AAA VS.
CARBONELL the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
AAA v. Carbonell; June 8, 2007; YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
Feb. 28, 2001 to Aug.16, 2001: AAA worked as a secretary at the Arzadon
Automotive and Car Service Center. He Boss Arzadon is the accused.
May 27, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m.: Arzadon asked her to deliver a book to an
office located at another building but when she returned to their office, the
lights had been turned off and the gate was closed. But she still went in to
get her handbag.
On her way out, she saw Arzadon standing beside a parked van holding a
pipe. He told her to go near him and upon reaching his side, he threatened
her with the pipe and forced her to lie on the pavement. He removed her
pants and underwear, and inserted his penis into her vagina. She wept and
cried out for help but those were useless since nobody was there. She didn’t
report the incident at first because of Arzadon’s threats but then she found
out she’s preggy so she eventually filed the complaint for rape.
AAA failed to appear for the 4 consecutive orders to take the witness stand in
order to satisfy the judge for the existence of probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest. Because of this, dismissed the Case for lack of
probable cause. He claims that under Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
“to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
Petitioner contends that the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and her witnesses in satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as the documentary
evidence and transcript of stenographic notes may sufficiently establish this.
Respondent Judge Carbonell argues in his Comment that the finding of
probable cause by the investigating prosecutor is not binding or obligatory, and
that he was justified in requiring petitioner and her witnesses to take the
witness stand in order to determine probable cause.
ISSUE: WON Judge Carbonell acted with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause
HELD: YES.
Soliven v. Makasiar: The constitutional provision does not mandatorily
require the judge to personally examine the complainant and her
witnesses. Instead, he may opt to: 1)personally evaluate the report and
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor or 2) he may disregard
witnesses. ->
What the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge is
that he should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor.
In this case, Judge Carbonell dismissed the case without taking into
consideration the June 11, 2003 Resolution of 2nd Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Georgina Hidalgo, the October 13, 2003 Resolution of the panel of
prosecutors, and the July 1, 2005 Resolution of the Department of Justice, all
of which sustain a finding of probable cause against Arzadon. Moreover, he
failed to evaluate the evidence in support thereof. Respondent judge’s
finding of lack of probable cause was premised only on the
complainant’s and her witnesses’ absence during the hearing scheduled
by the respondent judge for the judicial determination of probable
cause.
Petitioner narrated in detail the alleged rape incident both in her Sinumpaang
Salaysay. and Complaint-Affidavit. She attended several clarificatory hearings
that were conducted in the instant case. The transcript of stenographic notes
of the hearing held on October 11, 2002 shows that she positively identified
Arzadon as her assailant, and the specific time and place of the incident. She
also claimed that she bore a child as a result of the rape and, in support of her
contentions, presented the child and her birth certificate as evidence. In
contrast, Arzadon merely relied on the defense of alibi which is the weakest of
all defenses.
After a careful examination of the records, the SC found that there is
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause.
Thus, respondent Judge committed GAD in the dismissal. for lack of probable
cause on the ground that petitioner and her witnesses failed to take the witness
stand. Considering there is ample evidence and sufficient basis on record to
support a finding of probable cause, it was unnecessary for him to take the
further step of examining the petitioner and her witnesses. Moreover, he erred
in holding that petitioner’s absences in the scheduled hearings were indicative
of a lack of interest in prosecuting the case. In fact, the records show that she
has relentlessly pursued the same.
Needless to say, a full-blown trial is to be preferred to ferret out the truth.
In a rape case, private complainant failed to appear 4
consecutive orders to take the witness stand in order to
satisfy the judge for the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack
of probable cause on the ground that the complainant and
her witnesses failed to take the witness stand. He claims
that under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause “to
be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce.”
Is Judge Carbonell correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Judge Carbonell committed grave abuse of discretion. The
Supreme Court explained that this constitutional provision
does not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine
the complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to
personally evaluate the report and supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the
prosecutor’s report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses.
“We reiterated the above ruling in the case of Webb v. De
Leon, where we held that before issuing warrants of arrest,
judges merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of
guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de
novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause.
They just personally review the initial determination of the
prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by
substantial evidence.”
fellester.blogspot.com It is well to remember that there is a
distinction between the preliminary inquiry which determines
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the
preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the
offender should be held for trial or be released. The
determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing the
warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary
investigation proper – whether or not there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged – is the function of the investigating prosecutor.
True, there are cases where the circumstances may call for
the judge’s personal examination of the complainant and his
witnesses. But it must be emphasized that such personal
examination is not mandatory and indispensable in the
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an utter
failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable
cause. Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the
investigating prosecutor, provided that he likewise evaluates
the documentary evidence in support thereof.
Indeed, what the law requires as personal determination on
the part of the judge is that he should not rely solely on the
report of the investigating prosecutor. In Okabe v. Gutierrez,
we stressed that the judge should consider not only the report
of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and the
documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of
the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation,
if any, submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor
upon the filing of the Information. If the report, taken
together with the supporting evidence, is sufficient to sustain
a finding of probable cause, it is not compulsory that a
personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses be
conducted. (AAA vs. Carbonell, G.R. No. 171465, June 8, 2007)
PEOPLE v. ALUNDAY
Sept 3, 2008 | Chico-Nazario, J. | Appeal from a decision of the CA | Arrests
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: People of the Philippines
ACCUSED-APPELLANT: Ricardo Alunday
SUMMARY: Alunday was arrested without warrant because he was seen cutting and gathering marijuana plants by the police. SC held that Alunday’s arrest was legal because he
was caught in flagrante delicto.
DOCTRINE: When a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an
arrest without a warrant on the basis of Section 5, par. (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view.
FACTS:
1. Sometime in May 2000, the Intelligence Section of the Police Provincial Office
of Mountain Province received a report from a confidential informant of an existing
marijuana plantation within the vicinity of Mount Churyon, Sadanga, Mountain
Province.
2. On Aug. 2, a contingent composed of policemen from Bauko, Sabangan, Tadian,
Sadanga, Provincial Headquarters and Bontoc Municipal Headquarters proceeded to
Mount Churyon.
3. On Aug. 3, a group of policemen, including SPO1 George Saipen, was dispatched
to scout the area ahead of the others. At a distance of 30 meters, Saipen, together with
the members of his group, saw Alunday cutting and gathering marijuana plants. SPO1
Saipen and others approached Alunday and introduced themselves as members of the
PNP.
4. Alunday was brought to a nearby hut where the operatives saw an old woman, an
M16 rifle and dried marijuana leaves.
5. Two informations were filed against Alunday, for violating Sec 9 of RA 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) and Sec 1 of PD 1866.
6. Alunday was convited for violation of RA 6425 and acquitted for violation of PD
1866 on reasonable doubt.
ISSUES:
1. WON the guilt of Alunday has been proven beyond reasonable doubt - YES
2. WON the court never acquired jurisdiction over Alunday’s person because he was
arrestd without a warrant (issue only raised in the SC) - NO
RULING: All told, the cultivation of marijuana fruiting tops by accused-appellant
having been established beyond reasonable doubt, we are constrained to uphold
appellants conviction. The penalty imposed by the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, being in accord with law, is likewise affirmed.
RATIO:
1. The prosecution was able to establish the following with conviction:
(1) A police continent raided a marijuana plantation located in Mount Churyon,
Sadanga, Mountain Province.
(2) In the course thereof, appellant was seen cutting and gathering marijuana plants
from the premises.
(3) There were no other plants except marijuana which were growing in the said area.
(4) There was a hut apparently used by appellant and an old woman as a camp or
temporary dwelling which existed alone within the area of the subject plantation.
(5) The samples taken from the said plantation were all found to be positive for
marijuana.
On the face of these positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant’s bare
denials must necessarily fail.
2. Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that a peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit, an
offense. Section 5(a) refers to arrest in flagrante delicto.
The police received the information sometime in May 2000 and arrested Alunday only
on Aug 3 because information about the existing marijuana plantation was finally
confirmed only on Aug. 2, 2000. Alunday’s arrest on Aug 3 was legal because he was
caught in flagrante delicto.
In People v. Sucro, the Court held that when a police officer sees the offense, although
at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the
scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Section 5, par.
(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the offense is deemed committed in his presence
or within his view. In essence, Section 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused
be caught in flagrante delicto or caught in the act
of committing a crime.

Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure for the acquisition by the
court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his
plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. SC also ruled that an accused may be
estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing
of the information against him before his arraignment. And since the legality of an
arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused, any
defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed cured when he voluntarily submits
to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Also, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint
after a trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction
of the accused.
Rule 113 arrest
People vs. Alunday
Summary: A suspected marijuana plantation was the subject of a raiding operation
when the alleged marijuana grower was caught cutting and gathering marijuana.
Further, when taken to a nearby hut, an unlicensed firearm was found.
the objection is deemed waived. We have also ruled that an accused may be
estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the
quashing of the information against him before his arraignment. And since the
legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused, any defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed cured when he
voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court. We have also held in a
number of cases that the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for
setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free
from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the
accused.
Herein, Alunday (D) went into arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, he actively participated in his trial. He raised the additional issue of
irregularity of his arrest only during his appeal to this Court. He is, therefore,
deemed to have waived such alleged defect by submitting himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by his counsel-assisted plea during his arraignment; by his
actively participating in the trial and by not raising the objection before his
arraignment.

Rule of Law: A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

Facts: The Intelligence Section of the Police Provincial Office of the Mountain
Province received a report from a confidential informant that there was an existing
marijuana plantation within the vicinity of Mt. Churyon. After a series of validations,
the existence of the subject plantation was finally confirmed.

The Police Director ordered a contingent of policemen to the subject plantation and
upon arriving at the area saw Ricardo Alunday (D) cutting and gathering marijuana
leaves. The police took Alunday (D) to the hut where they saw a woman, an M16
riffle and some dried marijuana leaves.

Issues: Is the warrantless arrest valid?

Ruling: Yes. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit, an offense. Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court refers to arrest in flagrante delicto.

Furthermore, the Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving a
warrant of arrest or the procedure for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise,

