Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 14

Civil Code of the Philippines

Section 1, Chapter 3, Title I, Book IV


Article 1187
Article 1187
The effects of a conditional obligation to give, once the condition has been fulfilled, shall
retroact to the day of the constitution of the obligation. Nevertheless, when the
obligation imposes reciprocal prestations upon the parties, the fruits and interests during
the pendency of the condition shall be deemed to have been mutually compensated. If
the obligation is unilateral, the debtor shall appropriate the fruits and interests received,
unless from the nature and circumstances of the obligation it should be inferred that the
intention of the person constituting the same was different.
In obligations to do and not to do, the courts shall determine, in each case, the
retroactive effect of the condition that has been complied with. (1120)

Art. 1187. The effects of a conditional obligation to give, once the condition has been fulfilled,
shall retroact to the day of the constitution of the obligation. Nevertheless, when the obligation
imposes reciprocal prestations upon the parties, the fruits and interests during the pendency of
the condition shall be deemed to have been mutually compensated. If the obligation is unilateral,
the debtor shall appropriate the fruits and interests received, unless from the nature and
circumstances of the obligation it should be inferred that the intention of the person constituting
the same was different.

In obligations to do and not to do, the courts shall determine, in each case, the retroactive effect
of the condition that has been complied with. (1120)

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-23616 September 30, 1976

RODRIGO ENRIQUEZ, AUREA SORIANO DE DIZON and


URBANO DIZON, JR., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. SOCORRO A.
RAMOS, defendant-appellee. c han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

CASTRO, C.J.: chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry


This case is a direct appeal from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Quezon City) dated December 3, 1963, reversing
its decision dated October 8, 1963 in favor of the plaintiffs-
appellants Rodrigo Enriquez, Aurea Soriano de Dizon and Urbano
Dizon, Jr., in civil case Q-7229, an action for foreclosure of real
estate mortgage. chanroble s virtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

This is the second time that the herein party litigants have come to
this Court on basically the same causes of action affecting the same
deed of sale with real estate mortgage covenanted between
them. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary

In Rodrigo Enriquez, et al. vs. Socorro A. Ramos (G.R. No. L18077,


September 29, 1962), the plaintiffs-appellants averred that on
November 24, 1958 they sold to the defendant-appellee Socorro A.
Ramos 20 subdivision lots in Quezon City for the sum of P235,056
of which only P35,056 had been paid 'The balance of P200,000 was
to be liquidated within two years from the date of the execution of
the deed of sale, with interest at six percent for the first year and
twelve percent thereafter until fully paid. To secure the payment of
that balance, the defendant-appellee executed in the same
document a deed of mortgage in favor of the vendors on several
parcels of land variously situated in Quezon City, Pampanga and
Bulacan. The deed of mortgage embodies certain stipulations which
the plaintiffs-appellants invoked, thus:

During the term and existence of this mortgage, the Mortgagor shall
duly pay and discharge, at her expense, and on their maturity, all
lawful taxes or assessments levied or assessed upon the mortgaged
property: in default thereof the Mortgagee may pay and discharge
such taxes of assessments and insure the security of the property,
and any and all sums so paid by the Mortgagee shall be repayable
on demand with interest at per annum and be a lien or. the
property herein mortgaged. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary

xxx xxx xxx chanroble s virtual law l ibrary

If for any reason the mortgage cannot be registered, then the whole
obligation shall immediately become due and demandable. chan roble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rtua l law li bra ry
In the event that the Mortgagor should fail to pay the amount
secured this mortgaged or any part thereof in accordance in that
terms an I conditions herein set forth, or should she fail to perform
and of the conditions stipulated herein, the Mortgage shall have the
right ... to foreclose this mortgage extra-judicial and to that end
that Mortgagee is hereby appointed the attorney-in-fact of the
Mortgagor with full power of substitution, to enter upon and take
possession of the mortgagee property without the order of any
court or any `authority other than that herein granted, and to sell
and dislike of the same to the highest bidder at public auction after
the publication of notice, in accordance with the provisions of Act
No. I5 of the Philippine Legislature, as amended.

