CASE DIGEST: Krivenko vs.

The Register of Deeds, City of Manila

G.R. No. L-360 November 15, 1947

ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appelant, vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF

MANILA, respondent and appellee.

FACTS:

Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot in December of 1941. The registration was
interrupted by war. In 1945, he sought to accomplish the registration but was denied by the register of
deed on ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land within the jurisdiction. Krivenko appealed to
the Court.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land?
2. Whether or not the prohibitions of the rights to acquire residential lot that was already of private
ownership prior to the approval of this Constitutions is applicable at the case at bar?

RULING:

1. NO. Under the Article XIII, Section 1, of the Constitution states that: All agricultural, timber, and
mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations
or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any
existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established
under this Constitution. This means to say that, under the provisions of the Constitutions, aliens are not
allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all
acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the fundamental law became effective are
null and void per se and ab initio.

2. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which
granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity. It is to be observed that the pharase
"no land" used in this section refers to all private lands, whether strictly agricultural, residential or
otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been acquired by any of the means
provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in effect,
that no private land could be transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine
Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of,
or alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to acquire private land merely by way of
reciprocity.
Halili v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 113539, March 12, 1998
FACTS
Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real
properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow private respondent Helen
Meyers Guzman, and his son, private respondent David Rey Guzman, both of whom
are also American citizens. On August 9, 1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaim,
assigning, transferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests in
and over six parcels of land which the two of them inherited from Simeon.
Among the said parcels of land is that now in litigation Guzman then sold the
parcel of land to Catanaig, who is one of respondents in this case. Petitioners, who are
owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, questioning the constitutionality and validity of the two conveyances —
between Helen Guzman and David Rey Guzman, and between the latter and Emiliano
Cataniag — and claiming ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption
under Art. 1621 of the Civil Code. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The CA
denied the appeal of the Halilis.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the land is null and void.

HELD
No, because the prohibition in the constitution has already been served. Article
XII, Section 7 provides that Non- Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or
to lands of the public domain, In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private
lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession. While it
is true that the transfer of Helen of his right to her son who is an American citizen
contradicts the prohibition set forth in the Constitution, the Supreme Court upheld the
subsequent sale of the land to Catanig, a Filipino citizen. Jurisprudence is consistent
that “if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or
transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the
title of the transferee is rendered valid.”
The rationale of this principle was explained in Vasquez vs. Li Seng Giap thus
“[I]f the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as
construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation’s lands for future
generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by
making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by
naturalization. “
Petition was denied.
Case Digest: MULLER vs MULLER
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY; MULLER VS. MULLER
G.R. No. 149615, August 29,2006
Doctrine:
He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.
Facts:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg,
Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by respondent’s
parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent
had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the
purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house
amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner, Elena
Buenaventura Muller.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses
eventually separated.
On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. The court granted said petition. It also decreed the separation of properties between
them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those
acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that
it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot
recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the
Constitution.
The respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the RTC. It
held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not
acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It ordered the respondent to REIMBURSE the petitioner the
amount of P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000.00 for the
construction of the house situated in Antipolo, Rizal.
Elena Muller then filed a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.
Ruling:
No, respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.
Ratio Decidendi:
There is an express prohibition against foreigners owning land in the Philippines.
Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”
In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the property despite a constitutional
prohibition. And to get away with that constitutional prohibition, he put the property under the name of
his Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly what the fundamental law bars him to do directly.
With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity. It
has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which,
because of public policy, cannot be done directly.
REPUBLIC v. CA AND SPS. MARIO B. LAPIÑA AND FLOR DE VEGA, GR No. 108998, 1994-08-
24
Facts:
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a
total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the
time of the purchase, respondent spouses were then natural-born
Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land
before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no
longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian... citizenship through naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic... court a quo rendered a decision confirming private
respondents' title to the lots in question... petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the registration thereof in their favor.
It maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are presumed to be public lands under the...
principle that lands of whatever classification belong to the State under the Regalian doctrine.
before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the
land since it still pertains to the State.
Issues:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase
while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for
registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
Ruling:
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or through his
predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the... vendee/applicant has been in possession of the
subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title
has been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his possession.
respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
of the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937.
Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired
all the legal rights necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title.
open, continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts
the same to private property
This means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his predecessors-
in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and
(b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period
prescribed in the Public Land Act
Torrens system
It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership.
private... respondents were able to establish the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-interest.
Evidence was offered to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on the subject land and
introduced improvements thereon... certified true copy... of the affidavit executed by Cristeta Dazo and
her sister Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that the subject parcels of land were inherited by
vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her only sister Simplicia... a...
report from the Bureau of Lands was presented in evidence together with a letter from the Bureau of
Forest Development, to prove that the questioned lots were part of the alienable and disposable zone of
the government and that no forestry interest was affected... private respondents were undoubtedly natural-
born Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested
rights thereon, tacking in the process, the possession in the concept of... owner and the prescribed period
of time held by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act.
private respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the contested property, now occupied
by respondent Lapiña's mother.
"Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a... transferee of private lands, subject to
limitations provided by law."
"Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as his
residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide."
"Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has
the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to
a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the... case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of
rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the
privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not
exceed the... maximum herein fixed.
what governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his
Philippine citizenship remains... to be BP 185.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of the
properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there
could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by... respondents in view of what the
Constitution ordains.
The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain. They are already
private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and
exclusive... possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since
1937.
The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may
be a transferee of a private land up to a... maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in
case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens of the
Philippines.
For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant whether
private respondents are no longer Filipino... citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of
land in question. What is important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for registration
This decree of registration is the one that is submitted to the office of the register of deeds for issuance of
the certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior to... the issuance of the decree of registration, the
register of deeds has no participation in the approval of the application for registration of title as the
decree of registration is yet to be issued.
Principles:
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and
(b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period
prescribed in the Public Land Act
When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires
a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued
As such, the land ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the Director of
Lands to dispose of.
Chavez v PEA and AMARI G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002.
7/7/2010
0 Comments

Facts: On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating
PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop,
improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." On the same date, then President Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila
Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).