PEOPLE VS. JAYSON
FACTS:
• In March 1991, Wenceslao Jayson was a bouncer at the Ihaw-
Ihaw nightclub in Dav ao City. He was
arrested without a warrant after being pointed by eyewitnesses
as the gunman in the killing of Nelson
Jordan. Recovered from him was a .38 caliber revolver with 4
live bullets and an
empty shell.
• The gun and ammo were covered by a memorandum receipt
and mission order issued by Major
Arquillano, Deputy Commander of the Civil-Military Operation
and CAFGU Affairs o f Davao
Metropolitan District Command. Said order authorized the
Jayson to carry the gun
and 12 rounds of
ammo for 3 months following certain restrictions:
o Carrying of firearms is prohibited in places where people
gather for politica l, religious, social, educational, and
recreational purposes, such as churches or chapels, carnival
grounds or fairs, n ightclubs, cabarets (...) except when
the personnel concerned is on official mission in such places for
which he was a uthorized to carry firearms.
• With respect to the arrest, SPO1 Tenebro testified that while
he and Patrolmen Camotes and Racolas
were patrolling in their car, they received a radio message
directing them to Ih aw-Ihaw where there had
been a shooting. They proceeded to the place and saw the
victim. Bystanders poin ted to Jayson as the
gunman. He was apprehended about 10 meters away,
attempting to flee.
• He was initially charged with murder but was allowed to plead
guilty to the les ser offense of homicide
after plea-bargaining. He was sentenced to 6 years and 1 day of
prision mayor to
12 years and 1 day of
reclusion temporal).
• He was subsequently charged with illegal possession of
firearm (violation of PD
1866). Finding him in
good faith (believing that the mission order and memorandum
receipt issued to hi
m were valid), RTC
sentenced him to 20 years imprisonment. CA increased the
penalty to reclusion pe rpetua.
• SC: Although not raised as an error by the accused-appellant,
it is pertinent t o consider the
circumstances surrounding accused-appellant’s arrest and the
seizure from him of t he firearm in
question considering that both were made without any warrant
from a court.
W/N the warrantless arrest, search, and seizure were valid
!YES, YES, YES
Rule 113, §5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that an warrantless arrest shall be lawful when an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
know ledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it. In the case at bar there was a shoot ing. The
policemen summoned to the scene of the crime found the
victim. Jayson was pointed to them as the assailant only
moments after the shooting. In fact Jayson had not gone very
far. The arresting officers thus acted on the basis of personal
knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts indicating that
Jayson was the assailant. The search and seizure were hence
incident to a lawful arrest as allowed under Rule 126, §12.
W/N Jayson is liable for illegal possession of firearm ! YES
Major Arquillano was not authorized to issue mission orders to
civilian agents of the AFP as he was not any of the officers
enumerated in the IRR of PD 1866. Neither was Jayson qualifi
ed to be issued a mission order because he was a mere reserve
of the CAFGU without regular monthly compens ation. He also
violated the restrictions in the mission order by carrying the
firearm inside the nightcl ub. While the defense argues that
the prosecution failed to present the police officer who certified
that Jayson i s not licensed to own a firearm, the objection must
be deemed waived in view of Jayson s failure to object to the
pre sentation of the certificate.

W/N RA 8294 amending PD 1866 can be applied on the theory

that it is more favora ble to Jayson ! NO

While the new law reduces the penalty for illegal possession of
firearm, it cannot be applied because
the statute provides that the lighter penalty does not apply to
cases where anot her crime has been committed.

Neither can the paragraph treating the use of the subject firearm
in the commiss ion of murder or homicide to
be considered as an aggravating circumstance be applied
because this case concer ns solely the charge of

illegal possession of firearm. Bianca Danica Santiago Villarama

PESTILOS VS. GENEROSO
Facts:
On February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the morning, an
altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno
Generoso. Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District,
Station to report the incident. Acting on this report, the Desk
Officer dispatched policemen to go to the scene of the crime and
to render assistance. The policemen arrived at the scene of the
crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation and they
saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten. Atty. Generoso then pointed to
the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the
police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to the Police Station
for investigation. The petitioners went with the police officers.
At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor found that
the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon.
Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack. The petitioners
were indicted for attempted murder.
The petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation on the ground that they had not been
lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest
took place since the police officers had no personal knowledge
that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed
that they were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest
proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for
preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant
to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
RTC denied the motion. The court likewise denied the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before
the CA on a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. They attributed grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
on the RTC for the denial of their motion for preliminary
investigation.
CA dismissed the petition.
Issue:
Were the petitioners validly arrested without a warrant?
Ruling:
For purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the
warrantless arrest of the present petitioners, the question to be
resolved is whether the requirements for a valid warrantless
arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has the crime
just been committed when they were arrested? 2) Did the
arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? And 3)
based on these facts and circumstances that the arresting officer
possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest, would a
reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the
attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the
petitioners?
From a review of the records, we conclude that the police
officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances upon
which they had properly determined probable cause in effecting
a warrantless arrest against the petitioners.
The arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon
the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police
officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1)
hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a
community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty.
Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those
responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners and Atty.
Generoso lived almost in the same neighborhood; more
importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting
officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with
Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what
transpired.
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers
gathered and which they have personally observed less than one
hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime
until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it
reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners'
warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the
police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time
of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers'
personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge,
prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
Personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the
terms of the above-cited provision, does not require actual
presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is
enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is
patent (as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently
committed the crime.
ISSUE:
W/N there is valid warrantless arrest
RULING:
Yes.The court held that petitioners were validly arrest
without warrant. The requirements of a warrantless arrest are
now summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which states that: A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forth with delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated
under Section 5(a) above has been denominated as one "in
flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been
described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that:
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
The elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been
committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
The Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has
just been committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it"
depended on the particular circumstances of the case. The
element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances",
however, under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure requires clarification. Circumstances may
pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal
evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the
crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen
someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest
if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the
scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable
cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the
crime.
However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering
of facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the
commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of
immediacy. In other words, the clincher in the element of
''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required
element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances
should be gathered.

With the facts and circumstances of the case at bar that the police
officers gathered and which they have personally observed less
than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene
of the crime, it is reasonable to conclude that the police officers
had personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances justifying
the petitioners’ warrantless arrests.

