PCSO Board of Directors v. Lapid. G.R. No.

191940, 12 April 2011

Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Baguio City

EN BANC

PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES G.R. No. 191940

OFFICE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS and Present:
REYNALDO P. MARTIN,
Petitioners,
CORONA, C.J.,

CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,

VELASCO, JR.,

- versus - NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA,
MARIE JEAN C. LAPID,
Respondent. BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ,

MENDOZA, and

SERENO, JJ.
 Promulgated:
April 12, 2011

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office Board of Directors (PCSO) and Reynaldo P. Martin
against respondent Marie Jean C. Lapid (Lapid). The petition challenges: (1) the November 18,
2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) granting the petition and ordering the
reinstatement and retention of the respondent in the service until the expiration of her casual
employment, unless she had been earlier dismissed for cause in another case; and (2) the April
13, 2010 Resolution[2] denying the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners.

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

(as recited by the Civil Service Commission and adopted by the CA):

Marie Jean C. Lapid [Lapid], Casual Clerk (Teller), Philippine Charity

Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), Bataan Provincial District Office, Balanga,
Bataan, appeals the Decision of the PCSO, embodied in Board Resolution No.
340, Series of 2005, dated October 12, 2005, through the PCSO Board of
Directors, which found her guilty of Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duties
and Grave Misconduct and imposed on her the penalty of Dismissal from the
Service.

The appealed Decision reads, in part, as follows:

RESOLVED, that the Board of Directors confirms, as it hereby

confirms, the recommendation of the Assistant General
Managers for On Line Lottery and Administration, and OIC
Manager for Northern and Central Luzon, On Line Lottery
Sector, the termination of Marie Jean Lapid, as Casual-Teller
assigned at the Bataan Provincial District Office for
Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duties and Grave
Misconduct effective immediately subject to compliance with
applicable Civil Service rules and regulations.

xxxxxxxxx

Records show that the present case is rooted on the Sworn Statement executed by
Mr. Lolito O. Guemo, Chief Lottery Operations Officer, Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Bataan Provincial District on June 23, 2005. Said
Sworn Statement documented an incident which allegedly occurred on June 17,
2005, wherein respondent-appellant Marie Jean C. Lapid, Casual Clerk (Acting
Teller), confronted, badmouthed and shouted invectives at Mr. Guemo, in the
presence of other employees and patients seeking assistance from the PCSO-
Bataan Provincial District Office. The same document also included the filing of
an administrative complaint against appellant, which read, as follows:

8. That in view of the foregoing, I am filing an

administrative charge against Ms. Marie Jean C. Lapid,
designated Casual Teller for violation of civil service rules and
regulations for Misconduct; Discourtesy of official function (sic);

Guemos declaration in his sworn statement was also documented in the

Memorandum sent by the former to Josefina Sarsonas, then OIC Manager of the
PCSO Northern and Central Luzon Department, dated June 20, 2005. The said
Memorandum informed Sarsonas of the incident which occurred in the PCSO-
Bataan Provincial District Office on June 17, 2005. Pertinent portions of Guemos
Incident Report, are as follows:

The facts of the case are as follows: Ms. Jean Lapid was heard
crying for unknown reason. Minutes later, she confronted me at
the table of Mr. Manuel Arazas, SLOO Accountant while we are
discussing about the report to be submitted to the Commission on
(sic) Audit. I asked Ms. Lapid if she had a problem. Right then
and there, she shouted at me with patients around who were
seeking medical assistance. I told her to please calm down and
asked her to discuss her problem in front of my table. I tried to
give her a seat but she remained standing and again shouting at
me and saying something like these (sic), Tawagin ninyo na ako
sir na bastos wala akong pakialam at talagang bastos ako at
magkakabastusan na tayo dito. Inaamin ko na ako ay
bastos. Pero mas bastos ka sa akin dahil tinanggalan ninyo ako
ng telepono at iniusog ninyo ang mga lotto supplies malapit sa
teller booth para si Tracy Anne ay hindi makagtrabaho (sic)
doon. Pinapagamit ninyo sa kanya ang maliit na office table na
ayaw naman niya. Then she continued saying with high tone
without due respect to the undersigned and shouting bastos ka,
bastos ka, while she was finger pointing at me.

The foregoing incident report was also signed by six (6) employees of the PCSO-
Bataan Provincial District Office, as witnesses. The information contained in the
Incident Report and Sworn Statement of Guemo was also echoed in the incident
report of Security Guard Jayson M. Enriquez, who was assigned to the PCSO-
Bataan Provincial District Office at the time of the incident.

On June 20, 2005, Guemo sent a Memorandum to respondent-appellant Lapid,

requiring her to explain in writing within seventy two (72) hours why no
administrative charges should be filed against her as a result of the June 17,
2005 incident. Lapid was also furnished with a copy of the incident
report. On June 24, 2005, respondent-appellant submitted her reply to
Guemos June 20, 2005 Memorandum. In respondent-appellants reply she
denied the events, as stated in Guemos incident report, and gave her own version
of the incident. Lapid also alluded to the filing of a case against Guemo with this
Commission for harassment, insulting behavior, discourtesy and oppression.

The PCSO Legal Department, through Investigating Officer Atty. Victor M.

Manlapaz, sent a Memorandum to Lapid on June 27, 2005, asking the latter to
respond to the Affidavit-Complaint of Guemo. Respondent-appellant submitted
her Answer, with Comment and Motion and Motion to Dismiss on July 19,
2005. In her Answer, Lapid stated that Guemos complaint against her must be
dismissed on the ground that the said complaint does not conform to the
essential requisites prescribed by Section 8 of the Uniform Rules in
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. She also asserted that the
administrative offense of Discourtesy of Official Function does not exist under
Civil Service Rules. Complainant Guemo filed his reply to the Answer of
respondent-appellant on July 29, 2005.

On August 11, 2005, the Legal Department of the PCSO submitted its
recommendation to the PCSO General Manager and Board of Directors for the
issuance of the Formal Charge against respondent-appellant for Discourtesy in
the Course of Official Duties and Grave Misconduct. x x x.

xxxxxxxxx

The PCSO also submitted a copy of the Resolution of the Legal Department
signed by Atty. Victor M. Manlapaz, Investigating Officer, on the issuance of the
Formal Charge, as well as an unsigned copy of the Formal Charge, with PCSO
General Manager Rosario Uriarte as signatory. Both documents are dated August
11, 2005.

On August 31, 2005, Guemo, again, sent a Memorandum to Sarsonas, to report

an incident which occurred on August 31, 2005 involving respondent-
appellant. In the Incident Report, Guemo stated that on said date, between 4:10
to 4:20 in the afternoon, respondent-appellant, for no apparent reason or
provocation, painted over her name, the name of Tracy Anne Ventura and that of
Rolando S. Manlapid in the Organizational Chart of the PCSO-Bataan Provincial
District Office. During the said incident, respondent-appellant shouted within the
hearing of those present that Guemo ordered her to paint over the name of
Manlapid. She also shouted threats and invectives against Guemo. Another
incident involving respondent-appellant took place on October 6, 2005, where
the latter caused a scene in the office. The incident was again witnessed by her
co-employees and some of them also signed as witnesses in the Incident Report
that Guemo wrote to PCSO General Manager Rosario C. Uriarte.

In Resolution No. 340, Series of 2005 dated October 12, 2005, the PCSO Board of
Directors resolved to confirm the recommendation to terminate the services of
Marie Jean Lapid due to Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duties and Grave
Misconduct. Respondent-appellant received her Notice of Termination from
 Reynaldo P. Martin, OIC-Regional Operations Manager of the PCSO on October
17, 2005 with a copy of the PCSO Board Resolution which contained the board
decision to terminate her services.Respondent-appellant moved for
reconsideration of the said decision of the PCSO Board on October 20, 2005. The
same was denied on January 6, 2006.[3]

Lapid appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC, in its Resolution No. 070396
dated March 6, 2007, [4] dismissed respondents appeal. Thus:

Records clearly show that respondent-appellant was never formally

charged for the administrative offense of Discourtesy in the Course of Official
Duties and Grave Misconduct, for which she was dismissed from service. PCSOs
vain attempt to remedy their lapse with the submission of the copy of the
unsigned Formal Charge with their Comment must be censured. However,
PCSOs failure to observe due process is irrelevant in this present case and the
real issue for the Commissions determination is the termination of Lapids casual
employment.

Based on the status of Lapids employment [as] a casual employee,

this Commission finds this present appeal moot and academic and all proceedings
conducted pursuant to the aforementioned incidents, bereft of any legal effects.

The Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel

Actions which is implemented in CSC Memorandum Circular No., 40 (sic), s.
1998 provides a definition of a casual employment in Rule III, Section 2(f), to wit:

f. Casual issued only for essential and necessary services

where there are not enough regular staff to meet the demands of
the service.

Further, the fact that Lapid was employed by the PCSO as a casual
employee, means that she does not enjoy security of tenure. Lapids services are
terminable anytime, there being no need to show cause. Lapids allegations that
there is no substantial evidence to sustain the finding of her guilt for Grave
Misconduct and her dismissal from the service is irrelevant in the present case as
she is a casual employee, without any security of tenure. Hence, she may be
separated from service at any time(Erasmo vs. Home Insurance and Guaranty
Corporation, 38 SCRA 122).

This Commission, in RODRIGO, Filma A., CSC Resolution No. 011947

dated September 10, 2001, cited in LECCIO, Nemia E., CSC Resolution No. 030858
dated August 8, 2003, ruled as follows:

The fact that she was in the employ of the municipal

government as a casual employee, which she admitted in her
 appeal, means that she enjoys no tenurial security granted by the
Constitution. Her services are terminable anytime, there being no
need to show cause. Her invocation of alleged political
motivation or color underlying her ouster cannot afford her any
relief for the same does not alter the fact that hers was a casual
employment, devoid of security of tenure.

xxxxxxxxx

WHEREFORE, the present administrative case against Marie Jean C.

Lapid is hereby declared MOOT AND ACADEMIC. The appeal is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. [Emphases Supplied]

Respondent Lapid moved for a reconsideration. Her motion was, however, denied by the
CSC in its Resolution No. 071401 dated July 24, 2007.[5]

Aggrieved, Lapid filed a petition for review (under Rule 43) before the CA presenting the sole
issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION IS CORRECT IN

RULING INSTEAD ON THE STATUS OF THE APPELLANTS CASUAL
EMPLOYMENT ANDNOT ON THE ISSUE OF NON-OBSERVANCE OF DUE
PROCESS IN THE TERMINATION OF APPELLANTS SERVICES. [6]

Lapid claimed that the CSC erred in denying her appeal on the ground that she was a casual
employee who was without any security of tenure x x x and may be separated from service at any
time. She argued that the CSC should have decided her appeal on the merits and resolved the
issue of whether or not her termination from service was executed with due process. She further
averred that No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except
for cause as provided by law and after due process.[7]

The CA agreed with Lapid. The CA ruled that while it was previously held that casual employees
were not protected by security of tenure as they may be removed from the service with or
without cause, a recent case decided by the Court held otherwise. In the said case, entitled, Re:
Vehicular Accident involving SC Shuttle Bus No. 3 with Plate No. SEG-357 driven by Gerry B.
Moral, Driver II-Casual,[8] the Court ruled that since there was no evidence supporting the
charge against the respondent therein, it could not sustain his recommended dismissal on the
mere ground that he was a casual employee, for even a casual or temporary employee enjoys
security of tenure and cannot be dismissed except for cause enumerated in Sec. 22, Rule XIV of
the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations and other pertinent laws.[9] Absent, therefore, a
proven cause to dismiss, the CA held that Lapid was dismissed without cause as contemplated in
law.

Regarding the question of due process, Lapid argued that she was denied her right thereto
because the charges against her were not duly proven. The supposed Formal Charge was
unsigned and, worse, it was not served on her. No formal investigation was ever conducted on
her case.[10]

The CA again ruled for Lapid and held that she was denied due process. The dispositive portion
of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition

is GRANTED. Petitioner is ordered REINSTATED and RETAINED in the service
until the expiration of her casual employment, unless she has been earlier
dismissed for cause in another case.

SO ORDERED.[11]

Not in conformity, petitioners now seek relief from this Court via this petition anchored
on the sole ground that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GRANTING

RESPONDENTS PETITION, IN EFFECT, REVERSING THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSIONS RESOLUTIONS.[12]

Preliminarily, there is a need to ascertain the meaning and essence of the term casual
employee. As stated in Rule III, Section 2(f) of the Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other
Personnel Actions:

f. Casual issued only for essential and necessary

services where there are not enough regular staff to meet
the demands of the service.

Notably, the Plantilla of Casual Appointment appears and reads as follows:

 CSC Form No. 001
(Revised 1991)

Republic of the Philippines

____________________________
_____________________

PLANTILLA OF CASUAL APPOINTMENT

Source of Funds:_________________
Department/Division: _________ Date Prepared by HRMO: ___________

If Renewal
Name of Position Level SG Daily Period of Employment (indicate dates of
Appointee/s Wage previous
employment)
From To

The abovenamed personnel are hereby hired/appointed as casuals at the rate of compensation stated
opposite their/his name(s) for the period indicated. It is understood that such employment will cease
automatically at the end of the period stated unless renewed. Any or all of them may be laid-off any
time before the expiration of the employment period when their services are no longer needed or funds
are no longer available or the project has already been completed/finished or their performance are
below par.
________________________________________________________________________

CERTIFICATION CSC ACTION:

This is to certify that all requirement and supporting _______ Approved

papers pursuant to CSC MC No. 40, s. 1998, as amended, _______ Disapproved
have been complied with, reviewed and found in order.

_____________________
HRMO
APPOINTING AUTHORITY:

______________________ ____________________
Name/Position Head CSC Field Officer

______________________ ____________________
Date Date Signed
[Emphasis Supplied]

Thus, by the nature of their employment, casual employees were deemed to be not
covered by the security of tenure protection as they could be removed from the service at
anytime, with or without cause. Then came the recent case of Moral,[13] which was the basis of
the CA Decision where the Court resolved the issue of whether or not a shuttle bus driver could
be terminated from his casual employment without cause. Pertinent portions of the said en
banc Resolution reads:

Article IX (B) of the Constitution

Sec. 2. x x x

(3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or

suspended except for cause provided by law.
xxx

(6) Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such

protection as may be provided by law.

The Civil Service Law

Sec. 46. Discipline: General Provisions. (a) No officer or employee in the

Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law
after due process.