On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and
transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894)
square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands
known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City.

PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board of
Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos,
through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.

The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated
September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to
AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and
therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and
(3) the JVA itself is illegal.

On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a
Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The
members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, and the
Government Corporate Counsel. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions
reached by the Senate Committees.

On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for
Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to
AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28,
Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern.

Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on
"constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."

Issue: The issues raised by petitioner, PEA and AMARI are as follows:
1. Whether the reliefs prayed for are moot and academic because of subsequent events;
2. Whether the petition should be dismissed for failing to observe the principle of governing the heirarchy of courts;
3. Whether the petition should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies;
4. Whether petitioner has locus standi;
5. Whether the constitutional right to information includes information on on-going neogtiations BEFORE a final
agreement;
6. Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to AMARI of certain lands,
reclaimed and still to be reclaimed violate the 1987 Constitution; and
7. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the issue whether the amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the
government

Held: 1. We rule that the signing and of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the President
cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction.
 PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA
on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have
signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its
violation of the Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the government from alienating lands of the
public domain to private corporations. The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but one which seeks
to transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila Bay to a single
private corporation.

Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression being a wholly government owned corporation performing
public as well as proprietary functions. All previous decisions of the Court involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution, covered agricultural lands sold to private
corporations which acquired the lands from private parties.

Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition because of the possible
transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended
JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy percent proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as
the reclamation progresses, The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the entire reclaimed
area to raise financing for the reclamation project.

2. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. The Court
can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for
mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We
resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.

3. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands.
The law obligated PEA make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA failed
to make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated
contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure,
and was even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.

The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or
constitutional question. The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA
in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations. We
rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case.

The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with
its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information
on matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable
distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino Citizens.
The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public
domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.

4. Ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of
government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they
'immediately affect the social, economic and moral well being of the people.'

We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights — to
information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources — matters of transcendental public importance, the
petitioner has the requisite locus standi.

5. The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people's right to
information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution,
thus: “Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."

Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission understood that the
right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction." Certainly,
a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can
never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to
expose its defects.

Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly
disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli.

However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating
to the renegotiation of the JVA. 34 The right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which means the
opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the records, documents and papers at
his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public
records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and how to conduct the
inspection and copying.

6. Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is —
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is employed in some public
service, or in the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the
territory, and mines, until granted to private individuals.

Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In contrast, property devoted to
public service referred to property used for some specific public service and open only to those authorized to use the
property.Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to property not so
used but employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property constituted property of public dominion
although employed for some economic or commercial activity to increase the national wealth.

"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to the defense of the territory,
shall become a part of the private property of the State." This provision, however, was not self-executing. The
legislature, or the executive department pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer needed for public use or
territorial defense before the government could lease or alienate the property to private parties.

Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature

Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, shall be classified
as suitable for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural
purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter,
and not otherwise.

The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public lands for
non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for public service. This is the reason the government
prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties. The State always reserved these
lands for some future public service.

However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to classification as disposable public
agricultural lands, could only be leased and not sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874.

The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows
private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No. 141.

Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public
domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many
corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting
his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the
constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.
 PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands,
is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily fall under
the classification of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the
public domain are the only natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All other natural
resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters . . . owned by the State" forming part of the public domain, and are
inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is vested
with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water whether directly or through private
contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands
subject to the approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain.

Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make the
reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise,
the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.

There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No.
1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No.
525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." PEA's charter, however, expressly
tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands . . . owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government." 87 (Emphasis supplied) There is,
therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance with the PEA charter free from
constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.

Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code, the government
is required to sell valuable government property through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates that:...
"In the event that the public auction fails, the property may be sold at a private sale at such price as may be fixed by
the same committee or body concerned and approved by the Commission."

However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands and the additional 250
hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a
negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares. The failure of public bidding on December 10,
1991, involving only 407.84 hectares, is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double
the area publicly auctioned.

Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the alienable land of the
public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA.

The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not
automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the
public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of
public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will
become illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands of a
government agency tasked to dispose of public lands.

To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction
a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. This scheme can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public domain since PEA can
"acquire . . . any and all kinds of lands."

The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the
name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may
not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations.

7. Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on this last issue.
Besides, the Court is not the trier of facts, and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
Land Titles And Deeds Case Digest: Director Of Lands V. IAC (1986)
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and Deeds)

FACTS:
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano
and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land
possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan
land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to
members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the
alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements
ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the government
when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela
donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela
IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of
ISSUES:
W/N the land is already a private land - YES
W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations
applies- NO
HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
YES
already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is
not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the
courts, an application therefore is sufficient
it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency
of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said
patent.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law
2. NO
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally
sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must
also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural
lands in excess of 1,024 hectares