Hence, the petitioners were validly arrested and the subsequent

inquest proceeding was likewise appropriate.
FACTS: (2) In the course thereof, appellant was seen cutting and gathering
7. Sometime in May 2000, the Intelligence Section of the Police marijuana plants from the premises.
Provincial Office of Mountain Province received a report from a (3) There were no other plants except marijuana which were growing
confidential informant of an existing marijuana plantation within the in the said area.
vicinity of Mount Churyon, Sadanga, Mountain Province. (4) There was a hut apparently used by appellant and an old woman
8. On Aug. 2, a contingent composed of policemen from Bauko, as a camp or temporary dwelling which existed alone within the area
Sabangan, Tadian, Sadanga, Provincial Headquarters and Bontoc of the subject plantation.
Municipal Headquarters proceeded to Mount Churyon. (5) The samples taken from the said plantation were all found to be
9. On Aug. 3, a group of policemen, including SPO1 George Saipen, positive for marijuana.
was dispatched to scout the area ahead of the others. At a distance of
30 meters, Saipen, together with the members of his group, saw
Alunday cutting and gathering marijuana plants. SPO1 Saipen and
others approached Alunday and introduced themselves as members
of the PNP.
10. Alunday was brought to a nearby hut where the operatives saw an
old woman, an M16 rifle and dried marijuana leaves.
11. Two informations were filed against Alunday, for violating Sec 9 of
RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) and Sec 1 of PD 1866.
12. Alunday was convited for violation of RA 6425 and acquitted for
violation of PD 1866 on reasonable doubt.

ISSUES:
3. WON the guilt of Alunday has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt - YES
4. WON the court never acquired jurisdiction over Alunday’s person
because he was arrestd without a warrant (issue only raised in the SC)
- NO

RULING: All told, the cultivation of marijuana fruiting tops by accused-

appellant having been established beyond reasonable doubt, we are
constrained to uphold appellants conviction. The penalty imposed by
the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, being in accord with
law, is likewise affirmed.

RATIO:
2. The prosecution was able to establish the following with
conviction:
(1) A police continent raided a marijuana plantation located in Mount
Churyon, Sadanga, Mountain Province.
PEOPLE v. TAN G.R. No. L-21805 February 25, 1967
FACTS:
The CFI denied an appeal for the re-arrest of Fidel Tan.
Tan was to suffer TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS, as
minimum, to FOUR (4) YEA RS and TWO (2) MONTHS, as maximum.
The sentence became final and was committed t o the Director of
Prisons. However, provincial warden did not commit Tan to the
national penitentiary and retained him in the provincial jail. The
warden, then,
applied Art. 97 and 99 of the RPC and released
Tan before serving his maximum sentence.
The warden said that the transfer was not made because of the
congestion and bloody riots in the Bilibid.

ISSUE: Whether Tan should be re-arrested.