Further, Civil Aeronautics Administration v. IAC held that the mantle of

protection against arbitrary dismissals is accorded to an employee even if he is a
non-eligible and holds a temporary appointment.
Hence, a government employee holding a casual or temporary
employment cannot be terminated within the period of his employment except for
cause. [Emphases supplied]
 The Court further stated in Moral that since there was no evidence supporting the charge
of gross neglect of duty on the part of respondent, the recommendation of the Office of
Administrative Services (OAS) for his dismissal on the ground that he was a mere casual
employee could not be sustained. The Court wrote that:

x x x. Even a casual or temporary employee enjoys security of tenure

and cannot be dismissed except for cause enumerated in Sec. 22, Rule
XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations and other
pertinent laws. [Emphasis Supplied]

Despite this new ruling on casual employees, it is not the intention of the Court to make
the status of a casual employee at par with that of a regular employee, who enjoys permanence of
employment.[14] The rule is still that casual employment will cease automatically at the end of the
period unless renewed as stated in the Plantilla of Casual Employment. Casual employees may
also be terminated anytime though subject to certain conditions or qualifications with reference
to the abovequoted CSC Form No. 001. Thus, they may be laid-off anytime before the expiration
of the employment period provided any of the following occurs: (1) when their services are no
longer needed; (2) funds are no longer available; (3) the project has already been
completed/finished; or (4) their performance are below par.

Equally important, they are entitled to due process especially if they are to be removed
for more serious causes or for causes other than the reasons mentioned in CSC Form No.
001. This is pursuant to Section 2, Article IX(B) of the Constitution and Section 46 of the Civil
Service Law. The reason for this is that their termination from the service could carry a penalty
affecting their rights and future employment in the government.

In the case at bench, the action of petitioners clearly violated Lapids basic rights as a
casual employee. As pointed out by the CSC itself, Lapid was NEVER formally charged with the
administrative offenses of Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duties and Grave Misconduct.
According to the CSC, the Formal Charge, was even unsigned, and it categorically stated that
PCSO failed to observe due process.[15]

Lapid moved for the reconsideration of Resolution No. 340.[16] In Resolution No. 401,
Series of 2005,[17] the Board of Directors of PCSO, upon the recommendation of the Assistant
General Manager for Online Lottery Sector and the Manager of the Northern and Central Luzon,
denied said motion for reconsideration. It was only in the said resolution that it
was belatedly stated that her services was no longer needed per the list of Plantilla of Casual
Appointment. This was an empty statement, however, as this was not substantiated.

Section 3(2), Article XIII of the Constitution guarantees the rights of all workers not just
in terms of self-organization, collective bargaining, peaceful concerted activities, the right to
strike with qualifications, humane conditions of work, and a living wage but also to security of
tenure. Likewise, Section 2(3), Article IX-B of the Constitution provides that no officer or
employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by
law.[18] Apparently, the Civil Service Law echoes this constitutional edict of security of tenure of
the employees in the civil service. Thus, Section 46 (a) of the Civil Service Law provides
that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for
cause as provided by law after due process.[19] [Emphases supplied]

As earlier stated, the CSC itself found that Lapid was denied due process as she
was never formally charged with the administrative offenses of Discourtesy in the Course of
Official Duties and Grave Misconduct, for which she was dismissed from the service. To
somehow remedy the situation, the petitioners mentioned in their Memorandum before the CA
that there was no reason anymore to pursue the administrative charge against Lapid and to
investigate further as this was superseded by Memorandum dated September 14, 2005
recommending the termination of respondent Lapids casual employment. They pointed out that
this was precisely the reason why no Formal Charge was issued.

The September 14, 2005 Memorandum, however, was not an action independent of the
administrative case which dispensed with the filing of a Formal Charge. The CA even quoted
pertinent portions of the said Memorandum. Thus:

Subject: Termination of Services of Ms. Marie Jean C. Lapid

This is with reference to the two (2) complaints for multiple acts of Grave
Misconduct and Discourtesy in the Course of official Duty filed by Mr. Lolito O.
Guemo, CLOO, Bataan PDO against Ms. Marie Jean C. Lapid, casual employee of
PDO Bataan.

1.) The 1st complaint was the subject of Memorandum

dated August 11, 2005 of Legal Department recommending
the filing of Formal Charge against subject employee for
Discourtesy in the Course of Duties and Grave Misconduct
 committed on June 17, 2005. The Memo was forwarded to
your office [on] August 18, 2005; and

2.) The 2nd complaint dated August 31, 2005 for Grave
Misconduct and Discourtesy in the Course of official duties
was filed against the same employee by the CLOO of Bataan
PDO for disciplinary action.

As an immediate disciplinary action for her wanton behavior in the

performance of duties and obligations which constitute violation of office and
civil service rules, we respectfully recommend that her services as casual
employee be terminated.[20]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, respondent Marie Jean C. Lapid

is hereby allowed to continue rendering services as Casual Clerk (Teller) of the PCSO, Bataan
Provincial District Office, Balanga City, Bataan, until the end of the term of her temporary
employment unless she is earlier dismissed for cause in another case and after due process. She
is also entitled to payment of backwages from the date of dismissal until the date of actual
reinstatement. However, if the term of her employment has already expired, backwages shall be
computed from the date of dismissal until the end of her period of employment under the terms
of her contract as a casual employee.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 48-63. Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, with Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Associate
Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, concurring.
[2]
Id. at 65.
[3]
Id. at 49-53.
[4]
Id. at 96-104.
[5]
Id. at 106-112.
[6]
Id. at 55.
[7]
Id.
[8]
A.M. No. 2008-13-SC, November 19, 2008, 571 SCRA 352.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 57-58.
[10]
Id. at 58.
[11]
Id. at 63.
[12]
Id. at 36.
[13]
Supra note 8.
[14]
See Batangas State University v. Bonifacio, G.R. No. 167762, December 15, 2005, 478 SCRA 142, 148.
[15]
See rollo, p. 103.
[16]
Id. at 70-72.
[17]
Id. at 73.
[18]
See also Civil Service Commission v. Magnaye, Jr., G.R. No. 183337, April 23, 2010.
[19]
Rollo, p. 73.
[20]
Id. at 22-23
Article IX-B, Section 3

B. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the
Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote
morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the
civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human
resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a
management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the
President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.
Pastor v. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 146873, May 9, 2002
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 146873. May 9, 2002]

REMEDIOS PASTOR, petitioner, vs. CITY OF PASIG, MAYOR VICENTE

EUSEBIO, THE COURT OF APPEALS (15th Division), and the CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Remedios Pastor is Budget Officer of the Municipality (now City) of Pasig. In
1992, she was reassigned to the Office of the Municipal Administrator pending investigation of
reports against her concerning the issuance of Advice of Allotments by her. In 1995, after three
years with no case filed against her, she asked for reinstatement to her former position. But she
was instead reassigned to another unit of the now city government. Upon her complaint, the Civil
Service Commission ordered her reinstatement as Budget Officer of the City of Pasig. However,
on appeal of the city government, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). Hence this petition for certiorari.
The question is whether the decision of the Court of Appeals should be set aside and that of
the CSC reinstated. We answer the question in the affirmative.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Remedios Pastor was appointed Budget Officer of the then Municipality (now
City) of Pasig on May 1, 1986. Her appointment was confirmed by the Department of Budget
and Management on July 17, 1987.
On July 6, 1992, the newly-elected Mayor of Pasig, Vicente P. Eusebio, issued a
memorandum relieving petitioner from her position as Municipal Budget Officer and reassigning
her to the Office of the Municipal Administrator of Pasig. The Mayors order stated:

In view of the adverse report of the Committee on Budget that you issued Advice of
Allotments without sufficient cash collections and pending thorough investigation
there[on], you are hereby relieved of your position as Municipal Budget Officer and
temporarily detailed [sic][1] with the Office of the Municipal Administrator.

Upon receipt hereof, you are hereby directed to turn over all records, properties, and
responsibilities to MR. EDENISON FAINSAN who is hereby designated as Officer-
In-Charge, Municipal Budget Officer.
In this connection, you are hereby ordered to report to the Office of the Municipal
Administrator for temporary assignment.

This order is issued in the interest of public service and shall take effect
immediately.[2]

On March 6, 1995, Mayor Eusebio issued another memorandum (Memorandum Order No.
06-95) directing petitioner to conduct an in-depth evaluation/study of the operations of the Pasig
City Hall Annex.[3]
Alleging that since her relief as Budget Officer, no investigation had been conducted
regarding the charge that she had issued Advice of Allotments without sufficient cash
collections, petitioner filed on October 20, 1995 a complaint with the CSC.[4] She contended that
her protracted detail to the Office of the City Administrator and the deletion of her name from
the payroll for the City Budget Office for the period October 1-15, 1995 were in violation of
Civil Service laws, rules, and regulations and that they constituted oppression and abuse of
authority on the part of Mayor Eusebio. Petitioner prayed for her reinstatement as City Budget
Officer of Pasig and for an order enjoining Mayor Eusebio from designating another person to
that petition.
On December 6, 1995, Pasig City Administrator Atty. Reynaldo P. Dionisio issued a
memorandum directing petitioner in the exigency of the service, in addition to your present
duties, to [conduct a] study on how to improve budgeting and disbursement procedures of city
funds, as well as [a] study on how to enhance the revenue of the city in preparation [for] the
adverse effects of the Supreme Court Ruling on Realty Tax against the City of Pasig.[5]
In his comment[6] on petitioners complaint before the CSC, respondent City Mayor alleged,
among other things, that petitioner had been reassigned to the Office of the Municipal (now City)
Administrator in view of her long years of experience in finance and [that she had been] tasked
to conduct studies best suited to her qualifications; that instead of being suspended for issuing
Advice of Allotments without sufficient cash collections, she was reassigned for her professional
productive growth [and for the benefit] of the city; that her reassignment was in the best interest
of the service and did not involve any diminution of salary or rank as a department head; and that
the deletion of petitioners name from the payroll for October 15, 1995 was due to a management
directive that every personnel should be in the payroll of actual office assignment and that in fact
petitioner received her salary for that period and continued to receive the salary and benefits
attached to her position.
In its Resolution No. 96-1190, dated February 5, 1996, the CSC ordered:

WHEREFORE, the appeal of Remedios Pastor is hereby found meritorious. She

should already be returned to her former position or assigned to an office where she
can perform as head of a department.[7]

The CSC held that, while petitioners reassignment was originally made in the exigency of the
service without reduction in her rank, status, or salary, respondent City Mayor failed to advance
sufficient reason to warrant petitioners continuous reassignment for more than three years which
appears too long for one to conduct the study assigned to her.
Respondent City of Pasig did not ask for reconsideration of Resolution No. 96-
1190. Instead, apparently in compliance with the same, it designated petitioner head of the Pasig
City Hall Annex, Karangalan, Pasig City. But petitioner was not satisfied. She asked the CSC for
a clarification of its Resolution. She alleged that there was no position of Head of Pasig City Hall
Annex in the plantilla of the city government nor an ordinance creating the Office of Pasig City
Hall Annex which, she claimed, was in fact just a small bungalow-type building located at
Karangalan Village, Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City, manned by one (1) representative each
from about five (5) departments who report directly to their respective Department Heads at the
Pasig City Hall. Hence, there was really nothing for her to oversee.
In its Resolution No. 97-2845,[8] dated May 20, 1997, the CSC found petitioners
reassignment to the Pasig City Hall Annex to be not in compliance with its decision. It held that
the so-called Pasig City Hall Annex was not a department of the City Government of Pasay but a
mere extension of the City Hall. The CSC also cited the fact that under Municipal Ordinance No.
01-92 of the City, it was the Vice-Mayor who was Officer-in-Charge of the extension office. The
CSC ordered further reassignments of petitioner to other offices be stopped since [she] has been
out of her official station as Budget Officer for such a long time.
Respondent Mayor Eusebio moved for a reconsideration, arguing that (1) the Pasig City Hall
Annex was, for all intents and purposes, a department of the Pasig local government and (2)
Municipal Ordinance No. 01-92 had been amended and now provides that the officer-in-charge
of the Pasig City Hall Annex shall be either the Vice-Mayor or a department head or official of
equivalent rank.[9] His motion was denied, however, by the CSC in its Resolution No. 99-
0200.[10] The CSC held that the position of Head of the Pasig City Hall Annex was not equivalent
to the position of City Budget Officer because the Annex was not a line department.
Petitioner then wrote Mayor Eusebio informing him of her intention to resume her duties as
City Budget Officer.[11] She was advised, however, to wait because the city government intended
to appeal the decision of the CSC.[12]
Respondent City of Pasig then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition, denominated for
writ of certiorari, under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, impleading only the Civil
Service Commission as respondent. On January 15, 1999, the appeals court rendered a
decision,[13] the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolution (No. 99-0200) of the Civil Service

Commission dated January 15, 1999 is SET ASIDE and RECALLED.

