
was approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the
said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN
on February 28, 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed made a
law on February 28, 1914.

HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the recitals
in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of
the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and
the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.
Pons’ witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature.
The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the
court did not err in declining to go beyond these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in
this particular case.

30. Philippine Judges Association vs Pete Prado

FACTS: Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) to withdraw franking
privileges from certain government agencies. Franking privilege is a privilege granted to certain agencies to make use of
the Philippine postal service free of charge.

In 1992, a study came about where it was determined that the bulk of the expenditure of the postal service comes from
the judiciary’s use of the postal service (issuance of court processes). Hence, the postal service recommended that the
franking privilege be withdrawn from the judiciary. AS a result, the PPC issued a circular withdrawing the said franking
privilege.

The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed the circular and questioned the validity of Section 35 of RA 7354. PJA
claimed that the said provision is violative of the equal protection clause.

ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is valid.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The judiciary needs the
franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high expense allotted to the judiciary’s
franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the
judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing
the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other
departments. If the problem is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from
all agencies of the government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and
withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may
not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without
distinction (it is true that the postmaster withdraw the franking privileges from other agencies of the government but still,
the judiciary is different because its operation largely relies on the mailing of court processes). This might in fact
sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless
of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things
similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed
the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines
and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in
fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.
31. Robles v. HRET

FACTS

Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos were candidates for the position of Congressman
of the 1st district of Caloocan City in the last May 11, 1987 congressional elections. Petitioner Robles was proclaimed the
winner on December 23, 1987. Rep. Virgilio Robles elected to 1st Dist. of Caloocan. Romeo Santos then filed an elec.
contest w/ HRET (electoral fraud & irregularities) & called for re-counting / re-appreciation of votes. Santos, filed Motion to
Withdraw Contest but later filed Urgent Motion to Recall/Disregard his Previous Motion. 1 st Motion not acted upon by
HRET, 2nd Motion granted. Robles claimed that the 1st motion divested HRET of jurisdiction.

ISSUE

Whether HRET acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion thus giving the Supreme Jurisdiction
over the subject matter

RULING

The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested precincts, without any action on
the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. It is an established
doctrine that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the instance of the parties but continues until the case is
terminated. Certainly, the Tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective
only when the Motion is granted. To hold otherwise would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already
acquired. Petition is dismissed.

32. Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936

I. THE FACTS

Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the National Assembly of
the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the
election of those who have not been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the petitioner
before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral
Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not submitted on or
before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of
respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.

II. THE ISSUE

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed
against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the
National Assembly?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition.]

NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election
by resolution of the National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier
resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of the
National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might
prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the
exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to
limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty
enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In
the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the
Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

33. LAZATIN VS HRET

FACTS: Lazatin filed the instant petition assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to annul his proclamation after he had
taken his oath of office, assumed office, and discharged the duties of Congressman of the 1st District of Pampanga.
Lazatin claims that the HRET and not the COMELEC is the sole judge of all election contests. Buan, Jr., and Timbol
(Lazatin’s opposition), alleged that the instant petition has become moot and academic because the assailed COMELEC
Resolution had already become final and executory when the SC issued a TRO on October 6, 1987. In the COMMENT of
the Sol-Gen, he alleges that the instant petition should be given due course because the proclamation was valid. The
Telex Order issued by the COMELEC directing the canvassing board to proclaim the winner if warranted under Section
245 of the Omnibus Election Code," was in effect a grant of authority by the COMELEC to the canvassing board, to
proclaim the winner. A Separate Comment was filed by the COMELEC, alleging that the proclamation of Lazatin was
illegal and void because the board simply corrected the returns contested by Lazatin without waiting for the final
resolutions of the petitions of candidates Timbol, Buan, Jr., and Lazatin himself, against certain election returns.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRET’s jurisdiction.

HELD: The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due course to the petition. The petition is
impressed with merit because petitioner has been proclaimed winner of the Congressional elections in the first district of
Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and assumed his duties as Congressman. For this Court to take
cognizance of the electoral protest against him would be to usurp the functions of the House Electoral Tribunal. The
alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged
irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is
also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.