RULING:
The SC found the warden's reasons unacceptable. Being sentenced
to more than one year of imprisonment, the convict should be confined
in a national prison.
Also, the warden applying Arts. 97 and 99 was unjustified as the
Director of Prisons is the only one who vests the authority.
Assuming that Tan was entitled to good conduct time allowance, he
would still have 11 months and five days.
The SC explained the defendants argument in the lower court. The SC
said that the lower has not lost jurisdiction to amend the judgment of
conviction as they also have the prerogative to see if the convict has
served his sentence rightfully.
There is no double jeopardy in the re-arrest as it is merely a
continuation of the penalty. Lastly, the application of the service of
penalties is governed by the RPC and does not depend on the good
faith of the warden or prisoner.
The SC ordered the re-arrest, and the continuance of the
imprisonment Tan, for o ne (1) year, five (5) months and eleven (11)
days more.
City Warden of Manila vs Estrella
FACTS:
In celebration of Law Day on September 18, 1999, IBP
volunteer lawyers and law students visited various jails in
Metro Manila. In the City Jail of Manila, they found thirty-four
(34) prisoners (Estrella et. al.), whom they believed were
entitled to be released after deducting time allowances for
good conduct in the service of their respective sentences.
Consequently, Estrella et. al.asked Rosendo M. Dial, City
Warden of the Manila City Jail, to effect their release on the
ground that they had already served their sentences, less time
allowances for good conduct invoking Arts. 97 and 99 of the
Revised Penal Code (Note: these Articles were amended by RA
10592) which provide:
ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct. — The good conduct of
any prisoner in any penal institution shall entitle him to the
following deduction from the period of his sentence:
1. During the first two years of his imprisonment, he shall be
allowed a deduction of five days for each month of good
behavior;
2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his
imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of eight days
for each month of good behavior;
3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of
his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of ten days
for each month of good behavior; and
4. During the eleventh and successive years of his
imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of fifteen days
for each month of good behavior.
ART 99. Who grants time allowances. — Whenever lawfully
justified, the Director of Prisons shall grant allowances for
good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be
revoked.
However, City Warden denied the request of Estrella et. al. on
the ground that only the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
can grant them allowances for good conduct under Art. 99 of
the Revised Penal Code. Nonetheless, on October 11, 1999,
City Warden issued certifications of good behavior to Estrella
et. al. stating that had Estrella et. al. been credited time
allowances for good conduct, they should have already been
released.
Thereafter, Estrella et. al., represented by the IBP National
Committee on Legal Aid, filed in the Supreme Court a petition
for habeas corpus.
The Supreme Court issued the writ of habeas corpus which it
made returnable to the Regional Trial Court, Manila. In his
return, City Warden, through the Solicitor General, opposed
the release of Estrella et. al., arguing that while the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections no longer exercises authority over
city and municipal prisoners, he remains the sole authority
under Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code who can grant time
allowances for good conduct to prisoners.
It turned out that 22 of the 34 prisoners had already been
released.
The RTC ruled that the Bureau of Corrections, no longer has
the authority to grant good conduct time allowances to
inmates in the provincial, city, and municipal jails (like Estrella
et. al.) in view of the enactment of R.A. No. 6975, otherwise
known as the Department of the Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990, which places provincial, city, and
municipal jails under the supervision and control of the
Bureau of Jail Management.
Hence petition for review on certiorari was filed by the
Solicitor General.
The Solicitor General contends that despite changes in the
organizational structure of the prison system, the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections remains the exclusive authority for
granting good conduct time allowances and, therefore, it was
error for the lower court to order the release of Estrella et. al.
on the basis of certifications issued by the City Warden as to
time allowances for good conduct that Estrella et. al. are
entitled to.
ISSUES:
A. Whether there is inconsistency between Art. 99 of the
RPC and R.A. No. 6975.
B. Who has authority to grant good conduct time
allowances, the City Warden or the Bureau of Corrections?
C. Whether the RTC may rely on the certification of the City
Warden as to good conduct time allowances in ordering the
release of prisoners by writ of habeas corpus
RULING:
A. There is no inconsistency between Art. 99 of the RPC
and R.A. No. 6975.
Repeals by implication are not favored. To the contrary, every
statute must be so interpreted and brought in accord with
other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.
Interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi.
For there to be an implied repeal, there must be a clear
showing of repugnance. The language used in the later statute
must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what has been
formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that
standard does not suffice.
B. In Kabigting v. Director of Prisons (G.R. No. L-12276, Aug.
26, 1958), it was held that in habeas corpus proceedings, the
trial court has no power to grant the petitioner time
allowances for good conduct” in accordance with Article 99 of
the Revised Penal Code it is the Director of the Prisons (now
Bureau of Corrections) who shall grant allowances for good
conduct if such good conduct has been observed by the
prisoner concerned.” In People v. Tan (19 SCRA 433 (1967)), it
was emphatically held that a provincial warden cannot grant
credit for good conduct to a prisoner and order his release
because Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code vests the authority
to grant prisoners good conduct time allowances “exclusively
in the Director and no one else.” In that case, the prisoner was
under the supervision and control of the provincial warden,
but the authority of the Director to grant good conduct time
allowances was upheld. Indeed, there is nothing in R.A. No.
6975 which repeals Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code.
C. The RTC committed an error in ordering the release of
Estrella et. al. on the basis of the certification issued by the
City Warden in view of Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code
vesting the authority to grant good conduct time allowances
solely in the Bureau of Corrections.
In the first place, the certifications issued by the City Warden
lacked data on the dates when Estrella et. al. started serving
sentence. Such data are important because, as has been
observed, good conduct time allowances under Art. 97 may
only be earned by prisoners while serving their sentence.
While Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code provides that time
spent in preventive imprisonment shall be credited in full or
four-fifths in service of sentence, it does not say that the
prisoners shall earn the credit for good behavior under Art. 97
during such period of preventive detention.
In view of the foregoing, the Court is constrained to order the
re-arrest of Estrella et. al. This can be done without placing
them in double jeopardy of being punished for the same
offense because their re-incarceration is merely a
continuation of the penalties that they had not completely
served due to the invalid crediting of good conduct time
allowances in their favor.
———————————————-
THINGS DECIDED:
A) Repeals by implication are not favored. To the contrary,
every statute must be so interpreted and brought in accord
with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.
B) A provincial warden cannot grant credit for good conduct to
a prisoner and order his release because Art. 99 of the Revised
Penal Code vests the authority to grant prisoners good
conduct time allowances “exclusively in the Director and no
one else.” (Please note of the amendments made by RA
10592)
*** By virtue of RA 10592 Article 99 of the RPC now reads:
“ART. 99. Who grants time allowances. – Whenever lawfully
justified, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, the Chief
of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and/or the
Warden of a provincial, district, municipal or city jail shall
grant allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once
granted shall not be revoked.”
‘Stand by things decided’ ~ Stare Decisis
 1. SAN MIGUEL v. MACEDA, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1749,
April 4, 2007
Facts: Complainant was arrested for illegal sale, dispensation,
distribution and delivery of .50 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, punishable by prision correccional. He jumped
bail. On May 10, 2001, then Judge Alumbres issued a bench
warrant and canceled his bail bond in the amount of
P60,000.00 and fixed a new bail bond in the amount
ofP120,000.00. Complainant was arrested on September 8,
2001. On September 12, 2001, the state prosecutor filed a
Motion to Cancel Recommended Bail on the ground of
reasonable belief and indications pointing to the probability
that accused is seriously considering flight from prosecution.
The Motion was set for hearing on September 19, 2001. On
September 17, 2001, complainant filed an Opposition to the
Motion. Complainant comes to this Court alleging that his
right to procedural due process was gravely violated when
respondent issued the September 17, 2001 Order without
giving him the opportunity to comment on the same. The
issuance of the September 17, 2001 Order shows respondent's
gross ignorance of the law as the offense charged is neither a
capital offense nor punishable by reclusion perpetua. His right
to bail is not a mere privilege but a constitutionally
guaranteed right that cannot be defeated by any order.
Clearly, the intendment of the September 17, 2001 Order was
to deny him of his constitutional right to bail.
OCA submitted its evaluation and recommendation and
stated that the complainant is correct in saying that the order
dated September 17, 2001 of respondent denied him his right
to bail. It is thus clear that what the prosecution prayed for
was the cancellation of the bail of P120,000.00 set by Judge
Alumbres in his Warrant of Arrest dated May 10, 2001. This
necessarily meant that the prosecution wanted complainant
to remain in jail without bail. Hence, when respondent
granted the motion in his order dated September 17, 2001, he
in effect denied complainant his right to bail. It cannot be
denied that since complainant was charged with an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua and life