The appeals court held that petitioners reassignment, first to the Office of the Municipal (now
City) Administrator and later as head of the Pasig City Hall Annex, was a valid exercise of the
extraordinary powers of the respondent City Government. It pointed out that the reassignment to
the Office of the Municipal Administrator was only temporary in nature and that, in designating
petitioner as head of the City Hall Annex, the city government had substantially complied with
Resolution No. 96-1190 of the CSC:
The City Hall Annex was a creation of Municipal Ordinance (No. 01-92) dated
January 22, 1992 to bring the services of the government expeditiously and efficiently
to the residents of Manggahan, Dela Paz, and Santolan, Pasig City. There was no
reduction of [petitioners] rank, status, or salary. The officer-in-charge shall either be
the Vice-Mayor [or] a department head or official of equivalent rank (Ordinance No.
22, Series of 1997. See: Annex D) It is, according to [respondents], a small version of
the Pasig City Hall. [Petitioners] power was that of a department head exercising
general supervision, direction, and control over the operations of the postal services,
library, Office of the Civil Registry, Police Headquarters, Offices of the Treasurer and
Assessor, Engineering and Building Office [and the] Community Relation and
Information Office. She was to oversee the payment of fees/revenues and
communication facilities, and provided with sufficient funds for its operation and
maintenance. (Municipal Ordinance No. 01-92, Annex E, Petition) [Respondents]
therefore had advanced sufficient reasons to warrant [petitioners] assignment as head
of the Pasig City Hall Annex in Manggahan, Pasig City pursuant to resolution No. 96-
1190.[14]

On January 29, 2001, the Court of Appeals denied the CSCs motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the same is not allowed under its internal
rules.[15]
Petitioner filed this petition alleging that 
I. THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN
IT HAD TAKEN COGNIZANCE AND PASSED JUDGMENT ON THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSIONS ORDER PARTICULARLY CSC RES. NO. 990200, WHICH WAS A
MERE CLARIFICATORY ORDER OF CSC RESOLUTION NO. 961190 WHICH HAD
LONG ATTAINED FINALITY AND EXECUTORY CHARACTER AFTER THE LAPSE
OF THE 15-DAY REGLEMENTARY PERIOD AND NO [MOTION FOR]
RECONSIDERATION WAS EVER FILED BY THE RESPONDENT CITY OF PASIG -
AND THUS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE LATTERS OBLIGATION (COMPELLABLE
BY MANDAMUS) TO COMPLY WITH THE SUBJECT CSC RESOLUTIONS.
II. THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE RESPONDENT CITY OF
PASIG NOT BEING THE PERSON ADVERSELY AFFECTED [BY] THE CSC
RESOLUTION NO. 961190 AND OTHER CLARIFICATORY RESOLUTIONS HAS NO
RIGHT NOR PERSONALITY TO APPEAL AND/OR ASSAIL VIA CERTIORARI IN
SAID CA-G.R. S.P. NO. 51098 ASSAILING THE CSC RESOLUTIONS/ORDER FOR
THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER TO HER PREVIOUS
POSITION AS CITY BUDGET OFFICER.
III. WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO GROUND NO. 2, ABOVE STATED, THE RESPONDENT
COURT OF APPEALS HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DID NOT
DISMISS RESPONDENT CITY OF PASIGS PETITION IN C.A. G.R. S.P. NO. 51098
FOR FAILURE TO IMPLEAD AND/OR EVEN JUST FURNISH A COPY TO THE
 HEREIN PETITION OF THEIR SAID PETITION DESPITE THE FACT THAT
PETITIONER IS A NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE PARTY [WHICH
CONSTITUTES] A GROSS VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS.[16]
Petitioner prays that the decision of the Court of Appeals be set aside and that a writ of
mandamus be issued for the enforcement of CSC Resolution Nos. 96-1190, 97-2845, and 99-
0200.
The Court finds for petitioner Remedios Pastor.
Appeals from the decisions or final orders of the Civil Service Commission to the Court of
Appeals should be by a petition for review pursuant to Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. As provided by 5 thereof, a copy of the petition should be served on the adverse party
and on the Civil Service Commission. Section 6(a) provides that the petition should state the full
names of the parties to the case without impleading the Civil Service Commission either as
petitioner or respondent. Section 7 provides that the failure of the petitioner to comply with any
of the foregoing requirements regarding proof of service and the contents of the petition is a
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the same. The petition for writ of certiorari filed by
respondent city government should therefore have been dismissed for its failure to implead
petitioner as the adverse party and to serve a copy of the petition on her.
We do not agree with petitioners contention, however, that respondent City of Pasig did not
have the requisite personality to file the petition in the Court of Appeals. Petitioner cites our
ruling in University of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission[17] in support of her
counterclaim that the phrase party adversely affected in P.D. No. 807, 39[18] refers only to the
person or the respondent employee against whom the administrative disciplinary case is filed.
Petitioners contention is without merit. The ruling cited, first made in Paredes v. Civil
Service Commission,[19] does not apply since it refers to administrative disciplinary cases, which
this case is not.Moreover, said ruling has already been modified in Civil Service Commission v.
Dacoycoy,[20] so that appeal now lies from a decision exonerating a civil service employee of
administrative charges.
We turn now to the merits of the case. Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, 26(7) of Executive Order
No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, provides:

Reassignment. An employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to

another in the same agency: Provided, That such reassignment shall not involve a
reduction in rank, status, or salary.

It has been held that a reassignment that is indefinite and results in a reduction in rank, status,
and salary is in effect a constructive removal from the service.[21] In this case, contrary to the
ruling of the Court of Appeals, petitioners reassignment to different offices in the local
government of Pasig City is indefinite. Petitioner has been on virtual floating assignments which
cannot but amount to a diminution of her rank, hence impermissible under the law.[22] As already
noted, her reassignment began in 1992 with her detail to the Office of the (now) City
Administrator pending investigation of reports that she had issued Advice of Allotments without
sufficient cash collections. However, no investigation appears to have ever been conducted on
the said charge. To justify her continuing reassignment, respondent City Mayor claimed that the
same was due to petitioners long years of experience in finance which especially fitted her for
studies regarding the citys revenues.
A similar justification was invoked in Gloria v. Court of Appeals[23] for the reassignment of
Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano, Superintendent of the Division of City Schools of Quezon City as
Vocational School Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology. It was
contended that the reassignment would best fit his qualification and experience as an expert in
vocational and technical education. Considering the reason given for the reassignment, it was
held that the same was more than [merely] temporary and hence violative of Dr. Icasianos
security of tenure.
For the same reason, petitioners reassignment to various offices should be considered more
than merely a temporary one. For all intents and purposes, her reassignment, lasting nearly ten
years now, is a removal without cause as Budget Officer of the City of Pasig. Indeed, her duties
in her new assignment as head of the Pasig City Hall Annex
1. Oversee the operation of all units in the City Hall Annex and submit weekly accomplishment
reports to the City Mayor;
2. Institute measures to improve collections of all income-generating units and submit periodic
progress reports with specific recommendations to the City Mayor through the City
Administrator;
3. Prepare and submit the annual budget of City Hall Annex for inclusion in the regular city
budget;
4. Prepare a sound personnel program to promote careerism and staff development; and
5. Perform other duties that may be assigned by the City Mayor or Ordinance[24]-
show the more than temporary nature of her reassignment.
That she has suffered a diminution in her rank is also evident. Under 30 of the Charter of the
City of Pasig,[25] her duties and functions as City Budget Officer are to:

(c) . . . take charge of the City Budget Office, and . . .

(1) Prepare forms, orders, and circulars embodying instructions on budgetary and
appropriation matters for the signature of the city mayor;

(2) Review and consolidate the budget proposals of different departments and offices
of the City;

(3) Assist the city mayor in the preparation of the budget and during budget hearings;

(4) Study and evaluate budgetary implications of proposed legislation and submit
comments and recommendations thereon;

(5) Submit periodic budgetary reports to the Department of Budget and Management;
(6) Coordinate with the city treasurer, the city accountant, and the city planning and
development coordinator for the purpose of budgeting;

(7) Assist the sangguniang panlungsod in reviewing the approved budgets of

component barangays of the City;

(8) Coordinate with the city planning and development coordinator in the formulation
of the development plan of the City; and

(9) Perform such other duties and functions and exercise such other powers as
provided for under Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, and those that are prescribed by law or ordinance.

In contrast, as head of the Pasig City Hall Annex, petitioners budget proposals for the same will
be subject to review by the City Budget Officer. Moreover, the position of City Budget Officer is
created by statute, while that of the head of the Pasig City Hall Annex is created by mere
ordinance.
We agree with the CSC that petitioner should now be returned to her original position for
her indefinite detail to other positions would amount to her removal without cause from the
position to which she has been permanently appointed. As we said in Cruz v. Navarro:[26]

There is no question that we recognize the validity and indispensable necessity of the
well established rule that for the good of public service and whenever public interest
demands, [a] public official may be temporarily assigned or detailed to other duties
even over his objection without necessarily violating his fundamental and legal rights
to security of tenure in the civil service. But as we have already stated, such cannot be
undertaken when the transfer of the employee is with a view to his removal and if
the transfer is resorted to as a scheme to lure the employee away from his permanent
position because such attitude is improper as it would in effect result in a
circumvention of the prohibition which safeguards the tenure of office of those who
are in the civil service.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of
Appeals is SET ASIDE. Respondent City of Pasig is ordered to forthwith REINSTATE
petitioner Remedios Pastor to her original position as Budget Officer of the City of Pasig.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
Melo, J., maintain his dissent in the Dacoycoy case.
Vitug, J., join Justice Melo in his dissent.
De Leon, Jr., J., abroad on official business.
[1]
A detail is different from reassignment in that the former involves movement from one agency to another, while
the latter involves movement from one organizational unit to another in the same agency. See Book V, Title I,
Subtitle A, Chapter 5, 26(6) and (7) of E.O. No. 292.
[2]
Petition, Annex C; Rollo, p. 35.
[3]
Per Petitioners complaint to the Civil Service Commission, dated October 20, 1995, p. 2; Rollo, p. 37. The said
memorandum order gave rise to the filing of an election offense case by petitioner against respondent Eusebio which
was later on dismissed by the Commission on Elections.
[4]
Petition, Annex D; Rollo, pp. 36-38.
[5]
Id., Annex F; id., p. 40.
[6]
As quoted in Resolution No. 96-1190, pp. 3-5; id., pp. 52-54.
[7]
Petition, Annex C, p. 7; id., p. 56.
[8]
Id., Annex Q; id., pp. 73-75.
[9]
Id., Annex S; id., pp. 74-81.
[10]
Id., Annex V; id., pp. 84-85.
[11]
Id., Annex V; id., p. 86.
[12]
Id., Annex W; id., p. 87.
[13]
Per Associate Justice Mariano M. Umali and concurred in by Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Rebecca de
Guia-Salvador. Petition, Annex A; Rollo, pp. 21-32.
[14]
Petition, Annex A, p. 11; Rollo, p. 31.
[15]
Id., Annex B; id., p. 34.
[16]
Petition, p. 6; id., pp. 8-9.
[17]
228 SCRA 207 (1993).
[18]
Reiterated in Book V, Chapter 3, Subtitle A, 49(1) of E.O. No. 292. This provision states that Appeals, where
allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision within fifteen days from receipt of the
decision unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed, which petition shall be decided within fifteen days .
..
[19]
192 SCRA 84 (1990).
[20]
306 SCRA 425 (1999).
[21]
Bentain v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 644 (1992).
[22]
Cf. Padolina v. Fernandez, 342 SCRA 442 (2000).
[23]
338 SCRA 5 (2000).
[24]
Petition, Annex L; Rollo, p. 57.
[25]
R.A. No. 7829 (1994), An Act Converting the Municipality of Pasig into a Highly Urbanized City to be known
as the City of Pasig.
[26]
66 SCRA 79, 90 (1975).
Domingo v. Zamora, G.R. No. 142283, February 6, 2003
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 142283. February 6, 2003]

ROSA LIGAYA C. DOMINGO, ROMEO M. FERNANDEZ, VICTORIA S.

ESTRADA, JULIETA C. FAJARDO, ADELAIDA B.
GAWIRAN, MARCIANO M. SERVO, VICTORIA S.
DAOANG, FELICIANO N. TOLEDO III, JAYNELYN D.
FLORES, MA. LIZA B. LLOREN, ROMELIA A.
CONTAPAY,MARIVIC B. TOLITOL, PAZ LEVITA G.
VILLANUEVA, EDITHA C. HERNANDEZ, JOSE HERNANDEZ,
JR., VERONICA C. BELLES, AMELITA S. BUCE, MERCELITA C.
MARANAN, CRISTITUTO C. LLOREN, HERNANDO M.
EVANGELISTA, and CARLOS BACAY, JR., petitioners, vs.HON.
RONALDO D. ZAMORA, in his capacity as the Executive
Secretary, HON. ANDREW B. GONZALES, in his capacity as the
Secretary of Education, and HON. CARLOS D. TUASON, in his
capacity as the Chairman of the Philippine Sports
Commission, respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition[1] with prayer for temporary restraining
order seeking to nullify Executive Order No. 81 and Memoranda Nos. 01592 and
01594.[2] The assailed executive order transferred the sports development programs and
activities of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS for brevity) to the
Philippine Sports Commission (PSC for brevity). The questioned memoranda (DECS
Memoranda for brevity), on the other hand, reassigned all Bureau of Physical Education
and School Sports (BPESS for brevity) personnel named in the DECS Memoranda to
various offices within the DECS.

The Facts
 On March 5, 1999, former President Joseph E. Estrada issued Executive Order No.
81 (EO 81 for brevity) entitled Transferring the Sports Programs and Activities of the
[3]

Department of Education, Culture and Sports to the Philippine Sports Commission and
Defining the Role of DECS in School-Based Sports.
EO 81 provided thus:

Section 1. Transferring the Sports Program and Activities to the PSC. All the
functions, programs and activities of DECS related to sports development as provided
for in Sec. 16 of EO 117 (s. 1987) are hereby transferred to PSC.

Section 2. Defining the Role of DECS in School-Based Sports. The DECS shall have
jurisdiction and function over the enhancement of Physical Education (P.E.)
curriculum and its application in whatever form inside schools.

Section 3. The Role of PSC. As the primary agency tasked to formulate policies and
oversee the national sports development program, the management and
implementation of all school-based sports competitions among schools at the district,
provincial, regional, national and international levels, in coordination with concerned
public and private entities shall be transferred to the PSC.

Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary Andrew B. Gonzales (Secretary

Gonzales for brevity) issued Memorandum No. 01592 on January 10,
2000. Memorandum No. 01592 temporarily reassigned, in the exigency of the service,
all remaining BPESS Staff to other divisions or bureaus of the DECS effective March
15, 2000.
On January 21, 2000, Secretary Gonzales issued Memorandum No. 01594
reassigning the BPESS staff named in the Memorandum to various offices within the
DECS effective March 15, 2000. Petitioners were among the BPESS personnel affected
by Memorandum No. 01594. Dissatisfied with their reassignment, petitioners filed the
instant petition.
In their Petition, petitioners argue that EO 81 is void and unconstitutional for being
an undue legislation by President Estrada. Petitioners maintain that the Presidents
issuance of EO 81 violated the principle of separation of powers. Petitioners also
challenge the DECS Memoranda for violating their right to security of tenure.
Petitioners seek to nullify EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda. Petitioners pray that
this Court prohibit the PSC from performing functions related to school sports
development.Petitioners further pray that, upon filing of the petition, this Court issue a
temporary restraining order against respondents to desist from implementing EO 81.
During the pendency of the case, Republic Act No. 9155 (RA 9155 for brevity),
otherwise known as the Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001, was enacted on
August 11, 2001.RA 9155 expressly abolished the BPESS and transferred the
functions, programs and activities of the DECS relating to sports competition to the
PSC. The pertinent provision thereof reads:

SEC. 9. Abolition of BPESS. All functions, programs and activities of the Department
of Education related to sports competition shall be transferred to the Philippine Sports
Commission (PSC). The Program for school sports and physical fitness shall remain
part of the basic education curriculum.