According to the plaintiffs-appellants in L-18077, the defendant-


appellee violated the terms of their agreement in the following
respects: chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

1. Inspite of repeated demands, the defendant-appellee refused to


pay the sum of P200,000 within the stipulated period; chanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

2. The mortgage, on the Bulacan property was never registered


and chanroble s virtual law lib rary

3. The realty tax for 1959 on the lots mortgaged were not paid by
the defendant-appellee. cha nro blesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law lib rary

This Court upheld the findings and conclusions of the trial court
which ruled that the actual price of the lots sold to the defendant-
appellee was only P185,056 instead of P235,056, and that only if
and when the roads shall have been constructed pursuant to the
ordinances of Quezon City "may the period of two years specified in
the contract begin to run." These conclusions arrived account of a
private deed entitled "Explanation" in which the plaintiffs- appellants
certified that of the consideration of P235,056 appearing in the
questioned deed of sale for mortgage, P50,000 "represent
contribution of his Socorro A. Ramos for the construction of roads,
which we will undertake in accordance with the provisions of the
City Ordinances of Quezon City." chanroble s vi rtual law lib rary
With reference to the non-payment of the 1959 realty tax and the
non-registration of the mortgaged Bulacan estate, this Court held
that "aside from being minor matters, the appear sufficient,
explained in the brief of defendant- appellee." In her in L-18077,
the defendant-appellee had stated that she applied her backpay
certificates to the payment of her realty and income taxes but as
she had not yet received said certificates the payment of the taxes
was delayed. On the other hand the registration of the Bulacan
property could not be Under taken because it was then still
registered in both her name in the name of co-owner. The
defendant-appellee promised that she would pay the taxes in due
time and undertake the needed segregation and the annotation of
the lien of the mortgage on the Bulacan property as soon as the
vendors proceeded with the construction of the roads on the
purchased lots. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rychan rob les virtua l law lib rary

Now returning to the case at bar, the plaintiffs-appellants charged


on May 4, 1963 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon
City) that the defendant-appellee has not yet paid the sum of
P200,000 despite the fact that the roads on the questioned lots
were completed on May 9, 1960; that the mortgage on the Bulacan
property has not yet been registered; and that the realty taxes
corresponding to the years 1959 to 1963 on the mortgaged lots had
not been paid.chanro blesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law libra ry

The defendant-appellee admits that she has not paid the realty
taxes and has not registered the mortgage on the Bulacan property,
but argues that in L-18077 these matters were considered minor
ones and also sufficiently explained by her, invoking the rule of res
judicata. The defendant-appellee likewise does not dispute her non-
payment of the sum of P200,000; she contends, however, that the
roads have not yet been completed in accordance with Ordinance
No. 2999 of Quezon Cities the pertinent portions of which state:

SEC. 10. The following subdivision improvements shall be


contracted or provided in accordance with the plans and/pr
specifications as adopted by the Administrative Agency. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry
(a) Street paraments. - All streets shall be paved. Waterbound
macadam pavements on a suitable base shall be considered the
minimum standard or pavement that shall be used. chanroblesvi rtua lawli brary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

(b) Curbs and gutters. - All streets shall be provided with concrete
curbs and gutters. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary

(c) Filling. - The subdivision shall be filled up to the grade as may


be required by the Administrative Agency. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rtua l law li bra ry

(d) Drainage facilities. - The subdivision shall be provided with


adequate drainage facilities as approved by the Administrative
Agency. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rtua l law li bra ry

(e) Tree Plantings. - The subdivider shall plant and grow shade
trees, if none are yet existing for the purpose of this requirement,
on the side or sides of every lot adjacent to streets about three (3)
meters from the street line, with a maximum spacing of en (10)
meters. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rtua l law li bra ry

(f) Water facilities. - The subdivider shall provide the subdivision


with adequate water facilities.