imprisonment and since he has not yet been convicted, bail in
his case is still a matter of right. (Section 4, Rule 114, Rules of
Court) This is true notwithstanding the fact that he previously
jumped bail. In such a case, respondent should have increased
the amount of bail or set certain conditions to ensure
complainant's presence during the trial, but he cannot deny
altogether complainant's right to bail. The Court agrees with
the findings and recommendations of the OCA. However,
respondent Judge Maceda continued with the hearing on
September 19, 2001. He considered the Opposition to the
Motion as a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Order
granting the withdrawal by the prosecution of the
recommended bail.
Issue: whether or not the increased bail of P120,000.00 fixed
by Hon. Alumbres, in the Warrant of Arrest he issued on May
10, 2001 was also withdrawn by the Order dated September
17, 2001 granting the prosecution's withdrawal of its
recommended bail.
Ruling:No. On September 19, 2001 Atty. Sebrio xxx manifested
that x x x the bail fixed by Judge Alumbres was not affected by
the withdrawal of the prosecution's recommended bail. That
is correct. Any of the accused, therefore, could have applied
for bail thereunder. They could have even moved for the evidence that judicial discretion is weighed in determining
lifting of the warrant dated May 10. But, they did not. whether the guilt of the accused is strong. And in Sy Guan v.
It is clear from the September 17 Order that only the bail Amparo, where bail is a matter of right and prior absconding
recommended by the prosecutor was "considered and forfeiture is not excepted from such right, bail must be
withdrawn". Such Order does not speak of cancellation of the allowed irrespective of such circumstance. The existence of a
P120,000.00 bail fixed by the former Presiding Judge x x x. And high degree of probability that the defendant will abscond
even granting for the sake of argument that complainant was confers upon the court no greater discretion than to increase
also charged with the crime of murder on September 14, the bond to such an amount as would reasonably tend to
2001, or three days before the Order of cancellation was assure the presence of the defendant when it is wanted, such
issued, respondent failed to consider that what was being amount to be subject, of course, to the other provision that
prayed for by the prosecutor was the cancellation of the excessive bail shall not be required.
recommended bail for violation of R.A. No. 6425 and not that Upon review of the TSN of the September 19, 2001 hearing,
of the crime of murder. we find that the prosecutor failed to adduce evidence that
there exists a high probability of accused's jumping bail that
Respondent's asseveration that the cancellation of the bail would warrant the cancellation of the recommended bail
without due hearing was justified considering that bond. Following then the above ratiocination, respondent's
complainant was already detained for the non-bailable only recourse is to fix a higher amount of bail and not cancel
offense of murder three days before the cancellation was the P120,000.00 bail fixed by Judge Alumbres.
ordered, is misplaced.
As the Court opined in Andres v. Beltran, it is a misconception
that when an accused is charged with the crime of murder, he
is not entitled to bail at all or that the crime of murder is non-
bailable. The grant of bail to an accused charged with an
offense that carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua x
x x is discretionary on the part of the trial court. In other
words, accused is still entitled to bail but no longer "as a
matter of right." Instead, it is discretionary and calls for a
judicial determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong
in order to grant bail. The prosecution is accorded ample
opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of
deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such
LAVIDES VS CA
G.R. 129670
February 1, 2000
FACTS: Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3,
1997 for child abuse under R.A. No. 7610 (an act
providing for stronger deterrence and special
protection against child abuse, exploitation and
discrimination, providing penalties for its violation,
and other purposes). His arrest was made without
a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted
by the police. It appears that on April 3, 1997, the
parents of complainant Lorelie San Miguel reported
to the police that their daughter, then 16 years old,
had been contacted by petitioner for an
assignation that night at petitioner’s room at the
Metropolitan Hotel in
Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the
first time the police received reports of petitioner’s
activities.
When petitioner opened the door, the police saw
him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt
and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him.
Based on the sworn statement of complainant and
the affidavits of the arresting officers, which were
submitted at the inquest, an information for
violation of Art. III, §5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 was filed
against petitioner.
petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For the
Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully
Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and
(3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the
Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail
as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is
Charged.
nine more informations for child abuse were filed
against petitioner by the same complainant, Lorelie
San Miguel, and by three other minor children
No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner
filed separate applications for bail in the nine cases.
TRIAL COURT: 2. The accused is entitled to bail in all
the above-entitled case. He is hereby granted the
right to post bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for
each case or a total of P800,000.00 for all the cases
under the following conditions:
a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of
appearance during the trial of these cases. He shall
and must always be present at the hearings of
these cases;
b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so,
his bail bonds shall be automatically cancelled and
forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be
immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to
trial in absentia;
c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated
April 10, 1997 stands; and
d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only
after the arraignment to enable this Court to
immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused;
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations
against him. Pending resolution of his motion, he
asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment
scheduled on May 23, 1997. He filed a motion in
which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds be
reduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that the
same be done prior to his arraignment.
the trial court, in separate orders, denied
petitioner’s motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash
the informations, and to suspend arraignment.
Accordingly, petitioner was arraigned during which
he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him
and then ordered him released upon posting bail
bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject
to the conditions in the May 16, 1997 order and
the "hold-departure" order of April 10, 1997. The
pre-trial conference was set on June 7, 1997.
The Court of Appeals declared conditions (a) and
(b) invalid but declined to pass upon the validity of
condition (d) on the ground that the issue had
become moot and academic. Petitioner takes issue
with the Court of Appeals with respect to its
treatment of condition (d) of the May 16, 1997
order of the trial court which makes petitioner’s
arraignment a prerequisite to the approval of his
bail bonds. His contention is that this condition is
void and that his arraignment was also invalid
because it was held pursuant to such invalid
condition.
ISSUE: WON the condition is void and the
arraignment invalid.
HELD: CONDITION IS VOID.
bail should be granted before arraignment,
otherwise the accused may be precluded from
filing a motion to quash. For if the information is
quashed and the case is dismissed, there would
then be no need for the arraignment of the
accused. In the second place, the trial court could
ensure the presence of petitioner at the
arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering
his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such
as arraignment. Under Rule 114, §2(b) of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail
is that "the accused shall appear before the proper
court whenever so required by the court or these
Rules," while under Rule 116, §1(b) the presence of
the accused at the arraignment is required
to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his
arraignment would be to place him in a position
where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion
to quash and thus delay his release on bail because
until his motion to quash can be resolved, his
arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the
filing of a motion to quash so that he can be
arraigned at once and thereafter be released on
bail. These scenarios certainly
undermine the accused’s constitutional right not to
be put on trial except upon valid complaint or
information sufficient to charge him with a crime
and his right to bail.
The condition imposed in the trial court’s order of
May 16, 1997 that the accused cannot waive his
appearance at the trial but that he must be present
at the hearings of the case is valid and is in
accordance with Rule 114. For another condition of
bail under Rule 114, §2(c) is that "The failure of the
accused to appear at the trial without justification
despite due notice to him or his bondsman shall be
deemed an express waiver of his right to be
present on the date specified in the notice. In such
case, trial shall proceed in absentia." Jjsc
Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials
in absentia allows the accused to be absent at the
trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to
wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of
innocence or of guilt, (b) during trial whenever
necessary for identification purposes, and (c) at the
promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light
offense, in which case the accused may appear by
counsel or representative. At such stages of the
proceedings, his presence is required and cannot
be waived.
IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT THE ARRAIGNMENT OF
PETITIONER ON MAY 23, 1997 WAS ALSO INVALID.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the
arraignment did not emanate from the invalid
condition that "approval of the bail bonds shall be
made only after the arraignment." Even without
such a condition, the arraignment of petitioner
could not be omitted. In sum, although the
condition for the grant of bail to petitioner is
invalid, his arraignment and the subsequent
proceedings against him are valid.