The Bureau of Physical Education and School Sports (BPESS) is hereby

abolished. The personnel of the BPESS, presently detailed with the PSC, are hereby
transferred to the PSC without loss of rank, including the plantilla positions they
occupy. All other BPESS personnel shall be retained by the Department.

The Issue

The issue to resolve is whether EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda are valid.

The Courts Ruling

We dismiss this petition for being moot and academic.

As manifested by both petitioners[4] and respondents,[5] the subsequent enactment of
RA 9155 has rendered the issues in the present case moot and academic. Since RA
9155 abolished the BPESS and transferred the DECS functions relating to sports
competition to the PSC, petitioners now admit that it is no longer plausible to raise
any ultra vires assumption by the PSC of the functions of the BPESS. [6] Moreover, since
RA 9155 provides that BPESS personnel not transferred to the PSC shall be retained
by the DECS, petitioners now accept that the law explicitly protects and preserves [7] their
right to security of tenure.
Although the issue is already academic, its significance constrains the Court to point
out that Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292 for brevity), otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, expressly grants the President continuing authority to
reorganize the Office of the President. Section 31 of EO 292 provides:

SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. The
President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize
the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may
take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper,
including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System
and the Common Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units
thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;

(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or
Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other
Departments and Agencies; and

(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or
agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other
Departments or Agencies. (Emphasis supplied.)

Since EO 81 is based on the Presidents continuing authority under Section 31 (2)

and (3) of EO 292,[8] EO 81 is a valid exercise of the Presidents delegated power to
reorganize the Office of the President. The law grants the President this power in
recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. The Office of the President is the nerve center of the
Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be
capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to
carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command
post of the President. This is the rationale behind the Presidents continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President.
Petitioners contention that the DECS is not part of the Office of the President is
immaterial. Under EO 292, the DECS is indisputably a Department of the Executive
Branch. Even if the DECS is not part of the Office of the President, Section 31 (2) and
(3) of EO 292 clearly authorizes the President to transfer any function or agency of the
DECS to the Office of the President. Under its charter, the PSC is attached to the Office
of the President.[9] Therefore, the President has the authority to transfer the functions,
programs and activities of DECS related to sports development[10] to the PSC, making
EO 81 a valid presidential issuance.
However, the Presidents power to reorganize the Office of the President under
Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize
the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can
reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or
merging units, or by transferringfunctions from one unit to another. In contrast, under
Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the Presidents power to reorganize offices outside the
Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited to
merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to
Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.
This distinction is crucial as it affects the security of tenure of employees. The
abolition of an office in good faith necessarily results in the employees cessation in
office, but in such event there is no dismissal or separation because the office itself
ceases to exist.[11] On the other hand, the transfer of functions or agencies does not
result in the employees cessation in office because his office continues to exist although
in another department, agency or office. In the instant case, the BPESS employees who
were not transferred to PSC were at first temporarily, then later permanently reassigned
to other offices of the DECS, ensuring their continued employment. At any rate, RA
9155 now mandates that these employees shall be retained by the Department.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., no part.

[1]
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
[2]
Issued by then Department of Education Secretary Andrew B. Gonzales.
[3]
Co-signed by former Executive Secretary Ronaldo D. Zamora.
[4]
Rollo, p. 106, Petitioners Reply to Comments, p. 12.
[5]
Ibid., p. 137, Memorandum for Respondents, p. 7.
[6]
Supra, see note 4.
[7]
Supra, see note 4.
[8]
The preamble of EO 81 provides:
xxx
WHEREAS, paragraph 2, Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987
grants the President the continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President by, among
others, transferring any function, to include certain programs, from other Departments and/or
Agencies to the Office of the President.
[9]
Section 4 of RA 6847 provides:
Status of the Commission. The Commission shall have the same status as that of a governmental
regulatory national agency attached to the Office of the President with the Chairman thereof
being of the same level as a department undersecretary and the Commissioners that of
department assistant secretaries.
[10]
Section 1, EO 81.
[11]
Dario v. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 (1989).
David v. Gania, G.R. No. 156039, August 14, 2003
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 156039. August 14, 2003]

HON. KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, HON. JOSE F. ERESTAIN, JR.,

and HON. WALDEMAR V. VALMORES, in their capacities as
Chairman and Commissioners, respectively, of the CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioners, vs. ZENAIDA D.
PANGANDAMAN-GANIA,respondent.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

A system of procedure is perverted from its proper function when it multiplies

impediments to justice without the warrant of clear necessity, so says Cardozo - an
observation especially apt in the instant case involving the payment of back wages and
other benefits resulting from the illegal dismissal of an employee due to improper
personnel and non-disciplinary action.The disquieting procedural steps risked by
respondent before the Court of Appeals, the tendency of the appellate court to overlook
most of them, the doggedness of the Solicitor General to venture others, when neither
the court a quo nor the parties to the case appear perturbed that elementary rules of
procedure were either indulgently brushed aside or subtly exploited one after the other,
do not leave us ensnared in borderline technical maneuvers, or so it is said, being too
impotent to address the pith of this controversy.
Respondent Zenaida D. Pangandaman-Gania is a Director II and Manila
Information and Liaisoning Officer of the Mindanao State University (MSU). She has
been holding this position after the confirmation of her appointment by the MSU Board
of Regents on 1 June 1995.
On 2 October 1998 respondent received a copy of Special Order No. 477-P dated
28 September 1998 designating a certain Agnes Mangondato as Acting Director in her
place in view of the alleged expiration of her term and was no longer allowed to report
for work. She verified the status of her appointment and found out that her appointment
was not submitted to the Civil Service Commission for attestation.
Respondent immediately brought the matter to the CSC for a ruling on the validity of
the termination of her employment.[1] In Resolution No. 00-1265 dated 24 May 2000 the
CSC upheld her dismissal for lack of attestation and prolonged absence without official
leave from the time she was removed from her post in September 1998 as a result of
Special Order No. 477-P.
 Respondent moved for reconsideration. In Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8 March
2001 the CSC found merit in her motion, declared her removal from office as illegal,
exonerated her from the charge of being on absence without official leave and ordered
her reinstatement as Director II and Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer of MSU
but disallowed the payment of back salaries for the period she was not working as a
result of the illegal dismissal. The CSC explained the non-payment of her back wages -

Be that as it may, the incumbency of Dr. Gania is governed by the principle of

quantum meruit (as you work so shall you earn). In other words, her entitlement to
compensation depends on her actual performance of work. Short of approval by the
Commission, the appointment while already effective, by itself is not a basis for
payment of salary but the assumption of duties of her office x x x x Such being the
case, Dr. Gania is not entitled to compensation for the period that she was not
reporting to work.[2]

MSU moved for reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8 March
2001, while respondent moved for its early execution. In Resolution No. 01-1225 dated
19 July 2001, the CSC denied MSUs motion for reconsideration and ordered its
President to allow respondent to assume and exercise the functions of Manila
Information and Liaisoning Officer.
MSU appealed from the denial of its motion for reconsideration under Rule 43 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-66188, to the Court of
Appeals, but the appellate court did not issue any restraining order or injunction to
prevent the execution of the resolution on appeal.
Respondent did not seek a review of any of the resolutions of the CSC including the
order denying back salaries and other benefits for the period she was out of work. She
instead pursued her prayer for reinstatement but MSU refused to employ her
back. Hence, she was compelled to file a second motion for the execution of CSC
Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001, citing Sec. 82 of the Revised Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which states that [t]he filing and
pendency of petition for review with the Court of Appeals or certiorari with the Supreme
Court shall not stop the execution of the final decision of the Commission unless the
Court issues a restraining order or an injunction.
In Resolution No. 01-1616 dated 4 October 2001 the CSC granted respondents
motion and held that CSC Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001 has attained
finality and must be immediately implemented, as it again ordered the MSU President to
reinstate respondent.
On 8 October 2001 respondent for the first time questioned the portion of CSC
Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001 prohibiting the payment of back wages and
other benefits to her for the period that her employment was terminated, and moved for
the modification of the resolution by granting her the relief prayed for.
On 29 October 2001 the Court of Appeals dismissed MSUs petition for review on
the ground that the certificate of non-forum shopping was not personally signed by
pertinent officers of the university but by its counsel of record. [3] MSU moved for
reconsideration of the dismissal.
On 12 December 2001, there being still no action on her request to be paid her
back salaries and other benefits, respondent moved for an immediate ruling thereon.
On 21 February 2002 the Court of Appeals denied MSUs motion for reconsideration
of the dismissal of its petition for review for lack of merit.
On 28 February 2002 the CSC in Resolution No. 02-0321 denied respondents
motion -

Since nowhere in the records does it show that [respondent Gania] actually assumed
and performed the duties of her position, it logically follows that there can be no basis
for the grant of back salaries in her favor.
[4]

Without the aid of an attorney, respondent appealed CSC Resolution No. 02-0321
dated 28 February 2002 to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69668. In her petition for review, she did
not mention that she did not seek a review of CSC Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8
March 2001 which was the real object of her appeal.[5] In addition, she impleaded only
the petitioners herein, Chairperson Karina Constantino-David and Commissioners Jose
F. Erestain Jr. and Waldemar V. Valmores of the CSC, but did not name as party-
respondent the Mindanao State University or any of its officers.
In its Comment before the Court of Appeals, the CSC through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) rebuffed respondents claim for back wages since she allegedly
failed to actually assume the position of Director II and Manila Information and
Liaisoning Officer of MSU. But the CSC did not assail the procedural infirmities of
respondents petition and appeared contented to refute just the substantial arguments
thereof.
On 28 October 2002 the Court of Appeals partially found merit in respondents
petition for review.[6] Apparently failing to note that respondent did not appeal from the
denial of her claim for payment of back salaries in CSC Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8
March 2001, which she found objectionable, the Court of Appeals concluded that -

x x x petitioner had assumed and had been exercising the functions [at MSU] as early
as June 1995, after the MSU Board of Regents approved her permanent appointment
which was issued earlier x x x on April 10, 1995. It was only in September 1998,
when she was terminated from service on the alleged ground of expiration of term,
that she was prevented from performing the functions of her position. [7]

The Court of Appeals ruled that back wages should be paid to respondent from the
time of her illegal dismissal until she was ordered reinstated by the CSC as Director II of
MSU on 8 March 2001, but excluded the period after the CSC had ordered MSU to
admit respondent back to work since the damages she suffered for that period were
chargeable in the proper forum against the MSU President who in bad faith refused to
abide by the relevant CSC resolutions.
On 3 January 2003 the OSG filed the instant petition for review under Rule 45, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, allegedly in behalf of the petitioners named herein, and also
signed for them the verification and certification of non-forum shopping. The OSG
asserted as grounds for review the principle recognizing finality to factual findings of
quasi-judicial agencies as well as its puzzling statement that [w]hile the dismissal of
herein respondent was declared illegal, she was, however, not exonerated from the
charges. Hence, respondent is not entitled to back wages.[8] Once again the OSG did
not call attention to procedural defects in the petition of respondent before the Court of
Appeals.
Respondent filed in her own behalf a Comment claiming that the CSC cannot be a
party-petitioner in a case where its decision is the subject of review, citing Civil Service
Commission v. Court of Appeals.[9] As to whether respondent actually assumed the
duties of Director II, she referred not only to the finding of the Court of Appeals that she
had assumed office and worked for MSU as early as June 1995 but also to the
voluminous records of MSU showing that she reported for work until her illegal dismissal
in September 1998.[10] She also manifested that she was reinstated to her job on 18
September 2002 while the proceedings before the Court of Appeals were ongoing
although she was not paid her salary and other benefits. In another Manifestation before
this Court, she affirmed that her salary as well as RATA and other benefits for the
month of September 2002 were paid on 23 April 2003.
We deny the instant petition for review. It is true that respondent had lost the right to
ask for the modification of CSC Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001 and to
demand compensation for her back salaries and other benefits. She did not move for
the reconsideration of this resolution within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof[11] nor
did she file a petition for its review within the same period under Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.[12] To be sure, both the CSC and respondent herself admitted
the finality of the Resolution and acted upon it when she was granted an order for its
execution.
Meanwhile, MSU filed its petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No.
SP-66188) assailing CSC Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001 and CSC
Resolution No. 01-1225 dated 19 July 2001 denying MSUs motion for reconsideration.
Ordinarily, under the foregoing circumstances, neither the Civil Service Commission
nor the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to direct the substantial amendment of CSCs
relevant resolutions upon the behest of respondent.[13] The principle governing ordinary
appeal from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals applies
suppletorily[14] mutatis mutandis -

x x x where all the parties have either thus perfected their appeals by filing their
notices of appeal in due time and the period to file such notice of appeal has lapsed for
those who did not do so, then the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case as of the
filing of the last notice of appeal or the expiration of the period to do so for all the
parties.
[15]