According to the defendant-appellee, the roads in question cannot


be considered completed because the plaintiffs-appellants have not
yet planted trees nor put up water facilities as required by the
foregoing ordinance. Neither may said roads be considered
completed in the legal sense until their construction has been
accepted by the Capital City Planning Commission which was
designated to implement Ordinance 2969. Moreover, even if the
roads in question have already been constructed in accordance with
the mentioned ordinance. still her obligation to pay the sum of
P200,000 has not yet arisen as no previous notice and demand for
payment has been made on her. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virt ual law li bra ry

We find the posture of the defendant-appellee to be untenable. chanroble svi rtualawl ib raryc hanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

1. It is true that in L-18077 this Court held that the non-payment of


the 1956 realty tax as well as the non-registration of the mortgaged
Bulacan estate by the defendant-appellee were minor matters aside
from being sufficiently explained by her. That pronouncement,
however, should be taken in the light of the environmental,
however, should be taken in the light of the environmental,
however, should be taken in the light of the environmental milieu
under which L-18077 was decided. The non-payment of the realty
tax for a year and the non-registration of the mortgaged property
within a reasonable time after the execution of a contract may be
considered minor matters, particularly where, in addition, the failure
to do so was sufficiently explained, and the mortgagor promised this
Court that positive remedial action would be taken. The opinion of
this Court cannot however be taken as a license for the continued
non-fulfillment by the defendant-appellee of her contractual
obligations. It was far from the intention of this Court to allow or
enable the litigants to utilized its decision as an instrument whereby
solemnly covenanted obligations could be avoided. In such
situation, the continued obligations could be avoided. In such
situation, the continued violation by the defendant appelle of the
express terms of her contract can no longer be countenanced. As it
is, not only has the defendant-appelle failed to perform the
mentioned obligations, but she has likewise entirely failed to deliver
to the plaintiffs-appellants the sum of P50,000 which she promised
to contribute to the latter for the construction of the roads on her
lots in accordance with the ordinances of Quezon City. The deed of
sale with mortgage makes it the express duty of the defendant-
appellee to pay the realty taxes on the mortgaged lots, to register
the mortgaged estates, and to contribute P50,000 for the
construction of roads on the purchased lots. By its express terms, if
the defendant-appelle failed to fulfill these conditions her entire
obligation was to become immediately due and demandable and the
mortgage would have the option to foreclosure the mortgage. These
terms of the contract have the force of law between the parties
thereto. 1
chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

2. On the issue of whether the construction of the questioned roads


has already been completed in accordance with the ordinances of
Quezon City, evidence adduced below sufficiently supports the
plaintiff-appellant's position. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary
At the trial below, the plaintiffs-appellants adduced the testimonies
of two witnesses, Oscar Delfin and Atty. Gelacio L. Dimaano
(plaintiffs-appellants' counsel). Delfin testified that he was a
construction superintendent of Wendel Construction Co., Inc. which
was contracted to open up roads on the lots in question; that his
outfit undertook the building of the said roads in accordance with
the ordinances of Quezon City, having laid out "type B gutters,
concrete curbs, pavement made of Vituminous macadam asphalt;"
that construction commenced on November 2, 1959 and was
completed on May 9, 1960 for the sum of P100,000 which has
already been paid by the plaintiffs-appellants; that while the
construction was in progress, the defendant-appellee visited the
worksite two or three times and inspected the work being done; and
that the certificate of turnover of the roads was given by the
president of his firm to the plaintiffs-appellants. Dimaano, in the
main, corroborated Delfin's testimony, and added that under the
mentioned deed of sale with mortgage, the attorney's fees in case
of litigation would be 10% of the amount due. chanroble svirtualawl ibra rycha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

At the trial below, the defendant-appellee, pursuant to a partial


stipulation of facts, presented a letter dated May 9, 1963 of the
Acting City Engineer of Quezon City which states the following:

This is in reply to your letter dated May 3, 1969 requesting


inspection of the Mindanao Avenue Subdivisions, Quezon City, in
which you have purchased thirty-one (31) lots. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

In that connection, I wish to advise you that an ocular inspection


has already been made by a representative of this Office and his
report points out that said subdivision is already provided with curbs
and gutters together with drainage facilities. The roads have already
been asphalted but no final test, verification and approval have
been undertaken by this Office. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary

It was revealed also that water and lighting system have not yet
been installed thereat.