34. Firdausi Abbas et al vs The Senate Electoral Tribunal

FACTS: In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest against 22 candidates of the
LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11 (1987) congressional elections by the COMELEC.
The SET was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed
for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said election protest on the ground that all of them
are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due
process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas
suggested the following amendment: Tribunal’s Rules (Section 24) —- requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for
the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature —- is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the
remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt
resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for
disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members
who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas’ proposal could be given due weight.

HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself which,
in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and
powers.

“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall
be its Chairman.”

It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the Senate, the
Constitution intended that both those “judicial” and “legislative” components commonly share the duty and authority of
deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein
cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the
spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit
or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his
conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of
the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no
amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial
election contest.

35. Bondoc vs. Pineda 201 SCRA 792

FACTS:

In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for
the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest
in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of
the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member
is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of
the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he
was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for
allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the
decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the
House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the
HRET.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein, may change
that party’s representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an
election contest pending therein.

RULING:

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and
impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence,
disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In
expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly
on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of
Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of
expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman
Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are
entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore,
membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s
congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the
tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by
the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another.

36. Francisco I. Chavez v Commission on Elections

Facts:
This case was originally an urgent petition ad cautelam praying, among others, for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from proclaiming the 24 th highest senatorial
candidate.
On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a resolution in GR No. 104704. The above mentioned resolution was received
by respondent COMELEC on May 6, 1992 and on the same day, petitioner filed an urgent motion to disseminate through
the fastest available means and order said Election Officials to delete the name Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified
list of candidates tally sheets, election returns and count all votes in favor of Fransisco I. Chavez. But petitioner assailed
that COMELEC failed to perform its mandatory function thus the name of Melchor Chavez remained undeleted.
Petitioner prays not only for a restraining order but the judgment be rendered requiring the COMELEC to reopen
the ballot boxes in 80,348 precincts in 13 provinces including Metro Manila, scan the ballots for “Chavez” votes which
were invalidated or declared stray and credit said scanned “Chavez” votes in favor of petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition.

Ruling:
It is quite obvious that petitioner’s prayer does not call for the correction of “manifest errors” in the certificates of
canvass or election returns before the COMELEC but for the ballots contained therein. Indeed, petitioner has not even
pointed to any “manifest error” in the certificates of canvass or election returns he desires to be rectified. There being
none, petitioners proper recourse is to file a regular election protest which, under the constitution and the Omnibus
Election code, exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Thus, Sec. 17 Art. Vl of the constitution provides that “the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective members…” (Emphasis supplied). The word sole underscores the exclusivity of the tribunal’s jurisdiction
over election contest relating to their respective members. It is therefore crystal clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the instant petition. It is the Senate Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of
petitioner relating to the election of a member of the Senate.
As the authenticity of the certificates of canvass or election returns are not questioned, they must be prima facie
considered valid for purposes of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates.
Premises considered, the Court resolved to dismiss the instant petition for lack of merit.

37. Raul Daza vs Luis Singson

FACTS: The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a political realignment in the lower
house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by
Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in
the CoA which consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned such
replacement.

ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the composition of the Commission
on Appointments.

HELD: As provided in the constitution, “there should be a Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve Senators
and twelve members of the House of Representatives elected by each House respectively on the basis of proportional
representation” of the political parties therein, this necessarily connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to
it that the requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial
organization of the Commission but also subsequently thereto NOT the court.
38. Coseteng vs Mitra

Facts:

Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of Representatives under KAIBA, wrote to Speaker
Ramon Mitra to appoint her as a member of the Commission on Appointments (CA) and House Tribunal – a request
backed by nine congressmen.

Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12 congressmen to the CA and later on, added
Roque Ablan, Jr. as the twelfth member, representing the Coalesced Minority. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP)
was also organized as a party, prompting the revision of the House majority membership in CA due to political
realignments and the replacement of Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep. Singson (LDP).

Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (considered as petition
for quo warranto and injunction) praying that the Court declare the election of respondent Ablan, Singson and the rest of
the CA members null and void on the theory that their election violated the constitutional mandate of proportional
representation because the New Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats and members must be nominated and elected
by their parties. She further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA because of the support of 9 other congressmen
from the Minority.

The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political question, hence outside the jurisdiction of the
Court, was in consonance with the “proportional representation” clause in Art VI of the Constitution and that petitioner was
bound by the Majority decision since KAIBA was part of the Coalesced Majority.