4.
JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 189122 March 17, 2010
CORONA, J.:
Facts: Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas,
petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and
one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day
of reclusion temporal as maximum. Pending appeal, he filed
an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal on
the grounds of his advanced age and health condition, and
claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his
part. The Court of Appeals denied his application for bail and
found that petitioner failed to show that he suffers from
ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during
trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger
and the physical condition of petitioner does not prevent him
from seeking medical attention while confined in prison,
though he clearly preferred to be attended by his personal
physician. The Court of Appeals also considered the fact of
petitioner‘s conviction and that there was no reason
substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioner‘s
guilt. Petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the
denial of his application for bail, considering that none of the
conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present.
Petitioner‘s theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the
trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years
and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant
pending appeal.
Issue: Whether in an application for bail pending appeal by an
appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of
imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary
nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail
should automatically be granted absent any of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling: Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a
matter of right when the offense charged is not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other
hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion,
except when any of the enumerated circumstances under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be
denied.
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of
innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right
to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to
judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such
discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for
strong reasons.
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial
discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or On the other hand, if the appellant‘s case falls within the
deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be second scenario, the appellate court‘s stringent discretion
denied even if the bail-negating ]circumstances in the third requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, determination of the proof of the presence of any of the
the appellate court‘s denial of bail pending appeal where none circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail.
of the said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances
constitute abuse of discretion. is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not
exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will
ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound
fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to discretion approach.
deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the
appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of
discretion will thereby be committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application
for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective
of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where
the appellate court must determine whether any of the
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court
will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in
resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the
exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellant‘s
case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of
sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant
circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of
equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or
disallow bail.
5.
CRIMINAL
RULE 114, Sec. 5 – Bail, When discretionary
PROCEDURE
G.R. No. 149723
Date: October 27, 2006
Title
PEOPLE VS. FITZGERALD
Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VICTOR KEITH FITZGERALD
– petitioner – respondent
Nature of the case: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the August 31, 2001 Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 20431 which granted the Motion for Bail2 of accused-appellant, herein
respondent Victor Keith Fitzgerald
FACTS
1. An Information filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75,
Olongapo City charging Fitzgerald, an Australian citizen, with Violation
of Art. III, Section 5, paragraph (a), subparagraph (5) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7610 alleging that sometime in the month of September
1993, in the City of Olongapo, Zambales, said accused VICTOR KEITH
FITZGERALD induced complainant "AAA," a minor, 13 years of age, to
engage in prostitution by then and there showering said "AAA" with
gifts clothes and food and thereafter having carnal knowledge of her in
violation of the aforesaid law.
2. The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Fitzgerald applied for bail which the RTC denied on the basis that the
circumstances of the accused indicate probability of flight and that
there is undue risk (pedophilia) that the accused may commit a similar
offense if released on bail pending appeal.
3. Fitzgerald appealed to the CA but the appellate court affirmed the
decision.
4. Fitzgerald filed a Motion for New Trial and a Supplemental to
Accused's Motion for New Trial on the ground that new and material
evidence not previously available had surfaced. The CA granted the
Motion for New Trial.
5. The People (petitioner) filed a Motion for Reconsideration for the grant
of the new trial wwhile Fitzgerald filed a Motion to Fix Bail with
Manifestation. Both Motions were denied by the CA. With respect to
the bail, they ruled pursuant to the provisions of Section 7, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court they cannot grant such motion because in the case
at bar, the maximum imposable penalty in accordance with Republic
Act 7610 is reclusion perpetua. And as it is, the evidence of guilt is
strong. As to his alleged physical condition, let it be stressed that
accused-appellant is not precluded from seeking medical
attention if the need arises provided the necessary
representations with the proper authorities are made.
6. Later on Fitzgerald filed again a Motion to bail which the CA granted on
August 31, 2000, ruling that though they maintained that the evidence
of guilt is strong, taking a second look at appellant's plea for
temporary liberty considering primarily the fact that he is already of old
age and is not in the best of health, the CA granted the motion in the
higher interest of substantial justice and considering the new trial
granted in this case.
7. Thereafter, the RTC ordered Fitzgerald's temporary release on
September 4, 2001 upon his filing a cash bond in the amount
of P100,000.00. Hence, this petition was filed.
ISSUE/S
WON the CA erred when it allowed respondent to bail
RATIO
The right to bail emanates from of the right to be presumed innocent. It is
accorded to a person in the custody of the law who may, by reason of the
presumption of innocence he enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of
a security to guarantee his appearance before any court, as required under
specified conditions. Implementing Sec. 13,43 Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 114 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure set forth
substantive and procedural rules on the disposition of bail applications. Sec. 4
provides that bail is a matter of right to an accused person in custody for an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, but a
matter of discretion on the part of the court, concerning one facing an accusation
for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when
the evidence of his guilt is strong. As for an accused already convicted and
sentenced to imprisonment term exceeding six years, bail may be denied or
revoked based on prosecution evidence as to the existence of any of the
circumstances under Sec. 5.
In the case at bar, bail was not a matter of right but a mere privilege subject (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
to the discretion of the CA to be exercised in accordance with the stringent committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
requirements of Sec. 5, Rule 114. And Sec. 5 directs the denial or revocation of
bail upon evidence of the existence of any of the circumstances enumerated (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
therein such as those indicating probability of flight if released on bail or undue risk sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
that the accused may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal. It
is bad enough that the CA granted bail on grounds other than those stated in the
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
Motion filed by respondent; it is worse that it granted bail on the mere claim of the
conditional pardon;
latter's illness. Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner
needing medical care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is
not a ground for bail. (d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the August 31, 2001 CA
Resolution ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The bail bond posted by respondent (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during
is CANCELLED. Let an ORDER OF ARREST ISSUE against the person of the the pendency of the appeal.
accused, Victor Keith Fitzgerald. No costs. SO ORDERED.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either
case.
Notes
2S SUMANQUI
Section 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be
filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal,
provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court.
However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the
nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can
only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue
on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail
subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years,
the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by
the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:

6.
FACTS:
On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged
with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his
purported involvement in the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion
requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On
July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to
Petitioner's voluntary surrender.
Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix
Bail which was heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued
that: (a) Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence
of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age
and voluntary surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion
temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk
due to his age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied
this in its assailed resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was
likewise denied.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right
unless the crime charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua
where the evidence of guilt is strong.
a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever
petitioner would be convicted, he will be punishable by
reclusion perpetua.
b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's
guilt is strong.
2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a
flight risk.
HELD:
1. YES.
Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of
innocence.
Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded
by the constitutional right to be released on bail.
The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at trial and so the amount of bail should be high
enough to assure the presence of the accused when so
required, but no higher than what may be reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose.
Bail as a matter of discretion
Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987
Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure to wit:
Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with
a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.
The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any
criminal offense, shall be bailable.
Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable
with reclusion perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been
established that the evidence of guilt is strong. Where
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according
to the discretion of the court.
Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:
Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted
upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal,
provided it has not transmitted the original record to the
appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense
from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only
be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be
allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the
pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his
bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution,
with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without
valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation,
parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability
of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime
during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any
party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after
notice to the adverse party in either case.
Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life
imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua subject to judicial
discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held:
“[S]uch discretion may be exercised only after the hearing
called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the
purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional
liberty.” Bail hearing with notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs.
Belmonte). The hearing should primarily determine whether
the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs.
Catral:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion,
notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail
or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of
the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt
of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court
to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on
the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the
accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra)
Otherwise petition should be denied.
2. YES.
Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail
The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility
to the international community arising from its commitment
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore
have the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right
of every person to liberty and due process and for detainees
to avail of such remedies which safeguard their fundamental
right to liberty. Quoting from Government of Hong Kong SAR
vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value
the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is
enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which
provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines,
therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting
the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring
that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without
delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if
justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under
obligation to make available to every person under detention
such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to
liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to
bail. (emphasis in decision)
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to
ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial and
unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile
health and advanced age of Petitioner. As such the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the
Motion to Fix Bail. It acted whimsically and capriciously and
was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].
7.
Esteban vs. Alhambra
G.R. No. 135012
Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez
FACTS:
1. The case came to the SC as a petition for certiorari filed
by Anita Esteban, sister in law of the accused, to reverse the
two petitions for the annulment of cash bail of Gerardo
Esteban amounting to P20,000 each.
2. Anita, originally posted the bail for Gerardo, however,
he committed another crime while out on bail; she got "fed
up", and moved for the cancellation of the posted money to
the court and surrendered the accused to the City Jail Warden.
However this was denied, so was her motion for
reconsideration.
3. Anita now pleas that the respondent judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
and that the issue is one of "first impression". She cites that
under Sec 19, now Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the
accused.
ISSUE: WON Respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it refused to
cancel the bail upon petition of Anita
HELD: No
1. Anita misapplies the provision; the cash bail cannot be
cancelled because Gerardo was not surrendered for the four
criminal cases he was originally charged with, he was acquired
because of the subsequent case filed against him
2. The court also cites section 14 which states:
“Section 14. Deposit of cash as bail. – The accused or any
person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the
nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city or
municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or
recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the
case. Upon submission of a proper certificate of deposit and a
written undertaking showing compliance with the
requirements of Section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall be
discharged from custody. The money deposited shall be
considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and
costs, while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused
or to whoever made the deposit.” (Underscoring supplied)
A cash bond is treated as the money of the accused (even if it
was supplied by another person in his behalf). The money of
the accused shall than applied as payment for any fine or cost
imposed by the court. It is treated in the nature of a lien. In
the cited case of Esler vs. Ledesma, between the accused and
the third party (the one who posted the bond) the residue of
the cash bail is not subject to the claim of a creditor to
property.