In connection with the aforequoted letter, the parties stipulated that


the "test, verification and approval mentioned in Exhibit 1-A is
required only when the roads of the subdivision and easements are
to be donated to the city Government, and there is no law as to
when the roads of any subdivision are to be donated (to the) City
Government." This stipulation was arrived at after the counsel for
the defendant-appelle had conferred with a representative of the
Quezon City Engineer's Office.chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

On the basis of the foregoing items of evidence, not contradicted by


the defendant-appelle, the completion of the roads in question must
be regarded as having been sufficiently established. chanroblesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

3. The defendant-appellee, however, argues that the said roads "are


not yet completed in the technical, legal sense. This is because the
final say or acceptance by the Administrative Agency was not yet
secured." This posture is inordinately technical and also is devoid of
merit. There is nothing at all in Ordinance 296!) of Quezon City
which makes the acceptance by the said agency a condition
precedent before a street in Quezon City may be considered
constructed in accordance with Ordinance 2969. chanroblesv irtualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

4. The planting of trees and the installation of water facilities


required by section 10 of Ordinance 2969, supra, which the
defendant-appellee says must first be made before the roads in
question may be considered legally completed are matters which
could not have been conceivably within the contemplation of the
parties. In the first place, these activities involve a substantial
outlay of funds which, by its very nature, should have been
unavoidably referred to in the mentioned "Explanation." In the
second place, the said requirements are imposed on the subdivision
owner, and it is obvious from this decision in L-18077 that it was
the defendant-appellee who intended to develop the purchased lots
into a subdivision. this said in L-18077:

We find no error in the conclusion reached by the court a quo for


indeed that is the condition to be expected by a person who desire
to purchase a big parcel of land for purposes of subdivision. In a
subdivision the main improvement to be undertaken before it could
be sold to the public is feeder roads as otherwise it would be
inaccessible and valueless and would offer no attraction to the
buying public. And so it is correct to presume, as the court a
quo did, that when the sale in question was being negotiated, the
construction of roads in the prospective subdivision must have been
uppermost in the mind of defendant for her purpose in purchasing
the property was to develop it into a subdivision ...

In the third place, no evidence has been adduced which would show
that the planting of trees and the putting up to of water facilities
were within the contemplation of the parties when they were
negotiating for the purchase of the lots in question. And in the
fourth place, there is nothing in Ordinance 2969 which would
indicate that a street may be considered completed water facilities
are built on the subdivision. These activities are definitely
segregable from the laying out and construction of roads and cannot
be deemed included within the scope of the latter. chanroble svirtualawl ibra rycha nrobles vi rtual law lib rary

5. As to be alleged lack of previous notice completion and demand


for payment, the filing of the case below is sufficient notice to the
defendant-appellee of the completion of the roads in question and of
the plaintiffs-appellee's desire to be paid the purchase price of the
questioned lots. The effect of such demand retroacts to the day of
the constitution of the defendant-appellee's obligation. Thus, Article
1187 provides the "The effects of a conditional obligation to give,
once the condition has been fulfilled, shall retroact to the day of the
constitution obligation..." The contacted obligation of the defendant-
appellee under the facts of the case at bar was to pay the balance
of P200,000 within two years from the date the roads in question
are completed. chanro blesvi rtu alawlib ra rychan roble s virt ual law lib rary

Accordingly the order of the court a quo dated December 3, 1963 is


set aside, and judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant-
appellee to pay to the plaintiffs-appellants, within ninety (90) days
from the finality of this decision, the following : chanro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

1. The sum of P200,000 representing the unpaid balance of her


contractual obligation; chanrobles vi rtua l law lib rary

2. Interest thereon, as stipulated in the deed of sale with mortgage,


at the rate of 6% per annum from May 9, 1960 up to May 9, 1961,
and, thereafter, 12% interest per annum until the principal amount
shall have been fully paid; cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry
3. An amount equivalent to 5% of the mortgage indebtedness of
attorney's fees; and chanroble s virtual law l ibra ry