Issue:

W/N the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional representation.

Held:

Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not because issue raised was a political question but because revision in
House representation in CA was based on proportional representation.

The composition of the House membership shows that there are 160 LDP members in the House, comprising 79% of the
House membership. This granted them a rounded-up 10 seats in the CA and left the remaining two to LP and KBL as the
next largest parties. KAIBA, being a member of the Coalesced Majority, is bound by the majority choices. Even if KAIBA
were an opposition party, its lone member Coseteng represents less than 1% of the House membership and, hence, does
not entitle her a seat in the 12 House seats in CA.

Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential because they are not members of her party and they
signed identical endorsements for her rival, Cong. Verano-Yap.

There is no merit in petitioner’s contention that CA members should have been nominated and elected by their parties
because of members were nominated by their floor leaders and elected by the House.

Jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled in Daza vs Singson in that the Constitution conferred the Court
with expanded jurisdiction to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has
been committed by the other government branches.

39. Guingona v. Gonzales

Facts:

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-
NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12
representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12
seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members
for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader,
nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should
represent the same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed
that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-
NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is
against proportional representation.
Issue:

whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s representation in the Commission on
Appointments

Held:

It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of
the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of
the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which
each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole
membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other party’s
fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the Commission on
Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because
it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional
representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced
the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for
every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has
only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with
each other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the
other party.

40. Jean Arnault vs Nazareno

FACTS: This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of the Buenavista
and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses called to be examined by the special committee created
by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a representative of
the vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said representative, at the same time
invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the
custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned “until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . .
the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection
therewith.” Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus

ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions in a congressional hearing in aid
of legislation.

HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to conduct inquiry in aid of
legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee may be
detained during the term of the members imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate the
witness’ right to due process of law.

41. Garcia vs. Mata

Facts: Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who was reversed to inactive status. He filed an action for mandamus
to compel the DND and AFP to reinstate him to active service and readjust his rank and pay emoluments.

Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status is violation of RA 1600 which prohibits the reversion of officers with at
least 10 years of service.

On the other hand, the AFP and DND contend that the said provision of RA 1600 has no relevance or pertinence to the
budget in question or to any appropriation item therein. (RA 1600 was an appropriation law for 1956-57).

Issue: Whether RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill?

Held: The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the relevance to any
appropriation item. RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the operation of government while Section 11 refers to a
fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the
AFP.
Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in violation of the
constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It was indeed a new and completely unrelated
provision attached to the GAA.

It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed in the title of the act.
When an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such
provisions are void, inoperative and without effect.

SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.

42. Demetrio Demetria vs Manuel Alba

FACTS: Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Manuel Alba,
then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget Reform
Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides
that:

“The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices
and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project
or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment.”

Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.

HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional
commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices
from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under the Constitution. It
empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually
savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the
fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor
thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.

But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the GAA may be allowed by
law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another here.

43. Philconsa vs Enriquez

FACTS

Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994.

GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the REalignment of Allocation for Operational
Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are the ones
authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of Congress themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain provisional conditions: that the
AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the pension funds under the Retirement and Separation
Benefits of the AFP.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.

RULING:
Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the realignment.
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings, and 2) the transfer is for the
purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer to be made.

As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of
the Constitution. The list of those who may be authorized to transfer funds is exclusive. the AFP Chief of Staff may not be
given authority.
44. Liga vs Comelec (copy from stat con)

45. Philconsa vs. Gimenez

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of Republic Act No. 3836 insofar as the same
allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives. PHILCONSA
now seeks to enjoin Pedor Gimenez, the Auditor General, from disbursing funds therefor.

According to PHILCONSA, the provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on
increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section
14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes “selfish class legislation” because it allows members and officers of
Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four
years of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree, while all other officers and
employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is
only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision
on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is
another attempt of the legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General, arguing for Congress, averred that the grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act
No. 3836 to the officers does not constitute “forbidden compensation” within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable vacation
and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely “in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring
member” and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3836 is constitutional.

HELD: No, the said law is unconstitutional. Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution, provides:

The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an
annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or
allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective district in the case of Members of the
House of Representatives and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of
the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law,
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation
of sixteen thousand pesos.