This rule is also articulated in Associated Bank v. Gonong[16] where we held that only
after all the parties respective periods to appeal shall have lapsed that the court loses
its jurisdiction over the case. What is left as residual jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission pertains only to matters for the protection and preservation of the rights of
the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal or the immediate
execution of its resolutions under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service. This is to ensure the orderly disposition of the case at both the levels
of the CSC and the appellate court.[17]
Nonetheless, we cannot inflexibly dwell on the defect of a belated appeal and coldly
thwart a review of the instant case. For it cannot be denied that even after
acknowledging the finality of Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001, the CSC still
entertained the twin motions of respondent on 8 October 2001 and 12 December 2001
to modify the same resolution and insert therein an order for the payment of back
wages. The CSC in fact promulgated Resolution No. 02-0321 dated 28 February
2002 denying respondents importunate motions for the reason that she allegedly did not
report for work but not because they were already time-barred.
No doubt, the Civil Service Commission was in the legitimate exercise of its
mandate under Sec. 3, Rule I, of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Servicethat [a]dministrative investigations shall be conducted without
necessarily adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable
to judicial proceedings. This authority is consistent with its powers and functions to
[p]rescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the
provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws being the central personnel
agency of the Government.[18]
Furthermore, there are special circumstances in accordance with the tenets of
justice and fair play that warrant such liberal attitude on the part of the CSC and a
compassionate like-minded discernment by this Court.[19] To begin with, respondent was
consistently denied reinstatement by the responsible officers of MSU and vehemently
barred from resuming her previous position. The first order for her return to work was
issued on 8 March 2001 which was followed by repeated personal appeals for the
immediate execution of the CSC resolution.[20] Thereafter, when respondent was still
forced out of work, the CSC issued its second and third orders on 19 July 2001 and 4
October 2001, respectively, for the President of MSU to restore her to the item from
which she was illegally dismissed. As these private requests and official directives were
cruelly rejected by her employer and the period of her unemployment was unduly
prolonged, respondent had no choice and was compelled to ask for back salaries and
other benefits to offset the callous repudiation of what was due her.
To prevent respondent from claiming back wages would leave incomplete the
redress of the illegal dismissal that had been done to her and amount to endorsing the
wrongful refusal of her employer or whoever was accountable to reinstate her. A too-
rigid application of the pertinent provisions of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Serviceas well as the Rules of Court will not be given
premium where it would obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in the
light of the prevailing circumstances in the case under consideration.
As commented in Obut v. Court of Appeals,[21] we cannot look with favor on a course
of action which would place the administration of justice in a straightjacket for then the
result would be a poor kind of justice, if there would be justice at all. Verily, judicial
orders x x x are issued to be obeyed, nonetheless a non-compliance is to be dealt with
as the circumstances attending the case may warrant. What should guide judicial action
is the principle that a party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the
merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or
property on technicalities.
The same principle of liberality may also be drawn upon to gloss over the failure of
respondent to implead MSU as party-respondent in the petition before the Court of
Appeals while joining only herein petitioners as Chairman and Commissioners of the
CSC to answer her petition. While as a rule it would have been necessary to adhere to
this practice,[22] in the instant case no one among the Court of Appeals, the CSC and the
Office of the Solicitor General saw it fit to name or cause to be included MSU as party-
respondent. Indeed, the Comment of the OSG argued on the merits as if it was acting in
unison with respondents employer, stressing all possible claims that may be alleged to
defeat respondents petition. Ultimately, what is crucial is that both CSC and MSU are
part of the same bureaucracy that manages and supervises government personnel, and
as such, represent a common interest on the question raised in the petition to be
defended by the same core of lawyers from the OSG or the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel (OGCC).[23]
Justifiably, where no injury has been done as probably all lines of reasoning to
oppose the petition have been asserted by parties of the same principal and brought to
the fore in the proceedings a quo, and considering further that the underlying principle in
the administration of justice and application of the rules is substance rather than form,
reasonableness and fair play in place of formalities, we deem it apposite to except this
particular case from the rigid operation of the procedure for the joinder of parties.
In any event, none of these procedural defects were raised as an issue on appeal
and are now deemed waived. Of course we are not surprised that the OSG did not
touch on these procedural issues and would seemingly prefer a ruling squarely on the
issue of respondents entitlement to back wages. As its services are paid for by
taxpayers money, the OSG ought to be the foremost officers of the court who in suitable
cases must delve into the real concerns.
Unfortunately, the OSG also treaded upon technically precarious grounds when it
filed the petition in the name of the CSC and signed the verification and certificate of
non-forum shopping in behalf of its client. Sure enough, respondent vigorously objects
to the standing of the CSC as party-petitioner in the instant petition, citing our ruling
in Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals.[24]
That the CSC may appeal from an adverse decision of the Court of Appeals
reversing or modifying its resolutions which may seriously prejudice the civil service
system is beyond doubt. In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy[25] this Court held that
the CSC may become the party adversely affected by such ruling and the aggrieved
party who may appeal the decision to this Court.
The situation where the CSCs participation is beneficial and indispensable often
involves complaints for administrative offenses, such as neglect of duty, being
notoriously undesirable, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official
duties, and the like, where the complainant is more often than not acting merely as a
witness for the government which is the real party injured by the illicit act. In cases of
this nature, a ruling of the Court of Appeals favorable to the respondent employee is
understandably adverse to the government, and unavoidably the CSC as representative
of the government may appeal the decision to this Court to protect the integrity of the
civil service system.
The CSC may also seek a review of the decisions of the Court of Appeals that are
detrimental to its constitutional mandate as the central personnel agency of the
government tasked to establish a career service, adopt measures to promote morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness and courtesy in the civil service,
strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development
programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive
to public accountability. Nonetheless, the right of the CSC to appeal the adverse
decision does not preclude the private complainant in appropriate cases from similarly
elevating the decision for review.[26]
The ruling in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy was further explained in Civil
Service Commission v. Court of Appeals[27] where we held that the real party-in-interest
in a case involving the non-renewal of the appointments of contractual employees would
be the person who was allegedly dismissed from work and not the CSC, for it is he who
would be benefited or injured by his reinstatement or non-reinstatement and who is
present, available and competent to bring the matter on appeal. Like a judge whose
order or decision is being assailed, the CSC should not be joined in the petition as it is
not a combatant in a proceeding where opposing parties may contend their respective
positions without the active participation of the CSC.[28]
In the instant case, the CSC is not the real party-in-interest as this suit confronts
the Decision of the Court of Appeals to award back wages for respondent arising from
an illegitimate personnel and non-disciplinary action of MSU, which is different from an
administrative disciplinary proceeding where the injured party is the government. We fail
to see how the assailedDecision can impair the effectiveness of government, damage
the civil service system or weaken the constitutional authority of the CSC so as to
authorize the latter to prosecute this case.As a rule, the material interest for this
purpose belongs to MSU since it instigated the illegal dismissal and the execution of
the Decision devolves upon it.[29]
Regrettably, however, respondent cannot insist that MSU be the indispensable
party in the instant petition since the latter was not designated as respondent in the
petition before the Court of Appeals. It would truly be a case of having her cake and
eating it too for respondent to require MSU to undertake the present appeal from the
assailed Decision when it was deprived of standing in the appellate court proceedings
and unilaterally booted out as a prospective litigant herein. Hence, by force of
circumstances, the CSC has the standing to initiate the instant petition for review.
Moreover, the OSG executed the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping
in behalf of the CSC, citing as bases therefor City Warden of the Manila City Jail v.
Estrella,[30] andCommissioner of Internal Revenue v. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc.[31] Some
clarification is in order to avoid perpetuating a misconception.
City Warden of the Manila City Jail v. Estrella is not an authority for the OSG to
execute verification and certification of non-forum shopping on its own as legal
representative of client agencies. The reason is that the OSG was in that case acting
as a Peoples Tribune regardless of the official opinion of the relevant government
agencies therein -

That the City Warden appears to have acquiesced in the release order of the trial court
by his compliance therewith does not preclude the Solicitor General from taking a
contrary position and appealing the same.The Solicitor General's duty is to present
what he considers would legally uphold the best interest of the
Government (underscoring added).
[32]

Hence, there was no necessity for the verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping to be executed by the City Warden himself. To be sure, it would have been
awkward and irregular for the City Warden to do so given that his position was not the
same as those reflected in the petition of the OSG. No doubt, the real party-in-interest is
the OSG itself as representative of the State.[33] In Pimentel v. Commission on
Elections[34] we held

x x x the Solicitor General may, as it has in instances take a position adverse and
contrary to that of the Government on the reasoning that it is incumbent upon him to
present to the court what he considers would legally uphold the best interest of the
government although it may run counter to a client's position x x x x As we
commented on the role of the Solicitor General in cases pending before this Court,
This Court does not expect the Solicitor General to waver in the performance of his
duty. As a matter of fact, the Court appreciates the participation of the Solicitor
General in many proceedings and his continued fealty to his assigned task. He should
not therefore desist from appearing before this Court even in those cases he finds his
opinion inconsistent with the Government or any of its agents he is expected to
represent. The Court must be advised of his position just as well. [35]

But the rule is different where the OSG is acting as counsel of record for a
government agency. For in such a case it becomes necessary to determine whether the
petitioning government body has authorized the filing of the petition and is espousing
the same stand propounded by the OSG. Verily, it is not improbable for government
agencies to adopt a stand different from the position of the OSG since they weigh not
just legal considerations but policy repercussions as well. They have their respective
mandates for which they are to be held accountable, and the prerogative to determine
whether further resort to a higher court is desirable and indispensable under the
circumstances.
The verification of a pleading, if signed by the proper officials of the client agency
itself, would fittingly serve the purpose of attesting that the allegations in the pleading
are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation,
and that the pleading is filed in good faith. Of course, the OSG may opt to file its own
petition as a Peoples Tribune but the representation would not be for a client office but
for its own perceived best interest of the State.
The case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc., is
not also a precedent that may be invoked at all times to allow the OSG to sign the
certificate of non-forum shopping in place of the real party-in-interest. The ruling therein
mentions merely that the certification of non-forum shopping executed by the OSG
constitutes substantial compliance with the rule since the OSG is the only lawyer for
the petitioner, which is a government agency mandated under Section 35, Chapter 12,
Title III, Book IV, of the 1987 Administrative Code (Reiterated under Memorandum
Circular No. 152 dated May 17, 1992) to be represented only by the Solicitor General. [36]
By its very nature, substantial compliance is actually inadequate observance of the
requirements of a rule or regulation which are waived under equitable
circumstances[37] to facilitate the administration of justice[38] there being no damage or
injury caused by such flawed compliance.[39] This concept is expressed in the
statement the rigidity of a previous doctrine was thus subjected to an inroad under the
concept of substantial compliance.[40] In every inquiry on whether to accept substantial
compliance, the focus is always on the presence of equitable conditions to administer
justice effectively and efficiently without damage or injury to the spirit of the legal
obligation.
We have ruled previously[41] that substantial compliance with the certificate of non-
forum shopping is sufficient. The equitable circumstances pleaded to show substantial
compliance include the proximity of the filing of the complaint to the date of the
effectivity of the circular requiring the certificate and the belated filing thereof, but the
mere submission thereof after the filing of a motion to dismiss does not ipso
facto operate as a substantial compliance.[42] As summarized in Bank of the Philippine
Islands v. Court of Appeals,[43] [w]hen a strict and literal application of the rules on non-
forum shopping and verification will result in a patent denial of substantial justice, they
may be liberally construed. This guideline is especially true when the petitioner has
satisfactorily explained the lapse and fulfilled the requirements in its motion for
reconsideration.
The fact that the OSG under the 1987 Administrative Code is the only lawyer for a
government agency wanting to file a petition, or complaint for that matter, does not
operate per se to vest the OSG with the authority to execute in its name the certificate
of non-forum shopping for a client office. For, in many instances, client agencies of the
OSG have legal departments which at times inadvertently take legal matters requiring
court representation into their own hands without the intervention of the
OSG.[44] Consequently, the OSG would have no personal knowledge of the history of a
particular case so as to adequately execute the certificate of non-forum shopping; and
even if the OSG does have the relevant information, the courts on the other hand would
have no way of ascertaining the accuracy of the OSGs assertion without precise
references in the record of the case. Thus, unless equitable circumstances which
are manifest from the record of a case prevail, it becomes necessary for the
concerned government agency or its authorized representatives to certify for non-forum
shopping if only to be sure that no other similar case or incident is pending before any
other court.
We recognize the occasions when the OSG has difficulty in securing the attention
and signatures of officials in charge of government offices for the verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping of an initiatory pleading. This predicament is
especially true where the period for filing such pleading is non-extendible or can no
longer be further extended for reasons of public interest such as in applications for the
writ of habeas corpus, in election cases or where sensitive issues are involved. This
quandary is more pronounced where public officials have stations outside Metro Manila.
But this difficult fact of life within the OSG, equitable as it may seem, does not
excuse it from wantonly executing by itself the verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping. If the OSG is compelled by circumstances to verify and certify the pleading in
behalf of a client agency, the OSG should at least endeavor to inform the courts of its
reasons for doing so, beyond instinctively citing City Warden of the Manila City Jail v.
Estrella and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc.
Henceforth, to be able to verify and certify an initiatory pleading for non-forum
shopping when acting as counsel of record for a client agency, the OSG must (a) allege
under oath the circumstances that make signatures of the concerned officials
impossible to obtain within the period for filing the initiatory pleading; (b) append to the
petition or complaint such authentic document to prove that the party-petitioner or
complainant authorized the filing of the petition or complaint and understood and
adopted the allegations set forth therein, and an affirmation that no action or claim
involving the same issues has been filed or commenced in any court, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency; and, (c) undertake to inform the court promptly and reasonably of any
change in the stance of the client agency.
Anent the document that may be annexed to a petition or complaint under letter (b)
hereof, the letter-endorsement of the client agency to the OSG, or other
correspondence to prove that the subject-matter of the initiatory pleading had been
previously discussed between the OSG and its client, is satisfactory evidence of the
facts under letter (b) above. In this exceptional situation where the OSG signs the
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping, the court reserves the authority to
determine the sufficiency of the OSGs action as measured by the equitable
considerations discussed herein.
Finally, after our lengthy discourse on the technical imperfections afflicting the
instant case, we resolve the substantive issue of whether respondent is entitled to
receive back salaries and other benefits for the period that she was illegally
dismissed. Obviously, the answer is in the affirmative.
 There is more than substantial evidence in the record consisting of the general
payroll and attendance sheets to prove that petitioner assumed and exercised the
functions of Director II and Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer at MSU as early as
June 1995 after the MSU Board of Regents approved her permanent appointment
which was issued earlier on 10 April 1995.[45] It cannot be refuted that in September 1998
she was terminated from the service on the alleged ground of expiration of her term and
stopped from performing the functions of her position, and subsequently reinstated to
her job upon the declaration of the CSC that her dismissal from the service was
illegal. Clearly, the CSC gravely erred when thereafter it ruled that respondent did not
actually assume and perform the duties of her position so as to deprive her of back
wages and other benefits.
In Gabriel v. Domingo[46] this Court held that an illegally dismissed government
employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to back wages and other monetary
benefits from the time of his illegal dismissal up to his reinstatement. This is only fair
and sensible because an employee who is reinstated after having been illegally
dismissed is considered as not having left his office and should be given a comparable
compensation at the time of his reinstatement.
Respondent cannot be faulted for her inability to work or to render any service from
the time she was illegally dismissed up to the time of her reinstatement. The policy of no
work, no pay cannot be applied to her, for such distressing state of affairs was not of her
own making or liking even as her family suffered tremendously as a consequence of her
removal and while she was jobless. Verily, to withhold her back salaries and other
benefits during her illegal dismissal would put to naught the constitutional guarantee of
security of tenure for those in the civil service.
We also agree with the Court of Appeals that MSU cannot be made to
pay all accruing back salaries and other benefits in favor of respondent. There are
allegations to the effect that officials of MSU disobeyed in bad faith the writ of execution
issued by the CSC. In Gabriel v. Domingo[47] we held that if the illegal dismissal,
including the refusal to reinstate an employee after a finding of unlawful termination, is
found to have been made in bad faith or due to personal malice of the superior officers
then they will be held personally accountable for the employees back salaries;
otherwise, the government disburses funds to answer for such arbitrary dismissal. [48] This
rule is also enunciated in Secs. 38[49] and 39[50] of Book I, E.O. 292,and in Secs.
53,[51] 55,[52] 56[53] and 58[54] of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and
Regulations.
Accordingly, MSU as a government institution must compensate respondent with
back salaries and other benefits only from the time of her illegal dismissal, which
according to the case record began sometime in October 1998, until the motion for
reconsideration of the MSU was denied and a writ of execution for respondents
reinstatement as Director II and Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer was
issued. The reckoning period is not 8 March 2001 as determined by the appellate court
but 19 July 2001 when CSC Resolution No. 01-1225 was promulgated wherein the
motion for reconsideration of the MSU was denied with finality and the latter was
explicitly commanded to allow respondent to assume and exercise the functions of
Director II and Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer. For, a final decision of the
CSC is immediately executory unless a motion for reconsideration is filed in the
meantime.[55]
The back wages and other benefits accruing after 19 July 2001 are to be treated
separately since they must be collected in the proper forum wherein the assertions of
malice and ill will in the failure to reinstate respondent to her post are threshed out and
the concerned parties given the full opportunity to be heard. Until such separate
proceeding has been instituted and decided, it is premature to fix the liability for this
portion of respondents back wages and other benefits upon either the government as
represented by MSU or the accountable officers thereof.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 28 October 2002 is AFFIRMED except that the cut-off date for
the payment of back salaries to respondent should be adjusted from the date of her
illegal dismissal to 19 July 2001, instead of 8 March 2001, since it was only on 19 July
2001 that MSUs motion for reconsideration was denied and the order of execution
finally issued by the Civil Service Commission specifically directing MSU to reinstate
respondent Pangandaman-Gania and exercise the functions of her position with the
promulgation of CSC Resolution No. 01-1225.
This is without prejudice to respondents claim for back salaries and other benefits in
the appropriate forum corresponding to the period after 19 July 2001 until she is actually
reinstated as Director II and Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio- Morales,
Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ.,concur.
Callejo, Sr., J., on leave.