4. The costs. chanroblesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law li bra ry

Should the defendant-appellee fail to pay the aforementioned


mortgage indebtedness within the period granted in this decision,
and the properties mortgaged shall be sold at public auction and the
proceeds thereof shall be applied to the satisfaction of this
judgement and the costs of the auction sale. Costs against the
defendant-appellee. The motion of Guillermo N. Pablo "to join
defendant-appellee as co-party" is den

Rodrigo Enriquez Et. Al. vs. Soccoro Ramos


March 17, 2016

Case Digest

G.R. No. L-23616 September 30, 1976

Rodrigo Enriquez, Aurea Soriano de Dizon and Urbano Dizon, Jr., plaintiffs-appellants,

Vs.

Socorro A. Ramos, defendant-appellee.

Castro, C.J. :

Facts:

On November 24, 1958 Enriquez and spouses Dizon sold to Ramos 20 subdivision lots
in Quezon City for the sum of P235,056 of which only P35,056 had been paid. The
balance of P200,000 was to be liquidated within 2 years from the date of the execution
of the deed of sale, with interest at 6% for the 1st year and 12% thereafter until fully
paid. To secure the payment of that balance, Ramos executed in the same document a
deed of mortgage in favor of the vendors on several parcels of land variously situated in
Quezon City, Pampanga and Bulacan. The deed of mortgage embodies certain
stipulations which Ramos invoked. But according to the appellants the defendant
violated the terms of their agreement in the following respects:

The defendant refuse to pay the sum of P200,000 within the stipulated period.
The mortgage on Bulacan property was never registered and,
The realty tax for 1959 on the lots mortgage were not paid by the defendant.
Ramos admit that she has not paid the realty taxes and has not registered the mortgage
on Bulacan property but argues that it was a minor ones and still her obligation to pay
the sum of P200,000 has not arisen as no previous notice and demand for payment has
been made and according to her the road is not completed because the appellants have
not yet planted trees nor put up water facilities as required by the ordinance.

The court held that the non-payment of 1959 realty taxes as well as the non-registration
of the mortgaged on Bulacan estate by the defendant were minor matters. On the issue
of the completion of road the appellant adduced the testimonies of 2 witnesses that the
road was completed on May 9, 1960 in accordance with the ordinances of Quezon City
and there is nothing in Ordinance 2969 which would indicate that a street may be
considered completed with water facilities are built on the subdivision and these
activities are definitely segregable. As to be alleged lack of previous notice completion
and demand for payment, the filling of the case is sufficient notice to the defendant of
the completion of the roads in question and of the appellee’s desire to be paid the
purchase price of the questioned lots.

Issue: Whether or not Ramos should pay her balance to Enriquez and spouses Dizon
even though she is not yet fully satisfied with her demand?

Ruling: Yes, the effect of such demand retroacts to the day of the constitution of the
defendant obligation as it was stated in Art. 1187 provides that “THE EEFECTS OF A
CONDITIONAL OBLIGATION TO GIVE, ONCE THE CONDITION HAS BEEN
FULFILLED, SHALL RETROACT TO THE DAY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
OBLIGATION.” her demand on the road is already considered completed and the filling
of the case against her is sufficient notice to her therefore she is obligated to pay her
balance of P200,000 to the appellant’s within 2 years from the date the roads in
question are completed.

S
elacio L. Dimaano for plaintiffs-appellants.
Vicente K. Aranda for defendant-appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: chanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

libra ry
This is an action for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rtua l law

It is alleged that on November 24, 1958 defendant


purchased from plaintiffs 20 parcels of land located in Quezon City
and covered by transfer certificates of title for the amount of
P235,056.00 of which only the amount of P35,056.00 was paid on
the date of sale, the balance of P200,000.00 being payable within
two years from the date of sale, with 6% interest per annum during
the first year, and the remainder to draw 12% interest per annum if
paid thereafter, provided that at least P100,000.00 should be paid
during the first year, otherwise the whole unpaid balance would
become immediately demandable; that to secure the payment of
the balance of P200,000.00 defendant executed a mortgage in favor
of plaintiffs upon the 20 parcels of land sold and on a half interest
over a parcel of land in Bulacan which was embodied in the same
deed of sale; that said deed of sale with mortgage was registered in
the Offices of the Registers of Deeds of Quezon City and Pampanga;
and that as defendant broke certain stipulations contained in said
deed of sale with mortgage, plaintiffs instituted the present
foreclosure proceedings. chanro blesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law lib rary