When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by
it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows:

No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the
National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase.

In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the
salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the
Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.

The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term compensation “other
emoluments”.

“Emolument” is “the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation for services or which
is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites.”

It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for
services of one possessing any office.

RA 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to take
effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available
thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of
the Constitution. RA 3836 is hereby declared unconstitutional by the SC.
46. Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance

FACTS: Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value
Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of
Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197
and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading
it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill
1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it
with the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the
text) of the HB”. (It’s ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)

ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.

HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with
the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the
Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there
were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue
and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The
proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if
Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

47. Tan vs. Del Rosario

Facts:

Petitioner seeks declaration of unconstitutionality of RA7496 (also known as Simplified Net Income Taxation) due to
violation of the following constitutional provision:

Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof.

Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive
system of taxation.

The petitioner stressed that it violates the equal protection clause as it only imposed taxes upon one who practice his
profession and not to those who are engaged to single proprietorship.

Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of . . . property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 7496 violates the aforestated provision of the constitution

Held:

The SC ruled in the negative. The said law is not arbitrary; it is germane to the purpose of the law and; applies to all things
of equal conditions and of same class.

It is neither violative of equal protection clause due to the existence of substantial difference between one who practice his
profession alone and one who is engaged to proprietorship. Further, the SC said that RA 7496 is just an amendatory
provision of the code of taxpayers where it classifies taxpayers in to four main groups: Individuals, Corporations, Estate
under Judicial Settlement and Irrevocable Trust. The court would have appreciated the contention of the petitioner if RA
7496 was an independent law. But since it is attached to a law that has already classified taxpayers, there is no violation
of equal protection clause.
48. Tobias vs. Abalos

Facts:

Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of the RA 7675 with title An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Same bill is now in
question at to its constitutionality by the petitioners by invoking their right as tax payers and residents of Mandaluyong.

With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to for the the conversion of Mandaluyong to a
highly urbanized city ratifying RA 7675 and making it in effect.

Issues:

WON RA 7675 is in:

1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one subject one bill rule".

2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number of members of the Congress to 250 and reappropriating
the legislative districts.

Ruling:

Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of constitutionality pertaining to Art VI 26(1)
saying "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such
requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."

As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was enforced justifying the act of the legislature to
increase the number of the members of the congress.

Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which drafted the bill reapportioning the legislative
district.

In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

49. Gonzales vs. Macaraig

FACTS: Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Cory’s veto of Section 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16
FY ’90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the President’s line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to
item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89) and
Section 16 (FY ’90) which are provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot
exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to
strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4)
the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and,
therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has
the President the power to veto `provisions’ of an Appropriations Bill.

HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly
enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as “item,”
which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules that
even assuming arguendo that “provisions” are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section
16 (FY ’90) were not “provisions” in the budgetary sense of the term, they are “inappropriate provisions” that should be
treated as “items” for the purpose of the President’s veto power.

50. Bengzon vs. Drilon

FACTS: In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were “repealed” during the
time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain retirement benefits to retired judges, justices,
and members of the constitutional commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize
retirement benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No.
16297) on the ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to certain or select government officials.

Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking the court to readjust their
pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of those
unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non
publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.

Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted
additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the allotment in the following manner: Congress
made an item entitled: “General Fund Adjustment”; included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different
brances of the government; among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.

However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the retired justices in the
judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.

This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the constitutionality of the veto
made by the President. The President was represented by then Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional.

HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to
Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the
Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors
much less to the repeal of existing laws.

The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any
item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining
portion of said item. It appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the others.
This cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an
entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not veto the entire line item of the general
adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other
items covering obligations to the other departments of the government.

51. Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas vs. Tan

Facts: These four (4) petitions seek to nullify Executive Order No. 273 issued by the President of the Philippines, and
which amended certain sections of the National Internal Revenue Code and adopted the value-added tax, for being
unconstitutional in that its enactment is not allegedly within the powers of the President; that the VAT is oppressive,
discriminatory, regressive, and violates the due process and equal protection clauses and other provisions of the 1987
Constitution.

The VAT is a tax levied on a wide range of goods and services. It is a tax on the value, added by every seller, with
aggregate gross annual sales of articles and/or services, exceeding P200,00.00, to his purchase of goods and services,
unless exempt. VAT is computed at the rate of 0% or 10% of the gross selling price of goods or gross receipts realized
from the sale of services.