[1]
The complaint of respondent falls under Other Personnel and Non-Disciplinary Actions of the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
[2]
CA Rollo, p. 31.
[3]
Resolution penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred in by Associate Justices
Teodoro P. Regino and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador of the Seventh Division.
[4]
CA Rollo, p. 68.
[5]
Sec. 34, Rule 138, Rules of Court, authorizes a party to litigate his case personally.
[6]
Decision penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion and concurred in by Associate Justices
Conrado M. Vasquez Jr. and Sergio L. Pestao.
[7]
Rollo, p. 26.
[8]
Id., p. 7.
[9]
G.R. No. 126354, 15 December 1999, 320 SCRA 703.
[10]
See CA Rollo, pp. 119-175.
[11]
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule VI, Sec. 80.
[12]
See Sec. 4.
[13]
Pefianco v. Moral, G.R. No. 132248, 19 January 2000, 322 SCRA 439; Gloria v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 131012, 21 April 1999, 306 SCRA 287; Manaloto v. Santos, No. L-21262, 31 December
1965, 15 SCRA 690; Government of the Philippines v. Antonio, No. L-23736, 19 October 1965,
15 SCRA 119; Montejo v. Cabangon, No. L-17977, 30 May 1962, 5 SCRA 266; Vito v. Lacson,
No. L-16173, 23 December 1961, 3 SCRA 666.
[14]
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule I, Sec. 3.
[15]
I F.D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 508 (1997).
[16]
G.R. No. 77353, 30 July 1987, 152 SCRA 478.
[17]
Under Sec. 49 of the Civil Service Law (Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. 292), a motion or petition for
reconsideration takes precedence over an appeal where both parties opt to exercise their
respective rights to question the decision in an administrative case, i.e., one of the parties moves
for reconsideration while the other party files an appeal or petition for review. See
Simsim v. Belmonte, No. L-25388, 31 August 1970, 34 SCRA 536.
[18]
Civil Service Law, Secs. 1 and 12.
[19]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, Nos. L-31303-04, 31 May 1978, 83 SCRA 453; Paulino v. Court of
Appeals, No. L-46723, 28 October 1977, 80 SCRA 257.
[20]
The Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule VI, Sec. 82, provides
that [t]he filing and pendency of petition for review with the Court of Appeals or certiorari with the
Supreme Court shall not stop the execution of the final decision of the Commission unless the
Court issues a restraining order or an injunction.
[21]
No. L-40535, 30 April 1976, 70 SCRA 546, 554.
[22]
See 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43, Sec. 6 where public respondent is merely a nominal or
formal party; E.O. 292, Bk. VII, Chap. 4, Sec. 25 (3) which provides [t]he action for judicial review
may be brought against the agency, or its officers, and all indispensable and necessary parties as
defined in the Rules of Court; Pastor v. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 146873, 9 May 2002;
Calderon v. Solicitor General, G.R. Nos. 103752-53, 25 November 1992, 215 SCRA 876.
[23]
The Mindanao State University was incorporated as a State University under RA 1387 (1955) as
amended.
[24]
See Note 9.
[25]
G.R. No. 135805, 29 April 1999, 306 SCRA 425.
[26]
Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, G.R. No. 141246, 9 September 2002.
[27]
See Note 9.
[28]
See Calderon v. Solicitor General, supra Note 22.
[29]
See Pastor v. City of Pasig, supra Note 22.
[30]
G.R. No. 141211, 31 August 2001, 364 SCRA 257.
[31]
G.R. No. 127105, 25 June 1999, 309 SCRA 87.
[32]
See Note 30.
[33]
See C.R. Villacorta, The Sixteenth Justice: Balancing of Interests in the Office of the Solicitor General,
XIV Law. Rev. 31 July 2001, pp. 4, 6.
[34]
G.R. No. 126394, 24 April 1998, 289 SCRA 586.
[35]
Id. at 595 citing Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 92561, 12 September 1990, 189 SCRA
459.
[36]
See Note 31.
[37]
Ruga v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 72654-61; 22 January 1990, 181 SCRA 266.
[38]
Porac Trucking v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81093. 6 March 1990, 183 SCRA 45.
[39]
In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of Andres G. De Jesus and Bibiana Roxas De Jesus, Roxas v. De
Jesus, No. L-38338, 28 January 1985, 134 SCRA 245; Vda. de Roldan v. Roldan, No. L-19601,
31 March 1966, 16 SCRA 479.
[40]
Garcia v. Court of Appeals, No. L-34620, 29 April 1977, 76 SCRA 609.
[41]
Kavinta v. Castillo, G.R. No. 117083, 27 October 1995, 249 SCRA 604.
[42]
Ibid.
[43]
G.R. No. 146923, 30 April 2003.
[44]
See e.g. CA Rollo, pp. 79-80, 83-86 where the Civil Service Commission filed with the Court of Appeals
its own pleading captioned Manifestation In Lieu of Comment which the Office of the Solicitor
General in its counter-manifestation asked the appellate court to disregard.
[45]
CA Rollo, pp. 119-175.
[46]
G.R. No. 87420, 17 September 1990, 189 SCRA 674.
[47]
Ibid.
[48]
See also Dumlao v. Court of Appeals, 199 Phil. 442 (1982); Correa v. CFI of Bulacan, L-46096, July
30, 1979, 92 SCRA 312; Mindanao Realty Corp. v. Kintanar, No. L-17152, 30 November 1962, 6
SCRA 814; Tabuena v.Court of Appeals, No. L-16290, 31 October 1961, 3 SCRA 413.
[49]
Sec. 38. Liability of Superior Officers. - (1) A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the
performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross
negligence. (2) Any public officer who, without just cause, neglects to perform a duty within a
period fixed by law or regulation, or within a reasonable period if none is fixed, shall be liable for
damages to the private party concerned without prejudice to such other liability as may be
prescribed by law. (3) A head of a department or a superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the
wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence, or misfeasance of his subordinates, unless he has
actually authorized by written order the specific act or misconduct complained of.
[50]
Sec. 39. Liability of Subordinate Officers. - No subordinate officer or employee shall be civilly liable for
acts done by him in good faith in the performance of his duties. However, he shall be liable for
willful or negligent acts done by him which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good
customs even if he acted under orders or instructions of his superiors.
[51]
Sec. 53. The head of department or agency or any responsible official who willfully and deliberately
refuses or fails to implement or execute the final resolution or decision of the Commission to the
prejudice of the party affected or the public in general shall be liable for contempt of the
Commission. In case the decision directed payment of back salaries, the head of the department
shall be made liable in his personal capacity for the payment of said salaries and other monetary
benefits corresponding to the period of delay in the implementation of said decision, order or
ruling.
[52]
Sec. 55. Indirect contempt shall be imposed only after due proceedings. Indirect contempt may be
committed through any of the following acts or omissions: (a) disobedience or resistance to a
lawful writ, process, order, decision, resolution, ruling, summons, subpoena or command of, or
injunction of the Commission x x x x
[53]
Sec. 56. If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against the Commission,
he may be punished by a fine of not more than One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) for every act of
indirect contempt x x x x If the contempt consists in the violation of an injunction or omission to do
an act which is still within the power of the respondent to perform, the respondent shall, in
addition, be made liable for all damages as a consequence thereof.
[54]
Sec. 58. Damages sustained by the aggrieved party shall refer to the total amount of his or her salaries
and other money benefits which shall have accrued to the latter had the final order, decision,
resolution, ruling, injunction or processes of the Commission been enforced/implemented
immediately.
[55]
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule VI, Sec. 80; Omnibus Civil
Service Rules and Regulations, Rule XIV, Sec. 50.
Miranda v. Carreon, G.R. No. 143540, April 11, 2003
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 143540. April 11, 2003]

JOEL G. MIRANDA, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO C. CARREON,

MILAGROS B. CASCO, ELSIE S. ESTARES, JULIUS N. MALLARI,
ELINORA A. DANAO, JOVELYN G. RETAMAL, MARIFE S.
ALMAZAN, JONALD R. DALMACIO, JENNIFER C. PLAZA,
RIZALDY B. AGGABAO, VILMA T. VENTURA, BENEDICT B.
PANGANIBAN, JOSE L. GOMBIO, MELCHOR E. SORIANO,
ZARINA C. PANGANIBAN, EMELITA D. TAUYA, EVANGELINE A.
SICAM, MATABAI AQUARIOUS Q. CULANG, MELVIN L. GARCIA,
JOHNNY N. YU, JR., LOIDA J. PURUGGANAN, EDUARDO S.
VALENCIA, EDITHA A. REGLOS, HENRY P. MAPALAD, RAMIL C.
GALANG, JUSTINA M. MACASO, MARTHA B. ALLAM, and
ARSENIA A. CATAINA, respondents.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated May
21, 1999 and the Resolution dated June 5, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 36997.
In the early part of 1988, Vice Mayor Amelita Navarro, while serving as Acting
Mayor of the City of Santiago because of the suspension of Mayor Jose Miranda,
appointed the above-named respondents to various positions in the city
government. Their appointments were with permanent status and based on the
evaluation made by the City Personnel Selection and Promotion Board (PSPB) created
pursuant to Republic Act No. 7160.[3] The Civil Service Commission (CSC) approved the
appointments.
When Mayor Jose Miranda reassumed his post on March 5, 1998 after his
suspension, he considered the composition of the PSPB irregular since the majority
party, to which he belongs, was not properly represented. [4] He then formed a three-man
special performance audit team composed of Roberto C. Bayaua, Antonio AL. Martinez
and Antonio L. Santos, to conduct a personnel evaluation audit of those who were
previously screened by the PSPB and those on probation. After conducting the
evaluation, the audit team submitted to him a report dated June 8, 1998 stating that the
respondents were found wanting in (their) performance.
On June 10, 1998, or three months after Mayor Miranda reassumed his post, he
issued an order terminating respondents services effective June 15, 1998 because they
performed poorly during the probationary period.
Respondents appealed to the CSC, contending that being employees on
probation,[5] they can be dismissed from the service on the ground of poor performance
only after their probationary period of six months, not after three (3) months. They
also denied that an evaluation on their performance was conducted, hence, their
dismissal from the service violated their right to due process.
On October 19, 1998, the CSC issued Resolution No. 982717 reversing the order of
Mayor Miranda and ordering that respondents be reinstated to their former positions
with payment of backwages, thus:
xxx

Granting that the complainant-employees (now respondents) indeed rated poorly, the
question that remains is whether they can be terminated from the service on that
ground.

xxx

x x x, at the time of their termination the complainants have not finished the six (6)
months probationary period. x x x, they may be terminated even before the expiration
of the probationary period pursuant to Section 26, par. 1, Chapter 5, Book V, Title I-A
of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Said Section provides:

All such persons (appointees who meet all the requirements of the position) must
serve a probationary period of six months following their original appointment and
shall undergo a thorough character investigation in order to acquire a permanent civil
service status. A probationer may be dropped from the service for unsatisfactory
conduct or for want of capacity anytime before the expiration of the
probationary period: Provided, that such action is appealable to the
Commission.