Defendant set up as affirmative defense that the contract


mentioned in the complaint does not express the true agreement of
the parties because certain important conditions agreed upon were
not included therein by the counsel who prepared the contract; that
the stipulation that was omitted from the contract was the promise
assumed by plaintiffs that they would construct roads in the lands
which were to be subdivided for sale on or before January, 1959;
that said condition was not placed in the contract because,
according to plaintiffs' counsel, it was a superfluity, inasmuch as
there is an ordinance in Quezon City which requires the construction
of roads in a subdivision before lots therein could be sold; and that,
upon the suggestion of plaintiff's counsel, their promise to construct
the roads was not included in the contract because the ordinance
was deemed part of the contract. Defendant further claims that the
true purchase price of the sale was not P235,056.00 but only
P185,000.00, the difference of P50,000.00 being the voluntary
contribution of defendant to the cost of the construction of the roads
which plaintiffs assumed to do as abovementioned. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

After the reception of the evidence, the trial court sustained


the contention of defendant and dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the action of plaintiffs was premature. It found that
plaintiffs really assumed the construction of the roads as a condition
precedent to the fulfillment of the obligation stipulated in the
contract on the part of defendant, and since the same has not been
undertaken, plaintiffs have no cause of action. In due time, plaintiffs
have appealed. chan roble svirtualawl ibra rycha nrob les virtua l law lib rary

The evidence of record discloses the following facts: On


November 6, 1966, plaintiffs entered into a contract of conditional
sale with one Pedro del Rosario covering a parcel of land in Quezon
City described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1148 which has a
total area of 77,772 square meters in consideration of a purchase
price of P10.00 per square meter. To guarantee the performance of
the conditions stipulated therein a performance bond in the amount
of P100,000.00 was executed by Pedro del Rosario. Del Rosario was
given possession of the land for development as a subdivision at his
expense. He undertook to pay for the subdivision survey, the
construction of roads, the installation of light and water, and the
income tax plaintiffs may be required to pay arising from the
transaction, in consideration of which Del Rosario was allowed to
buy the property for P600,000.00 within a period of two years from
November 6, 1956 with the condition that, upon his failure to pay
said price when due, all the improvements introduced by him would
automatically become part of the property without any right on his
part to reimbursement and the conditional sale would be
rescinded.chanroble svi rtualaw lib raryc han robles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Unable to pay the consideration of P600,000.00 as agreed


upon, and in order to avoid court litigation, plaintiffs and Del
Rosario, together with defendant Socorro A. Ramos, who turned out
to be a partner of the latter, entered into a contract of rescission on
November 24, 1958. To release the performance bond and to
enable defendant to pay some of the lots for her own purposes,
plaintiffs allowed defendant to buy 20 of the lots herein involved at
the rate of P16.00 per square meter on condition that she will
assume the payment of P50,000.00 as her share in the construction
of roads and other improvements required in the subdivision. This
situation led to the execution of the contract of sale Exhibit A
subject of the present foreclosure proceedings. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

The main issues closed in this appeal are: (1) Is the


purchase price of the 20 lots bought by defendant from plaintiffs the
sum of P185,000.00, as claimed by defendant, or P235.056.00, as
claimed by plaintiffs?; and (2) Was an oral agreement, coetaneous
to the execution of the contract of sale, entered into between the
parties to the effect that plaintiffs would undertake the construction
of the roads on the lots sold before defendant could be required to
comply with her financial obligation?chanroble s virtual law l ib rary

Defendant contends that the contract of sale Exhibit A does


not express the true agreement of the parties because certain
important conditions agreed upon were not included therein by
plaintiffs' counsel among which is the promise assumed by plaintiffs
that they would undertake to construct the roads that may be
required