The VAT is said to have eliminated privilege taxes, multiple rated sales tax on manufacturers and producers, advance
sales tax, and compensating tax on importations. The framers of EO 273 that it is principally aimed to rationalize the
system of taxing goods and services; simplify tax administration; and make the tax system more equitable, to enable the
country to attain economic recovery.

The VAT is not entirely new. It was already in force, in a modified form, before EO 273 was issued. As pointed out by the
Solicitor General, the Philippine sales tax system, prior to the issuance of EO 273, was essentially a single stage value
added tax system computed under the "cost subtraction method" or "cost deduction method" and was imposed only on
original sale, barter or exchange of articles by manufacturers, producers, or importers. Subsequent sales of such articles
were not subject to sales tax. However, with the issuance of PD 1991 on 31 October 1985, a 3% tax was imposed on a
second sale, which was reduced to 1.5% upon the issuance of PD 2006 on 31 December 1985, to take effect 1 January
1986. Reduced sales taxes were imposed not only on the second sale, but on every subsequent sale, as well. EO 273
merely increased the VAT on every sale to 10%, unless zero-rated or exempt.

Issue: Whether or not EO 273 is unconstitutional

Held: No. Petitioners have failed to show that EO 273 was issued capriciously and whimsically or in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It appears that a comprehensive study of the VAT had been
extensively discussed by this framers and other government agencies involved in its implementation, even under the past
administration. As the Solicitor General correctly sated. "The signing of E.O. 273 was merely the last stage in the exercise
of her legislative powers. The legislative process started long before the signing when the data were gathered, proposals
were weighed and the final wordings of the measure were drafted, revised and finalized. Certainly, it cannot be said that
the President made a jump, so to speak, on the Congress, two days before it convened."

Next, the petitioners claim that EO 273 is oppressive, discriminatory, unjust and regressive.

The petitioners" assertions in this regard are not supported by facts and circumstances to warrant their conclusions. They
have failed to adequately show that the VAT is oppressive, discriminatory or unjust. Petitioners merely rely upon
newspaper articles which are actually hearsay and have evidentiary value. To justify the nullification of a law, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication.

As the Court sees it, EO 273 satisfies all the requirements of a valid tax. It is uniform. A tax is considered uniform when it
operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject may be found." The sales tax adopted in EO 273
is applied similarly on all goods and services sold to the public, which are not exempt, at the constant rate of 0% or 10%.

The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or services by persons engage in business
with an aggregate gross annual sales exceeding P200,000.00. Small corner sari-sari stores are consequently exempt
from its application. Likewise exempt from the tax are sales of farm and marine products, spared as they are from the
incidence of the VAT, are expected to be relatively lower and within the reach of the general public.

The Court likewise finds no merit in the contention of the petitioner Integrated Customs Brokers Association of the
Philippines that EO 273, more particularly the new Sec. 103 (r) of the National Internal Revenue Code, unduly
discriminates against customs brokers.

At any rate, the distinction of the customs brokers from the other professionals who are subject to occupation tax under
the Local Tax Code is based upon material differences, in that the activities of customs brokers (like those of stock, real
estate and immigration brokers) partake more of a business, rather than a profession and were thus subjected to the
percentage tax under Sec. 174 of the National Internal Revenue Code prior to its amendment by EO 273. EO 273
abolished the percentage tax and replaced it with the VAT.

52. Abra Valley College vs. Aquino

FACTS:

Abra Valley College, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated with the SEC
filed a complaint to annul and declare void the “Notice of Seizure” and the “Notice of Sale” of its lot and building located at
Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties. Paterno Millare filed through counsel a motion to
dismiss the complaint. The provincial fiscal filed a memorandum for the government wherein they opined hat based on the
evidence, the laws applicable, court decisions and jurisprudence, the school building and the school lot used for educational
purposes of the Abra Valley College are exempted from payment of taxes. Nonetheless, the trial court disagreed because
of the use of the second floor by the Director of the said school for residential purpose. He thus ruled for the government
and rendered the assailed decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lot and building in question are used exclusively for educational purposes?