It is, however, clear from the foregoing quoted provision that an employee on
probation status may be terminated only for unsatisfactory conduct or want of
capacity. In this case, the services of the complainants were terminated on the
ground of poor performance x x x. Although poor performance may come near
the concept of want of capacity, the latter, as held by this Commission, implies
opportunity on the part of the head of office to observe the performance and
demeanor of the employee concerned (Charito Pandes, CSC Resolution No.
965592). At this point, considering that Mayor Jose Miranda reassumed his post
only on March 5, 1998 after serving his suspension, it is quite improbable that he
can already gauge the performance of the complainants through the mere lapse
of three months considering that the date of the letter of termination is June 10,
1998 and its effectivity date June 15, 1998. (emphasis supplied)
[6]

Meanwhile, the COMELEC disqualified Mayor Jose Miranda as a mayoralty

candidate in the 1998 May elections. His son Joel G. Miranda, herein petitioner,
substituted for him and was proclaimed Mayor of Santiago City. He then filed a motion
for reconsideration of the CSC Resolution No. 982717 (in favor of respondents) but it
was denied in the CSC Resolution No. 990557 dated March 3, 1999.
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review on certiorari,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36997. On May 21, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision affirming in toto the CSC Resolution No. 982717. Forthwith, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, but before it could be resolved by the Court of Appeals,
several events supervened. This Court, in G.R. No. 136351, Joel G. Miranda vs.
Antonio M. Abaya and the COMELEC, set aside the proclamation of petitioner as Mayor
of Santiago City for lack of a certificate of candidacy and declared Vice Mayor Amelita
Navarro as City Mayor by operation of law.[7]
On December 20, 1999, Mayor Navarro filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion to
Withdraw the Motion for Reconsideration (previously submitted by former Mayor Joel G.
Miranda).
On June 5, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
of its Decision.
On June 11, 2000, the Court of Appeals granted Mayor Navarros Motion to
Withdraw the Motion for Reconsideration. In effect, the CSC Resolution reinstating
respondents to their positions stays.
In this petition, petitioner Joel G. Miranda contends that the Court of Appeals erred
in affirming the CSC Resolution declaring that the termination of respondents services is
illegal and ordering their reinstatement to their former positions with payment of
backwages.
In their comment, respondents claim that since petitioner ceased to be Mayor of
Santiago City, he has no legal personality to file the instant petition and, therefore, the
same should be dismissed. They insist that they were not actually evaluated on their
performance. But assuming there was indeed such an evaluation, it should have been
done by their immediate supervisors, not by those appointed by former Mayor Jose
Miranda.
In his reply, petitioner contends that as a taxpayer, he has a legal interest in the
case at bar, hence, can lawfully file this petition.
Section 17, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

Sec. 17. Death or separation of a party who is a public officer. When a public officer
is a party in an action in his official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns or
otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or
against his successor if, within thirty (30) days after the successor takes office or such
time as may be granted by the Court, it is satisfactorily shown by any party that there
is substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and the successor adopts or
continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor.

It is clear from the above Rule that when petitioner ceased to be mayor of Santiago
City, the action may be continued and maintained by his successor, Mayor Amelita
Navarro, if there is substantial need to do so.
Mayor Navarro, however, found no substantial need to continue and maintain the
action of her predecessor in light of the CSC Resolution declaring that respondents
services were illegally terminated by former Mayor Jose Miranda. In fact, she filed with
the Court of Appeals aMotion to Withdraw the Motion for Reconsideration (lodged by
petitioner). She likewise reinstated all the respondents to their respective positions and
approved the payment of their salaries.
Petitioner insists though that as a taxpayer, he is a real party-in-interest and,
therefore, should continue and maintain this suit. Such contention is misplaced. Section
2, Rule 3 of the same Rules provides:

Section 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. (emphasis supplied)

Even as a taxpayer, petitioner does not stand to be benefited or injured by the

judgment of the suit. Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the
legality of official acts done by the government.[8] It bears stressing that a taxpayers suit
refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds from taxation.[9] The issue in this case is whether
respondents services were illegally terminated. Clearly, it does not involve the illegal
disbursement of public funds, hence, petitioners action cannot be considered a
taxpayers suit.
At any rate, to put to rest the controversy at hand, we shall resolve the issue of
whether respondents services were illegally terminated by former Mayor Jose Miranda.
The 1987 Constitution provides that no officer or employee of the civil service shall
be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.[10] Under the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, a government officer or employee may be removed from
the service on two (2) grounds: (1) unsatisfactory conduct and (2) want of
capacity. While the Code does not define and delineate the concepts of these two
grounds, however, the Civil Service Law (Presidential Decree No. 807, as amended)
provides specific grounds for dismissing a government officer or employee from the
service. Among these grounds are inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of
official duties. In the case at bar, respondents were dismissed on the ground of poor
performance. Poor performance falls within the concept of inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties which, as earlier mentioned, are
grounds for dismissing a government official or employee from the service.
But inefficiency or incompetence can only be determined after the passage of
sufficient time, hence, the probationary period of six (6) months for the
respondents. Indeed, to be able to gauge whether a subordinate is inefficient or
incompetent requires enough time on the part of his immediate superior within which to
observe his performance. This condition, however, was not observed in this case. As
aptly stated by the CSC, it is quite improbable that Mayor Jose Miranda could finally
determine the performance of respondents for only the first three months of the
probationary period.
Not only that, we find merit in respondents claim that they were denied due
process. They cited Item 2.2 (b), Section VI of the Omnibus Guidelines on
Appointments and Other Personnel Actions (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, Series
of 1993, as amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of 1994) which
provides:

2.2. Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance

xxx

b. An official or employee who, for one evaluation period, is rated poor in

performance, may be dropped from the rolls after due notice. Due notice
shall mean that the officer or employee is informed in writing of the
status of his performance not later than the fourth month of that
rating period with sufficient warning that failure to improve his
performance within the remaining period of the semester shall
warrant his separation from the service. Such notice shall also contain
sufficient information which shall enable the employee to prepare an
explanation. (emphasis supplied)
[11]

Respondents vehemently assert that they were never notified in writing regarding
the status of their performance, neither were they warned that they will be dismissed
from the service should they fail to improve their performance. Significantly, petitioner
did not refute respondents assertion. The records show that what respondents received
was only the termination order from Mayor Jose Miranda. Obviously, respondents right
to due process was violated.
Moreover, respondents contend that the only reason behind their arbitrary dismissal
was Mayor Jose Mirandas perception that they were not loyal to him, being appointees
of then Acting Mayor Navarro. This contention appears to be true considering that all
those who were accepted and screened by the PSPB during the incumbency of Acting
Mayor Navarro were rated to have performed poorly by an audit team whose three
members were personally picked by Mayor Jose Miranda.
 The Constitution has envisioned the civil service to be a career service based on
merit and rewards system that will truly be accountable and responsive to the people
and deserving of their trust and support.[12] These noble objectives will be frustrated if the
tenure of its members is subject to the whim of partisan politics. A civil servant who lives
in ceaseless fear of being capriciously removed from office every time a new political
figure assumes power will strive to do anything that pleases the latter. In this way, he
will hardly develop efficiency, accountability and a sense of loyalty to the public service.
Such a climate will only breed opportunistic, inefficient and irresponsible civil servants to
the detriment of the public. This should not be countenanced.
In fine, we hold that petitioner, not being a real party in interest, has no legal
personality to file this petition. Besides, his motion for reconsideration was validly
withdrawn by the incumbent Mayor. Even assuming he is a real party in interest, we see
no reason to disturb the findings of both the CSC and the Court of Appeals. The
reinstatement of respondents who, unfortunately, were victims of political bickerings, is
in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated May 21, 1999
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36997 is AFFIRMED.
Treble costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna,
JJ., concur.

[1]
Filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
[2]
Penned by Justice Artemio G. Tuquero, retired, and concurred in by Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and
Justice Candido V. Rivera, retired.
[3]
Otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991.
[4]
Former Mayor Jose Mirandas preferred Councilor, a partymate, was substituted by another Councilor
through the intervention of Acting Mayor Navarro.
[5]
Although respondents original appointments were with permanent status, they must serve
a probationary period of six (6) months as provided in Section 2, Rule VII of the Omnibus Civil
Service Rules and Regulations, which reads:
SEC. 2. Original appointment refers to initial entry into the career service under a permanent status of a
person who meets all the requirements of the position including the civil service eligibility.
(a) All such persons must serve a probationary period of six (6) months following their original
appointment and shall undergo a thorough character investigation. A probationer may be dropped
from the service for unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity any time before the expiration of
the probationary period: Provided, That such action is appealable to the Commission.
(b) All original appointments of qualified persons to the position in the career service shall henceforth be
proposed as permanent. It is understood that the first six (6) months of service will be
 probationary in nature. However, if no notice of termination or unsatisfactory conduct or want of
capacity is given by the appointing authority to the employee before the expiration of the six-
month probationary period, the appointment automatically becomes permanent.
[6]
Rollo at 6.
[7]
370 Phil. 642 (1999).

[8]
Joya vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 225 SCRA 568 (1993).
[9]
Bayan (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA
449, citing Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 (1960); Maceda vs. Macaraig,
197 SCRA 771 (1991); Lozada vs. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337 (1983); Dumlao vs. COMELEC,
95 SCRA 392 (1980); Gonzales vs. Marcos, 65 SCRA 624 (1975).
[10]
Section 2(3), Article IX-B, 1987 Constitution.
[11]
CA Records at 260-261.
[12]
Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.
Office of the Pres. v. Buenaobra, G.R. No. 170021, Sept. 8, 2006

FIRST DIVISION

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 170021

Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
NITA P. BUENAOBRA,
Respondent. Promulgated:

September 8, 2006
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated May 27, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78279,
which reversed and set aside petitioners Resolutions dated April 11,
2003[2] and June 26, 2003[3] dismissing respondent Nita P. Buenaobra from the
service. Also assailed is the Resolution[4] dated October 3, 2005, denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The following facts are undisputed:

The Office of the Ombudsmans Special Prosecution Officer filed an

information against respondent Nita P. Buenaobra, Chairman of the Komisyon sa
Wikang Pilipino (KWP), with the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 for allegedly causing undue injury to the government
through gross inexcusable negligence in connection with the unauthorized
reprinting of the Diksyunaryo ng Wikang Pilipino. The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 26918 (the Sandiganbayan case).[5]

Upon respondents motion, the Sandiganbayan ordered a

reinvestigation. Thereafter, then Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo approved the
recommendation for the reversal of the probable cause finding and the
withdrawal of the information filed against respondent. Thus, a motion to
withdraw the information[6] was filed which the Sandiganbayan granted in its
Resolution dated April 30, 2003.[7]

While reinvestigation of the Sandiganbayan case was on-going, the Presidential

Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) conducted a parallel administrative investigation
(the PAGC case) against respondent charging her with the same acts and
omissions subject of the Sandiganbayan case. Respondent was charged with
causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits to
Merylvin Publishing House, Inc., through gross inexcusable negligence in not
taking legal action to collect the 15% royalty fee of P3,366,250.00 approved by
the KWF Board to be levied against the publisher for its unauthorized reprinting
and selling of the dictionary.[8]

Instead of filing her counter-affidavit/verified answer, respondent moved to

dismiss the administrative case on grounds of litis pendentia and forum shopping
in view of the pending Sandiganbayan case. The PAGC denied respondents motion
to dismiss and recommended respondents dismissal from the service, forfeiture
of financial benefits, and disqualification from joining the government.

On April 11, 2003, petitioner adopted PAGCs recommendation and

dismissed respondent from office.[9] It held as inapplicable the doctrines of litis
pendentia and forum shopping because the Sandiganbayan case was criminal,
while the PAGC case was administrative, in nature. It also ruled that respondent
was deemed to have admitted the material averments of PAGCs complaint when
she did not specifically deny them, despite an opportunity to do so.
Respondent moved for reconsideration[10] but was denied. Hence, she filed a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
78279.[11]

The Court of Appeals granted respondents petition in its assailed Decision

dated May 27, 2005 holding that the proceedings before the PAGC were
procedurally and substantially flawed because after denying respondents motion
to dismiss, the PAGC did not give respondent the opportunity to present
evidence. Instead, it proceeded to rule on the merits of the case. The Court of
Appeals also found no evidence to prove respondents administrative liability in
not collecting the 15% royalty fee. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed

Resolutions dated April [11], 2003 and June 26, 2003 are SET ASIDE. The
charge/complaint against petitioner Nita P. Buenaobra is hereby ordered DISMISSED for
complete lack of evidence against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.[12]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner argues that respondent was a presidential appointee and a

holder of a non-career service position, hence, she could be removed from the
service at the pleasure of the President.

The petition lacks merit.

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7104[13] creating the Commission on the Filipino
Language provides for 11 commissioners to be headed by a chairman and all
appointed by the President.[14] The chairman and two commissioners shall serve
full-time for a term of seven years.

Under Section 4, Article IV, of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807, or the Civil
Service Decree, positions in the civil service are classified into career service and
non-career service. Section 6 of same article describes a non-career service
employee or officer as follows:
 Sec. 6. The Non-Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance on bases
other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service;
and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous
with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the
duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made.

The Non-Career Service shall include:

xxxx

3. Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of

office and their personal or confidential staff; (Emphasis added)

xxxx

Based on the foregoing, respondent who is the Chairman of the KWP is a non-
career service personnel whose tenure is limited to seven years as provided under
R.A. No. 7104. Since her tenure is fixed by law, her removal from office is not at
the pleasure of the appointing authority.

We have consistently ruled that non-career service personnel enjoy security of

tenure. They may not be removed without just cause and non-observance of due
process.Thus, in Jocom v. Regalado,[15] we held:
Regardless of the classification of the position held by a government employee
covered by civil service rules, be it a career or non-career position, such employee may
not be removed without just cause. An employee who belongs to the non-career
service is protected from removal or suspension without just cause and non-
observance of due process.

xxxx

The constitutional and statutory guarantee of security of tenure is extended to

both those in the career and non-career service positions, and the cause under which an
employee may be removed or suspended must naturally have some relation to the
character or fitness of the officer or employee, for the discharge of the functions of his
office, or expiration of the project for which the employment was extended. (Emphasis
supplied)
Moreover, there is no showing that respondents failure to file suit to collect
the royalty fee prejudiced the government. In its assailed Resolution dated June
26, 2003, petitioner held that there was a PAGC categorical finding[16] of violation
of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. However, it was a bare conclusion by the PAGC in
violation of Sec. 5, Rule VII, Part III of the PAGC New Rules of Procedure,[17] that in
every case, the Commission shall use any and all reasonable means to ascertain
the facts in each case or complaint speedily and objectively and without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure, in all instances observing due process.

More important, Sec. 2, Rule VIII, Part IV of the PAGC rules requires that its
report and recommendation to the President shall state, among others, the
factual findings and legal conclusions, as well as the penalty recommended to be
imposed or such other action that may be taken. PAGC concluded that
respondent violated R.A. No. 3019, without any factual findings at all.

We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondent did not give
any unwarranted benefits to Merylvin, to wit:
The act of not taking legal action to collect is not defined by any criminal statute
as an offense by omission per se. If it were so, a sizeable number of public officials
would be out of the government service by mere omission to take such action. But could
the same act be the basis for administrative action against an erring public
official? Logically since such an omission is not a criminal offense per se, it could be the
basis of an administrative action only if there is a positive duty to take legal action
clearly imposed upon the petitioner.