HELD:

NO. It must be stressed that while the court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase
“exclusively used for educational purposes” as provided for in the Article VI, Section 22, Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purpose. Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or lot
for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of the second floor of
the main building in the case at bar for residential purposes of the Director and his family, may find justification under the
concept of incidental use, which is complimentary to the main or primary purpose – educational, the lease of the first floor
thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the
purposes of education.

Under the 1935 Constitution, the rial court correctly arrived at the conclusion that the school building as well as the
lot where it is built, should be taxed, not because the second floor of the same is being used by the director and his family
for residential purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being used for commercial purposes. However, since only a
portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be return to the school involved.

53. same as no. 11

54. Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works

FACTS: In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 “for the construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road terminals”. Wenceslao Pascual, then governor of
Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for
the terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose
Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta
misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at
the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications be restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an
afterthought, donated the said property to the City of Pasig.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.

HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose. The subsequent donation of the
property to the government to make the property public does not cure the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was
passed when the said property was still a private property cannot be ignored. “In accordance with the rule that the taxing
power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public purposes
and not for the advantage of private individuals.” Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be
constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null
and void.

55. Aglipay vs. Ruiz

FACTS : The 33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic Church took place sometime in
1936. In commemoration thereof. then Director of Posts, Juan Ruiz, initiated the production of certain stamps the design
of which would have in their center a chalice, with grape and stalks of wheat as border design. Eventually, the stamps
were produced and some were sold pursuant to Act No. 4052, which provides for appropriation.

Gregorio Aglipay, the head of the Philippine Independent Church, assailed the production and sale of such stamps.
Aglipay contends that the funding of said stamps commemorative to a particular religious event is in violation of Sec 13,
Article 6 of the Philippine Constitution which prohibits the appropriation or usage of public money for the use or benefit of
any church or denomination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the production of the said stamps violate the Constitution.

HELD: No. The sale of stamps is not in violation of the Constitution. In fact, what was emphasized on the stamps was not
the religious event itself but rather the City of Manila as being the seat of such event. Act No. 4052 on the other hand did
not appropriate any public money to a religious event. Act No. 4052 appropriated the sum of P60,000.00 for the cost of
plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and merely authorizes the
Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount
appropriated in the manner indicated and “as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government”. The fact that
the fund is being used for such is only incidental to the function of Director of Posts and under his discretion.

On religious freedom

The Supreme Court noted however that the elevating influence of religion is recognized here as elsewhere. Evidence
would be our preamble where we implored the aid of divine providence to establish an ideal government. If should also be
further noted that religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not an inhibition of profound reverence to religion.

56. Guingona vs. Carague

FACTS:

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3
Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while
the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “ Amending Certain Provisions of
Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177,
entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by
PD No.1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its
Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.”

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher than
the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to “assign the
highest budgetary priority to education.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for
education.

HELD:

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to “assign the highest
budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it
the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can
reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country.
More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for
debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be
thereby assailed as unconstitutional.

57. Osmeña vs. Orbos

FACTS: Senator John Osmeña assails the constitutionality of paragraph 1c of PD 1956, as amended by EO 137,
empowering the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve the increase of fuel prices or impose additional amounts on
petroleum products which proceeds shall accrue to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) established for the
reimbursement to ailing oil companies in the event of sudden price increases. The petitioner avers that the collection on oil
products establishments is an undue and invalid delegation of legislative power to tax. Further, the petitioner points out that
since a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State,
although the use thereof is limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created. It thus appears that the challenge
posed by the petitioner is premised primarily on the view that the powers granted to the ERB under P.D. 1956, as amended,
partake of the nature of the taxation power of the State.

ISSUE: Is there an undue delegation of the legislative power of taxation?

HELD: None. It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of
the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF as a special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O.
137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the
fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply
with the constitutional description of a "special fund." With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the
Court finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products
provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general policy of the law to protect
the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose
additional amounts to augment the resources of the Fund.

58. MANOSCA v COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari, the Court is asked to resolve whether or not the “public use” requirement of
Eminent Domain is extant in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492-square-meter parcel of land so declared
by the National Historical Institute (“NHI”) as a national historical landmark.
Petitioners inherited a 492 sq.m. land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila. When the parcel
was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed
Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a national
historical landmark. It was approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, while the Secretary of Justice, in his
opinion on the legality of the measure, said in part that “the birthsite of the founder of the Iglesia ni Cristo, the late Felix Y.
Manalo, who, admittedly, had made contributions to Philippine history and culture has been declared as a national
landmark. It has been held that places invested with unusual historical interest is a public use for which the power of eminent
domain may be authorized x x x. it is believed that the NHI… may initiate the institution of condemnation proceedings for
the purpose of acquiring the lot in question in accordance with the procedure provided for in Rule 67 of the Revised Rules
of Court.”
In May 1989, the Republic, through the OSG, instituted a complaint for expropriation before RTC Pasig for and in
behalf of the NHI. At the same time, it filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate
possession of the property. The motion was opposed by petitioners. The trial court ruled in favor of the Republic.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public
purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987
Constitution. Motion was dismissed. Petitioners then lodged a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the expropriation of the land in the case at bar is for public use.
HELD:
YES. Petitioners ask about the so-called unusual interest that the expropriation of (Felix Manalo’s) birthplace
become so vital as to be a public use appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent domain” when only members of
the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit. This attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration,
for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise
of the power. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix
Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni
Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others
could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that
only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character
of public use.
All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be in accord with law and jurisprudence. The petition is
DENIED.

59. First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA

Facts: The Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amended provided that appeals from decisions of the Board of
Investments (BOI) shall be the exclusive jurisdiction of the CA. Just a few months after the 1987 Constitution took effect
(July 17, 1987), the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (EO 226) was promulgated which provided in Art 82 thereof that
such appeals be directly filed with the SC. The SC later promulgated, under its rule-making power, Circular No. 1-91 which
confirmed that jurisdiction of the CA over appeals from the decisions of the BOI. SC’s Second Division, relying on said
Circular, accordingly sustained the appellate jurisdiction of the CA in this present case. Petitioner now move to reconsider
and question the Second Division’s ruling which provided:

“….although the right to appeal granted by Art 82 of EO 226 is a substantive right which cannot be modified by a rule of
procedure, nonetheless, questions concerning where and in what manner the appeal can be brought are only matters of
procedure which this Court hast he power to regulate.”

They contend that Circular No. 191 (a rule of procedure) cannot be deemed to have superseded Art 82 of EO 226 (a
legislation).

Issue: Was the Court correct in sustaining the appellate jurisdiction of the CA in decisions from the Board of Investments?

Held: Yes. EO 226 was promulgated after the 1987 Constitution took effect February 2, 1987. Thus, Art 82 of EO 226,
which provides for increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC, is invalid and therefore never became effective for the
concurrence of the Court was no sought in its enactment. Thus, the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amended still
stands. The exclusive jurisdiction on appeals from decisions of the BOI belongs to the CA.

60. Diaz vs. CA

Facts:
On 23 January 1991, Davao Light and Power Company, Inc. (DLPC) filed with the Energy Regulatory Board
(ERB) an application for the approval of the sound value appraisal of its property in service.
The Asian Appraisal Company valued the property and equipment of DLPC as of 12 March 1990 at One
Billion One Hundred Forty One Million Seven Hundred Seventy Four Thousand Pesos (P1,141,774,000.00).
On 6 December 1992, ERB approved the application of DLPC after deducting Fourteen Million Eight
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P14,800,000.00) worth of property and equipment which were not used by DLPC in its
operation.
On 6 July 1992, petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court assailing the
decision of ERB on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
 In our resolution of 8 September 1992, the Supreme Court referred the case for proper disposition to the
Court of Appeals which subsequently dismissed the petition on the ground that (1) the filing of the petition for review
with the Supreme Court was a wrong mode of appeal, and (2) the petition did not comply with the provisions of
Supreme Court Circular 1-88 in that (a) it did not state the date when the petitioners received notice of the ERB
decision, (b) it did not state the date when the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, and (c) it inconsistently
alleged different dates when petitioners supposedly received the denial of their motion by ERB.

On 18 December 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that our resolution of 8
September 1992 was a directive for the Court of Appeals to disregard the above circular.

In its resolution of 24 March 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Issue:
whether or not E.O. No. 172 is violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution
Held:
Yes. Since Sec. 10 of E.O. No. 172 was enacted without the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court,
this provision never became effective, with the result that it cannot be deemed to have amended the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. Consequently, the authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases from the Board of
Energy, now ERB, remains.