In the instant case, insofar as the criminal aspect of the case is concerned, the
office of the Ombudsman already ruled that the accused x x x cannot be faulted if she
instituted no action to collect royalty fee from the publishing house. In fact, if she
instituted such action, the same would be unauthorized and without legal basis as there
was no contract between the KWF and the publisher. It is for this reason that the Motion
to Withdraw Information in Criminal Case No. 26918 entitled People vs. Nita P.
Buenaobra was granted by the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan.

This lack of positive duty to take legal action on the part of the petitioner is
bolstered by the fact that KWF Board Resolution No. 2002-2
specifically disauthorized her to enter into a contract with Merylvin Publishing House,
thus, Buenaobras inaction to collect the 15% royalty fee from said publisher was only in
accord with the KWF Board of Commissioners decision. KWF is a collegial body and as
such it acts only in accordance with the Boards directives. In fact, much earlier, the offer
to pay fifteen percent (15%) royalty fee was referred by the KWF Board to the State
Auditor for his comment and recommendations under Resolution No. 2000-1 passed
and approved on February 2, 2000.

Petitioner Buenaobra was dismissed from the service as a result of an illogical

conclusion of an unreasonable mind. Buenaobra was charged for her omission to collect
from Merylvin Publishing House but the KWF Board of Commissioners, of which the
private complainant is a member, disauthorized Buenaobra from entering into a
contract with Merylvin Publishing House (which offered the 15% royalty fee), which
 would have been the basis for collection. Clearly then, as pointed out by the Office of
the Ombudsman, without such contract, there was no basis for collection. If We have to
pinpoint responsibility for non-collection, it is not because of the inaction of Buenaobra
but because of the KWF Board Resolution No. 2000-2 disauthorizing Buenaobra from
entering into a contract with Merylvin Publishing House. The sad thing is that one of the
signatories of said resolution is the private complainant KWF Commissioner Fe Aldave-
Yap, who is herself the cause of the non-collection. The filing of this complaint resulting
in the resolution of the administrative body dismissing petitioner Buenaobra from
government service is a sad commentary of the mentality of public functionaries who
file cases and those who cursorily give them due course even though the factual bases
clearly show a comedy of errors. It escapes logic and clear thinking why this complaint
against petitioner was filed and entertained in the first place. x x x.

xxxx

Buenaobra did not give any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to

the publisher nor had she acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. Such being the case, it necessarily follows that the
charge/complaint against petitioner must be dismissed.[18] (Italics and emphasis in the
original)
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated May 27, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78279, which
reversed and set aside the Resolutions dated April 11, 2003 and June 26, 2003 of
the Office of the President dismissing respondent Nita P. Buenaobra from the
service, and its Resolution dated October 3, 2005 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp. 39-74. Penned by Associate Justice Regalado E. Maambong and concurred in by Associate Justices
Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Lucenito N. Tagle.
[2]
Id. at 83-86.
[3]
Id. at 87-90.
[4]
Id. at 111-112.
[5]
CA rollo, p. 650.
[6]
Id. at 220-221.
[7]
Id. at 61-66. Penned by then Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario (now a Member of the Supreme Court)
and concurred in by Associate Justices Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada and Diosdado M. Peralta.
[8]
Id. at 288.
[9]
Id. at 21-24.
[10]
Id. at 25-41.
[11]
Id. at 7-20.
[12]
Rollo, p. 73.
[13]
Commission on the Filipino Language Act.
[14]
Secs. 5 and 6, id.
[15]
G.R. No. 77373, August 22, 1991, 201 SCRA 73, 81-82.
[16]
CA rollo, p. 338.
[17]
Adopted under PAGC Resolution No. 05, S. 2002, approved on March 14, 2002, and filed with the National
Administrative Register on same date.
[18]
Rollo, pp. 143-147.
ARTICLE III, SECTION 8

Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the

public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.
SSSEA v. Court of Appeals 175 SCRA 686 (1989)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON,

RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO
ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO,
RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents.

Vicente T. Ocampo & Associates for petitioners.

CORTES, J:

Primarily, the issue raised in this petition is whether or not the Regional Trial Court can enjoin the
Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and order the striking
employees to return to work. Collaterally, it is whether or not employees of the Social Security
System (SSS) have the right to strike.

The antecedents are as follows:

On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for
damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9,
1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to
the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members
from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor -
Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return
to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a
writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return
to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be
declared illegal.

It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which
included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and
holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of
service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries,
allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's
allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the
employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices [Rollo, pp. 21-
241].
The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a temporary restraining order pending resolution of the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction [Rollo, p. 71.] In the meantime, petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss alleging the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter [Rollo, pp. 72-
82.] To this motion, the SSS filed an opposition, reiterating its prayer for the issuance of a writ of
injunction [Rollo, pp. 209-222]. On July 22,1987, in a four-page order, the court a quo denied the
motion to dismiss and converted the restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after
finding that the strike was illegal [Rollo, pp. 83- 86]. As petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of
the aforesaid order was also denied on August 14, 1988 [Rollo, p. 94], petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before this Court. Their petition was docketed
as G.R. No. 79577. In a resolution dated October 21, 1987, the Court, through the Third Division,
resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
thereof, but during its pendency the Court of Appeals on March 9,1988 promulgated its decision on
the referred case [Rollo, pp. 130-137]. Petitioners moved to recall the Court of Appeals' decision. In
the meantime, the Court on June 29,1988 denied the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 97577
for being moot and academic. Petitioners' motion to recall the decision of the Court of Appeals was
also denied in view of this Court's denial of the motion for reconsideration [Rollo, pp. 141- 143].
Hence, the instant petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals [Rollo, pp. 12-37].

Upon motion of the SSS on February 6,1989, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the petitioners from staging another strike or from pursuing the notice of strike they filed
with the Department of Labor and Employment on January 25, 1989 and to maintain the status
quo [Rollo, pp. 151-152].

The Court, taking the comment as answer, and noting the reply and supplemental reply filed by
petitioners, considered the issues joined and the case submitted for decision.

The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case
initiated by the SSS and to issue the restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction, as
jurisdiction lay with the Department of Labor and Employment or the National Labor Relations
Commission, since the case involves a labor dispute.

On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on the ground that the employees of the
SSS are covered by civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they
do not have the right to strike. Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the
dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the employees from striking.

In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by petitioners,
the Court of Appeals held that since the employees of the SSS, are government employees, they are
not allowed to strike, and may be enjoined by the Regional Trial Court, which had jurisdiction over
the SSS' complaint for damages, from continuing with their strike.

Thus, the sequential questions to be resolved by the Court in deciding whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in finding that the Regional Trial Court did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction
when it took cognizance of the case and enjoined the strike are as follows:

1. Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?

2. Does the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to enjoin
the strikers from continuing with the strike and to order them to return to work?

These shall be discussed and resolved seriatim

 I

The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State
"shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec.
31].

By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and employees, including
those in the public sector, to strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this
impression, for in the Sub-Article on the Civil Service Commission, it provides, after defining the
scope of the civil service as "all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters," that
"[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(l)
and (50)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that "[tlhe right of the people, including
those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that
the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether
such recognition also includes the right to strike.

Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning
of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the
1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the
commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without
including the right to strike.

Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors of the provision that "[tlhe right to self-
organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(5)], in answer to the
apprehensions expressed by Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla, Vice-President of the Commission,
explained:

MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say will not take that long. When we proposed
this amendment providing for self-organization of government employees, it does not
mean that because they have the right to organize, they also have the right to strike.
That is a different matter. We are only talking about organizing, uniting as a union.
With regard to the right to strike, everyone will remember that in the Bill of Rights,
there is a provision that the right to form associations or societies whose purpose is
not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Now then, if the purpose of the state is to
prohibit the strikes coming from employees exercising government functions, that
could be done because the moment that is prohibited, then the union which will go on
strike will be an illegal union. And that provision is carried in Republic Act 875. In
Republic Act 875, workers, including those from the government-owned and
controlled, are allowed to organize but they are prohibited from striking. So, the fear
of our honorable Vice- President is unfounded. It does not mean that because we
approve this resolution, it carries with it the right to strike. That is a different matter.
As a matter of fact, that subject is now being discussed in the Committee on Social
Justice because we are trying to find a solution to this problem. We know that this
problem exist; that the moment we allow anybody in the government to strike, then
what will happen if the members of the Armed Forces will go on strike? What will
happen to those people trying to protect us? So that is a matter of discussion in the
Committee on Social Justice. But, I repeat, the right to form an organization does not
carry with it the right to strike. [Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 1, p.
569].
It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875), which was repealed by the Labor
Code (P.D. 442) in 1974, expressly banned strikes by employees in the Government, including
instrumentalities exercising governmental functions, but excluding entities entrusted with proprietary
functions:

.Sec. 11. Prohibition Against Strikes in the Government. — The terms and conditions
of employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof, are governed by law and it is declared to be the policy of this
Act that employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes or
modification in their terms and conditions of employment. Such employees may
belong to any labor organization which does not impose the obligation to strike or to
join in strike:Provided, however, That this section shall apply only to employees
employed in governmental functions and not those employed in proprietary functions
of the Government including but not limited to governmental corporations.

No similar provision is found in the Labor Code, although at one time it recognized the right of
employees of government corporations established under the Corporation Code to organize and
bargain collectively and those in the civil service to "form organizations for purposes not contrary to
law" [Art. 244, before its amendment by B.P. Blg. 70 in 1980], in the same breath it provided that
"[t]he terms and conditions of employment of all government employees, including employees of
government owned and controlled corporations, shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules
and regulations" [now Art. 276]. Understandably, the Labor Code is silent as to whether or not
government employees may strike, for such are excluded from its coverage [Ibid]. But then the Civil
Service Decree [P.D. No. 807], is equally silent on the matter.

On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of government employees to
organize, the President issued E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to
organize of government employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that "[t]he Civil Service law
and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress." The President was apparently referring
to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission under date April 21, 1987
which, "prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government
employees ... enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees
from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which
will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service." The air was thus cleared of the
confusion. At present, in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to strike,
recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from
striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180. [At this
juncture, it must be stated that the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6 is not at issue].

But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes?

The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he
civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art.
IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are
denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled
corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are
part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are
covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the
strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
The statement of the Court in Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and
Employment [G.R. No. 60403, August 3, 1:983, 124 SCRA 11 is relevant as it furnishes the rationale
for distinguishing between workers in the private sector and government employees with regard to
the right to strike:

The general rule in the past and up to the present is that 'the terms and conditions of
employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality
thereof are governed by law" (Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as
amended and Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442, as amended). Since the
terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government
workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to
secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in
private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by
law. Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially
voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor
and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized
private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In government
employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated
power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of
employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules,
and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements. [At p. 13; Emphasis
supplied].

Apropos is the observation of the Acting Commissioner of Civil Service, in his position paper
submitted to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and quoted with approval by the Court in Alliance,
to wit:

It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of the nature of the public
employer and the peculiar character of the public service, it must necessarily regard
the right to strike given to unions in private industry as not applying to public
employees and civil service employees. It has been stated that the Government, in
contrast to the private employer, protects the interest of all people in the public
service, and that accordingly, such conflicting interests as are present in private labor
relations could not exist in the relations between government and those whom they
employ. [At pp. 16-17; also quoted in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, G.R. No.
64313, January 17,1985,134 SCRA 172,178-179].

E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government
employees, while clinging to the same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow
negotiation where the terms and conditions of employment involved are not among those fixed by
law. Thus:

.SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of employment or improvements thereof, except

those that are fixed by law, may be the subject of negotiations between duly
recognized employees' organizations and appropriate government authorities.

The same executive order has also provided for the general mechanism for the settlement of labor
disputes in the public sector to wit:

.SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures, whenever
applicable, shall be followed in the resolution of complaints, grievances and cases
involving government employees. In case any dispute remains unresolved after
 exhausting all the available remedies under existing laws and procedures, the parties
may jointly refer the dispute to the [Public Sector Labor- Management] Council for
appropriate action.

Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the
Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of
legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those
which are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the
Public Sector Labor - Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service
may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private
sector, to pressure the Govemment to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule
III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government- Employees to
Self- Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of
employment in the government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and
government- owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and
employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."

II

The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner union being prohibited by law,
an injunction may be issued to restrain it.

It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of
injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike. The Labor Code itself provides that terms and
conditions of employment of government employees shall be governed by the Civil Service Law,
rules and regulations [Art. 276]. More importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the Public Sector Labor -
Management Council with jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputes involving government
employees [Sec. 16]. Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.

This being the case, the Regional Trial Court was not precluded, in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, from assuming jurisdiction over the SSS's complaint
for damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed for therein. Unlike the NLRC, the Public Sector
Labor - Management Council has not been granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in
labor disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council, and not the NLRC, that has
jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort to the general courts of law for the issuance of a writ
of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

Neither could the court a quo be accused of imprudence or overzealousness, for in fact it had
proceeded with caution. Thus, after issuing a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike
to prevent any further disruption of public service, the respondent judge, in the same order,
admonished the parties to refer the unresolved controversies emanating from their employer-
employee relationship to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council for appropriate action
[Rollo, p. 86].

III

In their "Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction," and reiterated in their reply
and supplemental reply, petitioners allege that the SSS unlawfully withheld bonuses and benefits
due the individual petitioners and they pray that the Court issue a writ of preliminary prohibitive and
mandatory injunction to restrain the SSS and its agents from withholding payment thereof and to
compel the SSS to pay them. In their supplemental reply, petitioners annexed an order of the Civil
Service Commission, dated May 5, 1989, which ruled that the officers of the SSSEA who are not
preventively suspended and who are reporting for work pending the resolution of the administrative
cases against them are entitled to their salaries, year-end bonuses and other fringe benefits and
affirmed the previous order of the Merit Systems Promotion Board.

The matter being extraneous to the issues elevated to this Court, it is Our view that petitioners'
remedy is not to petition this Court to issue an injunction, but to cause the execution of the aforesaid
order, if it has already become final.

WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the Court of Appeals, the instant
petition for review is hereby DENIED and the decision of the appellate court dated March 9, 1988 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 13192 is AFFIRMED. Petitioners' "Petition/Application for Preliminary and
Mandatory Injunction" dated December 13,1988 is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.